

United Nations Sanctions in Iraq: What worked? What didn't? What next?

Roger Parenteau
Undergraduate Candidate
Department of Political Science, University of Calgary

Roger Parenteau is currently studying at the University of Calgary, pursuing a Bachelor's Degree in Political Science. He will complete his fourth year of study in June of 2005 and is applying to graduate school for the following semester. His academic interests include American foreign policy and security, with a focus on terrorism and the proliferation of WMD's. Besides his current work regarding sanctions and the War in Iraq, he is also engaging in research related to domestic terrorism in the United States and religious fundamentalism.

Abstract:

A major challenge facing the international community today is how best to deal with states that do not adhere to international norms. One response, though widely disputed, has been the invocation of sanctions; however disagreements exist over the nature, duration and possible human cost of sanctions. The 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait provides an excellent lens through which the human consequences of sanctions can be viewed. Following the imposition of sanctions and the coalition bombing campaign in the 1991 Gulf War, the vast majority of Iraqis suffered from severe and prolonged deterioration of their standard of living. In addition to the humanitarian disaster, the failure of sanctions to extract the expected concessions from Saddam Hussein has severely damaged western credibility among the Iraqi people and within the region more broadly. It is largely because of the human suffering caused by sanctions, as well as the unpredictability of their results, that there has been such intense opposition to their use. Politically, the use of sanctions failed to extract the expected changes in the Iraqi regime and, in humanitarian and security terms, proved to spawn disastrous consequences that eclipsed any perceived successes.

Through an examination of contemporary sanctions literature, this paper considers both the alleged successes and failures of the Iraqi case, and argues that the sanctions regime imposed on Iraq throughout the 1990's must ultimately be considered a failure. The absence of weapons of mass destruction following the 2003 invasion is measured against the enormous human suffering caused by the inflexibility of sanctions imposed in Iraq. The ineffectiveness of the oil-for-food program is scrutinized for its role as an attempt to alleviate the suffering created by the war and initial comprehensive sanctions. In addition, reported abuses of the program by both coalition and Iraqi elites are examined. Finally, a brief overview of potential improvements to the current framework of sanctions is considered as well as the emergence of 'smart sanctions'.

Following the August 1990 Iraqi invasion and subsequent annexation of Kuwait the United Nations imposed the most extensive sanctions regime in the organization's history in order to force an Iraqi withdrawal. The mandatory nature of the sanctions imposed by the Security Council led to a near total embargo on goods flowing into and out of Iraq. Since the imposition of these sanctions and the coalition bombing campaign in the Gulf War (and periodically throughout the 1990s) the vast majority of Iraqis have suffered from a severe and prolonged deterioration in their standard of living. It is largely because of the human suffering caused by sanctions that there has been such intense opposition to their use. Much of this debate has been centered over their ineffectiveness in accomplishing their stated goals, the moral justification of their unintended consequences, and the balance between the humanitarian costs versus their usefulness as a non-violent means of coercion. Arguments as to the effectiveness of applying economic sanctions to an authoritarian regime and the effects upon the decision-making elites versus the cost to the greater population are also voiced in opposition to sanctions.

In the aftermath of the 2003 American-led invasion of Iraq there has emerged a body of evidence that sanctions did, in fact, work by disarming Saddam Hussein's regime. It is, however, the humanitarian disaster caused by sanctions that will be the hallmark of the United Nations efforts in Iraq. In addition to the evidence of success, there is ever-growing support for the assertion that the sanctions imposed not only led to the needless suffering of countless Iraqi civilians, but that throughout a large part of the 1990s their suffering was ignored by UN and allied administrators in the Security Council. It is also asserted that sanctions actually served to reinforce the dictator's grip on power. In addition, there is documentation that calls into question the motives of the sanction enforcing states as well as their efforts to alleviate the situation.

Politically, the use of sanctions failed to extract the expected changes in the Iraqi regime and in humanitarian situations proved to create a disaster that would overshadow any successes. It is the position of this paper that, despite some successes, sanctions in Iraq must ultimately be judged a failure. This is because what was accomplished by sanctions could have been achieved through more targeted means at a lower humanitarian cost. Through an examination of both elements of success and failure this paper will also address suggestions for the improvement of sanctions as seen in Iraq.

The Successes

Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq by a U.S. led coalition, indications emerged that sanctions had been successful in disarming and isolating the dictator. In the words of Chief UN Weapons Inspector Hans Blix "The UN and the world had succeeded in disarming Iraq without knowing it"¹. In the aftermath of the invasion, the failure to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD's) overshadowed the fact that sanctions had, in fact, worked. Sanctions can be said to have worked for several reasons. First, the imposition

¹ Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq (New York: Pantheon, 2004) p. 259

of sanctions had greatly eroded Iraq's military capabilities². "At the time of the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq was in the midst of a major arms-buying spree to replace to replace its extensive losses during the Iran-Iraq War and to rebuild its military capabilities"³ Following the 1991 Gulf War, Hussein was unable to replenish his weapons stocks, both small arms as well as larger munitions, greatly weakening what had been one of the region's most formidable armies. It is thought that it is because of the effectiveness of sanctions that the 2003 invasion encountered such little resistance from the poorly equipped Iraqi troops. Secondly, the sanctions imposed upon the Iraqi dictator forced him to accept international inspections and monitoring of his weapons capabilities, thereby creating greater security within the region. In doing so the aggressively expansionist Iraqi government was contained within its own borders and the UN and its partners were able to monitor the regime's compliance with international demands. Third, sanctions also provided political leverage to win concessions from Saddam⁴. In addition to avoiding the political vacuum and possible civil war that would have resulted from overthrowing Hussein, the international community was able to use sanctions to win important concessions from the dictator such as weapons inspections and monitoring. From 1991 to 1998 the UN as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency

conducted hundreds of inspection missions at weapons sites and document centers, systematically uncovering and eliminating Iraq's nuclear weapons program and most of its chemical, biological and ballistic missile systems.⁵

These inspections all but destroyed Saddam's ability to acquire or produce WMD's by destroying weapons making facilities, monitoring areas of potential production and reducing the possibility of him importing weapons from foreign countries. In addition, as part of their inspection and monitoring role, inspectors had developed and installed an extensive array of electronic monitoring and surveillance equipment that would make clandestine rearming far more difficult for Hussein.

The Failures

Unfortunately, despite the successes of disarmament, the humanitarian disaster caused by sanctions will be remembered as the primary result of the UN sanctions regime in Iraq. While the United Nations sought to uphold its peace and security mandate through sanctions it received widespread criticism that it in doing so it was violating its

² George A. Lopez and David Cortright "Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked" *Foreign Affairs* 83, 4 (July/ August 2004) p. 91

³ David Cortright and George A. Lopez "The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990's" (2000) International Peace Academy Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, Colorado p. 44

⁴ Lopez & Cortright "Containing Iraq" (2004) p. 91

⁵ Lopez & Cortright "Containing Iraq" (2004) p. 92

corresponding mandate of enhancing the human condition by implementing sanctions on an already impoverished population.⁶ As Shereen Ismael points out,

In times of total embargo and war, the most vulnerable – the aged, children, women and the impoverished – who have the least input into such political machinations are those who suffer disproportionately.⁷

Following the implementation of sanctions in 1990, the Iraqi people, already immiserated by years of war with neighboring Iran and soon to be defeated by coalition forces in the 1991 Gulf War, were further victimized by the UN sanctions imposed upon their dictatorial government. Comprehensive sanctions, meant to isolate the Iraqi regime from the international community and force compliance with UN demands, created a humanitarian disaster by depriving the Iraqi populace of food and medicine (as well as the implements to rebuild their devastated society following extensive coalition bombing of civilian infrastructure in 1991).

One of the primary recipients of blame for the extended suffering of the Iraqi people is the UN Oil-for-Food program. The program was first suggested in SCR 706 (1991)⁸ and 712 (1991)⁹ when the Security Council was made aware of the developing humanitarian crisis in Iraq. These resolutions proposed that Iraq be able to sell limited supplies of oil to meet humanitarian needs. Such humanitarian needs were further exacerbated by the fact that during “the Gulf War most of Iraq’s power plants, oil refineries, pumping stations and water treatment facilities had been destroyed, and the sanctions regime had the effect of further aggravating the resulting economic hardship”.¹⁰ However, these resolutions were rejected by the Iraqi regime as a violation of state sovereignty¹¹. At this time it is reasonable to expect that the Iraqi dictator saw the humanitarian crisis as an opportunity to manipulate public opinion in Iraq’s favour and break the sanctions regime. This would allow him to avoid concessions attached to the oil-for-food program, such as allowing UN monitoring of food distribution. Nevertheless this offer of aid is often used by supporters of sanctions to prove the humanitarianism of the imposing countries. This assertion, however, fails to address the fact that the sum allowed under the program, even in the modified 1995 Resolution, was inadequate to deal with the crisis at hand, much less the ongoing needs of the people.^{12 13}

⁶ David Cortright and George A. Lopez, “Reforming Sanctions” in *The UN Security Council: from the Cold War to the 21st Century* (2004) International Peace Academy Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, Colorado p. 168

⁷ Shereen T. Ismael “Dismantling the Iraqi Social Fabric: From Dictatorship Through Sanctions to Occupation” *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* 35, 2 (Spring 2004), p.336

⁸ United Nations Security Council Resolution 706 (1991) < <http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/42/IMG/NR059642.pdf?OpenElement> >.

⁹ United Nations Security Council Resolution 712 < <http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/48/IMG/NR059648.pdf?OpenElement> >.

¹⁰ Peter van Walsum “The Iraq Sanctions Committee” in *The UN Security Council: from the Cold War to the 21st Century* Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, CO (2004) p. 182

¹¹ David Cortright “A Hard Look at Iraqi Sanctions” *Nation* 273, 18 (2001) pp. 21 - 22

¹² Neil Arya and Sheila Zurbrigg “Operation Infinite Injustice: Impact of Sanctions and Prospective War on the People of Iraq” *Canadian Journal of Public Health* 94, 1 (January/ February 2003) p.

Since the start of the implementation of Resolution 986 (1995), it has become increasingly apparent that this sum is inadequate to prevent further deterioration in humanitarian conditions and cannot effect the improvement in the health and nutritional status of the Iraqi population the Council hoped for when it unanimously adopted the measure¹⁴

During the next four years the situation in Iraq continued to deteriorate. In early 1995 another humanitarian offer was made in SCR 986 (1995)¹⁵ which was ultimately accepted by an increasingly destitute Iraq. Under this offer the funds raised would be controlled by the UN and divided between reparations for the 1990 invasion, administrative costs and the remaining two-thirds divided between UN administered programs in the north and Iraqi administered and UN supervised programs in the center and south¹⁶. Several commentators have noted that, even though the UN controlled funds and purchasing, by allowing distribution to be controlled by Hussein's regime, the dictator was afforded an additional element of control over the civilian population. Substantial evidence exists that Hussein was in fact "sustained in power in part by the unanticipated effects of sanctions, especially after the oil for food program"¹⁷. By allowing Hussein to control distribution of goods within the center and south of Iraq even after the implementation of oil-for-food, he was afforded extensive coercive power over the majority of the population.

Critics also point to the "handout" nature of the program as implemented in central and southern Iraq as further evidence of the failure to address a greater problem. By failing to stimulate the economy by providing cash for internally produced goods and services, the oil-for-food program did little to produce sustainable economic improvements for the Iraqi populace¹⁸. The population's near total dependency on handouts, which were controlled by Hussein, served to solidify his position in power and helped to demonize the international community seen as responsible for their suffering.

Another failing of the sanctions regime and the oil-for-food program concerned humanitarian items considered as 'dual-use'. Many pharmaceuticals as well as commonly used chemicals such as Chlorine (used to process drinking water) were branded "dual use" because of their potential to be reprocessed and weaponized. While the potential exists to create weapons from such substances the regime in Iraq did not possess the means of delivery and the diversion of amounts large enough to create a

¹³ Tim Niblock "Pariah States' and Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan" Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, CO (2001) p. 120

¹⁴ United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Resolution 1143, S/1998/90, 1 February 1998, para. 66. < <http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/153/75/IMG/N9815375.pdf?OpenElement> > Accessed 19 October 2004

¹⁵ United Nations Security Council Resolution 986 (1995) < <http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/109/88/PDF/N9510988.pdf?OpenElement> > Accessed 19 October 2004

¹⁶ Eric Herring "Between Iraq and a Hard Place: A Critique of the British Government's Case for UN Economic Sanctions" *Review of International Studies* 28 (2002) 39 - 56

¹⁷ Rosemary Hollis "Getting out of the Iraq Trap" *International Affairs* 79, 1 (2003) p.34

¹⁸ Abbas Alnasrawi "Iraq: economic sanctions and consequences, 1990 - 2000" *Third World Quarterly* 22, 2 (2001) p. 213

credible threat would surely have been noticed, especially if the distribution and use of such items were strictly monitored, as was the case until 1998. Inspectors, as part of their mandate, could have ensured the proper use of many pharmaceutical and chemical items and monitored against their possible diversion. In addition, after years of UN inspections and sanctions it is unlikely the regime possessed the facilities necessary to weaponize chemical substances in the amounts required to pose a significant risk to surrounding states, let alone the delivery capacity to direct them to distant nations.

During the course of sanctions the Hussein regime was given little incentive for partial compliance with UN demands since any relaxing or removal of sanctions required his total capitulation. In order to have sanctions removed or even modified the Security Council would have to issue a new resolution to this effect. This created an impasse between the U.S. and U.K. delegations and France along with the rest of the Council who believed that sanctions should be based on time limits and lifted once performance criteria were reached¹⁹. The American and British insistence on total Iraqi compliance for the removal of sanctions produced a carrot and stick (without the carrot) approach to relations with the dictator. Any co-operation on the dictator's part would simply result in the next demand being placed before him. The dictator was essentially given a choice between non-compliance and total submission.

While the Iraqi regimes illegal invasion and annexation of Kuwait in 1990 can be blamed for many subsequent events, the majority of responsibility for the humanitarian disaster that befell the Iraqi populace must be shouldered by coalition forces. The massive air campaign waged in the early part of the war as well as an ever-expanding list of bombing targets resulted in pervasive destruction to civilian infrastructure. The cost of such destruction to the Iraqi civilian population cannot be overstated. The bombing of Iraq

was aimed at not only military targets but also at such assets as civilian infrastructure, power stations, transport and telecommunications networks, fertilizer plants, oil facilities, iron and steel plants, bridges, schools, hospitals, storage facilities, industrial plants and civilian buildings. And the assets that were not bombed were rendered dysfunctional because of the destruction of power generating facilities.²⁰

Coupled with comprehensive sanctions, the extensive damage to civilian communications, transportation, water and sanitation facilities represented a fatal blow to many Iraqis, by not only destroying vital civilian infrastructure but also denying them the means to repair it.

In addition to the 'on-the-ground' problems experienced in Iraq, the politicized nature of the UN Security Council as well as member states acting out of individual self interest also contributed to the failure of sanctions: "UN sanctions are the result of a political bargaining process among the very diverse and conflicting power interests

¹⁹ Cortright and Lopez, "Reforming Sanctions" (2004) p. 175

²⁰ Alnasrawi "Iraq" (2001) p. 209

represented in the Security Council”²¹. The U.S. / UK shift in policy toward one of regime change rather than compliance in the mid-1990’s demonstrates such an example. As such, the interests of the Security Council are not necessarily the same as what is best for the target country or the greater world community. During the application of sanctions some countries within the Security Council “pursued a punitive policy that has victimized the people of Iraq in the name of isolating Saddam Hussein”²². These policies have been followed despite the fact that “the generally accepted purpose and emphasis of such sanctions lies in modifying behavior, not in punishment”²³. As long as individual nations are able to manipulate UN institutions and policies to advance their own agenda without regard for the greater membership’s goals sanctions will lack credibility.

Future use of Sanctions

One of the fundamental flaws of sanctions as conceived of and applied to Iraq was the belief that “hardships inflicted on the civilian population of a targeted state will lead to grassroots political pressure on that state’s leaders to change their behavior”²⁴. This assertion fails, however, to take into account the nature of the regime in a particular state. In a dictatorship such as Iraq the tools of repression possessed by the regime often preclude grassroots action by the populace. Also, involving the dictator in the administration of humanitarian supplies only served to reinforce his position by allowing him to deny vital supplies to potential opposition.

Following the experiences of the 1990s, a movement arose toward the adoption of ‘smart sanctions’ rather than the ‘blunt instrument’ of comprehensive sanctions that had been used in Iraq. “Smart sanctions” differ from those imposed on Iraq in two major ways. First, they more effectively target and penalize those in power. This is accomplished by targeting the mechanisms through which political and social elite derive their power. Arms embargoes restrict access to weapons and thereby limit the coercive power of the regime and may act to shorten the duration of a conflict. Financial sanctions serve to restrict access to funds deposited or invested in international institutions as well as making the sanctioned state ineligible for loans and aid. Restricting access to cash serves to limit the elite’s access to tools of repression as well as their ability to purchase influence. Travel restrictions serve restrict access to outside support and sympathy and to embarrass public conscious elites by widely publicizing their identity²⁵.

Secondly, ‘smart sanctions’ seek to protect vulnerable social groups, such as women, children and the elderly, from falling victim to the collateral effects of broad

²¹ Arne Tostensen and Beate Bull “Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?” World Politics 54, 3 (April 2002) p. 378

²² Cortright “A Hard Look” (2001) p. 21

²³ August Reinisch “Developing Human Rights and International Law Accountability of the Security Council for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions” The American Journal of International Law 95 (2001) p. 851

²⁴ Tostensen and Bull “Are Smart Sanctions”(2002) p. 375

²⁵ David Cortright and George A. Lopez with Linda Gerber “Sanction and the Search for Security: Challenges to UN Action” Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, CO (2002) p. 141

spectrum sanctions. By insulating the most vulnerable members of society from the effects of sanctions, humanitarian disasters will be minimized and the battle for the hearts and minds of the society can be swayed in favor of the international community. Though never issued as an official report, a working group of the UN in 2000 produced an agenda for reform to improve the effectiveness of Security Council sanctions. Some recommendations for reform included: Strengthening the capacity of the UN secretariat to administer sanctions; promoting greater transparency and more effective communications, to inform member states and the public about sanctions requirements and purposes; standardize and improve procedures for providing humanitarian exemptions and assistance as well as clarifying the conditions that must be met for sanctions to be lifted, and consider easing sanctions partially in response to partial compliance by targeted regimes²⁶.

In addition to these suggestions a general formula must be developed for the avoidance of humanitarian disasters caused by the implementation of ad hoc sanctions. Each state must be assessed upon their needs, particularly their ability to produce food and medicine in sufficient amounts to supply their population. Any sanctions regime must include a pre-authorized list of goods that is country specific and takes into account supply difficulties to the civilian population during a crisis.

Conclusion

At the close of the 1990s the UN and the world learned a hard lesson in that, “economic sanctions are likely to be imposed when they are not likely to succeed in changing the target’s behavior” and that, “sanctions that are likely to succeed will do so at the mere threat of sanctions.”²⁷ By applying broad spectrum sanctions it has been proven that, while they may help to accomplish a goal, the collateral damage caused to human populations and the loss of credibility by those imposing the sanctions far outweigh the benefits.

Despite some successes in containing the expansionist Iraqi dictator, UN sanctions in Iraq must be regarded as an overwhelming failure. This is in large part due to the fact that the isolation of the Iraqi dictator and the ruling party could have been accomplished with targeted measures that would have pressured the decision-making elites and avoided the enormous suffering endured by the Iraqi people. The ad hoc nature of the oil-for-food program ensured its failure by allowing abuses by both sides of the conflict. Ultimately the failings of sanctions were not due to the limitations of the instrument itself but to flaws in the overall U.S. /UN policy toward Iraq²⁸. The humanitarian disaster caused by sanctions has led some observers to question to what

²⁶ Chairman’s Proposed Outcome - Working Group on Sanctions – Draft Report (14 February 2001) <<http://www.casi.org.uk/info/scwgs140201.html>> Accessed 19 October 2004

²⁷ Dean Lacy and Emerson M.S. Niou “A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage: The Roles of Preferences, Information, and Threats” *The Journal of Politics* 66, 1 (February 2004) p. 25

²⁸ David Courtright and George A. Lopez, “Are Sanctions Just? The Problematic Case of Iraq” *Journal of International Affairs* 52, 2 (Spring 1999) p. 752-3

extent can we justify sanctions that in themselves constitute weapons of mass destruction?²⁹

In addition to program failures, the manipulation of the Security Council by member states for the furtherance of national agendas ultimately undermined the legitimacy of the action and the United Nations. As a result, many in the international community and, more importantly, many in Iraq believe that the international community and the UN are directly responsible for 12 years of unnecessary Iraqi suffering. In support of this belief the former chairman of the Iraq sanctions committee, Peter van Walsum, was led to ponder, “I sometimes wonder whether brief military action might not have been more humane than comprehensive sanctions spun out over almost decade”³⁰. When war is considered a preferable action over non-violent intervention significant changes must be made to the latter.

The evolution of smart sanctions, however, provides hope for the future. The development and implementation of changes to the sanctions regime can provide the political leverage to force change in state behavior without claims of collective punishment. By focusing coercive measures against political elites and regimes while supporting the greater society sanctions can become an important tool for the non-violent resolution of state conflict.

²⁹ J. Mueller “Sanctions of Mass Destruction” *Foreign Affairs* 78, 3 (May/June 1999) p.43

³⁰ van Walsum “Iraq Sanctions” (2004) p. 192

Bibliography

- Alnasrawi, Abbas "Iraq: Economic Sanctions and Consequences, 1990 – 2000" Third World Quarterly 22, 2 (2001) 205 – 218
- Arya, Neil and Sheila Zurbrigg "Operation Infinite Injustice: Impact of Sanctions and Prospective War on the People of Iraq" Canadian Journal of Public Health 94, 1 (January/ February 2003) 9 - 12
- Blix, Hans, Disarming Iraq (New York: Pantheon, 2004)
- David Cortright and George A. Lopez, "Are Sanctions Just? The Problematic Case of Iraq" Journal of International Affairs 52, 2 (Spring 1999) 735 - 755
- Cortright, David and Lopez, George A. "The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990's" (2000) Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, Colorado
- David Cortright and George A. Lopez with Linda Gerber "Sanction and the Search for Security: Challenges to UN Action" (2002) Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, CO
- Cortright, David "A Hard Look at Iraqi Sanctions" Nation 273, 18 (2001)
- Herring, Eric "Between Iraq and a Hard Place: A Critique of the British Government's Case for UN Economic Sanctions" Review of International Studies 28 (2002)
- Hollis, Rosemary "Getting Out of the Iraq Trap" International Affairs 79, 1 (January 2003) 23 - 35
- Ismael, Shereen T. "Dismantling the Iraqi Social Fabric: From Dictatorship Through Sanctions to Occupation" Journal of Comparative Family Studies 35, 2 (Spring2004) 333 – 347
- Lacy, Dean and Emerson M.S. Niou "A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage: The Roles of Preferences, Information, and Threats" The Journal of Politics 66, 1 (February 2004) 25 – 42
- Lopez, George A. and David Cortright "Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked" Foreign Affairs 83, 4 (July/ August 2004) 90 – 103
- Malone, David M. (ed.) "The UN Security Council: from the Cold War to the 21st Century" (2004) Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, CO
- Mueller, John and Mueller, Karl. "Sanctions of Mass Destruction" Foreign Affairs 78, 3 (May/June 1999) 43 - 53

Tim Niblock “‘Pariah States’ and Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan”
(2001) Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, CO

Reinisch, August “Developing Human Rights and International Law Accountability of
the Security Council for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions” The American
Journal of International Law 95 (2001) 851 - 871

Tostensen, Arne and Beate Bull “Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?” World Politics 54, 3
(April 2002) 373 – 403

Internet Citations

Chairman’s Proposed Outcome - Working Group on Sanctions – Draft Report (14
February 2001) <<http://www.casi.org.uk/info/scwgs140201.html>> Accessed 20
September 2004

United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Resolution
1143, S/1998/90, 1 February 1998, < [http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/153/75/IMG/N9815375.pdf?OpenElement](http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/153/75/IMG/N9815375.pdf?OpenElement)>
Accessed 19 October 2004

United Nations Security Council Resolution 706 (1991)
<[http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/42/IMG/NR059642.pdf?OpenElement](http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/42/IMG/NR059642.pdf?OpenElement)
> Accessed 20 September 2004

United Nations Security Council Resolution 712 (1991)
<[http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/48/IMG/NR059648.pdf?OpenElement](http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/48/IMG/NR059648.pdf?OpenElement)
> Accessed 20 September 2004

United Nations Security Council Resolution 986 (1995)
<[http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/109/88/PDF/N9510988.pdf?OpenElement](http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/109/88/PDF/N9510988.pdf?OpenElement)>
Accessed 20 September 2004