The United Nations and Regional Organizations: A New Paradigm for Peace?

David Quayat
Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary.

Introduction

In *A Strategic Assessment*, the Conference of Defence Associations attempts to present a broad geopolitical framework for understanding the role of the Canadian Armed Forces in the new millennium. Citing the cases of the Persian Gulf and Bosnia, *A Strategic Assessment* suggests that future peace deployments will be handled by regional organizations upon the approval of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Notwithstanding that the Operation Dessert Storm was undertaken by a coalition and not a regional organization, the assertion that regional organizations should, or are in fact able to carry out peace deployments raises several troubling questions. While virtually all regions of world contain their own intergovernmental organizations, not all regional organizations possess the same operational capability in the field of peace operations. The experience of the 1990s has provided few definitive answers to understanding the relationship between the UN and regional organizations. The failure of *A Strategic Assessment* to deal with these issues reveals the need to examine the current state of relations between the UN and regional organizations, and discern if the conclusion that future peace operations should or will be conducted primarily by regional organizations is a valid one.

Discussion on the role of regional organizations in peacekeeping has drawn a wide assortment of opinions from academics, soldiers and policy practitioners. Writers such as Richard Jones, Tamara Duffey and Maurice Marnika have supported increased involvement by regional organizations claiming that regional groups have the advantages of proximity and cultural understanding, making them better able to respond to crisis situations. Other scholars such as Walter Dorn have strongly criticized peacekeeping by regional organizations arguing that power politics and a lack of adequate resources means that future regional peacekeeping missions will befall the same fate as the Nigerian led force that attempted to restore order in Liberia in 1990. In 1991, the UN General Assembly requested that the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations Organization and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization "consider the proposal on the enhancement of cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations." Despite the abundance of scholarly writing and analysis by governmental and intergovernmental actors, little consensus exists on the role of regional organizations in UN peacekeeping.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the UN and regional organizations in the sphere of international peace and security. First, this paper will explore the origins and basis for regional peacekeeping by examining the relevant sections of the UN Charter as well as the political dynamics providing the impetus for regional peacekeeping. This paper will then proceed to survey the operational experience of regional organizations in UN peace deployments focusing on Africa and Europe. The core premise of this work is that the blanket

assertion made by *A Strategic Assessment* on the increasing primacy of regional organizations in UN peacekeeping is based on an exclusively European experience that is unshared by African states. While not completely discounting the future involvement of regional organizations in peacekeeping, this paper will contrast the relative success of European regional organizations against the unsuccessful deployments of African regional groups.

One of the most prevalent problems, both among scholars and policy practitioners in dealing with UN peacekeeping is the lack of a common vocabulary. As Riccardo Cappelli recently pointed out, a clear example of this has been the numerous terms created to classify types of peace operations. *A Strategic Assessment* provides little help in this area using broad terms such as "peace operations" and "force." In the broader context of conflict management, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali outlined three categories of peace deployments: preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. This paper is concerned with the involvement of regional organizations in peacekeeping and peacemaking. However, the inclusion of peacemaking must be qualified. According to Boutros-Ghali, peacemaking includes a variety of activities ranging from mediation to the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This paper will limit its inquiry under peacemaking to those activities envisioned under Chapter VII of the Charter. While understanding the role of regional organizations in the pacific settlement of disputes may be interesting, it seems clear from the context of *A Strategic Assessment* that the focus of regional organizations in peace operations shall be on those operations with the potential for the use of military force.

Another point that merits attention is assessing the success of peace operations. Much like the definition of peace operations, the term successful has been widely debated by scholars and policy practitioners. Any definition of successful peace operations, for the purpose of this discussion, must meet certain criteria. First, the definition must be able to judge a mission both while it is on the ground, and the effect of the deployment after it has been withdrawal. This is especially important given the fact that several peace operations being conducted by regional organizations have yet to be completed. Ann Brown and Paul Diehl have focused on a variety of criteria for determining the success of peacekeeping operations including fulfillment of mandate, resolution of underlying disputes, and the limitation of armed conflict. However, Duane Bratt articulated a more refined model of success for peacekeeping operations. His model focuses on four criteria: facilitating conflict resolution, conflict containment, limitation of casualties, and mandate fulfillment. These criteria provide an excellent measuring stick because of the focus on both the actual deployment and situation that develops as a result. As such, this discussion will utilize, where possible, Bratt’s four indicators for successful peacekeeping missions.

Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping:

Historical and Political Dynamics

The debate over the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations goes back to W.W.II. In the late stages of the War, when the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union were debating the structure of a future global organization, several proposals for a regional approach to international peace and security were made. The most notable was a proposal made by Sir Stafford Cripps, a senior policy advisor in the British Foreign Office. In a

memorandum to Winston Churchill, Cripps formulated a plan based around the creation of regional commissions for Asia, Europe and the Americas. These regional commissions would in turn report to a world council made up of Great Powers. A critical factor in the Cripps plan was the presence of at least one Great Power in each commission. Churchill was committed above all else to keep the United States involved in Europe beyond the length of the War and US participation in the Council of Europe was essential.

Roosevelt was, however, in favour of a universal organization and was opposed to the Cripps plan. Claiming that the League of Nations was in effect a regional organization, Roosevelt feared that the Senate would reject regionalism out of fear that it would lead to further conflict. In addition, Roosevelt believed that a regional commission for the Americas was not needed. Beyond this, the decline of the stability of the alliance between the Great Powers led Roosevelt to conclude that a universal organization was the only way to ensure global stability. Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill eventually agreed to the more centralized Security Council, recognizing that each of the Great Powers would have the ability to block actions by using their veto.

The result of the Dumbarton Oaks process was largely reflected in the final UN Charter. The Security Council, under Article 24 of the UN Charter, has the "responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." However, Chapter VIII of the Charter was created as compromise and gave a broad and somewhat ambiguous role to regional organizations. Article 52 of the Charter prescribes that regional organizations may be called upon by the Security Council to maintain peace and security "as appropriate for regional actions." The Charter also places regional organizations at the disposal of the Security Council for use in enforcement actions. However, the mandate of the Security Council is expressly required before any regional organization can undertake enforcement action except in instances of self-defence.

The experience of the Cold War did little to clarify the role of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security within a UN context. With the onset set of the Cold War, the United Nations Security Council (SC) became paralyzed. With the exception of Korea and the Belgian Congo, the Council authorized no enforcement missions. Instead, the SC was limited to deploying small observer missions and other lightly armed peacekeepers. This paralysis sparked a remarkable increase in the number of regional organizations devoted to promoting peace and security including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Warsaw Pact, the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Despite the proliferation of these groups, only once did a regional organization act in a peacekeeping or peacemaking capacity.

In 1979, the African nation of Chad was plagued by civil war. The largest anti-government guerrilla group, the *Front de Libération Nation de Tchad* (FROLINAT) had split in to several smaller factions. The two largest factions of FROLINAT were receiving aid and direct military support from external sources. In northern of Chad, Goukhini Waddeye’s faction received support from the Libyan army. Libya supported Waddeye in an attempt to further Qadafi’s claim to a portion of northern Chad called the Aouzou strip. Hissance Habre, the leader of the main faction opposed to Waddeye, received vast military support from France and the United States. France and the United States were motivated to assist Habre in light of Libya’s support of Waddeye. On 11 March 1979, a conference held at Kano, Nigeria agreed on a peace framework

for Chad. The highlights of the framework included the creation of a government of national unity and the insertion of a force sponsored by the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Nigeria, the regional power, was given the responsibility of upholding the Kano accord. In May 1979 Nigeria deployed a small force of 2,500 troops. The force, which survived in Chad for less than six months, had a vague mandate and was badly understaffed. Nigeria's intervention into Chad had come without full OAU support. Nigeria's failed intervention placed a great deal of diplomatic pressure on the OAU to find a viable solution to the conflict in Chad. In January 1980, after seven rounds of diplomatic talks an agreement was reached to create the Inter African Force (IAF) under the auspices of the OAU to maintain peace in Chad. In order to enhance the mission's credibility, Nigeria was barred from participation. Guinea, Benin and Congo pledged troops to the new force however, only 550 troops from Congo were initially deployed. Few resources were available to the IAF and three months later the force was withdrawn.

In 1982, with the civil war still raging the OAU made a final attempt to revive the IAF for deployment into Chad. This time the realization was made that, for practical reasons, the Nigerians' could not be excluded from the force. In January 1982, the IAF, composed of troops from Nigeria, Senegal, Zaire, Benin and Togo deployed into Chad. However, the problems that plagued the first deployment of the IAF had not abated. The IAF received only 3,500 of the 5,500 troops expected. The lack of a formal command structure, improper equipment, and a lack of financing doomed the IAF to failure. The United Nations did little to improve the situation. On 30 April 1982, the SC approved Resolution 504. The Resolution only tacitly recognized the IAF and requested the UN Secretary-General to solicit voluntary financial contributions for the force. In May 1982, the IAF was accused of furthering the political objectives of Nigeria and the United States. This combined with the lack of resources and ongoing violence prompted the OAU to withdraw the force in June 1982.

The end of the Cold War brought with it a renewed belief that the Security Council, free from deadlock between the United States and the USSR could fulfill its promise as the guarantor of international peace and security. The empirical evidence between 1990 and 1994 supported this assertion. In 1988, United Nations peacekeepers received the Nobel peace prize for their work and sacrifice. At the time, there were roughly ten thousand troops from thirty-five countries serving in seven UN peacekeeping missions. Six years later in May 1994, there were over eighty-five thousand troops and civilians serving in seventeen missions at an annual cost of over four billion US dollars. Despite the dramatic increase in the size and number of UN peacekeeping operations, the involvement of regional organizations had been kept to a minimum. In early October 1993, the dynamics of UN peacekeeping were irrevocably altered in Somalia.

In 1992, armed with its success in the Persian Gulf the United Nations SC undertook one of its most ambitious and, ultimately, one its bloodiest peacekeeping operations. On 3 December 1992 the SC adopted Resolution 794 which created the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) under the command and control of the United States. Operation Restore Hope was authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter to employ all necessary means to establish a secure environment in Somalia for the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance. Somalia, which had descended into civil chaos in 1989, had no functional government and was ruled by well-armed warlords. On 4 May 1993, the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) replaced UNITAF as the

force responsible for security in Somalia. Despite the shift away from US command and control, the US remained the single largest contributor to UNOSOM II.

The summer of 1993 set the stage for the eventual collapse of the UN mission in Somalia. On 5 June 1993, 24 peacekeepers from Pakistan were ambushed in Mogadishu. Despite some movements towards peace, violence continued to erupt throughout various regions of Somalia. After a prolonged investigation, the United States concluded that elements of a faction controlled by warlord Farah Aidid had planned and executed the attack on the Pakistani peacekeepers. Based on this information, on 3 October 1993, United States Rangers, acting under direct orders of President Clinton launched a raid aimed at arresting suspects involved in the incident of 5 June. The raid took place in one of the most dangerous parts of the Somali capital. In the process of evacuating the 24 suspects the Rangers came under heavy attack. Eighteen US servicemen lost their lives and 76 were wounded. The next night, the international community turned on their television sets and saw the bodies of two dead US Rangers being dragged around the capital of Somalia. Beyond issues of command and control in UNOSOM II, the public fall out in the United States over the incident forced President Clinton to announce on 7 October 1993, that all US troops would leave Somalia by 31 March 1994. Less than a year after the departure of the US from UNOSOM II, the UN ended its tragic involvement in Somalia.

The events in Somalia led to a profound change in US policy on UN peacekeeping. Confronted by a Congress that was unwilling to pay is assessments at the UN, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 in May 1994. The Directive established new strict criteria for US involvement in UN peacekeeping missions, including the stipulation that new peacekeeping missions would require a definite timeline for withdrawal and, for the United States to get involved a clear interest to US policy would have to exist. Furthermore, the Directive unilaterally reduced the US contribution to the UN peacekeeping budget from 31% to 25%. What followed the crisis in Somalia was a total withdrawal of the United States from UN peacekeeping. Instead of sending US troops to maintain peace, US policymakers became convinced that promoting "homegrown" peacekeeping efforts was a way to avoid direct involvement. The US Congress, in September 1994 adopted the African Conflict Resolution Act, which provided US$25 million in support for the OAU’s peacekeeping efforts. The US extended the spirit of the African Conflict Resolution Act in 1996 when former Secretary of State Warren Christopher launched the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). The ACRI was established to facilitate bilateral cooperation with African nations to provide them with training and equipment to enhance their peacekeeping capacity.

While the French and British have remained willing to participate in UN peacekeeping operations, they too have adopted policies supporting the increase of Africa’s peacekeeping capacity. Much along US lines, the UK has worked to provide training and equipment to countries such as Zimbabwe and Ghana. France’s contribution has been in the form of a program called RECAMP, "Renforcement des capacités africanes de maintein de paix" (strengthening of African peacekeeping capacity). This program, which acts very similarly to the American initiative, focuses on providing training and equipment to African, primarily francophone countries. Beyond just training and equipment, French, British and US troops have been involved in small-scale multinational exercises with African nations. On 23 February 1999, the US, France, UK, Ghana. Mali, Mauritania, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde participated in

Exercise Guidimakha. The exercise has been followed up by other bilateral and multilateral training missions. On 27 July 1999, British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, and French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine met to discuss a joint strategy for capacity building in West Africa.

While the policy shifts of the US, UK and France have translated into fewer peacekeeping missions and an emphasis and capacity building in Africa, there have been few attempts to clearly delineate the role of regional organizations in UN peacekeeping. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, former Secretary General Boutros-Ghali released a follow up to his 1992 report *An Agenda for Peace*. Within the supplement, Boutros-Ghali devoted a substantial amount of attention to the role of regional organizations. In terms of peace operations, the follow up to *Agenda for Peace* lists three types of cooperation between the UN and regional organizations: Operational Support, Co-deployment and Joint Operations. The primary difference among these operational types is the degree to which regional organizations are involved in peace operations. For example, in missions labeled "Operational Support," regional organizations act as a back up to UN forces. A clear example would be NATO's air support to the UNPROFOR in 1993. In missions under the category of "Co-deployments," forces from the UN and a regional organization are deployed with the regional organization bearing the main burden of the mission. What is important here is that, regardless of the role played by the regional organization, the UN under all three of the typologies listed plays a role in deploying forces. Boutros-Ghali's definitions of possible cooperation are vague. His definitions fail to determine who will be responsible for absorbing the costs of missions or which organization will act as the fulcrum in which type of operations. However, despite the claim made by *A Strategic Assessment*, Boutros-Ghali foresees no instance where regional organizations are simply handed a peace operation.

Underlying the different typologies proposed by Boutros-Ghali are his core principles for cooperation between the UN and regional organizations. His first principle is the establishment of agreed mechanisms for consultation between the UN and regional organizations. Such mechanisms have yet to be established. While the OAU did create it own Conflict Management Mechanism, its relationship to the UN operations has yet to be determined. Furthermore, during the recent Kosovo crisis, NATO's decision to bomb Serbia without the support of the UN Security Council rendered the need for consultation moot. While some regional organizations such as the OAU and OAS have been granted observer status at the UN, others such as NATO and ECOMOG maintain no permanent representation at the UN. The second principle espoused by Boutros-Ghali is that of the primacy of the Charter. Underlying this principle is the belief that no regional organization should act without the consent of the Security Council. The limits of this principle have been tested and, in some cases, completely disregarded. In 1982, the Security Council did not authorize the presence of the OAU in Chad until months after IAF had deployed. In Kosovo, NATO acted without a UN mandate, and only after seventy-eight days of sustained bombing was a peace plan presented at the Security Council. This despite an earlier pledge by NATO not to take offensive force without UN approval.

The post-Cold War period has been marked by two unclear trends, making any analysis of the results convoluted. The first trend has been an attempt by UN senior officials to define the role of regional organizations in relation to the US. The second trend has been an attempt by the US, UK and France to offload its peacekeeping responsibilities, primarily in Africa. The period

following the release of the supplement for *An Agenda for Peace* has seen an increase in the number of missions being taken on by regional organizations. Despite this, the level of clarity about the role of regional organizations remains muddy at best. In his 1999 report on the work of the UN, Kofi Annan mentions only in passing the role of regional organizations and suggests that the division of work remains largely undefined. The lack of a clear political relationship between the UN and regional organizations has been further exacerbated by experiences in the field.

European Regional Organizations and Peace Operations:

The Exception

Of any region on earth, Europe hosts the best prepared and best equipped regional security organization. For fifty years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) trained for a war it was never forced to fight. In the post-Cold War period, NATO has been consumed by a debate among its members as to its future role. Whether willingly or not, NATO has found itself in the protracted conflicts that plague the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). NATO's experience in the FRY has, using the typology suggested by Boutros-Ghali varied from operational support of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to peace enforcement in Kosovo. What is troubling about this evolution is that it now posses a serious threat to a stable relationship between NATO and the UN. In addition, it is still far too early to tell if NATO's efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo will produce a lasting peace. NATO has extended the life of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia beyond the targeted completion date of 1998, which may signify that peace in Bosnia is coming at a slow pace. What seems to be emerging from Europe is an interesting division of labour between NATO and the UN, driven primarily by the large amount of force at the disposal of the North Atlantic Council. In Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO has provided the entirety of the military force while the UN has provided the civil administration to help rebuild war torn areas. While the Security Council has not always authorized NATO's use of force, the dual presence of NATO and the UN has been almost constant. However, this emerging division of labour is the product of circumstances unique to Europe.

In 1992, the foreign ministers of NATO undertook a historic decision to extend the role of NATO beyond that of collective defence into the realm of peacekeeping. In December, NATO informed the UN Secretary-General that NATO was willing to become involved in operations in the former Yugoslavia. On 31 March 1993, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 816 authorizing the creation of a NATO enforced no-fly zone over Bosnia. Two weeks later the NATO alliance launched Operation Deny Flight. In 1994, Operation Deny Flight destroyed four Serbian aircraft that were in violation of the no-fly zone. NATO, in mid-1993, extended its offer further to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) by placing air elements on standby to provide close air support to UN personnel in Bosnia. In preparation for this mission, NATO alliance started flying training missions over Bosnia in July 1993. In April 1994, NATO conducted its first close air support mission providing cover for UN personnel in the UN-designated "safe areas" primarily in the area of Gorazde. UN Security Council Resolution 958 (1994) provided NATO the justification to extend its air support operations into Croatia. NATO conducted its first offensive action of the post Cold War era on 11 July 1995, by bombing targets designated by UN ground commanders near Srebrenica. Despite NATO air support, the UN safe areas of

Zepa and Srebrenica fell to Bosnian Serb forces. On 9 October 1995, NATO bombed artillery near Tuzla in response to the Serb shelling of UN forces in the area.

The actions of NATO leading up to the authorization of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in Security Council Resolution 1031 represent perhaps the ideal security cooperation between the UN and a regional organization insofar as the model proposed by Boutros-Ghali. The authorization for bombing came from the Security Council. UN and NATO commanders were in constant contact to ensure that NATO action fell within the scope of the UN's mandate. Targets struck by NATO were selected by UN force commanders putting effective operational control in the hands of the UN. Before any decision to bomb was taken UNPROFOR commanders would communicate with the Security Council and the Secretary-General.

From an operational perspective UNPROFOR eventually became unable to maintain peace in Bosnia. UNPROFOR was simply not large enough to cope with the constant pounding of Serb forces. Furthermore, UNPROFOR's peacekeepers came from several Member States of unequal military ability making any unified action difficult. But UNPROFOR's performance notwithstanding, the cooperation between NATO and the UN was near perfect. While NATO bombs did not stop the advancing Serbs from overrunning UN controlled areas, the decision-making structure represents the area of success in UN/NATO relations. The UN, as a political body, gathered the political will and consensus needed to take military action. The UN then turned to NATO, a powerful military force, to implement the decision of the Security Council. This division of labour is at the heart of the cooperation model proposed by Boutros-Ghali.

At the conclusion of UNPROFOR's mission, the United Nations authorized a follow up mission to take up the civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Accord. This deployment reflects a broader trend in UN peacekeeping whereby the UN is no longer expected just to monitor a cease-fire, but to help rebuild civil society. This new marriage between civil administration and military force leaves organizations such as NATO, a collective defence alliance unable to completely fulfill the peacekeeping mandate. The United Nations Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina (UNMIBH) was authorized under Security Council Resolution 1035 (1995) and has had its twelve month mandate renewed every year since. Included in the mission is the International Police Task Force (IPTF) which is mandated to help restore a civilian justice system based on equality of all ethnic groups. While the outcome of the overall peace mission in Bosnia is far from known, the cooperation between the UN and NATO in Bosnia has been ideal in that the strengths of each organization were recognized and put to good use. The evolution from UNPROFOR to IFOR and subsequently SFOR represented an important step for the UN in terms of sharing responsibility with regional organizations.

The co-deployment model that was suggested by Boutros-Ghali, and which has evolved in Bosnia has been repeated in two other European theatres. This first is in the former Soviet republic of Georgia. There, the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNIMOG) was joined by a peacekeeping force from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in August 1994. Since then the two forces (totaling approximately 3,000 military personnel) have maintained an uneasy peace between the Abkhaz separatist movement and the government of Eduard Sheverdnadze. While Russia's motives for deploying troops into Georgia have been questioned, the Secretary-General, in his most recent report on the situation praised the CIS

peacekeepers for their role in helping to maintain a certain degree of stability. The second European theatre to witness a co-deployment has been the province of Kosovo. Despite NATO's unauthorized bombing of Serbia between March and June 1999, the UN Security Council was able to authorize a resolution for the deployment of a multinational force. Deployed along side the Kosovo Force (KFOR) is the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Borrowing from the model in Bosnia, KFOR has provided the military security while the UNMIK has provided the civil administration.

From the superficial prospective of the use of force, it would seem that *A Strategic Assessment*, in the European theatre, is correct. However, this view is based on a limited number of cases that have several qualifiers attached to it. Only twice has NATO been put in the position of having to use force. The first was in support of UNPROFOR and the second was against Serbia in the Kosovo crisis of 1999. In the first case, the UN had taken responsibility for the use of force by deploying UNPROFOR to deal with the crisis. With respect to NATO's support of UNPROFOR, the UN controlled one of the keys in the dual approval model for the use of force against Bosnian Serbs. UN officials were in the command position by informing NATO commanders which targets were to be struck. In the case of Kosovo, NATO's use of force was not authorized by the Security Council, which seriously undermines the position espoused by *A Strategic Assessment*. With respect to peacekeeping, the UN and regional organizations have, in the European context, settled into an amicable division of labour, which has seen the UN provide the legitimacy and civil administration and regional organizations provide the troops for the mission.

Applying Bratt's criteria, we see that NATO's missions in the Former Yugoslavia and the CIS mission in Georgia have, to this point, been relatively successful. There has been no return to mass violence or genocide in Bosnia, Kosovo, or Georgia, which has seriously curtailed the number of casualties. KFOR, SFOR and CIS forces continue to uphold the mandates assigned to them by the Security Council while the UN conducts its civil administration operations. Whether or not any of these missions will produce long-term solutions to the underlying disputes remains to be seen. Recently, several UN workers were taken hostage in Georgia, exposing how truly tense the situation is. The stated position of NATO on the Serbian leadership also exposes the impasse that has been created in Kosovo. As already pointed out, NATO has remained in Bosnia longer then anticipated and has not set a target date for the completion of its mission. Thus, while short-term stability has been provided by regional organizations in Europe, the overall effectiveness of their missions remains to be seen.

Some further trends raise questions about the model of cooperation that has developed between the UN and regional organizations in Europe. First, as of 1 January 1999, all completed UN missions in Europe have taken place in the Former Yugoslavia. NATO's peacekeeping experience is limited only the Former Yugoslavia. The need for any kind of armed intervention by a regional organization in Europe, outside of the FRY seems increasingly unlikely. While the situation in Russia is indeed perilous, it is doubtful that NATO or the UN would be in a position to restore order if Russia were to collapse. A second trend is the continued presence of the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The continued need for the UN in Cyprus has taught the international community several important lessons that. First, intervention in ethnic conflict can require a long-term presence of an international force to maintain peace. The ethnic hatred in the Former Yugoslavia is likely as intense, if not more so then that in Cyprus. A critical question that

will confront NATO is how long is it willing to stay deployed in Bosnia and Kosovo. Interestingly enough, earlier this decade, the United States articulated in PDD 25 that it would only become involved in peacekeeping missions if a clear exit strategy for each mission was developed. Ironically, now the United States and NATO have become trapped in what would seem to be open-ended peacekeeping engagements. While NATO is planning to reduce SFOR by 10,000 troops by March 2000, there will still be 20,000 troops in Bosnia with no target for a final withdrawal set. The notion of an exit strategy is even less existent in Kosovo. Thus even we grant the assertion that regional organizations are becoming more responsible for peace operations (both peacemaking and peacekeeping), the question becomes, can regional organizations do it any better than the UN has done in places like Cyprus? A further question is how many more times will NATO have to provide peacekeeping forces in the European theatre? If the need for NATO peacekeepers is in decline, then the assertion that regional organizations will become more responsible for peacekeeping becomes quite tenuous.

African Subregional Groups and Peacekeeping:

Muddy Waters

In terms of cooperation between the UN and regional organizations in peace operations, Africa provides unique insights for several reasons. First, unlike Europe, African subregional organizations have completed peace operations in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau. These completed missions make analysis of cooperation between the UN and regional organizations more complete because the results and consequences of these missions can be observed. Second, unlike Europe, Africa does not have a well-developed collective defence organization with an integrated command and control structure. Thus, the problems confronted by African states in attempting to bring peace to their continent are likely to be far more representative of the ability of regional organizations to conduct peace operations. Only one regional organization in Africa has been involved regularly in peace operations, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Military Observer Group (ECOMOG). In the last ten years, ECOMOG has intervened militarily on three separate occasions: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. Two of these missions are now complete and their results have produced serious causes for concern about the ability regional organizations, outside of Europe, to become responsible for the provision of effective regional peace and security.

While the history of Liberia is both oppressive and brutal, in 1980 the level of violence and instability rose dramatically. The government of Samuel Doe received substantial military support from Nigeria and the United States. During the 1980s, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NFPL) formed promising to bring to democracy to Liberia. Led by Charles Taylor, the NFPL received arms and training from Libya and Burkina Faso. In December 1989, entering Liberia from Cote d'Ivoire with a force of 10,000 men, Taylor began a march towards the Liberian capital of Monrovia. In mid-August 1990, fearing a possible spread of the conflict, ECOWAS decided to deploy ECOMOG with the broad mandate of restoring order to Liberia. The ECOMOG force to Liberia was deployed without the consent of the Security Council, which was focused on the crisis in Kuwait. Comprised of 2,700 troops, primarily from Nigeria, the ECOMOG force landed in Monrovia under hostile fire and had to fight just to establish a secure

landing area. This difficult landing provided the first taste of violence that ECOMOG would have to deal with over the next seven years.

Between the landing at Monrovia and the 1997 elections in Liberia, several lessons were learned about regional peacekeeping. First, there were deep divisions among ECOWAS countries about the role of the ECOMOG. Ghana viewed ECOMOG as a peacekeeping force that should remain impartial. Nigeria viewed the ECOMOG mission as one of peace enforcement that relied on its ability to intimidate the Liberian factions into a peace agreement. ECOMOG's deployment into Liberia became a tool of the Nigerian policy to deny Charles Taylor the presidency of Liberia. On several occasions, ECOMOG provided arms to several of the factions fighting against Charles Taylor. Soon, ECOWAS members started to act directly against ECOMOG. In 1992, with troops provided by Burkina Faso, Charles Taylor mounted a major offensive against ECOMOG. The second major lesson learned in Liberia was the need for interoperability in peace operations. The relatively unsophisticated and untrained forces of ECOMOG did not, nor could they operate as a unified force capable of achieving a single objective. The national contingents of ECOMOG often took orders from their home governments and not the ECOMOG force commander. While the overwhelming presence of Nigerian troops did quell some of the operational difficulties, the lack of proper equipment and financing tested the limits of ECOWAS's ability to sustain a military deployment.

In 1997, Liberia finally held elections with Charles Taylor emerging as President. While ECOMOG has received praise from the UN for its work, the holding of democratic elections can hardly obscure the failure that was ECOMOG's deployment to Liberia. Applying Bratt's criteria, it is clear that ECOMOG's mission cannot be considered a success. First, ECOMOG failed to uphold its mandate of restoring law and order during its seven-year mission. Violence continued throughout Liberia even in the period following the election and the withdrawal of ECOMOG troops. Following from this was ECOMOG's inability to contain the conflict. In some instances, ECOMOG's actions helped to widen the crisis. In addition, ECOMOG failed to facilitate any resolution of the conflict between the parties. It was only after the UN became involved in the negotiations in 1993 that a workable framework towards peace was born. Finally, ECOMOG's presence in Liberia did not limit casualties. When ECOMOG arrived in Liberia in 1990, fewer then 5,000 people had died in the civil strife that erupted in 1989. By the time of ECOMOG's departure, more than 150,000 people had died. Thus, while an election was eventually held, the process that brought about that election was bloody and was unnecessarily prolonged by ECOMOG's actions.

On 7 June 1998, ECOWAS members' Senegal and Guinea launched a unilateral intervention in Guinea-Bissau after an attempted coup by the army chief General Mano. After months of diplomacy ECOWAS, its resources badly drained from its operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone, decided to deploy a force in support of the Abuja Accords signed in November. The ECOMOG force, backed by a resolution of the Security Council arrived in February 1999. The force was inserted to help disarm the combatants and to provide a stable environment for the holding of general elections. The ECOMOG force withdrew in June 1999 after President Vieira fled to Portugal. New elections have, with the support of all parties, been scheduled.

Judging the success of this mission is difficult given its short-lived existence. The ECOMOG presence in Guinea-Bissau never numbered greater than 600 troops. In terms of effecting its mandate, the ECOMOG force was able to provide access for humanitarian agencies as prescribed by UN Security Council Resolution 1216 (1998). However, on 1 May 1999, violence broke out in the capital between forces loyal to the President and troops supporting General Mane. Furthermore, Senegal and Guinea had established a relative calm that prevailed long before the deployment of ECOMOG's. Thus crediting ECOMOG with securing its mandate is largely misleading, as most of the preconditions for success had been established before their arrival. To ECOMOG's credit, the number of conflict related causalities in Guinea-Bissau that occurred during its deployment were few. Furthermore, the conflict did not spread during the course of ECOMOG's limited deployment. However, ECOMOG's deployment was overshadowed by the unilateral intervention of Senegal and Guinea.

Conclusion:

The UN Back in the Peacekeeping Business

This paper has argued that assertion that regional organizations are the new providers of effective peace operations is based primarily on the experience of NATO in Yugoslavia. In fact, when a larger view is taken we see that regional organizations have had a lackluster performance in peace operations. Two recent developments have also helped to undermine the argument favoring regional organizations. First, on 25 October 1999, the UN Security Council authorized the creation of a UN led peacekeeping force for Sierra Leone. There, ECOMOG peacekeepers have been deployed since 1998 after an attempted coup and intense civil violence. Earlier this year Nigeria, the primary troop provider to ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, announced that, due to insufficient financial resources, it was withdrawing its troops. This pullout has highlighted two major problems for ECOMOG in its peace operations. First, the mission to Sierra Leone has exposed the lack of financial resources available to ECOMOG countries. In fact, one of the obstacles facing ECOMOG is deploying into Guinea-Bissau was a lack of financial resources. A second weakness that has been exposed is ECOMOG's dependence on Nigeria for troops. Over 95% of the troops deployed to Sierra Leone have come from Nigeria. With relatively little strain on its resources, NATO was able to deploy over 49,000 troops to Kosovo while maintaining a slightly smaller deployment to Bosnia. In comparison, ECOMOG has been barely able to support a deployment of 12,000 troops to Sierra Leone. When ECOWAS decided to deploy to Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria announced it would not contribute to the force. Subsequently, ECOMOG was only able to assembly 600 peacekeepers for Guinea-Bissau.

Another recent development has been the situation in East Timor. Following the referendum there, East Timor descended into mass violence. With international pressure, Indonesia, which annexed the half-island territory in 1975, agreed to allow an intervention force to enter East Timor. The force, led by Australia, deployed in mid-September 1999. As a part of the agreement with Indonesia, a UN peacekeeping mission was to be created to replace the Australian led multinational force INTERFET. On 25 October 1999, the Security Council authorized the creation of a UN peacekeeping mission of approximately 9,000 troops to replace INTERFET. Thus, combined with its decision in Sierra Leone, the Security Council has effectively doubled the number of troops authorized for peacekeeping worldwide. Whether or not this new found

willingness by the Security Council to deploy peacekeepers will be sustained remains to seen. However, the recent authorizations for deployments do reveal the shortcomings of relying on regional organizations for peace operations. In Sierra Leone, ECOMOG has proven that it cannot sustain a large scale, long-term deployment. In Asia, the sheer lack of a capable regional organization has pressed individual nations to take the lead in providing for security.

If the need for NATO as an instrument of peacekeeping is truly in decline, then the assertion that regional organizations are becoming responsible for peacekeeping is not sustainable. In Africa, we have discovered that regional organizations have been unable to provide effective peacekeeping forces for a variety of reasons. While the US, UK and France are working on building the capacity of African states, the results of those programs could take years to manifest themselves. And even if the capacity of African states to conduct peacekeeping missions can be improved, issues of power perception and interests may not be resolved. As Dorn has suggested, capacity forms only one pillar in effective peacekeeping. This combined with the recent development in the Security Council leaves the future of regional peacekeeping efforts truly in doubt.