

## ***Perceptions of Security: Is more really better?***

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*The concept of nuclear deterrence was refined during the Cold War conflict between the USA and USSR. In the post-Cold War era nuclear nonproliferation has been a priority for the international community. In the New World Order the question remains as to why some States choose to develop nuclear arsenals while others remove nuclear weapons from their military strategy. Is more really better? In answering this question systemic conditions and geostrategic concerns affect any potential for peaceful international relations.*

### **Deterrence Constructs**

The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki fundamentally altered both the post-W.W.II era and the way in which military strategy is crafted and conducted. The use of nuclear weapons by the Allies during the War necessitated the inclusion of nuclear weapons capabilities in post-W.W.II strategic military calculations. The bipolar order between the USA and USSR was built upon the military strategy of nuclear deterrence and this construct maintained a stable, if tense, international order for almost 50 years. The demise of the Soviet Union in 1989 placed into question the role of nuclear deterrence in military strategy and the maintenance of the nonproliferation regime. With the lack of a definitive enemy, the creation of military doctrine and nuclear strategy becomes much more complex as the constructs of Cold War deterrence cannot be unilaterally applied to a new multilateral and conflictual international system. This paper will focus on States within this changing international system which have addressed the issue of nuclear proliferation with different strategies. Beginning with a general discussion of Cold War nuclear deterrence, the utility of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world are inherent in the political bias of the NPT. Following this discussion the nuclear stance of India and its decision to go nuclear will be placed within specific geostrategic and domestic frameworks. Contrasted with India's nuclear proliferation is the Ukraine's decision to roll back its residual USSR nuclear arsenal, also considered within geostrategic and domestic frameworks. Ending with a comparison of each State's decision to go nuclear or not, this paper suggests the attitude of the international community will affect a State's decision to proliferate. As such, the international

community has a duty to acknowledge both the dangers and advantages of maintaining a nuclear arsenal.

### ***The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence***

Based on the rough parity of strategic nuclear forces, the equal status in Cold War deterrence enabled the Superpowers to “maintain their superpower status and translate the quantitative parameters of their strategic arsenals into some political dividends.”<sup>[1]</sup> The premise that “threats, properly made and supported, are both necessary and sufficient to dissuade adversar[ial] states from acting on their desires to change the status quo to their liking,”<sup>[2]</sup> was supported by two simplifying behavioral assumptions. First, States were driven primarily by a quest for gains in international competition when challenging the status quo. Second, these States pursued this quest as if they were unitary rational decision-makers.<sup>[3]</sup> This “draw” of nuclear deterrence structured orderly interactions around which a sense of stability was created. The fundamental objective of a nuclear force posture was to minimize the risk of nuclear war, both deliberate and inadvertent. The importance the USA and USSR placed on force levels, capabilities and structures of their force postures qualified the terms of deterrence. Thus the resolution of the Cold War conflict focused on the dismantling of nuclear arsenals rather than addressing underlying security concerns.

Attempting to influence another actor’s assessment of interests, deterrence seeks to prevent undesired behavior by convincing the party who may be contemplating offensive action that the cost of such action will exceed any possible gain. The essence of deterrence is prevention, accomplished by attempting to influence another actor’s assessment of interests. Deterrence is at core a psychological theory and it is built on assumptions about the way leaders think under specified conditions, an actor’s terms of beliefs, estimates and judgements which are incorporated in an assessment of an adversary’s perspective. Traditionally based on a defensive military strategy, the acquisition of nuclear weapons changed the conceptualization of deterrence and required the Superpowers to include both offensive and defensive calculation in their military strategies. The political aims of war, to win or deny victory to one’s opponent,

were encapsulated by the MAD doctrine. The development of a second strike capability ensured the mutual destruction of both Superpowers and that the political aims of war were achieved. Nuclear deterrence theory is premised on the objective determination of the roles of challenger and defender and assumes that adversarial leaders perceive themselves accordingly. The decision to develop and acquire nuclear weapons is affected by a leaders' domestic motives, including the need to maintain power and national security. Sometimes departing in important ways from standard concepts of rationality, challengers may disregard or misinterpret available information that, if heeded, would have convinced them it was not in their interest to develop nuclear weapons.

In the post-Cold War world underlying deterrence assumptions are challenged; their inherent normative value does not necessarily apply homogeneously and unilaterally to all actors within the international system. The strategic context within which the Cold War calculus of nuclear risks and benefits was articulated has changed fundamentally and “not all regional leaders are rational by western standards and hence [do] not necessarily share the same 'culture of deterrence.’”<sup>[4]</sup> Nor are all challenges to the status quo equitable to a quest for gains. Not all states incorporate a nuclear arsenal into military strategy in order to support expansion. Rather some states perceive the existence of a serious security threat which can only be addressed with nuclear acquisition. Within the Cold War construct, “as long as nations possess nuclear weapons, they will invariably plan on how and when to use them - plans that imply a distinction between potential enemies and potential friends.”<sup>[5]</sup> In the post-Cold War world this definitive difference between friend and enemy is more fluid and creating a deterrence framework on explicit adversarial relationships may in fact be at variance with the self-perceptions of principle actors.<sup>[6]</sup> The end of the Cold War is likely to challenge current widely held views regarding linkages between the behavior of the major current nuclear powers and the willingness of the rest of the world to forego nuclear weapons acquisition. The current rationales for nuclear weapons are primarily political and must be addressed in this context.

## Perspectives on Deterrence

The utility of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world and the 'traditional' conceptualization of their usage is the debate upon which the future of the NPT rests. Operating within the parameters of Cold War deterrence, the Americans follow a policy of enforcing nonproliferation by utilizing economic assistance and other incentives and disincentives to maintain their superiority in the nuclear arena. But "the end of the Cold War does not end the need to maintain credible nuclear deterrent forces. Only the complete elimination of a nuclear threat would do that, and such an occurrence is not likely for the foreseeable future."[\[7\]](#) The position adopted by France recognizes the durability of nuclear arsenals and the American desire to maintain control over the nonproliferation regime and the international system as a whole.

Maintaining an independent nuclear arsenal preserves French autonomy and self-sufficiency. This allows France to obtain the Superpower status associated with nuclear forces and maintain a credible deterrent defense system without having to depend on the support of the US. The fundamental premise of French nuclear doctrine is that nuclear weapons are defensive weapons and are not to be construed within the NATO flexible response doctrine.[\[8\]](#) Nuclear weapons are considered poor offensive weapons because they are too destructive and too indiscriminate in this destructive power. Inherently a political instrument and not a military weapon, nuclear arsenals are designed to make war impossible. Whatever benefit an enemy could reap in invasion it would never offset the cost of nuclear destruction. The right of every state to self-defense and the non-use of nuclear weapons leading to political rather than military solutions dominates the pattern of French nuclear constructs.[\[9\]](#)

France disagrees with the underlying logic of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is seen as an

additional manifestation of 'patronizing Anglo-Saxon puritanism' which finds it normal to divide the world into civilized countries (ie. countries which would have a responsible attitude toward their nuclear weapons) and uncivilized countries (ie. the rest of the world).[\[10\]](#)

There is the recognition that states creating nuclear arsenals do not have to maintain force levels that were common in the USA and USSR during the Cold War. This is based on the fact that

[i]n the case of nuclear weapons, numbers are almost irrelevant once more than 'none' have been acquired...for small states with nuclear mini-forces, the deterrence of the strong by the weak is quite feasible. It is not necessary to threaten the entire destruction of an opponent's society in order to deter him...[i]t is only necessary to threaten the plausible loss of social value commensurate with the potential gains of an attacker.[\[11\]](#)

Although stability and order are threatened by proliferation, a realistic acknowledgment of the inherent values of nuclear weapons allows for potential cooperation to create military command and control arrangements which could maintain the stability of the international system. There will be States which acquire nuclear weapons; in order to ensure this acquisition contributes to international stability rather than threatening it, collaboration between mature and immature nuclear powers is needed.[\[12\]](#)

### ***Nuclear Proliferation***

#### ***India and the International Community***

The shattering of the nuclear silence by India and Pakistan in 1998 placed into question the durability of the nonproliferation regime. On 13 May 1998, India tested thermonuclear, fission and low-yield nuclear weapons.[\[13\]](#) All were warhead prototypes and the wide range of weapons capabilities displayed sought to present a *fait accompli* to the world that India had arrived as a nuclear capable state.[\[14\]](#) Ranging in yield from 15kt to 45kt, the tests were designed to prove that India had graduated from the implosion type pure fission design of its 1974 nuclear test to the sophisticated boosted fission and thermonuclear weapons central to nuclear deterrence.[\[15\]](#) No State has ever concurrently tested such a wide range of weapon capabilities. India did so in part to prove its technological prowess and signal a warning to Pakistan, but there was also a need to quickly complete a wide range of tests in order to avoid the international pressure that would mount against such testing.

Finally settling its' twenty-three year old nuclear dilemma,[\[16\]](#) India's change in stance on the nuclear issue was influenced by current international politics. The three primary reasons behind India's nuclear expansion were "the growing costs imposed by non-proliferation regimes, the increasing size and sophistication of the nuclear capabilities of its regional adversaries...and the failure to begin the process of achieving global disarmament."[\[17\]](#) In combination with domestic political factors these three security concerns pressured India to publicly acknowledge its nuclear capability. Both the CTBT and NPT had a significant impact on Indian thinking and policy and the CTBT was a key catalyst prompting the testing.[\[18\]](#) During CTBT negotiations India was threatened with sanctions if Indian representatives refused to sign the treaty. By seeking forcibly to 'capture' India through a coercive entry-into-force provision, New Delhi was left with few moderate policy options to exercise. The CTBT negotiations made India aware of the technical imperatives of its long-held nuclear option and of the closing opportunity to test its' prototype weapons. If India did not complete its tests quickly, the country would generally have to buy rather than develop nuclear capabilities. Exacerbating India's frustration towards the international community and affecting its willingness and ability to negotiate the CTBT was the treatment of the People's Republic of China by the USA. The PRC enjoyed favoured access to Western technology and continued to modernize its nuclear and missile arsenals with assistance from the US.[\[19\]](#) Rewarding the world's largest autocracy with supercomputers and space and missile technology, the Americans were concurrently penalizing the world's largest democracy with increasing US-inspired national and multinational technology sanctions.[\[20\]](#) While India was exercising nuclear restraint, the PRC was blatantly proliferating and assisting Pakistan's WMD efforts.

Prior to the tests, India's security assessment required the world move towards complete nuclear disarmament or in the absence of such a move India required the ability to exercise its territorial right to self-defense and develop a nuclear capability. With the NPT permanently extended in 1995, nuclear disarmament seems to be an illusory and elusive goal.[\[21\]](#) In the absence of global disarmament India demanded the ability to exercise the same right as other states to an equivalent security status enjoyed

both by nuclear states and those ensconced under a nuclear umbrella. At the time of its testing, India was the only economy among the world's top ten to be without the protection of a nuclear arsenal or umbrella.[\[22\]](#) The increasing importance and perceived security insurance nuclear acquisition has attained since the end of the Cold War has enabled nuclear strategy to obtain a new rationale and role.

### ***India's Geostrategic Concerns***

The PRC poses a real and serious security concern to Indian sovereignty. India's longest border is with China and the PRC continues to modernize and expand its nuclear and missile weapons capabilities.[\[23\]](#) Maintaining one of the highest levels of arm sales internationally and unofficially endorsing proliferation, in the past China has supplied Iran with missiles and in turn Iran aided Pakistan in its 1965 war with India.[\[24\]](#) The connections between these adversaries of India are real and concrete. At least seven countries around India are armed with ballistic missiles capable of striking India targets. Wedged between China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Myanmar (Burma), India is geostrategically insecure. Clearly suffering from a 'battered victim' syndrome arising from its crushing defeat to China in 1962, India has utilized a policy of rapprochement towards the PRC. This policy has continually confined India to the subcontinent and unable to play a role in Asia or the world commensurate with its size and potential. If India had maintained its nuclear indecision, it would be unable to legitimately deter China from a nuclear strike. India would also be but on par with Pakistan, a state a fifth its size in terms of territory and a seventh its size in terms of population.

The relationship between the PRC and Pakistan has created a vital security concern to India. This bilateral relationship is the one of India's main strategic concerns and a rationale for Indian proliferation. The PRC has long transferred nuclear and missile technological advances to Islamabad, enabling Pakistan to continue to wage low-intensity warfare against India. Without military and technological assistance from China, Pakistan would be unable to sustain its bellicosity towards India or to pose the level of threat that it does. The Pakistani acquisition of the ICBM *Ghauri*, also known as

the *Half5*, was accomplished with the aid of Beijing.[\[25\]](#) Thus the advantage of strategic depth India secured with the development of the *Angi* was nullified in one step.

Regardless of the strength of Indian conventional defense, India cannot deter a potential nuclear attack from China or Pakistan armed only with conventional weapons. Retaining nuclear capability is the only way to deter a nuclear attack as conventional forces are not a credible threat against total annihilation. Implicit in this new deterrence structure is the realization that nuclear deterrence does not demand qualitative or quantitative parity with a rival.

Credible deterrence does not demand that India matches every adversarial WMD system with a weapon of equivalent range and destructive power. What it does require is an unmistakable capability to inflict unacceptable damage on a potential aggressor soon after receiving a first strike.[\[26\]](#)

India's military posture, if based solely on conventional forces, would sap India's strength by increasing its spending on arms imports, including nuclear weapons. For India, which does not covet the territory of its neighbours and whose defense policy is based on preventing its borders from shrinking further, WMD and delivery vehicles are the most cost-effective ways to deter aggression.

## **Domestic Political Opinion**

India's geostrategic concerns are exacerbated by its' domestic politics and contradicting self-image. At odds with itself and increasingly marginalized through its vacillations and 'revolving-door' politics, India remains vulnerable and open to external coercion. India's enormous population requires definite security assurances from New Dheli, and opposition to the NPT has been so deeply embedded in Indian politics that no government acceding to the treaty could ever survive. Building a long-term nuclear doctrine demands brokering political consensus on nuclear deterrence and the political will to punish an aggressor. Developing the broad consensus needed to create such a doctrine could be complicated by India's raucous and splintered politics and the shaky coalition governments that it has produced. India's self-defeating image does nothing to enhance the coalescence of its security doctrine. "India's bark, which has traditionally

taken the form of high-pitched moralizing, has always been worse than its bite. This moralizing helps to sustain illusions of national grandeur among the country's self-serving elites."[\[27\]](#) Although the acquisition of nuclear weapons places India in a "superpower" status enhancing Indian prestige internationally, India still presents itself as unwilling to suffer pain to achieve national goals, or to inflict it on those that flagrantly undermine its security. Contradicting actions do not enhance nor secure India's standing nor assist it in the development of deterrence doctrine.

The development of Indian deterrence doctrine is complicated by the lack of military control over defense. India is the only major democracy to exclude uniformed officers from the Defense Ministry, which is run by non-specialists from an elite civil service. As civil servants move to another ministry every few years, this turnover creates a Defense Ministry which is reactive and run by bureaucrats unable to create long-term defense strategy. The tight civilian control of the armed forces was intended to preclude any possibility of a military coup, but this democratic safety valve makes it difficult to create and maintain nuclear doctrine. India has stated it will exercise minimum nuclear deterrence and will not be the first to use nuclear weapons.[\[28\]](#) This solely defensive nuclear force is adopted out of necessity. Indian minimum deterrence and its no-first-use stance was created due to the fact that India does not have the plutonium nor the financial resources to build more than a very small nuclear arsenal; it is far from having the capacity to carry out a first strike that could disarm an adversary. Similarly, since the military does not have a role in planning the only discernible aspect of India's command-and-control system is that it will be firmly in civilian hands, with the PM as the ultimate decision-maker.

### ***Nuclear Reversal***

#### ***The Ukraine and the end of the Cold War***

The demise of the USSR has had numerous global ramifications but nowhere moreso than in the former satellite state of the Ukraine. Although opposition to the Soviet regime had been building for years prior to the demise of the Soviet Union, it wasn't until the Declaration of Sovereignty was made by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet

on 16 July 1990 that the collapse of the USSR was official.<sup>[29]</sup> Numerous question regarding the Ukraine arose, the most prominent and pressing being the future of the Russian nuclear weapons residing on Ukrainian soil and whether or not the Ukraine would include itself in the international nonproliferation regime.

## **Nonproliferation Attitudes**

The collective memory of the Ukrainian people has marginally assisted in shaping the State's choice of nuclear weapons policy. The meltdown of the Chernobyl' nuclear reactor in 1986 left the "Ukrainian public opinion profoundly antinuclear, and this sentiment [was]...embodied in the 1990 Declaration of Sovereignty, which committed Ukraine 'not to accept, not to produce and not to acquire nuclear weapons'."<sup>[30]</sup> But the anti-nuclear stance taken by the Ukraine in 1990 was not based on this sentiment; rather the decision was a hedge made by state decision-makers. In order to secure state borders the Ukraine required international recognition. Unable to determine the level of support either the USA or USSR would grant their independence, the Ukraine used its' non-nuclear stance to secure its sovereignty and ensure economic assistance was forthcoming.

The concern that Russian strategic nuclear weapons on the soil of an independent state could promote proliferation coupled with the possibility Russian command and control systems could break down created a massive push to ensure that the Ukraine did not retain its nuclear arsenal. Tied to the nuclear roll-back of START, these talks expanded to include the former Soviet republics which inherited Soviet nuclear arms. Even with the drive to encompass the Ukraine in the non-proliferation regime, nuclear material and nuclear power plants continue to remain on Ukrainian soil and dominate its' electrical industry.<sup>[31]</sup> Although Chernobyl' has contributed to an anti-nuclear stance among some portions of the Ukrainian polity, these attitudes seem to have not permeated elite thinking. The Ukraine's first non-nuclear stance was iterated in its' Declaration of Sovereignty, and this was then reaffirmed by a Declaration of non-nuclear status on 24 October 1991.<sup>[32]</sup> The Ukraine eventually promised to remove all tactical nuclear weapons for destruction by summer 1992, and all strategic weapons by

the end of 1994.<sup>[33]</sup> But in 1993 Ukrainian state leaders “claimed the separate components and materials of these nuclear weapons as their property, and by early July the parliament in Kiev approved a foreign-policy doctrine specifying that Ukraine owns nuclear weapons on its territory.”<sup>[34]</sup> The confusion arising from such contradicting statements has been interpreted by nonproliferating states as a stalling tactic on the part of the Ukraine.

Calling into question the validity of the Declaration,

[i]n [the Ukraine] the process of military formation... began before a proper political consensus developed on the nature of threats to the state, the basic thrust of military doctrine, the force structure this obliges or the characteristics of military relations with neighbouring or CIS states.<sup>[35]</sup>

Although some security issues have been established in the years since the Declaration of Independence, there is still no clear position the Ukraine has taken on long-term disarmament. In 1994 President Kuchma abolished the Ukrainian State Committee for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (UkrSCNRS) and incorporated it into the Ministry for Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety, headed by Yuri Kostenko.<sup>[36]</sup> President Kuchma also ratified the NPT on 16 November 1994. This ratification is not binding or absolute due to the difficulty of enforcing the international responsibilities of the NPT. The Ukraine’s reluctance to adhere to the nonproliferation regime due to nationalistic tendencies and sovereignty concerns were

overcome partly by the fear of acquiring the status of a pariah and losing Western assistance...Ukraine’s considerations for its national security required the support of the major powers and therefore these anxieties provided the political will to pursue good faith denuclearization and nonproliferation efforts.<sup>[37]</sup>

## **Economic influence**

During the course of the 1990s one of the primary concerns of the Ukraine has been economic restructuring and development. The collapse of the USSR severed economic support from Moscow and the Ukraine has had to search elsewhere for economic assistance. Concerned that “the former Soviet republics would not be able to

provide for safe disposition and security of [their] nuclear weapons,"[\[38\]](#) the United States Senate passed the Nunn-Lugar legislation, creating the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR). The goal of the CTR Program is to

destroy nuclear, chemical and other weapons; transport, store, disable and safeguard weapons in conjunction with their destruction; establish safeguards against proliferation; support the conversion of the military-industrial complex to civilian purposes; and, expand military-to-military contacts.[\[39\]](#)

The CTR program has become political leverage for Ukrainian politicians. The *Yuzhmash* plant in Dnepropetrovsk, formerly the largest strategic missile factory in the Soviet Union, has been transformed into a SS-19 missile dismantlement site, similar to numerous other plant transformations.[\[40\]](#) On 4 June 1996 the Ukraine announced its nuclear free status; the deactivation of all 46 SS-24 ICBMs, 130 SS-19 ICBMs and the return to Russia of 2,000 ICBM and Air-Launched Cruise Missile warheads was complete.[\[41\]](#) The Ukraine stresses the importance of continued CTR dismantlement assistance citing that without it the Ukraine could not continue dismantlement efforts.

Countries join non-proliferation agreements due to "perceived security interests, a desire for international standing, encouragement by other countries, the expectation that not being a member will negatively effect politics and trade."[\[42\]](#) The severity of the economic crisis in the Ukraine has raised numerous questions, the most serious of which regards the cohesiveness of the Ukrainian state; the National Intelligence Estimate postulates the "possibility of Ukraine breaking up into several pieces if it does not move forward to put its economic house in order."[\[43\]](#) The worse the state of the Ukrainian economy, the more influence hard-line nationalist groups gain. The overhaul of a national economy from communism to capitalism involves numerous difficulties and "the reforms that President Kuchma is pursuing are very unpleasant and are facing significant resistance in the *Rada* and on the part of the people in general."[\[44\]](#) But President Kuchma has used the Ukraine's control of nuclear weapons to the State's advantage, as the idea of receiving substantial support for Ukrainian for nuclear disarmament has been attributed to the Kuchma. Maintaining Western support for Ukrainian development is key, as there is the concern that once the Ukrainian nuclear

question is settled the international community may not be as forthcoming with economic assistance.

The lack of economic reform and economic decline have raised questions about the Ukraine's future. The internal composition and demographics of the Ukraine pose numerous challenges to domestic policy makers. Dominated by ethnic Russians who compose over 67% of the regional population, there has been some movement by politicians in the area to reunify with the Russian Republic. Of an even greater concern to the stability of bilateral relations is the question of who will receive payments composed of the rent money from the leasing of Russian bases in Crimea.<sup>[45]</sup> Any violent outbreaks in this area could threaten Ukraine's territorial integrity and pose serious challenges for the Ukrainian-Russian relationship. Relations with Russia are tenuous and volatile; faced with a potential nuclear adversary and the dangers of a disintegrating state, policy makers must balance the need for orderly interactions with any perceived potential threat.

### ***Geostrategic Location***

Ukraine's geostrategic location dictates the balancing force it must play between East and West; this position compounds the complexity decision makers face when determining the hierarchy of Ukrainian interests and security concerns. Due to the instability of independence the paramount concern for policy-makers is the maintenance of the Ukrainian State. Historical conflicts with Poland and Russia coupled with the influence both States attempt to exert on the Ukraine place a large focus on securing Ukrainian borders. But with the end of the Cold War the Ukraine finds itself in a unique position; Poland requires the Ukraine's existence for its' own security and Russia has neither the means nor motive at present to forcibly coerce the Ukraine back into the satellite sphere of Russian influence.

However, the Ukraine is in no danger of being overrun by either Poland or Russia. For Poland, the existence of a sovereign Ukraine ensures Russian domination does not reach Polish borders. The best way to ensure Polish territorial integrity is to ensure that a sovereign Ukraine remains between Poland and Russia. A Russian threat

would therefore be buffered by the Ukraine before reaching Polish borders. Although there are volatile issues between the Ukraine and Russia that strain bilateral relations, the Russians are in no position economically to invade Ukrainian soil. Pushing the Western front of Russian territory to the Eastern edge of the NATO alliance could reignite a Cold War style conflict which the Russians simply cannot economically support at this time.

The Russian threat to the Ukraine is a paradoxical one. Their closest ally and biggest adversary, historically the “Ukraine and Russia have really been very close - in their languages, religion, and geographical location.”[\[46\]](#) The simple fact of geography ensures that the Ukraine will always have Russia as its largest market. The ties of the Communist Empire still predominate market interactions and the existing patterns of economic interrelationships, especially due to the significant dependence of the Ukraine on Russia for energy supplies. Due to economic and ethnic ties, there is no feasibility of creating a Ukrainian nuclear doctrine that specifically incorporates Russia. ICBMs cannot be directly pointed at Russian targets but neither can the Ukraine ignore the fact that its’ largest neighbour is a nuclear ready and capable state.

The Russians attempted to manipulate this skewed relationship in the 1992 Russian draft of a friendship treaty with Ukraine which boldly inserted clauses for an agreed military doctrine and joint defense policy. This “friendship treaty” was indignantly and unequivocally rejected by Kiev. There have been calls from nationalists in the Ukrainian National Assembly supporting the claim that the Ukraine’s strategic interests would be met by creating an anti-Russian alliance of the successor states. The idea of a Baltic-Black Sea Confederation, made up of the Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States and perhaps Poland is a variation of this plan. This Confederation has yet to materialize in part due to the lack of control nationalists have over the *Rada* and due to the common interests of Russian and Ukrainian to cooperate on bilateral issues and maintain joint influence in the Mediterranean peninsula.

Even as early as 1993 the Ukrainian parliament failed to agree on principles for a draft military doctrine of the State; the issue of non-nuclear status was one stumbling

block. The chaos in the *Rada* and ensuing elections in October 1999 do not assist the government to solidify a particular nuclear stance. Due to the influence of economic assistance tied to the international community and the difficult geostrategic position the Ukraine finds itself in, the government has adopted a doctrine of neutrality, although equating this to force structure has been difficult.

Neutrality as a policy reflects the official Ukrainian line that potential threats for the state could arise from various directions...but to restructure forces there to suit a concept of defense *tous azimuts*...demands a radically different force posture and military organization from the one Ukraine has inherited.[\[47\]](#)

Even with denuclearization the military force structures of the Ukraine are organized according to Soviet theatre warfare plans, which focus on Ukrainian troops as part of the first strategic echelon in a large-scale offensive westwards. Ukrainian defense also depends on crucial components and supplies from Russia which fosters a sense of dependence and complicates the nuclear question further. The maintenance of neutrality will entirely depend on the Ukrainian perspective of direct security threats, as in the present fluid threat environment Russia is likely to rely on nuclear deterrence as its principal means of defense. If the Ukraine finds itself in a direct confrontation with Russia, nuclear force would be necessary.

### ***Kosovo and NATO Actions***

The crisis in Kosovo questions the validity and soundness of the Ukrainian nuclear reversal policy, and highlights problems with the economic incentives used to maintain inclusion in the NPT regime. The political uncertainty in the Balkans coupled with the 1999 elections in the Ukraine create an unstable political environment. On the 25 March 1999, the Ukrainian Parliament urged the government to reconsider its' nuclear status. Condemning the NATO decision to use force in Yugoslavia, the Supreme Council passed a resolution asking the government to prepare legislation on renouncing Ukraine's non-nuclear stance.[\[48\]](#) The President of the Ukraine is the only legitimate authority with regulatory powers over foreign policy and security issues and Kuchma has not made any statement promoting Ukrainian nuclear development. The

Supreme Council has ratified an agreement with the US regarding civilian cooperation on nuclear energy, which allows the Ukraine to import US nuclear materials and technology.<sup>[49]</sup> Although there may be positive gains in retaining a non-nuclear policy at present, this does not mean that the Ukraine will maintain a non-nuclear or non-proliferation policy. Though the nonproliferation regime attempts to promote non-nuclear norms, such norms have not been ingrained in Ukrainian political thought and may be difficult to concretely instill.

### ***Is more really better?***

In an anarchical international system based on power relationships and self-interested acts made by States, the basic tenet of self defense is often cited in support of nuclear deterrence strategies. “The right to defend one’s territory and citizens, to honor commitments to allies and to retaliate against attacks against one’s important interests is integral to the maintenance of international order.”<sup>[50]</sup> It should not be surprising that some States wish to confer upon themselves the power of nuclear weapons. With the spread of nuclear weapons, “an increasing number of analysts are prepared to agree that the only purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter and respond to the first use of nuclear weapons by others.”<sup>[51]</sup> If the international community wished to create a non-nuclear order, the powerful members of the system would demonstrate by their own conduct that nuclear weapons are not integral to their own security. The very ownership of nuclear weapons legitimates the Permanent-5 and maintains the status and power they enjoy at the international level.

The acquisition by States of nuclear weapons is not simply a question of proliferation but has far reaching strategic, doctrinal and systemic implications. One cannot acquire a nuclear arsenal in a vacuum and instantaneously; there is always context and time, two factors which immensely influence the acquisition process and outcome. The international community cannot deny the destructiveness and utility of nuclear weapons; the naive belief that one can abolish nuclear weapons is as dangerous as increasing the ease by which nuclear weapons can be acquired. Kenneth Waltz’s thought that “more is better”<sup>[52]</sup> was constructed in the terms of the Cold War

conflict. But this does not mean that the basic premise of proliferation cannot be applied in the post-Cold War world. Nuclear weapons will not go away unless their political value, perceived utility in averting war and legitimacy as instruments of security seriously erode. To curtail proliferation, not only do the benefits of nuclear weapons for national and collective defense have to be substituted with new elements of security, but they will also need to be stripped of their halo of legitimacy. The nuclear powers insist that nuclear weapons are legitimate instruments of security *for them*.<sup>[53]</sup> Proliferation stability or instability is likely to relate more or less directly to a general international stability or instability and the attitudes of dominant States in the international system.

The world possesses nuclear weapons only in order not to use them; it is the case that non-proliferation has been sustained, and will be increasingly sustained or rejected, by national or regional perceptions of security and the benefits of nuclear weapons. If States perceive the need to acquire nuclear weapons and deem it essential to their survival, then more is better. Under the assumption that security will be enhanced by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, one must also assume nuclear weapons will bring with them the immorality of use and the responsible development of command and control structures. If the assumption is that nuclear weapons are inherently unstable to international order and acquisition does not include responsible development and security, then more is not better.

The strategy of nuclear deterrence bases its stability on the possibility of total annihilation, but there is the danger that nuclear weapons will not deter all actors. If the Kamikaze fighter pilots of the Second World War are any indication, there are people who are not deterred by ultimate destruction. Not all international actors form preferences within any terms of rationality. As such it is imperative to ensure that nuclear weapons and materials are retained within the power and control of State apparatus and structures. In this way the international community can attempt to exert systemic pressure on the State and not individual level. It is important to acknowledge that the spread of technology and the persistence of political and economic disputes reinforce the point that the veneer of the international norm against proliferation remains

very thin. The international community can condemn India for its' actions, but it must also ensure that India does not become a pariah state. Incentives to join the nonproliferation regime must not just coerce and persuade but also legitimately attempt to address the security concerns of States; the Ukrainian reversal was co-opted with promises of economic aid but the norms of nonproliferation within the State are presently extremely shallow. Both the Ukraine and India are developing states that do not have the security of a nuclear umbrella to maintain their safety during periods of crisis. Coupled with their difficult geostrategic positions, both retain a defensive utility value in nuclear acquisition. Not in terms of offensive acquisition for a military strike but rather simply to possess nuclear capability. At present this does not require nor entail the need to define potential enemies and friends; a *tous azimuts* philosophy is by far the safest for such states. Nuclear weapons will not disappear and the international community must be responsible for the potential ramifications these weapons inherently hold. Therefore, the question then should not be: Is more better? But rather: How do we safely deal with more? To answer this question one must address the underlying security concerns of the State at a systemic level; the resolution of systemic insecurities is the heart of nuclear stability.

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