

## **Rebuilding Broken Societies: Which Model of Trust should we Use?**

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### **1. Introduction**

The challenge of rebuilding societies broken by virulent strains of nationalism faces both theorists of nationalism and theorists of international relations. At the centre of this rebuilding, it seems, is the notion of trust, an element of a relationship that is easy to destroy and challenging to redevelop. On the one hand, philosophers of trust have yet to theorize about how trust might be rebuilt once it is destroyed – instead, they remain focussed on how to understand trust. On the other hand, writers in the field of international relations focus on the process of negotiating settlements, and until very recently, paid little attention to the various elements of creating, maintaining and building lasting peace. The objective of this paper is to theorize these two fields together by arguing that each understanding of trust undergirds a different aspect of the peace process. I will argue that these two fields speak to each other, and together are able to form a complete foundation for action in the reconstruction of broken societies.

This paper is divided into three sections. In the first of these sections, I consider three interpretations of the nature of trust: Annette Baier's conception of trust as vulnerability, Niklas Luhmann's distinction between trust and confidence, and Russell Hardin's reliance on self-interest at the heart of trust relationships. I argue, here, that none of these writers has sufficiently considered how trust on an individual scale might apply to an institutional scale. Further, I will argue in this section that none of these writers has paid attention to how such trust might be rebuilt once it is destroyed.

In the second section, I will outline trends and developments in the field of international relations, with a view to showing how the notion of reconstruction is becoming increasingly complex. Here, I consider the relationship between conflict resolution theory and humanitarian intervention, with a view to asking where trust fits in these related disciplines. In the final section, I conclude that the nature of trust that undergirds both conflict resolution theory and humanitarian intervention is under-theorized and under-considered. I will show how the use of the word 'trust' is haphazard, reflecting the fact that there is, as of yet, no coherent philosophy of trust that underlies international humanitarian efforts. I will argue, here, that a more complex understanding of trust would improve intervention efforts that aim to rebuild broken societies, but that none of the trust philosophers, on their own, has the tools to do so. Because rebuilding of broken societies is infinitely complex, I will argue that the underlying notion of trust must also be appropriately complex. I conclude by considering the various elements needed in this notion of trust, and conclude by offering the beginnings of what I speculate this notion of trust might look like.

### **2. The philosophy of trust**

Annette Baier is somewhat of a forerunner in the contemporary discussions on the philosophy of trust, to the extent that the vast majority of philosophers following her define themselves in relation to her position. Baier defines trust as the "accepted vulnerability to another's possible

but not expected ill (or lack of good will) toward one." She writes that trust is generally not a purposive action, although she leaves room for situations in which intentional trusting plays a role. She points out the number of instances in our lives (contemporary, western lives, that is) where we engage in trusting activities that are virtually inexplicable from a philosophical perspective. We go to the doctor, she writes, expecting that s/he will do all that s/he can in the interests of our health. We trust that uniformed people are trained appropriately and will carry out their role without hesitation. The result is that in trusting others, we let others "take care of something the truster cares about, where such 'caring for' involves some exercise of discretionary powers." We expect, that is, that people will carry out their role-appropriate duties and we take their expertise for granted.

Importantly, Baier notes that "trust is a notoriously vulnerable good, easily wounded and not at all easily healed." Relatedly, she also plays down the relevance of contract-induced trust (which, as I will show below, distinguishes her substantially from other philosophers of trust), and writes that the essence of trust flows from a sense of "innate, if selective trust, [which] seems a necessary element in any surviving creature. . .and this innate but fragile trust could serve as the explanation both of the possibility of other forms of trust and of their fragility." This is important, she claims, because there are no "rules to guide us on where to trust, [and] where not to. . .we seem to have no choice but to trust our own trust or suspicion on these matters." Baier points to writers who have attempted to develop principles to guide us in matters of trust, and concludes that ultimately they deal merely with the specifications of contract or relations between intimates. She rejects, for example, Thomas Scanlon's efforts to base trust in a sort of Kantian morality where duty would include an obligation to be trustworthy (I will return, shortly, to the distinction between trust and trustworthiness).

Baier's account is helpful, in that she spends time teasing out different ways in which people engage in trusting behaviour and are deserving of others' trust. With respect to the project of this paper, however, she has somewhat less to offer. In her writing, she pays no attention to the rebuilding of trust and this is what allows her to speculate that no guidelines or principles for trust are available. Moreover, she points out the following: "We take many appearances on trust, and we would go mad if we did not and could not. We trust uniforms, badges, and framed certificates on professionals' walls, all of them fairly easily faked."

Yet, in a society framed by ethnic conflict, the problem is clearly the reverse; that is, citizens are unable to take these appearances on trust. It is possible that the violence that occasionally erupts in situations of ethnic conflict is a form of madness (few westerners, I suspect, would doubt that this is, in fact the case), but this is not helpful from the perspective of rebuilding societies that have been ravaged by such violence. It seems, instead, that what is needed in such situations is first, the realization that trust is more than a feature to wonder at, and second, that the guidelines for trusting that Baier cannot find are specifically what is needed. It is insufficient to suggest that the capacity to trust is innate, although surely there is some truth to this, but this offers us no way to see how trust might be relearned. That is, the fact of innateness does not show us how to take the risk that seems to be necessary in the relearning of trust in a broken society.

It is in this context, then, that I will turn to Niklas Luhmann's portrayal of trust and its relationship to confidence and risk-taking. Trust, on Luhmann's account, requires a 'presumption

of risk.' This presumption of risk, he writes, distinguishes trust from confidence, where "if you do not consider alternatives, you are in a situation of confidence. If you choose one action in preference to others in spite of the possibility of being disappointed by the action of others, you define the situation as trust." This distinction will be important again in Section 4, where I consider the distinctions between predictability and trust, and their relations to conflict resolution and humanitarian intervention. For now, it is sufficient to note that Luhmann imagines trust to be operative primarily in inter-personal relations and confidence to play a large role in political participation. These two conceptions are related, of course, in that without confidence in a political system, there is no sense in which trust could extend farther than one's closest relations. On Luhmann's account, in our increasingly complex societies, we may require "more confidence as a prerequisite of participation and trust as a condition of the best utilization of chances and opportunities". He suggests, for example, that confidence in political institutions turns to trust: confidence is the impetus for casting a vote, trust as risk-taking develops as people abide by the rules of the game regardless of whether their selected party wins or loses.

Luhmann continues, provocatively, to write that the existence or non-existence of trust impacts the way in which citizens make decisions with respect to important issues. Thus, he concludes, "the development of trust and distrust depends on local milieu and personal experience." The fallout of negative milieu and personal experiences is severe: "It reduces the range of possibilities for rational action. . . Through lack of trust a system may lose size; it may even shrink below a critical threshold necessary for its own reproduction at a certain level of development." The two preceding statements are clearly of particular relevance in the case of broken societies. Evidently, if one's local milieu is plagued by ethnic hostility, trust will be lacking. Likewise, it is clear that the range of opportunities is diminished in such a community, and when considering communities that degenerate into ethnic violence, the critical threshold that Luhmann speaks of has been undercut.

Like Baier, however, Luhmann offers no follow-up commentary on the elements that compose this trust. He offers no guidelines or principles that might serve to undergird peace building initiatives. He rejects Baier's account of trust as an innate capacity, but is no more helpful in establishing criteria for developing either the confidence or trust that is lost once the minimum level of trust needed for a functioning society has been lost. Thus, I will turn to an assessment of Russell Hardin's conception of trust as 'encapsulated interest,' where rational interest is seen as the prime motivator for trust.

Of the three philosophers of trust being evaluated here, Hardin is the most clearly conscious of the need to create a theory of trust that is transferable to large-scale institutions, in which ethnic conflict might play a role. I will begin, first, by establishing his conception of trust in general, and then follow this with an assessment of the role he sees for trust among groups and ethnic conflict. Hardin notes, usefully, that prior experience has a tremendous impact on how people trust others: "My prior experiences with trust may have been so charmed that I optimistically trust this new person. Or they may have been so disastrous that I pessimistically distrust her. She is no different in the two cases; my alternative experiences are the source of difference." He continues, further, to note that past experience has a tremendous impact, so that if past experience "too heavily represented good grounds for trust or distrust, it may now take a long run of contrary experience to correct my assessments and, therefore, my actual psychological

capacities." Hardin rightly identifies psychological capacities as critical to understanding trust, and in this sense, his explanation of trust is consistent with Baier's emphasis on the innateness of one's capacity to trust.

Hardin makes several further helpful distinctions in his discussions of trust. He distinguishes, for example, between the notion of trust and the notion of trustworthiness. Trust, on Hardin's account, is either a capability or a 'product of rational expectation' that is void of moral content. Trustworthiness, on the other hand, is the locus for normative judgement, and relates to a kind of personal virtue to which an individual should aspire. He argues that most philosophers, including Luhmann, run these two concepts together.

Instead, Hardin argues, trust is a three-part relation, where "A trusts B to do X," and is "eminently rational." Therefore, Hardin writes, the best way to understand trust is as "encapsulated interest, an account in which the truster's expectations of the trusted's behavior depend on rational assessments of the trusted's motivations." Trust applies only in conditional situations, in which expectations are rationally expected to be fulfilled given certain boundary conditions, conditions that Hardin equates with those that surround contracts. A contract is uniquely able, says Hardin, to protect a relationship involving trust against "the worst of all risks it might entail, thereby enabling the parties to cooperate on less risky matters." Although it is not clear how, on Hardin's account, trust is involved in a situation in which a contract acts as a resource for unfulfilled expectations, the rigour of a contract-like relationship will be helpful in rebuilding broken societies and is a prevalent conception of trust in conflict resolution strategies (but not humanitarian efforts), as I will show below.

A second useful distinction that Hardin makes concerns the relationship between individual and institutional-level trust. They are conceptually related, although different variables are relevant at each level. Moreover, Hardin is clear that his conception of trust as encapsulated interest at the individual level is generalizable to the institutional level. Individual trust refers to the small-scale relations (Hardin actually calls them controls) of our ongoing relations with those that we are in regular contact with. Institutional-level trust, on the other hand, refers to the large-scale relations in a large community, and these include trust in law and government. Hardin is concerned to make these distinctions, since he sees that the "quick blurring of individual and institutional problems" is the most prevalent mistake in the current philosophy of trust.

### **3. The road not taken: why conflict is not 'natural'**

Perhaps the most helpful way to begin this section of the paper is to present an argument with respect to the resolution of protracted, internal conflict that I cannot, for the purposes of this paper, take to be a relevant one. This argument is the one presented in Edward Luttwak's article "Give War a Chance," in which he suggests that resolution is not feasible until wars have "been allowed to run their natural course." He points to imposed cease fires that serve merely to allow warring parties to recuperate and gather arms, as they wait for the international parties to look the other way so that they may resume their conflict. Luttwak suggests that if a war has not exhausted either side, imposed armistices are not able to negotiate peace settlements, since "no party is threatened by defeat and loss. . .[so] the dominant priority is to prepare for future war rather than to reconstruct devastated economies and ravaged societies." He concludes that "peace

takes hold only when war is truly over," and combatants are prepared to engage truthfully in a peace-building process.

In some senses, there is both an initial plausibility and an initial revulsion towards an argument phrased so starkly, that it leads to the suggestion that the United Nations should perhaps help "the strong defeat the weak more decisively [so that] it would actually enhance the peacemaking potential of war." The plausibility arises from the sense that people who are unwilling to cooperate simply will not be able to be convinced to do so, whereas the revulsion arises from experiences that indicate that the strong may not be prepared to cooperate until a complete ethnic cleansing has occurred, in which case an imposed armistice seems necessary. But, aside from suggesting that there is a natural course to war, Luttwak's concerns ultimately have little to do with this contentious claim, in which case his argument might bear important similarities to Michael Ignatieff's argument in "Narcissism of Minor Differences," but instead has more to do with his critique of the ineffectiveness of peace creating initiatives in the past.

Instead, Luttwak grabs attention with a stark argument, and then proceeds to point out the problems of peace initiatives in the past. He complains that international peacekeepers have been too wary of violence to offer sufficient protection to civilians. He argues that the presence of peacekeepers prevents the traditional reaction of endangered civilians, "which is to escape the combat zone. Deluded into thinking they will be protected, civilians in danger remain in place until it is too late to flee." He points out that international intervention too often relies on national political rather than international humanitarian concerns, so that the duration and strength of peacekeepers is often unrelated to what is needed. Finally, he argues that refugee camps fail to help the situation, since their conditions are often better than local conditions, and because their unarmed organizers are unable to "exclude armed warriors from their feeding stations, clinics, and shelters." Refugee camps, therefore, unwittingly prolong rather than extinguish the conditions for conflict by refuelling the fighters and discouraging civilians from returning to their homes. These arguments, however, are compelling to show that there are improvements to be made the process of intervention, rather than indicative of a naturalness to war that ought to be allowed to play out. Equally as important for the present argument is the fact that Luttwak has mingled a number of words and concepts that are carefully dissected in international relations theory, concepts that carry different but complementary guidelines for action in broken societies. It is with this in mind that the remainder of this paper turns its focus to the notions of trust that undergird the various ways in which the international community attempts to rebuild broken societies.

#### **4. Conflict resolution versus humanitarianism**

In the field of international relations, conflict resolution or management via third party mediation is a well-documented area. Interestingly, theories of mediation have converged over the past ten years, to agree that the best strategy for mediation is one that is framed by a kind of rational choice theory. Jacob Bercovitch, who will be taken for the purposes of this paper, to be a prototype of writers in this field, writes that:

The proper concern of conflict management is thus with increasing values and beneficial consequences and decreasing costs and harmful consequences. Conflict management is an

attempt to feed learning into the process of conflict, learning which can make conflict more productive and less costly. . .The purpose of conflict management is not to eliminate, prevent or control conflicts, but rather to increase their value and benefits, and decrease costs and dissatisfaction.

The focus of international mediators, then, is on the sort of incentives that will get parties to the negotiating table, and agreements focus on how to parcel out the resources that the international community is willing to donate in exchange for a cessation of violence. Security is at the top of the priority list, since no negotiations can properly take hold in a situation where citizens are concerned for their safety. There are, however, two crucial problems, one practical and more substantially fundamental, with this perspective with respect to internal, protracted, ethnic conflict. On a practical level, the leaders of particular ethnic groups are often not taken to be the genuine spokespeople for the group in question. On a more fundamental level, however, such efforts focus merely on issues of "immediate interest. . .and may not deal with the underlying, more fundamental issues at stake."

A new emphasis in the field of conflict resolution has arisen in response to criticism from humanitarians who accuse peacekeepers of ignoring such fundamental issues. Emphasis on civil society and the notion of the public peace process (a term which developed over the course of negotiations between Egypt and Israel) have thus become a target of concern among writers who define their field of research as 'conflict transformation.' Along with trying to accommodate the concerns raised by humanitarian organizations, these writers have developed their ideas in response to the increasing number of internal conflicts in contemporary international politics, as opposed to the inter-state conflicts that predominated before the 1990's. Thus, the concept of rebuilding civil society via a process of 'transformation' has taken hold among a small number of those writing within the field of conflict resolution. Again for this section, I have chosen a writer who best represents the innovations of this field, Harold Saunders.

Saunders focuses his work around the notion of relationships, where he pays attention to the human element to conflict. He says that "there is a human dimension to starting and ending conflict, and building peace is also a human – not just an institutional – task." He points out that most internal conflict reflects a breakdown of both state and local authority, based in deep-rooted hostility towards others. The challenge, he writes, is that "enemies must transform stereotypes into human beings with human claims." Relationships are key, in that the elements and dynamics must be the focus of peacebuilding efforts – this is where change must occur. Moreover, Saunders places his hopes for peace in the rebuilding of civil society, since conflict resolution will only be possible when solutions are "enlarged to include rebuilding civil societies." Saunders is certainly right that civil society ought to be a significant focus of the reconstruction process. What is interesting, however, is the infrequency with which he refers to the notion of trust in the rebuilding process. Thus, although the notion of transformation captures a fundamental element of rebuilding, his writing is less helpful than it could have been had he focussed on what, other than 'relationships,' is changing.

Dealing with such fundamental issues, of course, has typically been the role of humanitarian organizations. Until recently as I will show below, the roles of the military and humanitarian organizations have been understood as fundamentally separate to the extent that intervention has

failed because of a lack of co-ordination. For the purposes of the following discussion on humanitarian intervention, I will take Kenneth Bush's work as the focus of my comments. Bush warns against what he calls bungee cord humanitarianism, "quick in-and-out operations [where] their emphasis [is] on rapidity and short term commitment." He argues that peacebuilding has all too frequently been understood as a subset of the military's emphasis on security enforcement, and thus been subject to the same time frame with respect to its activities in a broken society. But, he argues, this conflates projects that ought to be distinguished from one another: military peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. He says that:

Peacekeeping is best undertaken by military actors; peacemaking and preventative diplomacy are best tackled by formal political actors and organizations – including political leaders, statesmen, and recognized and accepted leaders of the groups involved in the conflict; and peacebuilding falls most clearly within the purview of NGO's, PVO's, and community organizations. Thus, the military should not be expected to play a development role effectively, just as development NGO's should not be expected to play a peacekeeping role. This is not to suggest that the activities associated with these roles are not at times interdependent – they are not interchangeable, however.

On Bush's account, peacekeeping creates the conditions for peace, peacemaking creates the condition for reconstruction, and peacebuilding creates the conditions for development.

The interdependence of these three aspects of healing broken societies is crucially important from the perspective of the philosophy of trust, as I will now argue. It is my contention that Bush's distinctions are not complete, primarily because although the categories are plausible, there is no sense in which they are sufficiently theorized. Thus, I argue that he must focus on the nature of trust that undergirds reconstruction initiatives, and that this focus would better allow him to see the relationships among the military, political leaders, and humanitarian organizations who focus on civil society. The relationship, specifically, has to do with the dynamic notions of trust that form the framework for action of each of these distinct, but inter-related, groups.

## **5. Understanding trust as we rebuild broken societies**

The fact that the notion of trust is strangely missing from discussions of peacebuilding undergirds the argument of this final section of the paper. I will show, here, how each of the philosophers presented above can add crucial elements to the philosophy of peacebuilding. Specifically, I will argue that it is Luhmann's notion of confidence that must underlie military peacekeeping efforts, that Hardin's conception of trust as encapsulated interest is crucial with respect to peacemaking, and that Baier's understanding of trust as vulnerability is the goal of peacemaking and efforts to rebuild civil society via 'transformation.'

The security element has been, first and foremost, the priority of international organizations that intervene in conflict situations. Even when the United Nations first entered Bosnia in 1991, their intention was merely to provide a secure environment to allow humanitarian organizations safe access to those who were suffering. It has, however, also often been the most poorly managed aspect of conflict intervention. The fact is, a secure environment is what provides for what

Luhmann describes as confidence, but in order for this to occur, a security apparatus must act decisively.

Writers in the field of international relations discuss the ways in which international organizations possess a certain type of authority from the perspective of civilians caught in the midst of warring parties, and rely on them to provide for a secure environment in which they can resume their daily activities. They pay less attention to how easily this simple reliance on outsiders can be broken – stories about (lack of) international involvement in Rwanda and the inability of the United Nations to stop retribution killings in Kosova indicate that this is true. That is, with respect to the creation of confidence, timing is critical. Trust can arise from confidence, on Luhmann's account, but only if there is, first, no risk involved in behaving in a confident way -- remember that confidence entails sureness that it would not be otherwise. A international team whose goal is to impose the security structures under which peaceful co-existence can resume, it would seem, has only a limited amount of time in which to prove that such security has been provided. Once the ability of the international contingent to provide an absolutely secure and peaceful environment is seen as untenable, creating genuine trust will be next to impossible.

Following the imposition of confidence via militarized security, a second form of trust plays a role. Reconstruction occurs in the stage Bush identifies as peacemaking. At this point, members of previously hostile ethnic groups are not willing to trust 'others', but they have some sense of self-interest that propels them into a kind of conversation. This interest, I would argue, is the notion of encapsulated self-interest that Hardin sees as the foundation for a non-moral understanding of trust. Hardin writes that trust must be "explicable as a capability or as a product of rational expectation without any moral residue." Hardin continues, explaining under conditions of encapsulated interest, politicians have an "interest in supporting people in [their own] position in relevant ways." From the perspective of conflict resolution theory, therefore, these are the conditions under which high level politicians and statespeople may be in a position to negotiate on behalf of their groups. Indeed, the vast majority of work in conflict resolution theory has focussed on various coercive and non-coercive measures to convince warring parties to cooperate. Forced co-operation is part of this process, where conflicting groups may not yet respect each other, but are willing to work together to, say, rebuild the roads that will allow humanitarian supplies to reach both their communities.

It is from this forced co-operation, that becomes acceptable to conflicting parties via a sense of their own encapsulated self interest, that the foundations for trustworthiness are built. Trustworthiness, on the other hand, is a personal (or group) characteristic that attaches to one's function or role. That is, if you can be relied upon to carry out the role that I think is assigned to you, say a police officer due to your uniform, then you are trustworthy from my perspective. Thus, the politicians are trustworthy in that given conditions of imposed peace, they are taken as reliable leaders of their group. Negotiations that begin prior to an imposed peace may fail, remember, since the politicians are not able to stop the fighting and so are not trusted as genuine and authoritative leaders. Politicians acting in their own self-interest, as well as the interest of the group they represent, are able to negotiate rationally with others. Their constituents see them as trustworthy providing the negotiations go well.

Hardin assigns the name 'thick-theory' of trust to the trust that exists among family and friends – this thick-theory, which has much in common with the way in which Baier describes trust in general, has no role in the relationships between politicians and their constituents. Likewise, Luhmann has written that the politician-constituent relationship is not characterized by trust. He argues, along with Hardin, that this relationship is understood in terms of functional roles held by the players involved. Thick trust, on both their accounts, is characteristic of a more intimate and personal relationship. Hardin, however, pays no attention to the role of the conditions under which trust can occur, imagining all trust relationships to be based in self-interest. Luhmann, on the other hand, writes about a situation of confidence as distinct from personal trust relations, without being clear about how the nature of the interactions differ under each condition.

Baier's version of trust, it seems, is the sort of trust that ought to be built via humanitarian efforts that aim at what Bush designates as development. The transformation of civil society can only occur after politicians of various groups have come together to negotiate settlements, which as noted above, are settlements based in individual groups' self-interest. Civil society, on the other hand, consists of all relationships that occur at the community level. It is the area in which citizens must continue to live following violent ethnic clashes. It is also here where Saunders' emphasis on relationships is most relevant. He writes that efforts at transforming civil society into a "safe public space [where people] who are going about the difficult work of changing conflictual relationships and designing peaceful ones. . . Once relationships are changed in that space, a minimum level of trust is established."

Baier's account of trust as a crucial element of all relationships, therefore, comes into play here. In spite of the fact that it seems clear that Saunders' emphasis is on trust-building, he mentions the word 'trust' only three times in the first section of his book. Thus, although he is closest, in my mind, among writers who emphasize the relevance of transformation at the community level, he pays no attention to the nature of trust he is concerned to create. Even Hardin notes that if we do not understand the nature of trust, we run the risk of creating institutions that fail to induce trust, or worse, that serve to worsen existing mistrust.

Saunders emphasizes that redevelopment is an exercise in community building, so that movements to do so are internal, bottom-up efforts. He pays little attention, however, to the fact that the creation of the conditions under which this occurs is a top-down phenomenon. Likewise, Baier in her emphasis on the personal level of trust, pays little attention the fact that there are specific conditions under which trust can occur. In the context following violent conflict, this is a strong security apparatus that allows for a certain amount of predictability. In the context of the philosophy of trust, these are the conditions of confidence that Luhmann writes about. That is, the security apparatus is uniquely able to provide the conditions under which trust-building, of the type that Baier has in mind, can occur.

Baier's contribution to the philosophy of trust is crucial in that she is alone among the writers to emphasize the notion of vulnerability that accompanies trust. She emphasizes vulnerability in the context of writing of the wounds experienced by those who have misplaced their trust. Likewise, citizens in conditions following violent ethnic clashes may still be feeling vulnerable to the psychological wounds inflicted by neighbours who previously were friends. A second element of Baier's writing on trust that is helpful with respect to rebuilding societies arises from a

description of how trust comes into being. She writes that trust comes with "various degrees of self-consciousness, voluntariness, and expressness." Again, this sort of trust may be irrelevant from the position of self-interested politicians negotiating settlements, but it is crucial when citizens attempt to rebuild their communities. They must be self-conscious and ready to make themselves partially vulnerable to people who may have been their enemies in the recent past.

A final contribution offered by Baier here, is her emphasis on an innate capacity to trust. She is criticized fairly heavily for her tendency to liken trust to the relationship between an infant and a mother – both Hardin and Luhmann take her to task for this – in spite of this, Hardin, following a harsh criticism of this sort of trust says that "readiness may be a necessary or at least important foundation on which the capacity for trust may be built." That is, although the analogy to infant trust may be misplaced, especially considering that an infant's trust seems instinctive rather than conscious, Baier is write to emphasize that trust can be built since it is a natural feeling which can play a part in most human relationships and interactions. Thus, in some senses, understanding what it means to trust another person is a crucial element in the outlook of those who are rebuilding broken societies.

I have attempted, in this paper, to show that writers of the philosophy of trust pay insufficient attention to the complexities of different types of trust. I have argued that in societies broken by virulent strains of nationalism, trust must be rebuilt, but that philosophers of trust have not paid sufficient attention to the transfer of individual relations of trust to the institutional level. I have shown how, on Kenneth Bush's account, there are three stages to rebuilding broken societies, and that each has, at its foundation, a different type of trust. I have argued, however, that he, himself, pays little attention the notions of trust that undergird his stages, and thus that his writing is not as helpful as it might have been. In the final section of this paper, I suggested that each theory of trust plays a role in different aspects of the rebuilding of broken societies – that Niklas Luhmann's conception of confidence is critical when imposing a structure of security, that Russell Hardin's conception of self-interest is critical at the negotiating table, and that Annette Baier's conception of trust as vulnerability is critical when rebuilding societies at the community level. Combined, these three philosophers are able to provide a picture of the complexity of trust that ought to form the foundation of the peace process.