

Canada, the US and Human Security –  
The Use of Rhetoric in Foreign Policy Making

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Human security is an approach to security focused on the protection of the individual, determining variables that challenge the human condition, including personal and violent insecurities to individual survival. Canada has ascribed to a ‘human-centred’ foreign policy, compared to other states like the US which has a decidedly non-humanitarian approach to its role in the international system. Despite this distinction, this does not assume that Canada is a ‘purely’ humanitarian international actor, nor does it assume that the US is exclusively self-interested. Rather, this leads to the question investigating the relationship between stated policy and the operationalization of this rhetoric in intervention situations.

Therefore, the central question driving this research asks: does the foreign policy rhetoric of the United States and Canada determine their international action as human security actors? To investigate the difference in human security rhetoric and action of these states, this paper will look contrast the involvement of both Canada and the US in the interventions in Kosovo and Afghanistan.

For a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between foreign policy rhetoric, human security and state actions, it is important to compare these two case studies of Kosovo and Afghanistan at several levels of analysis. First, at the domestic level, comparison must span over the course of the Liberal and Conservative governments to address the criticism that ‘human security’ was a Liberal government phenomenon. It will be seen in the Canadian interventions, that the Liberal government

used human security rhetoric to justify its involvement in both Kosovo and Afghanistan. Since the election of the Conservative government in 2004, the mission in Afghanistan has been operationalised similarly as under the Liberals. The central difference asks if both governments follow human security actions during intervention, then what does this say about national rhetoric in foreign policy?

Second, at the state-level, the comparison must take into account the actions and rhetoric of more than one country to indicate a pattern in the national rhetoric with foreign policy practice. An example shows why this is important: assuming that Canada uses 'human security' rhetoric and follows through in policy contrasted to the United States which claims national security concerns for its engagement, but performs similar operations in the field, what does this say about Canada's national rhetoric? Therefore, it is a key element of this paper to compare these two states in their policy.

Finally, these two cases are compared to assess the structural changes in the international system. Intervention in Kosovo occurred in the post-Cold War period, under the auspices of a 'friendly' international system, where states were freed from the constraints of the figurative battle between the United States and the Soviet Union. Afghanistan, on the other hand, is a reaction to the terrorist attacks in the United States of September 11, 2001. It is in this time that analysts argue that the international system has returned to the realist model of 'self-help' and 'national security.'<sup>1</sup> If this investigation

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<sup>1</sup> For example please see: Glenn H. Snyder, "Mearsheimer's World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security" *International Security* 27:1, (2002), 167-173; Flynn, Stephen E, "America The Vulnerable" *Foreign Affairs* 80:1, Jan/Feb2002, 60-75. Robert Keohane, The Globalization of Informal Violence, Theories of World Politics, and the "Liberalism of Fear" *Dialog-IO*, Spring 2002, 29-43.

finds that state action does not change between Kosovo and Afghanistan, can it be argued that structural constraints of the system have changed how states interact?

*Background: Kosovo*

Under Tito, the province of Kosovo existed as an autonomous region of Greater Serbia. In 1989, Slobodan Milosevic was elected President of Serbia, and began to introduce controls on the existence of the autonomous provinces of Montenegro, Vojvodina, and Kosovo.<sup>2</sup> While the other two provinces had a high concentration of Serbians, Kosovo was the only province to have a majority of ethnic Albanians. After his election in 1990, Milosevic attempted to consolidate power in his own hands by controlling the votes of Montenegro, Vojvodina, and Kosovo in the federal legislature and for that purpose dissolved the Kosovar legislature.<sup>3</sup> Finding this unacceptable, the leadership in Kosovo formulated their legislature and by July 1990, declared independence from Serbia in July 1990.<sup>4</sup> In the time period between 1990 and 1995, Serbian forces, led by Milosevic, responded to this declaration through economic, legal, and violent means, as Albanians were displaced from jobs, villages were razed, and people killed. However, other than a few isolated incidences, the ethnic Albanian population largely resisted against this Serbian oppression through Gandhian forms of peaceful protest.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> For details of the Kosovo intervention please see: BBC, 1999., Booth, 2001., Butler, 2000., DiPrizio, 2002., Jokic., NATO, 2005., UK., 1999., Schnabel and Thakur, 2000., UN, 1998, 1999.

<sup>3</sup> Jokic, Aleksandar eds. Lessons of Kosovo: The Dangers of Humanitarian Intervention. Toronto: Broadview Press, 2003. p. 5-6.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Carrie Booth Walling, "The History and Politics of Ethnic Cleansing". In Ken Booth eds. In The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimentions. Portland: Frank Cass Publishing, 2001. p.48-65, 119.

The breaking point for this adherence to peaceful protest occurred during the negotiation of the Dayton Accord ending the Bosnian conflict. More specifically, international community refused to investigate and negotiate the humanitarian abuses occurring in Kosovo during the Dayton Accords. Much of the Kosovar leadership looked to the international community for support against human rights abuses that were perpetrated by Serbian forces, but with Milosevic being heralded for the success of Dayton, this expectation grew less realistic.<sup>6</sup> Seeing no other methods to end the oppression by Serbia, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was formed in 1995. 1996 onwards, there was a large increase in the numbers of violent interactions between Serbian forces and the KLA, as the KLA adopted terrorist activities for their violent protest, such as kidnappings and ambushes; and the Serbian forces responded with increased violent action.<sup>7</sup>

However, the crackdown by Serbia did not only foster violent oppression; but Albanians were also subject to economic apartheid.<sup>8</sup> Jobs were forcibly terminated, as Serbian authorities passed laws that cost hundreds of thousands of Albanians their jobs, homes, and fundamental freedoms. One report notes that by 1998, 70 per cent of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo were unemployed, and were forced to resort to black market dealings to make ends meet.<sup>9</sup> Also, road blocks were setup to confiscate transfer of money from outside Kosovo. These actions ultimately set the stage for the beginning of the mass refugee movement at the start of 1998.

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<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> Some estimate that 20,000 – 50,000 Albanians were killed between 1996 and 1998.

<sup>8</sup> Alex J. Bellamy, “Human Wrongs in Kosovo: 1974-1999”. In Ken Booth eds. In The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimentions. Portland: Frank Cass Publishing, 2001. p.116.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

Between February and October 1998, an estimated 2000 Albanian civilians were killed by Serb forces. During the same timeframe, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees estimated that over 600,000 refugees had left Kosovo and fled into neighbouring countries such as Albania and Macedonia.<sup>10</sup> This large scale movement prompted the international community to respond, however the United Nations Security Council was deadlocked over intervention into Kosovo. A resolution to intervene was not even tabled by the UNSC, as Russia, due to its long-time ties to Serbia, promised the Council that it would veto any proposal for intervention into Kosovo.

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1199 was accepted on September 23, 1998 and stated: “(The UNSC) Demands that all parties, groups and individuals immediately cease hostilities and maintain a ceasefire in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” and furthermore stated “(The UNSC) Calls upon Member States and others concerned to provide adequate resources for humanitarian assistance in the region and to respond promptly and generously to the United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance Related to the Kosovo Crisis”.<sup>11</sup> This resolution - because of the possibility of the Russian veto - did not state an ‘or else’ clause that allowed for the use of force to address violations of this resolution. However, an ‘or else’ clause was interpreted into the resolution by NATO, and prompted the security alliance to issue “an ACT WARN for both a limited air option and a phased air campaign in Kosovo.”<sup>12</sup> NATO’s ACT WARN in the event that ethnic cleansing did not

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<sup>10</sup> United Nations High Commission for Refugees. “Kosovo Emergency Updates”. 7 Apr 1999. <[www.unhcr.ch](http://www.unhcr.ch)>. (15 March 2005).

<sup>11</sup> United Nations Security Council . “UNSCR 1199”. 1998. <<http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1199.htm> > (17 March 2005).

<sup>12</sup> NATO. “Statement by the Secretary General following the ACTWARN decision”. 2004. <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p980924e.htm>>. (12 March 2005).

stop in Kosovo, resulted in a series of peace talks between Milosevic and President Clinton's special envoy to Yugoslavia Richard Holbrooke.<sup>13</sup> On October 18, 1998, Holbrook and Milosevic were able to come to agreement for the withdrawal of 5000 Serbian soldiers and allowed 2000 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) unarmed observers into Kosovo, who were deployed in late November of 1998.<sup>14</sup>

NATO's second threat for air strikes came in January 1999, after the Racak massacre, which killed 45 Albanians and exacerbated the refugee movement out of Kosovo.<sup>15</sup> In February of 1999, ambassadors from NATO countries, including US secretary of state Madeline Albright, KLA representatives and Serbian representatives met to discuss Kosovo's autonomous status. These talks, which resulted in the Rambouillet Accord, were completed on Feb 19, 1999 and were meant to establish an agreement deadline of March 15, 1999.<sup>16</sup> By the deadline date, the KLA had signed the Accord, but the Serbian government had not. In response, Milosevic called for the full implementation of "Operation Horseshoe" which was the Serbian plan for the complete ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians from the province of Kosovo. Milosevic's declaration resulted in a removal of the OSCE forces from Kosovo and the beginning of the air strikes of strategic targets on March 24, 1999. These strikes, originally planned for "a few days", continued for approximately seventy-seven days as Milosevic refused to end Operation Horseshoe. Over eleven weeks, 800,000 more civilians were displaced

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<sup>13</sup> United States, "Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report". Report to Congress. 31 January 2000. Found at <<<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/kaar02072000.pdf>>>. (10 March 2005). P. 52.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>16</sup> United Kingdom, "Kosovo: Rambouillet Accords - Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo". February 23 1999. Found at: <[http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/rambouillet\\_text.htm](http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/rambouillet_text.htm)>. (10 March 2005).

and thousands were killed by both the air raids and the continued attack vis a vis Operation Horseshoe.<sup>17</sup>

Criticisms of NATO's techniques have focused largely on the military strategy that was chosen for Operation Allied Force. First, there was no ground troops used in Kosovo over the course of the operation. Instead, anywhere from 24,000 to 40,000 troops were stationed along Kosovo's borders and at refugee camps in neighbouring countries.<sup>18</sup> Because of this strategic decision, Milosevic's forces were able to continue the process of ethnic cleansing as outlined by Operation Horseshoe, as there were no ground forces to protect civilians from Serbian attack.<sup>19</sup> Second, the use of air strikes was also deemed to endanger the lives of non-combatants. The air force was mandated to maintain a height of over 15,000 feet, as opposed to the 10,000 feet that was standard in operations. Scholars have argued that anything higher than 10,000 feet makes targets undistinguishable, such as civilian automobiles from armored vehicles and combatant vehicles.<sup>20</sup> Another effect of the use of air strikes was that they exacerbated the flow of refugees out of Kosovo into neighbouring states. It is estimated that approximately 800,000 refugees fled Kosovo in the duration of air strikes to their end in June 1999.<sup>21</sup>

The Kosovo intervention is an important case for several reasons: first, the threat of a Russian veto in the Security Council made UN intervention a non-possibility. Rather, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) became the international body

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Please see footnote 64.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Martin Aguera, "Air Power Paradox: NATO's 'Misuse' of Military Force in Kosovo and its Consequences". *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 12:3 (Autumn 2001). P. 124

Marjorie Cohn, "The Myth of Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo" in Jokic, Aleksandar eds. Lessons of Kosovo: The Dangers of Humanitarian Intervention. Toronto: Broadview Press, 2003. p 121

<sup>21</sup> Jim Whitman, "The Kosovo Refugee Crisis: NATO's Humanitarianism versus Human Rights". In Ken Booth eds. In The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimentions. Portland: Frank Cass Publishing, 2001. p.169-172.

intervening on the basis of the ‘responsibility to protect’<sup>22</sup> in the ethnic cleansing situation. Second, it could be argued that Kosovo was the most successful humanitarian intervention launched in the Post-Cold War period. NATO intervened in Kosovo, with the goal of ending the ethnic cleansing and bringing Slobodan Milosevic to trial and accomplished both tasks. The end of the ethnic cleansing campaign was a direct result of the NATO air strikes and peacemaking. A third important element of the Kosovo campaign was the type of military engagement used to counter the Serbian forces. The use of strategic air strikes was a method of peacemaking that had not been used in previous humanitarian interventions as systematically as it had in Kosovo.

#### *Background: Afghanistan*

Afghanistan has been a battleground for major powers for over thirty years. Within the Cold War itself, it provided the backdrop for a long-drawn war between the USSR and the mujahadeen for close to ten years.<sup>23</sup> Once the USSR began its retreat, the international community lost its interest in the country, and civil war ensued within Afghanistan until 1994, when the Taliban emerged with a stronghold in the country, controlling more than 90 per cent of Afghanistan territory.<sup>24</sup> Since taking power in 1994, the Taliban have enforced stringent rules on its population, in the name of Islamic law and tradition. These include the extreme suppression of women’s rights, banning music, radio, dancing, educational facilities and other activities understood to be against Islam.

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<sup>22</sup> ‘Responsibility to Protect’ is a term coined by International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty document: *The Responsibility to Protect*.

<sup>23</sup> The Mujahadeen are seen to be Afghani freedom fighters.

<sup>24</sup> BBC News, “Country Profile: Afghanistan” September 16 2006.

<[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/country\\_profiles/1162668.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/country_profiles/1162668.stm)>. October 10, 2006.

In addition to these societal rules, the Taliban also allowed members of the *al Qaida* terrorist network to reside and train within Afghanistan's borders.

Since then, on September 11, 2001 nineteen members of the *al Qaida* terrorist network, based in Afghanistan, conspired and executed the plan to hijack and drive planes into the Pentagon, the White House and the World Trade Centre in New York City. The reaction was swift and precise, with the United States and United Kingdom launching Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) against both the Taliban and *al Qaida* in Afghanistan within less than a month of the initial attack.<sup>25</sup>

On September 20, 2001, the President Bush of the United States made several demands for the Taliban government of Afghanistan:

Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al-Qaida who hide in your land; release all foreign nationals -- including American citizens -- you have unjustly imprisoned, and protect foreign journalists, diplomats, and aid workers in your country, close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to appropriate authorities; give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating.<sup>26</sup>

Without an adequate response from the Taliban, the United States and the United Kingdom began a strategic air bombing campaign under the premise of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The focus was to destroy terrorist training camps, seek and detain *al Qaida* suspects, and target Taliban military equipment and supply centres. Within two weeks, the OEF coalition air strikes had destroyed most of the Taliban's air capabilities, strategic sites and supply centres. This being said, the problem found by the

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<sup>25</sup> Global Security, "Operation Enduring Freedom: Afghanistan" 2006.

<<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm>> October 10, 2006.

<sup>26</sup> United States, White House, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," September 20, 2001, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>> (Oct 15, 2006).

US-led intervention was the lack of ground support for the air campaign, which made Taliban destruction increasingly difficult.<sup>27</sup> Instead of having American and British troops fight Taliban members, they were training and supplying anti-Taliban United Front (UF) fighters to conduct combat operations.<sup>28</sup> An additional challenge faced by the United States was the ambiguous support from Pakistan.<sup>29</sup> This was particularly important as reinforcements from Pakistani training camps joined the war to assist Taliban fighters against the UF. Regardless, by December, OEF forces had taken control of Kandahar airport and also introduced an Afghanistan interim government. Careful precaution was taken during the initial stages of the intervention not to destroy or harm civilian infrastructure.

In January 2002, the US was joined by several allies including Canada and New Zealand. The states involved in Afghanistan are involved in the reconstruction of Afghanistan under several different organizational auspices. In addition to the Operation Enduring Freedom, in December 2001, the United Nations Security Council resolution 1389 authorized a 5,000-troop International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to enter Afghanistan. The auspices of the UN-mandate included a six-month term to “assist the Afghan Interim authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding

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<sup>27</sup> Carl Conetta, “Strange Victory: A critical appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Afghanistan war” PDA Research Monograph #6, 30 January 2002. Found at: CIAONET, <<http://www.ciaonet.org.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/wps/coc20/coc20a.html#txt44>>

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<sup>29</sup> Pakistan’s pledge to a partner on the War on Terror started immediately after the attacks in New York, however the January 12, 2002 televised policy announcement was the first institutional response of its kind. George Perkovich, “External Factors: Facilitating Military and Political Stability in South Asia,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 15:2, 2002, 290-2; C. Raja Mohan, “Musharraf vows to stop infiltration: Armitage,” The Hindu. June 7, 2002. Found at: <http://www.hinduonnet.com/2002/06/08/stories/2002060804470100.htm>, (April 10, 2006);

areas.”<sup>30</sup> Since this initial conception, control of ISAF transferred from the United Kingdom to NATO and has had its mandate time period extended until October 2007.<sup>31</sup>

Recently on October 5, 2006, in addition to its control of both the North and Western regions, ISAF took control over Eastern Afghanistan, to begin overseeing the nine Provincial Reconstruction Teams in the region. Countries working under Operation Enduring Freedom are also leading PRTs, with the United States controlling the bulk, including Canada and New Zealand controlling one each. The PRT is a recent military establishment created by the United States to “improve security and to facilitate reconstruction and economic development throughout the country.”<sup>32</sup> For example, the Canadian PRT in Kandahar has been in theatre since August 2005, composed of development workers, military forces, diplomats, and civilian police.<sup>33</sup> It is working under the mandate “. . . to extend the authority of the Afghanistan government in Kandahar province by promoting local stability and security, improving local governance structures, and engaging in reconstruction activities.”<sup>34</sup> Each PRT is designed with the region in mind, assessing on a needs-basis the proportions of civilian and military staff needed within each mission. Canada’s mission in Kandahar is notably one of the more dangerous regions in the country. There are large strongholds of Taliban, local warlords and affiliated terror groups operating in the region. Recognize that despite the premise of

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<sup>30</sup> United Nations Security Council . “UNSC 1386 (2001)”. 2001.

< <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm> > (17 October 2006).

<sup>31</sup> United Nations Security Council . “UNSC 1707 (2006)”

< [http://www.un.org/docs/sc/unsc\\_resolutions06.htm](http://www.un.org/docs/sc/unsc_resolutions06.htm)>

<sup>32</sup> United States, Department of State, “Fact Sheet: Provincial Reconstruction Teams” January 31, 2006

<<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/60085.htm>> (10 October 2006).

<sup>33</sup> Canada, “Canada's Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar Province,” June 2006, <[http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/prov\\_reconstruction-en.asp](http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/prov_reconstruction-en.asp)> (October 15, 2006).

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

the PRT to develop and reconstruct parts of Afghanistan, PRTs are in the process of war-fighting as the region must be secured before development begins.

Since the initial intervention within Afghanistan, the US and other states, including the NATO-based International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have made several gains within Afghanistan. Following the decisions made in the December 2001 Bonn Process, the Coalition help construct an interim Afghan government, and creation of a national Constitution by January 2004. Soon after, Afghanistan held its first set of Presidential elections in October 2004, electing Hamid Karzai with 55.4 per cent of the vote.<sup>35</sup> Following Karzai's victory, parliamentary elections were held in September 2005. Despite challenges to the transparency of the process - allegations of vote-rigging and corruption at the polls – the National Parliament was announced in December 2005. In January 2006, Afghan leaders, the Afghan government representatives of OEF, UN and ISAF met for the London Conference for Afghanistan. The delegation met to formalize a new stage in the rebuilding process of the country, to set out another plan after the expiration of the Bonn Process in September 2005. This meeting resulted in The Afghanistan Compact, which details the path for the Afghan government for the next five years and in three key areas; Security; Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights; and Economic and Social Development.<sup>36</sup> More specifically, these pillars narrow down to topics such as border security, counter-narcotics, education, health, and judicial development. One of the challenges facing the OEF and ISAF is the training of over 45,000 troops for the Afghan army, 67,000 police officers and other related staff.

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<sup>35</sup> BBC News, "Country Profile: Afghanistan" September 16 2006.  
<[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/country\\_profiles/1162668.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/country_profiles/1162668.stm)>. October 10, 2006.

<sup>36</sup> United Kingdom, "The Afghanistan Compact" BUILDING ON SUCCESS  
The London Conference on Afghanistan. 31 January – 1 February 2006. Found at:  
<<http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/20060130%20Afghanistan%20Compact%20Final%20Final,0.doc>>

Another major problem facing international troops in Afghanistan is the recent resurgence of Taliban and *al Qaida* fighters within the Southern parts of the country. Provincial Reconstruction Teams, with the mandate for rebuilding the country are engaged in guerrilla-style warfare with these remnants from the old regime.<sup>37</sup> Obviously, this is a serious cause for concern, as the increased use of landmines, booby traps and suicide bombs has compromised the safety of both coalition troops and citizens. Both President Karzai and other foreign diplomats have been threatened with assassination and kidnapping, in addition to the foreign civilians working in refugee camps, non-governmental organizations and support staff for military personnel.

This problem has several identifiable causes.<sup>38</sup> First, there has been a lack of ability to close training camps and madrassas in neighbouring state, especially Pakistan. Despite President Musharaff's support for the War on Terror, there is a disconnect with Pakistan's ability to enforce closing down of terrorist-friendly cells within the country.<sup>39</sup> Second, much of the animosity also comes from previously-powerful groups that have felt isolated since the fall of the Taliban. Third, with the national economy barely functioning due to security issues, the resurgence of the opium trade within the country has allowed for militant groups to fund their anti-Coalition activities. Fourth, the resurgence of these groups have challenged the human security of several groups in the state, including women, children and the impoverished.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> ABC News, "Taliban Leader Threatens Increased Attacks" October 23, 2006.

<<http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=2600335&page=1>> October 23, 2006.

<sup>38</sup> United Kingdom, "Afghanistan: the culmination of the Bonn process" October 26, 2005. House of Commons Library. <<http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2005/rp05072.pdf>>. Oct 2006.

<sup>39</sup> See footnote 29.

<sup>40</sup> United Kingdom, "Afghanistan: the culmination of the Bonn process" October 26, 2005.

### *Meeting Rhetoric and Practice*

This study is a preliminary look at the relationship between national rhetoric and practice. As a preliminary study, it did not use a complex methodology to categorize and analyse policy-makers' rhetoric. Rather, using a collection of speeches, announcements, lectures given by the major players in policy making, this paper used key themes within policy documents and speeches to give examples of the rhetoric of these state actors. Recognizing that this is not the most systematic method of investigation, it does serve the purpose of understanding the relationship between rhetoric and foreign policy making. It should be suggested that future study in this direction will attempt to further systematise rhetorical content within government.

### *Canadian Rhetoric and Practice: Kosovo to Afghanistan*

Initiated in October 1996, the beginnings of the Ottawa Process to ban landmines highlighted Canada's adherence to human security framework as a foreign policy objective. Axworthy's vision for human security foreign policy was defined as "a people centred approach to foreign policy which recognizes that lasting stability cannot be achieved until people are protected from violent threats to their rights, safety and lives."<sup>41</sup> The focus of the Canadian definition of human security is threefold; first, it emphasises human security as the elimination of violence against the individual, second, it links its definition with human rights, third it adopts a foreign policy based view of human security. Therefore, in 1998, the ethnic cleansing of Albanians from Kosovo provided a clear case for the invocation of human security justification of the intervention. Canada's

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<sup>41</sup> Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs. "Canada's Human Security Website". <<http://www.humansecurity.gc.ca>>. 2003. (10 Oct 2004).

position on humanitarian intervention stated, that “when conditions warrant coercive should diplomacy be used in the pursuit of the human security agenda.”<sup>42</sup> Therefore, it is important to recognize that Canada’s rhetorical approach to the intervention in Kosovo was human security-centred. This is argued by Lloyd Axworthy,

The well being of individuals – human security – is increasingly front and centre in how we define peace and security, where the treats originate and what our responses are. The crisis in Kosovo is a concrete expression of this human security dynamic at work.<sup>43</sup>

Interestingly, in measuring the Canadian policy rhetoric within Kosovo, Axworthy’s rhetoric is biased towards a human security framework, while Prime Minister Chrétien had a slightly more ambiguous explanation of the intervention into Kosovo. In a special debate in the House of Commons, Chrétien stated his outrage at the Milosevic regime “who are still leading a campaign of terror and destruction on innocent men, women and children in Kosovo.”<sup>44</sup> However, in contrast to Axworthy’s human security bias, Chrétien concludes that:

It is these three elements: our values as Canadians, our national interest in a stable and secure Europe and our obligations as a founding member of NATO, that led Canada to take arms with its NATO partners.<sup>45</sup>

In addition to human security, Chrétien also invokes elements of collective and international security to justify the intervention in Kosovo. These include Milosevic’s violation of “commitments to NATO and the OSCE” and his ignorance to United Nations Security Council Resolutions demanding the end of hostilities in Kosovo. He further

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<sup>42</sup> Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World* (Ottawa, 1999), p. 8.

<sup>43</sup> Axworthy, ‘Kosovo and the Human Security Agenda’, Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs, *Statements and Speeches 99/28*, 7 April 1999, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University.

<sup>44</sup> Government of Canada, Privy Council Office, “Jean Chrétien, Special House of Commons Debate” April 12, 1999. <<http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/>> October 12, 2006.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

argues that, “NATO has put into action the painful lesson we learned in the two world wars: that peace and stability can only be assured through effective collective security.”<sup>46</sup>

The most important point to consider is Canada’s dual understanding of the intervention, using both human security and international security claims to justify its role in the NATO mission in Kosovo. While this does not necessarily demean the human security impetus behind the intervention, it does draw a strong relationship between humanitarian issues and national/international security. In other words, Chrétien drew the linkage between protecting human security to ensure international security.

Therefore, an interesting comparison will be the matching of Canadian rhetoric to Canada’s *operation* in Kosovo. While under a commitment to human security, Canada’s role in Kosovo was not a stereotypical peacekeeping mission. Instead, Canada was engaged in a series of air strikes against key Serbian military targets. In support of the mission, Canada pledged over 800 ground troops and 18 CF-18/A Hornet fighter-bombers to the air-strikes led by NATO.<sup>47</sup>

For its air-strike approach, NATO came under attack by due to the intervention prioritizing risk-free strategy to humanitarianism. The air force was mandated to maintain a height of over 15,000 feet, as opposed to the 10,000 feet that was standard in operations. Scholars have argued that anything higher than 10,000 feet makes targets undistinguishable, such as civilian automobiles from armored vehicles and combatant vehicles.<sup>48</sup> This height also impeded the ability of NATO pilots to discern military from

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Hataley, T.S, Nossal, Kim Richard, “The Limits of the Human Security Agenda: The Case of Canada’s Response to the Timor Crisis.” *Global Change, Peace & Security* 16:1, Feb2004, 10.

<sup>48</sup> Martin Aguera,. “Air Power Paradox: NATO’s ‘Misuse’ of Military Force in Kosovo and its Consequences”. *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 12:3 (Autumn 2001). P. 124  
Marjorie Cohn, “The Myth of Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo” in Jokic, Aleksandar eds. *Lessons of Kosovo: The Dangers of Humanitarian Intervention*. Toronto: Broadview Press, 2003. p 121

civilian targets including a hospital and a marketplace.<sup>49</sup> Axworthy justified the NATO air-strike method through a human security lens by arguing that,

NATO's recourse to air strikes was precipitated by evidence that the regime of repression by the Serb government was on the rise and accelerating. ... NATO's air campaign should serve to dispel the misconception that military force and the human security agenda are mutually exclusive.<sup>50</sup>

This being said, there was an extensive background and research process behind Canada's contribution to the air strike campaign. Each target was carefully deciphered and given to a military legal analyst to determine the target's military or civilian nature. In cases where the legitimacy of a target came into question, Canada's Force Commander would refuse the target.<sup>51</sup>

In addition to the 78-day air strikes, Canada also committed 1,300 troops to the reconstruction and repatriation effort within Kosovo. There were three stages to the Canadian role in Kosovo. Immediately, after the air strikes, over 750,000 refugees headed back into Kosovo from neighbouring Macedonia. The initial Canadian mandate included the security and safety of returning refugees, economic reconstruction, institution-building and training. In the interim period, and associated with the rehabilitation process of states, Canada was involved as a key state in the removal of landmines from civilian areas. This proved to be an arduous task as it was later proven that Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) members were digging up and replanting Serbian anti-personnel mines.<sup>52</sup> Also, in the interim period, Canadian RCMP members were an

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<sup>49</sup> BBC News. "NATO Hits Chinese Embassy". May 8, 1999.

<sup>50</sup> Axworthy, 'Kosovo and the Human Security Agenda', Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs,

<sup>51</sup> Legault, Albert, "NATO Intervention in Kosovo: the Legal Context." *Canadian Military Journal* Spring 2000. 63-66.

<sup>52</sup> Mary Foster, "Kosovo and the 1997 Landmines Treaty" *The Ploughshares Monitor* 20:3, September 1999, <<http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/monitor/mons99c.html>>.

integral part of the team investigating and presenting information to the International Tribunal for War Crimes. Canada's role in Kosovo has been multidimensional, and humanitarian, this is a core case to draw a correlation between rhetoric and practice of human security in Canadian foreign policy.

To be able to draw conclusions about the relationship between human security rhetoric, policy and operational intervention, it is important to compare Canada's involvement in Kosovo with the Afghanistan case study. Canada's involvement in Afghanistan is an interesting case to look at particularly because nearly half-way through the mission, the Liberal party left office after an electoral defeat to the Conservative party lead by Stephen Harper. While both parties are in favour of the intervention, since the Conservatives took power, there have not been major adjustments to Canada's Afghanistan policy. The Conservative government have only recently recommitted Canada's mission in Afghanistan until 2009.<sup>53</sup> They have also, in late October, sent more troops to Afghanistan to make the Canadian contingent 2500-strong in personnel.

Canada's rhetoric during the Liberal government intervention was geared towards the emphasis of Canadian values and principles. In a speech given by Prime Minister Chrétien during the sendoff of naval forces in October 2001, Chrétien articulated that troops were responsible for the promotion of Canadian values such as freedom, democracy and justice within Afghanistan.<sup>54</sup> He stated: "Defend the values and principles of free and civilised people everywhere" and stated that "we are asking you to

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<sup>53</sup> CTV.ca, "MPs narrowly vote to extend Afghanistan mission" May. 17 2006, <[http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060517/nato\\_afghan\\_060517/20060517/](http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060517/nato_afghan_060517/20060517/)>

<sup>54</sup> Chretien, Jean. "Speech to soldiers going to Afghanistan" [http://www.cbc.ca/MRL/clips/rm-newsworld/chretien\\_jeanprime011017.rm](http://www.cbc.ca/MRL/clips/rm-newsworld/chretien_jeanprime011017.rm), October 2001.

stand up for justice and do what is right, to give the fullest meaning to our values and our resolve.”<sup>55</sup>

Interestingly, Chrétien’s objectives – Canadian values and principles - behind the intervention were undefined and abstract conceptions. Later in the intervention, his rhetoric becomes clearly more aligned with the humanitarian nature of Canada’s role in the country. In contrast, Prime Minister Chrétien failed to recognize that Canada was going to fight a war in Afghanistan. Instead, the major emphasis in his speech was directed toward the social development effect of the intervention within the country. His speech to troops during his October 2003 visit to Afghanistan stated, “By establishing peace and security, you are also providing the ground work for humanitarian assistance and development programs that will help Afghanistan rebuild its economic, political and judicial institutions.”<sup>56</sup> He continues:

You must take pride in the fact that the work you are doing and your sacrifices, are making a difference toward improving the quality of life of the Afghan people. The peace you have helped establish is bringing four million children, including one million girls, to school this fall -- the most in Afghan history. That is indeed an accomplishment.<sup>57</sup>

One of the interesting strategies behind Chrétien’s statements is his focus on the *effects* of the current operations rather than current Canadian troop action. In other words, Chrétien comments do not focus on the mechanism or method behind the intervention, rather he gives credence to the peace, security, development, well-digging, infrastructure and social development that came across as a product of the intervention. In contrast to Chrétien, his successor, Prime Minister Paul Martin justifies the

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<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> Canada, “Notes for Remarks by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien on the Occasion of a Visit to Camp Julien,” October 2003. < [http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/pm\\_visit\\_afghan-en.asp#pm3](http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/pm_visit_afghan-en.asp#pm3)> (October 15, 2006).

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

intervention in Afghanistan with an interesting mixed adherence to human security, cooperative and security reasons.

This is an important comparison between the Liberals and Conservatives are important to show the level of continuity between governments over the intervention in Afghanistan. In mid-March 2006, Prime Minister Harper conducted a trip to Afghanistan to meet with troops within the Provincial Reconstruction team in Kandahar.<sup>58</sup> The nature of his speech drew a significant difference between the previous Liberal party objectives emphasised by Chrétien and Martin. Within the speech, Harper conveyed a few key messages. First, he drew the linkage between domestic security within Afghanistan and its influence on Canadian security. He argues,

An unstable Afghanistan represents easy pickings for drug lords who would use the country as a safe haven for the production of heroin, which wreaks its own destruction on the streets of our country.... and what happens in places like Afghanistan threatens and affects all of us back home in our own country.<sup>59</sup>

While this line of argument is present within both the Chrétien and Martin rhetoric, the anomaly within Harper's speech is the predominance of this theme as the first issue of discussion with troops in Afghanistan. Second, Harper goes on to argue that Afghanistan presents an opportunity for Canada to take an international leadership role, as he states, "You can't lead from the bleachers. I want Canada to be a leader ... A country that really leads, not a country that just follows. That's what you are doing."<sup>60</sup> In this line of rhetoric, Prime Minister Harper's objective of leadership was not part of

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<sup>58</sup> CTV.ca, "PM makes surprise visit to troops in Afghanistan" Mar 13, 2006,

<[http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060301/afghan\\_template\\_060301/20060313/](http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060301/afghan_template_060301/20060313/)>

<sup>59</sup> Canada, Office of the Prime Minister. "Address by the Prime Minister To the Canadian Armed forces in Afghanistan" March 13, 2006. <<http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1056>> October 2006.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

the previous Liberal government's rhetoric, however he invokes this reasoning to make a point about Canada's international role as defined by Afghanistan.

Harper's third invocation of objectives in Afghanistan come back the humanitarian nature of the intervention and the relationship between humanitarianism and Canadian values. He reflects on the positive effect Canadian troops have had with social development efforts, including the reduction of poverty, freedom of voting, women's rights, and access to education.

Finally, but no less important, is the great humanitarian work you're doing. Working with the Afghan government and Afghan people to enhance their security helps them. It helps them rebuild their country to make a better life for themselves and their children.<sup>61</sup>

In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in September 2006, Harper reiterated the relationship between security and human development in Afghanistan. One of the key elements of his argument highlighted the idea –

Moreover, success cannot be assured by military means alone. This we all recognize. For success also requires a strong and unwavering civilian contribution: educators, engineers, elections advisors; direct aid and technical assistance. The list is lengthy, but the contributions essential ... These two actions – rebuilding a shattered society and providing a stable security environment – go hand in glove.<sup>62</sup>

Canada's military intervention in Afghanistan started soon after the attacks on the US in September 11, 2001. In October 2001, Canada sent approximately 750 troops as part of a naval contingent. However, it was not until January 2002, when Canada fully committed land troops for an offensive campaign alongside the US and the UK and in

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Canada, Office of the Prime Minister. "Address by the Prime Minister to the 61st Opening Session of the United Nations General Assembly" Sept 21, 2006 <<http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1329>> October 2006.

February, Princess Patricia's Light Infantry landed in Afghanistan to begin their six-month rotation.

From August 2003 to the end of 2005, Canada operated under the auspices of Operation Athena, controlled by NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In September 2006, Canada's troop total in Afghanistan was increased to 2,500 soldiers, working within ISAF and as a Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). Also, for support in special covert missions, Canada has also admitted to using its elite commando force, Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2), which has been working alongside US special forces covert missions in Afghanistan.<sup>63</sup>

While the mission has come under increased scrutiny by opposition members, media and the public, Canada's role in Afghanistan has been multifaceted. First, and most importantly, it has had control of a regional PRT in Kandahar. As mentioned previously, the PRTs are region-specific reconstruction groups consisting of military, NGO, civilian law enforcement, diplomatic and other specialists. Their objective is to provide opportunities for social, economic and political regrowth in the region by engaging in discussion with local leaders, specialised training for law enforcement, judiciary, and military forces.

In addition to these military contributions to Afghanistan, the multi-faceted nature of Canada's support should be highlighted. For example, before September 11, 2001, Canada's financial aid package to Afghanistan was a mere \$10 million dollars per year.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Canada, Department of National Defence, "About JTF2" December 2003. <[http://www.ops.forces.gc.ca/units/jtf2/pages/about\\_e.asp](http://www.ops.forces.gc.ca/units/jtf2/pages/about_e.asp)> October 2006; CBC News, "INDEPTH: CANADA'S MILITARY - JTF2: Canada's super-secret commandos" July 15, 2005. <<http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/cdnmilitary/jtf2.html>> October 23, 2006.

<sup>64</sup> Canada, Canadian International Development Agency, "Canada delivers emergency aid and new reconstruction to the people of Kandahar" October 23, 2006. <<http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/197C5DC612CA431485257116006C9C31?OpenDocument>>

Since 2001 however, the department responsible for international aid, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), has increased its funding package to \$616.5 million over eight years until 2009.<sup>65</sup>

There are a few important comparisons between Canada's role in both Kosovo and Afghanistan. In both cases, Canada was involved in a combat role, in both Kosovo and Afghanistan Canadian troops were involved in the war-fighting effort, including flying air-bombers within Kosovo and engaging in combat in Afghanistan. Second, in both cases the 'post-war' emphasis is on the reconstruction and development within these states. This is be a major focus within the analysis of this paper, however these actions underscore a continued adherence to the principles of human security within foreign policy decisions. Canadian resources, to a large extent, have been most effective in humanitarian reconstruction. Two key differences between the Liberal and Conservative governments has been the linking of national security benefits to Canada within the Afghanistan mission, in comparison to the Kosovo intervention. The second difference is the increased acceptance of casualties within Afghanistan.

#### *American Rhetoric: Kosovo to Afghanistan*

The US interventions in Kosovo and Afghanistan provide an interesting case to analyse the relationship between rhetoric and practice in foreign policy. For example, President Clinton's foreign policy is often heralded as internationalist, institutionalist and humanitarian. On the other hand, alternate analysis of his foreign policy also reflect an American-centred and realist focus to his decision-making. This dichotomy between the two perspective is one of the questions examined by this study: what are the objectives

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

behind the formation of US foreign policy? Second, does a change of government, from Democrat to Republican, change the nature of the foreign policy rhetoric or is there a chance in the operationalization of these policies on the ground? Also, what are the changes in US foreign policy before and after September 11, 2001?

Its obvious that the American intervention in Kosovo was a product of human security concerns for Kosovar Albanians being cleansed by the Milosevic regime. This is apparent through the rhetoric of the President Clinton in the January 1999 State of the Union address, "... and with our NATO allies, we are pressing the Serbian government to stop its brutal repression in Kosovo -- to bring those responsible to justice, and to give the people of Kosovo the self-government they deserve."<sup>66</sup> This adherence to *human security* arguments permeate Clinton's continued rhetoric over the course of the intervention. Another example shows Clinton arguing: "We cannot simply watch as hundreds of thousands of people are brutalized, murder, raped, forced from their homes, their family histories erased, all in the name of ethnic pride and purity."<sup>67</sup> However, there is a second element to Clinton's appeal for human security, as exemplified in his May 13, 1999 speech:

Can we strengthen a global community grounded in cooperation and tolerance, rooted in common humanity, or will repression and brutality, rooted in ethnic, racial and religious hatreds dominate the agenda for the new century and the new millennium?<sup>68</sup>

Clinton invokes a strong human security agenda within the opening moments of this speech. It is important to recognize his emphasis of cooperation, humanity and

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<sup>66</sup> Office of the White House Press Secretary, "State of the Union Address, 1999" January 19, 1999. Found at: <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/states/docs/sou99.htm> > October 2006.

<sup>67</sup> Association of Newspaper Editors, "Transcript of Clinton's remarks" April 16, 1999. <<http://www.asne.org/99reporter/friday/transcript.htm>> October 2006.

<sup>68</sup> CNN.com, "Transcript: Clinton justifies U.S. involvement in Kosovo" May 13, 1999, <<http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/05/13/clinton.kosovo/transcript.html>> October 2006.

communal tolerance. However as a continued justification of the intervention, he goes on to state:

But in this age of growing international interdependence, America needs a strong and peaceful Europe more than ever as our partner for freedom and for economic progress, and our partner against terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and instability.<sup>69</sup>

Clinton identifies Kosovo as a threat to the security of the United States and its allies as “this is also a significant security issue, particularly because of Kosovo's location.”<sup>70</sup> In other words, in addition to his human security stance, this statement shows another motivation for the intervention, when it challenges the national security of the United States. This position is reinforced by a US After Action Report released in January 2000, which identifies the security concerns that were taken into account in :

Undermine the successful Dayton peace process in Bosnia; re-ignite chaos in Albania; destabilize the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with its large Albanian minority; spill over into other neighboring countries, including Bulgaria and Greece. Instability in this region had the potential to exacerbate rivalries between Greece and Turkey, two NATO allies with significant and often distinct interests in Southern Europe.<sup>71</sup>

While the accuracy of these perceived threats is not the central focus of this argument, it must be recognized that action was taken in Kosovo because these threats to the state were *perceived* to exist. The situation in Kosovo, with the threat of spillover into other states, was defined as a traditional threat, that challenged the sovereignty of states within the region.

To reflect on these statements made within the US justifying the intervention, it is also important to understand the role the United States played in Kosovo. First, it is important to understand its role in the pre-intervention negotiations with Milosevic. As

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> United States, “Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report”. P. 4-.

mentioned previously, President Clinton's special negotiator Robert Holbrooke, was instrumental to negotiating the disarmament of 5000 Serbian soldiers and allowing 2000 OSCE monitors into the country. With the eventual failing of this negotiation in January with the Racik massacre, the US attempted a second set of negotiations led by my Secretary of State, Madeline Albright in February 1999.

Human security's preventative measures are exemplified by the democratic institution-building process of the Rambouillet Process of February 1999. The outcome of Rambouillet did not demand for the sovereignty of Kosovo, rather, it set up a framework for democracy-building in Kosovo. In fact, the first article of the Accord states: "All citizens in Kosovo shall enjoy, without discrimination, the equal rights and freedoms set forth in this Agreement"<sup>72</sup> and in addition: "Citizens in Kosovo shall have the right to democratic self-government through legislative, executive, judicial, and other institutions established in accordance with this Agreement"<sup>73</sup> including the right of representation and participation in free and fair elections. The accord outlined the implementation of self-government in Kosovo, but did not insist on complete sovereignty. In fact, by the accord Serbia was allowed to keep 5000 troops in Kosovo to protect its national interests in the area.<sup>74</sup> These preventative measures attempted to establish a compromise between the two sides and establish the standard for the implementation of democracy within Kosovo and human rights standards for all Kosovars. Again, these negotiations failed due to Serbian resistance to the Rambouillet Accords and the launching of Operation Horseshoe.

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<sup>72</sup> Rambouillet Accords, [http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/rambouillet\\_text.htm](http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/rambouillet_text.htm)

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid

In Kosovo, this is apparent with the use of air strike intervention to stop the ethnic cleansing in the province. With the use of high-end technology, the strategic bombing saw 24,000 bombs dropped over the course of seventy-seven days on strategic sites in Serbia. The cost of this technique for NATO countries was approximately \$4.63 billion dollars US.<sup>75</sup> The second major cost included \$33.86 billion dollars US in reconstruction. This cost was not just the reconstruction of the sites destroyed by the bombing, which cost approximately \$4 billion dollars;<sup>76</sup> rather the rebuilding costs included rehabilitating refugees by also rebuilding damaged homes and razed villages in rural Kosovo.

Finally, the major contribution of the United States in the intervention in Kosovo is the military equipment and troops supplied. Of course, it is understood that the majority of troops in the region and the air power supplied were primarily American.

The events of September 11, 2001 are the defining variables when justifying the intervention in Afghanistan. Unwillingness from the Taliban to hand over Osama bin Laden, and other members of *al Qaida* arguably forced the hands of the United States to intervene in the country. Therefore, to assess the rhetoric surrounding the US role in the country, it is key to use as a point of analysis President Bush's speeches immediately after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon. One of the most famous of Bush's speeches to the United States was the start on the "War on Terror" on September 20, 2001. First, in this speech it is important to note that Bush's first

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<sup>75</sup> The costs were found in a joint study undertaken by BBC and Jane's Defence Weekly found on <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/476134.stm>. The figures were presented in British Pounds at a currency rate from 1999. The conversion was done at the historical conversion rate of 1 British Pound/1.65170 USD, found at FXHistory – Historical Currency Exchange Rates. For example, 4.63 billion USD = 2.63 billion pounds. (<http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory>).

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

important demand is the iteration of the ultimatums for the Taliban government of Afghanistan. These set of ultimatums include the demand to close all terrorist training camps, hand over all members of the *Al Qaida* network in the country, allow the US access to terrorist training camps, and release of all foreign nationals in Afghani jails. Bush concludes this list of demands with, “These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.”<sup>77</sup>

Second, Bush’s approach to addressing the terrorism problem identified the “us and other” dichotomy between the terrorists and American people. He attributes the values of freedom, liberty, democracy and religious tolerance. Therefore, as the alternative group, Bush argues that the others believe in the anti-thesis of these values. It should be recognized that while Bush blames the terrorists within Afghanistan for believing in this dichotomous viewpoint, his rhetoric reinforces this distinction and also creates policy along these lines.

The third element of Bush’s speech is that he explains what he believes to be the nature of the intervention. Bush makes a distinction between the intervention Kosovo and the intervention in Afghanistan, where he argues,

It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat .... It may include dramatic strikes, visible on television, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or rest.

Finally, this speech drives home an important point for the rest of the states in the international system. Bush creates a second dichotomy by forcing states to choose

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<sup>77</sup> Global Security, “Text: Bush Announces Start of a “War on Terror”” 2001. < <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2001/09/mil-010920-usia01.htm> > October 10, 2006.

between the two sides in the ‘War on Terror’ by stating, “And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”<sup>78</sup>

However, within the rhetoric of the leadership within the United States also emphasizes a final important element; the democratization and liberalization of Afghanistan’s society and political institutions. While there are several examples of this, one of the most concise was during Vice President Cheney’s visit to Afghanistan in December 2005. In his speech, Cheney’s emphasis lay in two specific areas. Initially, he drew sympathy for the difficult task undertaken by the troops, but then continued to emphasize the implications of these actions on the democratization of Afghanistan. He prided the country for its participation in elections and the result of the democratization:

... our coalition has stood with this nation and helped prepare the way for democratic institutions and a free society ... We are proud to count Afghanistan as a free country, a fellow democracy, and a friend of the United States of America.<sup>79</sup>

Cheney continues on to argue:

By fighting enemies, by standing with our friends, we honour both the ideals and protect the security interests of the United States. The victory of freedom in Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq, will be an inspiration to democratic reformers in other lands.<sup>80</sup>

To support this viewpoint, the President has also placed a major emphasis on these elements of the intervention. During the first Presidential debate, against Senator John Kerry, President Bush makes two key indications. First, he argues that his record as President, after September 11<sup>th</sup> made the United States are increasingly safe in the

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> United States, White House, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” Dec 19, 2005 <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219.html>> (Oct 15, 2006).

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

international system. He argued that "... September the 11th changed how America must look at the world. And since that day our nation has been on a multi-pronged strategy to keep our country safer. We've pursued *al Qaeda* wherever *al Qaeda* tries to hide; 75 percent of known *al Qaeda* leaders have been brought to justice. The rest of them know we're after them."<sup>81</sup> In addition, however, he also emphasises the relationship between the American intervention and the democratization within Afghanistan. Bush uses the example, "Ten million citizens have registered to vote. It's a phenomenal statistic, that if given a chance to be free, they will show up at the polls. Forty-one percent of those 10 million are women."

While the facts surrounding the US intervention in Afghanistan are well known, it is important to underline some the key issues within the region for the United States. First, despite the well-established coalition *and* the US emphasis on the war in Iraq, it continues to be the largest contributor of troops within Afghanistan. This specifically includes three groups of troops; those under NATO/ISAF, those as US troops within PRTs and, special operations and elite forces. This does not include, the anti-Taliban United Front (UF), who were responsible for on-the-ground fighting against Taliban forces. Rather, the American and other allied troops in Afghanistan were responsible for training and arming UF troops in the country. The UF campaign was speeded along through the bombing campaign of the US and UK.<sup>82</sup> In fact, it was after the UF recovered Kabul that NATO and other troops entered the country.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> United States, White House, "Remarks by President Bush and Senator Kerry in First 2004 Presidential Debate," Oct 1, 2005 <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/10/20041001.html> > (Oct 15, 2006).

<sup>82</sup> Jane's Defence Weekly, "All eyes on Kabul's front line" November 07, 2001. Anthony Davis, Panshir Valley

<sup>83</sup> Jane's Defence Weekly, "Poor logistics and slow air war stall UF move on Kabul" October 31, 2001. Anthony Davis, Jabal Saraj, Afghanistan

Second, the distinctions between these groups is also key to understanding the American fight within Afghanistan. Under “Operation Enduring Freedom” the US engaged in a short air strike war starting October 7, 2001 lasted only twenty days. At this juncture, most Taliban heavy military equipment, especially their air force was destroyed. After this, it took until March 2002 to effectively move the Taliban out of government and hiding in the mountains.<sup>84</sup> One of the key military components of the operation included the delivery of humanitarian aid within the country. For example, within six months of the initial intervention, it was estimated that US psychological warfare ops has “delivered more than 50 million leaflets, and transport crews had delivered 2.5 million humanitarian daily rations, 1,700 tons of wheat, and 328,200 blankets. More than 5,000 radios had been provided to the Afghan people.”<sup>85</sup>

This eludes to one of the key elements to the US role in Afghanistan, the role of the US Psychological Operations (Psyops) within the mission. Psyops is the centre of the “hearts and minds” campaign to convince the local people of the US non-threatening stance for the locals. The leaflet campaign, humanitarian aid, and media are three key areas where Psyops makes its largest contribution. For example, images of rations being delivered in bags clearly marked “U.S.A” are a predominant image portrayed across the country. Also, the campaign differentiating the newly elected Karzai-government and the former Taliban is run through the delivery of radio and the promotion of musical broadcasts and television that were once restricted by the Taliban.

Finally, the other element of the US contribution that is important to highlight are the elite force role in the country. Despite the fact that ISAF and the US-run PRTs are a

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<sup>84</sup> Global Security, “Operation Enduring Freedom: Afghanistan” 2006.  
<<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm>> October 10, 2006.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

predominant development, training and humanitarian operation, the elite forces are the exception to the rule, seeking out *al Qaida* and Taliban members regrouping in the Hindu Kush mountains.

### *Relationships Between Rhetoric and Foreign Policy*

To analyze the outcomes of this study, this section will reintroduce the questions asked at the beginning of the paper, to determine the role of rhetoric in foreign policy decision-making. This section will analyze these three questions with the information presented in the preceding sections.

The first question asked about the relationship of human security rhetoric and foreign policy between governments in Canada. This paper came to the conclusion that there is only a small relationship between rhetoric and human security foreign policy in theatre. The paper investigated the rhetoric of the Conservatives and Liberals parties, where the Liberal government was a strong proponent of human security within its rhetoric. The interventions that took place under the Liberal government both had large components of war-fighting, including within the humanitarian mission in Kosovo.

With regards to Afghanistan, the preceding case studies show that there was a differentiation between the Liberal government rhetoric surrounding the intervention in Afghanistan compared to the Conservatives. While both governments used the objectives of national security and human security, it can be said that generally Prime Minister Harper emphasized national security arguments within his speeches. For example, he used the challenges of the drug trade, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism to show how Afghanistan was a threat to Canadian security. He also used the Canada's identity

as a global leader to justify the continued intervention within the country. It was *only* his last objective that highlighted the human security effects of Canadian intervention within Afghanistan society, including education, health and personal liberties. Recognize that this is a change from the Liberal party rhetoric that justified the intervention with humanitarianism, Canadian values and freedom from Taliban rule as the central objectives. This is not to say that the Liberal government did not evoke international security concerns, rather this objective was less stated than with the Conservatives.

However, it is interesting to see that there has been little change in Canada's strategy within Afghanistan to reflect this change in priorities of the Conservative government. Canada continues to be involved with the reconstruction effort within the PRTs, has 2,286 troops dedicated to ISAF under Operation Athena. The mandate continues to operate under the mission to promote: A stable nation that is no longer a haven for terrorism; a country that meets the needs of its people; and a fully integrated part of the international community.<sup>86</sup> Even primarily Conservative policies have not been necessarily distinct from previous Liberal policy, as the Conservatives just recently extended the mandate of the Canadian mission in the country. One example is the special Operations JTF2 mandate is simply a continuation of a Liberal policy by the Conservative government.

One of the questions that this leads to is the nature of reconstruction within Afghanistan, it could be argued that Canadians have engaged in offensive engagement more the recent past than they did under the Liberals. However, what should be understood is that this is not contradictory to the argument that the rhetoric has not

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<sup>86</sup> Canada, Department of National Defence, "Operation Archer" December 2003. <[http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/operations/archer/index\\_e.asp](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/operations/archer/index_e.asp)> October 2006.

changed the nature of the mission. It was under the Liberal government that the Department of National Defense conceived of the 3D approach within Afghanistan. What has actually changed is the tactics and strengths of the Taliban, warlords and *al Qaida* members in the country, to which Canadian policy is a response. In other words, based on the continuity within Canadian foreign policy, it could be argued that this is not outside the policies established by the Liberal Party and continued by the Conservative Party. Also, it should be noted that despite the emphasis on the combat and offensive encounters is not a pan-Afghanistan issue. Rather, the Canadian government and Canadian Forces members argued that this issue is specific to the South, where Taliban members are putting up more of a fight than was once expected.

Using the American example, it can also be argued that a change in rhetoric between Kosovo and Afghanistan did not change the technique of intervention used by the US. In both cases, the US pursued an air-strike method, keeping ground troops well out of the theatre of operation. It is only after the dispersion of the enemy combatant that US soldiers entered the country, in both Kosovo and Afghanistan. Also, there has been little change in the post-War strategy between these interventions. The democratization, institution and economy-building efforts occurring within the countries are similar mechanisms to promote long-term security. Therefore, under these premises, this paper can conclude that foreign policy rhetoric between governments does not necessarily change policy on the ground.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> A domestic example of this argument is the lack of initiative within the Conservative Party to change gay marriage legislation despite their strong rhetorical stance against the enlargement of the definition of marriage.

The second question asked for a comparison between Canada and the United States to ask; if Canada and the US use different rhetoric and yet contribute to the same mission, what does this say about the role of rhetoric and foreign policy? Within the comparisons between Canada and the US over the interventions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, this analysis again concludes that there is no real relationship between human security rhetoric and policy within interventions. Over the course of this paper, there are several examples of this between Canada and the US. In Kosovo, due to the humanitarianism of stopping the ethnic cleansing, both states' rhetoric was quite similar. Observations show that human security issues, including the cessation of hostility towards ethnic Albanians, the concerns over refugee movements into neighbouring states and delivery of aid supplies, were prerogatives of both governments. The differences between the two states were apparent because Canada used human security concepts as almost exclusive justification of intervention in Kosovo, whereas the US did invoke discussions relating the intervention to European stability, geopolitical location and NATO continuity.

Despite these differences in rhetoric, the Canadian and Americans were complementary and well-integrated within the Kosovo intervention. Both simultaneously took on air-strike responsibilities, despite Canada's air power being significantly less than the US. Once the ground hostilities were ceased, both states were engaged in the diplomatic, democratic and economic re-growth within Kosovo.

Now, this raises the argument, because Canada and the US were engaged in the same mission under NATO auspices, it is inevitable that the two states would have a similar policy on the ground. Therefore, it is also important to compare this situation

with the relationship between Canadian and US rhetoric over Afghanistan. Similar to Kosovo, the rhetoric used by these states when initiating the intervention in 2001, was different from one another. Canada continued to pursue the objectives defined by humanitarianism, democracy, and Canadian values and principles. In contrast, as the target of the 9/11 attacks, the US understandably had a more security oriented justification for the intervention.

On the outset of the mission, the US and UK had already begun to engage in air strikes over Northern Afghanistan. This is one element of the process that Canadian troops were not involved in and this draws one of our distinctions between the Canadian and US policies. However, further along in the intervention, with the Canadian's actually in theatre, the engagement of both militaries is quite similar. This can be assessed through their involvement in the PRTs, relationship within ISAF and the offensive operations currently in progress in the South. In addition, the Canadian JTF2 has been instrumental in the elite level search missions for Taliban fighters. Despite the fact that both states are under NATO auspices within Afghanistan, there are two contravening points. First, other NATO states have chosen not to engage in the Afghanistan mission to the same degree as Canada and the US. Hence, within Afghanistan NATO membership is not a barrier to individual state decisions. Second, there are major elements of the mission that have not been under the NATO mandate until recently, and therefore state's were in Afghanistan as individual actors up until ISAF took over operations in the South.

Therefore, the analysis accepts the argument that the outset of the war saw two different strategies between the US and Canada. However, at the holistic level, this is another case where rhetoric has not determined the nature of the foreign policy.

The last question from the beginning of the study asks if the structural effect of September 11<sup>th</sup> has effected states in intervention situations? Despite the previous conclusions that state action and foreign policy have not changed between Kosovo and Afghanistan, this paper does conclude that there is a structural difference between the pre- and post-9/11 security environments. This argument is clear for two reasons. First, this paper concluded that the system has changed because the nature of the threat has changed. In other words, the enemy that is being fought against is different, with an altered objective, altered relationship with the invading forces and local society, altered techniques and different measurement of success. For example, Milosevic's measuring stick to his success was to see how many ethnic Albanians he could rid from Kosovo. Milosevic ruthlessly used traditional military mechanisms to achieve his goals, using national armies to ethnically cleanse the area. In comparison, the Taliban, warlords and *al Qaida* members judge their success as the pursuit of the destruction of Western civilization, as the punishment of the infidels and the pursuit of jihad. In addition, the techniques used against the intervention forces, include suicide bombing and guerrilla warfare, without the material means to engage in traditional warfare.

Second, it can be argued that in the post 9/11 period, in Afghanistan, intervention states are increasingly willing to absorb casualties within this war. Despite recent deaths of Canadian soldiers, the Conservative government increased the term of the mission until 2009. Coincidentally, it is Canada and the US that have had the largest numbers of casualties in the mission. It is for these two reasons that this paper argues that the international structure has influenced a change in state interaction post-9/11.

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