

The Canadian Forces: A cosmopolitan-minded military?

Michael Rostek¹

PhD Candidate

War Studies Programme, Royal Military College of Canada

This article is reproduced with the kind permission of the Manchester University Press and appears in "Forces for good: cosmopolitan militaries in the 21st century", Lorraine Elliott and Graeme Cheeseman (eds), (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004). The author would also like to acknowledge Dr. Graeme Cheeseman, ADFA, for his editorial assistance and thank the participants at the Cosmopolitan Militaries Conference in Canberra, 2002.

Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Rostek joined the Canadian Forces in 1979 by way of Le Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean. In 1984, he graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada with a Bachelor of Arts (Commerce) and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps. Upon completion of armoured training in 1985 he became a member of The Royal Canadian Dragoons stationed in Lahr, West Germany. He has held a variety of Regimental command and staff appointments as well as various school and training positions. He was promoted to his current rank in 1999 and has most recently served as Directing Staff on the Australian Command and Staff College in Canberra, Australia. He is currently pursuing doctoral studies in War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada.

Abstract:

There is a broad consensus among Canada's policy-makers that they now inhabit a more complex and, in many respects, more dangerous world. As the Canadian Senate and House of Commons Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs observed, the process of globalisation, assisted by the information revolution, continues to challenge the power and effectiveness of the country's governmental institutions. The uneven effects of globalisation are also seen to be producing greater turbulence in both interstate and intrastate affairs, encouraging certain regional powers to seek to project, and possibly use, military force beyond their immediate neighbourhood confronting policy-makers with much more multifaceted and complex security challenges.

Among the challenges emerging since the 1990s are what Mary Kaldor labels 'new wars' - conflicts that 'arise in the context of an eroding concept of territorially based authority of the states, in particular of eroding state monopoly, legitimate violence and state sovereignty. The positions of states are eroded both from above - a process that started during the cold war, and from below - by privatization'. The resolution of such conflicts, Kaldor argues, requires militaries to be employed in cosmopolitan law-enforcement roles, ones that give greater priority to human rather than state security, and as Lorraine Elliott and Graeme Cheeseman note, seek to 'defend and save lives rather than to vanquish the enemy or destroy infrastructure'.

This paper explores whether and how far, in the face of these various concerns and challenges facing them, Canada's security decision-makers and its military forces have moved in the direction described by Kaldor and other cosmopolitan or cosmopolitan-minded scholars.

Introduction

There is a broad consensus among Canada's policy-makers that they now inhabit a more complex and, in many respects, more dangerous world. As the Canadian Senate and House of Commons Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs observed, the process of globalization, assisted by the information revolution, continues to challenge the power and effectiveness of the country's governmental institutions. The Committee observed that:

globalization is erasing time and space, making borders porous, and encouraging continental integration. In the process national sovereignty is being reshaped and the power of national governments to control events reduced.²

The uneven effects of globalization are also seen to be producing greater turbulence in both interstate and intrastate affairs, encouraging certain regional powers to seek to project, and possibly use, military force beyond their immediate neighbourhood,³ and, as David Dewitt observes, confronting policy-makers with a much more multifaceted and complex security environment:

Among peace and security challenges that have emerged in this first post-Cold War decade, one can identify at least four general categories: weapons proliferation, including but not limited to weapons of mass destruction; civil or internal warfare ...; terrorism; international or transnational crimes including drugs, migration, money laundering, technologies especially but not limited to the dual-use variety, and economic espionage.⁴

Among the challenges emerging since the 1990s are what Mary Kaldor labels 'new wars' - conflicts that 'arise in the context of an eroding concept of territorially based authority of the states, in particular of eroding state monopoly, legitimate violence and state sovereignty. The positions of states are eroded both from above - a process that started during the cold war, and from below - by privatization'.⁵ The resolution of such conflicts, Kaldor argues, requires militaries to be employed in cosmopolitan law-enforcement roles, ones that give greater priority to human rather than state security, and as Lorraine Elliott and Graeme Cheeseman note, seek to 'defend and save lives rather than to vanquish the enemy or destroy infrastructure'.⁶

This chapter explores whether and how far, in the face of these various concerns and challenges facing them, Canada's security decision-makers and its military forces have moved in the direction described by Kaldor and other cosmopolitan or cosmopolitan-minded scholars. It does this by surveying recent changes in Canada's foreign policy and examining whether and how these changes have served to influence its defence policies and practices. It is argued that the human security concerns that now underpin Canada's foreign policies are affecting its defence policy to the extent that the Canadian Forces (CF) are now much more cosmopolitan-minded than previously. Evidence for this is contained in the 2002 Canadian Army strategy, the evolving Canadian Army training regime, and the establishment in 1996 of the CF Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). Although the CF has, in recent years, become more cosmopolitan-minded, its structure, doctrine and ethos continue to be influenced by a

range of concerns that stem as much from its traditional as its new-found roles. Recent difficulties in matching rhetoric with reality in terms of deployment of the CF in the name of the human security or cosmopolitan-like values also signal the complexities of prosecuting such policies. Despite these complications and complexities, the government's clear and continuing commitment to human security means that the potential clearly exists for Canada to play a lead role in the development of a cosmopolitan-like military and, in so doing perhaps, re-establish its prominence in the global arena.

Canadian foreign policy: Pursuing human security in a global environment

The Canadian Government's most recent (1995) foreign policy review, entitled *Canada in the World*, acknowledges that the security threats to Canada have changed and have become more complex and multi-faceted.⁷ International as well as domestic economic and trade policies are identified as key drivers of Canada's future prosperity. Since Canadian well-being is also directly related to the maintenance of international security, a global approach to security policy is argued to be not only prudent but necessary. The Canadian defence establishment contributes to this global security approach through its continuing commitments to such international organisations as the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Closer to home, its collective agreements within the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and potentially Northern Command (NorthCom), continue to be held as the guarantors of continental security.

But Canada and the World also argues that the protection of Canadian security must go beyond economic and military preparedness. New approaches, new instruments, new institutional roles, and new political responsibilities in the maintenance of international security must also be developed.⁸ During the mid to late 1990s, the then Minister of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Lloyd Axworthy, defined human security and 'soft power' as key elements in any new approach to Canada's foreign policy. Soft power was defined as the 'art of disseminating information in such a way that desirable outcomes are achieved through persuasion rather than coercion'.⁹ Human security focused on the needs of the individual and was seen to involve more than an absence of a military threat:

At a minimum, human security requires that basic needs are met, but it also acknowledges that sustained economic development, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development and social equity are as important to global peace as arms control and disarmament.¹⁰

Although Axworthy has since left DFAIT, his human security and, to a lesser extent, the soft power legacy continues to figure prominently in Canada's foreign policy considerations. This is confirmed in the discussion paper prepared for the process instituted in 2002 to review Canada's foreign policy. That paper states that 'our human security approach to foreign policy recognizes that the security of states is essential but not sufficient to ensure the safety of their citizens.'¹¹ In line with this view, the Government of Canada, and in particular DFAIT, also took the lead role in establishing

the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). With Canadian support, the ICISS produced a report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect* which argues, among other things, that 'sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe - from mass murder and rape, from starvation - but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must [then] be borne by the broader community of states.'¹²

DFAIT has also stated that Canada's defence policy must adapt to this new, human security or cosmopolitan-minded approach to world affairs.

Canada now faces difficult choices about its military commitments. Since a nation's ability to influence international security decisions depends in part on its capacity to shoulder responsibilities, the kinds and level of military capacity that Canada has will affect our future role in the world. Increasingly, international forces are being called upon for a wide range of commitments: engaging in combat, restoring order, enforcing peace agreements, and protecting civilians. The coming years are likely to see high demand for military forces with varied capabilities. Canadians need to consider how our military can best support our foreign policy.¹³

This point was also made by Axworthy himself when, as Foreign Minister, he told a conference of peace activists that 'when other means of addressing the threats have been exhausted, robust measures (including military action) may be needed to defend human security. It is in this context that the response to the conflict in Kosovo should be seen'.¹⁴ From this perspective, commitments created for the Department of National Defense (DND) by DFAIT are seen to translate into 'diplomatic currency' which, in turn, allows Canada to influence international organisations such as the UN or NATO and therefore contribute to its own national security. As one observer has described it,

Canada uses its memberships in multilateral bodies such as the United Nations (UN), to forward the goals of human security. Membership in these organizations promotes collective security and enables Canada to leverage its soft power capabilities, making it imperative that Canada matches its commitments and capabilities to ensure that its voice in those organizations remains credible.¹⁵

One potential problem with this change in direction is that the CF are finding themselves in a position where they are having to undertake tasks driven by foreign policy imperatives without receiving the requisite material or financial support to carry them out (thereby producing the well-documented commitment-capability gap). Some defence analysts have even warned that Canada's 'human security' focus is serving to undermine the combat capabilities of the CF and that these types of operations should be avoided, although others believe that the acceptance of the human security agenda is an important means of obtaining increased funding for the CF.¹⁶ Fed by the complexities of the human security agenda, such arguments will continue, especially within the defence establishment. In spite of this, as Louise Delvoie has argued, 'it seems clear that the human security agenda has to be factored in to any assessment of contemporary Canadian security policy.'¹⁷

That the human security dimension of Canada's security policies will continue to emphasised in the future is clear from both DFAIT's 2003 A Dialogue on Foreign Policy,¹⁸ and from recent statements by Canada's Prime Minister 'in waiting', Paul Martin. In a speech to the Canadian press in Toronto in April 2003, Martin argued that the country's foreign policy 'must have a human dimension, a reminder of those to whom our policy, our efforts, our concerns and our diplomacy are directed.' He added that Canada needed to 'undertake a joint, systematic defence and foreign policy review - to ensure that our defence objectives and capabilities match our foreign policy goals, and that our defence and security obligations and objectives are achievable.'¹⁹

Canadian defence and the CF as a 'multi-purpose, combat capable force'

Canada's most recent white paper on defence was, at time of writing, crafted in 1994 with extensive input from both DFAIT and concurrent reviews of defence and foreign policy conducted by the Special Joint Committee (SJC) of Parliament. The SJC was a sixteen-member team of politicians from the House of Commons and the Senate whose mandate, for its report on defence policy, was to determine what Canadians wanted from their defence forces.²⁰ The Committee's research and subsequent report were extensive and, as the authors of the 1994 white paper acknowledged, its findings 'played an integral role in shaping Canada's new defense policy. Virtually all its recommendations are reflected in this White Paper'.²¹

Despite this seemingly tidy approach, the crafting of defence policy in the 1990s was not without its debates and controversies. Of particular relevance to the issue of cosmopolitan militaries was the division of opinion over how the CF should be structured in the future. The debate before the SJC essentially produced two camps. The first camp, mostly from within the defence establishment, proposed the retention of traditional 'general purpose forces' capable of engaging in 'old style' wars. The second camp, mostly from outside the defence establishment, proposed the development of military capabilities mainly suited to a world characterised by regional conflicts and low level peacekeeping and other military operations. One of the more vocal groups espousing this latter approach to defence was the Canada 21 Council which favoured restructuring the CF in ways that 'would have a negligible effect upon Canada's ability to withstand a conventional military attack, but would allow the Canadian Forces to play a larger role in enhancing common security'.²² Any decision to involve the CF more in the pursuit of common security (which incorporates concepts of human security) was likely to lead it towards a more extensive peacekeeping and humanitarian role.

While the Government accepted the worldview of those proposing more radical changes to the CF it balanced this with the need to take a more traditional approach to structuring Canada's defence force and its capabilities.²³ As a result, the concept of a 'multi-purpose, combat capable force' emerged as one of the main tenets of the 1994 defence white paper. What this meant in practice was not made clear, and so the term has been a source of some debate. What is clear, however, is that the 1994 defence white paper signaled a change in direction for Canadian defence, one that was seen to 'rescue defense policy from the dictates of the Cold War and officers and officials conditioned by that singular event'²⁴ and one that, in the process, would reflect many of the virtues

declared by cosmopolitanism albeit within the context of the state's structure and interests. Thus the 1994 defence white paper declared at the outset that:

Canada's commitment to remain an active participant in multilateral efforts to promote collective security is a reflection of our values and interests.

- Canadians believe that the rule of law must govern relations between states.
- Canadians have deemed their own security indivisible from that of their allies.
- Canadians have a strong sense of responsibility to alleviate suffering and respond, where their efforts make a difference.

These are the abiding foundations of Canada's commitment to collective security. They have proven their worth in the past and remain equally valid in a global environment that is increasingly interdependent.²⁵

The opening chapter, entitled 'International Environment', which set the tone for the document as a whole, stressed as key security concerns such global pressures as refugees, failed states, and ethnic, religious and political extremism rather than interstate rivalry. It stated that

UN Peacekeeping and humanitarian operations are playing a critical role in responding to the immediate consequences, both direct and indirect, of global population and resource pressures. Armed forces are being called upon increasingly to ensure a safe environment for the protection of refugees, the delivery of food and medical supplies, and the provision of essential services in countries where civil society has collapsed.²⁶

The chapter further declared that Canadians are internationalist and not isolationist by nature; multilateral security cooperation is an expression of Canadian values in the international sphere; multilateral cooperation is necessary to combat the complex security problems in evidence today; and the Government is committed to the full range of multilateral operations (NATO, UN, OSCE). A commitment to the idea of 'collective security' closely linked to the UN was put forward as one of the three main pillars of Canada's defence policy. Although the white paper did not dismiss Canada's responsibilities to 'collective defence' and its alliance commitments, NATO (which had traditionally received its own chapter in defence white papers), was grouped in a chapter on 'collective security'. This changing emphasis was also reflected in a chapter entitled 'Contribute to International Security', in which it was proclaimed that:

by choosing to maintain a multi-purpose, combat-capable force, Canada will retain the capability to make a significant and responsible contribution to international peace and stability, within a UN framework, through NATO, or in coalitions of like-minded countries.²⁷

Most commentators agree that these are not only reasonable tasks but essential ones although the emphasis placed on each of the tasks will vary from time to time.

Nonetheless, they are clear examples of cosmopolitan-like thinking existing within state (but not statist) structure. The deployment of the CF in support of human security missions (in the broadest sense) to such remote locations as Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti also support this notion of cosmopolitanism within the state structure. Indeed the mission statements of these operations refer to ‘protection of minorities’ and ‘humanitarian assistance’ as well as the more traditional ‘monitoring of ceasefires’, giving a strong indication of the cosmopolitan-like nature of the tasks undertaken by the CF in the first post-Cold War decade. The tasks are also similar to the cosmopolitan law enforcement functions anticipated by Kaldor and others, including the protection of civilians, enforcement of safe-havens and humanitarian corridors, arresting war criminals, implementing ceasefires, controlling weapons and over-seeing demilitarisation, and ensuring public security.²⁸

While prepared to task the CF in this way, however, the 1994 defence white paper also makes it quite clear that the Government will not create a defence force that is specifically designed to operate at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. The white paper argues that:

it would be misguided to invest in very specific forces and capabilities, whether at the high end of the scale (aircraft designed for antitank warfare, for example) or at the lower end (forces limited to minimal-risk peacekeeping operations). To opt for either approach would be to forego the capability and flexibility that are inherent in a multi-purpose force.²⁹

Thus although the definition of ‘multi-purpose, combat capable’ force is never defined within the 1994 defence white paper, it is clear from that document, as well as from recent CF deployments in Kosovo, Timor and Afghanistan, that cosmopolitan-like sentiments and tasks have become a mainstay in CF deployments. Whether intentional or not, it seems that the human security agenda embraced by DFAIT is driving defence policy to a much greater degree than in the immediate post-Cold War period. Through multipurpose combat capabilities to collective security closely linked to the UN, the CF exhibits at least some of the characteristics of an emerging cosmopolitan military, albeit within state structures.

Canada’s new army

These developments are further evident in the Canadian Army’s changing roles, strategy and training regimes. Canada’s Army remains a key instrument of the Canadian Government’s domestic and international policy. The Army’s role in national policy is defined in the departmental Defence Plan, which is, in turn, predicated on the direction articulated in the 1994 defence white paper. Under the Plan, the Army’s mission is ‘to generate and maintain combat capable, multipurpose land forces to meet Canada’s defence objectives which include supporting Canadian interests abroad, including for UN, NATO, and other multilateral operations, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance’. The Defence Plan also directs the Army to meet numerous operational tasks that span the entire Spectrum of Conflict. Although these include preparations for war,

most of the tasks identified involve operations-other-than-war (OOTW) in support of Canada's interests and most often as part of a United Nations or NATO coalition.³⁰

This transformation is further illustrated by the changing roles for the Army described in its new strategy - *Advancing with Purpose* - released in May 2002. This recognizes the demands of the new global security environment, the importance of foreign policy and the Army's growing role in contributing to that foreign policy. Thus the first part of the Strategy notes that,

Canada's foreign policy has expressed a strong vision of its place in the global community of nations, and the Army, as the ground force component of the CF, has played a major role in projecting that vision and Canadian values in an increasingly unstable and volatile world. In short, the Army is vital to the nation, not only for its traditional role in the defence of Canada, but also as one of the principle instruments for implementing Canadian foreign policy contributing to the maintenance of global peace, security and stability.³¹

This not only requires the Army to be able to be deployed abroad on traditional military tasks but also, and in line with the human security and soft power focus in Canada's foreign policy, to be ready to help defend 'others' against violence and unnecessary suffering. As the Army strategy goes on to say, such a response is demanded by 'the cosmopolitan nature of Canadian society and our desire for justice, human rights violations and human suffering anywhere in the world'.³²

In response to present day threats, the strategy indicates that one of the Army's three pillars is its 'contribution to international peace and security'. Further, the Defence Department's new strategic vision, *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020*,³³ which outlines a future strategy for the Department and the CF, has focused the Army on modernisation and global deployability. So it is against this backdrop that the new Army strategy has been formulated; a strategy that requires agility, flexibility and ability to respond on the world stage. As with the broader defence and foreign policies, then, the Army strategy has a strong undertone of a cosmopolitan-like thinking. Again as with the 1994 defence white Paper, however, the Army strategy also does not dismiss its training for conducting war in defence of national interests. Rather, it recognises a shift in emphasis demanded by today's unstable global security environment; that is, '... the requirement to fight, when required, to protect fundamental human rights and values as described in the government's human security agenda'.³⁴

This shift in emphasis is also evident in the Canadian Army's training regime. Under this regime, the Army must be prepared for all types of operations within the spectrum of conflict. While some operations, such as Multinational Forces and Observers, Sinai (MFO), and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, Golan Heights (UNDOF), may seem benign, most have at least the potential to involve organised violence which may require Canadian soldiers to apply lethal force to bring about conflict resolution or mission objectives. To demonstrate this possibility, the Canadian Army has adopted an operational model to better explain the different scenarios Canadian soldiers may face. So-called 'View 1' operations involve intense combat missions in situations of general war such as those in Korea or the Second World War. View 2 operations involve a mix of combat and non-combat operations in conflicts that

differ from traditional interstate warfare and includes Rwanda and Sierra Leone. The overlap between the two is defined as the CF's 'vital ground'.³⁵

The Canadian Army is frequently committed to 'View 2' operations while retaining its standing requirement to be prepared for 'View 1' eventualities. The prospect of combat is prevalent in both views. Furthermore, the effectiveness of forces engaged in View 2 missions often rests on their demonstrable ability to use combat power to achieve their goals, even if this combat capability is held as a deterrent. Therefore, a credible combat capability is seen to be essential for both views. Consequently, the Canadian Army trains its soldiers, leaders and units for View 1 - multipurpose, warfighting skills - and adds to this training the theatre and mission-specific training required for View 2 operations. This approach fits less comfortably with the expectations of a cosmopolitan military although the recognition of View 2 tasks - which involves a mix of combat and non-combat operations in conflict situations that differ from traditional interstate warfare - is also an indication of the notion of cosmopolitanism existing within the state structure. It may be significant, too, that the Army acknowledges that it will 'most likely' be employed mainly on View 2 tasks in the future.³⁶

Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)

Despite this emphasis on a 'warfighting' training regime, the Canadian Forces are also tasked to provide humanitarian assistance in response to both natural disasters and complex humanitarian emergencies. The agency used to provide this assistance is known as the Disaster Assistance Response Team or DART. The DART was formed in 1996 after the Canadian Government recognised the need for a rapid response capability to provide effective humanitarian aid. The DART is a unique capability unlikely to be used in non-permissive environments but does recognise marginal use in other or complex humanitarian emergencies. The establishment of the DART came about after a relief effort to Rwanda in 1994 failed to arrive in time to relieve the plight of refugees suffering from the effects of the conflict in that country. Today the Canadian Forces have 189 personnel ready to deploy in forty-eight hours to any location in the world. Recent deployments have included the despatch of ten bulldozers to help with recovery efforts after the mudslides around Sarno, Italy, in May 1998; providing medical and water purification services, and in-theatre airlift capabilities, in Honduras in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998; and the provision of medical care, water purification services and technical advice in response to the humanitarian disaster resulting from the earthquake in Turkey in August 1999. Of particular interest is the fact that the use of the DART was recently considered in providing humanitarian assistance to war-torn Iraq. Although the Canadian Government decided against this departure from the team's current mandate, it is probably reasonable to ask how long before the DART's mandate is modified to allow it to function in a non-permissive environment.

Leadership for international relief operations takes place largely within DFAIT and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The role of the CF is supportive but can also be vital to the Canadian contribution. CF personnel are often deployed alongside civilians from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), to work with them on what are, in large measure, civilian operations. This requires that all participants, including the CF, must make an effort to respect and understand each other. Work must

be coordinated, even though various groups involved work under separate mandates and, in some cases, with different goals and objectives in the broader effort to alleviate human suffering. NGOs today are a part of all international deployments and despite the fact that they will often try to keep at 'arms length' from government, especially military organisations, there may be scope for them to be convinced of the necessity of joining forces under a national capability, such as the DART, in the name of human security and the cosmopolitan approach.

Conclusion

Released from the grips of the bipolar rivalry in 1989, the 'new world order' which was to be defined through peace and prosperity failed to emerge, globalisation, unabated, continued to threaten state structures, and the global security landscape became dominated by what Kaldor defined as 'new wars': those based on a claim to power by one's particular identity, be it national, clan, religious, or linguistic. These conflicts were said to require an increasingly cosmopolitan or cosmopolitan-minded response by the international community in which human security considerations become at least as important as those of national security. Within this schema, militaries may exist as much to save lives as to defeat an enemy or destroy its infrastructure. We may have begun, in short, to witness the emergence of cosmopolitan or cosmopolitan-minded militaries.

Canada is no exception to this rule. Its prosperity is said to be linked to global stability. Its foreign policy objectives are and are likely to continue to be premised, at least in part, on the pursuit of human security. Such concerns, in turn, are driving Canada's defence policy and signaling the emergence of the CF as an increasingly cosmopolitan-minded military. Although training for war has not been dismissed, the shift towards a more cosmopolitan-like military is demonstrated through changes to the Canadian Army's training regime which now canvass a range of non-combat as well as combat operations. The Canadian Army recognises that its focus in the future is 'most likely' to be on the latter (so-called 'View 2') operations - those that involve a mix of combat and non-combat roles and which differ from traditional interstate wars. The DART, humanitarian assistance in response to both natural disasters and complex humanitarian emergencies anywhere in the world, is also provided as a further example of the CF's movement towards greater cosmopolitanism. Despite the DART's current mandate which largely prohibits its use in non-permissive environments, recent deliberations concerning its use in restoring war-torn Iraq provide insight into its potential use in the future. It is in this light, whether intentional or not, that we see the CF as an emerging cosmopolitan military residing within the state structure.

NOTES

¹ The views expressed here are those of the author and should not be taken to represent or reflect the official view of the Canadian government, the Canadian Defence Forces or the Department of National Defence.

² Cited in John Shields and B. Mitchell Evans, *Shrinking the State: Globalization and Public Administration Reform* (Halifax: Fernwood, 1998), p. 32.

³ Fen Osler Hampson, 'The changing nature of international conflict: Challenges and responses', in David G. Haglund and S. Neil MacFarlane (eds), *Security, Strategy and Global Economics of Defence Production* (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, 1999), p. 22.

⁴ David B. Dewitt, 'Future directions in Canadian security policy', in Michael J. Tucker et al. (eds), *Canada and the New World Order: Facing the New Millennium* (Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 2000), p. 95.

⁵ Bernard Dreano, Co-chair of International HCA, 'New wars?', <www.yhca.org.md/J9/Bernar.html>.

⁶ Lorraine Elliott and Graeme Cheeseman, 'Cosmopolitan theory, militaries and the deployment of force', Working Paper 2002/8 (Canberra: Department of International Relations, Australian National University, November 2002), p. 37.

⁷ Government of Canada, *Canada in the World: Canadian Foreign Policy Review 1995* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1995), <www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/menu-en.asp>.

⁸ Government of Canada, *Canada in the world*, p. 24.

⁹ Lloyd Axworthy, 'Canada and human security: The need for leadership', *International Journal*, 52:2 (1997), 192.

¹⁰ Axworthy, 'Canada and human security', p. 184.

¹¹ Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *A Dialogue on Foreign Policy: Report to Canadians* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, June 2003), p. 9, <www.foreign-policy-dialogue.ca/en/final_report/index.html> (accessed 26 August 2003).

¹² *The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), p. viii.

¹³ Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *A Dialogue on Foreign Policy*, p. 8.

¹⁴ See Joseph T. Jockel, *The Canadian Forces: Hard Choices, Soft Power* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1999), pp. 127–8.

¹⁵ Jaime Evaskevich, 'A critical assessment of the defence policy of Canada', January 2001, <www.stratnet.ucalgary.ca/research/pubs_%20evaskevich.html>.

¹⁶ See Natalie Mychajlyszn, 'The future of the Canadian Forces: Report on a workshop', Occasional Paper 25 (Ottawa: Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, 2001), pp. 8–9.

¹⁷ Louise Delvoie, 'Curious ambiguities: Canada's international security policy', *Policy Options*, January–February (2001), <www.irpp.org/po/index.htm> (accessed 26 August 2003), 37.

-
- ¹⁸ Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *A Dialogue on Foreign Policy*.
- ¹⁹ Paul Martin, 'Canada's role in a complex world', Speech to the Canadian Press, Toronto, 30 April 2003.
- ²⁰ See Parliament of Canada, *Security in a Changing World, Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy* (Ottawa: Parliamentary Publications Directorate, 1994); and Parliament of Canada, *Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future, Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy* (Ottawa: Parliamentary Publications Directorate, 1994).
- ²¹ Canadian Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper* (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group-Publishing, 1994), p. 2.
- ²² Ivan Head et al., *Canada 21: Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century* (Toronto: Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, 1994), p. 69.
- ²³ Some have remarked that the position taken in the white paper was closer to the 'Canada 21' approach than perhaps many had realised. See Jockel, *The Canadian Forces*, p. 33.
- ²⁴ Douglas Bland, *Canada's National Defence, Volume 1: Defence Policy* (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, 1997), p. 285.
- ²⁵ Canadian Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*, p. 12.
- ²⁶ Canadian Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*, p. 5.
- ²⁷ Canadian Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*, p. 38.
- ²⁸ See the discussion in Elliott and Cheeseman, 'Cosmopolitan theory'.
- ²⁹ Canadian Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*, p. 14.
- ³⁰ Chief of Land Staff, 'Training Canada's Army', B-GL-300-008/FP-001, 2001, p. 13, <www.army.forces.gc.ca/ael/pubs/300-008/B-GL-300-008/FP-001/B-GL-300-008-FP-001.pdf> (accessed 28 August 2003).
- ³¹ Commander Land Force Command, *Advancing with Purpose: The Army Strategy* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2002), p. 4.
- ³² Command Land Force Command, *Advancing with purpose*, p. 5.
- ³³ Canadian Department of National Defence, *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020*, June 2999, <www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/strategy2k/intro_e.asp>.
- ³⁴ Colonel M. D. Capstick, Director Land Personnel Strategy, 'Defining the culture: The Canadian Army in the 21st century', *Canadian Military Journal*, 4:1 (2003).
- ³⁵ Chief of Land Staff, 'Training Canada's Army', p. 14.
- ³⁶ Chief of Land Staff, 'Training Canada's Army', p. 14.