

## **Canadian Identity and the War on Terror**

**G. Gabriel Serbu**

MA Student

War Studies Programme, Royal Military College

George Gabriel Serbu received his B.A. degree in journalism and public relations from the University of Bucharest in 1995. He is currently enrolled as a M.A. candidate in the War Studies program at the Royal Military College of Canada. From 1995 to 1997 Mr. Serbu worked as a political analyst at the Center for Political Studies and Comparative Analysis in Bucharest on projects such as the “Procrastination Syndrome” (a critical study of the lack of economic reforms in Eastern Europe after the fall of the “iron curtain”) and the “Dynamics of the Liberal Movement in Romania”. From 1997 he worked as a P.R. consultant for the French financial group “Société Générale”. This summer Mr. Serbu successfully completed an internship at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre.

### **Abstract:**

Canadians are more preoccupied with their cultural identity than most nations, and this is wholly understandable. Canada used to be a British colony and it took centuries before she could claim total independence from the former empire. Now, many would argue that the British authority has been replaced by American political and cultural influence.

Canadians feel that they have identifiable values distinguishing them from any other nation in the world. Some of them also believe that these principles (such as communitarianism and multiculturalism) are more sympathetic to forms of united nations and international law. They also feel that peace building, meaning activities that provide incentives for peace by strengthening the capacity of local communities to find peaceful alternatives to violence, is the way of the future.

The war on terror initiated by the Bush administration after September 11 2001 comes in direct conflict with established Canadian ideals, not in its purpose however (that is to stop international terrorism), but in its means. This paper will analyze the distinct Canadian and American approaches on dealing with international terrorism.

## 1. *The Ideological Nature of Islamic Terrorism.*

### *1.1. The Crisis Within the Arab World: the Surfacing of Wahhabism;*

For many historians, especially in the Arab world, the Abbasid Dynasty marked the high point of Islamic power. The caliphate was exceptional in every regard: a vast and prosperous empire, expanding, assimilating nations, customs, cultures and inventions on an unprecedented scale. It all came to a crashing end during the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century.

Before the advent of the Western colonial powers, the Mongol was, in the Arab world, the favourite villain, held responsible for the destruction of what many would consider the most powerful Moslem civilization. Now, scores of historians would argue that by the time of the raids, the caliphate was dangerously weak. In 756 A.D. a member of the deposed Umayyad family founded his own dynasty at Cordoba in Spain; in 929 A.D. his descendant assumed the title of caliph (successor to the Prophet and spiritual head of Sunni Islam). Also in the tenth century, the Shiite Fatimids proclaimed themselves the true caliphs of all Islam. From their capital at Cairo, which they founded, their rule eventually extended from Morocco to northern Mesopotamia.

The spectacular reign of Harun al-Rachid in the eighth century marked in fact the climax of the Abbasid dynasty. By the time of the Mongol invasion, the caliphate had long lost its splendour and power. Also, the astonishing achievements of the Persian Empire and the Ottoman Turks, such as, in the case of the latter, the fall of Constantinople and the siege of Vienna in the seventeenth century - which directly threatened the whole of Europe - to mention only a few, are somehow overlooked by Arab historians. Arguably, Islamic civilization knew its hour of glory not before, but after the Mongol invasions. This point is important and will be further analysed in connection with the caliphate revivalists.

The Ottoman Empire's unpopularity with Arabs cannot simply be explained by the alleged oppression to which they were subjected by the Turks, but also by the failure of the empire to preserve its territorial integrity, which was the land of Islam (*dar al-Islam*). Moreover, the Ottoman Empire was eventually replaced by a secular, democratic, modern state shaped by Western values. The architect of this radical transformation was Kemal Atatürk, a politician not quite popular in the Islamic world. No other Muslim state followed through:

During the 1930s, Italy and then, far more, Germany offered new ideological and political models, with the added attraction of being opposed to the Western powers. These won widespread support, and even after their military defeat in World War II, they continued to serve as unavowed models in both ideology and statecraft.<sup>1</sup>

During the Second World War, the religious and political leader of the Palestinian Arabs, the grand mufti of Jerusalem, Haj-Amin al-Husseini was a Nazi. He eventually

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<sup>1</sup> Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong, Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.62

took refuge in Germany in 1941. In 1947, a young Syrian nationalist, Michel Aflaq founded the Baath (Renaissance) Party in Damascus to promote: ‘an Arab awakening based on fascist ideals and ideology.’<sup>2</sup> The Socialist Baathist credo was eventually adopted by an important number of countries in the Middle East, including Syria and Iraq:

The victory of the Soviet Union in 1945 suggested a different solution – a return to the economic explanation of Western success, but with a socialist shortcut. State control of the economy was imposed in several countries. Various types of socialism, sometimes called Arab socialism, sometimes called scientific socialism, were adopted. They ended in disastrous failure, in ruination maintained by tyranny. Most people in the region have by now decided that socialism – or at least their experience of it – is neither Arab, nor scientific.<sup>3</sup>

A classic example is Libya, whose eccentric dictator published the “Green Book” a volume defining the principles of Arab socialism. Qaddafi’s work is aggressively anti-democratic in its attempt to justify tyranny:

“The two dominant movements in the twentieth century were socialism and nationalism. Both have been discredited, the first by its failure, the second by its success and consequent exposure as ineffective. Freedom, interpreted to mean independence, was seen as the great talisman that would bring all other benefits. The overwhelming majority of Muslims now live in independent states, which have brought no solutions to their problems. The bastard off-spring of both ideologies, national socialism, still survives in a few states that have preserved the Nazi Fascist style of dictatorial government and indoctrination, the one through a vast and ubiquitous security apparatus, the other through a single all-powerful party. These regimes too have failed every test except survival, and have brought none of the promised benefits. If anything, their infrastructures are even more antiquated than the others, their armed forces designed primarily for terror and repression.”<sup>4</sup>

There is disenchantment with modern ideologies in the Arab world. They never solved anything. But then again, democracy was never tested, if one defines democracy as the clear-cut separation of the church and state, of the judiciary, executive, legislative powers, independent and accountable media, racial, religious and gender-based equality, a responsible government and the rule of law. Unfortunately, liberal democracy was always perceived as a foreign element, a Western creation unsuited for Moslems. Marxism, on the other hand, was experimented and it failed:

Revolutionary Marxism offered hope that Arabs could obtain the benefits of modernity without the humiliation of Westernization, as it was then believed the Soviets

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<sup>2</sup> Richard Perle et al., *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror* (New York: Random House Publishing, 2003), p.49

<sup>3</sup> Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong, Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.62

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p.158

had done. Revolutionary Marxism conjured up a seductive vision of progress without compromise with the wealthy West.<sup>5</sup>

Regrettably for Moslems, according to Karl Popper and Alain Besançon, the origins of communism and nationalism, of collectivism and populism lie in the “best” Western tradition.

Nostalgia nourished by the great achievements of the past, combined with a general sense of failure and pride brought to the forefront of the political stage the radical theologians and ideologues of Islam. If the Moslem world is no longer what it used to be it is because it abandoned the real legacy of Islam, they are saying, the one true faith. It is time to go back to the roots and reclaim the lost laurels. It shouldn't be surprising that the most successful rhetoric was also the most radical: the discourse of Wahhabism.

Wahhabism is everything that liberal democracy is not: politically intolerant, violent and abusive, while being socially discriminative and economically bankrupt. It is based on a very (if not the most) radical interpretation of the Koran:

Wahhabi Islam, which was established in mid-eighteenth-century Arabia by Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, remains the dominant religious creed in Saudi Arabia. Many regard Wahhabism as a radical and violent departure from the mainstream Islamic tradition.<sup>6</sup>

Al-Wahhab labelled all who disagreed with him heretics and apostates, which in his eyes justified the use of force in imposing both his beliefs and his political authority over neighbouring tribes. This in turn led him to declare holy war (jihad) on other Muslims, an act which would otherwise have been legally impossible under the rules of jihad.

In 1802, the Wahhabis captured Karbala in Iraq and destroyed the tomb of Shiite Imam Hasayn. In 1803, the Wahhabis captured Mecca. The Ottoman Turks became alarmed and dispatched Muhammad Ali, the Ottoman ruler of Egypt, to challenge the Wahhabis. He succeeded in reimposing Ottoman sovereignty in 1813. Nearly a century later, in 1901, with Wahhabi help, Saudi emir Abd al-Aziz al-Saud recaptured Riyadh. Saud's sovereignty over the Arabian Peninsula grew steadily until 1924, when his dominance became secure. The Wahhabis went on a rampage throughout the peninsula at this time smashing the tombs of Muslims saints and imams, including the tomb of the Prophet's daughter Fatima.

The first Wahhabi missionaries to Central Asia actually arrived there in 1912 led by a resident of Medina named Sayed Shari Muhammad. They set up cells in the Fergana Valley and mission activity came in 1962 when the Muslim World League was founded in Saudi Arabia for the specific purpose of exporting Wahhabism throughout the world.

The surge in oil prices following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war that brought unprecedented high levels of wealth into Saudi Arabia meant huge amounts of money became available to fund these Wahhabi missionary movements. The Wahhabis began

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<sup>5</sup> Richard Perle et al., *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror* (New York: Random House Publishing, 2003), p.53

<sup>6</sup> Dore Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism* (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2003), p.3

supporting Islamist revivalist movements in countries and regions such as Egypt, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Western China, in East Africa and Central Asia.

In the 1990s, in the aftermath of the war to liberate Kuwait, the Saudi government invited the United States to build military bases and station troops in the kingdom. As a result, tensions between the ruling Saudis and their Wahhabi allies began to grow. Financial support continues to flow though, especially from private sources, some of them in the Saudi royal family.

## 1.2. The Ideology of Wahhabism;

Since its resurgence in the twentieth century, Wahabbism grew in a very specific ideological environment. This particular setting rests on three pillars, on the work of three radical Islamists: Sayyid Qutb (an Egyptian), Mawlana Mawdudi (a Pakistani) and Ruhollah Khomeini (an Iranian):

Mawdudi and Qutb thought along similar lines and exercised influence among the Sunni Muslims. Khomeini operated within the framework of the Shiites. But all three men shared a vision of Islam as a political movement, and they all called for the establishment of an Islamic state. While opposing the secular nationalism that had dominated the 1960s, they also rejected the view within traditional Islam that relegated political combat to a secondary concern.

But in other ways, these men represented three very different approaches. Qutb advocated a clean break with the established order, a strategy that attracted a cross-section of Muslim youth from both educated and deprived backgrounds but alienated most clerics and the middle class. Mawdudi, by contrast, viewed the establishment of an Islamic republic as a task to be undertaken slowly, step by step. While his more moderate approach found favour with the Pakistani middle classes, it did not achieve support among the masses. Only Khomeini was able to create a workable coalition of all interested parties: the disinherited, the middle classes, radical intellectuals and clerics. Consequently, the Islamic revolution succeeded in Iran, whereas it failed in other countries.<sup>7</sup>

Undoubtedly, the most influential is Qutb, a former member of the Society of Muslim Brothers and author of *Signposts on the Road* and *In the Shadow of the Koran*. Although Sayyid Qutb has been executed and the Muslim Brotherhood dissolved by the Egyptian government after a failed attempt on Nasser's life in 1954, his books are still bestsellers all over the Islamic world. In his works, Qutb calls for a society based on the rigorous teachings of the Koran, which would eventually mould the social order into an uncompromising community fighting against the Western "pseudo-values":

Qutb devised a new way of writing about Islam that was simple and straightforward, very different from the complex rhetoric of the ulemas, which was laden with traditional references and pedantic commentary.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Gilles Kepel, *Jihad, the Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), p.24-25

<sup>8</sup> *ibid.*, p.26

Sayyid Qutb adopted a simple Marxist idiom with which his audience was familiar since most Egyptians were imbued by the collectivist Baathist rhetoric. He simply replaced the concept of the “inevitable” advent of a socialist society with puritan Islamist ideas, managing to fill a spiritual vacuum, which always undermined the establishment of a Socialist Arab state.

The brutal efficiency of the Egyptian security forces in hunting down members of the Muslim Brotherhood started an exodus of extremists to Saudi Arabia.

After Nasser emerged as the unchallenged secular leader of the Arab world, following his confrontation with England, France and ultimately Israel over the Suez Canal, tensions with the Saudis continued to grow in intensity. Increasingly, the kingdom neighbouring Egypt relied on clerics to support their struggle against Nasser’s attempts to extend his influence in Saudi Arabia. And the clerics looked for a radical ideology that would counter-balance the impact of Arab socialism; they found it in Wahhabism. The remnants of the Muslim Brotherhood permeated by Qutb’s philosophy turned out to be a refreshing addition to Wahhabism.

Mawdudi is an exponent of the “peripheral Islam”, of non-Arab Islamism, perceived in the Middle East as somehow marginal. His most influential book, *Jihad in Islam* published in Urdu in the late 1920s coincides with Hassan al-Banna’s creation of the Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt. Just like Qutb, Mawdudi is an ideologue of Supremacist Puritanism in Islam. In Pakistan, his influential work prepared the ground for Wahhabi proselytism:

For him (Mawdudi), the five traditional Pillars of Islam (profession of faith, prayer, the fast of Ramadan, pilgrimage and almsgiving) were merely phases of training and preparation for jihad, the struggle against those of Allah’s creatures who had usurped His sovereignty. The pen of Mawdudi turned religion into an ideology of political struggle. To carry out his jihad, he founded, in 1941, the Jamaat-e-Islami, which he saw as the vanguard of the Islamic Revolution, on a Leninist model.<sup>9</sup>

Traditionally, Sunnis and Shiites have been enemies, so contending that Wahhabism grew up in a political environment shaped by Khomeini might surprise many. After all, in the transcript of an intercepted letter addressed to bin-Laden, al-Zarqawi expresses his loathing of the Shiites:

They (the Shiites) are the insurmountable obstacle, the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying enemy, the penetrating venom.<sup>10</sup>

Following their religious tradition, the Shiites always believed that the world is unjust, immoral and corrupt. Light and justice would eventually return with the second coming of the twelfth imam, Ali’s descendent, Muhammad al-Mahdi, their Messiah. This credo shaped their attitude towards politics. Shiite faithful viewed political power as

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<sup>9</sup> Gilles Kepel, *Jihad, the Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), p.34

<sup>10</sup> The website of the Coalition Provisional Authority, see [http://www.cpa.iraq.org/transcripts/20040212\\_zarqawi\\_full.htm](http://www.cpa.iraq.org/transcripts/20040212_zarqawi_full.htm)

despoiled and evil, while rebellion against it was perceived as unacceptable, since politicians were only products of a sinful world, and not the root causes of its corruption.

Shiites organized their religious life around clerics, a hierarchy of interpreters of the Koran. The clerics were financially independent, with their livelihood assured by almsgivings from the faithful.

Starting with the 1960s though, just like Qutb's rhetoric, the Shiite discourse started to be permeated by Marxism. Two Marxist key words entered Islamic terminology: "oppressors" and "oppressed", which were translated into Farsi with the Koranic words "the arrogant" and the "disinherited".

At the beginning, Khomeini distanced himself from Marxist ideology. He had nothing but disdain for a secular political philosophy defining religion as just another opiate of the people. Nevertheless, he had to take a stand against the shah's "White Revolution", a movement promoting the emancipation of women and who was threatening the privileges of the grand ayatollahs, especially their considerable land holdings:

Before 1970, Khomeini's opposition to the shah was mostly expressed in moral and religious terms; he did not call for the revolutionary overthrow of the regime in the name of Islam. But that year, a series of lectures, the minutes of which would later be published under the title *Velayat-e Faqih: Hokumat-e Islami (Islamic Government: Under the Guardianship of a Doctor of the Law, abridged to Islamic Government)* represented a radical break with the Shiite stance of political passivity, and specifically with the previous attitudes of Khomeini himself. He now called for the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment on its ruins of an Islamic government, of which he exploded the entire intellectual edifice that endorsed submitting to the clergy and compromise with a bad prince while awaiting the Messiah. Instead, Khomeini preached the outright takeover of power by that very clergy.<sup>11</sup>

The Iranian Marxist-Leninists and other radical socialists finally found their leader, a man supported by the masses and by the middle class. Revolutionary left-wing principles and phraseology gave puritanical Islam the ideological weapons and the justification to wage a war against Western democracy. The shah's authoritarian regime enforced by a brutal secret police, the SAVAK, ultimately became unpopular and was toppled because it was perceived as a puppet of the United States. The westernization and modernization efforts made by Muhammad Reza Pahlavi were not recognized as tools that would eventually make Iran economically more efficient and politically more viable, but as just another inference from the "arrogant exploiter": the Christian West. More or equally repressive Middle-Eastern regimes based on comparable secular foundations, such as the dictatorship of al-Assad never had to deal with similarly strong opposition simply because they knew how to make use of a skilfully orchestrated propaganda campaign portraying them as defenders of the Arab and Muslim historical heritage.

### **1.3. The Emergence of Al-Qaeda;**

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<sup>11</sup> Gilles Kepel, *Jihad, the Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), p.40

The Islamic Revolution in Iran heralded a catastrophic year in American foreign policy. In December 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Unknowingly to the Americans, this turned out to be a blessing in disguise, not simply because the war would eventually contribute to economically ruin a system already politically bankrupt, but also because of the events already unfolding in Saudi Arabia. After the 1973 OPEC oil price hike, provoking an unprecedented crisis in the world, the Iranian Revolution was a second slap in the face of the West. Islamists realized that there were ways to bloody the nose of an “oppressive” West. In November 1979, hundreds of radicals pumped up by Wahhabism seized Mecca’s Grand Mosque taking hundreds of pilgrims hostages. The Saudi government was becoming increasingly nervous:

The rebellion had badly shaken the Saudi establishment, since al-Utaibi’s group had targeted the Saudi royal family for its corruption. Nor were al-Utaibi’s rebels the only threat to the Saudi state’s Wahhabi credentials. In fact, al-Utaibi’s radical criticisms reflected a more general backlash against the effects of the 1970s oil boom on Saudi society. As a result of the boom, Westerners had poured into the Saudi kingdom, threatening the conservative Wahhabi way of life. The struggle between the forces of modernization and conservatism, always a part of Saudi history, re-emerged.<sup>12</sup>

Faced with a potential revolution, the Saudi royal family was more than happy to ship the Wahhabi fundamentalists to Afghanistan. This political move achieved two essential purposes: first of all, it deflected attention from the presence of American *kufar* (infidels) on holy Muslim land; and secondly, it temporarily purged the kingdom of fanatics.

After ten years of murderous fighting, in February 1989, the Soviets finally withdrew from Afghanistan. The jihadists, however, failed to achieve their political purpose, which was to remove Mohammed Najibullah, the Afghani communist leader. Moreover, the Americans were not only losing interest in their struggle, but they became increasingly hostile to Hekmatyar and Sayyaf, the prominent pro-Wahhabite leaders of the *mujahedeen*. Hekmatyar was dealt another deadly blow in August 1988, when Pakistani prime minister General Zia, a supporter of the Afghani pro-Wahhabite factions was assassinated. Benazir Bhutto, the new prime minister, had no sympathy for the Islamists and started weakening the Jamaat-e-Islami (the party founded by Mawdudi responsible for the upsurge in the number of *madrassas* all over Pakistan, but especially in Peshawar, the small town bordering Afghanistan where the jihadists were recruiting). While money, weapons, assistance and know-how kept flowing from the CIA, the Wahhabists were willing to ignore the presence of the Americans in Saudi Arabia. But once the Soviet Army withdrew, the United States stopped support altogether. The jihadists were disenchanted, but most of all, unemployed:

The international brigade of jihad veterans, being outside the control of any state, was suddenly available to serve radical Islamist causes anywhere in the world. Since they were no longer bound by local political constituencies, they had no responsibilities to any

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<sup>12</sup> Dore Gold, *Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism* (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2003), p.108

social group either. They reflected neither the interests of the devout bourgeoisie, nor those of the young urban poor, even though their militants were drawn from both classes. They became the free electrons of jihad, professional Islamists trained to fight and to train others to do likewise; they were based in Pakistani tribal zones, in smugglers' fiefdoms over which Islamabad exercised next to no authority, and in Afghan mujahedeen encampments. Around the most heavily involved militants gathered clouds of sympathizers, many of whom were in trouble in their own countries and unable to obtain visas to Western nations; they were stuck in Pakistan and obliged to survive in the direst circumstances. Young Islamists from all over the world came to join these men and learn the terrorist trade from them; some emerged later as the perpetrators of a series of attacks in France in 1995. Above and beyond the cause they claimed to serve, they constituted a pool of manpower that could be used by the secret services of a number of states who might find it opportune to manipulate unattached extremist militants.<sup>13</sup>

Al-Qaeda is not the product of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, though. The war only provided the ideal circumstance for the violent and intolerant ideology of political Islam to develop a military wing.

In a declaration made on September 5, 2002, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said: "Hizballah may be the A-team of terrorists. While Al-Qaeda may be actually the B-team." I don't believe that the two can be compared: Hizballah is a Shi'a terrorist organization financed by Iran, supported by Syria and harboured by Lebanon. Its connections to the PLO thugocracy are well known, while its charities work as finance hubs and recruitment centres for homicide bombers. Al-Qaeda is a transnational Sunni terrorist and criminal organization increasingly disposed to more violent behavior since it answers to no one. Its political ambitions are surreal, surpassing the demands of Hamas, Hizballah, Islamic Jihad and the PLO put together:

After the fall of our *orthodox* caliphates on March 3, 1924 and after expelling the colonialists, our Islamic nation was afflicted with apostate rulers who took over in the Moslem nations. These rulers turned out to be more infidel and criminal than the colonialists themselves.<sup>14</sup>

March 3, 1924 marked the creation of the secular, democratic Turkish Republic by Kemal Atatürk. Al-Qaeda is an organization of caliphate revivalists, ultimately trying to recreate not one caliphate, but all of them at the same time, which is bizarre not only as to the unreasonable nature of their political aim, but also because traditionally the Ottomans were perceived by the Arabs as usurpers of the title of *caliph*:

In 1453, the Ottomans conquered Constantinople – the capital of Eastern Christendom, which had resisted the assaults of all previous Muslim powers – and changed the city's name to Istanbul. With this victory, the Ottoman sultan could claim an incontestable position of superiority vis-à-vis other Muslim leaders as the "Commander of the Faithful", for in the centuries of Muslim expansionism, spiritual authority had

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<sup>13</sup> Gilles Kepel, *Jihad, the Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002) p.219

<sup>14</sup> Al-Qaeda training manual, U.S. Department of Justice website. See [www.usdoj.gov/ag/](http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/)

always accompanied political authority. This was reinforced when the sultan seized the Muslim holy cities of the Hijaz in 1517.

The Ottoman claimed that the last Abbasid caliph, whose family had lived in exile in Egypt ever since the Mongols had destroyed Baghdad in 1258, ceded his title to Sultan Selim I when the Ottomans conquered Cairo in 1517. Thereafter, Ottoman sultans based in Istanbul were also caliphs, the highest religious authority in orthodox (Sunni) Islam. It was a tough claim to make, since according to Sunni Islamic doctrine, the caliph must come out of the Arabian tribe of Quraish. The Ottomans were ethnically Turks, not Arabs. Moreover, many scholars consider the story of the transfer of the caliphate from the Abbasids to the Ottomans to be apocryphal. Nevertheless, Ottoman sultans described themselves as “the supreme religious leader of Islam” from at least 1774.<sup>15</sup>

But Al-Qaeda is willing to ignore minor historical details in order to fully exploit propagandistically the historical legacy of Islam. The terrorist network only represents the tip of the iceberg, the harbinger of a growing popular movement based on pathological hate.

#### **1.4. Why Do They Hate Us?**

A question most Westerners are asking themselves is: why do they hate us so much? What is triggering this all-consuming loathing?

Take a vast area of earth’s surface, inhabited by people who remember a great history. Enrich them enough that they can afford satellite television and Internet connections, so they can see what life is like across the Mediterranean or across the Atlantic. Then, sentence them to live in choking, miserable, polluted cities ruled by corrupt, incompetent officials. Entangle them in regulations and controls so that nobody can ever make much of a living except by paying off some crooked officials. Subordinate them to elites who have become incalculably wealthy from shady dealings involving petroleum resources that supposedly belong to all. Tax them for the benefit of governments that provide nothing in return except military establishments that lose every war they fight: not roads, not clinics, not clean water, not street lighting. Reduce their living standards year after year for two decades. Deny them any forum or institution – not a parliament, not even a city council – where they may freely discuss their grievances. Kill, jail, corrupt or drive into exile every political figure, artist or intellectual who could articulate a modern alternative to bureaucratic tyranny. Neglect, close or simply fail to create an effective school system - so that the minds of the next generation are formed entirely by clerics whose own minds contain nothing but medieval theology and a smattering of third world nationalist self-pity. Combine all this, *and what else would one expect to create but an enraged populace ready to transmute every frustration in its frustrating daily life into a fanatical hatred of everything ‘un-Islamic’*.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Dore Gold, *Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism* (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2003), p.32

<sup>16</sup> Richard Perle et al., *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror* (New York: Random House Publishing, 2003), p.161

Containment doesn't really work anymore. The radicals are too numerous and too fanatical. Even the authoritarian or repressive regimes controlling the countries they are living in are afraid to challenge their discourse, for which they are in fact responsible. These regimes conceived a hate rhetoric, disseminated through the local media, designed to deflect attention from their own incompetence, corruption and disregard for even the most basic freedoms. Being the only avenue for people to express themselves, the state slowly but surely lost the monopoly it had on hate. And now, the choice for oppressive regimes in the Islamic world is either to clamp down on it or to join the mass hysteria. But the time for stomping is long gone. For once, they are going to do the will of the people:

If the peoples of the Middle East continue on their present path, the suicide bomber may become a metaphor for the whole region, and there will be no escape from a downward spiral of hate and spite, rage and self-pity, poverty and oppression, culminating sooner or later in yet another alien domination; perhaps from a new Europe reverting to old ways, perhaps from a resurgent Russia, perhaps from some new, expanding superpower in the East. If they can abandon grievance and victimhood, settle their differences, and join their talents, energies and resources in a common creative endeavour, then they can once again make the Middle East, in modern times as it was in antiquity and in the Middle Ages, a major centre of civilization. For the time being, the choice is their own.<sup>17</sup>

The danger democracy faces at the beginning of the twentieth century is very real. Western societies are particularly vulnerable giving their open nature. Ignoring it won't make it go away.

## ***2. The Canadian struggle for national identity.***

Canadians are more preoccupied with their cultural identity than most nations, and this is wholly understandable. Canada used to be a British colony and it took centuries before she could claim total independence from the former empire. Now, many would argue that the British authority has been replaced by American political and cultural influence.

Canadians feel that they have identifiable values distinguishing them from any other nation in the world. Some of them also believe that these principles (such as communitarianism and multiculturalism) are more sympathetic to forms of united nations and international law. They also believe that peace building, meaning activities that provide incentives for peace by strengthening the capacity of local communities to find peaceful alternatives to violence, is the way of the future. Compromise and negotiation are policies emanating from Canada's crucial values: peace, order and good government. But will these principles and the strategies deriving from them work when dealing with

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<sup>17</sup> Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong, Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.159-160

Islamic terrorism? Political Islam has no rational approach or strategy. It is re-inventing not only tradition, but also politics and diplomacy. Political Islam wants to socially mutate the whole planet. Are they willing to compromise, to negotiate, to talk things over? Their propaganda pictures Westerners as barely human. Were the Nazis willing to negotiate with the *Untermenschen*?

## 2.1. *Defining National Identity;*

National identity is shaped by a formally or informally stated set of values, beliefs and principles without which a nation cannot exist and function. According to François Lyotard<sup>18</sup>, all societies legitimize their existence by using “narratives”, stories that everybody takes for granted and that few would dare challenge. These stories originate in history: the French republic, for example, places its foundation in the French Revolution, just as the Americans believe that the War of Independence and the subsequent Civil War shaped the United States as a nation. François Furet, a former communist zealously determined to make amends for what were his earlier insidious loyalties, wrote *Penser la Révolution française (Interpreting the French Revolution)* a book in which he claims that since the legitimacy of a state can be challenged by simply challenging its origins, all history is politics. The more violent the past, the simpler it is to contest the legitimizing “narratives” of a country, especially in a time such as ours where war is perceived as the ultimate abomination. Michael Moore, for example, tried to undermine the very foundations of the United States by portraying her founders as a gang of frightened white bullies obsessed with security.

The national principles on which states are built and sustained will most often be forged through history, generally a violent history. In the 1999 throne speech, Governor General Adrienne Clarkson said:

The promise of Canada was born in an age when countries were created through war and revolution. Our nation’s founders chose a unique path – creating a country dedicated to peace, order and good government.<sup>19</sup>

Canada doesn’t have a violent past. Some, like Adrienne Clarkson (or, to be precise, the authors of the 1999 throne speech), would argue that the greatness of this country rests in her peaceful history, while others would claim that the very lack of belligerent past events and exploits is responsible for Canada’s absence of unity. It is very hard to root for a hockey team that refuses to compete.

Fixed values have no political dynamic of their own, there is nothing dialectical about them; they have a certain dogmatism, an uncompromising inflexibility: there can be no democracy without freedom of religion, no theocracy with freedom of religion. It is non-negotiable.

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<sup>18</sup> See *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*.

<sup>19</sup> Canadian Privy Council Office website. See [www.pco-bcp.gc.ca](http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca)

## 2.2. *The Canadian Values;*

Canada chose peace and order as her defining values, making appeasement and compromise crucial strategies in the conduct of her various policies. But these strategies go against the firmness of strong convictions. Do they work? We live in a country where the threat of various separatisms is looming, a confederation where a province, Quebec, will not recognize its constitution. In order to appease, Canada is a bilingual country:

The influence of language on the communications flow is highly visible since it has produced two distinct media systems: English and French. The independence of the two communications networks may be a healthy reflection of bilingualism and biculturalism. At the same time, however, the separateness of the French and English communications network is costly. It means a duplication of technical facilities which have the potential to serve a population far in excess of Canada's.

Even more important are the problems as they relate to politics. Do French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians receive similar descriptions of political developments in this country? Indications are that they do not, that the English and French media portray very different images of the realities of politics and society and thereby reinforce ethnic and linguistic divisions by providing a support structure for different value systems.<sup>20</sup>

Canada's numerous and unresolved cleavages were created by failed negotiation and compromise attempts that festered throughout time or by successful concessions that managed to antagonize a different segment of the population. Usually, in Canada, the less vocal group has the most to lose.

Let's also take a look at multiculturalism, a concept that defines Canada in harmony with her values, which at the same time offers the advantage of propping up a very unhealthy complex of moral superiority:

Canadian leaders, from Governor General Adrienne Clarkson on down, use the words 'diversity' and 'multiculturalism' as if they were synonyms. They're not, and this linguistic misuse is responsible for much of the confusion over cultural differences among Canadians. Diversity encompasses a broad range of characteristics that differentiate people: religion, language, dress, leisure pursuits and so forth. Diversity is not divisive in a secular Western democracy that upholds the freedom of the individual. But because there are irreconcilable differences between cultures, multiculturalism is divisive. That's why Canadians don't care what people eat – until someone decides to barbecue man's best friend. It's why Canadians don't care what people wear – until an RCMP member demands the right to wear a turban, changing a uniform that's a national symbol.<sup>21</sup>

Actually, the list is endless: that's why Canadians wish to decriminalize marijuana, while making qat - which is, for immigrants from Yemen and Somalia, more

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<sup>20</sup> Arthur Siegel, *Politics and the Media in Canada* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1983), p.7

<sup>21</sup> Daniel Stoffman, *Who Gets In, What's Wrong with Canada's Immigration Program – and How to Fix It* (Toronto: Macfarlane Walter & Ross, 2002), p.120

than a mild drug, it's a social institution - illegal. Multiculturalism never benefited immigrants, but Canadians using this harmful myth to sustain the complex of moral superiority they have towards the Americans:

In the *Illusion of Difference*, the University of Toronto sociologists Raymond Breton and Jeffrey Reitz examined the widely held belief that Canada is a mosaic in which immigrants retain their identities – unlike the United States, a melting pot in which immigrants swiftly become unhyphenated Americans. They found that, in fact, immigrants to Canada assimilate as quickly as do immigrants to the United States and, indeed, that Canadians are even less inclined than Americans to favour retention of ethnic cultural differences.

(...)Multiculturalism, an offshoot of our immigration program, consists of rhetoric similarly disconnected from the real world. Hypocrisy is a poor foundation for public policy because it can't help, but sow confusion and cynicism.<sup>22</sup>

Multiculturalism is a symptom of national malaise and it gives a Canadian identity lacking specificity the convenient generous vagueness of humanitarianism. Multiculturalism was also an attempt by the Trudeau government to fix some of the serious consequences of defining the country in bipolar terms: two nations, two languages, two cultures. Trudeau tried to dilute the dangerous concept, fuelling separatism, of a Canada created by two distinct nations, the English and the French:

Trudeau's multiculturalism act marked the first time in history that a country had deliberately set out to heighten, intensify, and make permanent the ethnic differences among its people. Why would Canada do this to itself? In part, the policy was a response to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, which had recommended a two-nations policy – one French, one English – for Canada. At the time, this was also the policy of the Progressive Conservatives under Robert Stanfield.

Trudeau hated the two-nations idea. He envisioned a bilingual Canada with no special status for Quebec. Multiculturalism, as Gwyn points out in *The Northern Magus*, his biography of Trudeau, was a way of forestalling biculturalism. Trudeau seemed to think that French-Canadians would become just another hyphenated group among dozens of others. It didn't work as planned, Gwyn writes, because 'French-Canadians escaped easily from the thicket of hyphens Trudeau was trying to plant amongst them by renaming themselves Quebecois.

If anything, the Quebecois were strengthened by multiculturalism, if only because English Canada was weakened by it. By dividing Canadians outside Quebec into dozens of hyphenated groups, multiculturalism amounted to a systematic attempt to eliminate the national identity of English-speaking Canada. In contrast, Quebec's national identity has been reinforced, in part through changes to the immigration program that gave it the right to enhance its francophone character by recruiting francophone immigrants. English Canada has no right to use immigration to enhance its character.

In the 1972 election, Trudeau squeaked back into power with only a two-seat advantage over the Conservatives. Demoted to minority status in Parliament, Trudeau

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 121-122

decided to switch his approach from doing what was right to doing what worked. He had to be prepared, Gwyn writes, ‘to use every tool and all the money in the public purse to win re-election.’ Trudeau has been accused of neglecting the ethnic vote. That wouldn’t do. And so, recounts Gwyn, ‘up sprang a trebled multiculturalism program that functioned as a slush fund to buy votes.’<sup>23</sup>

In 1991, the Ontario Government redrafted legislation granting Muslim religious leaders the authority to arbitrate civil matters using the sharia. The law, called the *Arbitration Act* was supposed to be a healthy reflection of Canadian multiculturalism. Trying to appease Muslim traditionalists, the Ontario Government managed only to undermine the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms because the sharia clearly discriminates against women.

### **2.3. Canadian Anti-Americanism: Communitarianism vs. Capitalism; Multiculturalism vs. Assimilation; Peacekeepers vs. “Warmongers”.**

Another trait defining Canadian nationalism is anti-Americanism. Canadian anti-Americanism is driven by a sense of political fatalism: the belief that sooner or later Canada will be absorbed by the United States. This conviction is so powerful, that it is somehow forcing determinism on its advocates.

Some Canadians believe that there are major genuine differences between Canada and its only neighbour. Unlike the United States for example, Canada is not a country based on selfishness, cruel and vain materialistic interests. Canada is a community, they’re saying, very much like a big family who loves to share. The sharing is usually done through abusive taxation, while in the family, mom tried twice to divorce dad: once in 1980 and the second time, when she came very close, in 1995. Also, unlike the United States, which is a melting pot, Canada is a multicultural country welcoming and cultivating differences. In his book, *Selling Illusions*, Neil Bissoondath reveals that Canada preserves the immigrants’ traditions by isolating them in miserable ghettos and by refusing to informally have anything to do with them outside. At least throwing someone in the melting cultural cauldron takes some sort of human contact.

Most Canadians refuse to believe that war is a valid and legitimate way of settling international disputes. But military conflict is the ultimate argument of diplomatic efforts, which, naturally, shouldn’t be used frivolously; no country though should shrink from using it when its very existence is threatened. The “peacekeepers” myth is both dangerous and precarious, but symptomatic of a country lacking values that operate like a compass, giving nations drive, clarity of vision and direction. Canada’s internationalist principles are only cultivating divisions leading to confusion and, what is worse, self-delusion.

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<sup>23</sup> Daniel Stoffman, *Who Gets In, What’s Wrong with Canada’s Immigration Program – and How to Fix It* (Toronto: Macfarlane Walter & Ross, 2002), p. 127-128

The United States is the main trading partner of Canada and a security guarantee, not a security threat to this country. Moreover, shaping national distinctiveness around the repudiation of a different culture is a mistake.

Compromise, negotiation and appeasement are policies emanating from Canada's crucial values: peace, order and good government. But, because these strategies clash with critical principles such as national unity, territorial integrity and the freedoms and liberties protected by the Canadian Charter, there is the danger of these principles being neglected or even sometimes ignored. It is impossible for a government to please everyone, but is it the duty of any responsible government to uphold democratic values in a strong and united country. Without them, one day, there might be no good government at all, and therefore, no Canada.

### ***3. How Should the War on Terror be Waged?***

The war on terror initiated by the Bush administration after September 11 2001 comes in direct conflict with established Canadian values, not in its purpose however (that is to stop international terrorism), but in its means.

#### ***3.1. Is There an Axis of Evil?***

Democracy was always challenged by various forms of populism and collectivism. Over the decades, they took the form of Communism, Fascism and National Socialism. Today, the main threats to liberal democracy come from political Islam and various groups of left-wing radicals. The latter is almost insignificant compared to the first. Political Islam developed by grafting unto medieval Muslim theology the Marxist-Leninist phraseology and line of reasoning. It is the *aggiornamento*<sup>24</sup> of Islam.

Each time democracy was challenged by outside ideologies, the voices supporting liberty such as Churchill's, Reagan's or Bush's adopted a drastically different rhetoric from the one used during parliamentary debates and political quarrels. Unusual, for the vocabulary of a politician in a constitutional parliamentary democracy, words and linguistic constructs such as "evil empire" "evil-doers" or "axis of evil" shocked or surprised many. Some fear that the recourse to moral terms evocative of Christian sermons might endanger the separation between church and state. Their fears are unfounded; the usage of the word "evil" in describing terrorists doesn't herald the advent of a new Spanish Inquisition. It is simply intended to designate and isolate a group of people or states whose legitimacy will not be accepted by the exponents of democracy. The extreme actions of terrorists or of states financing and promoting terrorism make them incompatible with the language of negotiation and compromise characterizing the democratic process.

So, is there an "axis of evil"? No one doubts now the existence of a group of states such as Iran, Syria and North Korea that for different reasons endanger the stability of their respective regions or even world peace.

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<sup>24</sup> The process of bringing a religious organization up to date; example: the Catholic Church and the Vatican II Council.

Through the creation and support of Hizballah, Iran is responsible for the murder of thousands of people. It is also harbouring most of al-Qaeda's leadership; the Iranian government doesn't even bother to deny the allegations, arguing that the terrorists are not a nuisance, since they are being under house arrest and implicit surveillance. Iran would also like to see Israel destroyed through nuclear warfare:

In a December 2001 sermon, Iran's second most powerful figure, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, declared that Israel was 'the most hideous historic occurrence in history', which the Islamic world 'will vomit out from its midst' through nuclear warfare. Rafsanjani promised that an Islamic republic would soon have nuclear weapons. 'On that day, the strategy of the West will hit a dead end, since a single atomic bomb has the power to completely destroy Israel while an Israeli counterstrike can only cause partial damage to the Islamic world'. Threats like these almost compel Israel to strike Iran's nuclear facilities pre-emptively - with unforeseeable consequences for all.<sup>25</sup>

Iran is also manipulating Western diplomats by enacting some sort of mock battle between the so-called "reformers" and "conservatives". If such a struggle exists within the Iranian government, which is highly unlikely, it is nothing but a scuffle for power between the zealous fundamentalists and the extremely fanatical fundamentalists. Another common argument against taking military action against Iran is that of the "formidable" opposition put up by a young disenchanted generation that will eventually topple the mullahs. In all honesty though, and without showing disrespect to anyone, surrendering the security of the world to the young generation of Iranians or to the less fanatical mullahs is an error in judgement.

Some analysts also doubt the willingness of the Iranians to build nuclear weapons; after all, Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty:

All those non-proliferation treaties in which soft-liners put so much faith are based on the assumption that we can trust the world's least trustworthy regime to tell us its deepest secrets. Over the past twenty years, the IAEA has been surprised and surprised and surprised again: by India, by Iraq, by Pakistan and by North Korea. After a February 2003 inspection tour of Iran, an IAEA spokesman acknowledged that the agency had been surprised once again: 'We knew that Iran was working on a centrifuge program. But we were surprised by the number of the centrifuge pieces waiting to be assembled. They had a hundred-plus centrifuges built, and they were building more.' The Iranians had other surprises for the IAEA, too: They forbade them to visit the facility that many believed to be the headquarters of the centrifuge program. And shortly after the IAEA inspectors left Iran, Iranian dissidents revealed - and satellite photography confirmed - two additional nuclear sites of which the IAEA had been entirely unaware.

Iran's formal adherence to the NPT actually makes it much harder to take effective action to curtail Iran's obvious intentions to acquire nuclear weapons. In fact, the only real restraint imposed by the antiproliferation agreements is the restraint on the rest of the world, which is obliged to pretend to believe the most glaring lies.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Richard Perle et al., *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror* (New York: Random House Publishing, 2003), p.106

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p.109

In Syria, Bashir al-Assad follows in his father's footsteps by preserving his country as a 'terrorist-sponsoring private collection agency'<sup>27</sup>. He also continues to encourage the bellicose rhetoric against Israel and to foment terrorist attacks from Lebanon, which Syria controls without having any explicit international mandate. Syria's dictator also turns a blind eye to the numerous Arab mercenaries transiting the Syrian territory on their way to Iraq.

The main threat presented by North Korea comes from her potential ties with al-Qaeda and from her ability to strike South Korea and Japan with incalculable economic and political consequences for the rest of the world. North Korea already has strong diplomatic relations with Iran and has by now allegedly sold nuclear technology to the Islamic Republic. The presence of an important part of al-Qaeda's leadership in Iran while there are transactions involving nuclear technology is a bad omen.

### 3.2. *The Unites States or the United Nations?*

Giving her penchant for compromise, Canada is more inclined to find objectionable pre-emptive strikes and international military interventions staged by coalitions of the willing. In international crisis, Canadians seem to favour negotiation often mediated by UN. But the critics of the United Nations would point out that the corruption, inefficiency and patronage administratively plaguing the UN hardly makes it a model of efficiency. Furthermore, the presence in the UN and the Security Council of repressive and authoritarian states scarcely gives the organization the moral authority to settle disputes. Although the principles of the United Nations are noble and worth fighting for, few member countries uphold them.

Two weeks ago, to everybody's surprise, Peter Hansen, commissioner-general of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian refugees (UNRWA) admitted employing members of Hamas, a practice perfectly legitimate in his opinion. His confession came in the midst of allegations claiming that UN ambulances have been used to 'ferry munitions and gunmen throughout the occupied territories'<sup>28</sup>. In an article entitled "Entrenching Human Misery" published in the *National Post* on October 9, 2004, Robert Fulford claims that in 1951 there were about 860,000 refugees to worry about. Today, there are 4.1 million. The UNRWA is the classic example of a bureaucratic institution legitimizing its existence by nurturing the very problem it is suppose to solve.

The fact of the matter is that the United Nations has become a populist forum giving the opportunity to ambassadors and representatives of various oppressive states to spew their poisonous rhetoric with impunity. Strangely enough, some of the staunchest supporters of the UN are nowadays countries with little to no respect for the freedoms and rights enshrined in the Charter:

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<sup>27</sup> Richard Perle et al., *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror* (New York: Random House Publishing, 2003), p.116

<sup>28</sup> Sean Gordon, "Members of Hamas 'on UN Payroll'", *National Post* 04.10. 2004

The UN regularly turns itself into the stage for a hackneyed political melodrama, where bored crowds watch endless replays of the same dreary performance, dully booing the never changing villains (Israel, the United States), spiritlessly applauding the stereotyped heroes (Cuba, Zimbabwe, the Palestinian Authority). When the stage lights switch off, the crowd rushes for the exits, knowing full well that in real life the villains are not as villainous and the heroes are thieves, thugs, liars and killers. The UN regularly broadcasts a spectacle as dishonest and morally deadening as a Stalinist show trial, a televised ritual of condemnation that inflames hatreds and sustains quarrels that might otherwise fade away.<sup>29</sup>

The fact that the war on terror is waged mainly by the United States and not by the United Nations is another symptom of the latter's inability to efficiently fight a global threat. The UN needs to be reformed in order to restore its relevance. The United Nations must live up to the noble ideals of the Charter.

### 3.3. *Canada the Seductress.*

Canada is not only externally challenged by international terrorism, but also internally, by the same hate motivating Islamists and by well-positioned bureaucrats willing to ignore or to downplay the terrorist threat because the political correctness of their position furthers their careers. Fighting hate is fighting an embryonic terrorism. The Canadian Intelligence community and law enforcement agencies should not only act when a danger is imminent, since all looming and extreme threat is a symptom of a growing social disease (after all revolutions are the violent political declaration of a social change that has already occurred in a given society). Cancer should not be fought once it has already metastasized. Without freedom there can be no real peace, order and good government. The lessons of history should not be forgotten, how Chamberlain's obsession with peace precipitated the whole world into war. For extremists, the lack of decisive actions has always been a sign of weakness, which they never hesitated to exploit.

In an unprecedented move, Concordia University barred Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak from speaking on campus, fearing a recurrence 'of the rioting that forced the cancellation of a planned speech two years ago by Benjamin Netanyahu another former Israeli prime minister and currently the Finance Minister'<sup>30</sup>. The rioters were organized by a group of students called *Solidarity for Palestinian Human Rights*. If tolerance is exploited to destroy basic freedoms, such as the freedom of speech, Canada is in a dire situation.

For Canada, compromise and negotiation are reflections of her key values, peace, order and good government. Unfortunately, from time to time when our basic freedoms are threatened we need to act swiftly, without hesitation. The Western world is dealing with an enemy driven by pathological frustrations and hatred, a foe that is not interested

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<sup>29</sup> Richard Perle et al., *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror* (New York: Random House Publishing, 2003), p.270

<sup>30</sup> Graeme Hamilton et al., "Concordia Assailed for Bowing to 'Terror'", *National Post* 06.10. 2004

in sitting at the negotiation table. Looking for the supposed reasons why terrorism exists (such as the political reality of the state of Israel or the American military presence in Saudi Arabia) is pointless, since Islamists will always find a reason to kill, even if this reason will be the alleged oppression to which Muslims are subjected to in the Western world. The enemy simply cannot be appeased.

Utopian Islamic groups seek to destroy the existing order. They operate at every level, from the local to the global, and do not form alliances with the state which they contest. They have no rational approach or strategy, and endorse no traditional social structure; they are reinventing tradition. Their doctrinal principles include no negotiation, no dialogue and no peacemaking.<sup>31</sup>

Canada shouldn't shrink from aligning herself with the United States, because, supposedly, this would infringe on our sovereignty. The only thing that really infringes on our sovereignty is our incapacity to fight for liberty. When Trudeau visited Cuba in January 1976, he did it to spite the US and by that prove once and for all that Canada answers to no one, not even her allies. By his visit, the former prime minister morally endorsed a terrible political system responsible for the murder, torture and oppression of tens of millions of people around the globe. A declaration of independence is not made by shaking the hand of a dictator. It is made by standing tall amongst countries sharing the same democratic beliefs and ideals and fighting for them. Just because some Canadians refuse to take an active interest in terrorism, it doesn't mean that eventually terrorism won't take an interest in them.

Canada has to join the United States and Australia in their aggressive efforts to weed out not only terrorism, but also its root causes. And the source of terrorism perpetrated in the name of Islam, just like in the case of Communism, Fascism and National-Socialism is hate: for the rich, the racially and religiously different, the fortunate, the gifted. Intolerance and political violence triggered by envy should be stopped. Churchill once said that the great disadvantage of democracy is the unequal distribution of blessings, while the great blessing of totalitarian regimes is the equal sharing of misery. Sadly, misery loves company and it is coming our way.

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<sup>31</sup> Rohan, Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (London: Hurst & Co. Publishing, 2002), p. 93

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