

**Managing the Unexpected:**  
An Examination of the Effects of Departmental Culture on Crisis Management.

By Richard Shimooka  
University of Wales, Aberystwyth  
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## 1.0 Introduction

On November 11<sup>th</sup> 1996, the Prime Minister Jean Chrétien made the unprecedented decision for Canada to lead an international response to a looming humanitarian catastrophe in Zaire, code named Operation Assurance. It was the first time since the Suez Crisis Canada led an international intervention. However barely six weeks had elapsed before the government withdrew its efforts, tarnishing Canada's prestige abroad and leaving behind nearly 200,000 refugees in the jungles of Eastern Zaire without aid. Although the intervention suffered from a number of different problems, one of the more chronic and debilitating was an apparent lack of cooperation among the lead department of the government's foreign policy apparatus. At several critical junctures, statements or actions made by departmental representatives contradicted those made by other department's representatives. As a result the Canadian response was perceived to be ad hoc and ill organized, ultimately undermining its credibility abroad.

The effects of internal factors on crisis decision-making has largely been neglected or in the study of international relations. This is not surprising since scholars in this field have tended to regard states as unitary actors, either generalizing or completely discounting the effect of intrastate actors. There have been several meaningful attempts to remedy this, beginning with Richard Snyder H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin's groundbreaking 1962 study, *Foreign Policy Decision Making*, followed up by Graham T. Allison and Morton Halperin's seminal work on bureaucratic politics. In spite of this rich academic history though, it seems that this mode of inquiry remains somewhat marginalized in the study of international relations.

With this in mind, this article will attempt to offer an alternative framework for understanding the actions of the Canadian government, by identifying the effects that departmental cultures had on decision-making during the Zairan Crisis. It will seek to answer the wider question; under what conditions does the differing organizational cultures of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Department of National Defence, affect the implementation of Canadian foreign and security policy? It should be noted that this analysis is made up of two separate tasks. It is not merely interested in identifying the cognitive biases that affect foreign policy decision makers, but also how these actors interact within interdepartmental fora. Specifically, it will focus on the operation of two interdepartmental committees: the Zaire Interdepartmental Task Force and the Committee of Deputies. As it will become apparent, the nature of the fora that these departmental representatives interacted in had a clear affect on decision-making.

The examination will be separated into three sections. Section one will provide the reader with an overview of the Zairian Crisis. It will focus on the roots of the conflict and Canadian response, providing an understanding of the context in which the planning and management of Operation Assurance occurred. The second section will examine theoretical perspectives for explaining the effects of departmental culture on foreign policy, derived from interdisciplinary research methods from organizational and group psychology. Two frameworks will be scrutinized: Edgar Schein's organizational culture approach and Linda L. Putnam and Cynthia Stohl's bona fide group perspective. Section three will apply the theoretical frameworks put forward in section two on the Zairian case

study. This section will be broken up into two sub-sections that deal with the above-mentioned perspectives individually.

## 2.0 Background to the Crisis

The 1996 Zairian crisis emerged largely as a consequence of the Rwandan genocide two years previous. In July 1994, over a million Hutu refugees intermixed with remnants of former government forces (Forces Armées Rwandaises, or FAR) fled the Rwandan Patriotic Force offensive. Many of these refugees escaped to Zaire through safe zones set up by French Forces in Southern Rwanda, or entered the country directly in the region of Goma in Kivu Province in the east. Among the 1.1 Million refugees were an estimated 60,000 to 100,000 FAR and Interhamwe militia members, who constituted what Lischer describes as a “state in exile” along the Rwandan border.<sup>1</sup> The ousted Hutu government reconstituted itself over the refugee populations, who were supported by humanitarian aid agencies and military aid from the regime of President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. In many cases refugee populations were held against their will by the FAR in order to manipulate humanitarian aid to enhance their power. Through these means, the Hutu leaders managed to continue their struggle against the Tutsi-dominated regimes in Burundi and Rwanda.

Over the next two years, the situation in the Great Lakes region slowly deteriorated as states buckled under the strain of the refugee populations and armed rebels. In Burundi, indigenous Hutu insurgents reinforced by former Rwandan government forces conducted guerrilla attacks throughout 1995 and the spring of 1996. The situation was somewhat diffused with the relatively bloodless coup by Major Pierre Buyoya. But as Burundi gradually returned to normality during the summer of 1996, the situation in Zaire worsened rapidly. In early September, Zairian authorities ordered all indigenous Banyamulenge Tutsis to leave the country within a week, initiating attacks against their enclaves in the Kivu Province soon after.<sup>2</sup> Previously these groups had been spared from fighting as the Ex-Hutu authorities concentrated on cross border raids against Rwanda and Burundi.

The decision turned out to be a disaster. The Rwandan government used the attacks as a pretext for intervening into the conflict, enabling the Banyamulenge Tutsis to successfully blunt their attacks. In September they initiated a counter-offensive, pushing out the Zairian and FARs soldiers from the eastern enclaves. Citing security reasons in response to the escalation of the fighting, Humanitarian aid agencies withdrew their operations from the region, leaving hundreds of thousands of refugees without food or medical aid. In addition, retreating FAR and Intehamwe militias emptied many camps in order to relocate their base of support. The situation amounted to a witch’s brew of

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<sup>1</sup> The Interhamwe was a poorly trained militia force established by FAR Pg 93, 99 Sarah Kenyon Lischer “Collateral Damage: Humanitarian Assistance as a source of Conflict” International Security Vol. 28 No. 1 (2003)

<sup>2</sup> Human Rights Watch World Report 1997, Human Rights Watch. July 19<sup>th</sup> 2005  
<<http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/zaire/Zaire-05.htm>>

violence, disease and famine, which the UN High Commissioner for Refugees described its potential as “a catastrophe greater than the one we knew in 1994.”<sup>3</sup>

From 1994 onwards, Canada maintained a strong presence in the region. Canada was an initial contributor to United Nations Assistance Mission In Rwanda (UNAMIR) that was to oversee the Arusha Accords, providing a command and signals elements, as well as the Force Commander, Maj. General Romeo Dallaire. When the civil war erupted in May and the situation collapsed into genocide, Canada was the only state to increase its involvement to UNAMIR. Yet the scenes of genocide and the lackluster international response would adversely affect many in the government. During a meeting with returning Force Commander Romeo Dallaire, Diplomatic Advisor to the Prime Minister, James Bartleman stated:

I remember thinking that it was not only the United Nations that had let him down, his own country could have done more. And in that regard I was culpable as anyone in the Canadian power structure. After all I was the trusted diplomatic advisor to the Prime Minister and other than recommending the dispatch of a couple of cargo aircraft to help out, I sat on my hands. I found it difficult to look into Dallaire’s eyes.<sup>4</sup>

Clearly Rwanda firmly set Africa into the mindset of some at the Canadian government. As the situation in the Great Lakes region deteriorated throughout 1995 and 1996, the Canadian Government maintained watched with vigilance. When Burundi teetered on the brink of civil war in May 1996, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy directed the foreign policy apparatus to develop a response to the deteriorating situation.<sup>5</sup> Although Burundi righted itself without western intervention, the worsening situation in Zaire soon replaced it in the headlines.

On October 26<sup>th</sup> Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, telephoned Canadian Representative to the UN Robert Fowler to ask if Canada would like to provide a special representative to deal with the Zairian crisis. Boutros-Ghali’s initiative was taken without any previous discussion with Canadian authorities, but it was not surprising. Canada was one of only three countries that had the capacity to provide a representative that could speak both French and English, and did not have any prior colonial history in the region.<sup>6</sup> The request was forwarded via Deputy Minister (DM) Gordon Smith, upwards to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Axworthy, who then informed the Prime Minister.<sup>7</sup> Axworthy recommended that Ambassador Raymond Chrétien, a uniquely qualified ambassador who had served in the region with distinction and the PM’s nephew, be named to the post. PM Chrétien immediately agreed and three days later the Ambassador was officially announced as Secretary General’s special representative to the region.

Raymond Chrétien’s appointment on October 31<sup>st</sup> would mark a hastening of the western response to the crisis. Prime Minister Chrétien took a more personal advocacy

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<sup>3</sup> Sadako Ogata as quoted in Pg. 5 Hay (1999).

<sup>4</sup> Pg 176 James Bartleman Roller Coaster Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. 2005

<sup>5</sup> Access to Information Act A9611168 (2#5) Pg 1~2

<sup>6</sup> Gordon Smith Interview August 18<sup>th</sup> 2005

<sup>7</sup> *ibid*

role, raising the issue with President Clinton on November 5<sup>th</sup>. The next day during a conversation with James Bartleman, the US National Security advisor Anthony Lake hinted that the US might be willing to place US troops under Canadian command if an intervention were to take place. The feeler was repeated in a conversation on the 7<sup>th</sup> between DFAIT Deputy Minister Gordon Smith and US Undersecretary of State, Peter Tarnoff. These three conversations would embolden the Canadian executive towards undertaking a far more prominent role than they had first envisioned. However the Canadian government realized that they were completely dependant upon American support because Canada had precious little military capability to spare for any intervention.

The 1990s were a period of extreme duress for the Canadian Forces (CF). Though most western militaries felt the pressure from the transition to the post cold war era, the CF's experience was particularly traumatic. At the time the Canadian Forces were in the midst of the Somalia inquiry, which had a disastrous effect on its own morale and wider public perceptions of the CF. In addition, while Canadian forces were being deployed to the greatest extent since the Second World War, it was doing so in the face of massive manpower and budgetary reductions; by 1996 the funding had dropped from 1994 levels by 11%.<sup>8</sup> The year was marked by two major commitments: a brigade sized contingent as part of SFOR in the Balkans in support of the Dayton accords, and a large commitment as part of UN Mission to Haiti. As a result, at the time of the Zairian Crisis, Canada had little reserve capacity to deploy any meaningful combat forces, which would handicap its attempts to develop a response.

From November 9<sup>th</sup>, DFAIT and the Prime Minister engaged in a furious round of conversations with several heads of state to canvas their support for an intervention. The general tone of these conversations was overwhelmingly positive.<sup>9</sup> Most countries offered support of some kind, including combat units and financial aid. Finally UN Security Council passed resolution 1078 on November 9<sup>th</sup> that endorsed the Secretary General's recommendation that a multinational force be deployed "for humanitarian purposes."<sup>10</sup> Put together, the Washington feelers, the very favorable response among world leaders to the Canadian feelers, and the presence of Ambassador Chrétien, would give the impression to many Canadian government officials that they were in a unique position to lead the response to the crisis.

Canada's official response would coalesce during the Remembrance Day long weekend (Nov. 9<sup>th</sup> to 11<sup>th</sup>). In addition to the international diplomacy undertaken by Prime Minister Chrétien, the principle departments associated with international relations including DFAIT, DND, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Privy Council Office and the Prime Minister's Office, began to initiate their own planning processes. Almost immediately was it apparent that the normal structure of the executive was ill equipped to handle this new task. Nominally, Canada would rely on a multilateral organization like the UN or NATO to undertake the political crisis management, and the government would contribute military units and support where needed. The organization

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<sup>8</sup> Pg 167 Douglas Bland and Sean Maloney Campaigns for International Security. Kingston: McGill Queens University Press. 2004

<sup>9</sup> Pg 184 Bartleman (2005)

<sup>10</sup> United Nation Security Council Resolution 1078 November 9<sup>th</sup> 1996, August 4<sup>th</sup> 2005 <[http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1078%20\(1996\)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC](http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1078%20(1996)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC)>

and structure of the foreign policy apparatus was generally found to be sufficient for these purposes. Yet by taking a leadership role in the Zaire crisis the Canadian government essentially assumed the responsibility of political crisis management duties, a role they were unprepared and arguably ill equipped for.

Three institutional responses were developed. Within DFAIT a complete reorganization took place that pulled together every available resource to manage the crisis. DM Gordon Smith noted that the Zaire crisis was one of only two cases where the department had to drop everything else to handle a single crisis.<sup>11</sup> Secondly, two ad-hoc interdepartmental committees were formed; The Zaire Interdepartmental Task Force (ZITF) was primarily made up of senior managers from the lead foreign policy departments and offices and the Committee of Deputies. The Committee essentially consisted of more regularized meetings of senior department heads around the DM level that would make the brunt of the major planning decisions during the crisis. Finally, a multinational “Steering Group” was established in Stuttgart Germany to coordinate states willing to participate troops.

Almost immediately after the decision was taken to intervene, the Canadian response suffered its first of many setbacks. On the day Canada made its announcement about the intervention, the US administration started to ask critical questions about the Canadian plans, and seemed to withdraw their initial willingness to offer troops as well. An uncomfortable compromise was hammered out when a high level Canadian delegation traveled to Washington, but the episode would foreshadow many of the problems that dogged the Canadian effort to piece together a Multinational Force. Probably the most significant factor that negated the need for intervention was the rapidly changing situation in eastern Zaire and Rwanda. The Tutsi Banyamulenge and Rwandan forces made significant gains on the ground, and were able to separate many refugee populations from the FAR and Interhamwe militias. Freed from the coercion, an estimated one million refugees decided to return to Rwanda peacefully.

The changing situation gave the perception to many in the West that the humanitarian catastrophe had been averted and the need for intervention had diminished. Meetings of the Steering Group went reflected this. States that had initially indicated their willingness to deploy forces hesitated, and by early December none were willing to deploy any capabilities, save for France and Belgium.<sup>12</sup> Canada did deploy a command and communications element and a reconnaissance party into the region, but it did not actually enter Zaire proper, and had little substantive effect on the situation. The influx of refugees back to Rwanda did not totally alleviate the need for assistance, as an estimated 200,000 refugees remained in the jungles of eastern Zaire without aid.<sup>13</sup> However without international support (particularly from the US), or forces of its own, Canada had little choice but to withdraw its efforts. By December 31<sup>st</sup> the last troops left the region, and Canada’s attempt to lead an international response was officially over.

It should be made clear that the difference in cultures within the foreign policy apparatus only played a small role in the greater failure of Operation Assurance. Plainly,

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<sup>11</sup> The other instance was the so-called “Turbot War” with Spain. Gordon Smith Interview August 18<sup>th</sup> 2005

<sup>12</sup> Pg 36 Hay 1999

<sup>13</sup> Pg 23 Michael Hennessy “Operation Assurance: Planning a Multinational Task Force for Rwanda/Zaire” Canadian Forces Journal Vol2. No. 1, 2001

events on the ground unfolded in a way that eliminated much of the original basis for intervention. With a majority of the refugee population safely repatriated to Rwanda, certain individuals within the government used the situation to successfully argue for the termination of the operation. Therefore how the situation evolved was not attributable to the actions of the Canadian government. Few long-term implications may be drawn from this factor, as each potential intervention will unfold in unique ways. The other salient factors also suffer this problem. It is difficult to predict the availability of the Canadian forces at any one time, or the disposition of members of the international community towards a particular intervention.

Unlike these factors, the effects of departmental culture are endemic to almost every policy decision taken by government. Although in this case it was not a salient factor in determining the outcome of the operation, it did have a serious affect on how the government response developed, and very easily could have been a salient factor in determining the outcome of the operation. The rest of this study will be devoted to identifying their effects.

### 3.0 Methodology

In order to understand the nature and effects of the organizational culture of the DFAIT and DND, the use of two separate, but complementary approaches is appropriate to understand the government's response; Edgar Schein's organizational culture model and Putnam and Stohl's bona fide group perspective. Although they originate from disciplines outside the study of international relations, it will become apparent that they are quite effective in understanding the factors that affected actors' actions during the intervention.

#### 3.1 The Organizational Culture Approach

For the purposes of this paper, Edgar Schein's organizational culture approach will provide a framework to identify main cultures of Department of National Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. While the approach has traditionally been used to study the operation of private sector corporations such as that of the Digital Equipment Corporation, it is by no means limited to such a narrow application.<sup>14</sup> Firstly, the conceptual foundations of the Organizational Culture model were conceived to apply to a wide variety of organizations and not to ascribe it to just business organizations. Schein defines group culture as:

A pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems.<sup>15</sup>

Schein and other organizational culture theorists argue that this process of is common to all socially created groups that humans create. His approach is intended to provide a framework for understanding how groups create and sustain these basic assumptions and

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<sup>14</sup> See Schein Edgar H. DEC is Dead; Long live DEC San Francisco; Berrett-Koeler 2003

<sup>15</sup> Pg 14 Schein (2004)

their effects on decision-making. It does not attempt to infer what those assumptions may be, as these are unique to each organization as its members develop responses and solutions to the problems they encounter. This avoids the contextual problems encountered by the bureaucratic politics approach. It maintains enough flexibility to enable its application to a wide range of contexts and individuals, while providing a useful framework for understanding how specific organizations operate. In addition to corporate organizations, Schein has successfully applied the cultural model to understand the operation of military organizations, such as that of the Army Corps of Engineers and the Naval Research Laboratory.<sup>16</sup> Using a similar conceptual framework, Geert Hofstede has been able to identify cultural differences among nations and groups.<sup>17</sup>

Schein identifies four aspects that are common to a group culture: structural stability, depth, breadth, and patterning and integration. Structural stability refers to the permanence of a group culture in contrast to its changing environment.<sup>18</sup> The depth of culture identifies how it is the deepest and most unconscious part of a group. Most quantifiable aspects of a group's outputs are only manifestations of culture and that the beliefs of members may only be identified indirectly through a reading of their aspects. Hofstede argues similarly, noting that many values remain unconscious to their holder, and that "they cannot be discussed nor can they be directly observed by outsiders."<sup>19</sup> The pervasiveness of a group culture refers to its "breadth." A group's culture extends to "all aspects of how an organization deals with its primary task, its various environments and its internal operations."<sup>20</sup> Patterning and integration ties all aspects of a culture operation together into a greater paradigm, enabling individuals to formulate consistent response to any situation. When confronted by new stimuli, an organization will attempt to develop a response based in part on other group beliefs. If accepted by the group, this response becomes the part of the group history and integrated into its behavior. In order to provide a framework to analyze the phenomenon, Schein separates culture into three levels of analysis: artifacts, espoused beliefs and values, and underlying or basic assumptions.<sup>21</sup> Each level refers to the "degree to which the cultural phenomenon is visible to the observer."<sup>22,</sup>

Artifacts are the most visible products of a group's operation that are observable to an outside individual. These may include its language, technology, styles, observable actions, organizational structures and processes, etc.<sup>23</sup> For example, the artifacts of the Department of National Defence may be the actions it takes (such as the deployment of forces abroad), its organizational structure (like combat units), and the technology it implies (rifles, tanks, radios, ect). Artifacts also include the structural processes by which such behavior is made routine, such as institutional organization of a department. However it is difficult to correctly infer any deeper meaning from artifacts without

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<sup>16</sup> Pg 355, 360 Schein (2004)

<sup>17</sup> Geert Hofstede Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind London: Profile Books. 2003

<sup>18</sup> Pg 14 Schein (2004)

<sup>19</sup> Pg 8 Hofstede (2003)

<sup>20</sup> Pg 14 Schein (2004)

<sup>21</sup> Pg 26 Ibid

<sup>22</sup> Pg 25 Ibid

<sup>23</sup> Pg 26 Ibid

understanding the basic assumptions that inform them.<sup>24</sup> Although the meaning of some artifacts may be widely understood, they may also hold deeper connotations for members of a group. An individual may attempt to explain a group's artifact by assuming one's own assumptions are congruent to that of the members of the group that is being studied. Yet there are no assurances at all that such a congruency exists. The values held by members of a culture may be fundamentally different from individuals outside the group, and not at all apparent without a deeper penetration of the organizational culture.

Espoused beliefs and values are stated strategies, goals, and philosophies produced by the group in order to conceptualize and operate in their environment. These are often proven strategies to dealing with reoccurring issues experienced by a group, which have been confirmed by a shared social experience.<sup>25</sup> They may also deal with less contestable concepts such as aesthetics and morals. Yet even with these less contestable concepts, social validation is just as critical for it to become an espoused belief or value. Examples of this for government organizations include, rules of conduct, regulations, bills, acts, White Papers, and lessons learned documents. Various documents significant for the conduct and operation of DND and the Canadian Forces, include the Queens Regulations and Orders, the 1947 National Defence Act, the Financial Administration Act and various White Papers on Defence.<sup>26</sup>

For the most part, espoused values will explain much of a group's behavior, but as discussed in the above critique of the bureaucratic politics model, they can be misleading. Espoused values may cover issues that have never been experienced by a group before, and only reflect what individuals say they would do in such a situation rather than what they would actually do.<sup>27</sup> Similarly, it is difficult to judge how a situation may be interpreted by an organization, which may affect what means it may believe to be appropriate to respond to a situation. An organization's perspective on how to assess a phenomenon may not be clearly stated in any document, but socialized into the culture so that it is implicit within its operation.

The third and deepest level of cultural analysis is that of basic assumptions or values. Schein defines these as,

(Concepts) that have become so taken for granted that one finds little variation within a social unit. This degree of consensus results from repeated success in application of certain beliefs and values<sup>28</sup>

Therefore within an organization, one would expect that all members would hold these basic assumptions. This should not be taken to mean that everybody hold all of the same assumptions at the same time, as various subcultures may co-exist within an organization. Some of the assumptions held by subcultures may even be equivocal to

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<sup>24</sup> Pg 29 Ibid

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Pg 75 Douglas L. Bland National Defence Headquarters: Center For Decision. Ottawa Public Works and Government Services Canada. 1997

<sup>27</sup> Pg 30 Schein (2004)

<sup>28</sup> Pg 31 Schein (2004)

others present in the group. For example, members of the Canadian army undoubtedly share many basic assumptions, like the value of teamwork and camaraderie as a vital part of staying alive.<sup>29</sup> In addition to the army culture, sub cultures also form, most notably around the regiments that are based on their own traditions. These regimental cultures are in part based on their own basic values, many of which are shared with the rest of the army, some are not. Winslow notes that members of the disbanded Canadian Airborne Regiment held the common belief that they were superior to other regiments, which was reinforced by hazing rituals.<sup>30</sup>

Individuals within organizations will tend to develop an integrated set of assumptions that will define how individuals react to a wide variety of stimuli, what Schein describes as a “thought world or mental map”<sup>31</sup> The basic assumptions that make up this mental map tend to be non-negotiable or non-debatable, and as a result very difficult to change. Schein attributes their persistence to the human need for cognitive stability; challenging them releases anxiety and defensiveness.<sup>32</sup>

To explore the concept of basic assumptions further, Schein separates them into two broad categories, assumptions about managing internal integration and assumptions about external adaptation issues. He develops the latter into three sub categories. Within external adaptation issues, three key subcategories exist: assumptions on mission and strategy goals, goals derived from missions, and means to achieve goals. For the purposes of the analysis of the organizational cultures of DND and DFAIT a comprehensive examination of each category will not be necessary. Only basic assumptions that affect their interaction and the outcome of decision-making approach will be discussed.

Schein’s approach possesses several deficiencies though. The model encounters difficulty when explaining group dynamics in more complex settings. Its deficiencies become apparent when one attempts to analyze the interaction between two or more strong departmental cultures, such as that of DND and DFAIT within the operation of the Committee of Deputies. As discussed above the committee was largely an ad hoc group put together to plan a Canadian response to the crisis. Although it was not a permanent body, meetings among its members occurred frequently, and a professional collegial atmosphere prevailed during meetings.<sup>33</sup> In spite of this, the member’s positions were highly constrained by the departments that individuals represented. To understand the committee’s dynamics the organizational culture approach would attempt to understand its operations by viewing it through the culture it develops. Given that the Committee consists of members who come from two different departmental cultures and that they are still embedded within that culture at the same time, a cultural analysis would not fully grasp the importance of the group’s context constrain its operation. Schien’s approach could explain how the group developed routines to manage this conflict, but it would have difficulty in understanding about the factors that influence how decisions are reached.

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<sup>29</sup> Pg 4 Donna Winslow “Misplaced Loyalties: The Role of Military Culture in the Breakdown of Discipline in Two Peace Operations” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies Vol. 6 No. 3, 2004

<sup>30</sup> Ibid

<sup>31</sup> Pg 32 Schein (2004)

<sup>32</sup> Pg 32 Ibid

<sup>33</sup> Gordon Smith Interview August 18<sup>th</sup> 2005

### 3.2 The Bona Fide Group Perspective.

In order to fill the conceptual gap left by Schein, a second approach will be utilized to understand the operation of the Committee of Deputies and the Zaire Interdepartmental Task Force, the Bona Fide group perspective. Unlike the organization culture approach, the bona fide group theory offers a different perspective on the factors that drive group operation. They state:

The bona fide group perspective challenges the assumption that a group has a fixed location, an existence apart from its environment and a boundary formed by static borders.<sup>34</sup>

The perspective is ideally suited to identifying the effects of a group's present setting affects the decision making process. The bona fide group perspective identifies two essential characteristics: stable yet permeable boundaries and interdependence with immediate context.<sup>35</sup> Neither characteristic can be privileged over another as they coexist at the same time and cannot be studied in isolation from the other; in effect they are two sides of the same coin.

Stable yet permeable boundaries focuses on the membership and survival of the group within the intergroup system.<sup>36</sup> Putnam and Stohl identify several factors that are pertinent to the study Canadian crisis decision-making apparatus: multiple memberships and conflicting role identities, individual representative roles and group identity formation.<sup>37</sup> Within bona fide groups, individuals are often members of several groups at a single time, which may have serious consequences on group dynamics. It may divide loyalties, or cause value conflicts to occur. This characteristic can easily be observed within our case study, as individuals within the ad-hoc committees were also members of their home departments, which altered the dynamics of the group discussions. Furthermore as individuals serve implicitly as boundary spanners between groups, they may also come to be perceived as representatives of those groups. Within the Committee of Deputies, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), as the highest-ranking military officer within the Canadian Forces was the statutory sole provider of military advice, having serious consequences on how decisions were taken. Finally, groups may also develop their own identities, thus their own values and idiosyncrasies that would affect the type and content of decisions made by a group.

Interdependence within immediate context identifies how a group, as a collective unit, "depends and contributes to its environment."<sup>38</sup> Putnam and Stohl identify three factors that are significant in this category: intergroup communication, coordinated

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<sup>34</sup> Pg 149 Linda Putnam and Cynthia Stohl "Bona Fide Groups" Randy Hirokawa and Marshall Scott Poole (eds.) Communication and Group Decision Making London: Sage Publications. 1996.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid

<sup>36</sup> Pg 257 Putnam and Stohl "Bona Fide Groups: A Reconceptualization of Groups in Context." Communication Studies Vol 41 No. 3. 1990

<sup>37</sup> A fourth factor, "fluctuations in membership" was not relevant to the case study since no membership changes occurred in either group studied. Pg 150 Putnam and Stohl (1996)

<sup>38</sup> Pg 258 Putnam and Stohl (1990)

actions among groups and negotiations on jurisdictions and autonomy.<sup>39</sup> The effects of intergroup communication are critical to understanding how groups interact with their environment. The nature and quality of interactions with other groups may have serious effects on the decisions groups may take, and the dynamics within the group. The nature of intergroup communications is also seriously affected by how actions are coordinated among groups. Task characteristics such as “complexity, urgency and centrality,” often have an important part in shaping coordination.<sup>40</sup> Of the two committees examined, the pressing time constraints may have been an important factor in overriding traditional interdepartmental rivalries to facilitate a response. Finally, negotiations of jurisdiction and autonomy, “relates to interaction that shapes responsibility and accountability for a task.”<sup>41</sup> Factors like the autonomy placed on a group and authority in respects to other organizations are critical to understand how a group operates within its environment. Generally the committee of deputies had authority to implement most of the decisions it came to in regards to planning the operation despite existing problems.<sup>42</sup>

Although Putnam and Stohl’s approach is a powerful instrument for understanding group behavior, it suffers from several deficiencies. On its own, the bona fide perspective is unable to understand how individuals are affected by the existence of social structures. The perspective places group decisions in the milieu of its current context, focusing on including internal and external factors, but it is unable to provide a framework for understanding on how group members are affected by their past experiences. In order to mitigate this deficiency, several authors have integrated the perspective with complementary approaches such as Marshall Scott Poole’s advanced structuration theory or Ernst Bormann’s symbolic convergence theory.<sup>43</sup> In this fashion, Schein’s organizational culture approach will be applied as a conceptual tool to discover the cultures and practices of the statutory departments of the Canadian Government.

This essentially concludes the theoretical outline for the study. Although neither approach offers an ideal methodology for understanding how the different organizational cultures affect foreign policy outputs, a critical examination employing both will provide the reader with a robust examination of the factors that led to the problems encountered in Zaire.

#### 4.0 Understanding the Culture Gap

##### 4.1 Organizational Cultures

With the methodology and background identified, the discussion may now turn to identifying the organizational cultures of the two lead departments and assessing how they interacted during the Zairian crisis. The section will start off by identifying the culture of the Department of National Defence, then turn to the Department of Foreign

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<sup>39</sup> Pg 153 Putnam and Stohl (1996)

<sup>40</sup> Ibid

<sup>41</sup> Ibid

<sup>42</sup> Pg 154 ibid

<sup>43</sup> See Hauser, Brock and Hauser “A Multicultural, Intergenerational Youth Program” Lawrence Frey (ed.) Group Communication In Context: Studies of Bona Fide Groups London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 2003

Affairs and International Trade by applying Schein's organizational culture model. This analysis will be followed by a detailed examination of the two interdepartmental committees that managed the crisis, using the bona fide group perspective. These two committees were the main areas of interdepartmental discussion within the Canadian government, and offer an excellent case study for viewing how the cultures of the departments interact.

#### 4.11 Department of National Defence

Of the two cultures to be examined in this study, the Department of National Defence certainly is the most unique. Militaries worldwide have often been noted for their unique culture that often very different from the civilian societies they are embedded within.<sup>44</sup> The Canadian Forces is no different. The basic assumptions that make up the Canadian military ethos, even at the tactical and operational levels, is vital for understanding the culture of CF members when they enter senior command positions. James O'Brien observes in his study of the CF;

The CF training and development system for officers seems to contain an embedded assumption that early-career experience in decision-making is foundational to the corresponding senior officer competency.<sup>45</sup>

As O'Brien makes clear, the basic assumptions that are disseminated to officers early in their careers are intended to guide them even when they enter the senior staff. Therefore identifying key aspects of the Canadian Forces' military ethos, would provide a excellent basis for understanding how members of DND would react when confronted by a crisis situation.

It should also be noted that the title of this section is a bit of a misnomer. Statutorily, the DND and the Canadian Forces are separate institutions by law. The exception of this is in the operation of National Defence Headquarters, which amalgamated the command functions of the Canadian forces with the administrative functions of the DND into a single entity. Therefore during the day to day operation of the foreign policy apparatus, it is NDHQ, that handles all aspects of senior military decision making. Yet the unified entity of NDHQ has come under considerable criticism as diluting military values and replacing them with civilian ones. For the purposes of this analysis, the basic assumptions of Canadian forces will be identified first, followed by a discussion on the effects of civilianization.

The first basic assumption that can be discerned is the military's belief of its proper role in society. Ideally the military believes that it must remain as detached as possible from the political decision-making, preferring to remove itself entirely from public debate. An illuminating example of this assumption can be observed in 1937

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<sup>44</sup> An excellent comparative analysis of this can be found in Albert Legault and Joel Sokolsky's (eds.) The Soldier and the State in the Post Cold War Era. Kingston: Queens University Press 2002

<sup>45</sup> Pg 13 James O'Brien Free Thinking in a Large Box" or Bound and Determined?: Senior Officer Decision Making in the Canadian Forces Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute.(2003)

Memorandum on a Canadian Organization for the Higher Direction of National Defence, written by Colonel Maurice Pope. Pope's memorandum offers an excellent insight into military assumptions for the higher leadership the CF, since basic assumptions tend to resist change and persist for long periods of time. Pope identified three fundamental considerations that limit the military's area of responsibility:

1. War, including defensive war is an instrument of National Policy
2. National Policy is a responsibility of government
3. Government in Canada, must obtain the consent if not support of the majority of the people<sup>46</sup>

Pope's labeling these facts regarding military administration as immutable laws, can be compared favorably to Schein's non-debatable assumptions. Civil control of the armed forces would never be questioned by the military; it wishes to remain apolitical, which certainly remains the case today. Although respect for civil control of the military is common among civil military relations in western world, its pervasiveness seems to be even more apparent in the Canadian context. As noted by Winslow, there seems to be an aversion to politics within the officer corps. "Politics is seen as a civilian domain and something that officers should not be involved in."<sup>47</sup> This has likely contributed to unwillingness by soldiers to publicize their role or to openly criticize the government. The following statement made by an unnamed NDHQ official about peacekeeping missions emphasizes this:

The Government's policy is to participate in peacekeeping missions and they assume them to be free of human costs... Therefore if we were to report publicly, say in parliament, the real cost of these operations, then Canadians might have asked the government to withdraw from them. Then the Government's defence and foreign policies would be threatened. So we did the best we could to make sure the news never got out. After all, our job is to protect the interests of the government of the day. (Emphasis added)<sup>48</sup>

Although this statement was likely made by a civilian, it reflects the military assumption about the proper role of DND vis-à-vis the government. It is the military's duty to serve the government, and soldiers and civilians will do what it can to serve those interests.

A corollary that may be derived from Pope's three facts is that the military expects the government to make decisions matters of strategic level policy. As the military maintains its separation from politics, it looks to government to handle these matters, and provide it with clear strategic guidance for its operations. Clear statements on what the political aims of the government enables the CF to determine what sort of

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<sup>46</sup> Pg 7 Col. Maurice Pope "Memorandum on a Canadian Organization for the Higher Direction of National Defence: 8 March 1937" Douglas Bland Canada's National Defence Vol.2: Defence Organization Kingston: School of Policy Studies 1998.

<sup>47</sup> Pg 19 Donna Winslow "Canadian Society and its Army" Canadian Military Journal Vol 4. No.4 (2003)

<sup>48</sup> Pg 137 Bland and Maloney (2004)

capabilities it requires to carry out a mission and how to measure success. This has been an ongoing problem for the CF, and not just limited to the Canadian government.

During planning for the United Nations Operation to Somalia (UNOSOM) Canadian military officers repeatedly complained about the UN's lack of clarification of the missions and tasks for the troops it was to deploy.<sup>49</sup> Although the military will likely deploy its forces if forced to do so, lack of political guidance will have important consequences for how the military reacts to the situation. During Operation Assurance, the Joint Planning Staff noted that a lack of strategic level guidance had very clear consequences for the effectiveness of the operational HQ deployed in theater. It was deployed "without the benefit of a clearly defined mission, theatre of operations, force composition, ROE (Rules of Engagement) or end state."<sup>50</sup> Without such guidelines it made it difficult to determine; what the Multinational Force was intended to do, the means to by which it was supposed to do it, and when it was done whatever it was doing. Various thinkers have long identified clear strategic guidance as a prerequisite for military success, most recently in the Weinberger and Powell doctrines developed in the United States.<sup>51</sup>

The want for strategic guidance by political authorities is not without qualification though. As in any relationship, the military also expects a reciprocal respect for its area of competence. Officers believe that their specialist background sets them apart from other professions, and therefore only they have the necessary expertise to discuss these issues.<sup>52</sup> Although some authors, such as Morris Janowitz dispute this claim, stating that the development of new technologies has led to a convergence of civilian and military occupational categories, this has not really been reflected by reality.<sup>53</sup>

What sets the military apart from civilian occupational categories is that the military encompasses a whole way of life rather than a simple occupation.<sup>54</sup> These beliefs are reinforced by a perceived lack of understanding about military matters within civilian governance. An excellent example of a breach of this assumption can be observed in a May 1996 DFAIT attempts to involve Canada in a military observer mission to Burundi, without consultation of DND. In response to Minister Axworthy's initiatives, Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) Kenneth Calder sent a terse memo "expressing our displeasure" to DFAIT, also indicating that the department was not interested in involvement.<sup>55</sup> It is unlikely that the Department would have refused to provide capabilities if ordered to do so, but lack of consultation of the department can have a detrimental effect on the CF's support for the mission and alter how it may implement the mission.

Moreover, if the military expects civilian leaders to respect their opinions, they certainly do not want direct interference in areas of their authority, especially in areas of

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<sup>49</sup> Pg 12, Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Forces into Somalia Final Report: Vol 3 Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada. 1996 (hereafter referred to as Somalia inquiry)

<sup>50</sup> Access to Information Act A970671 (1#2) Pg 179

<sup>51</sup> See for example Pg. 11-12 Michael I Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought. 3<sup>rd</sup> Ed. London: Frank Cass, 2002.

<sup>52</sup> Pg 67 Bland, Maloney (2004)

<sup>53</sup> Pg 9 Morris Janowitz The Professional Soldier New York: Free Press 1960

<sup>54</sup> Douglas Bland Military Leadership and Change in the 1990's. Conference of Defence Association. 10<sup>th</sup> June 2005 <<http://www.cda-cdai.ca/library/bland.htm>>

<sup>55</sup> Access to Information Act A9611168 (2#5) Pg 3

tactical and operational responsibility. Unnecessary interference in the areas is greeted with severe disagreement, even to the point of insubordination. The experience of the unification of the Canadian Armed Forces in the early 1960s provides an illuminating example. Before 1964, the chiefs of each service submitted their budgetary requests separately to the MND, who was then forced to deal with the boated requests that were unrealistic, given the overall budgetary constraints. This occurred because each service chief held the belief that operational matters in their environmental command was an exclusive preserve that only they could understand. Bland describes this situation as the “Strong Services approach,” whereby each equated what was best for their service was best for their country.<sup>56</sup> In an attempt to remedy this problem, MND Paul Hellyer introduced the Bill C-90 in 1964, which created the post of Chief of Defence Staff to coordinate the service chiefs’ proposals. Hellyer’s proposals were greeted with extreme resistance, which went as far as the resignation of Admiral William Landymore. Bill C-90 and later Bill C-243 in 1966 were viewed by the military as a clear violation of the proper role of the civilian leadership into military affairs, which prompted one of the deepest crises in civil military relations in modern Canadian history.

Another basic assumption held by the military is the concept of loyalty. Loyalty as a concept can be separated into several different assumptions, with very important affects. Former Chief of Defence Staff General Dextraze highlighted two types of loyalty; “Loyalty up to one’s superior and Loyalty down to one’s subordinate.”<sup>57</sup> Loyalty towards one’s superior can be seen all the way up through the chain of command, right up from the CDS to the Prime Minister, whilst downwards it goes to one’s subordinates, and even to a service. Tied up with the concept of loyalty is that of responsibility. Officers clearly are responsible to carry out orders, but they are also responsible for the care and wellbeing of their subordinates. During the Somalia Inquiry, Major General Romeo Dallaire testified that:

The military leader has undivided responsibility for all that subordinates do or fail to do, and a personal responsibility to ensure that they accomplish the assigned mission. The leader must motivate subordinates and see that they are prepared for their tasks, and that they do not suffer unnecessary casualties, are cared for if they are sick or wounded, comforted if dying, and buried with dignity when they have died<sup>58</sup>

A statement made by U.S. Army General Mathew Ridgeway, used to train Canadian officers, further emphasized this:

When all is said and done, the most precious asset any nation has is its youth, and for a battlefield commander ever to condone the unnecessary sacrifice of his men is inexcusable. In any action you must balance the inevitable cost in lives against the objectives you seek to attain. Unless the

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<sup>56</sup> Bland <<http://www.cda-cdai.ca/library/bland.htm>>

<sup>57</sup> Pg 9 Gen. Jacques Dextraze quoted in Somalia Inquiry Vol. 2 (1996)

<sup>58</sup> Pg 11 Maj. General Dallaire, quoted in Somalia Inquiry Vol. 2 (1996)

results to be expected can reasonably justify the estimated loss of life the action involves, then for my part I want none of it.<sup>59</sup>

Dallaire and Ridgeway's statements make it clear that leaders must balance the need for mission expediency with the lives of their subordinates. Commanders must do everything in their power to protect soldiers' lives, even going as far as insubordination according to General Ridgeway.

An implication of this assumption is that military officers develop an acute awareness of the potential dangers involved in any particular intervention. If the security situation of a potential operation cannot be ascertained, officers will insist that in-theater reconnaissance be undertaken before commitment of forces takes place. If senior officials deem the risks to be excessive they may ask to change the parameters of the operation in order to reduce the vulnerability of deployed troops, either to limit Canadian participation or to augment the contribution with additional assets. An illustrative example of the alternate standards by which CF officers view operations may be observed in the deployment of Canadian Forces as peacekeepers to the Balkans as part of UNPROFOR. During the Cold War, most peacekeeping operations were generally undertaken by combat troops under a UN mandate, positioned between two warring parties that agreed to their deployment. Peacekeepers traditionally were seen as impartial observers, and lightly armed in order to reinforce that perception.

At first glance, the 1992 Vance-Owen agreement, which enabled 14,000 peacekeepers to be deployed to protect safe zones and separate combatants within the former Yugoslavia, would seem to fit this model of operation. Certainly this was the view of the UN and some within the Canadian government. In spite of this attitude and prevailing norms within peacekeeping operations, Canadian troops deployed to the Balkans with their heavy weaponry such as anti-tank missiles and heavy mortars. The following passage by Lt. Col. Michel Jones, Commanding officer of the 1er Royal 22e Regiment battalion group in Sarajevo 1992, highlights the issue,

At one point General Mackenzie asked me what kind of equipment I would like to have and I produced a shopping list, which he approved. As a matter of fact the TOW launcher vehicles and self-propelled mortars were in the initial proposal... but the UN denied it. The main reason for the TOW was for the sights, and in addition to that the range of the TOW was greater than the range of the belligerents' anti-aircraft guns that were set up pointing at the airport. We would have been able to shoot those if it were required. There were a bunch of belligerent tanks around the airport... These were normal, necessary steps for our protection. (emphasis added)<sup>60</sup>

This quote clearly illustrates the effects of military culture on the decision-making of CF officers. The decision to include heavy weapons was motivated by the belief that soldiers should be able to protect themselves from any threat. This discrepancy can be explained by how members of the Canadian forces viewed Bosnia; it was essentially as a

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<sup>59</sup> Pg 22 Gen Matthew B. Ridgeway, "Leadership", in *Military Leadership: in Pursuit of Excellence*, ed. Taylor and Rosenback. Quoted in Pg 10 *Somalia Inquiry Vol.2* (1996)

<sup>60</sup> Pg 31~32 Sean Maloney & John Lambias *Chances for peace Canadian soldiers in the Balkans* Vanwell

combat zone. Croatian officials told Canadian General Lew Mackenzie that they “would take the UN protected areas by force at the first opportunity.”<sup>61</sup> Therefore military officers did not share the perception that Peacekeepers’ authority would be respected and altered their response to the mission. Soldiers were provided heavy weaponry in order to enable them to respond to any threat of aggression and to aid them in achieving their mandate.

The conflict over loyalty to government and subordinates, also manifests itself in what soldiers believe is the proper role of the military. In a study of its organizational culture and ethos conducted by the Canadian army, it was found that with there was clear support for most missions the Canadian Army has been engaged in (See figure 1).<sup>62</sup> The only mission role not commanding clear support was the use of Canadian Forces to promote Canadian social values.<sup>63</sup> Its findings make it apparent that the military possesses deep assumptions about consists a proper role for itself. Clearly the defence of Canadian territory and citizens, and to a lesser extent that of allied citizens, are closer to the ideal organizational mission than promoting Canadian values for the CF. This is not to say that military officers will refuse any of these missions if ordered. The military has participated in all types of operations since 1990, including humanitarian interventions, with no hint of insubordination.

A very striking aspect of the CF’s study on military ethos was the response of soldiers when they were asked what more important for each mission: troop safety or mission accomplishment. Only the categories of combat operations to defend Canadian territory, and Canadian citizens elicited clear support for mission success being more important than soldiers’ lives, while the category of “Combat Options to Defend an Ally of Canada” exhibited an even split.<sup>64</sup> For all other categories, respondents’ valued lives over mission accomplishment. This has serious affects on how the military may respond to a government request for a military intervention. If faced with a task that is not among the preferred organizational missions, the military will do everything to protect soldier’s safety in the field. If given unclear orders, the department may use them to argue to a premature closure of a mission, or to do the bare minimum in order to achieve mission objectives. Furthermore they may take additional precautions that delay expediency, including the deployment of additional capabilities in order to protect the lives of soldiers.

The final area of discussion is the effect of civilianization on the basic assumptions of the members of NDHQ. As discussed above, NDHQ was created as a result of a 1972 amalgamation of the Canadian Forces Headquarters and the Department of National Defence into NDHQ. The overall aim of the reorganization was to enhance the management efficiency of Department of National Defence by merging the operational and management aspects of the overall establishment into a new unified

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<sup>61</sup> Pg 28 Dawn Hewitt From Ottawa to Sarajevo: Canadian Peacekeepers in the Balkans. Kingston: Queen’s Centre for International Relations. 1998

<sup>62</sup> Pg 33 Capstick, et al. Canada’s Soldiers: Military Ethos and Canadian Values in the 21st Century Army November 2004. Land Force Command. June 12<sup>th</sup> 2005

<[http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/lfwa\\_hq/Conferences/Army\\_Culture\\_Survey.pdf](http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/lfwa_hq/Conferences/Army_Culture_Survey.pdf)>

<sup>63</sup> Pg 34 Capstick, et al. (2004)

<sup>64</sup> Pg 36 Capsick et al. (2004)

headquarters. Undoubtedly organizational change has had a substantial impact on the organizational culture of NDHQ, but it is questionable whether it has affected the basic assumptions of the CF outlined above.

Figure 1. Canadian Army Views on Appropriate Roles for the Military




Table Adapted from Pg. 33 Capstick Et al. “Canada’s Soldiers: Military Ethos and Canadian Values in the 21st Century Army” Land Force Command. June 12<sup>th</sup> 2005 <[http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/lfa\\_hq/Conferences/Army\\_Culture\\_Survey.pdf](http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/lfa_hq/Conferences/Army_Culture_Survey.pdf)>

The effect of civilianization on the basic assumptions of NDHQ culture is difficult to discern. Certainly there has been an injection of civilian values into some aspects of the department’s organization. The 1979 Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces, known as the Vance Review, observed that civilianization was having a detrimental impact on the day-to-day management of the armed forces, by contributing to a lack of consideration for the unique needs of CF members.<sup>65</sup> The task force also noted that unification was contributing to a deterioration of military ethos, but much of the evidence since then has pointed to the contrary. In more than one occasion, Canadian troops fought with courage and distinction, upholding many of the principles of the CF ethos. As Lee Windsor observed:

The greatest lesson to be learned from the Medak Pocket operation is that contrary to the findings of the Somalia Inquiry, the Canadian Army in 1993 consisted of dedicated, highly trained, superbly disciplined soldiers.

<sup>65</sup> Maj General John Vance et al. “Review Group on the Report of the Task Force on Unification of the Canadian Forces” Bland (1997)

These troops were led by competent, well-educated, highly capable officers and senior NCOs.<sup>66</sup>

Windsor's statement makes it perfectly apparent that Canadian troops performed admirably under the difficult combat conditions of the Medak pocket, displaying all the hallmarks of a professional military ethos in the process. This has been repeated time and time again from the skies of Kosovo to the hills of Afghanistan, proving the continued viability of the assumptions listed above.

Finally the Vance Review identified that individuals outside NDHQ had the perception that civilians had a major impact on the decision-making process.<sup>67</sup> Certainly from the perspective of individuals within DFAIT during the Zairian crisis, the Civilian and Military representatives of NDHQ were on the same page, but Deputy Minister Louise Frechette took a greater leadership role than the CDS Larry Murray.<sup>68</sup> This may have been due to Murray's recent appointment as Acting CDS, which would have put him at a disadvantage to the longer serving Frechette. Initially it would seem to confirm suspicions that the 1972 MRG had introduced greater civilian control into the decision making process, but this does not necessarily mean that civilian values have replaced military ones.

One of the key traits of an organizational culture is that members are socialized into basic assumptions, many of which are instituted by the initial leader of the organization.<sup>69</sup> The original leader of NDHQ was General Dextraze. Initially CDS Dextraze agreed to the MRG, as he believed that he could institutionalize the powers of the CDS over the Deputy Minister, though on paper they existed as co-equals. In spite of his efforts, Deputy Ministers began to take on a greater role in military decision-making after his retirement.<sup>70</sup> However it is more than likely the next DM was socialized with the military basic assumptions that Dextraze implemented and perpetuated.

Though DMs do not originate from a military background, they are likely socialized to military values and assumptions during their time of service within the department. As a result they must operate under similar basic assumptions to their CF colleagues. If they attempted to violate the military's basic assumptions on operational matters, it would lead to a serious civil-military crisis within the department. Military members would likely reject the DM's leadership if he or she violated major aspects of the military ethos. Thus civilians could only alter culture in areas where their expertise was most proficient such as in the use of general management techniques to enhance the efficiency of the CF. This would be consistent with the Vance Review's observation that civilianization has had a detrimental impact on the day to day management of the CF, but not on the overall decision making of the CF.

Consequently it is difficult to observe where civilianization has changed the basic assumptions of the CF in respect to operational issues. Although the Vance review notes that civilianization has altered some aspects of military values, in all likelihood it has had

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<sup>66</sup> Lee A. Windsor The Medak Pocket Conference of Defence Associations <<http://www.cda-cdai.ca/library/medakpocket.htm>>

<sup>67</sup> Pg 11 Somalia Inquiry Ch. 2. (1996)

<sup>68</sup> Gordon Smith Interview August 18<sup>th</sup> 2005

<sup>69</sup> Pg 226 Schein (2004)

<sup>70</sup> Douglas Bland Military Leadership and Change in the 1990's. Conference of Defence Association. 10<sup>th</sup> June 2005 <<http://www.cda-cdai.ca/library/bland.htm>>

little effect on the assumptions discussed above. It is very apparent that the DND, the CF, and NDHQ possess a unique culture, with significant effects on foreign policy making.

#### 4.12 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

The organizational culture of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade stands in marked contrast to that of the Department of National Defence. The department holds several assumptions that create the basis for interdepartmental strife when interacting with DND, with potentially serious effects on how foreign and defence policy is implemented.

Firstly, it is clear that the foundation of the departmental culture of Foreign affairs Canada is based on the assumption that its members are the principle representatives of Canada abroad. An indicator of its centrality is that it forms the overarching basis by which potential employees are evaluated upon.<sup>71</sup> On the surface this would seem to be very similar to basic assumption held by members of DND concerning government loyalty, but with two important differences. Firstly the department does not possess conflicting assumptions based on loyalty to subordinates derived from military ethos. Secondly, in its role as a diplomatic representative of Canada, DFAIT members are noted for their attention towards the political implications of decisions. The root of this difference may result from functional considerations related to instrumentality. DFAIT's main instrument for affecting its external environment is that of dialogue and communication with foreign actors. Therefore the perception of issues holds a greater prominence for employees, which alters the standards that are drawn upon to define mission success.

During Operation Assurance, one CIDA participant observed that DND members were easier to work with than DFAIT officials, "if only because DND and CIDA were both more concerned with practicalities and less with diplomatic/political ephemera."<sup>72</sup> This can easily become a source of conflict between DFAIT and other departments. Since other foreign policy departments like DND and CIDA's assumptions are in part based on the instruments they possess, they may possess radically different perspectives on a crisis. As noted above, this problem was quite apparent during the Canadian Forces deployment to Bosnia in 1992. At the time, DFAIT officials were particularly worried that the troops' possession of heavy weapons would provoke belligerents and incite even more violence.<sup>73</sup>

Another basic assumptions guiding DFAIT employees is the role of the department as the lead agency on all aspects of foreign policy in Canada. The roots of this assumption are quite deep, but its modern basis emerged during the 1970s. During the Trudeau Government, the Department of External Affairs (DEA) assumed the role as the coordinator of the Canadian foreign policy apparatus. This was partly due to Trudeau's reforms that gave primary domestic ministries like Trade Industry and Commerce, and Employment and Immigration a greater role in foreign policy making in

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<sup>71</sup> David Elder Interview

<sup>72</sup> Pg 10 John Hay (1999)

<sup>73</sup> Pg 36 Dawn W. Hewitt From Ottawa to Sarajevo Canadian Peacekeepers in the Balkans Kingston: Centre for International Relations Queens University (1998)

their own areas. In response the DEA began strategic policy planning “as part of a broader concept of the leadership role that the department could exert on behalf of the prime minister in coordinating the foreign policy process.”<sup>74</sup> Its role was further enhanced during a major spending and restructuring program initiated in 1982, which enabled DFAIT to consolidate its position above other departments and enhance its policy-making capabilities.<sup>75</sup>

As a result of its experiences, the department believed that it held a central role for directing Canadian foreign policy. The implications of this assumption is that, much like DND in respects to military matters, DFAIT members believe that they must be involved in any decision that has a foreign policy aspect to it. This has been the cause of serious interdepartmental strife over the past several decades, when officials from other federal ministries and provincial governments failed to inform DFAIT of their international activities.<sup>76</sup> This problem is exacerbated by the unclear delineation of departmental responsibility over foreign policy issues. Although Foreign Affairs is nominally the lead department over all foreign policy, there is little clarification on the delineation of responsibilities on specific policy areas. No clearer example of this problem exists than with relationship between DFAIT and DND, specifically with their differing assumptions on security and defence policy.

The basis for DFAIT’s assumptions on security and defence policy may be discerned in what Schein would label its shared assumptions about mission and strategy. Whereas the DND possesses a limited conception of the proper role of military force in foreign policy, DFAIT members embrace a more expansive conception that is tied to its organizational mission. Bartleman identifies three core missions held by the department:

- Ensure the security of the State
- To provide for the economic well being of Canadian citizens
- To project internationally the values of the nation.<sup>77</sup>

Although all three of these missions exist at all time, it belies the contemporary focus of the department. Much of Canada’s domestic security and economic prosperity is directly linked with its relationship with the United States, which has remained very stable in the past century. The deep cultural, economic, and security links between the two states ensures that their relationship remains relatively maintenance free. Therefore with the first two pillars or missions of Canadian foreign policy remaining somewhat latent, disproportionate attention is paid to the third assumption, or projecting national values abroad.

The roots of this assumption may be found in the so-called “Golden Era” of Canadian foreign policy from 1945 to 1967, when Canada took on a leading international role under the leadership of Lester B. Pearson. Defining events included role in the creation of the 1950 Colombo Plan, and crucial roles in resolving the 1947-1948 India-Pakistan and 1956 Suez Crises.<sup>78</sup> The successes of the golden era bred the assumption that one of Canada’s missions should be to play an activist role by promoting its values in

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<sup>74</sup> Pg 223 David Dewitt and John Kirton Canada as a Principle Power Toronto: John Wiley and Sons. 1983

<sup>75</sup> Ibid

<sup>76</sup> Pg 58-60 Michael Tucker Canadian Foreign Policy Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980

<sup>77</sup> Pg 36 Bartleman (2005)

<sup>78</sup> Pg 132 Cohen (2003)

the international sphere. Many External Affairs officials came to the belief that Canada occupied a unique position within the international system, and it could leverage it to contribute to international peace and security. This belief became ingrained into culture of the Department of External Affairs to such an extent that by the 1990s the concept of peacekeeping itself was seen as a Canadian value.<sup>79</sup>

This may explain to a great degree the enthusiastic reception of the two major foreign policy initiatives that occurred in the 1990s; the “Human Security Agenda” and “Soft Power Model.” Both Concepts were spearheaded under the dynamic leadership of Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy, and largely adopted by the Department. The Human Security Doctrine aimed to infuse Canadian foreign policy with an ethical dimension by placing a greater prominence on issues of democracy promotion and human rights protection in its relations with the less developed world. As David Elder notes “Many in the Department saw it as an alternative framing for one of the Department’s essential thrusts, and others as an opportunity to reposition Canada as the world was changing.”<sup>80</sup> As it is apparent from this passage, the values of the human security were viewed as being largely consistent with pre-existing basic assumptions of the department, which facilitated their adoption. Human security provided a useful framework to operationalize the core mission of promoting Canadian values abroad. Thus human security could be identified as an organizational goal derived from missions.

Linked to the adoption of the human security agenda, the development” of the “Soft Power Model,” which can be viewed as an assumption on means derived from goals. In his 1997 International Journal article, Axworthy describes soft power as:

Security against economic privation, an acceptable quality of life, and a guarantee of fundamental human rights...At a minimum, human security requires that basic needs are met, but it acknowledges that sustained economic development, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development and social equity are as important to global peace as arms control and disarmament.<sup>81</sup>

Although Soft Power largely focused on applying diplomatic and economic instruments to achieve foreign policy interests, it did not exclude the use of military force to support these aims. Within this framework, Military force could often play a vital role in guaranteeing fundamental freedoms and rule of law, which Dennis Stairs sarcastically referred to as “social engineering.”<sup>82</sup> The use of military force in support of human security objectives at the present time does not suggest that this has always been the case. Sean Maloney has effectively argued that the rationale for cold war peacekeeping missions

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<sup>79</sup> Pg 46 Stairs, Denis Canada in the 1990s: Speak Loudly and Carry a Bent Twig January/February 2001, Policy Options <<http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/jan01/stairs.pdf>>

<sup>80</sup> David elder interview

<sup>81</sup> Pg 183 Lloyd Axworthy, “Canada and Human Security: the Need for Leadership,” International Journal Vol.52 (1997)

<sup>82</sup> Pg 47 Dennis Stairs (2001)

were often based on realist calculations, which emanated from the now latent core mission of ensuring Canadian security.<sup>83</sup>

Interestingly, DFAIT has developed a unique culture in order to manage issues of internal adaptation. Officially, the department operates within a hierarchical system that ensures a policy proposal or action follows a well-established process of approval in order to ensure its adoption or implementation. However the culture also promotes open discussion on policy issues and the open expression of dissent, so that a large number of people may have a significant influence on a policy process.<sup>84</sup> Information is passed to all positions relevant to the discussion, and consultation is opened to as many individuals as possible.<sup>85</sup> This system has presented difficulty at times in reaching a consensus or coherent position, which is exacerbated by the existence of strong sub cultures that have a tendency to develop around specialist interests/skill groups. Several may be identified including, the “Asia group”, the Economic Policy Bureau, and the security/intelligence/military liaison sub-culture.<sup>86</sup> During the tenure of the Lloyd Axworthy, members of the security/intelligence/military liaison subculture were particularly uncomfortable with the department’s adoption of the soft power and human security initiatives. Although the initiatives were adopted in spite of their concerns, the episode reveals the effect of these subgroups have on decision-making. It is very possible that one may have a defining role on policymaking given the right situation.

With the organizational culture of DFAIT and DND identified, we can now turn to the final section of the study, which will identify how the cultures interacted during a crisis management operation. It is already apparent at this point that while DND and DFAIT share some similar values and beliefs, they also possess equivocal ones as well, with serious consequences for the government’s ability to undertake effective crisis management.

#### 4.2 The Bona Fide Group Perspective Applied

This final section will identify how these two cultures interacted during the Zairian intervention by applying the bona fide group perspective to the operation of two interdepartmental committees. Normally, DND and DFAIT interact via several interdepartmental mechanisms, some institutionalized, some ad hoc. These included weekly meetings between Deputy Ministers and the CDS, and ad hoc partnerships between mid level bureaucrats as required for various issues.<sup>87</sup> The formation of the Zaire Interdepartmental Task Force and the Committee of Deputies followed the realization by members of the Canadian Government foreign policy apparatus that the existing structures were wholly inadequate to the task. As it will become apparent, departmental

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<sup>83</sup> See Sean Maloney Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishing. (2002)

<sup>84</sup> David C. Elder Interview. July 28<sup>th</sup> 2005

<sup>85</sup> David C. Elder Interview. July 28<sup>th</sup> 2005

<sup>86</sup> David C. Elder Interview. July 28<sup>th</sup> 2005

<sup>87</sup> Confidential Interview.

cultures constrained the actions of these groups and had a significant effect on the outcome of events.

#### 4.21 Stable Yet Permeable Boundaries

Members of the two committees possessed multiple group memberships, which had important effects on determining the dynamics of group interaction. Individuals of three major departments and two offices staffed both the Task Force and the Committee of Deputies. These included DND, DFAIT, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the Privy Council Office and Prime Ministers Office, with the Committee of Deputies and the Task Force consisting of eight and ten members, respectively.<sup>88</sup> The procedures differed between both groups, partially due to their different history. The members of the Committee of Deputies had a long history of cooperation, meeting weekly and on an ad-hoc basis when the situation called for it. During the Zairian crisis however, meetings were held almost on a daily basis, convening for two to three hours each morning. Afterwards members would return to their departments and implement the planning agreed upon before. The Task Force on the other hand possessed a more permanent structure. Members were relocated to their own bank of offices in the Privy Council Office and meetings occurred every morning and in the afternoon as need be. Meetings with pertinent individuals, such as ADMs, DMs and Ministers occurred as necessary, usually when developments in the situation dictated.<sup>89</sup> For both groups the members were well known to each other, but only the Committee of Deputies had operated in this format before November 1996. Discussions were held with little overt friction and relationships were generally collegial, reflecting the professionalism of senior levels of government.

Members from each department brought with them their own values and assumptions to both groups, and disagreements over policy were frequent. Likely the greatest conflict emerged between DND representatives and the rest of the group.<sup>90</sup> From the start, DND was opposed to carrying out an intervention, and attempted everything within its means to prevent itself from having to commit anything more than the bare minimum. Contingency planning had started as early as November 6<sup>th</sup> within DND for a mission to the Zaire, but this was only in support of a multinational intervention, not in a leadership role.<sup>91</sup> DND was not consulted about leading the mission, and the CDS and DM were essentially informed by the PM that Canada would lead the mission in a meeting on November 10<sup>th</sup> without any chance to discuss the pros and cons of intervention.<sup>92</sup> Plainly, two of the key basic assumptions held by DND had been violated even before the mission started: DND had not been consulted about the operation, nor was it close to what officials believed to be the proper role of the CF. During the Operation Assurance, DND officials were especially conscious about possible risks to

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<sup>88</sup> CIDA is the primary agency tasked with the distribution of humanitarian aid and development.

<sup>89</sup> Confidential Interview

<sup>90</sup> Graham Smith Interview August 18<sup>th</sup> 2005

<sup>91</sup> Pg 13 Hennessy (2001)

<sup>92</sup> John Hay Conditions of Influence: An exploratory study of the Canadian government's effect on U.S. policy in the case of intervention in eastern Zaire. Unpublished Masters thesis, Carleton University.

troops, as well as defining the strategic mission goals, which was largely not forthcoming.<sup>93</sup>

Moreover, many parties misunderstood the appropriate role for military force and the implications of the missions they wished to carry out. This can be observed in UN Resolution 1078 of November 16<sup>th</sup>, which calls upon the creation of a Multinational Force with the objectives of:

- Assisting the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees with the protection and voluntary repatriation of refugees and displaced persons;
- Establishing humanitarian corridors for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to assist the voluntary repatriation of refugees after carefully ascertaining their effective will to repatriate;<sup>94</sup>

The wording of the resolution, crafted in part by Canadian diplomats, was fundamentally a flawed document from a military perspective. To “ascertain a refugee’s effective will to repatriate,” would almost certainly require CF units to enter militarized encampments and separate the Hutu Militias from the refugees. The CF clearly viewed this as an excessively dangerous mission for a role that ranked very low on its priority list, and did not want to get involved in the situation in the least. The dangers of simply providing humanitarian aid in a combat zone was very well known to the CF; they had suffered dozens of casualties while doing so as part of UNPROFOR. The implications unquestioningly pushing such a mission was not clear to some DFAIT individuals, and it undoubtedly alienated DND members from doing anything more than the bare minimum. Furthermore, the ongoing Somalia inquiry was perceived to have a very negative effect on DND morale. The most visible effect of this was the recent disbanding of the CAR and the “retirement” of CDS Jean Boyle and his replacement by Acting Chief Of Defence Staff Larry Murray, only a month before the crisis.<sup>95</sup> In light of these factors, it is unsurprising that DND representatives in the Committee were generally unwilling to commit to the operation.<sup>96</sup> When refugees started streaming back into Rwanda in mid November, they disputed whether an intervention was even an appropriate course of action at all. Upon the repatriation of refugees to Rwanda, one high-ranking military officer confided that it “was one of the happiest moments of (his) military career.”<sup>97</sup>

Other departmental representatives generally believed that an intervention was necessary to alleviate the suffering of the Rwandan refugees, and were largely on the same page but for different reasons. Members of DFAIT had several reasons for pushing for an intervention. The obvious argument for intervention rested on the basic assumption that the bureaucracy must maintain complete loyalty to the government. As PM Chrétien had staked considerable personal prestige in pushing for intervention, DFAIT officials felt obligated to do their best to achieve his wishes.<sup>98</sup> However duty alone is not a sufficient explanation for the zeal DFAIT members had in pushing for an intervention. In

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<sup>93</sup> Confidential Interview

<sup>94</sup> United Nation Security Council Resolution 1078 November 9<sup>th</sup> 1996, August 4<sup>th</sup> 2005 <[http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1078%20\(1996\)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC](http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1078%20(1996)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC)>

<sup>95</sup> Pg 133 Bland and Maloney (2004)

<sup>96</sup> Gordon Smith Interview August 18<sup>th</sup> 2005

<sup>97</sup> Pg 121 Hay (1998)

<sup>98</sup> Pg 16 Hay (1999)

the final stages of Operation Assurance, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy made a public effort to continue the intervention, even though the PM favored ending Canadian involvement. DFAIT's position can be understood through its basic assumption of Canada as an activist nation, which was given form by the human security doctrine. DM Smith noted that most members of the Committee of Deputies supported the intervention, including Diplomatic Advisor James Bartleman, and Task Force leader James Judd.<sup>99</sup> Since they, and much of the foreign policy apparatus had served in DFAIT, it is clear that they were all socialized to the same basic assumptions and values.

The clash of values enacted through group membership can be seen in the way intelligence was utilized by various groups. Likely the most visible example of this could be seen in how intelligence on refugee flows was distorted by departments to suit their departmental interests. Within the Canadian government both DND and DFAIT/CIDA utilized different metrics for estimating refugee flows, which altered perceptions about what needed to be done. DND utilized military intelligence reports shared by the UK Ministry of Defence and the Pentagon, mostly consisting of aerial reconnaissance missions over the region. However the other members of the Task Force were slow to realize that these reports only covered a thin strip of the border area and did not account for the number or conditions of refugees located deeper in the jungle.<sup>100</sup> This dramatically underreported the number refugees and thus lending credence to their claims that the need for an intervention had dissipated. On the other hand, DFAIT and CIDA used figures obtained from NGOs, which in many cases were highly inflated by them to pressure the international community into action. The perception among members of CIDA and DFAIT officials was that NGOs were essentially neutral third party organizations, and their estimates were taken as genuine reflections of the situation in the region. This perception was soon questioned and a post-operation DND/DFAIT lessons learned document suggested that NGOs be treated as normal political actors with their own agendas.<sup>101</sup>

Representative roles among members clearly developed during the lifespan of the groups. Within the Committee of Deputies, one of the most visible was that of the CDS Larry Murray as the highest-ranking military officer, which was viewed by other members as the sole provider of military advice for the operation. Other members of the group felt unable to question the military's advice because of the specialized nature of the information their representatives provided.<sup>102</sup> Though each member possessed unique capabilities as provided by their department, none were as impenetrable as those of DND. For example, the CIDA representative in the Task Force had inadequate experience in crisis management and could not keep up with the dynamics of the operation. Other group members quickly identified this, and the individual was often bypassed when dealing with CIDA.<sup>103</sup> This would be highly unlikely in the case of DND, as other members of the groups had little basis to question their statements. This enabled DND representatives to control the tone of discussions on military capability on their terms.

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<sup>99</sup> Gordon Smith Interview August 18<sup>th</sup> 2005

<sup>100</sup> Confidential Interview. August 18<sup>th</sup> 2005

<sup>101</sup> Access to Information A970706 Pg 14

<sup>102</sup> Gordon Smith Interview. August 18<sup>th</sup> 2005

<sup>103</sup> Confidential Interview

The importance of representative roles became apparent in how the military used its position as the sole provider of military advice to leverage the discussions to its own ends. During the planning stages of Operation Assurance, the DND representatives gave biased information to delay the government's response in the hope that this would alleviate the need for an intervention. They would tend to exaggerate deployment times and claim that implementation of subsequent phases could not occur before certain preconditions were met. Other representatives were forced to respect the expert military advice given and were unable to question these figures, even though they suspected that the CF representatives were dragging their heels.<sup>104</sup>

The final aspect of stable yet permeable boundaries identified by Putnam and Stohl is the development of a group culture, which clearly developed during the group's operation. As one participant of the ZITF noted:

In forming the group, we accepted the rationale that what was needed was a cohesive group that would think/advise and act in a "whole of government" manner rather than simply be a re-creation of competing departmental interests. We did not need a task force to achieve the latter.

This statement makes it clear that a group identity was fundamental to the operation of the Task Force. In order to facilitate discussion, the group developed general procedures to prevent serious conflicts from erupting, such as keeping meetings short and informal.<sup>105</sup> The significance of the clear conflict management procedures is that they are substantive proof of a group identity's development around the idea that the group should act above narrower departmental and values and interests. The familiarity of members from before the crisis undoubtedly facilitated discussions; it provided a basis for members to operate a group format. Close contact between members under the difficult time constraints also strengthened the group identity in both the Task Force and the Committee.

A slight discrepancy seems to be apparent when one compares the group cultures of the ZITF and the Committee of Deputies. The Committee's operation was marked by more serious disagreements than the ZITF. Several factors may contribute to this. Firstly, the differing levels of responsibility charged to various individuals likely contributed to this discrepancy. The ZITF was made by mid- to high-level managers of various departments seconded to the task force, which removed the burden of having to maintain departmental values and positions in order to enhance consensus building. The Committee on the other hand was made up of heads of departments who had to be more rigid in their positions on issues. Moreover, the development of a group culture likely exacerbated these differences to some degree. Since the Task Force relocated members to the Privy Council office and operated as a more coherent group, it likely developed a stronger group culture than the more informal Committee of Deputies. DMs remained based in their home departments, which hindered group socialization and reinforced departmental assumptions.

#### 4.22 Interdependence Within Immediate Context.

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<sup>104</sup> Gordon Smith Interview. August 18<sup>th</sup> 2005, Confidential Interview.

<sup>105</sup> Confidential Interview. August 18<sup>th</sup> 2005

Relations of the Committee of Deputies and the Zaire Interdepartmental Task Force with groups in their environment reflected many of the differences in culture. Communications between groups occurred one of several ways. The Committee generally communicated its decisions via group members who went back to their departments to implement decisions in person. The ZITF on the other hand used one of several methods. Task Force often met with relevant ADMs as a group or individually to communicate their orders, and used telephones and faxes to pass information and orders as well. On the whole, both group's members did not note any difficulty in the implementation of planning decisions made within either group.<sup>106</sup> Decisions were implemented faithfully to what had been agreed upon within the groups. However where difficulty occurred was when group members attempted to explain the reasoning behind decisions to individuals of other departments.

When it became necessary to explain a decision driven by aid considerations to a DND Operations Centre Watch officer, a senior DND officer could often do it in terms that Watch Officer would understand better.<sup>107</sup>

It is apparent from this account that slight differences in organizational cultural created difficulty in the implementation of the decisions agreed upon by the Task Force. Although this problem was less likely to occur in the Committee's operation because the departmental representative implemented decisions, the ZITF would be more prone to encountering this sort of problem because of its collegial format that blurred accountability lines more than in the Committee.

The state of coordination actions among groups is the next important factor identified as being critical for the study of interdependence within immediate context. Putnam and Stohl list task centrality and urgency as one of the key factors to coordination. It is clear that DFAIT and DND possessed fairly divergent assumptions on the concept of intervention. Given National Defence's apprehension, it is questionable whether it elicited the same commitment towards mission success as it did for the DFAIT. In spite of this, both groups generally cooperated well once major planning decisions had been taken. It was the role of the ZITF and the Committee to ensure cooperation occurred, however how they accomplished this was markedly different. The Committee basically operated as a body for the coordination of planning for department heads in their nominal role. The pressing nature of the crisis and its obvious priority for the government, forced the participants to meet at a higher frequency than normal. This likely aided consensus building to occur, but overall it did not represent a new institutional or capability response to crisis decision-making. Interdepartmental differences were often apparent as both major departments aimed to achieve their wishes.

The Task Force on the other hand was a completely original development, and was tasked with a variety of roles that did not exist prior to the crisis. First off it was an established institution whose members were seconded to it, which enabled it to develop consensus on issues as noted above. It was also directly tasked with ensuring

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<sup>106</sup> Gordon Smith Interview. August 18<sup>th</sup> 2005, Confidential interviews

<sup>107</sup> Confidential Interview.

interdepartmental coordination. The ZITF ensured that the departments were on the same page and that decided policies were implemented as agreed; “people were to leave a meeting and know exactly what was to happen next.”<sup>108</sup> As well, the group wrote and vetted certain political statements made by ministers. This was a particularly difficult and frustrating task as often Ministers were in need of being “reigned in.”<sup>109</sup> As the crisis progressed it started to formulate responses to developing events as well.

A key task of the ZITF that promoted interdepartmental cooperation was its activities in intelligence gathering and dissemination. Each day the Task Force published a daily briefing that was sent to all relevant offices involved in management of the Zairian crisis. It included a report about events in Zaire, diplomatic, military and humanitarian developments, media activity and major issues that needed to be resolved.<sup>110</sup> This daily briefing was essential to for keeping the government abreast of the rapidly evolving situation and on the same page. DM Smith noted that the Daily Briefing reduced the time spent in the Committee squabbling over different interpretations of conditions and focused it on dealing with the problems themselves.<sup>111</sup>

For both groups, there was little negotiation on jurisdiction and autonomy, as they were given a clear mandate in their authority to ensure coordination of activities. The Task Force generally operated at the level of ADM, but could go up to DMs if the individual did not have the requisite authority to make a decision. The Committee, being the highest non-elected body in government, had clear authority over all departmental actions. This blanket authority given to the Task Force is part and parcel of the time constraints and priority of the crisis to the government. However the departmental heads still retained their control, and as a result, DND was still able to defend their departmental interests within the Committee of Deputies.

Overall the ZITF and the Committee was generally successful in coordinating government action when agreed upon. Yet it must be remembered that while the two groups struggled to deal the tight conditions imposed by the situation, in reality it was not seriously tested either. Only a few units were deployed to the region and the situation largely resolved itself without any soldiers being put in harms way. Various departments were not confronted with the numerous scenarios that could have easily played on divergent interdepartmental interests. It is unclear how the CF would have reacted if ordered into Eastern Zaire or had incurred significant casualties. It may well have made interdepartmental coordination impossible.

## 5.0 Conclusion

It is clear that any discussion of Canada’s involvement in Zaire would be incomplete without understanding the affects that departmental cultures played on the management of the intervention. Although the ultimate failure of the Canadian led intervention was not attributable to problems with interdepartmental coordination, they did play an important role in determining the way that the government responded. And

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<sup>108</sup> Confidential Interview

<sup>109</sup> Confidential Interview.

<sup>110</sup> Access for Information A61168 (3#5) Pg.161

<sup>111</sup> Gordon Smith Interview. August 18<sup>th</sup> 2005

given the right conditions, interdepartmental friction could have serious consequences for the management of Canadian Foreign policy.

Several areas were identified where interdepartmental friction was likely to occur. One area of difficulty was in the department's differing conception of intergovernmental relations. National Defence desires for a very strict division of responsibilities between it and the civilian power, which is contradictory to Foreign Affairs' expansive conception of its role in government. Another problem area is the departments' differing conceptions for the proper role of military force. Many DFAIT members hold the assumption that military force should be integrated into a set of tools that help promote Canadian values abroad. Yet DND members are less than supportive of this role and assess these operations by very different metrics than other departments. For these missions, the Canadian Forces place far more importance in protecting the safety of soldiers, which is fundamentally different from Foreign Affairs' attention to the political nuances of situation. If the Canadian Forces' safety cannot be guaranteed for these missions, then it will attempt to limit its involvement or oppose it altogether.

The Canadian bureaucratic response to the Zairian crisis also lends further credence to the effect of departmental cultures on foreign policymaking. It is quite apparent that the dynamics of the Committee of Deputies and to a lesser extent the Zaire Interdepartmental Task Force were affected by differing departmental aims and values. The violation of several basic assumptions of National Defence even before the operation began, altered how its representatives conducted themselves within the interdepartmental fora. DND employed a number of tactics within group discussion to achieve its departmental interests. National Defence members exploited their role as the sole provider of military expertise in order to manipulate intelligence and downplay the number of refugees. This enabled them to argue that the intervention should be shelved.

Differences in departmental cultures were ironed out to some degree within these committees, with greater success being achieved by the Task Force than the Committee of Deputies. Certainly both groups were able to work through issues and manufacture consensus on how to implement decisions. The Task Force played a key role in consensus building through several different processes. Firstly it used the authority delegated to it to ensure that departments implemented coherent policies. Secondly it combined intelligence reports to develop a unified government version of events that prevented inconsistencies over information to crop up. Although the operation of the Committee of Deputies and the Zaire Interdepartmental Task Force did not solve the problems associated with the culture gap, their operation greatly enhances observers understanding of the events.

The management of Operation Assurance offers clear lessons for both scholars and academics interested in the study of foreign policy making. This study leaves little doubt that organizational and group psychological theories offer a useful approach for understanding the actions of actors in international relations. Continued inquiry along these lines will only serve to strengthen the academic discipline of international relations.

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### Interviews

Four Interviews were conducted during the length of my research, one of which was conducted anonymously.

David C. Elder (Privy Council Of Canada) Conducted on July 28<sup>th</sup> 2005

Gordon Smith (Former Deputy Minister of DFAIT) Conducted on August 18<sup>th</sup> 2005