

EMPTY RHETORIC OR GENUINE EFFORT?

EVALUATING THE POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF RAPID REACTION FORCES IN PREVENTING CONFLICT

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Written by:

KRISTINE ST-PIERRE

MA Candidate, 2nd year

Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

Carleton University

Ottawa, Canada

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to examine the discourse surrounding the need for rapid reaction forces and the reality of the international community's rapid reaction capability. This reality is exposed through an assessment of NATO and EU rapid reaction forces, and their potential effectiveness as mechanisms of conflict prevention. The paper argues that rapid reaction forces can serve as valuable tools for conflict prevention and that military reform is in fact required for such forces to be effective. However, political will and support for investing in military capabilities and for undertaking out of area operations remain major impediments to the effectiveness of these forces in practice. Following these findings, the paper points to the broadening of the concepts and application of rapid reaction. The paper also explores the role of Canada within a new international strategic environment, and more specifically, within the context of both organizations.

The time has come for all of us to take practical responsibility to prevent the needless loss of human life, and to be ready to act in the cause of prevention and not just in the aftermath of disaster.

– The Responsibility to Protect, 2001

But the key message, from my point of view, is this: the one thing no society can afford is a loss of security. Proper investment in defence is a small, and reasonable price to pay to insure the freedom and the safety that we enjoy today.

– NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, 11 June 2001

[T]he status Quo and too often empty rhetoric must make way here for a new and pragmatic multilateralism measured by concrete results, not simply by promises.

- Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin, 16 September 2005

I. INTRODUCTION

The last decade has seen an increased awareness of the need for conflict prevention. For one, the failures to prevent such conflicts as those witnessed in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo brought to the forefront questions regarding the international community's capacity and willingness to respond to deadly conflict. Secondly, the 1990s, and potentially more so in the 21st century, saw a growing recognition by all actors of the changing nature of the international security environment in which internal conflicts and terrorist attacks are ever more relevant. In a direct response to these concerns, the notions of preventive action and rapid response are slowly gaining grounds and acceptance.

The concept of conflict prevention is not new.¹ What is new however, is the intensity with which the international community is responding to the calls for increased preventive capacity and rapid action. In recent years, the UN has been a key proponent and advocate of conflict prevention.² The importance of prevention in the form of rapid response has also been emphasized in numerous reports.³ Recent years have further witnessed a number of initiatives by regional actors to address the preventive deficiency. These initiatives, the creation of a NATO and EU Rapid Reaction Force, differ from preventive deployment by adding the elements of rapidity and effectiveness to the concept of conflict prevention. As a member of NATO and close partner to the EU, Canada is taking advantage of the new strategic environment. Canada's International Policy Statement, *Pride and Influence in the World*, views the capacity to respond to the challenge posed by state failure as a key component of its defence strategy.⁴ Specifically, Canada's strategy highlights the role of international organizations as the basis for stability and peace within the international system.⁵ Of additional interest is the necessity for any initiative to have a "3D" approach, including defence, diplomatic, and development components.

While discussion on rapid preventive action is increasing, the trouble lies in the current disconnect between the 'why'—which addresses the political need for rapid reaction capability—and the 'how'—which addresses the mechanization of rapid reaction forces. What is even more alarming is the concern that, at a time when the idea of rapid response makes more sense than ever before, rhetoric is disguising the core issues at play: these core issues are western security and the modernization of the armed forces.

In light of the above disconnect and the mounting commitment to conflict prevention, are rapid reaction capabilities likely to be effective in preventing deadly conflict? In responding to this question, the paper seeks to illustrate whether the implied need for enhanced rapid reaction capabilities is a genuine attempt at conflict prevention or an avenue for legitimizing the reform and modernization of the military, including NATO and EU structures. The paper argues that both NATO and EU rapid reaction forces have the potential to serve as valuable tools in preventing conflict and that military reform is in fact necessary to ensure such forces are effective. However, political willingness and support for investing in military capabilities and for undertaking out of area operations remain major impediments to the effectiveness of these forces in practice. In fact, the paper points to the broadening of the concepts and application of rapid reaction. The implications of these findings on Canada's role within the context of the new international strategic environment, and more specifically within both organizations, are subsequently explored.

Sections II and III outline the current discourse surrounding conflict prevention and the need for increasing the international community's rapid reaction capability. Section IV looks at how this need has manifested itself across international organizations by specifically looking at

the NATO and EU rapid reaction forces to better understand their mechanism and potential for conflict prevention. The examination focuses on the mandate, objectives, and expectations of the organizations' respective rapid reaction force. Section V then considers whether the actual schemes are likely to be effective by assessing the viability and feasibility of the forces both in theory and empirically and by identifying their potential strengths and weaknesses. In light of these findings, section VI identifies two opportunities for Canada to strategically (re)-position itself within the international context. Finally, section VII concludes by providing a set of recommendations for policy actions.

II. CONFLICT PREVENTION

Conflict prevention, or the idea of taking early action to reduce or stop disputes from escalating, is by no means a new concept. In fact, such intents were integral parts of the establishment of the UN, the League of Nations, and the Concert of Europe.⁶ As Jentleson notes, conflict prevention is meant to “[r]educe tensions that, if intensified, could lead to war. Deal with today’s conflicts before they become tomorrow’s crises.”⁷ What is new is the international community’s renewed interest in conflict prevention.

The 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century have witnessed a growing recognition by all actors of the changing nature of the international security environment. One feature of this new environment is the predominance of internal conflicts as the principal form of violence in the world.⁸ Internal conflicts are worrisome not just because they exhibit far bloodier and devastating violence than interstate wars, but also because they tend to extend over longer periods of time and often pose greater obstacles to achieving peaceful resolutions than intrastate wars.⁹ A second feature of the new international security arena is terrorism, as it effectively challenges the confidence and assurance of the West by re-igniting the latter’s fears of diminished security.

The effectiveness, or lack thereof, of conflict prevention appears clear for the post-Cold War era: there are few examples of successful preventive diplomacy and a succession of failed preventive action and missed opportunities.¹⁰ Waiting was often assumed to be less costly than taking preventive action; however, recent events have shown the wait to be more costly than anticipated, and even more costly than if preventive action had been taken.¹¹ A study conducted by the Carnegie Commission found that whereas \$200 billion had been spent by the international community on conflict management in seven major interventions during the 1990s, as much as \$130 billion could have been saved through greater preventive action.¹² Particularly troubling are the UN experiences in complex emergencies throughout the 1990s. The failures to prevent genocide in Rwanda, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo, mass murder in East Timor, gross human rights violations in Sierra Leone and Afghanistan brought to the forefront questions regarding the international community’s capacity and willingness to respond to deadly conflict.¹³ The resurgence of violence in many countries has also provided the basis for encouraging preventive operations and for ‘seizing’ the opportunities for early action before they are ‘missed’.

Lund contends that the international community is increasingly voicing its doubts that conflict could have been avoided and questioning ‘what went wrong’ and ‘who is responsible.’¹⁴ Lund also suggests that a new international norm in support of “regular and more thorough conflict prevention” is slowly being articulated, especially in light of the international

community's growing sense of accountability for the prevention of political or man-made disasters.¹⁵ Similarly, Jentleson's assessment of the international community's past record of conflict prevention is worthy of note. He argues that opportunities for preventive action were present in all the cases looked at in *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World*.¹⁶ The evidence shows missed opportunities in Somalia, Rwanda, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, that if seized through "timely diplomatic interventions" or a "more determined international response" could have significantly limited, contained, and even prevented the conflicts.¹⁷ Evidence is also provided showing how seized opportunities in preventive action helped to avoid the intensification of conflicts in Macedonia, Ukraine, the Baltic States, North Korea, and the Congo-Brazzaville in 1993.¹⁸

Conflict prevention can occur at multiple stages of the conflict cycle. For the purpose of this research, prevention is viewed as taking place at three levels: (1) before a conflict, as measures taken in the event of a serious dispute or instability; (2) in reaction to a crisis (also referred to as crisis-preventive action); and (3) in the post-conflict period as part of an initiative to avoid the reoccurrence of armed warfare.¹⁹ While the logic of conflict prevention is widely accepted, its practice is less so. The latter varies mainly with regards to application, both in terms of the strategies used and when they are used.²⁰ The primary goal of preventive efforts is often seen as one to reduce, and possibly eliminate, the need for armed intervention. Regardless of the stage at which prevention occurs, preventive operations—whether diplomatic or military—will require different strategies. Some operations may require advanced military capabilities and sometimes the use of force.²¹ Others will find sufficient the use of special envoys or "naming and shaming."²² The stages at which forces are deployed also affect the requirements of a particular strategy.

Conflict prevention tools follow a continuum from less coercive preventive diplomatic strategies to the more robust preventive military force. Jentleson for example, uses the term preventive statecraft to convey the importance of employing a mix of preventive strategies, including the preventive uses of military force, in addition to classical forms of diplomacy.²³ Others contend that the very nature of preventive military action confines its use to 'extreme cases' only, and direct their attention at relatively non-intrusive and less coercive measures.²⁴ In the long-term, few question the need to address the root causes of conflict, including poverty, underdevelopment, and environmental stress, through effective diplomacy, development assistance, and open trade.²⁵ In short-term, however, prevention consists of addressing "potential new complex emergencies;" to help defuse or avoid conflicts.²⁶ While sanctions and diplomacy may be effective tools for short-term or crisis-preventive operations, they are sometimes not enough and may even fail to deter violence, making military tools the only adequate means of response. As Robertson asserts, effective military means and competence "remain a precondition for security in the 21st century."²⁷ Military means and competence may in effect play a vital role in establishing credibility and in contributing to political solutions.

Preventive military operations should not, however, be confused with direct military intervention. The Responsibility to Protect identifies two types of preventive military operations: (1) "preventive deployment," which involves "the positioning of troops where there is an emerging threat of conflict" to deter the escalation of a current situation into an armed conflict; and (2) the threat of military force, or the deployment of military resources without an actual intervention on the territory of the state concerned. The logic follows that "[a] robust and decisive deployment may help to deter trouble," and if either type of prevention should fail, the

operation could then be “turned into an intervention tool” by providing a rapid response capacity.²⁸ This concept of rapid reaction capability is addressed in the following section.

III. THE NEED FOR RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY

To be effective, preventive diplomacy must often be complemented by “a credible threat to act coercively through military force, economic sanctions, or other coercive strategies,” and should not be restricted to an instrument of last resort.²⁹ Following this logic, the rationale of a rapid reaction capability is clear: enable immediate force deployment when urgently needed.³⁰ The recommendations to the United Nations by the Brahimi Report are a clear restatement of that logic. The report identifies four key conditions for increasing the success of future complex operations: political support, rapid deployment, credible force, and a viable peace-building strategy.³¹ As the Panel explains “all [actors] agree on the need for the United Nations to significantly strengthen capacity to deploy new field operations rapidly and effectively.”³² The logic also follows that to respond to the challenges of the 21st Century forces need to be mobile, flexible, effective, and sustainable.³³ In other words, forces should move rapidly, adjust quickly, be robust, and be able to remain in the field for as long as required. As such, rapid reaction capability differs from preventive deployment by adding the elements of rapidity and effectiveness to the concept of conflict prevention.

The concept of rapidity refers to the question of timing. Timing is a central element of any preventive strategy, especially when attempting to prevent an emerging crisis from escalating into war or a nation from falling back into conflict.³⁴ It is generally understood that the 6 to 12 week period immediately following a cease-fire or peace accord is of utmost importance for establishing the grounds for stable peace. Credibility and political momentum become crucial factors in this period, which once lost, are difficult to regain. Indeed, instead of rapid deployment, the 1990s witnessed delays of 4-to-6 months, effectively discrediting the force.³⁵ As defined by Carment:

...failing to act in an escalating violent situation is the difference between a situation that can be contained and a humanitarian disaster that can spiral beyond control and result in thousand of people being displaced or killed. A failure to act quickly, early and decisively not only leads to conflict escalation but incriminates the Western powers directly in the ensuing violence and severely damages the legitimacy of international norms.³⁶

By contrast, the effectiveness of a response refers to the need for the right equipment for the job. As the Panel to the Brahimi Report identifies:

To be effective, the missions personnel need material (equipment and logistics support), finance (cash in hand to procure goods and services), information assets (training and briefing), and operational strategy and, for operations deploying into uncertain circumstances, a military and political “centre of gravity sufficient to enable it to anticipate and overcome one or more of the parties’ second thoughts about taking a peace process forward.”³⁷

This view also builds on the realization among professionals that action must not only be taken, but must prove to be effective. As Lund mentions, “the current challenge is no longer simply whether action is taken, but whether appropriate action is taken.”³⁸ Moreover, while the primary objective of rapid deployment is to address short-term needs, its value will also widely depend on its establishment of building blocks for future efforts.³⁹

The issue of timing also raises the question of which actors should be responsible for preventive action. The UN is undoubtedly the only international legitimate body able to establish global norms and authorize actions on behalf of the international community. Nonetheless, resistance by Member States to establish the building blocks for the UN to acquire the operational ability to deploy rapidly and effectively renders futile its future attempts to establish a complex peace operation.

Discussions over the development of UN rapid deployment capability have been underway for some time. Many proposals for a standing UN capability have been put forward in the past decade. Proposals range from a UN Legion of Professional Volunteers, to a Permanent UN Rapid Deployment Brigade, to a Standing Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force, and a UN Standing Emergency Group.⁴⁰ The perceived advantages of such a UN standing capability were offered in a 2002 study by Peter Langille examining the options for enhancing UN rapid deployment. Most importantly, it was assumed that the development of UN rapid deployment capability would positively address the lack of political will, the gap between the UN commitment to prevent and protect versus the reality of its capacity, and the time between the passing of a UN mandate and the deployment of a force ready to operate. Despite these and other potential benefits, the implementation of such force remains elusive due in most part to the absence of broad political support by the majority UN Member States.⁴¹ Constrained by this context, the UN has tried to avoid the issue while concentrating on strengthening other areas of peacekeeping. Doing so, however, has direct implications on conflict prevention operations, both in terms of their deployment and their effectiveness.

The UN ability to respond rapidly and effectively to emerging crises has also been impeded by the recognition that the UN does not wage war. As a result, enforcement actions have increasingly been relegated to regional organizations or coalitions of willing states, following authorization by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. Recent examples of rapid deployments include the British forces’ joint rapid reaction force (JRRF) to Sierra Leone in May 2000, the EU Rapid Reaction Force (using NATO assets) in Macedonia under Operation Concordia in March 2003, and the French-led Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in May 2004; and to a lesser extent, the deployment of SHIRBIRG, the Multinational Stand-by High Readiness Brigade, to Ethiopia and Eritrea in January 2000, and to Sudan in 2005.⁴² While the case of Sudan may be too early to assess, the four other cases clearly demonstrate the value of effective, modern forces in preventing the further escalation of conflict (DRC, Sierra Leone and Macedonia), or in averting a recurrence of violence (Eritrea and Ethiopia).

Given the constraints placed on the UN, the development of regional organizations is gaining acceptance as the preferred option for Western defense establishments. NATO and the EU are the only organizations with a definite rapid deployment capacity, thus warranting their examination.⁴³

IV. NATO & EU Rapid Reaction Forces

As mentioned above, regional organizations have taken on an increasingly important function with respect to conflict prevention.⁴⁴ In 1999, NATO approved the creation of a rapid reaction force. More recently in 2004, EU members agreed to the creation of their own rapid reaction force. This section specifically looks at the NATO and EU reaction forces as a means to better understand the reasoning behind their development and their potential for conflict prevention. The comparison focuses on the role, objectives, and expectations of the organizations' respective rapid reaction forces.

NATO Response Force (NRF)

Established in 2002, the NATO Response Force (NRF) was devised with the intention to respond to imminent threats such as ethnic tensions, terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction. As early as 2004, the force was operational and ready for deployment. In the words of NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, "The NRF will be, and indeed it is already, a highly ready and technologically advanced force that the Alliance can deploy quickly wherever it is needed."⁴⁵ The NRF can achieve deployment in a matter of five days and can sustain itself for one month. Its role is to provide a fully integrated and interoperable force with sea, land, and air capability, and because it is a standing force, it does not require mobilization making it available for immediate deployment.⁴⁶

In accordance with the principle of 'first force in, first force out,' the NRF follows various missions ranging from the deployment of a stand-alone force for collective defense or for a crisis response operation, to support for disaster consequence management, humanitarian crisis situations and counter terrorism operations. For instance, "[t]he presence of this force, during a humanitarian crisis (...) could help stabilize a situation before it escalates and might even bring about the conditions for an eventual political settlement without a significant loss of life occurring first."⁴⁷ Other missions include the deployment of an immediate force to allow for a subsequent larger contingent, or to act as a credible force (in support of diplomacy if need be) with the goal of deterring imminent crises and forestalling conflict.⁴⁸ As the force is established to 'respond' to imminent crises, it is in essence taking crisis-preventive actions and conducting short-term preventive operations.

Whereas the new threats to international security evoked in the previous sections posed serious risks and challenges to the international community, these provided key opportunities for the NATO Alliance to embark on an ambitious transformation and modernization program of its military structures.⁴⁹ While talks were initiated in the mid-1990s, the program was set in motion at the Prague Summit in November of 2002. The new endeavours serve two central aims: high combat-readiness and capability transformation.⁵⁰ The former implies a rapid reaction force ready for deployment when needed; the later refers to the NRF's role as a catalyst for further improvements in capability and longer-term development. The idea of rapid reaction was a new concept, which had first been tested with the deployment of the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) in Bosnia in 1995.⁵¹ The acknowledgment of the new threats also allowed for the expansion of the NATO mandate to include out of area missions. Originating from both these changes is the clear perception within the Alliance that the NRF—with its agility, flexibility, credibility, and global reach—"is instrumental in transforming NATO into a much stronger and more effective military alliance with world wide influence."⁵²

The recognition that new threats require new forces to confront them stems from an even earlier reality. The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of NATO's conventional threat directly challenged the Alliance's very existence in a post-Cold War world. It was not long, however, before new threats were identified to which effective responses were sought. As a result, NATO became engaged in various crisis-response operations and saw its scope extend further and further afield, from operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina to Afghanistan and Iraq, and to providing support for the Olympic Games and European Football Championships in Greece. In contrast to the forces operational during the Cold War, forces today "have to be agile, proactive and maneuverable on the battlefield with no clear front lines."⁵³ With this perspective in mind, the NRF is like no other international force in that it has the unique ability to organize, mobilize, and provide resources for major military operations. The force further builds on new changes to the military structure, including a common military approach among NATO partners, the unity of the command structure, and clearer communications within the chain of command.⁵⁴

These new developments and recognition of the need for expanding security and stability "when and where necessary" appear to provide an effective tool for preventing conflict. The Alliance's ability is unmatched by any other force, and makes the NRF a unique and crucial player in a wide range of missions, including humanitarian operations, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, as well as missions of direct actions such as forced intervention. However, this reasonable faith in NATO forces may be overstated; it assumes NATO is able to deliver on all counts, with the right number of forces and capabilities and at the right time. Effective action by NATO is constrained by the need to obtain parliamentary approval before troops can be deployed, effectively questioning the preventive capacity of a NRF deployment. In addition, the NRF also requires individual countries to have the force structure and capability necessary to deploy troops rapidly and be sustainable on the battlefield. It is thus interesting to note that the very transformation of NATO military structures necessitates the active participation of member countries, and perhaps most importantly their unanimous willingness to undertake key changes and improvements.

Unfortunately, commitments still come short of the military forces and capabilities necessary for the NRF to be truly effective. In addition, it remains unlikely that the NRF will be deployed in areas of limited security interest to the North Atlantic Council, NATO's main decision-making body. While it is understandable that missions be determined on a case-by-case basis—irrespective of geographical location—the power to decide still lays in the hands of its members.

EU Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF)

The role of the EU Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) is to respond to international crises by undertaking military operations. The focus is on short-term crisis prevention and management; however, there is confusion over what tasks should be included as part of the latter. Article 17(2) of the 1997 Treaty on the European Union incorporates "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking."⁵⁵ The force could also be deployed as an immediate force before UN peacekeepers are ready to deploy.⁵⁶ The ERRF is intended to take two months to deploy and must be able to sustain military forces of up to 60 000 persons for at least one year. While two months is far from qualifying as rapid reaction—in fact, some argue two months leaves ample time for crises to

spiral into full-scale wars—the EU is also working towards being able to deploy 1000 police in one month, as well as smaller civilian contingents that could deploy even more rapidly.⁵⁷

The ERRF does not serve to replicate NATO, but provides for additional avenues for preventing and responding to conflict, specifically by responding to crises where NATO is not engaged militarily. As noted by Lindborg, “The ERRF’s purpose will be to intervene in crises before they become full-scale wars, and to release NATO from participating in some military interventions.”⁵⁸ The ERRF deploys at the request of either the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the United Nations.⁵⁹ While it is not intended to deploy at the request of NATO, the force may still make use of NATO assets and capabilities. In contrast to NATO, the ERRF is not a defensive alliance, nor does it attempt to create a European standing army.

As with NATO, the end of the Cold War has had profound consequences for EU security.⁶⁰ While the EU benefited from NATO during the Cold War, it now felt compelled to build its own security strategy. The strategy would not only strengthen the EU integration process, but also increase EU capabilities and decision-making, both of which would contribute to a more autonomous EU.⁶¹ As part of the strategy, the need for an ERRF came as a direct response to the perceived weakness of EU military capability in light of the new international security environment. Two events are said to have prompted the reconsideration of defense spending and military capabilities: the Kosovo crisis and the attacks of September 11, 2001.⁶² For one, the Kosovo crisis of 1998-1999 exposed Europe’s weakness in its capacity to respond to international crises and effectively undermined its strategic role in the international system. The crisis also confirmed what should have been learned almost a decade earlier during the Gulf War: that most European states did not have the capacity to project credible force outside their borders. The stark realizations led EU leaders to conclude at the Cologne European Council in June 1999 that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises....”⁶³ The terrorist attacks and ensuing War on Terror have since given greater emphasis to the need for a European capacity to be able to respond to conventional threats as well as non-conventional ones.⁶⁴

In addition, mounting criticism on the part of US leaders regarding Europe’s failure to do enough in times of crises and their ailing military capability and coordination also proved efficient in advancing change in the EU. In particular, the war on Kosovo exposed Europe’s missing capabilities in surveillance, all-weather precision munitions, and stealth technology, though most disturbing was that troops were deployed slowly and with great difficulty.⁶⁵ Pressure has also been felt within Europe. In a June 2001 speech, then NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson acknowledged that other options are needed besides that of NATO and called on Europe to provide a capability to respond when the US or NATO does not. He followed by admitting that “[i]n the post-Cold War world, there is simply no guarantee that the US, or NATO as an organization, will wish to get involved in each and every security crisis in and around Europe.”⁶⁶ In light of NATO potential reluctance to get involved, the EU must ensure it has the capacity to respond to impending crises if necessary and prevent further escalation of conflict.

In this regard, the ERRF could in fact provide an effective tool for preventing conflict, particularly where NATO is not involved. Yet, it is worthy to note that the debate surrounding the development of an ERRF has focused primarily on questions of capabilities, or the “nuts and bolts,” while leaving policy questions to the side.⁶⁷ Capability shortfalls of EU armed forces pertain to the key areas of Deployability and Mobility, Sustainability and Logistics, and

Command Control and Infrastructure.⁶⁸ Moreover, according to the 2003 study *Equipping the Rapid Reaction Force – Options For and Constraints on a European Defense Equipment Strategy*, “the ability to provide an integrated approach to preventing and managing violent conflict is perhaps the single greatest challenge facing the EU.”⁶⁹ This challenge is also that of NATO and the UN. Indeed, it is only recently that defense policies started to shift from the Cold War standard of large and heavy-platform armies to smaller, lighter and more easily and rapidly deployable forces which have proven necessary for responding to the crises of the 1990s.

Just as the NRF, the ERRF requires individual countries to have the force structure and capability necessary to deploy troops rapidly and be sustainable on the battlefield, and most specifically, the willingness to invest in these key changes and improvements. Deployment will necessarily also be constrained by political will and strategic interests of member states. Moreover, investment in military capabilities will be challenging considering the attention and focus of EU citizens on socio-economic issues rather than defense. Nonetheless, the ERRF seems to portray a genuine will for conflict prevention. The following quote by Lindborg merits attention.

At the very least, however, the ERRF is an expression of political will which acknowledges that tragedies such as those in the Balkans fall partly under the responsibility of other Europeans nations. Once the ERRF is up and fully running, its mere existence hopefully will help institutionalize the obligation to react to crises and to help prevent the abdication of political responsibility that leads to deadly delays in action.⁷⁰

While the appearance of a genuine will to prevent conflict should not be overstated, it may be that Europe’s vocation, in becoming a global power, could see itself conducting out of area operations. But even with a genuine will to prevent conflict, out of area missions will not be feasible without the appropriate military capabilities and force structure. Indeed, two major lessons from Operation Artemis in the DRC was that the European actors are likely to self-impose limits on their deployments and that “the magnitude of the assets necessary for effective crisis response—[are] assets that only a world power could pull together so quickly.”⁷¹

V. ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RAPID REACTION FORCES

Based on the above, is the creation of NATO and EU rapid reaction forces likely to prove effective in preventing conflict? In other words, what is the driving force behind the need for such capability? Are rapid reaction forces simple rhetoric in that the forces serve the goal of reforming and modernizing the armed forces? Or are they part of a genuine effort to prevent large-scale humanitarian crises and other such atrocities, violence and destruction? From the previous section, it is possible to identify a number of factors that help to explain the need for these forces.

First and foremost, there is no denying that rapid reaction forces are driven by the changing nature of the strategic environment. Following that logic, the development of RRFs by NATO and the EU make perfect sense. The argument holds that states are failing, increasing the potential for internal conflicts and terrorist attacks, and as a result, the need to react rapidly.

Operating in the new strategic environment no longer requires huge regiments; today's forces are much smaller and more conventional, and specifically aligned towards rapid intervention.

The creation of RRFs may also portray the general trend observed throughout the 1990s of reforming the army and military structure. Indeed, with the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the West's main enemy, most Western states were questioning the necessity for continued investment in the military. The types of forces used to fight the Cold War were no longer a requirement, and thus armies required a new justification. However, as the need for smaller and easily deployable forces increased, defense spending declined. Plus, these forces are not new; they already existed—albeit under a different name—and were for the most part equally sophisticated. For example, the NATO force existed under the name 'immediate land mobile deployment' and was employed in Bosnia in 1995. What then is the implication of creating, or formalizing these new forces? Are RRFs a substitute for something else? Does the creation of RRFs allow NATO and EU members to invest money where it would otherwise not go?

What is evident is that the development of RRFs is part of an ongoing process of reorganization of the military structure and professionalization of armed forces both within NATO and the EU. More so, the fact is that this reorganization and restructure is crucial for ensuring rapid and sustainable deployment and should be viewed as a significant accomplishment.⁷² In addition, while rapid reaction capability existed beforehand, the new forces differ in that they are more apt at deploying promptly and in a wide range of environments. Perhaps of most importance is the new forces' added interoperability, as different member troops train together as opposed to individually.⁷³

The creation of a distinct EU force alongside that of NATO also raises questions as to the motives behind the force. Indeed, the ERRF has been criticized on the basis that the force may take away from NATO's ability to undertake effective actions, as both organizations are using the same forces and resources. Then again, it seems more reasonable to argue that EU and NATO RRFs will be mutually reinforcing, and that a strong EU force will actually strengthen NATO. Arguably, if the goal is to reorganize and reform military structures, it may just be easier to convince EU citizens to invest in their own EU security and defence (through the ERRF thus investing in NATO indirectly) than to invest in NATO directly.⁷⁴

The investigation of the rationale for creating reaction forces also raises the question of where these forces will deploy. Both the NRF and ERRF operate in almost the same geographic area and are comprised of almost the same members, with the obvious exception of the US. In what kind of strategic environment will these forces deploy? To which types of crises will these forces respond? There are no clear answers to these questions. The strategic deployment environment is a delicate issue where a range of particular interests either join to form alliances or collide in the face of the overall organization. Furthermore, out of area operations present a weaker link with collective defense and cannot be agreed upon as easily as areas of immediate strategic interest.⁷⁵ The threats are more diffuse and less evident, thus rendering the decision-making process between member states much more laborious.

With respect to NATO, one possible option is for deployment to occur when and where requested by a member state. The concept of alliance is important, especially considering the expansion in recent years of both NATO and EU membership. This expansion may effectively increase the immediate region of interest; however, the significance of this extension remains to be seen. Regardless, one could make the case that NATO assets are in Iraq, thus, why not in other places? With regards to the EU, the Balkan region remains an area of strategic interest, as demonstrated by the deployment of the ERRF (using NATO assets) in Macedonia under

Operation Concordia. There are also talks of replacing NATO forces in Kosovo as the region becomes less of a strategic concern.⁷⁶ Furthermore, there are suggestions that Africa could be a potential future area of deployment, as was demonstrated by the British JRRF in Sierra Leone in 2000 and the French-led Operation Artemis in the DRC in May 2004. However, as the current security and humanitarian situation in the Darfur region of Sudan keeps deteriorating, it seems appropriate to ask why such force is not being deployed. In fact, the International Crisis Group (ICG) has argued that in the short-term, “a multinational bridging force will be the only solution to tackle Darfur’s most urgent protection needs,” and that “NATO would appear to be the best equipped organization to provide, and lead, the additional troops required in the necessary numbers and within the necessary time-frame.”⁷⁷ Whether non-intervention by NATO and EU forces is a result of their involvement in other areas, their limited capacity, or other factors, out of area operations remain a central debate to both forces.

In the end, ICG President Gareth Evans may be right in stating that “Only a partnership of diverse military, civilian and humanitarian actors -- including the AU, EU, NATO, UN, and NGOs -- will succeed in providing an adequate degree of protection for the civilian population and laying the foundation for a secure environment and a stable peace.”⁷⁸

VI. OPPORTUNITIES FOR CANADA

The effectiveness of NATO and ERRF as tools of conflict prevention is real, but it is contingent on the strategic and sustainable nature of the military reform of their members. Furthermore, providing political will remains limited, the forces are likely to be deployed where direct security interests are at stake. As a result, the effectiveness in practice of both the NRF and ERRF not only requires member countries to ensure they have the force structure and capability necessary for rapid troop deployment and sustainable action on the battlefield, but a willingness to undertake these changes and to take part in deployment initiatives. As a member of NATO and a close partner to the EU, these findings present Canada with a dual opportunity for action: the opportunity of enhancing command and operational capabilities within the framework of international organizations, and that of advancing the country’s foreign policy goals with respect to failed and failing states.

The first opportunity is identified in the context of both NATO’s and the EU’s programs of modernization and transformation of military structures. Canada must take the opportunity created by this momentum of change to address its own command and operational capabilities. As a matter of fact, Canada is already taking advantage of the new strategic environment. As part of its new International Policy Statement, *Pride and Influence in the World*, the Canadian Government wants to ensure Canadian interoperability with other member states under both organizations. In fact, within the IPS is a pledge to fully support the NATO reorganization and transformation process, as well as the NRF, and a commitment for continued work with the EU to ensure future Canadian participation in its missions.⁷⁹ As Carment argues, such improvement of “Canadian operational level leadership capacity in coalition and alliance operations has the potential to directly improve Canada’s capacity to influence international operations in an independent and effective manner.”⁸⁰ This advantage could arguably allow Canada a stronger voice, and perhaps a stronger manifestation of the Canadian interests.

The second opportunity is best viewed in the context of the Statement’s overarching theme: the focus on failed and failing states, and the emphasis on rapid response.⁸¹ As part of the

statement, the Canadian Government identifies the capacity to respond to the challenge posed by state failure as a key component of Canada's defence strategy.⁸² This commitment to helping failed and failing states is crucial in that it reasserts the goals of the NRF and ERRF, and further justifies Canadian involvement in missions undertaken by both forces. The commitment is also of importance in that it recognizes the necessity for any initiative to have a "3D" approach, involving the three components of defence, diplomacy, and development.

These two opportunities not only provide Canada with the ability to strategically (re)-position itself within the international context, particularly within NATO and EU structures, but also constitute significant steps toward closing the gap between rhetoric and reality, and bringing willingness closer to capacity.

Nevertheless, just as NATO and the EU, Canada cannot be everywhere at the same time, and as a result, will be required to "prioritize which regions of the world are of strategic interest and where Canada can make the greatest impact."⁸³ Doing so will inevitably involve a certain discrimination against areas of lesser security concern, making a strong case for increasing support of the United Nations. Perhaps as a testament to this logic, Canada's strategy highlights the role of international organizations as the basis for stability and peace within the international system.⁸⁴

VII. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The objective of this research paper was to evaluate whether rapid reaction forces are likely to be effective in preventing conflict. At a time when the idea of rapid response makes more sense than ever before, it is essential to understand the challenges and opportunities presented by these forces, if improvements are to be made.

The above analysis clearly demonstrates that the NATO and EU rapid reaction forces may serve as effective tools in responding to conflict based on the forces' stated rapidity, deployability, sustainability, as well as their force structure, coordination, and interoperability. However, the forces will remain constrained by a lack of political will, restricting their deployment to areas demonstrating a direct and tangible security threat. The fact is that preventive action will only be likely when political will is present. As Jentleson notes, "Almost every study of preventive statecraft concludes that when all is said and done, the main obstacle is the problem of political will."⁸⁵ Lund further contends that pressing for preventive action is no longer sufficient when confronted with nascent conflict situations; what is needed, is the political wisdom and the will of international actors to undertake these actions.⁸⁶

Equally significant is the fact that the effectiveness of RRFs in practice will also depend on the willingness of states to invest in their military capabilities and improve their armed forces. While the rationale behind the creation of RRFs may be to a certain extent driven by military zeal and fervor for structural reform and modernization in a post-Cold War world, military capabilities are nonetheless an essential component of conflict prevention. Rapid reaction forces will only be effective to the extent they are supported by a robust and credible military structure, and the necessary equipment and organization. To this regard, the analysis also gives credence to the notion that military reform is necessary, not to say critical, to ensure such forces are effective, and as such, alleviates the concern that rapid reaction forces provide an avenue for legitimizing the reform and modernization of the military. The effectiveness of RRFs in preventing conflict and crises will likely depend on the willingness of states to invest in defense

and security, and improve their military capabilities and armed forces. This will be a great challenge, especially for EU member states, whose population is increasingly more preoccupied with socio-economic issues. While this challenge may not be so different in Canada, the response may prove otherwise.

The shortcomings of both the NRF and ERRF in conflict prevention may indeed present Canada with the opportunity to strategically (re)-position itself within the international context, including NATO and EU structures. While strategic interests will remain a crucial criteria defining Canadian deployment, this re-positioning could arguably lessen the gap between empty rhetoric and a genuine effort at conflict prevention.

The previous discussion warrants making an important distinction between the NRF and ERRF. While the NRF may prove more operationally capable, it appears unlikely that the force will extend to areas of little or no strategic interest to the NATO member states, especially the United States. By contrast, the ERRF has already deployed to Africa. Although strategic interests were a major if not the main factor in the decision to deploy, the initiatives could set a precedent for future deployments in the region. As it stands however, the EU's small capacity could effectively end up dictating what can and cannot be done.

Finally, and as a corollary of the above findings, the paper points to the broadening of the concepts and application of rapid reaction. It may be that the greatest impact will not come from conventional forces, but from the deployment of regional forces equipped with rapid reaction capability. These go beyond NATO and EU forces to include such regional forces as the African Union Standby Force (ASF) and ECOWAS Standby Brigade (ECOBRIg), as well as national forces such as the British forces' joint rapid reaction force (JRRF), and the Canadian Standing Contingency Task Force.

In conclusion, the paper makes two recommendations directed specifically at the international community with the goal of increasing the latter's capacity and effectiveness in preventing conflict.

First, to increase the effectiveness of RRFs to prevent conflict, it is essential that members of both NATO and the EU firmly commit to their respective organization's RRF.⁸⁷ This commitment entails pressuring for greater political will and support to allow for larger investment in defense and security and for undertaking out of area operations. Close cooperation between both NATO and EU forces will be critical for avoiding duplication and the inefficient allocation of resources. Likewise, a close working relationship could further provide the EU with the necessary resources (by using NATO assets) to conduct out of area operations, mainly to Africa.

Second, the international community should encourage the creation of regional forces with rapid deployment capabilities such as the African Union Standby Force (ASF) and ECOWAS Standby Brigade (ECOBRIg). Regional forces have definite advantages. The UN, acting on behalf of the international community, should provide greater resources and funding to these forces, and ensure they are fully operational, and militarily and structurally adequate for the missions they undertake.

In the meantime, however, NATO and or EU forces should act as supporting forces to address the immediate needs on the ground.

Only by guaranteeing a strong commitment to both the NRF and ERRF, and by taking firm steps to help in the development of new regional forces, will conflict prevention in the form of rapid response become an accepted practice.

Notes

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- ¹ Michael Lund, "Creeping Institutionalisation of the Culture of Prevention?," in *Preventing Violent Conflict: The Search for Political Will, Strategies and Effective Tools*, The Report of the Krusenberg Seminar, 19-20 June 2000; ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect: Supplementary Volume*, Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2001.
- ² ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect: Supplementary Volume*; see also Boutros Boutros-Gali, *An Agenda for Peace*, New York: United Nations, 1992, para. 23; Kofi Annan, the UN millennium Report, "We the People": The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, New York: United Nations, 2000; Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, New York: United Nations, 2000, para. 33.
- ³ Such reports include The Brahimi Report: A Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 2000. Available at <http://www.un.org> (accessed 12 February 2005); the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *The Responsibility to Protect Final Report and Supplementary Volume*, Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2001; Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *Preventing Deadly Conflict – Final Report*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997.
- ⁴ David Carment, "Effective Defence Policy for Responding to Failed and Failing States," Research Paper Series, Calgary: Canadian Defense & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2005, 7.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁶ ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect: Supplementary Volume*.
- ⁷ Bruce Jentleson, "The Realism of Preventive Statecraft," in *Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion?*, eds. David Carment and A. Schnabel, New York: UN University Press, 2003, 43.
- ⁸ Daniel L. Byman, *Keeping the Peace: Lasting Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002, 2.
- ⁹ Byman, 2.
- ¹⁰ ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect: Supplementary Volume*, 27.
- ¹¹ Jentleson, "The Realism of Preventive Statecraft," 31.
- ¹² ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect: Final Report*; Carnegie Commission, *Preventing Deadly Conflict – Final Report*. The seven major interventions are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, the Persian Gulf, Cambodia and El Salvador. For other assessments of the costs of conflict management versus prevention see Michael E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance, eds., *The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena*, Landham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999.
- ¹³ Peter Langille, *Bridging the Commitment–Capacity Gap: Existing Arrangements and Options for Enhancing UN Rapid Deployment*, Geneva: Center for UN Reform Education, 2002, 17.
- ¹⁴ Lund, 24.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁶ Jentleson, "The Realism of Preventive Statecraft," 28. See also Bruce Jentleson, ed., *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999. The book examines 10 case studies from the 1990s: Croatia-Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya, Macedonia, Congo (Brazzaville), Russia-Latvia/Estonia, Russia-Ukraine, North Korea.
- ¹⁷ Jentleson, "The Realism of Preventive Statecraft," 28-29.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁹ *The Responsibility to Protect: Supplementary Volume* provides a useful categorization of conflict prevention measures. They are "structural prevention," "early prevention," "late prevention," and "post-conflict peace building;" these also follow a continuum from "long-term structural measures" to "short-term, crisis management actions." For the purpose of this research and its focus on rapid deployment, the paper only addresses the last three types of prevention. See ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect: Supplementary Volume*, 32.
- ²⁰ Lund describes current international conflict prevention as "still hit-and-miss" and as being mainly driven by "evanescent agendas" and "political accidents, funding and sentiments," 25. See also ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect Final Report and Supplementary Volume*.
- ²¹ Robertson.
- ²² ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect: Supplementary Volume*, 38.

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- ²³ Jentleson, "The Realism of Preventive Statecraft."
- ²⁴ ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect: Final Report*, 45.
- ²⁵ See speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, "European Defence: Challenges and Prospects," NATO Speeches, 11 June 2001. Available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010611a.htm> (accessed 16 March 2005). See also ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect: Supplementary Volume; The Brahimi Report*.
- ²⁶ *The Brahimi Report*, 6.
- ²⁷ Robertson, 3.
- ²⁸ ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect: Final Report*, 57-58.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, 38-39.
- ³⁰ Peter Langille, "Preventing Genocide: Time for a UN 911," *Globe and Mail* (Ottawa), 19 October 2004. Available at <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/reform/2004/1019timefor.htm> (accessed 16 February 2005).
- ³¹ *The Brahimi Report*.
- ³² *Ibid.*
- ³³ Robertson.
- ³⁴ "Developing a Rapid Deployment Capability: An Old Idea for Troubled Times," Council for a Livable World. Available at <http://www.clw.org/archive/un/rapreac.html> (accessed 13 March 2005).
- ³⁵ Gabi Baramki, Gerard Toulouse, and Peter Langille, "Report on Working Group 3 International Cooperation and Human Security," 53rd Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs (Nova Scotia), 17-21 July 2003. Available at <http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac53/wg3.htm> (accessed 13 March 2005).
- ³⁶ David Carment, "Effective Defence Policy for Responding to Failed and Failing States," 21.
- ³⁷ *The Brahimi Report*, 15.
- ³⁸ Lund, 27.
- ³⁹ Langille, *Bridging the Commitment–Capacity Gap*.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁴² On Britain's JRRF see "Britain's military Joint Rapid Reaction Forces gets new communications network," *PublicTechnology.net*, 14 February 2005. Available at <http://www.publictechnology.net> (accessed 13 March 2005). On Operation Concordia see Alexander B. Abele, *The EU Rapid Reaction Force and Operation Concordia in Macedonia*, Vienna: University of Vienna, 2002. Available at http://www.juridicum.at/component/option,com_docman/task,cat_view/gid,100/ (accessed 13 March 2005). On Operation Artemis see "Ituri Challenges World's Conscience," *United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*. Available at <http://www.una-uk.org/africa/iturichallenge.html> (accessed 13 March 2005). On SHIRBRIG see "Backgrounder: The Origins and Status of SHIRBRIG," *Canadian Forces Website*, 16 December 2002. Available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=500 (accessed 29 January 2005).
- ⁴³ While NATO and the EU are the only two Western defense establishments to have preventive capacity, other organizations are considering the development of rapid deployment as a means to respond to conflict, including the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring (ECOMOG).
- ⁴⁴ Jentleson, "The Realism of Preventive Statecraft."
- ⁴⁵ NATO, "NATO Response Force: Deploying Forces Faster and Further Than Ever Before," NATO Briefing, January 2005, 2. Available at <http://www.nato.int> (accessed 12 February 2005).
- ⁴⁶ NATO, "The NATO Response Force – NRF," *SHAPE Issues*, 2005. Available at http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shpape_nrf/nrf_intro.htm (accessed 29 January 2005).
- ⁴⁷ NATO, "Taking NATO's Partnership Forward," *NATO Review*, Spring 2004. Available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue1/english/military.html> (accessed 6 March 2005).
- ⁴⁸ NATO, "NATO Response Force."
- ⁴⁹ NATO, "Taking NATO's Partnership Forward."
- ⁵⁰ NATO, "NATO Response Force."
- ⁵¹ NATO, "The New NATO Force Structure," *International Military Staff*, 10 October 2003. Available at <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/force-structure.htm> (accessed 31 March 2005).
- ⁵² NATO, "The NATO Response Force – NRF."
- ⁵³ NATO, "Taking NATO's Partnership Forward."
- ⁵⁴ ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect: Final Report*.
- ⁵⁵ Jocelyn Mawdsley and Gerrard Quille, *Paper 33: Equipping the Rapid Reaction Force – Options For and Constraints on a European Defense Equipment Strategy*, Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2003, section 2. Available at <http://www.bicc.de> (accessed 6 March 2005).

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- ⁵⁶ BBC News, "EU Approves Rapid Reaction Force," BBC News, 24 November 2004, <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/> (accessed 29 January 2005).
- ⁵⁷ Chris Lindborg, "The EU Rapid Reaction Force: Europe Takes on a New Security Challenge," *Occasional Papers on International Security Policy*, no. 37, August 2001. Available at <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP37.htm> (accessed 13 March 2005).
- ⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.
- ⁵⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁰ Presentation by Ambassador Luc Carbonnez, Director, European Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgium, *European Security in a Changing World*, Wednesday 6 April 2005, Carleton University.
- ⁶¹ Carbonnez.
- ⁶² Mawdsley and Quille.
- ⁶³ See Abele, 5.
- ⁶⁴ Mawdsley and Quille.
- ⁶⁵ William A. Hay and Harvey Sicherman, "Europe's Rapid Reaction Force: What, Why, and How?," *Watch on the West* 2, no. 2, Luxembourg: Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 2001. Available at <http://www.fpri.org/ww/0202.200102.haysicherman.euoperapidreaction.html> (accessed 29 January 2005).
- ⁶⁶ Robertson.
- ⁶⁷ Mawdsley and Quille, 7.
- ⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, section 2.
- ⁶⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁰ Lindborg, 6-7.
- ⁷¹ Cyrus Samii, "Peace Operations in Africa: Capacity, Operations, and Implications," Report from the 34th annual Vienna Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Seminar, New York: International Peace Academy, 24 September 2004. Available at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/library/Samii_Vienna04_040924.doc (accessed 27 May 2005).
- ⁷² Personal interview with Elinor Sloan, Associate Professor of Political Science at Carleton University, conducted Tuesday 5 March 2005.
- ⁷³ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁴ Carbonnez.
- ⁷⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁷ Gareth Evans, *Darfur Needs Bolder International Intervention*, Brussels: International Crisis Group, 25 May 2005. Available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3468> (accessed on 26 May 2004).
- ⁷⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁹ *International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World—Defence*. Ottawa, 2005, 26.
- ⁸⁰ Carment, 30.
- ⁸¹ See Carment.
- ⁸² David Carment, "Effective Defence Policy for Responding to Failed and Failing States," *Research Paper Series*, Calgary: Canadian Defense & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2005, 7.
- ⁸³ Carment, 10.
- ⁸⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁸⁵ Jentleson, "The Realism of Preventive Statecraft," 33.
- ⁸⁶ Lund.
- ⁸⁷ Canada's Standing Contingency Task Force, for example, is one such effort toward rapid response to emerging crises. According to the *International Policy Statement*, the Task Force "will be ready to deploy with 10 days' notice, and provide an initial Canadian Forces presence to work with security partners to stabilize the situation or facilitate the deployment of larger, follow-on forces should circumstances warrant." See *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World—Defence*.