

Bureaucratic Politics and the Department of National Defence

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"No modern state can be run without great authority in the hands of its non- elected officials. In such an uncertain nation as Canada, the civil service is perhaps the essential instrument by which nationhood is preserved."

Patricia Ingraham's analysis of the public policy process, and the changing roles of the civil service, concludes that three models are applicable to illustrate how governments can potentially function, at a time when the roles they are expected to perform are under pressure to change. The first model, which she claims is most applicable to Canada, is the traditional senior service, whereby a link is established between the political leadership and the senior level bureaucrats. The second model is called the chief executive. This model assumes an authoritarian leader with a clear mandate to make decisions in pursuit of a specific objective. The third model Ingraham maintains as being current is the broker/facilitator model. This model incorporates actors external to the political and civil service realm, and accepting the condition that these non-traditional actors have a role in policy development.

In their classic work on the decision making process, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow propose three different models, which have some degree of overlap with Ingraham's models. The three models offered by Allison are the rational actor model, the organizational behaviour model and the governmental politics model. The first model, the rational actor, attempts to explain the actions taken by a government as a process undertaken by one unified national body. Moreover, the decisions that are made are done so under a clear objective and goal that is shared throughout the governmental institution. The second model, organizational behaviour model, emphasizes the distinct logic, capabilities, culture, and procedures of large organizations such as governments. Whereas the rational actor model focuses on a single unified actor involved in decision making, the organizational behaviour model stresses the context in which decisions are made. The organizational behaviour model accepts that decisions will be representative of the character of the institution in which they were made.

The third model, and the one of greatest interest in this study, is the governmental politics model. The primary characteristic of the governmental politics model is that decisions are best understood as the result of bargaining among the actors involved in the decision making process. Although Allison's model of governmental politics focuses predominately on decisions in the realm of foreign affairs, Kernaghan and Siegel propose a version of governmental politics, which they label as bureaucratic politics, characterized by intragovernmental as well as intergovernmental attributes.

The purpose of this essay, in very general terms, is to examine the decision making process in the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND), and to determine if the bureaucratic politics model is applicable to the decision making process in the DND. To facilitate this investigation the essay will be developed in the following manner. The first part of the paper will

examine the bureaucratic politics model. In this section the model will be clearly explained, the assumptions made within the model will be stated, and the strengths and weaknesses of the model will be exposed.

The bulk of the theoretical framework for the bureaucratic politics model comes from the writings of Guy Peters, in his two books Comparing Public Bureaucracies: Problems and Theory and Method and The Politics of Bureaucracy. The bureaucratic politics model is put into the perspective of foreign affairs and defence through the writings of a variety of authors. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow in their book Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis appear to be the experts in applying this model to foreign and defence relations. Allison and Zelikow's book was recently released as a second edition, published in 1999, with examples more recent than the Cuban missile crisis. David Kozak and James Keagle provide further support in their book Bureaucratic Politics and National Security. Finally, Morton Halperin and his book Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy is used to round out the connection between the bureaucratic politics model and foreign and defence policies.

The second part of this essay will explore the bureaucratic and political structure of the DND. In doing so the actors who have an input capacity into policy decisions will be illustrated, along with clarification on their relative position of power and influence. Wherever applicable examples will be used to illustrate the existence of the necessary conditions theoretically required for the bureaucratic politics model to operate. The bureaucratic politics model is placed into a Canadian perspective by Richard Simeon in his book Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada, and by Richard Schultz in Federalism, Bureaucracy and Public Policy: The Politics of Highway Transportation Regulation. The model is further applied to defence and foreign policy by using the writings of a variety of authors. This includes Douglas Bland, who presently heads the Defence Management Studies Program at Queen's University. This paper also relies on the writings of Kim Nossal, and investigations he has undertaken with regards to the bureaucratic politics model and foreign and defence policies. Finally, the defence journal Canadian Defence Quarterly was used a great deal, as were a number of government white papers on defence.

The Bureaucratic Politics Model

According to the bureaucratic politics model policy decisions are not made by rational choice nor by a unitary actor, rather policy decisions are determined by an activity of give and take between organizational units which can best be described as a process of bargaining. Allison explains the bureaucratic politics model as individuals in a group who are players bargaining for position and power. As a result government interaction can be understood as a bargaining game, with the outcomes resulting from competition. Bureaucratic politics sees no unitary actors but many actors who focus not on a single issue but a variety of issues.

Kozak and Keagle contend that the relationship between politics and administration in the early twentieth century was depicted as policy-making being the realm of the elected officials. The mechanical execution of determined policy, was the realm of the professional public servant. Following World War II scholars began to develop a skepticism about the politics/administration relationship. Many scholars and administrators felt that the reality of public administration was

not well served by a model that separated politics from administration. From that line of questioning a model was developed that emphasized the political roles and relationships of bureaucracies, agencies and departments and those who manage them.

A study of the bureaucratic politics model by Kozak and Keagle summarizes twelve major propositions explaining the major concepts and notions of bureaucratic politics. The following twelve conditions have been developed by Kozak and Keagle, based on the writings of the dominant scholars of the bureaucratic politics model. Kozak and Keagle identify those scholars as George Appleby, Norton Long, Aaron Wildavsky, Francis Rouke, Graham Allison, Morton Halperin and Guy Peters. The twelve points pertinent to the bureaucratic politics model can be summarized as follows:

1. Bureaucracy makes policy through the exercise of discretion. Since the end of the Second World War the role and responsibilities of government have become increasingly complex and numerous. As a result legislators cannot be expected to understand or anticipate issues and problems they face. Therefore elected officials depend on the bureaucracy for advice and to 'fill in the blanks'. The exercise of these responsibilities gives the administration a political quality.

2. Administration is affected by influences outside the agencies internal environment. This may include lobby groups, citizen coalitions, public pressure or countless other groups. The net result is that decisions made by bureaucrats can be affected by outside influences.

3. Bureaucrats and bureaucracy are driven by agency interests in order to insure their survival. As a consequence of the insecurity that comes with not having political power, bureaucracies endeavour to attain as much power as possible. Therefore those who manage agencies are driven by agency centred interests in order to maintain their survival.

4. Agencies and bureaucracies are involved in a constant competition for various stakes and prizes. Morton Halperin maintains that national security policy making is usually the result of the interplay among interests, and participants. The net effect is a policy process whereby struggles for organizational survival, expansion and growth and imperialism are inevitable.

5. Competition produces an intra-agency bureaucratic culture and behaviour pattern. Membership in a bureaucracy creates certain patterns of behaviour that will determine the participants' perceptions and goals, which may be agency centred. The axiom 'where you stand depends upon where you sit', accurately describes this condition.

6. Certain resources and strategies are associated with successful bureaucratic politics. Bureaucracies have a number of advantages over elected officials in the realm of policy making. Those include expertise, continuity, responsibility for implementation, and longevity. These characteristics create an asymmetrical power and dependency relationship between the professional bureaucrats and the elected officials.

7. Policy made in the arena of bureaucratic politics is characterized by bargaining, accommodation and compromise. Except for times of national crisis or emergency, policy tends to be developed in a competitive marketplace, characterized by interaction amongst a variety of

actors bargaining for influence. This condition has special applicability in a federal system such as Canada, whereby the federal and provincial governments participate in a bargaining process as opposed to a federal provincial hierarchy.

8. Bureaucratic politics is characterized by strong political ties to clientele groups. Clientele group influence at various levels of the bureaucratic structure is not difficult to observe, simply investigate the proliferation of lobby groups. There exists a mutual relationship between the bureaucracy and the clientele group. By maintaining support for the bureaucratic structure, the clientele gains a role in policy making. Moreover, a recent development in the clientele/bureaucracy relationship is the dependency bureaucracies are developing on clientele groups for information. Cutbacks in the governments sectors have limited the ability of the bureaucracy to gather and aggregate information. As a result this responsibility has been taken up by clientele groups, who in turn provide information to the bureaucracies. This has created a problem of having to question the source of information that the bureaucracy receiving. Is the information that bureaucracies receive from clientele or non-governmental organizations reflective of the government's needs, the bureaucrat's needs or the clientele group's needs?

9. In the same way that clientele groups increasingly control the flow of information to bureaucracies, a similar relationship exists between bureaucracies and political institutions. Ad hoc committees, standing committees and meetings below the ministerial level all represent a policy-making forum. Under these conditions the bureaucrat is provided with the occasion to influence policy development while at the same time defending their interests.

10. In a system of bureaucratic politics the role of the executive is to coordinate, integrate and synthesize bureaucratic politics. This condition is more evident in the United States where the role of the executive is played out by a single actor, the president. In Canada, with the tradition of cabinet secrecy and solidarity it is more difficult to observe the role of the Prime Minister as a facilitator integrating conflicting policy perspectives.

11. In the bureaucratic politics system proposals for change are driven by political considerations. As noted bureaucracies have a deep-seated interest in self-preservation. Alterations to the organizational structure are attempts to provide greater influence to a different organization. For example, by relegating defence to a junior cabinet post, the ability to influence the inner circle of the cabinet is reduced considerably.

12. By its nature, bureaucratic politics raises questions concerning control, accountability, responsiveness and responsibility in a democratic society. The political approach to the study of the politics/administration dichotomy raises serious issues about the development of policy in a democratic society. In a system where policy making is supposed to be the realm of the elected official, the reality appears to be that policy is more likely to be developed by non-elected bureaucrats, with interests divergent from those of elected officials.

The preceding twelve points are not conditions on which the government operates. They are in fact, premises that can provide insight in the actual functioning of a modern government. Recall that the bureaucratic politics approach is a model. The purpose of this investigation is to decide if this model is applicable to the functioning of the Canadian DND.

The current day expert and student of the bureaucratic politics model, Guy Peters, provides an interesting approach to the study of bureaucratic government. Peters approached the study of bureaucratic politics by posing the question of what is required by a group of actors in politics to effectively govern a country? Peters provides a list of six criteria required for any group attempting to govern a society. Those six criteria are:

The group must formulate policy intentions for enactment in office.

These intentions must be supported by statements of "not unworkable" means to the ends.

There should be some competition over the allocation of resources.

The group should be in sufficient numerical strength in the most important positions in the regime.

Those given offices must have the skills necessary for running a large bureaucratic organization.

High priority must be given to the implementation of goals.

In his study Peters assesses each of the criteria separately to determine the role of bureaucracy in governance. Space does not allow for a review of the study, however, the conclusions that Peters draws from his study are applicable here. Peters concludes that there is, to some degree, leadership in the policy process being provided by the bureaucracy. In modern industrial societies governing parties do not possess the necessary skills for managing a nation. As a result they must turn to and rely on the machinery of bureaucracy for the missing or weak criteria. Increasingly the overload of government is being passed on to become the overload of the bureaucracy. As an outcome bureaucracies are faced with many of the same roadblocks in policy development as government. Those include the need to answer to citizens, clientele groups, and the survival of the organization. Thus bureaucracy, Peters concludes, does supply some government, but unlike political parties, the government provided by bureaucracies is non consensual and directed by the bureaucracies' relationship with various clientele groups.

Policy making, as an activity in which a variety of actors participate, requires certain capabilities and conditions. It appears that some of these capabilities and conditions favor the bureaucracy, while some of the others favor the elected officials. Capabilities and conditions, and who controls those assets equate to who will have the power in the relationship between government and bureaucracy. For that reason the bureaucratic model incorporates an understanding that conflict and competition are inherent in bureaucratic life, and therefore analysis must focus on the positions occupied and the roles performed by various officials. To that end, the comparative advantage in resources favouring the bureaucracy will first be examined followed by those of the government.

The first and most important resource of the bureaucracy is information and expertise. The elected officials rely on information that is collated and interpreted by the bureaucracy in order to make policy decisions and respond to policy questions. Peters contends that this relative monopoly over information leads to the argument that since the bureaucracy has the most

knowledge, they should have control over the policy development. Even when politicians do take it upon themselves to develop policy they must still rely on information from the bureaucracy, which can be used by the bureaucracy as a bargaining tool to gain influence in policy development.

The second power at the disposal of the bureaucracy is the power of decision. Bureaucracies, in comparison to political institutions are less restricted and more efficient in the decision making processes. Bureaucracies are not subject to the same rules of debate and questioning as are legislatures, nor do they have to be as sensitive to political pressures from the constituents they represent. Seen in this light the bureaucracy is capable of acting quickly and efficiently.

A third resource for the bureaucracy is the supporters of bureaucratic institutions. Bureaucratic institutions have a mutually beneficial relationship with their clientele, and therefore gain support and justification for their existence through the mobilization of clientele forces. This link could be as subtle as a well placed lobbyist who benefits from government contracts, or as public as citizens protesting cuts to social programs. Whichever the case, agency support is bound to affect the decisions made by elected officials.

A fourth advantage which bureaucracies possess is the fact that they are divorced from partisan politics. Civil servants do not have the pressure of having to run for election. As a result there is no need to carry the party line, or to answer to citizens in their respected constituencies. It is precisely this removal from partisan politics that allows bureaucrats to argue that their expertise and decisions are affected by only what is best for the nation.

A fifth advantage bureaucracies have is that over time they can develop an agency ideology. An agency ideology is essentially a broad-based framework that identifies operational objectives. Therefore particular agencies are assumed to perform a role with little debate as to whether or not it is a necessary or positive role. A clear example in the Canadian case would be the role of peacekeeping in the Canadian military. The Canadian government feels that one of the best ways to maintain a 'seat at the table' in world security issues is through the participation in peacekeeping operations. As a result when troops are committed to a peacekeeping operation there is little debate on participation, rather only debate on capability.

The final advantage, identified by Peters, is that the bureaucracy has the advantage of permanence and stability. The work carried out by civil servants has a continuity that allows them the advantage of developing greater expertise and understanding long term planning and goals. Ministers on the other hand come and go with elections and even during the governing period are often transferred to different portfolios as a way of rewarding or disciplining their behaviour.

Political institutions have some degree of power and legitimacy that does not exist in the bureaucracy. Peters identifies three resources unique to the political institutions that provide the comparative advantage for the elected officials. The legitimate position of power ceded to the government by the will of the people as the result of an election is perhaps the greatest asset for the political authorities. Ultimately the elected officials have the formal power, which they in

turn transfer to the bureaucracy in one manner or another. The transfer of power from the constitutional authority to the bureaucracy may be done by delegation, funding, or acquiescence.

As critical as formal power, although more tangible, is the power over the budget held by the elected officials. Bureaucracies require money to function and to survive, elected officials control the budgetary process. Bureaucracies seek the autonomy to spend money, as they deem best, while elected officials seek to ensure accountability on how money is spent. Needless to say, the quest to control the money has led to a variety of techniques on both sides to counter the powers of one another. Included in those methods would be the belief amongst agencies that 'if you don't spend it, you won't get it next year'.

The third issue, which is related to the first two, is the ability of the political authority to grant autonomy to a particular agency. Agencies are interested in gaining a level of autonomy and authority over a particular policy area. Political leaders can use this desire to gain concessions or compliance on other issues. By giving specific policy authority to an agency, the political leadership is able to gain leverage for present or future policy issues.

Schultz declares, and this would certainly be supported by Peters, that the bureaucratic politics model implies that governments may not exhibit the high degree of unity that is assumed by the unitary actor model. That is, decision-making, instead of being dominated by a few central actors, may exhibit a much more complex political process. Moreover, the policy making process includes actors from a variety of institutions, public and private. The critical assumption put forward by Schultz in this claim is that governments have diverse goals and means. As a consequence the roles and positions individuals develop are competitive and not homogeneous.

This assumption of divergent goals between the elected officials and the bureaucratic officials is a basic and necessary condition for the bureaucratic politics model to be successful. Halperin contends that participants in the policy making process have a view shaped by organizational, Prime Ministerial or personal interests and not necessarily shared with others. Allison shares this view claiming that within the framework of broad values and shared interests, government leaders, bureaucratic decision-makers and other interested parties have competitive not identical operational objectives, priorities and perceptions. Allison takes this condition one step further by claiming that the result of this competitive atmosphere coalitions are formed to produce the desired action. Coalitions may include relevant outsiders, legislators, lobbyists or even foreign officials.

Schultz asserts that conflict in the bureaucratic politics model can take two separate forms:

Within government departments or agencies.

Between departments and agencies.

A third arena for conflict, presented by Simeon, takes the form of intergovernmental conflict. This type of conflict is particularly applicable to Canadian federalism, in describing negotiations between the federal and provincial governments. Traditionally, military concerns have been uniquely the concern of the federal government. However, with post-Cold War demilitarization,

the closure of military bases has had a significant impact on provincial economies. This has resulted in provincial governments entering the defence policy world as a relevant outside party.

The bureaucratic politics model, whether one is inclined to see it in a positive or negative perspective, has both good and bad attributes. Keagle and Kozak succinctly summarize the reality of the bureaucratic politics model. The good is policy by debate, compromise, consultation and consensus, policy made in intense debate and deliberation with a variety of views represented. Policy is made by experts and specialists, which tends to reduce the extremist perspective. The bad of the bureaucratic politics model is problems of coordination, the competitive zero-sum game and the general lack of accountability to the electorate by professional bureaucrats.

Testing the validity of the bureaucratic politics model presents some special problems, especially in a parliamentary system like that of Canada. The problems extend from the top of the political elite down to the lowest levels of the bureaucracy. Cabinet solidarity and secrecy makes it difficult to empirically measure the level of debate and compromise taking place within the inner circle of government. The condition of non-partisanship adhered to by bureaucrats (in most cases) makes any public record from a senior bureaucrat suspect to questions of neutrality or ruling party doctrine. Finally, the debate that occurs at the intra-departmental level occurs behind closed doors during the course of the working day and is not susceptible to public debate and scrutiny.

Regardless of these problems, there are certain conditions which when they exist lend themselves to the condition of the bureaucratic politics model. Allison contends that a circle of power players must be formed by those at the top of the institutions involved in a strategic issue. These may include politicians, bureaucrats, business, lobby groups, NGOs and a variety of other actors. Not all of these actors are welcome in the decision making process, therefore some may look for access to the decision process at a different level, 'elbow' their way in, or be completely shut out. Therefore one of the first conditions of bureaucratic politics is the existence of a variety of actors participating in a decision making process.

Hand in hand with this first condition is the need to demonstrate that these actors do not possess homogeneous perceptions on a strategic issue. Halperin provides some clarity on this issue. Halperin maintains that by posing the question 'what shapes the world/security view of these participants?' then it is possible to determine the perception on an issue. For example, on the issue of purchasing new helicopters for the Canadian military, the Department of Finance will view the issue in economic terms, while the Department of Industry and Trade is more likely to see the issue in social terms, or job creation opportunities. Therefore a second condition to bureaucratic politics model is participating actors with divergent views on the same issue.

A third objective condition of the bureaucratic politics model is determining the access to resources. Bureaucratic politics, as determined earlier, is characterized by bureaucracies having the advantage of access to expertise, continuity and longevity. This condition is easily measurable, simply by observing whether or not a new government brings with it new policies, in this case defence, or if the old policies and programs continue under a new minister. Obviously, if they continue, the bureaucrats will possess a definite advantage over the elected officials.

A fourth condition that provides evidence of bureaucratic politics is the existence of a strong relationship between the bureaucracy and clientele groups. This issue is particularly applicable to the defence sector. Many of the clientele groups in defence are formalized by official agreements. For example, Canada has certain responsibilities to NATO and NORAD by way of treaties. Other member states to these agreements can therefore form clientele groups influencing Canadian defence policy. Moreover, defence policy decisions often overlap with other government agencies, such as DFAIT and with global institutions, such as the UN.

A bureaucracy that has become pseudo-institutionalized creates the fifth condition in which bureaucratic politics can flourish. In certain bureaucracies the role they perform has continued from government to government for such a significant period of time that the role has become institutionalized. This appears to be the case with the Canadian military and peacekeeping. In the global community Canada has become known as the peacekeeper of the world, as a result the role of peacekeeper often goes unquestioned.

The preceding five conditions will set the framework for the next section of this paper. The next part of this document will examine the structure of the DND to determine if that structure is conducive to the existence of the bureaucratic politics model. The structure of the DND will have to be examined from two perspectives. Defence has obvious currency for political leaders, which may well be different than the perspective of defence bureaucrats. Therefore it is necessary to examine defence from both a political and a bureaucratic perspective. In addition, those relationships can be further complicated by examining both those perspectives in terms of intergovernmental and intragovernmental relationships.

Bureaucracy and Politics of the Department of National Defence

Dewitt and Leyton-Brown maintain that the defence policy process cannot be considered outside the setting and organizational structure in which it takes place. This includes the roles and responsibilities of the principal actors, the elements of the management system, the machinery of government, and most important of all, the financial or budgetary climate. The logical starting point for this investigation is to examine initially the bureaucratic structure of the DND. An examination of the bureaucratic structure can shed some light on who are the primary actors and perhaps, as Halperin suggests, shed some light on what their worldview may be.

A cursory review of the command structure for the DND presents the reader with two parallel and equal command structures. At the top of the command pyramid is the Minister of National Defence, however it is the next level of command where the confusion starts. Below the level of Minister of National Defence are two positions of equal status, Deputy Minister of National Defence and the Chief of Defence Staff. The next level of command one finds five Assistant Deputy Minister, one for each of the following headings: policy, personnel, material, finance and Deputy Chief of Defence Staff.

The present day integrated command structure was not always present. Prior to 1972 the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces existed under separate command structures. In August of 1971, then Minister of National Defence, Donald MacDonald published the 1971 Defence White Paper. In that paper he concluded that the Canadian military

was in need of a management review, and therefore he took the necessary steps to appoint the Management Review Group (MRG). The MRG was tasked with the job of determining if the command structure of the Canadian military was as efficient as it could be and to determine where redundancies could be eliminated. The committee made seven recommendations, amongst those the integration of the civilian and military bureaucracies under one national defence headquarters (NDHQ).

The integration of the Department of Defence and the Canadian Forces in effect created two separate bureaucratic entities, one civilian and one military, working within the same ministry. According to General Theriault integration had the benefit of creating one political authority. However, it also created an increasingly over-sized bureaucratic structure and culture that have led to a blurring of responsibility and accountability, which in turn generated tension and led to a growth of informal power accruing to established bureaucracies. Most importantly, Theriault claims, is that the organization has thwarted the evolution of a necessary, disciplined, unified military staff system.

The unification of the military and civilian bodies of the Canadian defence establishment has created further problems in terms of the worldview that each actor has developed, and how that worldview has affected policy development. Every analyst agrees that the Cold War has ended. Unfortunately, with the end of the Cold War so too has ended the stability imposed by the Cold War. It may seem ironic to speak of stability and Cold War as mutual conditions, however from a policy perspective, the Cold War created a condition in which policy was developed, unquestioned, to support the Cold War coalitions. The result was a civilian sector and a military sector that shared common values and goals.

The end of the Cold War has not been replaced by any other dominant ideology with which to direct policy development. This has created the condition of having a variety of actors each with separate agendas supported by unique values and goals. Albert Legault refers to the post-Cold War condition as the new social pyramid (la pyramide sociale). During the Cold War the social pyramid was of little importance, however as a result of more recent developments, a greater variety of individuals, social groups and institutions are posing more questions about the fundamental nature of peace and security.

The last of the Defence White Papers to be published during the Cold War period was Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canadians, produce by the Conservative government in 1987. As the primary operating document for the DND, Challenge and Commitment reaffirmed Canada's worldview as being one dominated by east-west rivalry, each side being led by a superpower. The mandate of Canada's military would continue to be expressed through contribution to collective security arrangements, such as NATO and NORAD. Rapid changes in the status of the Soviet Union in 1990 completely undermined the operating focus of the Canadian military as it was stated in the 1987 White Paper. As a result the military was left without a clear operating mandate or a legitimate purpose for their existence. The result was a rapid influx of actors, internal and external to the defence establishment, seeking to provide direction for the Canadian military. In very general terms, actors outside of the defence establishment were motivated by the expectation of a peace dividend resulting from the end of

the Cold War, whereas, actors internal to the defence establishment were busy trying to develop a new rationale for an operational military.

The arguments of the internal actors, for a continued commitment to defence, ranged from the possibility of a re-emergence of an adversarial Russia, to regional economic benefits of defence to the military as a political tool for maintaining 'a seat at the table' for Canada. From the outside, arguments emerged ranging from the need to scale down the military for a variety of financial and social reasons to developing a military for humanitarian and co-operational operations. Although the range of arguments is diverse there is one assumption identical in all the arguments regardless of perspective. All of the options that emerged in the immediate post-Cold War era were based on a military that no longer existed for uniquely the sake of defence. In the post-Cold War era the military evolved into an institution existing to support greater policy issues.

This condition, that the military would function as an aid to greater policy goals, was reflected in the 1994 Defence White Paper. The 1994 white paper, commissioned by the present day Liberal government remains the operational document for the Canadian military today. The 1994 white paper operationalized the subordinate role of defence to other policy goals specifically economic goals. Within the 1994 white paper the government of Canada recognized that the Cold War was over and as a result the role played by the Canadian military had to change to reflect those shifts in global relationships. Specifically the document declared that Canada had a 'vital interest in doing its part to ensure global security, especially since Canada's economic future depends on its ability to trade freely with other nations'. Not only did the 1994 document recognize the need for defence to support the economic interests of Canada, but it also stated a variety of other domestic concerns that were added to the mandate of the DND. Included were tasks such as: assist in fisheries protection, drug interdiction, environmental protection, humanitarian and disaster relief and respond to demands for aid to civil power.

The 1994 Defence White Paper illustrates two distinct shifts in defence policy from the period prior to 1990. First is the recognition that defence no longer had a well-defined role set out by common values amongst the policy makers. While members of the military establishment were struggling to maintain Cold War funding levels and a military presence in Europe, other interested parties, including other ministries, were arguing for a peace dividend. The second shift was the increase in the number of actors involved in the defence policy process. Recall the first two conditions discussed earlier, condition one, a variety of actors involved in the decision process, and condition two, the perceptions shared by these actors are not homogeneous. Clearly, the 1994 Defence White Paper sets in place and acknowledges the first two conditions conducive to the bureaucratic politics model.

Perhaps nowhere in defence policy circles is the intrusion of an outside non-traditional actor more evident than in the new relationship developed between the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the expanded, and somewhat new definition of security, known as 'human security'. In simple terms human security attempts to define security in terms of the individual, as opposed to the state being the central actor in the security debate. By securing the individual, the definition of security is broadened to include issues such as the environment, economics, health, crime and a variety of other non-traditional security issues.

In historical terms there is nothing new about DND and DFAIT having policies that are linked and cross over into mutual policy areas. However, the current enthusiasm for human security and soft power is at complete odds with the mandate and assumptions on which DND functions. In the words of National War Museum historian Dean Oliver soft power does not require frigates, fighters or submarines. Given the problems the military faced in the early 1990s over Somalia, cut backs in resources following the Gulf conflict and having several chiefs of defence staff in a short period of time, the military has been limited in its ability to input into policy reform. The result has been a virtual DFAIT monopoly in setting the agenda for Canada's international security policy.

Indeed, the success DFAIT has had with the global landmine awareness program and the landmine treaty agreement illustrates the impact larger and more influential ministers and ministries have over DND. Initially DND was opposed to the landmine ban, based on the argument that landmines provided a useful defence for Canadian soldiers. In the end the humanitarian argument won out over the DND tactical argument.

The landmine case illustrates two issues significant to the bureaucratic politics model. In the first place it demonstrates the power of external actors. In this instance the external actor was not simply DFAIT. The entire landmine ban campaign was a very public affair. DFAIT was successful in taking their message to the public and enlisting their support. What in fact DFAIT successfully accomplished, in terms of the bureaucratic politics model, was to successfully introduce another actor to the policy making process, in this case the public. Recall conditions one and two, a variety of actors, not like minded on a particular strategic issue. Equally important was DFAIT's ability to access and mobilize resources that would normally be the domain of the DND and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the Red Cross and other humanitarian aid organizations.

The example of the campaign to ban landmines also illustrates the third condition of the bureaucratic politics modes, that being control and access to resources. Whereas in the past weapons and weapons systems were considered to be the domain of the DND, the landmine issue was a direct assault on how the defence experts would conduct operations. While DND experts argued for landmine retention, other experts argued there was no need for these weapons in modern combat. For the first time the DND no longer had a monopoly on which resources would be used to conduct combat operations. As a result of input from external experts the DND would no longer be able conduct operations using landmines.

The second issue illustrated by the landmine campaign was to demonstrate the degree to which the concept of human security had become entrenched as a distinguishing feature of Canadian security policy. As Oliver notes the evolution of the security discourse cannot be attributed to DFAIT, however ex-Minister Axworthy played a key role in translating into practice the prescriptions of human security. These dictates include a focus on humanitarian action outside of traditional multilateral institutions. As a result security issues have become linked to a diverse group of institutions including trade, industry, environment and health to name a few.

As the human security discourse becomes entrenched in the Canadian bureaucratic psyche it creates two conditions in which bureaucratic politics can flourish. First, clearly it increases the

number of actors for each security issue. Second, the discourse itself becomes institutionalized, resulting in the situation whereby policy is developed within the framework of preconceived ideas pertaining to the required institutional role.

To a large extent Canada's role as peacekeeper to the world is an institutionalized concept that affects how policy decisions are made. The 1994 Defence White Paper distinctly portrays this belief. The white paper states: 'Canadians have a strong sense of responsibility to alleviate suffering and respond, where their efforts can make a difference.'. Ironically prior to the 1971 defence review the role of peacekeeping, let alone a 'responsibility' to participate, receives only brief mention in the defence white papers. In fact even the 1971 defence white paper refers to peacekeeping as a role Canada 'may assume from time to time'. In historical terms the role that the Canadian military has played is no different from the role of any other western country. Canada has sought security in collective agreements, and participated in conflicts when obliged, either because of treaty or tradition. At some point in our history the idea that Canada was a peacekeeping nation became entrenched in the public and bureaucratic mindset. As a result much of our present day defence policy, in terms of force posture, equipment procurement and training is determined by this belief.

The discussion thus far has focused largely, although not exclusively, on the interdepartmental interactions. That is to say, to this point the investigation has focused on the actors exterior to defence which have an impact on the development of policy. Briefly, however, it is also worth examining the intradepartmental conditions that exist unique to the defence apparatus. Historically Canada's military was divided into three distinct services, the navy, the army and the air force. However, under Bill C-243, The Canadian Forces Reorganization Act, the three services became united as one Canadian Armed Forces in December of 1966. Despite the efforts to bring the military under one command and system of management, time has proved that traditions die-hard. Although on paper the military may appear to be a unified tri-service organization, Bland and others comment that inter-service rivalries continue to dominate relations in the Canadian Forces. To comment on inter-service rivalries would be difficult since it is not something that is measured or studied by academics. Nonetheless, some light can be shed on the potential existence of this condition by examining which service the Chief of Defense Staff belongs to, and any rotational pattern that may exist. A cursory examination of the CDS position shows a rotational pattern between the services. Although complete speculation, this 'sharing' of the top command position is probably done so as to maintain equity between the service environments.

One of the final conditions for developing the framework for the bureaucratic politics model is a strong relationship between the bureaucracy and clientele groups. As noted earlier, this is of particular importance when dealing with defence, since many of the clientele groups are established by treaty. Therefore when examining this condition it is necessary to explore the relationship between two different clientele groups, those established by treaty and those that exist on a more informal basis.

The 1994 Defence White Paper states that from a Canadian perspective, collective defence remains fundamental to Canadian security. Equally important is the assertion that our allies are countries to which we are bound by political values, interests and traditions that we have an

interest in upholding and fostering. Canadian reliance on collective defence agreements is not a unique condition. Douglas Murray, in The Defence Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study, claims that Canada has never had a defence policy based on self-reliance. This is a result of the fact that there is no external threat that is unique to Canada. Stemming from this reliance on collective defence agreements emerges a variety of formal agreements to which Canada is partnered. These agreements include: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), North American Aerospace Agreement on Defence (NORAD), Organization of American States (OAS), and the United Nations just to name a few. The obvious result of membership in this vast array of groups is policy making that must be done in an atmosphere of consideration for our allies and influence from our allies.

Suffice to say that the debate surrounding the level of influence exercised by the more powerful partners in the Canadian defence relationship could go on forever. This is especially true of the Canadian relationship with the United States, where the crossovers between defence and other sectors, be they social or economic, creates a complex web with countless links and counter links. However some level of exactness can be placed on this investigation by examining a few of the requirements of interoperability.

Recent history clearly illustrates that western military intervention is taking, and will continue to take, the form of coalition forces. It seems no western country is willing to 'go it alone' when it comes to expressing military might. The intervention in the gulf, NATO strike forces in the former Yugoslavia, and countless UN interventions bear witness to this trend. Resulting from this shift in military cooperation emerges the need for forces from different countries to be interoperable. This condition could be something as simple as the need to be able to communicate with the commander of an allied force, or as specific as the need to use allied weapons systems on Canadian platforms. For modern forces to be combat compatible there is a requirement to be able to communicate and to have equipment that is interchangeable.

These examples may not appear to be overly significant, except when placed in the context of budgets and procurement. First, in terms of budgeting, policy officials have to be sensitive to allied demands for types and numbers of weapons and communication systems. This directly affects how much and where a product is going to be purchased. In a time of scarcity of resources, (no money) these question take on a greater significance, especially when framed in the context of domestic or foreign purchase. Allied pressure is a significant problem for the Canadian military. Canada's closest ally, the United States, is also the most advanced military power in the world. As the United States forges ahead with what has become known as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), Canada is less able to participate in military exercises and military operations in any significant manner. At the present time Canada stands to lose any level of influence she may have once had, and any currency for international influence, that military participation afforded.

A second problem related to the need to be interoperable with our allies, which has been eluded to early, is in the realm of procurement. The current Canadian defence budget is in excess of twelve billion dollars, of which up to thirty percent can be spent on the purchase of military equipment. As a result Canadian forces have played a significant role in the development and maintenance of particular sectors of the Canadian economy. At a time of shrinking defence

budgets and fiscal restraint, Canadians would naturally expect that the defence budget would benefit the national economy, as opposed to a foreign state. Here is yet another consideration for the procurement officer, buy local and support the Canadian economy, search for a better deal elsewhere, or buy interoperable equipment regardless of cost and nation of origin.

The process of defence procurement is considerably more complicated than this brief example illustrates. The spending of defence dollars can often be viewed as a form of political currency useful for placating allies, or, in the context of Canada, regions. The complexity and results of policy decisions can be illustrated by the example of the CF-18 maintenance contract. When a maintenance contract for the CF-18 fighter was issued in the fall of 1986, the two contenders were Bristol Aerospace of Winnipeg and Canadair of Montreal. Under pressure from Quebec lobbyists, which included a number of politicians, Quebec was awarded the contract, despite the fact that Bristol Aerospace had a less expensive and technically superior bid. The awarding of the contract to Canadair became a symbol of western Canadian alienation and in some circles it is believed that this 'special treatment of Quebec' served as the impetus for the creation of the Reform Party of Canada.

The implications of the relationship between defence bureaucracy and clientele groups are fairly obvious. It is important to add to this relationship a third actor who, although is not a clientele group, equally influences the outcome of defence policy, that being governments. National governments interact with other national governments, provincial governments interact with national governments, and all of these actors, including the bureaucracy, interact with interested parties.

Regardless of the ministry, if money is to be spent there will always be some interested party attempting to sway the spending decision in their favour. Defence is not unique in this case. However, what does separate defence from other agencies is that the budget is largely discretionary. Without a clear mandate on where, when and how to spend the budget, procurement officers become the target of countless lobbyists who have a convincing argument for why the money should be spent where they deem best.

Conclusion

From the outset the purpose of this paper was to examine the policy making process in the Canadian Department of National Defence, and to determine if the bureaucratic politics model was applicable to that process. To that end the paper started with an examination of the bureaucratic politics model to establish a theoretical framework from which to analyze the defence process. Upon establishing those characteristics which imply the presence of the bureaucratic politics model it became evident that establishing the existence of this model within one ministry would be difficult, let alone applying it to a field of actors with a variety of origins and motivations. Bureaucratic politics, it has been determined, is a difficult commodity to measure, since much of what characterizes it takes place outside of public record or is a matter of convention and tradition. For that reason a list of five objective conditions were established. The assertion at this point was that the existence of these conditions creates an atmosphere in which the bureaucratic politics model could potentially flourish. The existence of these five conditions in no way determines absolutely the applicability of the bureaucratic politics model. These five

conditions simply establish a framework from which to assume the possibility that the bureaucratic politics model could accurately describe the policy making process in defence.

What emerges from the analysis of the defence policy making process is an image of a complex bureaucracy, characterized by cast of actors and an almost infinite list of potential considerations. To further complicate this situation, neither the actors nor the competing values exist in a symmetrical relationship. Policy makers in the defence ministry have to be aware not only of 'who and what', but also of their relative value in the defence world. This predicament is particularly evident in Canada's relationships with our military allies. How our dominant ally, the United States, will react to a policy decision must always be in the back of the mind of the policy making body.

In the final analysis, the potential for the bureaucratic politics model to be applicable to the defence establishment is very strong. When one considers the number of actors presently involved in defence policy making, the shift in Canada's strategic focus and the relative decline in the traditional role of the military, bargaining at a variety of political and bureaucratic levels is a significant likelihood. This is not to say that bureaucratic politics is the only possibility. In reality the model most applicable to policy making is most likely issue specific or a combination of bureaucratic politics and other existing models.

This study has suggested that the Department of National Defence has not been overly successful in controlling the direction in which defence policy has developed since the end of the Cold War. Or stated another way, if the bureaucratic politics model represents a realistic portrayal of how defence policy is formed, the DND has not been too successful implementing their policy ideas. There are a variety of reasons for the existence of this condition, some of which have already been alluded to. However, overwhelmingly, the central cause of this circumstance has been the inability of anyone, inside or outside of defence, to articulate an acceptable primary role for the military institution in the post-Cold War period.

This condition was referred to earlier in the paper by making the observation that the role of the defence establishment has become one of support for greater policy goals. As such, the existence of a military establishment is not longer justified as defence for the sake of defence, but rather defence for the sake of trade, politics, economics and aid to civil power. The traditional role of defence died with the end of the Cold War and has to some degree been replaced by the institutionalization of soft power and human security. Not only has the *raison d'être* for a defence establishment under gone a sea change, but how security is perceived and defined has also been expanded.

For a variety of reasons the concepts of soft power and human security have been and are presently appealing ideas for the Canadian government. First, soft power and human security concepts do not come with the high price tag of maintaining hard power, or military strength. Secondly, soft power and human security fit well with the self proclaimed Canadian peacekeeping culture. Third, as a trading nation, being an acceptable peace broker provides inroads for trade and business. Fourth, soft power and human security affords Canada a leadership role amongst like-minded nations, while at the same time maintaining some level of Canadian influence in bilateral and multilateral defence arrangements.

However appealing, and despite the benefits of soft power and human security, it has resulted in a significant loss of power within the defence department to unilaterally formulate and execute policy. The result of institutionalizing these two concepts has redefined the definition of security to the degree that the number of actors and types of issues involved in the security debate are far beyond the capability (and quite possibly the desire) of the DND to manage. The reformulation of the security paradigm has introduced into the security debate more actors with diverse ideas, shifted resource expertise to a variety of other agencies and increased the clientele group to which DND must respond. Under these conditions the Department of National Defence has, and justifiably so, lost the ability to be a dominant force in the formulation, development and execution of defence policy in Canada.

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