

INTRODUCTION

As we enter the new millennium, African continent remains one of the most turbulent regions of the world. Ethnic conflicts, military coups, and increasing poverty - these are just some of the challenges faced by the contemporary African nations. These challenges cannot always be addressed locally and in some cases require external intervention. However, due to the past failures of peace operations in Africa, international opinion appears to be skeptical about the success of such endeavors and the international organizations, such as the UN are often reluctant to intervene.

In this paper, I will show that peace operations in Africa remain necessary and justified. I will analyze the type of peace operations that can be implemented as well as the capabilities of multinational forces to assist in the resolution of African crises. I will then attempt to position Canadian Forces (CF) in the framework of peace operations in Africa and reflect on their possible role in this type of international activity.

Defining peacekeeping

An inexperienced reader is likely to be confused by the multitude of terms and definitions related to the subject of peacekeeping. Modern literature enlists such terms as “peacekeeping”, “peacemaking”, “peace-building”, “peace enforcement”, “wider peacekeeping” “multifunctional peacekeeping” etc. All these terms eventually refer to the same act of response to an armed conflict on the part of the presumably neutral parties. Each of the terms underlines specific doctrine or specific implemented actions. For the purposes of this paper we will refer the term “peacekeeping” to all peace operations. We will also use the term “peace operations” as a general term and “peace enforcement” to refer to a more aggressive type of peace operation that has the purpose of compelling the unwilling sides to cease hostilities and try to negotiate peace.

Why Multinational Peacekeeping in Africa?

The failure of certain UN peace operations in Africa in the past is believed to have been caused largely by the lack of commitment on the side of the Western powers that often regarded African conflicts as political and ethnical tangles (Coulon: 117). Such view of African military crises is, in fact, superficial for it ignores the nature of these phenomena and specifics of the security environment of African continent. Describing the anatomy of African conflicts Steven Metz notes that due to selective inclusion in political decision-making that creates a large pool of the discontented, harsh economical conditions and readily availability of weapons in most African states, they are prone to the outbreaks of internal violence. Moreover, because neither the government nor the militias, rebels, and insurgents who confront them have the military means to attain a decisive victory the conflicts often drag on destroying fragile infrastructure and leading to humanitarian disasters and refugee crises (Metz: 58-59). In this situation local

population becomes a hostage and is depleted of all resources and often massacred. The massacre can reach extreme scale. In Rwandan crisis within a period of three months of 1994 alone, an estimated five to eight hundred thousand people were killed as a result of civil war and genocide (Adelman: 1). Hence, not all African conflicts can be resolved from within and in quite a few cases external intervention is required. In some situations such intervention is, indeed, provided by ex-colonial powers. The presence of French troops in Ivory Coast would be a recent example. However, this poses a serious ethical dilemma for it is often unclear whether the external power is acting in the interest of the given African nation or is following its own agenda related to its economic or political interests. In addition, ex-colonial state may at any given time have limited interest or resources to get involved in the crisis in its ex-Colony. It becomes quite obvious that UN peace operations or the intervention of a neutral power or powers are highly preferred. Such operations, highly needed as they might be, are also quite expensive and risky for the participating Powers. According to the UN reports, the active peacekeeping operations all over the world cost over 2 billion dollars in the financial year 2001/2002 and casualties may vary from operation to operation, but are inevitably involved.

Western powers often lack understanding of the nature of African conflicts and this eventually leads to misinterpretation of the situation and subsequent losses and failures. Therefore, throughout the post-colonial history there's been a significant attempt to shift the responsibilities for peace operations in Africa to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and regional peacekeeping organizations. The initiative came both from the African states who have long aspired that African nations control their own destiny (Herbst:22) and Western powers who, especially after the failure of American mission in Somalia, became more and more cautious in deploying their troops in the region. The position of the latter was most clearly articulated by the Clinton administration in the mid-nineties. The Clinton strategy aimed increasing of "the number of capable states in Africa; that is nations that are able to define the challenges they face, manage their resources to effectively address those challenges and build stability and peace within their borders and their sub-regions". Beside the economic measures the Clinton administration created the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) "with the ultimate objective of helping African military units meet UN standards in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief" (Metz: 72). The other important initiative was the creation of the African Center for Security Studies in 1998, an institution offering academic courses promoting the transition to democratic governing and military decision-making. The strategy of the United States sought to minimize the American participation in African conflicts and subcontract all possible intervention to the regional states that would receive assistance in the form of infrastructural support or training. This approach was widely welcomed by other Western powers and certainly seems more logical and more ethical for it confirms the independent status of African states.

However, it has significant deficiencies that we will now discuss. First of all, while this approach will undoubtedly make African states and regional organizations more prepared for peace operations in the future, it can hardly help to meet the very immediate peacekeeping needs already existing in the region. Secondly, although President Clinton insisted on the ideas of democracy, his administration, according to

Steven Metz “remained willing to cooperate with less-than-perfect democracies on issues such as countering narcotrafficking and on peacekeeping” (Metz, 72). This poses a question of the willingness of such “less-than-perfect democracies” to intervene in a conflict on purely altruistic grounds. In fact such possibility raises concern amongst some experts concern about the probable consequences. Jeffrey Herbst notes, “The practical dynamics of state decay south of Sahara suggest that African countries often cannot and will not act as benign interveners. In small countries, African peacekeepers may act more as invaders than as peacekeepers and in large countries there may not be any African solution offered” (Herbst: 32). Following the same line of argument Mark Malan argues that peace enforcement initiatives have been and will always be pursued by different players on the international stage, including Western powers, but these players will tend to follow their own rules and agendas (Malan:3). As we can see whatever the economic interests and political agendas might dictate, the UN or other type of “neutral” intervention remains the only credible solution for African conflicts. As Christopher Clapham notes, “Even in cases where the UN may be regarded as having failed (and it has also had some important successes), there is generally little to suggest that another organization, such as the OAU, would have done any better.”(Clapham: 23) This point, however, brings up a number of issues related to the ways of implementation of the UN or other multinational intervention.

Chapter VI and a half?

The issue of the type of peace operations to be deployed in African conditions is the most debated one. Chapter VI of the UN Charter talks about preventive diplomacy as a main tool of conflict resolution. This suggests that even if the intervention of UN Forces occurs, they are to maintain their neutrality and to use force only in self-defense. However, this scheme does not work well (if at all) in intrastate conflicts especially if at least one of the sides finds it more advantageous to continue the warfare rather than to negotiate peace. Moreover, due to the complex social and ethnical structure of African states peace accords often leave certain social or military groups out of the agreement, and these groups later on can contribute to the re-ignition of the conflict. Such was the case of the Arusha peace accord. The Rwandan military opposing the agreement took a number of steps to undermine its implementation. In April 1994, the military shot down the plane carrying their Commander-in-Chief Juvenal Habyarimana and his counterpart Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira and this event re-launched civil war (Kieh:28). Under the circumstances the implementation of the operations in accordance to the chapter VI is highly debatable. It also increases the risk for the personnel involved as such limited mandate does not allow the peacekeeping forces to be adequately equipped even for the sole purpose of self-defense and the consequences can be and often were tragic. Therefore, the opinion in the post Cold-war era was calling for the implementation of Chapter VII that would allow UN forces to actually conduct a limited warfare to compel the fighting sides to cease-fire. Thus, emerges the notion of peace enforcement versus “traditional peacekeeping”. In fact, some scholars believe that although the UN tends to blame the permanent members of Security Council for their lack of commitment it would run into major difficulties implementing any real action if they chose to stay within the limits of the “traditional peacekeeping”. In somewhat

extreme way Mark Malan observes:

Dealing with violence is not only considered risky and expensive, it is also potentially 'messy', and may sully the reputation of the world body. Thus the 'politically correct' school continues with its fixation with Chapter VI and its reluctance to seriously consider how to make peace enforcement work (Malan: 2).

While Malan makes a valid point, the issue of sovereignty that is touched on by any type of intervention remains a very sensitive one. This issue leads to a number of complex questions such as, for example, how to decide which intrastate conflict requires external intervention and which does not, particularly in the situations where no legitimate government is available to request the UN assistance or if the sides of the conflict are, indeed, not interested in reconciliation. We might, indeed, rely on the concept of "humanitarian intervention" where the UN forces can act without invitation in case the human rights of the civilian population are being violated or the population is starving. However this approach leaves much room for interpretation. It should not be forgotten that the UN is obliged to consider national interests of the permanent five at all times. And the latter might or might not include participation in a given peacekeeping mission.

Hence, the political risks of peacekeeping decision-making are extremely high and the UN had often had to settle for the "middle way" in search of political compromises. Christopher Clapham notes, "The UN is not an autonomous actor, but the expression of an international consensus, to the extent that it is possible to obtain." Therefore, as Mike Moore notes, "Most of today's U.N. peacekeeping operations fall somewhere between Chapter VI and Chapter VII-"chapter six and a half," a term used by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld" (Moore:5). Whether or not Dag Hammarskjöld was referring to the actual insertion of the troops in the midst of the conflict or just a neutral armed military presence, as some suggest, the idea, as we understand it today is that of being "in between" the preventive diplomacy and military intervention. This did not seem to work very well in the 1960s with the Secretary-General perishing in a plane crash in Congo-Zaire and the region being ravaged by the civil war for several following years.

Today, as we face new types of conflicts and failed states this six and a half strategy seems even less appropriate. However, it was not until the International Community failed to prevent the genocide in Rwanda and to stop the fighting in Somalia that the UN has come to admit that some peacekeeping norms and practices ought to be reviewed. The results of the review implemented in 2000 were published in the Brahimi Report. Among other things, this document contained recommendations on new peacekeeping strategies. The 6th Workshop of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs on Brahimi Report specifically warns about the dangers of the "middle ground". According to the authors, the decision-makers are often faced with the dilemma when faced with the crisis in the country out of the sphere of their own state's vital interests. On one hand, it is difficult not to do anything due to public opinion and for ethical reasons. On the other hand spending money and possibly losing lives of their citizens is

not at all appealing. As a result, they often end up sending out understaffed and under-equipped missions with unclear mandates. Curiously enough, they use the example of ONUC (Operation des Nations Unies au Congo) as a case of such mission. Further in the report, the authors note:

“Decision-makers tend to assume that taking “the middle ground” is still better than doing nothing. That is a rather dubious assumption. There is more than one case where the middle ground approach has made things worse or even led to disaster.”(German Institute for International and Security Affairs:16).

Let us look at another example, that of UNAMSIL – UN mission in Sierra Leone reviewed during the same workshop on Brahimi Report. UNAMSIL was established in October 1999 to help the government of Sierra Leone and other parties of the conflict with the implementation of the peace accord of Lome signed in July 1999. It was, therefore, a “traditional” peacekeeping operation until it became clear very shortly that there was no peace to keep, that the fighting continued fiercely and different type of measures are required. Reporting on the failure of the mission at its initial stage, Manfred Eisele, former Assistant Secretary-General brings up several factors that hindered the operation at that point. These factors are of two distinct types and causations. I would define the first type as “coordination issues” and these can be summarized as follows:

- Lack of clarity and robustness in the mandate and Rules of Engagement on one hand and on the other hand, lack of initiative in the leadership.
- Problems interpreting the impartiality in the conditions where one of the parties does not comply with the rules.
- Fragmentation of the command and control the procedures. Lack of communication between the military, political authorities and civil administration.
- Lack of common operational culture, particularly language barrier.

The second set of issues is linked primarily and mainly to the lack of the political will that in case of UNAMSIL translated into lack of logistical support, limited “self-sustainability”, lack of participation on behalf of Member States and underestimation of the actual cost of the operation where the overages had to be covered from the resources within the Secretariat (German Institute for International and Security Affairs: 45-49). As we see from this example, although the issue of “political will” remains most important for the success of all present and future peacekeeping missions, it is equally important to clearly define the mandate of the mission and to coordinate the deployed personnel effectively in accordance with the Rules of Engagement. To determine whether African peacekeeping can be effective based on these recommendations we have to answer two questions. Is perfect coordination of a mission, as suggested by Manfred Eisele, feasible

in African context? And is it possible to implement peace operations in Africa when the political will of the members of the Security Council is lacking? The answer to the first question is readily available in the examples of Central African Republic where rapid UN intervention in 1998 prevented a disaster. Or, indeed, UNAMSIL itself that has become successful in many ways after more resources had been committed and some changes to the mandate had been made. While the coordination matters, as we have seen, can be resolved at least in some cases, the lack of political will in the matter of peacekeeping in Africa is here to stay. One might view it as a major source of pessimism for the future of the African continent. However, the recommendations of the report I have already cited above allow some reasons for cautious optimism. Authors note:

“Western politicians as well as military commands were thinking too much in terms of being compelled to send entire battalions for peace operations in Africa. Inevitably, the answer is “no” considering the low strategic interest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, sending small numbers of military or police personnel can still make a big difference....(German Institute for International and Security Affairs:16)”

Although peacekeeping in Africa is related to a number of complex issues, this does not mean that no successful operations can be implemented. As we have seen in this chapter the issues as complex as they may appear can all be addressed, hence, compromises and solutions are possible. Having established both necessity and possibility of multinational peace operations in Africa, we will now attempt to analyze Canada’s position and role in this complex framework of political, economic and military controversies.

World’s Peacekeeper?

The ideal of Canada as a peacekeeping nation has firmly established itself in the minds of Canadians and in many nations abroad to the extent that this activity has become to be perceived as a part of Canadian identity. Canadians are seen as a neutral and highly professional force and this combination of characteristics makes us ideal for peacekeeping missions. Yet, the issue of whether or not Canada is or should be leading the international peacekeeping or, indeed, if it should at all participate in peace operations, especially when they are undertaken in the areas of low strategic interests, is still being debated among scholars and policy-makers. To shed some light on this paradox we will review Canada’s past contributions and current aspirations in the field of peacekeeping and compare them to the political realities offered by current Defense and Foreign policies.

In his article “Almost a Legacy”, David Last tells us a story about Canadian peacekeeping that starts in the 19th century. He notes: “If Canadians can claim any special suitability to peacekeeping, it may stem from their early history – the political and social constraints on forces in Canada, and a practical approach to soldiering in the periphery of the British Empire” (Last:369). As early as 1880s when the government was in fact reluctant to dispatch troops to a distant African campaign of the British Empire, Canadians were recruited to Sudan for the purposes of “tacit logistical support

to a rescue mission that could be described as humanitarian”. During the period between 1897 and 1946 Canadian army or militia participated in 78 domestic interventions in Canada (Last: 370-371).

Since the establishment of the United Nations Canada has participated in almost all peacekeeping missions carried out under the UN mandate. In 1957 Canadian efforts were acknowledged by the Peace Nobel Prize awarded to Lester B. Pearson. However, according to Major Last, the greatest Canadian accomplishment is not its mere participation in peacekeeping missions, but rather its contribution to the science of conflict resolution. He notes: “The real accomplishment (of CF) has been progress from winning wars to preserving peace, both in a complex divided society at home and in difficult situations at home” (Last:369).

This suggests that whether deliberately or not Canada has accumulated a considerable experience in the field of peace operations. Another proof of our growing professionalism is the creation in 1994 of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre followed by the establishment of the Peace Support Training Centre in 1996. The latter institution is committed to provide the pre-employment training and post-employment reintegration of the personnel deployed in the peacekeeping operations, while the Pearson’s Peacekeeping Centre has a broader mission of:

1. Promoting a better understanding among policymakers and practitioners of the evolving nature of violent conflict, and strategies for its prevention, mitigation, resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding.
2. Ensuring that our participants have the knowledge and practical skills they need to be effective members of a peace operation.
3. Bringing a uniquely Canadian perspective to international peace operations education, training and research initiatives (PPC home page).

Both centers are frequently visited by representatives of all ranks from a number of different countries. It appears that Canadian peacekeeping is highly respected and valued abroad. Jocelyn Coulon notes that during his stay at the Pearson’s Peacekeeping centre he had a conversation with an African officer who confirmed that he does not wish the intervention of the Great Powers in the peacekeeping and that he finds that Canadians are neutral for they do not have a hidden agenda (Coulon:119). It seems obvious that Canadian contribution to peacekeeping is a major accomplishment of the nation. Hence, it would be logical to continue our participation in peace operation to maintain our international prestige if not for altruistic reasons that are often considered either unreal or unprofitable, but are nevertheless important. However, our future commitment to such operations seems to be hindered by the shrinking defense budget. Indeed, after the end of Cold War the Federal Government faced with a serious budget deficit decided to cut on certain expenses, particularly on Defense and International Aid. Moreover, the imminent threat of the Soviet Union no longer existed and Canada intended to benefit from the so-called “peace dividend” closing some of its military bases (particularly abroad) and reducing the number of personnel. The “at home” issues, such as employment, health care etc. become the priority of the governmental policies. These

factors have most certainly had an impact on Canadian involvement peacekeeping. Jean-Francois Rioux & Robin Hay note: “The end of the cold war and the need to address the federal deficit have clearly driven Canadian foreign policy away from a pure form of Pearsonian internationalism.” (Rioux: 64). Despite of the 1994 White Paper assurance that Canadians are internationalists, a number of experts argue that Chretien’s policy has been that of the “selective internationalism” and “isolationism”. Others would point to the fact that as Canadian defense budget is decreasing, the number and the tempo of the peacekeeping operations is on the rise. Some note that Canada is currently deploying a little over 260 personnel under various UN mandates. Meanwhile, the participation of Bangladesh, for instance, is over 5,000 troops (www.un.org). The latter argument, however, should be handled with caution for the population of Bangladesh is estimated at approximately 130 million people. A country’s geographical position, national interests and type of personnel contributed should also be taken into count. It is quite clear that some personnel require less investment than others. Moreover, we should not forget that Canada contributed several thousands of troops to the NATO mission in Bosnia.

Regardless of how one chooses to interpret the foreign policy in relation to the shrinking defense budget, such turn of events was not been unexpected. This was, in effect, a continuing tendency that prevailed in Canadian Defense Policy after the World War II and prior to that between the two World Wars. Therefore, we have all reasons to believe that this tendency is here to stay and in the coming years Canadians will have to operate all their missions with the available 58,000 personnel and approximately 12 billion dollars per annum if no further cuts are made. On the other hand, creation of peacekeeping training centers and Canadian technical accomplishments in the field suggest that Canada is not about to abandon its participation in peace operations. The combination of these two political realities means that, as Jocelyn Coulon puts it: “Canada can no longer participate in peace operations in the same way as it did until recently. In fact, the internal as much as external changes push for redefinition of this participation.” (Coulon, 2000: 3) How would we then redefine Canadian peacekeeping? In 2000 the Government made an attempt to address this issue by adopting the “early-in, early-out” strategy. This basically meant that Canadian troops would no longer participate in peace operations on a long-term basis. This policy alone, however, did not appear to be a sufficient solution, especially so as this threatened the internationalist image that Canada had abroad. Jocelyn Coulon makes several recommendations that, to my mind, can serve as the guidelines of redefinition of Canadian peacekeeping. First of all, he insists that Canada should further pursue the participation in the peace operations, but on a more modest scale. He also suggests the creation of a limited contingent of 1000 troops that could be employed in a limited and punctual fashion as a part of the Special Forces (JTF 2). There where Canada does not wish to contribute troops it must at all times provide technical and logistic support. Moreover, Coulon recommends active Canadian involvement in training its own personnel, but also administration of the educational programs that would “promote the Canadian know-how in the field of peacekeeping and respond directly to the recommendations of Brahimi report on the training and education of all Blue Helmets from the commanders to the militaries of all ranks” (Coulon, 2000:9). He also notes that with the decreasing numbers of military personnel available for peace operations Canada should rely on its civil population,

INGs and other organizations for their contribution to peace operations that can be quite significant. In other words, faced with the impossibility of contributing large number of troops, Canada has to seek the value of its contribution to peacekeeping in its technical capacities and its experience in the field. It should also regard the good will of Canadians as an asset of peacekeeping that can be a valuable input into international peacekeeping effort.

What about Africa?

Canadian involvement in African region was generally affected by the same factors as Canadian peacekeeping in general. Intervention in African States was an important part of the cold war with the primary objective of preventing the expansion of the USSR. After the end of the cold war the strategic importance of the African region declined and so did Canadian capability and political will to intervene in African conflicts. The lack of political will was amplified by the scandal in Somalia and the failure of the peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda. The skepticism about peace operations in Africa grew significantly. Many politicians saw Canadian withdrawal from all African security issues as a “realist” approach. Dave Black and Andrew Grant give three major reasons why this approach is not likely to be adopted. “First of all, Africa is not nearly as remote or marginal to the consciousness and interests of Canadians as is commonly thought.... Secondly, Canada will inevitably be drawn into African security issues, since they will continue to figure prominently on the agenda of the United Nations and, secondarily, the Commonwealth... Finally, the cosmopolitan sensibility of Canadians, however inconstant, is nevertheless now too well entrenched to allow our political leaders to wilfully ignore massive human suffering anywhere in the world, at least when it is featured in the Western mass media... The question is not, therefore, *whether* Canadians will continue to participate in the security affairs of Africa, but *how* and *how well* they will do so” (Black & Grant:4). As argued above, the possibility and quality of the operations is linked to the clarity of the mandate and availability of technical and financial resources. In these respect Canadian operations in Africa suffered from the same deficiencies as did all UN operations in the region. In fact, most of Canadian participation in African peacekeeping was, indeed, carried out under the UN mandate. In 1996 during the humanitarian crisis in the region of Great Lakes Canada came forward with the initiative of a peace operation in the affected area. The initiative was eventually supported by the UN and on the 16th of November, 1996 the Security Council issued the mandate for the operation. The operation no doubt displayed the good will of the international community. However, it failed to achieve any plausible results in saving people’s lives. Explaining the difficulties encountered in the mounting of the Great Lake initiative, Andrew Cooper notes: “...the initial enthusiasm for the mission displayed by Prime Minister Chrétien and some other state officials was not matched by the quantity and quality of resources which were (and could) be devoted to the initiative...”(Cooper:65). On the Canadian part, the Great Lake Initiative was, indeed, a classical example of unclear mandate and inadequate resources committed to the operation and its success is highly debatable. Nevertheless, since then Canada has participated in several other operations such as, for instance, mission MINURCA (Mission des Nations Unies en République Centre-Afrique) carried out in Central

African Republic under the UN mandate in 1998. Approximately 45 CF personnel deployed in the operation were responsible primarily for “providing communications element”(DND home page). The operation was a success and Canadian participation, however small in number, was significant since communication is a vital part of any military operation. This was, to my opinion an excellent instance of getting a maximum benefit out of the limited participation in a peace operation. Can this approach become a major trend? According to the data of the Department of National Defense current Canadian deployment in the African region is as follows:

1. UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) – 5 CF personnel acting as military observers
2. UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) – 8 CF personnel acting as staff officers at MONUC headquarters in Kinshasa and United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) in situations involving security, logistics and medical issues.
3. UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) – 6 military observers
4. International Military Assistance Training Team (IMATT) – 11 CF personnel This International Military Advisory Training Team (IMATT) is part of the UK Government's program of assistance to help the Government of Sierra Leone restore peace and stability. Canadian personnel is acting as advisors on a range of issues such as administration logistics etc.(DND home page)

As we see, most of the personnel currently deployed in Africa are there to share the Canadian “know-how” and to offer consultations on technical issues. Although some might consider decline in Canadian involvement in African security affairs I see it rather as a more efficient type of participation given scarce resources, relatively small population and low strategic interest of the African continent. We may debate over whether or not government should increase defense budget and whether we should take more interest in suffering of people in certain African countries. But if there is no doubt that in the current situation Canadian peacekeeping in Africa is happening and is as successful as it can be under the circumstances. How would we portray the future of Canadian involvement in Africa? Dave Black and Andrew Grant make several recommendations that highlight the desirable future for Canadian peacekeeping in Africa. The central suggestion is that “Canadian government must make a stable, long-term commitment to the security of African countries and their peoples” (Black & Grant:15). In the conditions of limited resources it is essential, according to the authors, to determine the areas where Canadians have most to offer. In other words Canada has to select a “niche of specialization” to make its participation as beneficial and effective as possible. Beside the purely military endeavors, however, civil issues, such as that of human security or debt relief, for instance, will obviously be increasingly important. The establishment of African security institutions and security policies is the only way to

guarantee the safety and prosperity of African peoples. Canadian mission, therefore, would be to share its experience with African nations that are willing to learn from it, offer training for African military personnel and at the same time work towards an effective development policy and mechanisms of debt relief.

CONCLUSION

The crises in Africa will obviously remain on the agenda of the UN and other international organizations, both military and humanitarian, in the decades to come. The effective resolution of these crises requires not only commitment and resources, but above all, defined strategies and clear mandates of the missions intervening in the region. The efforts of the international community should be focused on the development of complex measures that would address African conflicts on different levels and at different stages. The participation of the regional organizations in peace operations in Africa will obviously be increasing and its role can be constructive for the security of the continent. However, the involvement of such organizations should not entirely replace multinational intervention in African security affairs in order to conserve the neutrality of peace operations.

Although Canadian strategic interests in African region are relatively low, Canada will continue its participation in African peacekeeping. Considering the available resources, Canadians should opt for a limited, but effective participation such as providing logistic support, contribution of observers and highly trained specialized personnel, offering training for the African military personnel. It should also employ its significant political and diplomatic potential in negotiations for peace and in addressing non-military issues such as social reforms and debt relief.

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