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### **Abstract**

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, shocked the global status quo and the altered the shared security relationships between many of the worlds state actors. In terms of security, I hope to ascertain how the relationship between Canada and the United States was affected by the events of September 11.

Cooperative security policies between the United States and Canada have benefited the latter greatly over the second half of the twentieth century, placing our country under the protection of the sheer size and magnitude of American defense umbrella. In 1994 the Canadian Government issued a white paper on defense policy. In this document, it stated that Canada could not be an equal partner with the United States in terms of defense, but would play a key role in the protection of the continent and each other's security interests. The white paper emphasized the importance of both countries' forces to be able to work together in a variety of situations, however dually acknowledged that the Canadian military's immanent budget cuts.

Today the 1994 white paper is largely outdated. The possibility of defense budget cuts in has become a stark reality. Many people wonder if Canada is living up to the minimal military obligations shared with the United States, or other alliances such as NATO. In February 2002, a Standing Senate Committee released a critique on Canadian National Security and Defense. This report raised a flag on the relative decline of the Canadian military since the white paper was released in 1994.

The white paper notes, "The Government believes it is prudent to preserve the ability of Canada and the US to regenerate forces should a strategic threat to the continent arise in the future."<sup>[1]</sup> The hijacked airplanes that crashed into the World Trade Centers in New York, the Pentagon in Washington, and an empty field in Pennsylvania instantly created a new strategic threat to both United States and Canadian Security. Has the Canadian government made any defense or security policy changes since the events of September 11?

The current white paper contains very little detail as to what should be done in the event of a terrorist attack on the North American landmass. The Senate Report documents

many problems, ideas and recommendations in terms of Canadian security. What are these recommendations? Have any been implemented?

The current American government led by George W. Bush has also criticized Canadian security in the post September 11 world. To what degree have the events of September 11, 2001, affected the security relations between the United States and Canada? Has Canada done enough to ensure that that events such as these never happen again? If that is unavoidable, and another terrorist attack occurs on our continent, is Canada prepared to react?

## **September 11 to National Missile Defence**

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Cooperative security policies between the United States and Canada have benefited the latter greatly over the second half of the twentieth century, placing our country under the protection of the sheer size and magnitude of the American defence umbrella. In response to this, Canada has felt little need to develop an ostentatious military industrial structure of its own.

In 1994, the Canadian Government issued a white paper on defence policy. In this document, it stated that Canada could not be an equal partner with the United States in terms of defence, but would play a key role in the protection of the continent and each other's security interests. The white paper emphasized the importance of cooperation in a variety of situations, however it also acknowledged the Canadian military's inherent budget cuts.

Today the 1994 white paper is largely outdated. The possibility of cutbacks became a stark reality during the second half of the 1990's as our government continually slashed the defence budget. A Standing Senate Committee released a critique on Canadian National Security and Defence in February 2002. This report raised a flag on the relative decline of the Canadian military since the white paper was released in 1994, and among other items, recommended an immediate six billion dollar increase in the defence budget.<sup>[1]</sup> Is Canada taking enough responsibility in North American security and defence?

Interstate relations were altered the moment terrorists launched their attack on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001. Canada's place in the world and their relationship with the United States was immediately put into question. Topics such as border control, immigration, and refugee policies rapidly became the most imperative issues between the two countries. Questions about combined defence programs also

began to surface more often.

This paper will first seek to ascertain what defence or security policy changes have already been made by Canada in cooperation with the United States since the September 11 terrorist attacks. The next portion of the paper will investigate National Missile Defence. What is it, and what degree of participation should Canada have in the project? Questions around the issue have instigated heated debate in national political circles. Soon, a clear Canadian direction on the issue will need to be established.

### **September 11, 2001 and Immediately Afterwards**

At 8:45am EDT, on the morning of September 11, 2001, hijacked American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center. Soon afterwards, at 9:03am, a second plane, United Airlines Flight 175, crashed into the south tower.

Another aircraft, American Airlines Flight 77, crashed into the Pentagon shortly after, while a fourth plane, United Airlines Flight 93, was forced down into a field in Pennsylvania before it could reach its intended target. [\[ii\]](#) These events signalled the obvious; the United States was under attack.

Canada was one of the first nations to respond to the situation. Within forty-five minutes of the first attack, Canada elected to accept 224 planes destined for the United States. These planes landed at Canadian airports from Vancouver to St. Johns. This was a tremendous risk for Canada, as no one knew if more attacks were imminent or if other planes were hijacked. All 224 planes managed to land safely in Canada. Over the next three days, Canada graciously hosted the stranded travellers until air traffic resumed. [\[iii\]](#) Undeniably, Canada was quick in responding to the call of its ailing neighbour.

On Friday, 14 September 2001, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien spoke to the nation, calling on all Canadians to take part in a worldwide day of mourning, showing our support for the lives lost in the tragedy. [\[iv\]](#) The Canadian people responded. Over 100,000 people gathered on Parliament Hill to pay their respects. All over the country, other Canadians gathered at various locations to share their sympathy. [\[v\]](#)

Prime Minister Chrétien pledged to the American Ambassador to Canada, “Together with our allies, we will defy and defeat the threat terrorism poses to all civilized nations. Mr. Ambassador, we will be with the U.S. every step of the way. As friends, as neighbours, as family.” [\[vi\]](#)

Although Canada had expressed their solidarity with the Americans through both words and conduct, relations between Canada and the United States were not incredibly warm in the days after the attack. Accusations from the Americans soon surfaced that as many as five of the terrorists gained entry into the United States from Canada. [\[vii\]](#)

These claims were discredited almost immediately, however it was becoming obvious that the United States was not happy with liberal Canadian policies on immigration and refugees. [\[viii\]](#) Prominent people in the United States were pointing their finger to

Canada as a terrorist haven. To combat this, Paul Cellucci, the United States ambassador to Canada, suggested that Washington and Ottawa harmonize their immigration and visa requirements. This would create a “security perimeter” able to keep potential terrorists out of North America.[\[ix\]](#)

An impasse was created for us. As a sovereign nation, Canada was not prepared to reform their entire polices and law at the drop of a hat, however our country also realized that a degree of amalgamation with the Americans was in their best interest.

One of the first obstacles that threatened Canada/US relations after September 11, dealt with trade. In 2001, nearly eighty-four percent of Canadian exports went to the United States. Of all our imports in that year, nearly seventy-three percent came from our southern neighbour.[\[x\]](#) This highlights how dependant Canada is on the United States, and the need to ensure that trade routes remain open.

In the days immediately after September 11, border traffic between the two states slowed to a crawl as security increased. Some truckers were forced to wait nine hours to get across the border. This decline in transportation caused some Canadian factories to close down, as they could not operate without the import of American goods.[\[xi\]](#) General Motors published a statistic that estimated each minute the border between these countries is closed; \$1 million Canadian is lost.[\[xii\]](#) Canada has one of the worlds leading financial systems, and is a member of the elite G-8 organization. The increased security measures conducted along the border had the potential to badly damage the Canadian economy. As a result, the United States government realized that they held great deal of leverage over the decisions our government would make in response to the terrorist attacks.

One of the first actions Canada committed after the attack was to pledge full support to the War on Terrorism. Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien did this on 17 September 2001. Chrétien stated that Canada is "at war against terrorism." He promised to support the United States led coalition against terrorism in the way best suited for Canada, recognizing the inherent risks that such commitment would bring, namely the possibility of lost Canadian lives.[\[xiii\]](#)

On 7 October 2001, the Chrétien government elected to back the United States with a military force.[\[xiv\]](#) The Prime Minister announced that Canada would be sending a rather large contingent to the cause. To “Operation Apollo,” Canada pledged to contribute six ships, six aircraft and more than 2,000 service personnel, to assist with surveillance, and other humanitarian help. The elite Canadian commando unit, Joint Task Force 2, was also committed to the deployment, however their numbers and assignment were kept secret.[\[xv\]](#)

Quickly, this number increased to a deployment of over 3000 Canadian troops, including a 750 soldier Light Infantry Battle Group that operated with the American Army Task Force. This force only remained in Afghanistan for six months because of resource

constraints, however it is interesting to note that this force was the largest military contribution that Canada has made to single cause since the Korean War. [xvi] Our soldiers did not enter Afghanistan as a peacekeeping force in cooperation with the United Nations, but rather as a combat force, aiding in the completion of a offensive combat objective.[xvii]

Surprisingly enough, the United States was again not overly impressed with our efforts. Paul Cellucci repeatedly called for Canada to increase its diminished military budgets, if for nothing else, than for the ability to increase its peacekeeping capacity in other areas of the world.[xviii] Limited defence spending had obviously hindered Canada, and other countries were beginning to take notice.

To stay in the American “good books,” the Canadians tried to quickly respond to the post September 11 precedent set by the Americans in terms of border security. Canada’s borders were tightened as Minister Elanor Caplan quickly announced a new Canadian Immigration Act, including a screening policy for refugees.[xix] Canada committed itself to certain border reforms, however stated that they would not simply harmonize their policies with those of the Americans. They argued that Canadian sovereignty required them to make laws that fit with Canada’s unique ideological framework.[xx]

### **The Anti-terrorism Act**

On 26 October 2001, George W. Bush approved a piece of legislation called the USA Patriot Act. This new American anti-terrorism bill raced through the legislation process launching an aggressive attack at terrorism, designed to not only pursue and punish terrorists but also act as a preventative measure.[xxi]

The Patriot Act enabled police to detain anyone suspected of terrorist activity for seven days without charge, so long as the Attorney General or the Commission of Immigration granted approval. “Roving wiretaps” became legal, enabling police to tap all phones of an individual. Search warrants became nationwide, while email security also increased.

The United States government enabled itself to gain more access to overseas bank accounts. If an overseas financial institution or national government did not cooperate, they would face American sanctions. United States banks were also prohibited from dealing with offshore banks that had no connection to regulated banking systems.

Stiffer penalties were added for terrorist acts, and increased resources were allocated for monitoring people living in the United States on visas. In addition, the budget for patrolling the US/Canadian border was tripled.[xxii]

This border clause worried the Canadian government and placed them under increasing pressure to develop and implement their own anti-terrorism laws quickly. The legislation that the Canadian government replied with was Bill C-36, or the Anti-terrorism Act. The bill was introduced into parliament on 15 October 2001, and passed

by the House of Commons on 29 November 2001. It was proclaimed effective on 24 December 2001. When passed, the act was 186 pages. It drastically changed Canadian law in many ways.

For the first time in Canada, the new code defined terrorism. Like the American Patriot Act, forms of financing and facilitating terrorism were criminalized, including the participation in or active support for terrorist organizations. Wiretapping became legal, as did preventative arrests and investigative hearings, however the latter two were subject to a “sunset clause” which would require they be renewed at five-year intervals.[\[xxiii\]](#)

In contrast from the United States, as the Anti-terrorism Act was being developed in Canada, debate was allowed to occur and thus it became a more robust act than that of the Patriot Act in the United States. In the US, the legislation was rushed through government, and any opposition was considered unpatriotic. Canadian decision makers were hesitant to proceed as quickly.

The day after September 11, the Globe and Mail published an article by Thomas Homer-Dixon, author of the New York Times Bestseller *The Ingenuity Gap*, warning about the consequences of overreacting to September 11. He stated that it was necessary to address the “roots of the madness” like the disparity of wealth in the world. He also argued how easy and unfortunate it would be to turn on people of our own societies because the enemy in the situation was so diffuse and indeterminate. In the United States, observations such as these words were considered naïve or un-American, and thus subject to criticism.[\[xxiv\]](#) Conversely, in Canada, a degree of criticism was appreciated.

### **Other Canadian Policy Changes**

As stated previously, the Canadian government was able to quickly pass the new Immigration Act in wake of the terrorist attacks on the United States. This new bill was signed in November 2001, and limited refugee applicants to just one attempt in applying for citizenship.[\[xxv\]](#) When combined with the implementation of the Anti-terrorism Act in December of the same year, Canadian policy was in many ways different than it was before September 11.

The next major task for Canadian policy makers was to implement a workable solution for border disputes and related issues. An agreement on border matters was not announced until December 2001. On December 3, a joint Canada/US statement was released in Windsor with the participation of US Attorney General John Ashcroft. It addressed the possibility of a joint border security patrol, coordinated visa polices, and increased overseas immigration officers.[\[xxvi\]](#)

Ashcroft stated that 600 American National Guard troops would also be dispatched to the border to increase the speed of border traffic and provide relief for the overworked customs agents. Canadian Alliance Leader Stockwell Day stated at the House of

Commons in response, “Canadians now watch with dismay as the longest undefended border in modern history, a source of pride for over a century to Canadians, is now being defended by hundreds of U.S. troops.”[\[xxvii\]](#) This was a contentious issue between both countries, as the deployment would likely increase the speed of border traffic, while at the same time, could potentially take away a portion of our sovereignty.

The announcement also included the proposed “safe third country” clause. This idea would enable refugees to only apply for immigration to the country in which they landed, and would drastically reduce immigration claims for the two countries. Some Canadians argued that a policy such as this would bind Canadian immigration policy to the more strict American style, and thus this issue was controversial as well.[\[xxviii\]](#)

In addition, the Canadian government added visa requirements for eight new countries, including Zimbabwe and Grenada, as well as Saudi Arabia and Malaysia. American pressure was behind these alterations to policy.[\[xxix\]](#)

The most controversy that came out of the December 2001 agreements occurred because of the new American system that authorized fingerprinting, photographing and registration of visitors, all directed at populations that appeared suspicious. Many argued this to be stereotypical as it largely focused on minorities. American customs officials were told to direct their attentions to people born in the Middle East, regardless of their citizenship. Canada felt that too many of its citizens were being unfairly questioned. By November 2002, 1400 Canadians had been fingerprinted and photographed under the national security entry-exit system of the United States.[\[xxx\]](#)

In the long run, Canada was never forced to accept full visa convergence with the United States, even though we were made to adopt other portions of US policies. Canadian security in regards to human transfer across the border had increased due to the American pressure, however many people wondered if these discriminatory actions would prevent another terrorist attack or simply tarnish Canada’s identity in the world as multicultural nation. Unfortunately, we didn’t have much choice. Had Canada chose to ignore the American pressure, Canadian prosperity would likely have been jeopardized.[\[xxxii\]](#)

Another major agreement between the United States and Canada, signed in the post-September 11 world, was the Smart Border Declaration. This was an accord that would allow low risk people and goods to cross the border without significant delay. It also opened the door for technology and information sharing in terms of border control between the two countries. Foreign Affairs Minister John Manley and American Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge signed the framework for this declaration on 12 December 2001.[\[xxxiii\]](#)

On 9 September 2002, the Canadian Prime Minister and American President George W. Bush met with a large governmental entourage in Detroit, Michigan, to implement additions to this declaration. The two leaders announced a program called Free and Secure Trade (FAST) to speed up the flow of goods across the border, and another

program called NEXUS, aimed at allowing known travelers more efficient cross border transportation. Both of these programs were to be put into service at many of the major border crossings.[\[xxxiii\]](#) This was another big step for Canada in their relations with the Americans.

When all the amendments are looked at, Canada has clearly made modifications to their policies since the attacks of 11 September 2001. Many of these changes were catalyzed by American pressure to increase the overall security of the North American landmass, and prevent future terrorist attacks from taking place. In reality, Canada had little choice but to go along with the Americans, as our economy and general livelihood is so dependent on them. We can only speculate what would have occurred if had the Canadians refrained from following the American lead. The situation would not have been pleasant.

Even a year after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the United States still could not tolerate minimal criticism of their foreign policy. On 11 September 2002, Chrétien stated that the United States and the West must shoulder some of the responsibility for last year's terrorist attacks on New York and Washington because of their wealth and exercise of power in the world. These comments caused a great deal of criticism from south of the border. Fox News was particularly critical of the Canadian Prime Minister calling him a socialist, and then questioning Canadian security responsibilities.[\[xxxiv\]](#)

This once more placed the Canadians under the American microscope. For all that we had done, it still didn't appear that we were able to voice a viewpoint distinct from that of the United States. Were our efforts even appreciated? Sometimes this was difficult to tell. What would the next demand on the Canadian government be? The answer to this question is quickly materializing while a new fork in the road emerges. Canada will again have to decide what direction we are going to take.

In wake of the attack on the US homeland, and in response to the nuclear threat of North Korea, the United States has decided to rapidly speed ahead with a National Missile Defence program. The Bush government has recently withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and has plans to deploy anti-missile batteries in Alaska by 2005.[\[xxxv\]](#)

The United States has asked for Canadian participation in the project. Speculation over our eventual response has created a huge dilemma in Canadian politics. Can we afford to go ahead with the project, or better yet, can we afford not to. Of all the issues that Canada has had to face in regards to North American security since September 11, our response to this question could potentially be the most imperative to our future relationship with our closest friend and ally. What direction should the Canadian government take?

### **National Missile Defence**

The United States Government introduced the National Missile Defence Program

(NMD) in 1996. This program was to be an evolution from the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) that Ronald Reagan had desired to create in the 1980's. Whereas SDI would have attempted to be a strategic shield against a massive assault, the proposed plan for NMD is to protect against a limited or smaller scale attack, such as the launch of a few missiles.

On 22 July 1999, the National Missile Defence Act of 1999 was signed into law. This meant that United States would “deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective National Missile Defence system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized or deliberate)...”[\[xxxvi\]](#)

On the implementation of this program, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), Lieutenant General George Macdonald, stated that the proposed NMD system would create a shift in the US approach to nuclear security. It would provide the United States with an alternative to their current policy options of pre-emption, retaliatory strikes in the event of an assault, or absorption of an attack with no disciplinary action. Macdonald stated that an effective NMD system would allow the US time to assess hostile situations, and therefore the ability to consider possible courses of action.[\[xxxvii\]](#)

The United States has asked Canada to participate in the establishment of this program. Although we are not needed for the system to be operational, our southern neighbors would welcome our support. The United States values the traditional defence relationship with Canada, and realizes that in the future it may be important to have Canada on board.[\[xxxviii\]](#)

The goal of NMD is to be able to defend the United States territory, forces, or its friends and allies against hostile or accidentally launched ballistic missiles. The current American model calls for a ground and sea based system, which would employ six interceptors by 2004, and up to forty by interceptors by 2005. The reality of this is that the interceptors would attempt to destroy their targets by making physical contact at extremely high rates of speed. This is often referred to as “bullet to bullet contact.” The current US proposal does not call for the interceptors to be tipped with either nuclear or conventional explosive warheads.[\[xxxix\]](#)

In dealing with potential incoming missiles, the United States has elected to use a “layered” approach. This would include the utilization of land, sea and air platforms to shoot down hostile arriving objects. Land platforms would include large interceptor rockets or mobile launchers such as those currently used in the “Patriot” defense system. At sea, launchers would be deployed on United States “Aegis” class missile ships, while airborne laser techniques would be used above ground.

It is thought that the air and sea based interceptors would be able to attack during a missiles launch phase as they would be able to position themselves closer to the attacking object than the platforms situated on American soil. The land-based

interceptors would attempt to attack the incoming object while in outer space or high in the atmosphere. In theory, land-based platforms would also be able to intercept a missile in the “terminal phase” or final approach, however most of the US research is focused on attack during the “mid-course phase.” Currently there are land-based interceptors under construction in Alaska and California.[\[xl\]](#) Plans are also being made to place terminals in other areas of the world.

In August 2002, United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, stated his intentions to ask for permission from the United Kingdom and Denmark to upgrade early-warning radars in Fylingdales and Thule, Greenland. These stations would be included in the NMD Program.[\[xli\]](#) It is important to realize that this program is not an option that the United States may explore in the future, but rather a reality that they are actively pursuing.

On 13 December 2001, the United States government led by George W. Bush announced to the Russian Federation their intentions to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Bush remarked on this action, "I have concluded the ABM Treaty hinders our government's ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue-state missile attacks. Defending the American people is my highest priority as commander-in-chief and I cannot and will not allow the United States to remain in a treaty that prevents us from developing effective defenses."

The original ABM Treaty was signed on 26 May 1972, between American President Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev as an effort to slow and eventually reverse the arms race between the two superpowers. It was implemented on 3 October 1972, and specifically banned the development, testing, and deployment of sea, air, space, or mobile land-based ABM systems and their components. The single exception permitted both countries to have a limited ABM system around their respected capitals, a plan in which Moscow engaged. [\[xlii\]](#)

Lasting nearly three decades, the ABM Treaty was continually reformed and re-signed even after the Cold War came to a close. The actions of the Bush government ended this routine. Although the Russian government led by Vladimir Putin called the American decision a mistake, they were not able to prevent the United States from taking their desired action.[\[xliii\]](#) On 16 December 2002, a year after the Americans declared their intent to withdraw from the treaty, the White House released a National Security Presidential Directive called NSPD-23 where their plans for NMD were formally laid out.[\[xliv\]](#) By this point Canada realized that their time to declare a side on the issue was rapidly approaching.

### **The Opposing Viewpoints**

Another bilateral declaration, not previously mentioned, was implemented after the events of 11 September 2001, between the United States and Canada. The product that emerged was called the United States-Canadian Bilateral Planning Group. The goal of this agreement was to create a joint contingency plan for defending and responding to

possible threats shared by the two countries. These threats could be either natural disasters or terrorist attacks. By signing this agreement, a detailed, coordinated response could theoretically be worked out before a potential crisis occurred. This program was designed to be a supplement to NORAD, combining land, sea, and air defence measures in the event of an attack. Due to this, both governments felt that the control center for this the Planning Group should also be located at the NORAD Headquarters in Colorado Springs.[\[xlv\]](#)

This agreement again proved the Canadian resolve in satisfying the Americans new desire for increased security and defense over North America, however some wondered if it went far enough. Was this agreement simply a tactical move by the Canadian government to buy time while deciding what direction they should pursue in cooperation over NMD? It is glaringly obvious that the decision to either cooperate or refrain from cooperating with the United States on NMD will have large consequences for Canada. The arguments for both sides need to be examined.

There is a simple reason why the Canadian government has been so slow in declaring a Canadian direction on the issue. The Chrétien government does not think National Missile Defence matches well with Canada values. If the decision to join the Americans on this project was not connected to so many other important Canadian issues, our current government would likely choose to refrain from participation. Unfortunately, it is not that simple.

Canada's approach to international matters under the leadership of Chrétien is largely based on liberal international theory. Canadian policy has stated that potential ballistic missile proliferators should be engaged diplomatically. We feel that multilateral arms control mechanisms should be promoted while extensive debate is conducted over alternative defence policies. Through such an approach, the Canadian government believes that they, along with their allies, would be actively seeking "to address the threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology, in a manner that respects Canada's longstanding policies on arms control and strategic stability-including Canada's opposition to the weaponization of space, as articulated in the 1999 Government Statement on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation."[\[xlvi\]](#)

The Canadian government has been a very active member in the global fight against nuclear proliferation. In addition, Canada is a member of many multilateral groups who fight against the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction. We were one of the founding members of the Missile Technology Control Regime that was established in 1987. The goal of this organization was to counter the global spread of weapons of mass destruction by controlling the transfer of missile equipment, material and technology. We were also heavily involved in the creation of the 2002 Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation, along with many other agreements.[\[xlvii\]](#)

On defence issues, Canada currently has put its faith in the strength of

international organizations, such as the United Nations, rather than standing beside the sometimes-unilateral viewpoints of the United States. This was proven when Canada sided with the United Nations, and against the United States in their preemptive attack against Iraq. In this situation, Canada decided that their interests would be better served by refraining from participation in that war. Chrétien stated that close friends do not always have to make the same choices; they can disagree and still remain close.[\[xlvi\]](#) This may be true, however in situations of this magnitude, this might not be the best course of action for a small dependant country like Canada. Some policy influencers have yet to see that in the long run, failure to cooperate with the Americans could hurt us tremendously.

Former Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy is one prominent academic who preaches caution when dealing with NMD. He authored a Submission to the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA), in which he depicted what he thought Canada's role should be in NMD. Axworthy stated that Canada should be cautious when deciding on their participation in the project. He felt that it was necessary to not only consider the relationship between Canada and their largest trading partner when accessing the Canadian governments future decision, but also Canada's wider security objectives and international obligations.

He argued that the "layered" defence system that the United States plans to implement produces false promises of total protection. He also declared that mission creep would be likely to occur, tempting the US to implement numerous space-based interceptors, thus effectively weaponizing space. Canadian policy is adamantly against this issue.

Axworthy's submission to SCONDVA stated the problems associated with pursuing NMD for Canada. Implementation of this program would likely cause a rift in international peace and security, and thus hurt the international institutions and laws that govern the global system. Canadian participation would change our entire policy on the non-proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction. In addition, Axworthy felt that new arms race could commence from the program, ironically hindering global security by applying a program designed to increase it.[\[xli\]](#)

Project Ploughshares is another faction cautious about Canadian participation in NMD. This group is a branch off the Canadian Council of Churches, designed to pursue global peace and justice. The Director of Project Ploughshares, Ernie Regehr, has a viewpoint echoing much of what Axwothy stated in his submission to SCONDVA. He feels that the American proposal of a limited ballistic missile shield would directly clash with Canadian values. It would force the Canadians to rely on preemption and military superiority over a rules-based international system, favor counter-proliferation over nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and insist on the weaponization of space. In addition, Regehr stated that NMD would hinder Canadian power for autonomous contributions to international peace and security, by limiting their capacity to influence multilateral disarmament and security measures.[\[1\]](#)

It must be stated that these various reasons against Canadian participation in NMD are adequate. Canada's current policy would be better served if NMD never existed. Canada views itself as a nation who, like many smaller states, readily joins international organizations and institutions as means of collective security.<sup>[li]</sup> The failure of Canada to back the United States in their recent war against Iraq proves this. In joining NMD, many of Canada's policies and much of our legacy would be put into question. Canada's global reputation as a friendly peacekeeping nation, who firmly stands behind the international system, could be tarnished.

Would this be a worthwhile risk for Canada to take, uniting ourselves with the Americans on a project that had so much potential to damage our current line of policy and reputation around the world?

The answer is unequivocally yes. If NMD was a far-fetched dream that United States had talked about implementing over the course of the next century, the above arguments could be considered for Canada. This is clearly not the case. The United States is aggressively moving towards a working NMD system. It is no longer a possibility, but instead an unconcealed reality. If the Canadian government decides that NMD is not an ethical global decision, and that Canada should refrain from participation, it doesn't matter to our neighbors. The United States government is going ahead on the project with or without our support.

On 29 May 2003, John McCallum, the Canadian Minister of Defence, announced that Canada had to decided to enter into discussions with the United States on Canada's participation in NMD, however stated that no final decision had yet been made.<sup>[lii]</sup> This likely means that Canada will back the United States in some capacity on their program, however as of now, no official Canadian direction has been given.

What has been the hold up? Again, in an ideal and perfect world, the Canadian arguments discussed earlier are palatable. Our abstinence would create a global image for Canada as noble country that sided with international reason, and elected to usurp our sovereignty over an extremely important issue affecting both us, and our more powerful southern neighbor. Other countries that were against the American NMD project would praise us, and in general, Canada would be a champion of their own freewill.

Unfortunately, reality would eventually kick in, and we would be forced to realize everything that we lost by failing to cooperate with the Americans on this important issue. Much of the reform that our government made post September 11 could be for nothing, as our tight relationship with the United States would be loosened. The power we gain from the term "defence against help" would be greatly diminished, as some major faucets of Canadian power would be eroded.

Failure to cooperate with the Americans on NMD would have drastic implications for NORAD. If Canada refused to participate in missile defence, many predict that NORAD would eventually cease to operate. This would have a drastic

impact on Canada's status and power in the world.

NORAD was established on 12 May 1958, as a bilateral agreement between the United States and Canada, in an attempt to jointly defend the aerospace above the two countries. The establishment of this organization immediately benefited Canada. NORAD was created to house military personnel from both countries under a single integrated command structure. It was decided that the commander of NORAD would be a US general officer and the deputy would be a Canadian general officer. The commander would report to both the president and prime minister who would then report to the US Department of Defence and the Canadian Ministry of National Defence.

This agreement has traditionally worked very well for both nations. NORAD is where both countries fuse their data and information on various events occurring on land, in the air and in space. Both countries contribution to this organization over the years has been significant, and thus if a NMD cooperation between the countries was to exist, a possible location to combine the partnership would be in Colorado Springs, as much of the cooperative and technical infrastructure is already in place there.[\[liii\]](#)

NORAD is a tremendous asset for Canada as it enables Canada to patrol and control its vast airspace and sea frontier at a minimal incremental cost. It also creates for Canada, interoperability with the most powerful military force on the planet. If Canada decides to cooperate with United States on NMD, NORAD would likely be expanded, and thus Canada would benefit again.[\[liv\]](#)

If Canada declined the American invitation, NORAD would likely cease to exist in the same context as now, if even at all. Although Canada's role in the defence of North American aerospace was once important, over the years, and in part because of our diminishing defence budget, our influence has shrunk in relation to that of the United States. In addition, the core area of warning and assessment, the part of NORAD where Canada has traditionally been most involved, is the area that the United States plans to intertwine with battle plans for NMD.[\[lv\]](#) Joseph Jockel argues that if Canada could not participate in this part of NORAD, the organization would lose its raison d'être.[\[lvi\]](#)

In addition, after September 11, the United States recognized that the land and sea forces assigned to protect North America were facing difficulty in coordinating the increased demand for joint planning and execution in the event of an attack. In response to this potential problem, they created United States Northern Command or NORTHCOM. The goal of this organization was to unify the command of US military resources for the defence of the continental United States. It was decided that the headquarters for this operation should also be situated at the NORAD Headquarters in Colorado, as direct Canadian participation in the defence of North America is critical. Control over NORTHCOM was placed in the hands of the commander of NORAD.[\[lvii\]](#)

If this is extrapolated on, Dwight Mason suggests that Canada and the United States could eventually agree to expand NORAD to include land and sea forces. The joint Planning Group, NORAD and NORTHCOM all fall under the same command

authority. Mason states that the administration of all three organizations would be easier to manage if they all came under the leadership of NORAD. Although this combination would be advantageous to both countries, Canada would benefit more in terms of security and defence as it would be pulled further under the protective United States umbrella. All this potential ultimately rests on the Canadian decision to participate in NMD.

Eventually participation is more than likely for Canada, as we have too much to lose by not joining the Americans. That stated, Dwight Mason also criticizes the lack of urgency by the Canadian government. As Canada has taken its time in deciding which direction to take, the program has been moving steadily ahead without us. As of today, no radars or interceptors are needed in Canada, and as stated above, the system is not part of NORAD. The first interceptors are to be positioned in 2004.

Mason feels that Canada has deprived itself of influence on the program by failing to get involved. As time moves along, Canada will suffer more and more as dissidence will further limit our opportunities to be part of the research and development of the program, and thus give the United States less reason to consult with Canada about the program.[\[lviii\]](#)

It is true that some of our morals and values would have to be reexamined if we were to cooperate with the United States on NMD, however the end result for Canada would be worth it. Conversely, the short and long-term consequences our country would face if we were to decline the invitation would be overwhelming. Canada needs to explore the ramifications that this decision will have on our future prosperity and livelihood and then give the only adequate response possible. Hopefully this is done sooner rather than later.

## **Conclusion**

David Bercuson offers an interesting critique on the Canadian governments current relationship with the United States, It is ironic that a nation so dependant on international trade, and so securely tied to the US economy, should have emerged early in the twenty-first century as so cool to the US, so isolationist in its foreign policy outlook, and so self-deluded to believe that it matters much in the world councils any longer. Tepid government leadership in foreign affairs, the gutting of the military, and the felt need of some Liberal ministers to cater to the illusions of the otherwise tattered Canadian left have produced a growing impasse with the United States. As in the early days of the Cold War, the US is looking to Canada for help; unlike those days Ottawa is spurning Canada's only true neighbor and friend. If this policy trend is not reversed, the long-term implications for Canada will be devastating.[\[lix\]](#)

Since September 11, Canada has been working hard to implement the necessary measures to please the United States government. Although not harmonized, much of our post-September 11 policies have been reformed to correspond with the American security goals. Canada has tightened our policies on immigration and refugees while

also drafting a brand new piece of legislation on terrorism called the Anti-terrorism Act.

As of late, we publicly endorse our friendship with the United States and claim to be close associates. We feel that we have done the United States a huge favor since the attack on their homeland and thus, we should be rewarded. When trade and border issues don't go our way, we whimper and whine and honestly wonder why.

The Canadian government refuses to realize that they are not playing their part in the combined defense of North America. The Canadian military force has slid to an all-time low, thus making us more dependant than ever on American protection, yet when the Americans request our backing on a major international issue, we decide it prudent to oppose them and side with an international coalition.

On the issue of NMD, we team up with the international system, and are cautious in siding with the United States. Our government chooses to disregard the implications of our current neglect and overlook the reality that a failure to participate would bring. Canada would be far better off cooperating with the United States on NMD quickly. Once Canada had declared their support, we would be in a much better position to influence the direction of the program.

It is more than likely that Canada will eventually reason that it is in their best interest to contribute and play a role in NMD, therefore, the sooner that we decide to engage the better. Canada has done a great deal of work to ensure that our relationship with the United States remains close in the future. It would be a shame if our efforts were diminished because we elected indecision on National Missile Defence.

In the days after the September 11 attacks, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien pledged that Canada would be with the United States in terms of defence "every step of the way."<sup>[ix]</sup> The time has come for us to act on this statement.

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<sup>[1]</sup> Canada, Department of National Defense, 1994 Defense White Paper (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1994), 23.

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