

THE ROLE CANADA'S FORCES IN HOMELAND SECURITY: Responding To Terrorist Threats and Natural Disasters

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Abstract:

If the end of the Cold War and the unparalleled pace of change in technology ushered in a plethora of 'unconventional' threats to national security, the events of 9/11 created grounds to believe the world remains a perilous and unpredictable place, where threat to the homeland persists. Indeed, Canada now faces 'non-traditional' threats - military and otherwise, which may challenge its security as a nation. Natural disasters, global terrorism and, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, by state or non-state actors, raise the horrifying prospects of massive casualties - both military and civilian. In particular, the attacks of 9/11 on the United States were not only a clarion call, but engendered the broadest reorientation of Canadian strategy in over fifty years. Ottawa's goal now would be, not only to deter terror attacks on Canadian soil, but to pre-empt them before they occur.

Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, security of the homeland has taken on heightened significance within Canada. Our increased sense of defensive vulnerability has and will continue to focus attention on implementing measures to safeguard Canadian territory and citizens. The first ever 'National Security Policy' was issued in April 2004. The Canadian NSP details a broad range of new initiatives - including intelligence gathering, emergency planning and management, public health crises and transportation as well as border security to counter threats to Canadians. 'Canada's International Policy Statement' has been released; border and airport security have been tightened and resources have been reallocated to augment counter-terrorism capabilities. With regard to national defence, CF has been infused with heightened importance and force expansion of reserve and regular troops. 'Canada Command' has been established by an executive order, with the new command integrated to allow for enhanced flexibility and rapid response in times of need. Indeed, it would appear there's a shift in Canada defence to a new two front security strategy - a domestic front and an international one, both being of equal significance. These developments have considerable implications not only for the Canada-US defence relationship, but also CF and Canadian homeland security.

In light of prospective terrorist attacks on Canada and in the wake of recent global natural disasters, (US hurricanes and Pakistan earthquake), this work looks at the role of Canadian Forces in responding to threats of terrorism and emergencies. The paper will also look at what has changed, especially with the establishment of Canada Command. Specifically, the article addresses the question: "how do terrorists threaten the homeland security of Canada?" What are our vulnerabilities to natural disasters?" "What are CF options or approaches to responding to terrorist threats or emergencies in times of natural disasters? What equipment is best suited for the homeland security role or what equipment will fulfill the overseas and homeland tasks? Even with projected increases in defence capital expenditure and more personnel, what choices need to be made in the allocation of resources?"

In the following pages, I answer the question "what kind of homeland security is possible or desirable?"

Introduction

The global security environment changed at the dawn of the new millennium. The emergence of state and non-state weapons proliferators; global terrorism embodied by the fundamentalist Islamists; as well as intra and inter-communal conflicts occasioned by failed and failing states in far-flung regions of the globe indirectly impacts Canada's well being. The new threat, and the rebellion that are presently continuing in a dozens of countries, leave the world an unsafe and treacherous place. Indeed, these are trying times. As the terrorists' events of September 11 have demonstrated, no country or nation is immune to terrorist attacks. In the new security environment fraught with random dangers, Canada must be resolute in its determination to alleviate threat to its homeland. In so doing, it would count on CF's professionalism to strengthen our national character and reputation among comity of nations. Alongside other government organizations and departments, the CF would play a significant role, in protecting Canadians. In performing its duties, the CF must be relevant, responsive and effective in wielding capability to protect Canada and its interests at home or abroad. This paper argues that the nature of terrorist threat to the Canadian homeland is Asymmetric. The nature of response to the threat is Asymmetric Warfare. The CF will enhance its effectiveness when it specializes as a 'Niche Force'. A 'niche force' with a focus on continental defence is the most effective approach to a secure Canada. The kind of homeland security that is desirable is one that builds CF capabilities in homeland protection and consequence management.

The Nature of Terrorist Threat to Canada

Rather than just a book, Martin Van Creveld's thesis, *Transformation of War* is more about the future of the international system and about the future of wars therein. Low-intensity conflict is anticipated by defense experts as the most prevalent form of warfare that the world will be faced with in the future¹. The nature of terrorists' threat to Canadian homeland security is asymmetric and the nature of response to this threat will be one of asymmetrical warfare. Terrorist are deadly, non-state actors, who wield sophisticated, modern weaponry. It is known that future wars would be low-intensity; consequently, to be ready for low-intensity conflict, it is necessary that the CF first appreciate the intricacies of the diverse situations and operations they are likely to encounter in a low-intensity environment.

The word "asymmetric" denotes a disproportion in the relative size and strength of opponents or adversaries. Asymmetric threat is an effort or attempt by a minor, less potent actor to hurt a more powerful adversary by using shock and deception to attack targets that are otherwise hard to defend. Asymmetrical warfare features the struggle of that weaker opponent seeking to avoid the strength of the stronger opponent, while attacking his weakness, intending to generate significant favourable results². Therefore asymmetric threats may come in the form of: terrorist attacks that utilizes public transit or cargo systems as makeshift weapons of mass destruction, similar to the events of September 11th; use of radiological, biological, chemical or nuclear weapons on the

¹ Major C. E. Kirkley, *Low-Intensity Conflict and the Marine Air-Ground Task Force*; available at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1992/KCE.htm>

² Bereziuk, Cox, Davis and Osemwegie; in *National Security Strategy to Neutralize al-Qaeda in Canada*; an essay submitted to Dr. M.A. Hennessy of the Faculty of the Royal Military College of Canada, in partial fulfillment of graduate and post-graduate degrees requirements, April 2005

civilian populations of their adversaries; cyber attack on a state's critical computer networks; disruption or destruction of energy and transportation infrastructure as well as vital communications infrastructure. Terrorists use asymmetric techniques to exact economic toll on their adversaries in effort to weaken, destabilize and demoralize both their way of life and their physical security. Although terrorists differ in their means, but often, their cause is not inconsistent with those of state actors who, traditionally, employ more conventional methods. Asymmetric campaign enable terrorists achieve their goals without fears of reprisals by the conventional means of the defence and security apparatus of a state.

George McDonald argued that The Basic Security Documents relating to the defence of the North American continent that have been drawn up by Canada and the U.S. for the last 50 years have always primarily focused on conventional threats. These plans were also drawn up under the understanding that we would have relatively long periods of warning to prepare for a 'stand up fight' with a clearly defined enemy.³ Recent events have demonstrated the inadequacy of the earlier security frameworks. Thus, while it is important that Canada protect its air, space and maritime approaches to the continent as in the Cold era, today's immediate threat is 'asymmetric' and it invalidates much of the earlier structure of defence cooperation. In a nutshell,

Canadians are ambivalent about the nature of threat; in particular, the depth and thrust of terrorists' presence among us. 'Terrorism in Canada?' Yes, indeed. There is a sense 'it can't happen here'. "This is a commonly held sentiment and a mistake. On the

³ Lieutenant-General George Macdonald, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, in Canada-U.S. Defence Relations, Asymmetric Threats And The U.S. Unified Command Plan; May 6, 2002; available at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1004

surface, Canada appears to be a peaceful country.... For a country that was conceived, gestated, born and matured because of conflict and warfare, comparatively little political violence occurs here.”⁴ It is known that “there are around 80 terrorist groups currently pestering the world. Some are minor and amateurish...., while the far end of the spectrum is best represented by the likes of Al Qaeda.”⁵ Fuelled by globalization, many of these trans-national terrorists and their affiliates live and have common routines as other ordinary citizens. Evidence abounds that Islamic militants live and thrive in the western liberal democracies they claim to detest. Because “many Middle East regimes have tough internal security services that snuff out political dissent and give no quarter, many radical organizations find it difficult to operate. They need freedom from scrutiny to raise funds, recruit, publish, and meet”⁶. Militant Islamists are “holding ‘conferences’ where anti-Western and anti-Semitic topics are presented and the distribution of literature and tapes produced by Islamist clerics from the Middle East which advocated extreme violence against the West and Israel.”⁷ “Most of the world's terrorist groups have established themselves in Canada, seeking safe haven, setting up operational bases, and attempting to gain access to the USA. Many of these organizations possess the capability to carry out acts of terrorism in Canada”⁸. Once established “in Canada, terrorist groups tend to follow a familiar pattern of behaviour, which may include any or all of the following activities:

⁴ John Thompson, Overseas Terrorism in Canada, available at: http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2003/other_peoples_wars.htm#chapter1

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Lt. Cdr. Youssef H. Aboul-Enein. Review of American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us, by Steven Emerson, The Free Press, NY, 2002. At <http://www.leavenworth.army.mil/milrev/>

⁷ John Thompson, in an article, The Threat Matrix: Conceptualizing al-Qaeda and its Role in the Wider Islamist Threat Environment, available at: http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2003/al_qaeda_network2.htm

⁸ CSIS, 1997 Public Report; PART II: Counter-Terrorism. At http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/publicrp/pub1997_e.html#3

- a. providing logistic support for terrorist operations;
- b. procuring weapons and materiel;
- c. raising funds openly or covertly in support of terrorist activities;
- d. engaging in illegal activities to raise money;
- e. recruiting new members and supporters;
- f. providing safe haven in Canada for known or suspected terrorists;
- g. aiding the entry of terrorists into Canada by legal or illegal means;
- h. making fraudulent use of false or valid travel documentation;
- i. arranging the illegal transit of members to the U.S.; other countries;
- j. planning and participating in domestic and foreign terrorist operations.⁹

One of the “most shocking statistics regarding the penetration of Islamists into the Muslim community in the United States is that an estimated eighty percent of mosques are now controlled by the extremists. A similar pattern can potentially be inferred for both Canada and Europe.”¹⁰, argues John Thompson. Unhindered movement of trans-national terrorists and their probable slipping into liberal democracies have serious implications for those societies and for their allies. First, Islamists may occupy vital positions in mosques and organizations which receive donations and funding from sponsors of terror. Such control of mosques and organizations enables the radical Islamists to convey their sermon by promoting or sponsoring speakers who promote their hate-filled brand of Islam and support a vicious campaign effort targeting Muslims,

⁹ *ibid*

¹⁰ John Thompson, . The Threat Matrix: Conceptualizing al-Qaeda and its Role in the Wider Islamist Threat Environment. At http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2003/al_qaeda_network2.htm. Mar 05. The Authors dispute this statement, thinking that nowhere near 80% of mosques in Canada are controlled by extremists. While the control of the mosques in the US would be a high priority for al-Qaeda, the priority in Canada would be significantly lower, which is not reflected in this statement.

particularly in Canada. Although terrorist groups or affiliated cells are known to be active in Canada, “thus far, they have maintained a low profile. It is in their best interest to remain hidden within the Canadian population, taking advantage of Canada’s open society for as long as possible because Canada provides an excellent staging ground for attacks against the United States”¹¹. “Our proximity and close ties to the United States, the openness of our society for the movement of both people and money, and our multi-ethnic population make our country one in which terrorists may seek to find a haven”¹².

In 2002, Canada was listed by Osama bin-Laden among six countries to be targeted by al-Qaeda. William Hooper asserts that “al-Qaeda is the number one security threat to Canada”¹³. Osama bin Laden brought together an association of different radical Islamists of diverse nationalities to build his network, and work toward achieving their common goal of expelling infidels and non-Muslim influences from Muslim-populated countries. Counter-terrorism experts believe that instead of relying only on militant guerrillas, bin Laden's network has attracted a sophisticated and well-traveled following that slip into Western societies, including Canada, with relative ease. It is believed that “bin Laden accepts proposals for militant activities in which he might fund or arm, instead of personally directing those cells or their affiliates. The purported projects of all ‘sleeper-cells’ must be directly connected to, and support the ultimate goal of the Islamists: the destruction of the West for its Middle East policies as it impacts the Arab

¹¹ Bereziuk, Cox, Davis and Osemwegie; April 2005

¹² Speeches and Presentations, Speaking Notes for W.P.D. Elcock Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to the Vancouver Board of Trade, November 7, 2002; available at: <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/speeches/speech07112002.asp>

¹³ William John Hooper, Assistant Director of CSIS and Acting Deputy Director of Operations, in testimony to counsel to Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of RCMP and Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar; available at: http://www.cpc-cpp.gc.ca/DefaultSite/Reppub/index_e.aspx?articleid=669

world”¹⁴. As of time of writing, (October 2005), Canada is the only country on al-Qaeda’s list of enemies (marked by Bin Laden for involvement in Afghanistan) that has not yet been attacked. It is only a question of when the attack will occur, and targets in Canada could include public transportation and petrochemical industries.¹⁵ That terrorist have not struck on Canadian soil is no indication of their absence. “One must also remember that significant time elapsed between the bombings of the US embassies in East Africa, the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen, and the attacks of September 11. It has not been particularly unusual for a year to elapse between attacks by groups linked to al-Qaeda. Both the September 11 attacks and the bombings at the US embassies in East Africa are believed to have taken years to plan and execute”¹⁶. However, while some have claimed that Canadian national counter-terrorism measures have been successful in deterring attacks, and will continue to be, others suggest that it is only a matter of time before terrorists succeed in conducting a successful attack against Canadians. A third presumption is that Canada has not been directly attacked by al-Qaeda because Canada serves as a staging base for operations. But clearly, terrorists pose serious security threat to Canada; in particular, the ‘enemy within’ portends even graver security risk to Canada and Canadian interests.

Mitigating Threats to Canadian homeland

As a nation, Canada’s livelihood is largely dependent on trade and our ability to have unhindered access to the U.S. markets. Approximately 33% of the entire Canadian GDP results from trade to the United States. It is the lynch pin to our national

¹⁴Bereziuk, Cox, Davis and Osemwegie; April 2005

¹⁵William John Hooper

¹⁶W.P.D. Elcock 2002

prosperity.¹⁷ Therefore, obtaining improved access to American markets and beyond is crucial to Canada's economic survival. As demonstrated, terrorists pose a serious threat to Canada and its interests. They have expressed a desire to strike Canada, and they have a global reach; thus, as Michael Hennessey would say, they have "intent and capability". Second, the 'enemy-within'; i.e. terrorists' operatives and forebears of their affiliates are known to be living among Canadians, where the free nature of an open society makes it possible for them to organize, meet, work, obtain funding and plan attacks. Third, by its very act of recruiting activities here, terrorists pose a serious threat to the very fabric of Canadian society. Therefore, Canadians and Canadian interests are threatened. Given the capability and intent in new threat, Ottawa took crucial pre-emptive and defensive measures to protect Canadians and Canada's interests. Mindful of its responsibility to protect, Ottawa responded to the new threat with both military and non-military options – including two important new laws, the Anti Terrorism Act and Public Safety Act; and important policies, Securing an Open Border: National Security Policy and Canada's International Policy Statement

The Anti-Terrorism Act

Ottawa has worked collaboratively with allies, in particular, the United States to mitigate threats in the post 9/11 world. The Anti-terrorism Act and the Public Safety Act were passed in response to 9/11, giving Canadian law enforcement agencies the tools to deter, disable, identify, prosecute and punish terrorists.¹⁸ For example, the Anti Terrorism Act includes measures to identify, prosecute, convict and punish terrorist

¹⁷ Thompson. Other People's Wars.

¹⁸ Canada's Position: Securing an Open Society; available at:
<http://www.canadianembassy.org/defence/nationalsecurityposition-en.asp>

groups; provides new investigative tools to law enforcement and national security agencies; and ensures that Canadian values of respect and fairness are preserved.¹⁹ The Act is an important piece of legislation, which Ottawa advanced with an initial investment of \$7.7 billion to support a comprehensive, multi-year, multi-department federal strategy to strengthen public safety and security²⁰ by 2006. Ottawa also signed “all 12 United Nations Conventions and Protocols related to terrorism and has ratified 10, including those that protect against harming aircraft, civil aviation and airports, international shipping, internationally protected persons and diplomats, the safety of nuclear material; and preventing the taking of hostages and terrorist bombings”,²¹

Securing an Open Society: National Security Policy

Undeniably, security of Canadian homeland has taken on heightened significance in the new environment. Securing the homeland entails the prevention, pre-emption, and deterrence of, and defence against, aggression targeted at Canadian territory, and infrastructure as well as the management of the consequences of such aggression and other domestic emergencies. Canada’s National Security Policy strives to address “three core national security interests:

- i. protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad;
- ii. ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies; and
- iii. Contributing to international security.

¹⁹ Backgrounder, Royal Assent of Bill C-36 The Anti-Terrorism Act, available at: http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2001/doc_28217.html

²⁰ Backgrounder, Recent Canadian Investments in Defence and Security http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=998

²¹ Backgrounder, Highlights of Anti-Terrorism Act, available at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2001/doc_27787.html

Canada's International Policy Statements

Canada's International Policy Statement further strengthens Ottawa's determination to protect Canadian interests, and there is a role for the CF in defending and securing Canada. There had been no significant threat to Canada, following the end of the Cold War. Undoubtedly, the notion that Canada's homeland security is guaranteed, and that it could reap a "peace dividend", is being questioned by events outside and inside of the North American continent. In 'synch' with the changing circumstances, Ottawa, tabled a comprehensive international strategy for Canada, including a Defence Policy Statement that sets out a vision for the Canadian Forces and how it will adapt to the evolving, new international security environment.

CF Campaign against Terrorism: Strengthening Canada-U.S. Defence Relations

Traditionally, Canada's most significant defence ally has been the United States; this will likely be for the foreseeable future. Canada and the United States have maintained an enduring security and defence relations that is deep-rooted and vastly successful. In the new security environment, strengthening Canada-US defence relationship is crucial to the future security of the continent. Ottawa believes it is in "Canada's national interest to continue to engage cooperatively with the U.S. on measures that directly affect Canadian territory and citizens, and to maintain our ability to influence how the North American continent is defended"²² The Government of Canada's intention to do so was reflected in, among other instruments, "the Smart Border Declaration of 2001, the establishment of the Bi-National Planning Group in 2002, and

²² Overview, Canada's International Policy Statement; P8

the 2004 Joint Statement on Common Security, Common Prosperity by Prime Minister Martin and President Bush”²³.

Ottawa responded to Washington’s request for military assistance, in the wake of 9/11 attacks. CF initial contribution, which included intelligence-and the deployment of personnel, was part of Canada’s participation in NORAD. To support NORAD operations, Canada-based CF-18 fighter aircraft were placed in high alert, following 9/11 attacks. Since the beginning of Operation APOLLO, Canada's military contribution to the US-led global campaign against terrorism, CF has deployed several units and formations, among which is a Canadian Naval Task Group, on station in the Arabian Sea, comprising several ships, including patrol frigates, a replenishment ship and a destroyer; 3rd Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group with Coyote armoured reconnaissance vehicles from Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians); and three CC-130 Hercules tactical transport aircraft, employed primarily in the delivery of humanitarian relief and supplies to the people of Afghanistan, to mention but a few.²⁴

Canadian Military in the 21st Century: Military Capabilities

Canada Command and CF: adapting to a new security environment

Until recently, the previous review in Canada's Department of National Defence was in 1994, during which time much has changed. Canada's Defence Policy Statement (DPS) involves the most important transformation of Canada's military in the last 15 years. The Policy envisions a new role for the Canadian Forces that will see it become

²³ *ibid*

²⁴ Backgrounder, Canada-US Defence Relations, 8 January 2003; available at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=836

more 'relevant, responsive and effective', thereby strengthening its capacity to defend Canadian security, protect Canadian interests, and enhance Canada's role on the world stage. Canada Command, the integrated national operational command headquarters, allows CF to bring the best available military resources from across Canada to bear on a crisis or threat, wherever it occurs, nation-wide.²⁵ Among other functions, "Canada Command will help ensure the Canadian Forces are more relevant by providing them with a command structure that is better suited to the defence of Canada and North America in the new international security environment; responsive by allowing them to quickly mobilize and deploy personnel to deal with a crisis anywhere in Canada; and effective by considering Canada a single operational theatre"²⁶. The creation of Canada Command has implication for Canadian defence strategy and policy. It means that for the first time, a unified and integrated chain of command at the national and regional levels will have immediate authority to deploy maritime, land and air assets in support of domestic operations.²⁷ They include the Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command, which is responsible for all military international operations and the Special Operations Group, which is responsible for responding to terrorism and threats to Canadians at home and abroad.²⁸ While numerous writers have commented on Canada's military and defence effort as well as the future of the Canadian Forces, but ultimately, it is capabilities, not new organizations or regimes that will determine whether Canada is able

²⁵ Backgrounder, Canada Command, BG-05.017 - June 28, 2005; available at:
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1692

²⁶ Backgrounder, Canada Command, June 28, 2005; available at:
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1692

²⁷ Kristin Harold, in article, Star Top Shuffle Spotlights DND's Need for New Home, available at:
<http://www.colliersmn.com/prod/cclod.nsf/city/1C6672DEF0EE34188525708B00647B17>

²⁸ *ibid*

to make a contribution to the defence of North America in an age of catastrophic terrorism.²⁹

Change in the new security environment, the creation of Canada Command and, the emphasis on ‘a single operational theatre’ have implications for future capabilities of CF and how it adapts to a changed and changing world. Indeed, wars as we know it have metamorphosed from the conventional to unconventional. It is argued that, while still valid for conventional warfare, Clausewitz's Trinitarian model does not satisfactorily account for all types of warfare, specifically most forms of low intensity conflict and unconventional war common since 1945.³⁰ Irrefutably, von Clausewitz’s preeminence is virtually unequalled in the array of military theorists; his position incontrovertible. Yet, we continue to see trend in conflicts that have not been properly accounted for by Clausewitz's strictly political framework. In *Transformation of War*, Martin Van Creveld predicted that future wars will be waged by groups of insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists and brigands, motivated by fanatical, ideologically-based loyalties. For Van Creveld, skirmishes, bombings and massacres would take the place of conventional warfare; weapons will become less, rather than more, sophisticated. It would appear recent events in the 21st century have not only attested the credibility of Van Creveld’s thesis, but the gloominess of the future security environment is further evidence of his insights. That the geopolitical landscape is strewn with conditions rife for ‘Fourth Generation Warfare’ is undeniable. Consequently, the military capabilities for the 21st century armed forces are those that are relevant to the future of conflict and the new warfare. It combines elements of conventional and unconventional warfare for applicable

²⁹ Lagassé and Sokolsky, *The Evolving Security Environment and the Canadian Forces*; May 2004

³⁰ Major K. M. French, *Clausewitz vs. the Scholar: Martin Van Creveld's Expanded Theory of War*; available at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1992/FKM.htm>

use. In the evolving security environment, therefore, and in light of resource constraints, the most important capabilities for the Canadian Forces in the 21st century and beyond are those relevant to domestic and North American security³¹; one with an emphasis on providing the surveillance and ‘teeth’ within the larger context of Canada’s domestic security strategy.³²

Until recent times, it is suggested, the Canadian strategic tradition is based on Forward Security: stop security problems overseas from getting out of control before they have an adverse effect at home in North America.³³ It is recalled that the Cold War imperatives of the 1950-to-1990 period had the army worried about killing large numbers of tanks somewhere in Europe; the air force focused on detecting and shooting down other manned, high-performance military aircraft; and the navy working hard on the challenges of finding and destroying enemy submarines.³⁴ Arguably, Canada contributed its quota to an insecure International system during the Cold War. The Canadian military took part in several UN peacekeeping operations alongside its NATO allies and helped contain Soviet expansion.³⁵ But, with the exit of the Cold War, most of those skills set and capabilities blunted and outmoded. Critics and commentators on Canadian defence have since advanced different perspectives with respect to the future of the CF. While some believe inadequate funding has undermined the CF and left it in an unenviable state, others suggest that the state and future capability of CF is, and was borne out of ‘necessity’. The Cold War is over and there has been a move toward demilitarization.

³¹ Lagassé and Sokolsky, May 2004

³² Major-General Andrew Leslie, *Boots on the Ground*; Canadian Military Journal, Spring 2005, P21

³³ Sean M. Maloney, *Force Structure or Forced Structure?: The 1994 White Paper on Defence and the Canadian Forces in the 1990’s*; Vol. 10, no 5, May 2004; P14

³⁴ General Leslie, P19

³⁵ Lagassé and Sokolsky; May 2004

Soviet bombers no longer probe Canada's airspace and Canadian land forces are no longer needed to counter the East Bloc threat to the former West Germany. In the absence of a tangible foe, the need for a large, conventional, standing military has diminished.³⁶ There is no doubt that the skill sets and capabilities that prevailed in the Cold War era will still be required so as to ensure a certain range of interoperability with Canada's allies, and to maintain the government's range of force employment options well into an uncertain future.³⁷ The change in the security environment prompts for a leaner, more responsive force, consistent with the times. But, because the future is relatively unpredictable in the new environment, it is necessary that special attention be accorded to procurement of new capabilities for the 21st Century. This is even more so when we consider that it can take 15 years (and sometimes more) to introduce sophisticated new equipment into the CF; foronce a capability is gone, it can take many years to reacquire the equipment, and years after that before the appropriate people are fully trained so that they have a fighting chance to do their duty in defence of the nation.³⁸ As observed lately by Dumais, the United States is at the leading edge of many developments, and from a budgetary perspective, it's evident that we can't keep up in all areas, so we have to be very careful as to which areas we ensure that we keep up in, and get the most bang for our buck in terms of focusing future interoperability requirements.³⁹ Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Canada cannot hope to upgrade its military to the

³⁶ Jack Granatstein, On guard for thee? Canada's shrinking military; CBC Online, June 28, 2005; available at: http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/cdnmilitary/shrinking_military.html

³⁷ General Leslie, P21

³⁸ *ibid*

³⁹ As quoted in Middlemiss and Stairs, The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: The Issues; available at: <http://www.irpp.org/pm/archive/pmvol3no7.pdf>

current state-of-the-art without US help.⁴⁰. Therefore, the choice of equipment procured, their strategic importance, and the theatres where they would be applied, is crucial to future capabilities of the Canadian military in the 21st century.

Increasingly, future warfare is disparate, localised and low-intensity in nature; often, with widespread deviant norms and far-reaching consequences. To retain effective capability for the 21st century, a 'Niche' CF with 'MOOTW'-capabilities is called for. Traditionally, 'MOOTW' would include civil support by the military, domestic disaster relief operations such as might be encountered in emergencies of earthquakes, floods, hurricanes and fire; including managing outcomes and consequence, such as the aftermath of a terrorist attack with a WMD. In the new security environment, a Military Operations Other Than War Army may be conceived of as 'the catalyst', the new, unconventional army for Social Change. Therefore, Military-Operations-Other-Than-War-capable CF can be conceived of as a "potent squad of specifically-tailored Army of Change; its lean, tough, fast, virtual and controllable; it is highly-skilled and vastly trained in asymmetries; its constituents comprise of units drawn from mechanized, light forces, the aid peacekeeping community as well as JTF2/DART experience; combines lethal force and consequence management abilities, with domestic and modest internationalist capabilities; coalesces the functional elements of PPC-CUSO-CARE-REDCROSS. This 'niche force wields massive 'carrots and sticks' and is 'tailor-made' for 'Fourth Generation Warfare' or the future theatre. The squad is not only adept in low-intensity methods or environment, but wields capability to foster order, consensus and governance, while engaging reconstruction efforts; it is adaptable to both

⁴⁰ Christopher Sands, Canadian National Security after 9/11: What does the United States Expect?; available at: <http://www.sfu.ca/casr/ft-csands1.htm>

‘conventional’ and ‘unconventional’ conditions and theatres. In this equation, the conventional threat might be the terrorists and insurgents, and the unconventional, the massed military formations of anybody silly enough to present such a target-rich environment to the devastating abilities of modern military forces⁴¹.

Canada’s vast landmass, long coastlines, and sometimes intense weather conditions make the nation somewhat hard to defend. Without the help and influence of friends and allies, the costs of defending Canada in a sometimes turbulent and dangerous world would have been flatly impossible.⁴² Fortunately for Canada, we have the most important economic and military ally in the United States. By default of geography and history; shared common values and institutions, combined with numerous defence and security arrangements, Canada and the United States have become natural allies. Accordingly, Canada's security interest is not inconsistent with those of the United States. A specialized ‘niche force’ with continental defence of North America, especially at a time when the United States is deeply engrossed in prosecuting a global campaign against terror is not only desirable and necessary, but also, an absolute requirement in terms of Canada’s bilateral security relations with the United States. This would appear to be even more so, because “given Canada's limited investments in national security capabilities ...off-continent operations come at the expense of Canada's contributions to continental defence. While the new sense of threat to the United States itself continues, Washington will certainly prioritize Canadian contributions in North America over those elsewhere.”⁴³ Consequently, for the 21st century, a niche CF will acquire the right mix of

⁴¹Max Boot, as quoted in Thoughts on the Future of Canadian Forces; Andrew Leslie; available at : <http://www.irpp.org/events/archive/jun05NGO/leslie.pdf>

⁴² Major-General Andrew Leslie, Canadian Military Journal, Spring 2005, P21

⁴³ Christopher Sands, 2003

capabilities that are suitable for both homeland security and for fulfilling moderate overseas tasks. The CF 21st Century capabilities or choice of equipment procured will be influenced largely by several factors, including: the effectiveness and applicability of the equipment, “considering Canada a single operational theatre”⁴⁴; America’s military preeminence, relative to the rest of the world; CF ability to interoperate with US military and other allies as well as by how much defence-worthy contribution the equipment/CF makes to our militarily, self-sufficient ally, the United States. Put differently, how effective would we be in defending the continent? Do our contributions to international or US-led missions really make a difference at a time of limited resources and American-near-self-sufficiency in equipment?

American Military Preponderance relative to the rest of the world and CF Specialization

Certainly, the nature of war and future conflicts has transformed. It is believed that the Canadian political authorities...have usually operated on the principle that there has never really been a direct, external military threat to Canada⁴⁵. Often, the importance of maintaining large, potent armed force in peace time and the form or structure of a nation’s armed services is much a function of that nation’s defence policy, as it is influenced by its foreign policy options. Certainly, it would appear, based on its interests Ottawa has had higher priorities than defence and security on its options list until the recent past. Conversely, for example, since the end of the Cold War, the US armed services has increased considerably in technology and size; and it is likely to retain its lead in the RMA into the foreseeable future. Increasingly, the purpose, and degree to

⁴⁴ Overview: Canada’s international Policy Statement

⁴⁵ General Leslie, P18

which the United States armed forces are utilized, largely determines how it is funded. Along with its lead in RMA, the US armed services engage in varieties of tasks globally, necessitating not only complexities in technology and personnel, but command and control structures, including the recently created US Northcom, all of which directly or indirectly impacts the security environment. The establishment of US Northern Command and the US Office of Homeland Security, for example, has implications for Canadian security. Sands, argue that “the most basic US expectations are those security measures which are necessary to protect Canada's national interests. Since the two countries share many strategic interests, anything Canada does to protect itself is likely to complement US national security interests and will therefore be welcomed by Washington.”⁴⁶ In the new security environment and, from the standpoint of the ‘Economic Law of ‘Comparative Advantage’, a specialized ‘Niche Force’ provides CF the opportunity to maximize use of its resources in cost effective ways – especially in the face of American military preponderance, relative to the rest of the world, in particular, Canada. “The theory of Comparative Advantage explains why it can be beneficial for two countries to trade, even though one of them may be able to produce every kind of item more cheaply than the other”⁴⁷. “When one entity (be it a firm or a country) is able to produce more efficiently than another entity it has an Absolute Advantage; that is, assuming equal inputs, the entity with an absolute advantage will have a greater output”⁴⁸ The United States is not only the greatest military power on earth with respect to global reach and sophisticated military equipment, but only the U.S. military can undertake

⁴⁶ Christopher Sands; 2003

⁴⁷ Comparative Advantage, From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

⁴⁸ ibid

larger projects than any military in the world.⁴⁹ For instance, as indicated earlier, since the end of the Cold War, the US armed services have increased spectacularly in technology; making it the indisputable leader in the RMA, perhaps more than all other militaries combined. It follows then that the United States not only has a comparative, but absolute advantage, given its military preponderance.

In ‘U.S. Military: Strong Enough to Deter All Challenges’, Barry Posen posits a dual argument of ‘Command of the Commons’ and the ‘Contested Zones’. In principle, although he sees airspace belonging to the countries directly beneath it, he defines the ‘commons’ as those “areas that belong to no one state and provide access to much of the globe”⁵⁰. He argues that the specific weapons and platforms needed to secure and exploit command of the commons are expensive – including combat aircrafts; nuclear powered aircraft carriers and attack submarines, amphibious assault ships, and reconnaissance satellites that run into billions of dollars in unit costs. Acquiring these capabilities is largely contingent upon military use of information technology; and the key elements in acquiring it involves massive scientific and industrial base for equipment design and production. The US military preponderance is not only evident in this area, but also its military already excels in all spheres of the Revolution in Military Affairs.

Posen defines ‘Contested Zone’ as arenas of conventional combat where weak adversaries have a good chance of doing real damage to U.S. forces.⁵¹ He argues that a mixture of political, physical, and technological factors combine to create ‘contested zones’, for example, the US military casualties in the hands of rag-tag armies and

⁴⁹ Barry R. Posen, U.S. Military: Strong enough to Deter All Challenges’; MIT, 2005; page 3

⁵⁰ Posen, page 2

⁵¹ Ibid; page 3

insurgents on the streets of Mogadishu in 1993 happened in the ‘contested zone’. With his dual thesis, Posen argue realistically that “the United States has attained a very high degree of military capability on and under the sea, in the air (above 15,000 feet), and in space”⁵²; unrivalled by any other military power. Apparently, “with 3.5 to 4 percent of U.S. GDP devoted to defense (nearly one percent of Gross World Product), the U.S. military can undertake larger projects than any military in the world. In 2003 the U.S. Department of Defense budgeted \$56.8 billion for military research and development—nearly as much as Germany plus France (or the United Kingdom) together budgeted for their entire military effort. The United States seems destined to be on the cutting edge of weapons technology for a very long time.”⁵³

With heightened military spending, therefore, Command of the commons provides the United States with more useful military potential for a hegemonic foreign policy than any other offshore power has ever had.⁵⁴ The quantity and quality of the United States’ military power gives Washington an unchecked ‘command of the commons’. Command of the commons not only helps the United States to weaken its adversaries, by restricting their access to economic, military, and political assistance, but also, it has permitted the United States to wage wars on short notice even where it has had little permanent military presence, as was the case of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the 1993 intervention in Somalia, and the 2001 war in Afghanistan.

As argued by Daniel Marston, in the ongoing Iraq campaign, the “US land forces operate extremely well in the context of high-intensity warfare. Current doctrine reflects

⁵²Ibid

⁵³Ibid

⁵⁴Ibid

this excellent record. The conventional side of the conflict in Iraq was a success, reinforcing the reasons why most states will not attempt a conventional war against the US”⁵⁵. Having a command of the commons means the United States is supreme in its control of the world’s oceans, air space and outer space. No other navy can confront the United States Navy (USN) on the high seas. No other air force or air defence system can defeat the United States Air Force’s (USAF) fighters or match the USAF’s air transport capabilities. And no other state has grasped the military potentials of outer space as effectively as the United States.⁵⁶ Given that the United States possesses an unmatched ability to project power across the globe, it follows then that, not only is there a lack of competition to its air and sea supremacy, but also Washington has capability to impede the efforts of potential adversaries in the commons, while protecting its own interests. Accordingly, it does not rely on allies when it comes to marine or aerial operations. The implications for the CF is, whatever it inputs to US-led international mission would likely be considered its contribution with respect to defence of the North American continent. From the forgoing, therefore, it would appear the CF military capability for the 21st century and choice of equipment it procures would be influenced by this reality. This is worthy of consideration for CF military planners.

On the other hand, the Americans do not possess the same capability in ‘contested zones’ as they do in the ‘commons’. Indeed, the Americans are ill-equipped and ill-prepared to take on insurgencies and perform effectively in contested zones. As noted by Colonel Iron, “knowledge of the way insurgent or terrorist groups work is really important. But it doesn’t come easily or quickly. It comes from painstaking analysis of

⁵⁵Daniel Marston, Force Structure for High- and Low-Intensity Warfare: The Anglo-American Experience and Lessons for the Future; Royal Military Academy Sandhurst; available at: http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_2020_Support/2004_05_25_papers/force_structure.pdf

⁵⁶Lagassé and Sokolsky, May 2004

enemy patterns. . . . [A]dvanced IT certainly helps to store, retrieve, and analyze data, but it takes humans to collect the information in the first place. . . . [W]e need to work on [human and cultural] intelligence. . . . [I]t doesn't come through satellite imagery. . . . [I]t comes from talking to people.⁵⁷” Thus, the US military can be said to be tough, self-sufficient and capable of deterring and defeating adversaries in the commons and in high intensity conflicts, whereas, they are weak and ill-equipped to take on insurgencies in contested zones. Command of the commons by the Americans, combined with their vulnerability in contested zones, has implications for Canadian defence policy, and therefore, future capabilities of CF in the 21 century. Lagassé and Sokolsky argue that First, “Canada stands to gain little by bolstering American military power in the commons. The United States does not need allied contributions to help secure the high-seas, the air or outer space. As a result, Ottawa should not concern itself with threats to the commons, since the American armed forces are amply equipped to quash any such threats.”⁵⁸ Thus, contributing to the American military machinery in the ‘commons’, sometimes, in cases where an ally’s equipment may not harmonize, or even up to date with those of American military is, at best, an effort in futility. Rather, because the ‘contested zone’ is America’s ‘soft under-belly’ for vulnerability; the CF contribution in this area is worthwhile. Therefore, CF capability for the 21st century is one that deemphasizes the ‘commons’, but is relevant, responsive and effective in considering Canada and North American continent as ‘single operational theatre; possess ability to

⁵⁷ Col. Richard Iron, Deputy Director of British Army Doctrine; as quoted by Daniel Marston, in *Force Structure for High- and Low-Intensity Warfare: The Anglo-American Experience and Lessons for the Future*; Royal Military Academy Sandhurst; available at: http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_2020_Support/2004_05_25_papers/force_structure.pdf

⁵⁸ Lagassé and Sokolsky; May 2004

interoperate with US military and is attuned to future conflict as well as suitable for 'contested zone'.

By specializing as a 'Niche Force' with MOOTW-capabilities, CF will maximize its comparative advantage and retain lead in the Revolution in Military Affairs. Specialization enables the CF to build capability that is realistically attuned to the new security environment and responsive to the future of warfare. However, because the future is 'fluid' and relatively unpredictable, CF's approach will be cautious, but decisive in this process. With respect to capability or procurement of equipment for the Army, this means the choice of retaining the versatile LAVIII's and the Coyotes Armoured Reconnaissance Vehicles platforms; rather than less maneuverable platform such as Main Battle Tanks, which is viewed by many as 'Cold War' legacy and out of 'touch' with current realities. In the Maritimes, it means acquiring patrol vessels to augment the Navy with added capabilities to enable interoperability with USN and US Coast Guard, instead of purchasing an expensive Destroyer or more Victoria class submarines, supposedly, other 'Cold War' legacies. And, with respect to air operation, it means not deploying hi-tech flying machines like the US Joint Strike Fighter Program as is being contemplated by the US military.

The CF's choice for capital expenditure, (platforms) or how it allocates its resources has implications for its future capabilities and how it performs its professional role in the security and defence of Canada. Foremost, because its budget allocation is not unlimited, the CF is more efficient, and perhaps, more realistic in carrying out its duties with expected outcomes, thereby fulfilling its designated role in the Defence Policy

Statement. The enemy in the new threat environment is callous and deadly and, in some cases, possesses capability comparable to modern states'. It is important to stress that a disorganized and poorly-armed intervention or security force, thrown into the midst of ruthless warlords and hideously complicated venues; ...within local circumstances where respect for individual rights, due process or even the value of human lives are at a minimum ...is asking for nothing but trouble.⁵⁹ In the new security environment, analysts are unequivocal in the pragmatism of nurturing a highly trained, highly mobile, lethal force that wields capability not only to take out determined insurgents in interventions, but avoid the distress of becoming hostages to guerillas and warlords themselves. Therefore, because future conflicts and theatres of war would be a "blend of the political, economic, social, military and technological skills used in unconventional operations to establish whatever the conditions for success might be⁶⁰, a 'niche force with the "ability to deliver precise, carefully controlled and deadly combat power is more important than ever before in this era of fourth generation warfare'⁶¹.

It is asserted that Canada's contribution to the proposed US Joint Strike Fighter program is not only unnecessarily expensive, but denies Canada's ability to conduct delicate peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, where properly trained 'boots on the ground' make the difference between success and failure.⁶² A specialized 'Niche Force' with 'OOTW'-capability is critical if the CF is realistically to be successful in a '3-Block-Campaign' as detailed in the Defence Policy Statement. Not only would a 'Force' that considers Canada a single operational theatre be able to protect the homeland and

⁵⁹General Leslie, P21

⁶⁰ Ibid, P22

⁶¹ Ibid, P22

⁶² Steven Staples and Bill Robinson It's Never Enough: Canada's Alarming Rise in Military Spending, Oct. 2005; P6

interoperate with the US military, but contribute “specialists” on US or UN-led international operations, when called upon to do so. This affords the CF opportunity “to think and operate as a single entity with air, land and naval assets working as a joint team, both at home and abroad.”⁶³ In addition, it gives CF the opportunity “to learn how to work even more closely with all of the elements that can help in achieving the Canadian government’s objectives, as well as those of whatever international coalition we may choose to work with.”⁶⁴ As such, this will enable Ottawa options, with respect to ‘strategic’ and ‘selective’ deployment of Canada’s military for international operations, knowing the imposed limits on its armed forces and the attendant costs associated with international deployments. Should Ottawa adopt its policy to be selective and strategic, any military contribution to international operations must be seen as one more tool in the box of capabilities that Canada, in conjunction with her friends and allies, would bring to bear on the crisis.⁶⁵ Simultaneously, the ‘niche force’ being flexible and adaptable, can readily be reconstituted into a ‘standing army’, only when “called for by a very specific mission that they would organize to fight a large standing army.”⁶⁶

Canada’s ‘niche force’ and Ottawa’s policy with respect to deployment in international operations has implication for, and perhaps helpful to both Canada and the US in at least two ways: Canada secures the homeland and continent at a time when the Americans need all the resources they can muster to focus on the global campaign against terror; second, the Americans can use a helping hand where they need it the most: ‘contested zones’. Lagassé and Sokolsky argued that in the “global war on terror,

⁶³ Ibid, p23

⁶⁴ Ibid, p23

⁶⁵ David Eaves, et al, Canada 25. From Middle Power to Model Power: Recharging Canada’s Role in the World, (Toronto: Published by Canada25, 2004), pp. 31-32.

⁶⁶ General Leslie, P22

Washington wants allies who can contribute forces to the contested zones, while accepting the United States' campaign leadership."⁶⁷ The GWOT is an embodiment of 'contested zone'; the rules of engagement are not only deviant and unconventional; the conflicts are largely low-intensity. As argued by Marston, "in the area of low-intensity operations, US land forces have not been adequately trained and current doctrine does not reflect the need for such training. If America intends to pursue terrorists around the world, including raids into harboring countries, or to intervene in internal conflicts for humanitarian reasons, she will need to incorporate low intensity operations into both training and doctrine."⁶⁸ Undoubtedly, the contested zone is America's Achilles Heels, but because Canada's specialized niche force is vastly trained in asymmetries, it wields ample capabilities to help out our American allies in their area of vulnerability. While this paper is not advocating the structuring of CF 21st century capabilities to defend American interests, it suffices to say that this approach will help defray costs associated with an increased CF expeditionary tempo into the 'commons', where our most significant military ally excels and has 'absolute advantage'. Therefore, by defending ourselves and helping our ally where they are weakest, we help ourselves by freeing up resources for them to reciprocate the gesture elsewhere – especially in expeditionary forays into the 'commons', where we are less likely to make impact working alone. Thus, because the Americans have a paucity of trained fighters in 'contested zones', CF contributions to their effort in this area is timely, decisive and a form of 'division-of-labour'. By "buttressing American forces where they are vulnerable, Washington will be appreciative of the CF's support - even if this support is only marginal. Washington is

⁶⁷ Lagassé and Sokolsky, May 2004

⁶⁸ Daniel Marston, Force Structure for High- and Low-Intensity Warfare: The Anglo-American Experience and Lessons for the Future; Royal Military Academy Sandhurst; available at: http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_2020_Support/2004_05_25_papers/force_structure.pdf

grateful for whatever forces allies are willing to send, as long as they help with the overall objective and do not complicate strategies and tactics.”⁶⁹ The net result is win-win for both countries; not only will the US appreciate Canada’s effort and commitment to their continental security, natural alliance and shared values and institutions; in return, the US will fiercely defend Canadian interests, especially in the ‘commons’ and/or anywhere else threats to Canada may emanate.

As the new security environment evolves, so will the CF, to adapt to changing times. Therefore, as demonstrated earlier the Canadian military in the 21st century will be lean, agile and controllable. It neither can afford the capabilities and legacies of the ‘Cold War’, nor the doctrines and skills set of that era. Certainly, wars have changed, and from the standpoint of ‘Structural-Functionalism’, the CF need maintain capabilities relevant to the future. As indicated earlier, Van Creveld made a compelling argument that violence and war have existed throughout human history. He asserted further that conventional war as we know it is a relic that will soon fade away, to be replaced by insurgencies terrorism and the ‘new war’. Creveld persuasively argued that future conflicts will not necessarily be fought between states, and that technology and military superiority are not necessarily guarantees of victory. He demonstrated that while modern militaries have run away on a shopping binge to acquire sophisticated, new gadgets in the form of submarines, fighter jets, and laser guided weaponry; the enemies, in the form of terrorists and guerillas have acquired other, less sophisticated means to fight back. It is instructive that terrorists brought down US Blackhawk helicopters in Somalia and Afghanistan, not with high tech missiles, but by RPG-7s, a WWII era grenade launcher.

⁶⁹ Lagassé and Sokolsky, May 2004

As demonstrated by Posen, the US not only ‘commands the commons’ but leads the world in RMA. Competing with, or attempting to assist US’ effort in this area is not only futile, but would appear to be misplaced priority. Therefore, a CF ‘niche force with OOTW-capabilities not only makes effective economic and military strategy, but timely and consistent with future theatres as well as the roles assigned to the military.

Opportunities for CF ‘Interoperability’ with US Armed Forces

The United States military defines interoperability as “the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to, and accept services from other systems, units, or forces, and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.”⁷⁰ As argued by Middlemiss and Stairs “the immediate impacts [of September 11] in the Canadian context has been to intensify the drive to interoperability as a matter of principle, [and] to broaden its implications to include a potential integration of command and control arrangements [with our allies] across the board and at the highest levels.”⁷¹ “The notion of seamless cooperation and efficiency is the hallmark of an interoperable fighting force. It ... includes issues related to standardization, integration, cooperation, strategy, and defence production.”⁷² The concept of ‘Interoperability’ has implications for CF with respect to personnel, doctrine and equipment. It is in the interest of the CF to not only engage but expand ‘interoperability’ with the armed forces of the United States. It is noteworthy that the DND paper, Strategy for 2020 highlighted the validation and reinforcement of Canada’s unique and natural alliance with its key

⁷⁰ Myron Hura, Gary McLeod, Eric Larson, James Schneider, Daniel Gonzales, Daniel Norton, Jody Jacobs, Kevin O’Connell, William Little, Richard Mesic, Lewis Jamison; Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations; available at: <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1235/>

⁷¹ Danford W. Middlemiss and Denis Stairs, in The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: The Issues, 2003

⁷² Hura, et. al

partners, in particular, United States. Clearly, “closer integration would increase efficiency, minimize the blind spots and, to be blunt, enhance the ability to react should something go very badly wrong – while maintaining sovereignty.”⁷³

Besides the application of compatible technologies, the concept of interoperability necessitates that doctrine is attuned to training and command and control procedures. The ability to interoperate entails and, “implies changes to the command and control mechanisms; to the way the CF equips and trains its teams, and even in the way they are educated and view the profession of arms within the larger political and social context, in which they will have to operate, both at home and overseas.”⁷⁴ Increasingly, interoperability between Canadian and United States military cut across all spectrums. Among recent eight long-term strategic objectives of National Defence, interoperability is not only a key pillar, but the goal is to “strengthen our military-to- military relationships with our principal allies ensuring interoperable forces, doctrine and C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence).”⁷⁵ Three targets are identified as prerequisites for achieving this end:

- Manage our interoperability relationship with the US and other allies to permit seamless operational integration on short notice
- Develop a comprehensive program to adopt new doctrine and equipment compatible with our principal allies

⁷³ General Leslie, P21

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Middlemiss and Stairs, 2003

- Expand the joint and combined exercise program to include all environments and exchanges with the US⁷⁶

Interoperability not only enhances CF ability to wage ‘hassle-free’, modern warfare in collaboration with allies, it involves complete transformation, encompasses ‘Operation Other Than War’ capabilities and it is consistent with the notion of “Canada as single operational theatre”⁷⁷. Interoperability ensures division of labour in times of conflict as well as keeps both partners up-to-date with rare technologies and advances in all other spheres of the RMA. Given that the Canadian Forces lack the capacity to achieve their mission objectives by themselves when deployed abroad, yet another key DND document, Strategic Capability Planning for the Canadian Forces (SCP), also assumes that Canada will have to act with its major allies.⁷⁸ It states that:

“...the fundamental asset that the CF requires for an international operation ... is what may be termed a tactically self-sufficient unit (TSSU). It follows that TSSUs must be capable of integrating into a Combined Force package as a ‘task-tailored’ component. The consequence of this requirement ... is that TSSUs must be modular and adaptable, capable of integrating with other international and national forces that are likely to be involved in a joint and combined operation.”⁷⁹

Elements of CF ‘niche force’ interoperability with the US military enable both militaries to work flawlessly together in addressing common threat. This affords Ottawa and Washington rare opportunity to coordinate effort in achieving common objectives while minimizing risks. Thus, as argued by General Leslie, “changes to the ways in which the Canadian domestically focused forces are organized, controlled, trained, and equipped would appear to be in order, as the current mechanisms are, of necessity,

⁷⁶ Ibid

⁷⁷ Overview: Canada’s International Policy Statement

⁷⁸ Middlemiss and Stairs

⁷⁹ Strategic Capability Planning for the Canadian Forces: available at: http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/00native/rep-pub/dda/strat/Strategic_e.doc

products of the Cold War, and may not be as joint and integrated with the supported civilian agencies as they could be.”⁸⁰

As joint and combined training and exercises are vital components of the Canada-U.S. interoperability, this will further enhance and strengthen the efforts of both militaries to avoid duplicity, thereby coordinating procurement of equipment and allocating resources effectively. Reportedly, the USA has planned for the LAV III to be an integral part of its Interim Combat Brigade Teams (ICBTs)⁸¹, owing to DND’s acquisition of two major expeditionary land force platforms: 651 Light Armoured Vehicle III (LAV III) armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and 203 Coyote armoured reconnaissance vehicles⁸² in the mid 1990’s. These acquisitions have implication for both CF and US military. The Stryker Brigade Combat Team, (SBCT), is a unit of the US Interim Combat Brigade Teams (ICBTs). The brigade teams are a high frequency of joint contingency operations, started in the 1990’s by the US army-- a frequency directly linked to the rise in global instability and uncertainty in the post-Cold War world.⁸³ Likewise, CF’s JTF2...drawn from three branches of the Canadian Armed Forces, began in 1993 when it took over counter-terrorist duties from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.⁸⁴ Because these two organs have similar objectives; it is good strategy to collaborate. Increasingly, as interoperability results in equipment integration, it becomes mutually reinforcing since this enhance the pursuit of common security objectives, often with common tools, for example, an Army force structure composed of LAV IIIs, Coyotes and MGSs will be able to operate alongside American ICBTs in select contested

⁸⁰ General Leslie, P21

⁸¹ Lagassé and Sokolsky, May 2004

⁸² Lagassé and Sokolsky, May 2004

⁸³ Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT)<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/brigade-ibct.htm>

⁸⁴ JTF2: Canada’s super-secret commandos, CBC News Online | July 15, 2005

zones.⁸⁵ In addition to joint training and exercises, they harmonize equipment procurement, which, in the case of the LAV III's for example, would appear to have resulted primarily from their lightweight. At less than twenty tons, combined with their ease of manoeuvrability, these modern machines are C-130 transportable and tailor-made for 'Fourth Generation Warfare'. In part because they have similar equipment, this "force structure will also allow for limited deployments on UN peace support operations."⁸⁶ That other allies covet the Coyotes further attests their suitability for future conflicts. Therefore, if "kept up to date with compatible command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, CF LAV IIIs may operate with USA ICBTs on deployments in contested zones."⁸⁷ Being a specialised 'niche force' or procuring 'Fourth Generation Warfare' capabilities by no means indicate that the CF is confined strictly to, or cannot venture out of North America. Rather, it means a modest internationalist outlook as imposed by geopolitical and budgetary realities, so the dilemma that Canada's international effort makes no impact is readily overcome. Canada can make a difference in collaboration with allies and friends; interoperability makes that possible.

With respect to air capability, nevertheless, it is said the CF's upgrade of its reduced fleet of CF-18A/B fighter aircraft, which, "if funded to the full estimated cost of \$1.226 billion, will encompass ten individual projects designed to overcome certain of the key interoperability problems experienced during the Gulf and Kosovo air campaigns, and will extend the operational life of the CF-18s to about the year 2020, thereby

⁸⁵ Lagassé and Sokolsky, May 2004

⁸⁶ Ibid

⁸⁷ ibid

ensuring that they can play potentially significant roles in any future US-led coalition operations.”⁸⁸ Supposedly, Canada’s \$150 million (USD) contribution to the U.S. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, for example, is said to be expensive but without really contributing to Canada’s ability to conduct delicate peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations.⁸⁹ On the surface, it would appear these projects are really pricey; but, it’s unlikely that with limited resources, the CF can afford to procure new equipment on its own to replace the current CF18 platform, for example; or that it can afford to not collaborate as in joint programs, given the technology involved in modern weaponry.

Even if it did, ‘stepping up’ to innovations to retain edge in military avionics might unfairly check procurements of other equipment of high priority to the CF. Acquiring modern, hi-technology is quite pricey and CF’s nominal acquisition of these technologies in the recent past has only widened the gap. “Middlemiss and Stairs argue that “to a large extent, this is a reflection of the ‘catch-up’ problem facing Canada as it strives to strengthen its defence relationship with the United States at a time when the much-discussed ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) is threatening to leave behind all but the biggest of the defence spenders in the Western alliance.”⁹⁰ Yet, for example, the CF 18s are still very much needed as part of Canada’s committed to NORAD. Reportedly, in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US, “additional CF-18 fighter aircraft were placed at a high state of readiness in support of NORAD operations.”⁹¹ The high pricing of modern hi-tech fighters and the inability of CF to maintain the pace with innovations in the hi-tech avionics field requires alternative options. Consequently, “if

⁸⁸ Middlemiss and Stairs, 2003

⁸⁹ Staples and Robinson; 2005; P6

⁹⁰ Middlemiss and Stairs, 2003

⁹¹ Backgrounder, available at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=836

the CF-18s are retained and restricted to an air defence role, Canada need not acquire a new fighter-interceptor to meet its NORAD obligations.”⁹² Therefore, it would appear retaining and upgrading the CF18’s makes strategic sense. As its unlikely Canada would live isolated from others in an increasingly complex world; and because the CF does not possess the capability to project a strong, internationalist posture, it cannot be expected to realistically accomplish more with less on its own effort alone, especially in the face of American military dominance. It would appear the option for the 21st century CF is to retain its current, modest air capability and where and when needed, deploy on overseas missions. Whatever the nature of the international mission or who leads it, it makes economic and strategic sense from the standpoint of comparative advantage and of ‘division of labour’ to share it with the US armed forces. Lagasse and Sokolsky argue, that “expeditionary air power is a capability Canada can no longer afford. Projecting air power is expensive and unnecessary for Canada given the United States’ command of the air.”⁹³ Therefore, modest overseas capability in collaboration with allies lessens the burden imposed by air capability for the 21st century. Otherwise, a unilateral projection of international power is un-affordably costly. As noted earlier, the financial burden associated with the specific weapons and platforms, (including nuclear powered aircraft carriers tactical jets and attack submarines, amphibious assault ships, and reconnaissance satellites) needed to do so not only run into billions of dollars in unit costs, but “the military personnel needed to run these systems are among the most highly skilled and

⁹² Lagassé and Sokolsky; May 2004

⁹³ Ibid.

highly trained in the world. The barriers to entry to a state seeking the military capabilities to fight for the commons are very high.”⁹⁴

Assuming for example, Canada neither contributed to the U.S. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, nor purchased any other platform on its own, but manages to raise the tools and resources needed to conduct delicate peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, deployment of troops and the peacebuilding team to where they are needed would still pose a dilemma without strategic airlift capability. Dispatching the troops, aid and peacebuilding team to the field without airlift capability is akin to ‘FEDEX’ dispatching the delivery man without the truck. Lagasse and Sokolsky argue that a “strategic airlift capability is impractical for three reasons. First, it “is expensive and far beyond the means of the current capital budget. Second ...the Canadian Army is lightening. While a lighter force does not obviate the need for strategic airlift, it may lessen the need, at least marginally. Thirdly ...the Canadian Navy is building three Joint Support Ships. The JSSs will provide the CF with a strategic sealift capability. CF units requiring strategic lift will therefore be transportable by sea, albeit at a slower pace. Taken together, these three factors diminish the utility of a CF strategic airlift capability.”⁹⁵ “With respect to the CF’s strategic airlift capabilities, it is interesting to note that the DND evidently decided against adopting a fully integrated solution. At one point the Air Force had considered buying as many as six Boeing C-17 aircraft for this purpose and then ‘loaning’ them to the United States when they were not required by the CF. In return, the US would share the operating costs and would ensure that six of their

⁹⁴ Posen; P3

⁹⁵ Lagassé and Sokolsky; May 2004

own C-17s would always be available for Canadian military missions.”⁹⁶ It is believed that when that plan ran into a crisis owing to ‘complicating factors’ due in part to country's colours that would adorn the aircraft and other “political sensitivities” involved, Ottawa devised a “stop-gap alternative” that sees the conversion of two of its “CC-150 Airbuses into strategic re-fuellers, an initiative that has doubtless gained political support in the wake of the embarrassing delays the CF faced in getting 750 Canadian troops and their 12 Coyote reconnaissance vehicles to Afghanistan.”⁹⁷

It is noteworthy, however, that several of the CF's C-130Es airlift, have aged and are unable to perform effectively lacking adequate maintenance, even though they are still needed for long hauls. Thus, as noted by Sands, “the lack of strategic lift makes the maintenance of troops far from home dependent on the United States or another generous ally undertaking key support functions for the Canadian Forces, whether for peacekeeping or other purposes”⁹⁸ Therefore, with respect to procurement of airlift capability for the 21st Century, it would appear procuring a replacement for CF's tactical airlift platform is appropriate, because “these twin roles make tactical airlift a dual domestic/expeditionary capability. Buying new C-130s is thereby consistent with a greater CF focus on homeland security and defence.”⁹⁹ Moreover, because “CF land forces LAV IIIs and MGSs are C-130J transportable.”¹⁰⁰ C-130Js would thus be an asset on overseas deployments.”¹⁰¹ Therefore, even though C-130Js are expensive, it is worth

⁹⁶ Middlemiss and Stairs, 2003

⁹⁷ *ibid*

⁹⁸ Sands, Canadian National Security after 9/11: What does the United States Expect?

⁹⁹ Lagassé and Sokolsky; May 2004, P16

¹⁰⁰ It should be noted that there are two variants of the C-130J. Regular C-130Js are the same size as the C-130E. C-130J-30s, on the other hand, are fifteen feet longer than the C-130Js. For the sake of simplicity, both are referred to as C-130Js.

¹⁰¹ *ibid*

procuring it because of the twofold functions to which it could be applied: domestic and overseas use. Thus, C-130Js would be necessary replacement for the aged C-130Es

The CF Navy is reputed to be a middle power navy, with modest clout for global reach. Although it is sometimes derided for its “determination to maintain Cold War legacy capability such as the Victoria Class submarines,¹⁰² but with its fleet of sixteen surface warships, four submarines and the support of the Aurora maritime patrol aircraft, the Canadian Navy is a ‘Medium Global Force Projection Navy.’¹⁰³ “The Canadian Navy is the only foreign navy to successfully operate as part of U.S. Carrier Battle Groups. This success is due partly to interoperability; the extensive training that the American and Canadian navies conduct together”¹⁰⁴ as well as procuring similar kinds of equipment. Capabilities acquired from such joint ventures, provides CF with considerable leverage. Undoubtedly, the Victoria Class submarines will be useful for enforcing the ‘Exclusive Economic Zone and surveillance of the coastline when, and if, they become fully operational. While “the record of the post-Cold War era and the future geopolitical environment strongly suggests that the Navy will remain a vital instrument of Canadian foreign policy over the next decade”¹⁰⁵; nevertheless, CF experiences in East Timor, the Balkans and, lately in Afghanistan has underlined the minor role of marine power in achieving any major undertaking on land. On the other hand, however, submarines are said to be highly effective at sinking ships and other submarines, but they are of little or no use in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, or even in

¹⁰² Staples and Robinson; P6

¹⁰³ Lagassé and Sokolsky, P16

¹⁰⁴ DND, available at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/focus/canada-us/background_e.asp

¹⁰⁵ Lagassé and Sokolsky, P16

conducting coastal patrols to protect fisheries and catch smugglers.¹⁰⁶ In effect, partnership operations, or the more likely reconstruction and stabilization roles the CF and support team will undertake in the field may not have need for major naval elements. Therefore, as observed earlier, as the danger in the new environment changes, “so should our emphasis on how to best employ the very finite resources available to defend the nation.”¹⁰⁷

As we have seen previously, because contested zones are mainly on land, and seldom, on the seas, the validity of CF’s Navy power projection capabilities into the deep are flagging, and in decline. It is suggested by recent history and the realities of the future strategic environment that the utility of the Navy’s overseas capabilities will also be circumscribed¹⁰⁸ because the seas are not going to be ‘contested zone’ Accordingly, “particular attention and specialized capabilities to cover the air and maritime approaches to the nation would seem to be of paramount importance, especially when one considers the established trading patterns and the potential threats, as would the ability to interoperate with the military forces of the Americans, with whom we should be working even more closely.”¹⁰⁹ In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, apprehensions regarding security the Atlantic have declined considerably for Canada and other NATO allies. It is recalled that our allies, in particular the US, has sufficient sea-faring capabilities. It is recalled also that Cold War and NATO imperatives had the CF Navy preoccupied with hunting down enemy submarines and ships to keep the sea lines open, but with the changed security environment, a change in focus of CF naval

¹⁰⁶Staples and Robinson; P6

¹⁰⁷General Leslie, P21

¹⁰⁸ Lagassé and Sokolsky, P16

¹⁰⁹General Leslie, P21.

capability is required. For example, the CF's handful submarines will only provide a minor addition to the coastal defences of Canada. In light of the new threat, and in light of the futility of projecting power in the 'commons', it would appear not only will CF Navy's capabilities be needed closer to home, but also, it would have little use for Victoria Class submarine. Rather, it may elect to acquire more vessels comparable to the ones in service with the United States Coast Guard as well as other capabilities to beef up domestic and North American maritime security, and with this effort, play a vital role if, and when a 'naval NORAD' becomes a reality. As indicated earlier, the JSS program will provide CF with strategic sealift and afford some level of power projection into the blue seas, when it becomes operational. From capability options currently available to the CF, it would appear as usual, the CF Navy will be the most rapid and effortless way for Canada to deploy when its input is needed for collaborative overseas missions with allies. Therefore, it makes good strategic insight to build more security capabilities in the marines that would be capable of interoperability with the USCG and, to some degree, the USN in the armed defence of the continent.

Consequence Management and Disaster Response

Prevention of catastrophe, disaster response and outcome management are all capabilities integrated within the range of support in a crisis. In the event of disasters, specialized niche force with operation other than war capabilities will have the capacity to respond to disasters and manage consequences. In this respect, Canada Command headquarters, which draws together existing elements and resources of all the armed services into a single point headquarters for planning, coordination and execution, will have the responsibility of planning, organizing, and implementing defence of the

homeland along with other arms of government such as the Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEP), as the NSP mandates. Working with other government departments, Canada Command headquarters will coordinate inter-agency harmonization in order to deter and prevent trans-national terrorist threats to the homeland; organize military-unique support to domestic law enforcement agencies. The command plan will integrate the necessary civil support to respond, for example, to domestic or trans-national radiological, biological, chemical or other (RBCNE) consequence management, as well as deploy the needed forces whenever required to execute any mission. When directed in times of need, the commander of Canada Command will deploy to the spot of incidents and take control of the site, implements timely and effective response with designated, specially trained forces, while providing support to civil authorities to minimize casualties, prevent human suffering; save lives, mitigate or prevent further property damage¹¹⁰ and/or provide momentary critical life support.

Conclusion

The nature of terrorist threat to Canadian homeland is asymmetric; an appropriate response to this threat is asymmetric response. The emergence of terrorists and non-state weapons proliferators has left the world in peril. Future wars would be waged not necessarily among states; but with insurgents and warlords motivated by religious zeal. The change in the security environment has necessitated changes in military capabilities. The capabilities for a 21st century CF are the ones relevant to defence of the continent as well as responsive to the future of modern warfare. To be relevant, responsive and effective in the 21st century and fulfill its assigned role, a Canadian niche force with

¹¹⁰ DoD Smallpox Response Plan, Washington, DC; 29 September 2002; available at: <http://www.pathobiologics.org/btac/ref/dodsrp2002.doc>

operations other than war capabilities is called for. American military preponderance relative to rest of the world provides CF option to be a specialized niche force. The CF will maximise its security objectives by interoperability with the US armed forces and strengthening of relations with the USCG. Interoperability with Canada's closest military ally will result in greater collaboration and harmonization of effort to defend and secure the continent.

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