

## **Great Aspirations: The Fall and Rise of Muammar Qaddafi**

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In the publication *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001*, the American State Department's annual report on trends in international terrorism, seven countries were listed as being state sponsors of terrorism. They were: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria.<sup>1</sup> Over the past four years, there have been significant changes in the strategic global situation with regards to these seven terrorist states – the American-led coalition invasion of Iraq being the most prominent. However, even after the success of that invasion in deposing Saddam Hussein, the *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003*, only Iraq has been slated for removal from this infamous list, “once it has a constitutional government in place that pledges not to support acts of terrorism”<sup>2</sup>. Furthermore, in the latest State Department’s *Country Report on Terrorism 2004*, while Libya has not been removed from the list, that country received praise for its “cooperation in the global war on terrorism.”<sup>3</sup> While it is clearly quite difficult for a country to garner removal from this American list, Iraq seems to be well on its way after the American invasion, but then, so does Libya. This feat raises the obvious question of how did Libya manage to achieve this recognition without having undergone an invasion or even a change in government.

Therefore, in addition to an historical account of Libya’s independence and the subsequent military coup that overthrew the monarchy, this essay will describe how Libya came to be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. It will also examine the ideological differences to the practice of international geopolitics between Libya and most of the other countries of the world, as well as the pragmatic differences in the approaches to dealing with Libya of the United States, the former Soviet Union, the rest of the Arab and African nations, and the majority of the countries of Western Europe.

Of particular interest to this study is Muammar Muhammed al-Qaddafi<sup>4</sup>, Libya’s current strong dictator and only its second ruler since being granted its independence. Since his rise to power in the 1969 coup, when speaking of Libya, its name and international reputation are synonymous with the name and international reputation of its leader. In fact, since his ascent to power, the name Qaddafi has come to represent Libya and vice versa. Therefore, any study of the international relations of Libya over the past thirty-six years must also include a detailed evaluation of its leader. Consequently, this paper will explain how Qaddafi effectively changed his initial fanatical and ideological approach to the asymmetric international relations within the bipolar realities of the superpowers that he initially encountered upon assuming power to a pragmatic approach, which is more acceptable in the recently evolved unipolar world.

To better understand the situation in Libya before Qaddafi assumed power requires a brief review of its geographical and historical background. Due to its strategic position in North Africa, Libya has gained the reputation as being “The Gateway to Africa”<sup>5</sup>. With a coastline of 1800 kilometres on the south shore of the Mediterranean Sea, opposite Italy and Greece, Libya has long been viewed as vital ground for foreign domination by empires wanting to control the use of that strategic waterway. Consequently, during the past century alone, Libya has experienced a succession of colonial invaders: Turks, Italians, Germans, French and British. Libya is also located on the periphery between three worlds: the Arabic, the African, and the Mediterranean. Most importantly, in the Arabic context, Libya straddles two distinct Islamic

cultural factions. To its west, Libya is bordered by "the Maghreb", the Western Islamic World, which is composed of Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania. To the east of Libya is "the Mashreq", the eastern Islamic World consisting of Egypt and the rest of the Middle East's Arab nations.<sup>6</sup> In addition, with 1,759,540 square kilometers of territory,<sup>7</sup> Libya is a large country; the fourth largest in both Africa and the Arab World and the fifteenth largest country in the world.<sup>8</sup> It is one quarter the size of the continental United States and is larger than the combined size of its northern European neighbours of France, Italy, Spain and Germany. Despite its size, Libya is also a country with a sparse population.

Although it was conquered by the Allies during the Second World War, when the Germans were defeated during the North Africa campaign, after the war, initial control of Libya was divided along its provincial lines between the British in Cyrenaica, the French in the Fezzan, and the former Italian colonists remained in Tripolitania.<sup>9</sup> Until the discovery of oil in the early 1950s, Libya had little to offer internationally, other than its strategic position, which permits it to command the southern approaches to Europe and western approaches to the Mediterranean Sea. As was discussed at the Potsdam conference in the summer of 1945, "Libya is strategically important for control of the Central Mediterranean because of its ports and airfields".<sup>10</sup> For this reason, as the beginnings of the bipolar world competition started to emerge, the Western powers wanted to keep the Soviet Union out of the area. Consequently, both the British and Americans started to solidify their strategic position by building airfields and improving the ports in Libya.

To achieve the objective of securing Libya within their sphere of western influence, the Western Powers sought a political solution for Libya's future status through the United Nations. As a result, on October 7, 1951, the Libyan national assembly approved the UN-sponsored federal constitutional monarchy proposal, which came into effect on December 24, 1951, Libya's Independence Day.<sup>11</sup> King Idris I, an aging and ailing 61-year old former World War II allied partisan, was installed on the Libyan throne.<sup>12</sup> Unfortunately, this new monarch was supported by a greedy and corrupt court.<sup>13</sup>

King Idris became the sovereign of five million people, over 97% of them professing the Sunni Muslim faith, living in one of the poorest countries in the world.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, Libya was in a sorry state with an illiteracy rate of 94% and a horrifyingly large 40% infant mortality rate.<sup>15</sup> Some 57% of the population resided in the country's three major cities; Tripoli, Benghazi and Zawia, with the vast majority of the rest of the people residing on 10% of the remaining land that was inhabitable; this was a hundred kilometre strip of land bordering along the northern Mediterranean coast.<sup>16</sup>

Given these harsh conditions, it is not surprising, then, that when abundant, highly productive, high-grade, sulfur-free oil fields were discovered in Libya in 1955,<sup>17</sup> the importance and complexion of the country was significantly changed. Libya was said to be "transformed overnight into a beehive ... all sizes of [foreign] oil companies swarmed like bees to the Libyan honeycomb".<sup>18</sup> Unfortunately, given the corrupt governmental situation, "this oil bonanza brought negligible benefit to the impoverished majority of Libyans";<sup>19</sup> a situation that ultimately lead to significant disillusionment and discontent. However, for the time being, at least, the Western Powers were happy. They not only had their military installations in Libya, but they now also had ready access to the country's vast supply of oil reserves.

It was against this backdrop of corrupt national government and international greed that Qaddafi emerged. He was born in 1942 in the Libyan desert to a Berber family and led a very basic and nomadic Bedouin existence until he joined the Libyan army in 1963. He was sent for training to the new British-run Benghazi Military Institute, graduating with a commission as a

Lieutenant in 1965. Subsequently, in 1966, he was sent on a nine month training programme at the Royal Armoured Corps training facility in Britain to become an army armoured officer. It has been said that it was during this brief sojourn in England that "the young Arab nationalist saw an England plagued with racial discrimination, class conflict, and moral anarchy".<sup>20</sup> Consequently, Qaddafi had now experienced, first-hand, the blatant western prejudice that he came to despise and it was during this trip abroad that he apparently acquired his life-long distain for the decadent western lifestyle.

Upon his return to Libya and inspired by a copy of Gamal Abdul Nasser's revolutionary treatise, the Philosophy of the Revolution, which had helped Nasser to incite his successful 1952 revolt in Egypt,<sup>21</sup> Qaddafi began to organize his own pan-Arabian, Nasserite-styled revolt in Libya. During this period, he was described as being an individual of extraordinarily intelligence, with nearly total recall abilities and possessing a "very strong charismatic hold over the other junior officers".<sup>22</sup> As he rose rapidly through the ranks, attaining the rank of Colonel in only three years, Qaddafi was also very successful in his organizing efforts, gaining the full support of three army battalions. Consequently, on September 1, 1969, while King Idris was out of the country, a small band of officers led by Qaddafi, known as the Free Unionist Officers, "expertly coordinated a virtually bloodless coup".<sup>23</sup> During the night, his loyal troops occupied both Tripoli and Benghazi, as well as Zawia and several of the smaller cities in Libya. Within days, what little opposition there was against his coup had been suppressed and, at the ripe old age of twenty-nine, Qaddafi found himself firmly in charge of Libya.<sup>24</sup> As had happened with the 1952 Nasser takeover of Egypt, Qaddafi, who assumed the posts of prime minister and defence minister, appointed and led a twelve-member directorate, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), "to serve as the supreme governing authority."<sup>25</sup>

With this historical and geographical background, it is now appropriate to turn to the character analysis of Qaddafi. His early education occurred in the Arab World during the 1950s, when three distinct schools of political thought had emerged. The first group, the Pan-Arabian (Nasserites) School, was championed by President Nasser of Egypt. It urged a united movement to gain freedom for all of the Arab World. In the initial phase of his evolutionary development, Qaddafi could be considered to be a fervent follower of this School. Next, the Baathist (Resurrectionist) School, which was more outspoken than the Nasserites, championed a return of the Arab World to its former glory under the banner of Arab Socialism. Finally, the Islamist School of 'religious nationalism'<sup>26</sup>, which claimed Qaddafi's secondary loyalty, urged all Muslims on earth to unify, regardless of colour, ethnicity or nationality.

Specifically as a result of these ideological beliefs, when Qaddafi assumed the leadership of Libya, he did so with the intent of reshaping the Libyan society in the image of Nasser's Egypt. Political analysts have subsequently called the process, 'the Egyptianization of Libya', which featured Qaddafi's revolutionary motto "Freedom, Socialism and Unity".<sup>27</sup> Qaddafi immediately initiated his plan to remove foreign control from his country and use the petrol dollars to propel his nation into the Twentieth Century. To acquire this money, he sought economic change by restricting foreign ownership of companies and requiring at least fifty-one percent control by Libyan citizens. As a result, despite his earlier pledge not to nationalize them, Qaddafi subsequently reneged on this pledge and slowly began to nationalize all foreign oil companies, starting in July 1973, with the Bunker Hunt Oil Company.<sup>28</sup> To achieve this and gain much higher royalties rates than any other oil producing countries,

young Qaddafi (sic) waged a deft war of attrition against the combined power of the largest multinational oil companies, skilfully playing one off against the others, breaking their heretofore united front against producer nations.<sup>29</sup>

In addition, to secure his power within Libya, Qaddafi also nationalized the banks and he refused to renew the leases on all foreign military bases, thus giving the British and Americans only eight months to vacate their Libyan bases. As a result of this last edict, the British abandoned their bases at El-Aden and Tobruk on March 28, 1970,<sup>30</sup> and the Americans left, Wheelus Airfield, the largest USAF air base outside of the United States, on June 11, 1970.<sup>31</sup> The Americans relinquished the bases so readily because, from the American's viewpoint, "the future of the oil business was deemed more important than maintenance of the military bases on the Mediterranean Sea."<sup>32</sup> Earlier, the British had come to the same conclusions.<sup>33</sup>

Qaddafi also brought significant social changes to the lives of the average Libyan, by skilfully blending:

the threads of nationalism, anti-imperialism, and pan-Islamic loyalties, which had emerged in Libya at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, with contemporary movements for Arab nationalism, Arab socialism, and Arab unity".<sup>34</sup>

In addition, he sought to provide every citizen with a basic income, free medical care, free housing, access to a car, free education, and freedom from the exploitive worker-employee relationship.<sup>35</sup> During the first decade of his rule in Libya, Qaddafi accomplished many of these goals, easily achieving the highest gross national product in Africa. In fact, "the per capita income rose from \$2,168 in 1970 to \$9,827 in 1979, surpassing Great Britain, Italy and Japan".<sup>36</sup> As a result, by 1980, "virtually no citizen lacked food, clothing, education, medical care, housing, or transportation."<sup>37</sup> Therefore, despite having many detractors, it was said that:

only a fool or a willingly blind person, however he feels about Qaddafi's policies, could deny that the colonel from the desert has wrought these changes [guaranteed education, medical care, housing, and employment] for his country.<sup>38</sup>

Certainly, with his nationalization measures bearing the financial fruits of his country's oil riches, Qaddafi was able to bring billions of dollars to sweeten his revolutionary system of government. Consequently, during the first fifteen years of his reign, "the Colonel has brought undreamt-of prosperity to the average Libyan",<sup>39</sup> and this success led Qaddafi to proudly and somewhat justifiably declare that, "I created a Utopia here in Libya, not an imaginary one that people write about in books, but a concrete Utopia."<sup>40</sup>

In addition, Qaddafi concluded that the overwhelming and humiliating defeat that Egypt had suffered during the Arab-Israeli Six Day War in 1967 had "stemmed at least in part from Nasser's focus on secular reforms and his neglect of religious tradition."<sup>41</sup> He was determined not to fall into the same trap. Therefore, during his first decade in power, Qaddafi refined and published his societal philosophy in a three-book series, collectively known as The Green Book.<sup>42</sup> In these slender publications, Qaddafi soundly rejected the two predominant societal theories, 'materialistic capitalism' and 'atheistic communism', as being false ideologies, "because the former emphasized workers exploitation while the latter stresses class warfare."<sup>43</sup> In their place, Qaddafi developed his own "Third Universal Theory"<sup>44</sup> of direct participatory democracy

and neutrality. Besides rejecting both capitalism and communism, through this prescription for grass-roots-organized governmental chaos, Qaddafi also rejected man-made constitutions and laws, political parties, and parliamentary democracies. In their place, he preached a form of direct democracy through the institutionalized use of popular congresses and committees.<sup>45</sup> As Qaddafi described his vision, “Democracy is the supervision of the government by the people – comes to an end. It will be replaced by the right definition. Democracy is the supervision of the people by the people.”<sup>46</sup> In addition, Qaddafi prohibited the hiring a person for wages or the charging of rents. With the implementation these ideas, Qaddafi’s goal was to create:

an egalitarian, non-collectivist society in which every man works for himself to supply his needs; is a partner in a socialist corporation and shares in its production; or performs a public service for society which, in turn, provides his needs.<sup>47</sup>

Qaddafi also believed that by returning to basic fundamentals of Islam combined with his ‘Third Universal Theory’, “Libyans could lead Muslims everywhere along a “Third Way” toward economic development and political change.”<sup>48</sup>

As a result of such utopian beliefs, in Qaddafi’s revised 1977 Libyan constitution, there are only two articles. The first article officially changed the name of Libya to ‘The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (which means peopledom or the government or state of the masses)’, and the second article proclaims the Koran as the constitutional law for the Libyan state.<sup>49</sup> Qaddafi also pledged himself to the fulfillment of the Libyan constitution and the provisions of the Green Book. Consequently, to summarize Qaddafi’s revolutionary idea for government and society:

the Third Universal Theory is a herald to the masses announcing the final salvation from all fathers of injustice, despotism, exploitation and economic and political hegemony. It has the purpose of establishing the society of all people, where all men are free and equal in authority, wealth and arms, so that freedom may gain the final and complete triumph.<sup>50</sup>

Therefore, the implementation of this concept has been closely watched with interest by other Arab peoples and with some trepidation by other Arab leaders. As a result, some historians have claimed that Qaddafi’s coup and resulting revolution:

more than any other single event marked the beginning of the Islamic revival ... Coming after decades of seemingly irreversible Westernization throughout Islamdom, his own actions gave heart to [Muslim] legalists everywhere and attracted worldwide attention to the Shari’a.<sup>51</sup>

Interestingly, under this anarchical grass-roots governmental system, “Libyans do not have the right to change their government,”<sup>52</sup> so Qaddafi’s national leadership position is secure.

Finally, while a devote Muslim, with Islam clearly playing a central role in his motivation, policies and view of the world, Qaddafi has practiced his own unique brand of Islam. This unorthodox approach to religion has led him into some conflict with the Islamic clerics and has caused him to run afoul of the most Islamic fundamentalists. Immediately after his revolution, in an attempt to placate the Muslim clerics, Qaddafi banned the use of alcohol and playing of western music.<sup>53</sup> Still, despite this initial gesture of conciliation to organized Islam, it

soon became apparent that Qaddafi viewed the Muslim clerics as being "unnecessary mediators between individuals and God".<sup>54</sup> Then, in 1978, he declared the Hadith, the Islamic rulebook, as being non-binding. In its place, Qaddafi substituted his own personalized gospel, The Green Book, as "the guide to the emancipation of man".<sup>55</sup> This action further infuriated Libya's Muslim clerics, as well as many other influential individuals throughout the Muslim world.<sup>56</sup> Next, contrary to common Muslim practice, Qaddafi declared the equality of women within Libyan society. He subsequently, ensured that Muslim dictated dress codes and other customs which ran counter to female equality were outlawed. In addition, he even permitted women to serve in the Libyan armed forces and encouraged them to receive free high school and university educations.<sup>57</sup> Finally, to combat internal resistance in Libya to the massive changes resulting from his revolution, Qaddafi cracked down on any and all 'reactionaries', including the Islamic Fundamentalists.<sup>58</sup> Consequently, because of Qaddafi's radical and personalized brand of Islam, his fierce opposition to Islamic fundamentalism, and his resulting denigration of the role of Islamic religious functionaries, "the Grand Mufti of Libya, Sheik Tahir al-Zawi, resigned"<sup>59</sup> in protest in 1978. Qaddafi has never replaced him.

Next, it is time to examine how Qaddafi employed external affairs to help him achieve his objectives. Qaddafi, the idealist, wanted to ensure that his internal national revolution succeeded. He also wanted to follow Nasser as the pan-Arab nationalist leader, as well as ensuring that Israel was replaced by an Arab state as a homeland for the Palestinians. Qaddafi also "believed that the Arab nation was one homogeneous entity and that Arab power could only be attained through complete union."<sup>60</sup> Therefore, within months of taking power following his coup, Qaddafi proposed a political union between Libya, Egypt and the Sudan. This new Federation of Arab Republics (FAR) was formally established under the Tripoli Charter of December 25, 1969.<sup>61</sup> It was to be lead by Nasser himself, with Qaddafi and Numeiry of Sudan as the Vice-Presidents. Numeiry quickly got 'cold-feet' and quit the alliance, but Sudan was soon replaced by Hafez al-Asad's Syria.

Unfortunately, with the unexpected death of Nasser<sup>62</sup> and with Anwar Sadat as his replacement at the Egyptian helm, this political union was immediately in trouble. The final straw came in February 1973, when, following the Israeli error of shooting down a Libyan airliner which had erroneously strayed over the Sinai peninsula, Qaddafi ordered an Egyptian submarine commander to sink the Queen Elizabeth II oceanliner because it was carrying American and European Jews on a visit to Israel.<sup>63</sup> Fortunately, Sadat countermanded that order and realized that the fanatical and idealistic Qaddafi posed a danger to Egypt's security. Consequently, he dissolved the union and cut political ties, both with Libya and with the Soviets. However, while Qaddafi was disappointed by this turn of events, he was not discouraged in his quest. Over the next few years, he attempted to form political unions with a number of his neighbouring countries, including Syria, Sudan, Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Malta, Chad, Burkina Faso, Tunisia and even The People's Republic of China.<sup>64</sup> None of these acts of political union were successful, because the attempts to establish them all had to be negotiated under Qaddafi's restrictive and idealistic terms.<sup>65</sup>

Qaddafi was also a fanatic about his mission to eliminate the State of Israel. Some have even claimed that, "his dream was to drop a nuclear bomb on Tel Aviv".<sup>66</sup> However, after the unsuccessful Arab Wars of 1967 and 1974 against Israel, when it became clear to him that he could not hope to get sufficient support for his somewhat naive war of annihilation against Israel, Qaddafi found: "three alternative methods of opposing Israel - terrorism, propaganda (insisting on attacking Israel in every international forum, no matter how inappropriate), and diplomacy".<sup>67</sup>

For many years, he never ceased to pursue an opportunity to denigrate Israel and counter Zionist activities.

Qaddafi was also a fanatic about trying to aid other countries in freeing themselves from the grips of imperialist overlords, especially Arabic or Muslim countries and nationalist freedom movements. Under Qaddafi, "Libya vigorously applied itself to aiding terrorist 'freedom organization' and dictatorships threatened by democratic 'imperialist enemies' ".<sup>68</sup> Also, as a pious Muslim, with Islam always playing a central role in his motivations, policies, positions and world-view, Qaddafi has been compared to a Western Christian preacher with "a Koran in one hand and distributing petrol dollars and Islam with the other".<sup>69</sup> Consequently, he freely and openly provided financial aid, materiel support, and, eventually, training to guerrilla's and freedom fighters who were fighting to achieve this goal on behalf of their respective countries and people<sup>70</sup>. Unfortunately, for Libya, while Qaddafi took every opportunity to support such movements around the world, he was naive in thinking that he could politically challenge Western countries, while still maintaining economic relations with them.

To further supplement his support to national guerrilla and freedom fighters, Qaddafi established several training camps for these groups in Libya. In 1969, he started with a small camp to train George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Other Palestinian factions such as the Black September, and the Abu Nidal and Abu Musa groups also soon came to train at these camps<sup>71</sup>. Many other international 'freedom fighters' from around the world soon found their way to Qaddafi's camps.

During the heyday of these training camps in the early 1980's, Qaddafi had established three principle units, located at Sinawin, Zuwarah and Tubrug.<sup>72</sup> In combination, these camps were capable of producing seven to eight thousand guerrillas and freedom fighters in a single year. Qaddafi ensured that the 'freedom fighters' who participated in these training courses acquired the latest concepts and practices in guerrilla warfare from a cadre of instructors from Libya, Cuba, the Palestinians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Iranians, Syrians, North Koreans, Russians, Britons (mercenary veterans) and even Americans (former CIA operatives and retired Green Beret mercenaries).<sup>73</sup> The student body of these camps was even more nationality diverse.

On the tenth anniversary of his Revolution, September 1, 1979, Qaddafi held a huge parade in Benghazi with thousands of trainees from these camps.<sup>74</sup> Consequently, given his occasionally open displays of his support to these Western-designated terrorist groups, within Western circles at least, it was easy to argue that Qaddafi was a vital part of the development of the international terrorist network during the 1970s and 1980s, which provided for a

semi-permanent infrastructure of terrorism ... the resilient web of political fronts, personal relationships, clandestine contacts, foreign connections, alliances with other groups, support structures, resources and supplies of materials and services that sustain the terrorist underground.<sup>75</sup>

In fact, because he unabashedly defended his use of terrorism and subversion as a matter of principle, during this period, many in the West suggested that, "if there was a Nobel prize for terrorism, Qaddafi would surely be the obvious candidate".<sup>76</sup>

Throughout the 1980s, the last decade of the Cold War, the Americans claimed that Qaddafi was pawn of the Soviet Union. Initially, however, his revolution had been supported by the West. Nixon and Kissinger "concluded that Qaddafi held two aces --- Libyan oil and his intense dislike of godless communists".<sup>77</sup> He was someone with whom the Americans believed

they could work and mold<sup>78</sup> and, since they wanted to keep Qaddafi in the Western camp, American agents even infiltrated a group of Libyan officers planning a 1971 coup and turned them over to Qaddafi.<sup>79</sup> For his part, Qaddafi proved to be so anti-communist that he even intercepted a British airliner and forced it to land in Libya, whereupon, he removed two Communist rebel coup leaders and shipped them off to the Sudan, where they were subsequently executed.<sup>80</sup> Also, within the Arab world, especially because of his anti-communist rhetoric, "the Libyan dictator was widely viewed in the Arab world as a U.S. agent, and even his seizure of power was interpreted as having been engineered by the U.S."<sup>81</sup> To counter this view, early in his Libyan leadership, Qaddafi had to openly argue that, "the United States wants to bring Libya under its influence, wants to enslave us, but we want to be free".<sup>82</sup>

However, although he despised the idea of communism, Qaddafi was also not prepared to openly side with the United States, which he saw as a major obstacle, "to his dream of achieving the status of an internationally respected leader and champion of liberation".<sup>83</sup> Still, he realized that he needed the support of a superpower and the access to arms that such support would ensure. Consequently, Qaddafi's relationship with the Soviets was both contradictory and ambivalent – an association of convenience.

From the period August 19 to September 11, 1969, the Soviet navy conducted a major naval exercise off the coast of Cyrenaica. By coincidence, this exercise coincided with the Qaddafi coup and the Soviets let it be known that no nation was to try to thwart the ongoing Libyan revolution.<sup>84</sup> For the Soviets, the new Qaddafi regime was considered as being a good recruitment prospect. Starting in 1972, as their close military ties to Egypt were slowly being severed by Sadat, when the Soviets proved reluctant to sufficiently rearm Sadat in preparation for another war against Israel, and culminating with Egypt's subsequent thrashing at the hands of the Israelis in 1974, the Soviets increasingly looked to Libya as a potential alternate military ally in the Western Mediterranean. They hoped to be allowed access to Libyan ports and airfields to compensate for their eviction from Egypt. The Soviets also eyed Libyan oil and petrol dollars from arms sales. Besides initially endorsing his regime, the Soviets actively courted Qaddafi, awarding him the prestigious Order of Lenin in Moscow on June 26, 1971, for his work towards securing 'universal peace'.<sup>85</sup> Despite bestowing such recognition, the Soviets found Qaddafi to be a fickle potential ally. In 1972, for example, Qaddafi became angry with the Soviets, initially, for their support of India in the war against the Muslim Pakistanis, and then, for not properly rearming and supplying Egypt.<sup>86</sup>

Still, Libya was also fast becoming more of an international pariah in American eyes. Qaddafi's uncompromising views on colonialism and imperialism, combined with his vehement hatred of Israel, created difficulties for him to acquire arms in the West. In addition, this problem was exacerbated by his admitted links to numerous worldwide liberation movements, many of which the Americans regarded as agents of 'international terrorism'. Finally, Qaddafi was angered by Cairo's conciliatory signals towards the West. Consequently, as Qaddafi became increasingly isolated internationally, "Libya's need for arms and Sadat's gravitation towards the United States forced Libya to edge toward the Soviet Union".<sup>87</sup>

Although Qaddafi tried to abide by Nasser's earlier warning to him in 1969, while he was still a freshman dictator, "to keep his distance from the Soviets and not antagonize the United States",<sup>88</sup> Qaddafi believed it necessary to take up the Soviet's offer of arms and economic cooperation to help compensate for the Egyptian tilt towards the Americans. Starting in 1970, Qaddafi made his first major arms purchase. He bought 100 Mirage fighter planes from France, Chieftan tanks from Britain, and additional weapons systems from the Soviets.<sup>89</sup> At this stage,

Qaddafi was using whatever arms sources were available to him. Therefore, despite his idealism and antipathy for communism, Qaddafi “swallowed his revulsion of the atheism of the Marxist-Leninist states”,<sup>90</sup> and slowly became enmeshed in the Soviet circle of allies. For example, in 1975, instead of President Brezhnev visiting Cairo, he sent the Soviet Union’s Foreign Minister, Anatoly Kosygin, to visit Libya. During this visit, he and Qaddafi signed a number of economic agreements which allowed the Soviets to regain some prestige in the Middle East region, while giving Qaddafi an outlet for his oil in exchange for arms and other products. Still, despite this economic arrangement, “Libyan policy has avoided friendship pacts with the Soviet Union, and kept its distance from Moscow on many issues”.<sup>91</sup> In addition, while the Soviets refused to commit to defending Libya because they viewed Qaddafi as being “overly erratic and unpredictable ... Qaddafi felt it necessary to preserve Libya’s image of independence and refused the Soviets formal [military] base rights”.<sup>92</sup>

Even at this stage, when it was clear that Libya was drifting away from the Western sphere of influence, the Americans did not view Qaddafi as key player on either the Middle East or the World stage. Therefore, even though the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations were irked by Qaddafi’s support of international fringe groups, his anti-Israeli policies, his apparent friendship with the Soviets, and finally, his support to the Khomeni regime following the overthrow of Shah in Iran, “as far as American policymakers were concerned, Qaddafi was politically a non-actor and thus, while bothersome, he could still be ignored”.<sup>93</sup>

However, this tolerant opinion of Qaddafi started to change in early 1980s, with the new Reagan administration. Ronald Reagan was a 1950s vintage Cold War warrior who had earlier displayed an antipathy towards Nasserism. He subsequently carried this over into his consideration of how to deal with Libya. In addition, Reagan also believed that radical leaders such as Qaddafi had lost respect for American power and prowess in the post-Vietnam era and he set out to redress this misperception. Finally, Reagan viewed many of the regional differences occurring throughout the World and, especially in the Middle East, as being part of the Soviet Union’s global strategy to gain hegemony over the West.<sup>94</sup> Consequently, due to his bluster and international actions and intrigue, Qaddafi became an ideal and convenient target for Reagan’s Administration.<sup>95</sup> In effect, “Qaddafi was to Reagan what Castro was Kennedy and what Nasser was to Prime Minister Eden – an international pariah bent on exporting revolution and confronting the American and British interests worldwide”.<sup>96</sup>

Immediately after his January 1981 inauguration, Reagan “launched a campaign to isolate Libya internationally, and promote the downfall of the regime headed by Colonel Muammar Qaddafi”.<sup>97</sup> The Americans imposed diplomatic isolation, reduced its oil revenues, froze its assets, and disrupted its trading relationships.<sup>98</sup> Where Carter had started to reduce American diplomatic relation with Libya, Reagan severed them completely. He also ordered 1500 American oil workers out of Libya and he placed a blanket embargo on Libyan oil.<sup>99</sup> While Reagan called Qaddafi “the mad Dog of the Middle East”,<sup>100</sup> as being “crazy like a fox”,<sup>101</sup> and as deserving “to be treated as a pariah in the world community”,<sup>102</sup> members of his Administration also ratcheted up the rhetoric. Secretary of State Alexander Haig claimed that “Qaddafi was a cancer that had to be removed”,<sup>103</sup> and Vice-President George Bush called Qaddafi “an egomaniac who would trigger World War III to make headlines”.<sup>104</sup>

Whereas, it is clear that,

Qaddafi threw his backing behind national liberation movements in all parts of the world, while United States foreign policy has tended to support the international status quo,

setting both parties on a collision course, each one blaming the other for state terrorism,<sup>105</sup>

the American interpretation received much greater world attention. Even though it is apparent that states such as Iran and Syria were more important sponsors of terrorism than was Libya, “the Reagan administration focused on Libya because it was considered the softer target”.<sup>106</sup> In addition, “when a nation like Libya challenges Washington’s resolve, the likelihood of deterrence failure elsewhere increases”.<sup>107</sup> The subsequent American disinformation campaign portrayed: Qaddafi as a lunatic; Libya as a Soviet proxy; Qaddafi as the major source of international terrorism; and, the Libyan regime as being extremely repressive in nature.<sup>108</sup> Even with these damning declarations, the Europeans were not in full agreement with the American assessment of Qaddafi’s Libya.<sup>109</sup> Instead, they feared that such covert attacks on the credibility of the regime would only “revitalize flagging Libyan patriotism”,<sup>110</sup> push Qaddafi into even closer ties with the Soviet Union, and enhance Qaddafi’s leadership position within the Arab World.

Consequently, the Reagan Administration, which was already becoming “haunted with the spectre of terrorism becoming the sort of deadly domestic political liability that it had been for Jimmy Carter in the Iranian hostage crisis”,<sup>111</sup> sought reasons to take more forceful actions against Qaddafi. However, following the 1981 Reagan Administration’s pressure of Libya, western European diplomats in Tripoli unanimously “blame(d) American tactics for the moves Qaddafi made during the year to move closer to the Soviet Union”.<sup>112</sup> However, Qaddafi’s feeling of betrayal and duplicity as a result of the 1978 Camp David Peace Accords between Israel and Egypt, had likely already hastened his increased friendliness towards the Soviet Union.<sup>113</sup>

While Reagan disliked Qaddafi, the feeling was mutual. Qaddafi was aware of Reagan from his movies and he considered Reagan to be a buffoon. One of his favourite pastimes during this period was to watch the old Reagan movies and to ensure that the average Libyan also had the opportunity to view how weak and ridiculous Reagan looked in them. Qaddafi marvelled that a country as democratic and powerful as the United States could select such an individual to lead it. In 1986, Qaddafi commented that, “Reagan has to read history. He reads cheap Hollywood scenarios and that is the problem with the world today – namely, a second rate actor becomes the president of the biggest power”.<sup>114</sup> Thus, President Reagan became, “the Number One man on Qaddafi’s most-wanted list”.<sup>115</sup> He subsequently joined the Arab litany against the United States, “the Ayatollah Khomeini branding America ‘the Great Satan’, Qaddafi calling it ‘the Devil’, and the Syrian Prime Minister declared it ‘the essence of evil’”.<sup>116</sup> In effect, “the Bedouin of the African desert and the American cowboy faced each other at high noon.”<sup>117</sup>

Therefore, while the Americans wanted to lure Libya into a confrontation, “to deter Libya from the pursuit of what Washington saw as subversive and destabilizing activities,”<sup>118</sup> Qaddafi was willing to take the bait. During the early days of the Iranian American hostage situation, he allowed Libyan students to storm the American embassy in Tripoli. Also, although he weakly denied the allegations, the Americans claimed that Qaddafi had sent assassination teams to Egypt, France, Italy and Sudan to kill American ambassadors and consular officials, including an Amal terrorist team to Washington to kill President Reagan.<sup>119</sup> He also allowed Libyan People’s Bureaus (another name for Libyan Embassies) in many world capitals to become active suppliers of weapons and explosives to Libyan and Libyan-supported agents. In fact, in one tragic incident in London on April 17, 1984, during an anti-Qaddafi rally and stand-off at that city’s

Libyan People's Bureau, a British policewoman, Yvonne Fletcher, was killed by a shot fired from inside the building. During the ensuing diplomatic crisis, Qaddafi arrested six Britons in Libya and held them as 'insurance' hostages.<sup>120</sup>

The first openly hostile incident in the ongoing asymmetric struggle between the two countries occurred on August 19, 1981, when two Libyan SU-22 fighters tried to exert Libyan territorial authority by intercepting two American F-14 Tomcat fighters over the Gulf of Sidra, thirty miles off of the Libyan coast. Both Libyan planes were shot down.<sup>121</sup> Soon thereafter, Qaddafi negotiated a new Ethiopia-Yemeni-Libyan military pact to counter the growing stability and impending threat from the 'David Alliance' of the United States, Israel, Sudan and Egypt.<sup>122</sup> In addition, Qaddafi also felt threatened by the growing Tunisian hostility towards Libya manifested by American access to both Tunisian port and airfield facilities.<sup>123</sup>

In 1985, tensions were further heightened when a series of terrorist attacks on Western targets were blamed on Libyan complicity. For example, the Copenhagen office of the Northwest Orient Airlines was bombed. Also, a bombing occurred at the café next to the American Embassy in Rome. Then, following the October 1985 Achille Lauro Italian cruise ship hijacking in the Egyptian territorial waters of Mediterranean, which resulted in the death of one of the American hostages, Leon Klinghoffer, the perpetrators received a hero's welcome in Tripoli. Following this incident, Qaddafi cancelled his plans to attend the Fortieth Anniversary celebrations for the United Nations in New York, because "United Nations headquarters was located in a country that was an enemy of humanity and a leader of international terrorism".<sup>124</sup> The terrorist spree continued in November, when the Abu Nidal commandos, operating out of Libya, seized an EgyptAir passenger jet. During the ensuing botched rescue attempt, 59 people were killed. Finally, on December 27, the Abu Nidal commandos conducted coordinated attacks in the Israeli El Al counters in the Rome and Vienna airports, resulting in 25 deaths, including five Americans.<sup>125</sup>

This simmering low-intensity conflict between Libya and the United States came to a head in early 1986. Early in that year, Qaddafi claimed that the 200-mile economic zone, which was allowed under international law for each coastal country, meant that the 275-mile span across the Gulf of Sidra made it all Libyan territorial waters.<sup>126</sup> The Americans saw this claim as a challenge to their right of free passage on the high seas and claimed that only the twelve-mile territorial limit was applicable. This was the Libyan provocation that the Americans had been waiting for. On March 24, 1986, during a 'freedom of seas' exercise called, Operation Prairie Fire, the American Sixth Fleet, crossed Qaddafi's mythical 'Line of Death',<sup>127</sup> and entered into the Gulf of Sidra.<sup>128</sup> In the resulting skirmish, the Libyans fired six missiles at American jet fighters. They all missed their marks, but two Libyan fighter were shot down and three Libyan patrol boats were sunk.<sup>129</sup> The Americans subsequently warned the Libyans that, "the next act of terrorism would bring the hammer down".<sup>130</sup> In addition, it is important to note that neither the Soviets nor any other Arab country backed Libya during this dispute. In fact, following the incident, anti-American demonstrations occurred only in Libya and Syria.<sup>131</sup> Also, during an official meeting held around this time, when the Soviet Foreign Minister was pressed about the Soviet intentions to support Libya, he assured the American Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, that Libya was not a Soviet client state. This statement was follow-up by one from the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoliy Dobrynin during a subsequent discussion concerning Qaddafi's international conduct and continuing aid to terrorist in which, "Dobrynin made it clear that Libya was an American problem."<sup>132</sup> Thereby, freeing the Americans of any constraints on any subsequent actions that they might decide to take against Libya.

Unfortunately for both parties, the terrorism continued. On April 2, an explosion aboard TWA Flight 840, flying between Rome and Athens, killed one Columbian-American and three Greek-Americans.<sup>133</sup> Then, a few days later, at 1:49 am, on Saturday April 5, a bomb exploded at a nightclub in Berlin frequented by Americans, the La Belle Discotheque, killing two American servicemen, James Gain and Kenneth Ford and Ford's Turkish girlfriend, Nermin Hanay. The blast also injured 229 people, of which 79 were Americans.<sup>134</sup>

For the Reagan Administration, this attack was the last straw. They argued that Qaddafi had apparently called their bluff and they had to react. Consequently, on April 15, 1986, the Americans launched Operation Eldorado Canyon. This attack consisted of a twenty-four U.S. F-111 plane attack on the Libyan command and control centers in Tripoli and Benghazi. The attack resulted in the deaths of thirty Libyans.<sup>135</sup> However, because it was not aimed at the actual terrorist camps, the claim had been made that the air raid was partially targeted at Qaddafi himself.<sup>136</sup> Indeed, during the bombing, Qaddafi's private, three-storey living quarters in a ten-acre military compound, the Bab el-Azziziya Barrack, located on the southern outskirts of Tripoli, was hit.<sup>137</sup> His wife Sophia and three of his children suffered pressure shock injuries from the explosion of the 2000-pound bombs, and his sixteen-month old adopted daughter died from resulting brain damage.<sup>138</sup> Some pro-American analysts argue that the fact that, "the mission failed to assassinate Qaddafi was its only operational shortcoming"<sup>139</sup>. In retaliation, that same day, Libya launched two of its land-based SS-1 Scud B missiles towards the Italian island of Lampedusa in an attempt to hit an American long-range navigation station located on that island. However, the missiles missed their mark, falling into the Mediterranean waters two miles off of the shoreline.<sup>140</sup>

This American attack played to mixed world reaction, which was contrary to the American objectives. In many quarters, Qaddafi received a sympathetic ear. In Libya itself, Qaddafi's popularity soared. The attack by the Americans silenced the Libyan elite, the educators, academics, technicians, managers and planners, whose main criticism of Qaddafi, up until the attack, "had been that he has been too supportive of American and foreign interests in the country".<sup>141</sup> For their part, the Americans justified their action by arguing that, "it was time to strike a blow against terrorism in general and to raise the cost of it",<sup>142</sup> for anyone involved. While they admitted that Qaddafi was obviously not the source of the whole terrorism spectrum, the Administration "felt that punishing him could help discourage terrorism by others, including his allies, Syria and Iran".<sup>143</sup> In the process, they had hoped to either cause Qaddafi's downfall in a coup or at least to force him to desist from committing or supporting terrorist activities, by "making it too painful for him to continue".<sup>144</sup> Therefore,

by bombing Libya he [Reagan] made it very clear that if Qaddafi or other practitioners of international terrorism were caught sponsoring terrorism or supporting their deadly craft, they would be held accountable for their actions and the United States would defend itself.<sup>145</sup>

To a large extent, in the aftermath of this raid and despite the support that he received from internal and external sources, Qaddafi's activities were indeed tempered.

Changes in the pattern of state-sponsored terrorism in the period following the American raid on Libya indicate that the course of terrorism by states in question is not a matter of frantic frenzy, but rather a calculated tool of foreign policy ... Although many of the

individuals recruited for missions are zealots, and some are indeed psychological and social deviates, the states that use their services to promote ideological and strategic objectives do so in a calculated manner subject to cost-benefit analysis.<sup>146</sup>

Therefore, this raid can be considered as the turning point in his radical behaviour, as well as in the behaviour of other leaders who had been traditionally accused of sponsoring terrorist activities. In addition to the psychological effects of this raid, there was evidence of a change in the international bi-polar political situation. Even though they had been forewarned of the raid, the Soviets did not alert Qaddafi that it was coming. Then, following a disastrous autumn meeting between Gorbachev and Qaddafi, it became clear to Qaddafi that there was “a general feeling that the ‘correlation of forces’ in the world had shifted back in the United State’s favor (sic)”.<sup>147</sup> From the American’s perspective, even though they failed in their short-term attempt to eliminate Qaddafi and his regime<sup>148</sup>, their military actions did have the long-term effect of toning down his rhetoric and dampening his open state support and sponsorship of terrorists.<sup>149</sup>

The only other significant incident involving Libya since this raid has been the December 21, 1988 downing of the Pan Am jumbo jet over Lockerbie, Scotland. All 259 passengers and crew on board and eleven victims on the ground died in this tragedy.<sup>150</sup> Following an extensive investigation, two Libyan agents, Abel Basset Ail Al-Maghrabi (the former Director of Security for the Libyan Airlines and later the head of the Center for Strategic Studies in Tripoli) and Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah (the Director of the Libyan airlines office in Malta), were linked to the incident.<sup>151</sup> The United Nations demanded their extradition from Libya to stand trial for this crime in the International Criminal Court (ICC).<sup>152</sup> Because, Qaddafi did not immediately comply with this request, effective April 15, 1992, “the U.N. imposed a travel ban and an embargo against oil-industry spare parts and technology”.<sup>153</sup> Both actions, the imposition of sanctions and the demand for the turning over of the two Libyan suspects to the ICC for prosecution, which were of questionable legality under international law<sup>154</sup>, virtually isolated Libya from the rest of the world and, without the oil dollars, created economic hardships in Libya. Simultaneously with the successful UN embargo, world oil prices also fell, further compounding Qaddafi’s financial difficulties. During the 1980s, Libyan annual oil revenues rose from \$15 billion to \$25 billion; however, in the early 1990s, following the imposition of the UN embargo, they fell to \$7 billion.<sup>155</sup> Still,

despite the deprivations imposed by the 90’s sanctions, Libya still has one of the highest per-capita incomes in Africa and a far more equitable distribution of that income than most nations, including the United States.<sup>156</sup>

Regardless, Qaddafi’s asymmetric David and Goliath game with the United States was no longer possible and the extreme radicalism of this rogue Libyan regime fell silent.<sup>157</sup>

Fortunately, Qaddafi was no longer the young firebrand, but was wiser and more sedate. He now “yearned to be seen as a kind of elder statesman in the region, and that cannot happen if you’ve been essentially quarantined”.<sup>158</sup> Consequently, on April 5, 1999, after years of suffering under the restrictions of both the American and UN the embargoes and, following a compromise UN plan to have the two suspects tried in The Hague under Scottish law, Qaddafi eventually agreed to hand over the two suspects. As a result of their subsequent 84-day trial, which was conducted in a specially built courthouse at a Dutch military establishment, Camp Zeist, Al-

Maghrahi was convicted of conspiracy in the Lockerbie incident, while Fhimah was found not guilty and was freed.<sup>159</sup>

Following the relinquishing of the suspects, the UN removed its embargo on Libya and most nations of Europe resumed full business and diplomatic relations with that country. However, the United States was still not swayed and maintained its own embargo resulting from the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act,<sup>160</sup> until September 2004, when President Bush finally rescinded, but did not cancel, the economic sanctions against Libya. This came as a result of Libya's payment of \$10 million to the family of each victim of the Lockerbie bombing and \$170 million to the families of the victims of the UTA French airliner bombing.<sup>161</sup> Still, Libya continues to stress that these payments were "not acknowledging responsibility for the attack, but was making a humanitarian gesture."<sup>162</sup> However, it is clear that, through this gesture, Qaddafi was trying to save his country and its people from slipping further into economic turmoil.

In addition to the embargo, Qaddafi had also become disillusioned with his Arab and other international colleagues. After the lack of international support that he failed to receive in response to the 1986 American bombing raid, Qaddafi realized that, "all modern Arab rulers paid lip service to Arab unity, but no Arab regime favored (sic) it".<sup>163</sup> Qaddafi was frustrated by their talk of unity, while they simultaneously did everything possible to thwart its achievement. If it occurred, they would likely lose their grip on power and also, the more Qaddafi resorted to violence, the less inclined they were to support his leadership of the movement. Consequently, Qaddafi proclaimed that, "if this is your Arabism, then go it alone. I will be seeking ties with the United States and even Israel, because dealing with America and Israel is better than dealing with all Arab states combined".<sup>164</sup> Consequently, for a short time after, he turned his attention to achieving African unity.

Qaddafi also became disillusioned with the weak and rhetorical nature of the Non-Aligned movement. At a subsequent meeting in Harare, Qaddafi declared, "I want to say good-bye, farewell to this funny movement, to this fallacy, farewell to this utter falsehood".<sup>165</sup> Next, Qaddafi could not garner support from OPEC for an oil embargo against the United States and Britain and he lost, by a substantial margin, a UN vote condemning the United State's attack on Libya as a violation of international law.<sup>166</sup> Finally, Qaddafi did not even receive the support of the Organization of African Unity, many of whose members he had openly and actively supported both financially and militarily.<sup>167</sup> Reality had finally hit home and the idealistic Qaddafi was disillusioned, frustrated and tired. Consequently, his conversion to pragmatism in the conduct of Libya's international relations and activities now supplanted his earlier ideological fanaticism. Internationally and economically, Qaddafi had fallen as far as he could go.

As a result of this change of heart and perspective, in the past six years, Qaddafi has made a concerted effort to rehabilitate his international reputation and to end Libya's isolation. Almost twenty years of various for of sanctions and international ostracism had taken their toll on Muammar Qaddafi, and, more importantly, on the Libyan peoples. Therefore, Qaddafi was determined play the international relations game within acceptable guidelines and, hopefully, by so doing, to rescue his country from the international and economic wilderness.

In July 1999, his government acknowledged its responsibility for the 1984 death of the British policewoman and compensated her family. Shortly thereafter, Great Britain and Libya resumed diplomatic relations. Also in 1999, the thirtieth anniversary of the Libyan revolution, for the first time since 1977, Qaddafi not only attended but hosted the forty-three OAU leaders, proposing a 'United States of Africa' modelled on the European Union concept, which he

praised. Then, during a December 1999 visit to Tripoli by the Italian Prime Minister, Massimo D'Alema, the first by a Western political leader since the Lockerie bombing, Qaddafi strongly denounced terrorism and the practitioners of terrorist violence. Finally, at the April 2000 summit of African and Arab leaders in Cairo, Qaddafi openly invited the leader of the Israeli Labor Party to visit Tripoli.<sup>168</sup> In fact, Qaddafi's anti-Israeli viewpoint has undergone such a significant change that he is now even suggesting that the Palestinians and Israelis could join forces to create one country. It could be called 'Israetina' and, since Qaddafi plans to withdraw his country from the organization, it could take Libya's place within the Arab League of Nations.<sup>169</sup>

Following the 9/11 attacks in the United States, Qaddafi quickly condemned them as being "horrifying and destructive,"<sup>170</sup> and "offered to share intelligence information on Al Qaeda's activities with U.S. authorities".<sup>171</sup> Furthermore, even though he had once been the target of American retribution for his apparent terrorist actions, Qaddafi, "stated that the United States had the right to retaliate against those groups or individuals who carried out the attack."<sup>172</sup> Qaddafi was also the first to pursue an international criminal complaint against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda for an alleged assassination attempt against him.<sup>173</sup> He also personally intervened with the Islamic rebels in the Philippines securing the release Western hostages and with the Taliban regime to release Christian aid workers held after the fall of Kabul in late 2001.<sup>174</sup> In fact, by October, 2002, the British Foreign Office was doing an about-face and suggesting that Qaddafi was "a potential ally in the war on terrorism."<sup>175</sup>

In March 2003, while the American Alliance was using military force to end the perceived Iraqi threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), Qaddafi secretly announced to the Americans and British governments that Libya would both disclose and end its own WMD programme.<sup>176</sup> He went public with this announcement on December 19, 2003, calling "on the countries of the Middle East and Africa to make those regions a zone free of weapons of mass destructions."<sup>177</sup> Subsequently, on January 14, 2004, Libya ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and approved the establishment of a treaty-monitoring station on its territory.<sup>178</sup> Even with these overtures, the Americans have still only suspended and not eliminated their economic sanctions against Libya, which have been in place officially since 1986, but unofficially since 1981.<sup>179</sup>

Interestingly, while Qaddafi has a clear distaste for Islamic fundamentalism, his whole political life evolved around his unique personalized brand of Islam. His pan-Arab socialism was primarily an ideological concept which, despite his best efforts, he could not translate into practical terms. Qaddafi is also a populist who sincerely desired to free the World's oppressed from all forms of imperialist exploitation. He tried to improve the living conditions of all people and, consequently, he was less cautious and less focused in his approach to his international activities. He was basically honest, open and straightforward in his support for terrorist, or as he viewed them, guerrilla and freedom fighters. He also unselfishly used the rich natural resources of his country to provide that support both internally for the betterment his people and internationally for the freedom of the oppressed. Despite American claims to the contrary, Qaddafi was also always leery of the Soviets and kept an arms-length arrangement with them as well, using this relationship only as a means to obtain weapons. Finally, Qaddafi possesses an aura that went, "beyond charisma into the realm of the mystical".<sup>180</sup> He had clearly gained the respect of the Libyan people. As one international observer explained:

I never met a Libyan who thought he was perfect – they're quite aware of some of the stupid things he's gotten them involved in – but I think most have a deep affection for

him for the way he has stood up to the West. You can't forget that Libya before was a totally forgotten, beaten-down nation, and he changed that.<sup>181</sup>

Given his political longevity, Muammar Qaddafi is now the elder statesman of both the African and Arab worlds. Like their other nemesis in Cuba, Fidel Castro, the Americans have come to realize that he is not going to go away. In addition, with the evolving world energy situation, the Americans also realize that they and their European allies require Libyan oil, as well Qaddafi's knowledge and influence in their 'War on Terror'.

Qaddafi, when he came to power as brash young individual, possessed the ideals of Arab nationalism and freedom from oppression. In addition, he was willing to openly and consistently put his support, both financially and rhetorically, for these ideals into practice. However, as he matured, Qaddafi realized that he had two obstacles to overcome if he wanted to achieve his objectives. He was "caught between a great vision of the world engulfed in his "third international theory" (as compared to capitalism and communism) and his constant feeling of having to serve the regular man on the street."<sup>182</sup> He was also caught between conducting international relations based on acceptable, well-established norms, and the need to disregard such norms in order to succeed in achieving his vision. Qaddafi is also an intelligent man, but, at the age of twenty-nine, he was thrust into power as a novice at even the very basic qualities and practices needed to run a national government. Therefore, it can be said that, internally within Libya and internationally, what he lacked in practice, he more than made up for in theory. Given the political system that he has established in Libya, he is not the Libyan president or even the national ruler, but considers himself to be simply a leader and advisor to his people and to those throughout the world who are willing to listen to him and follow his guidance. Since his conversion from idealism to pragmatism, Qaddafi diplomatic cunning and skill have been amply displayed by the way that he has so masterfully manipulated the world leaders and international institutions to change from adversaries to allies supporting Libya's rehabilitation process.

With the sanctions against Libya either cancelled or suspended, with the Libyan economy starting to rebound and flourish, with Libya and its leader now recognized as a member in good standing within the international community, with Libya independence secure and Qaddafi's leadership position also secure both within Libya and abroad, Qaddafi has been resurrected! He is strong, more secure, more internationally acceptable, and more of a statesman than he has ever been before. It will be interesting to see where he is able to take Libya from here.

## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> Raphael Perl and Resselaer Lee, "Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy", Issue Brief for Congress, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, January 8, 2003), p. 2. Also, see Louise Richardson's 1998 article, "Global Rebels: Terrorist Organizations as Trans-National Actors" in Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer, *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*, (Guilford Conn.: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2003), p. 68, and Glenn E. Schweitzer, *Superterrorism: Assassins, Mobsters, and Weapons of Mass Destruction*, (New York: Plenum Trade, 1998), p. 41.

<sup>2</sup> Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, United States Department of States, April 2004, from: <http://www.mipt.org/pdf/2003PoGT.pdf>, accessed on 19 Aug 2005, p. ix.

<sup>3</sup> Country Report on Terrorism 2004, United States Department of State, April 2005, from: [http://www.mipt.org/pdf/Country-Reports-Terrorism\\_2004.pdf](http://www.mipt.org/pdf/Country-Reports-Terrorism_2004.pdf), accessed on 19 August 2005, p. 89. In this latest annual report, the State Department has changed the name, the format and the method of evaluation moving to a more detailed, country-specific, descriptive assessment of each country with any ties that the reports' analysts believe have any connection to terrorism; thus, the change new name for the annual report.

<sup>4</sup> Similarly, the translation of the Libyan leader's name appears in several spellings such as Gaddafi, Qadaffi, Qadhafi, or Qadhafi. However, for purposes of this essay, I have again chosen to employ the most common Americanized spelling, Qaddafi, unless the name appears in a quotation, in which case the spelling will appear as used by the quotation's author.

<sup>5</sup> Mansour O. El-Kikhia, *Libya's Qaddafi: The Politics of Contradiction*, (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1997), p. 9. El-Kikhia is an exiled Libyan who fled the intellectual repression of the Qaddafi regime and, consequently, holds very strong views against Qaddafi. He is now a professor at the University of Texas.

<sup>6</sup> Janice Monti-Belkaoui and Ahmed Riahi-Belkaoui, *Qaddafi: The Man and his Policies*, (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1996), p. vi. Also see, Ronald Bruce St. John, *Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), p. 14.

<sup>7</sup> *Military Powers: The Arab League of States - Libya*. Paris: Les Press de Provence, December 1986, p. 55.

<sup>8</sup> Brian L. Davis, *Quaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya*, (New York: Praeger, 1990), p.1.

<sup>9</sup> St John, *Libya and the United States*, p. 52. Of these three wilayas (or provinvcas), Tripolitania contained the principle urban centres, Cyrenaica ended up having most of the oil wealth, and the Fezzan was primarily desert. These features are described in more detail by Claudia Wright in her article, "Libya and the West: Headlong into Confrontation", *International Affairs*, Vol. 58, Issue 1, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Winter 1981-82), p. 20. Modern Libya was really the creation of the Italian empire builders who conquered these three desert provinces in 1911 and moulded them into a single colony that served as the Italian bridgehead into North Africa until it lost control as a result of its defeat during the Second World War. See: Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945*, (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), pg. 207.

<sup>10</sup> St. John, *Libya and the United States*, p. 2.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54. On December 10, 1949, Libya was placed under UN trusteeship and the UN Assistant Secretary-General, Adrian Pelt, was appointed a head a UN commission to develop the governmental structure and an implementation timetable for an independent Libya. Also detailed by El-Kikhia in *Politics of Contradiction*, p. 28, and Geoff Simons, *Libya and the West: From Independence to Lockerbie*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2003), pp xi-xii. In fact, in addition to providing a detailed description of the UN Resolution processes with respect to Libya, Simons argues that, "it was in part the narrowness of the United Nations vision, understandable in the dislocated circumstances of the post-war world, that led directly to the Authoritarian monarchy, the military coup d'état, and the Qadhafi regime.", p. 43.

<sup>12</sup> Emir Idris led the Sanussi brotherhood, a tightly knit clan of religious activists committed to the purification of Islam. Little, *American Orientalism*, p. 207.

<sup>13</sup> Henry M. Christman, Editor, *Qaddafi's Green Book: An Unauthorized Edition*, (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1988), p. 9.

<sup>14</sup> Scott Anderson, "The Makeover", *New York Times Magazine*, (New York: New York Times, Section 6, January 19, 2003), p. 31.

<sup>15</sup> El-Kikhia, *Politics of Contradiction*, p. 22.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

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<sup>17</sup> Although, in *Politics of Contradiction*, p. 66, El-Kikhia indicated that the oil was discovered in 1955, St. John states that the major oil finds were not confirmed until 1959, which led to a decade of change and western exploitation, in *St. John, Libya and the United States*, p. 76, and Little claims that the multinational oil companies discovered oil 200 miles south of Tripoli in late 1958. Little, *American Orientalism*, p. 209.

<sup>18</sup> El-Kikhia, *Politics of Contradiction*, p. 66.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> Belkaoui, *Qaddafi: The Man and his Politics*, p. 8.

<sup>21</sup> *St. John, Libya and the United States*, p. 88. In fact, “the Arab nationalism espoused by Egypt’s Gamal Abdul Nasser threatened conservative monarchs like Idris and galvanized millions of young Arabs who shared Nasser’s vision of Arab unity, nonalignment, and social justice.” Joseph T. Stanik, *El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Undeclared War with Qaddafi*, (Annapolis Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2003), p. 11.

<sup>22</sup> This description of Qaddafi was given by an American junior diplomat working in Libya in 1969, David Mack. He had numerous personal contacts with Qaddafi both before and after the revolution and is now working for the American Middle East Institute. See Anderson, *The Makeover*, p. 31.

<sup>23</sup> Christman, *The Green Book*, p. 10, Little, *American Orientalism*, p. 121, and Geoff Simons, *Libya and the West*, p. 43, which contains a quotation that the British proudly claimed that Qaddafi’s “military training in Britain evidently stood him in good stead. The September coup was widely regarded as an efficient operation.”

<sup>24</sup> Some analysts claim that the American actively assisted Qaddafi’s coup. See: Mark Zepezauer, *Boomerang! How Our Covert Wars have Created Enemies Across the Middle East and Brought Terror to American*, (Monroe, MA: Common Courage Press, 2003), p. 41. Others have observed that the coup was supported by the Soviets who had a military presence in the area when it occurred.

<sup>25</sup> Stanik, *El Dorado Canyon*, p. 11 and 13.

<sup>26</sup> El-Kikhia, *Politics of Contradiction*, p. 27.

<sup>27</sup> El-Kikhia, *Politics of Contradiction*, p. 42, and Zepezauer, *Boomerang*, p. 41.

<sup>28</sup> *St. John, Libya and the United States*, p. 105. Within a few years, eight additional foreign-owned oil companies were nationalized by the Qaddafi government: Standard Oil of New Jersey, Royal Dutch-Shell, Texaco, Mobil, Chevron, Gulf, British Petroleum, and La Compagnie France des Petroles. From Belkaoui, *Qaddafi: The Man and his Politics*, p. 6.

<sup>29</sup> When the USA did not back the oil companies in their negotiating position, the threat of American intervention disappeared and the OPEC countries followed Libya’s lead in obtaining higher oil royalties from the international oil companies. Zepezauer, *Boomerang*, p. 42.

<sup>30</sup> Wright, *Headlong into Confrontation*, p. 40.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4 and p. 95. This was a significant sacrifice for the Americans who had spent \$100 million to upgrade this sprawling old Libya World War II Mellaha airfield on the outskirts of Tripoli. Once revitalized, the Americans used Wheelus airfield as a forward staging base for dozens of long-range bombers and a strategic fighter airfield and training centre for their own and their NATO ally’s Mediterranean air patrols. They paid the Libyans an annual rent of only \$1 million. Also see, Anderson, *The Makeover*, p. 31, and Little, *American Orientalism*, p. 208. This air base was so nice that one U.S. Ambassador to Libya described Wheelus AFB as being “a little America ... on the sparkling shores of the Mediterranean,” in H.S. Villiard, *Libya: The New Kingdom of Africa*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 139.

<sup>32</sup> As one American official was quoted as stating, “the return to our balance of payments and the security of U.S. investments in oil are our primary interests.” Zepezauer, *Boomerang*, p. 41.

<sup>33</sup> Little, *American Orientalism*, p. 213.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> Christman, *Qaddafi’s Green Book*, p. 17, and Davis, *Qaddafi, Terrorism and the Origins of the Attack*, p. 3.

<sup>36</sup> Davis, *Qaddafi, Terrorism and the Origins of the U.S. Attack*, p. 3.

<sup>37</sup> Stanik, *El Dorado Canyon*, p. 18.

<sup>38</sup> John K. Cooley, *Libyan Sandstorm: The Complete Account of Qaddafi’s Revolution*, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982), p. 129. This book remains one of the best accounts of Qaddafi’s very efficient military coup.

<sup>39</sup> Christman, *Qaddafi’s Green Book*, p. 32.

<sup>40</sup> Stanik, *El Dorado Canyon*, p. 18.

<sup>41</sup> Little, *American Orientalism*, p. 213.

<sup>42</sup> Using Nasser’s theories and based on the format and philosophy of Mao Zedong’s ‘Little Red Book’, Qaddafi’s *Green Book* (green being the universally recognized colour of the Arab World) was published in the three following volumes: his theories on government (1975); his theories on economics (1977); and, his views on social organization

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(1978). Davis, Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the Attack, p. 4. Consequently, to summarize, "the Green Book is a manifesto of political, economic and social concept formulated by Qaddafi into a socialistic system of direct participatory democracy", from Christman, Qaddafi's Green Book, p. 7. Whereas, Qaddafi called the Green Book "the gospel of the new era, the era of the masses", the CIA described it as being "a blueprint for reshaping human society." Stanik, El Dorado Canyon, p. 16. Qaddafi has also written another book, *Escape From Hell*, in which he explains his leadership style and his international philosophy, based on an often accurate analysis of the international scene. See: Khalil I. Matar and Robert W. Thabit, *Lockerbie and Libya: A Study in International Relations*, (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Co., 2004), p. 160.

<sup>43</sup> Stanik, El Dorado Canyon, p. 15.

<sup>44</sup> Christman, Qaddafi's Green Book, p. 12.

<sup>45</sup> The new Libyan government was devoid of classes, elites, political parties, and all other forms of 'fake representation'. It was reorganized on three different levels: zones, municipalities (46), and the Nation. It has a national administrative governing triad consisting of: the General People's Congress; the General Popular Committee; and, the General Secretariat of the Congress, which is a body chaired by Qaddafi. See Kikhia, *The Politics of Contradiction*, pp.52-53.

<sup>46</sup> Muammar Qadhafi, *The Green Book*, Tripoli: Public Establishment for Publishing, Advertising and Distribution, 1977, p. 11.

<sup>47</sup> Christman, Qaddafi's Green Book, p. 17.

<sup>48</sup> Little, *American Orientalism*, p. 214.

<sup>49</sup> Christman, Qaddafi's Green Book, p. 16.

<sup>50</sup> El-Kikhia, *The Politics of Contradiction*, p. 57.

<sup>51</sup> Daniel Pipes, *In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power*, (New York: Basic Books, 1983), pp. 221 and 298.

<sup>52</sup> Simons, *Libya and the West*, p. 102.

<sup>53</sup> Anderson, *The Makeover*, p. 31.

<sup>54</sup> Belkaoui, *Qaddafi: The Man and his Politics*, p. 19.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> Stanik, *El Dorado Canyon*, p. 18.

<sup>57</sup> Anderson, *The Makeover*, p. 31.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> Belkaoui, *Qaddafi: The Man and his Politics*, p. 19.

<sup>60</sup> Stanik, *El Dorado Canyon*, p. 19.

<sup>61</sup> Belkaoui, *Qaddafi: The Man and His Politics*, p. 66.

<sup>62</sup> Nasser died suddenly from a heart attack on September 28, 1970. He espoused a policy of Non-Alignment, which led to the creation of the Organization of Non-Alignment States. Qaddafi fully supported the premise of this loosely knit international organization. See: *Ibid.*, p. 65.

<sup>63</sup> Davis, *Qaddafi, Terrorism and the Origins of the US Attack*, p. 25. Qaddafi was also furious with both Asad and Sadat because his FAR partners had excluded him from the planning of their stunning, two-prong October 1973 attack on Israel. See: Stanik, *El Dorado Canyon*, p. 20.

<sup>64</sup> Belkaoui, *Qaddafi: The Man and His Politics*, p. 25 and 93. These attempts at political mergers proceeded chronologically: Egypt from 1969 to 1973; Syria in 1970 and again in 1980; Tunisia in 1974; Morocco in 1984; Sudan in both 1969 and again in 1985; Chad in 1981; and Algeria in 1987. Also see: Stanik, *El Dorado Canyon*, p. 19.

<sup>65</sup> El-Kikhia, *The Politics of Contradiction*, p. 118. In all, Qaddafi had actually held negotiations for political union with twenty Arab regimes.

<sup>66</sup> Davis, *Qaddafi, Terrorism and the Origins of the US Attack*, p. 9.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>68</sup> Boaz Ganor, "Libya and Terrorism", from *Survey of Arab Affairs – A Periodic Supplement to Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints*, (SAA: 28 29 Iyar 5752, June 1, 1992), <<http://www.ict.org.il/articles/article3.htm>>.

<sup>69</sup> Belkaoui, *Qaddafi: The Man and His Politics*, p. 20. Since this vision is one of a Christian missionary, it is unlikely that Qaddafi would be pleased with this particular analogy of his behaviour.

<sup>70</sup> For example, in Africa, Qaddafi provided support to guerrilla groups in Namibia, Rhodesia, South Africa, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. He also provided financial aid to groups in the Caribbean and Latin America such as: the Marxist New Jewel in Grenada; rebels in Argentina; Sandinistas in Nicaragua; M-19 guerrillas in Columbia; the Senero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the Tupac Amaru revolutionary movements in Peru; the Alfaro Vive Carajo terrorists in Equador; the Marist Guerrillas in Uruguay, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Haiti; leftist

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political groups in Panama, Antigua, Dominica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago; and finally, against the French in Guadeloupe, Martinique and French Guyana. (See: Davis, Qaddafi, *Terrorism and the Origins of the US Attack*, p. 17). Qaddafi also provided support to separatist movements in Europe including: aid and weapons shipments to the IRA and to the Provisional IRA, plus aid to Scottish and Welsh movements; Sicilian, Breton, Corsican, Turkish, Sardinian, and Canary Island guerrilla's; the anti-Turkish Armenian terrorists (ASALA) and the Kurdish rebels; the Red Army Brigades of Italy; the Red Army Faction in West Germany; the Direct Action in France; FP-25 in Portugal; the Japanese Red Army; and, the Spanish Basque ETA. In Asia, Qaddafi supported guerrilla actions by Muslims in Burma (the Kawthoolei Muslim Front), Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines, Afghanistan, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and India. (Again see: Davis, Qaddafi, *Terrorism and the Origins of the US Attack*, p. 12, and Belkaoui, Qaddafi: *The Man and His Politics*, p. 25) He even provided support to groups in the United States with some money to the El Rukin street gang from Chicago and \$300,000 to the Black Panther movement in the United States, but ceased further support to this latter group once he discovered that they still used alcohol and marijuana. (See: Davis, Qaddafi: *Terrorism and the Origins of the U.S. Attack*, p. 35) He even donated \$1 billion to the American Muslim radical, Louis Farrakhan, who visited Libya as part of his organization's World Friendship Tour.<sup>70</sup> (See: Tanter, *Rogue Regimes*, p. 161).

<sup>71</sup> Belkaoui, Qaddafi: *The Man and His Politics*, p. 20.

<sup>72</sup> Ganor, *Libya and Terrorism*, p. 2. By the early 1980s, the CIA reported that, "Libya runs twenty-five terrorist training camps." Stanik, *El Dorado Canyon*, p. 24.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>74</sup> Belkaoui, Qaddafi: *The Man and His Politics*, p. 29.

<sup>75</sup> Davis, *Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack*, p. 13. This particular description of terrorism support was provided by the British terrorist specialist, Brian Jenkins.

<sup>76</sup> Belkaoui, Qaddafi: *The Man and His Politics*, p. 25. Belkaoui uses this quotation from the British terrorism expert, Paul Wilkinson, which appeared in the *Times of London*, January 28, 1986. Also see: Stanik, *El Dorado Canyon*, pp. 23-24.

<sup>77</sup> Belkaoui, Qaddafi: *The Man and His Politics*, p. 11.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11 and 27.

<sup>79</sup> Anderson, *The Makeover*, p. 32.

<sup>80</sup> El-Kikhia, *The Politics of Contradiction*, p. 131.

<sup>81</sup> Davis, *Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack*, p. 34.

<sup>82</sup> Belkaoui, Qaddafi: *The Man and His Politics*, p. 20.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>87</sup> El-Kikhia, *The Politics of Contradiction*, p. 131.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 129.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 65.

<sup>90</sup> M. Sicker, *The Making of a Pariah State: The Adventurist Politics of Muammar Qaddafi*, (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1987), p. 102.

<sup>91</sup> Wright, *Headlong into Confrontation*, p. 23.

<sup>92</sup> Davis, Qaddafi, *Terrorism and the Origins of the U.S. Attack*, p. 16.

<sup>93</sup> El-Kikhia, *The Politics of Contradiction*, p. 138.

<sup>94</sup> St. John, *Libya and the United States*, p. 130.

<sup>95</sup> Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 4, (December 1987), p. 28. In her article, Crenshaw suggests that, "the popularity of the 'state sponsorship' theory may represent a desire to make terrorism seem rational. Terrorism is conveniently fitted into a familiar spectrum of international conflict and national security threats".

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 140.

<sup>97</sup> Wright, *Headlong into Confrontation*, p. 13.

<sup>98</sup> St. John, *Libya and the United States*, p. 132.

<sup>99</sup> Anderson, *The Makeover*, p. 32.

<sup>100</sup> Ottar Brox, "Symbolic Competition in the Mediterranean", in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 23, Issue 4, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Ltd., December 1986), p. 306. Also see Belkaoui, Qaddafi: *The Man and*

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his Politics, p. 38. Such fame is obviously fleeting and lasted only a decade, because Qaddafi lost these distinct qualities to Saddam Hussein in the early 1990s.

<sup>101</sup> Davis, *Terrorism, and the Origins of the US Attack*, p. 22. While the Reagan Administration denigrated Qaddafi, a 1985 CIA report stated that, “he appears to be less like a madman than a ‘judicious political calculator’ ”. *Ibid.*

<sup>102</sup> St. John, *Libya and the United States*, p. 121.

<sup>103</sup> Wright, *Headlong into Confrontation*, p. 16

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.* Also consider that Reagan’s one-sided view of terrorism ignores “the political context and the legality of American military presence in a foreign state in which violence occurs”. For example, what the Reagan Administration labeled as ‘state terrorism’ when applied to the acts of Arabs in Lebanon, “is used by others for United States government policy in Central America”, and elsewhere around the world. See: Claudia Wright, “The Prohibition Against the Training or Support of terrorist Organizations Act of 1984”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 13, Issue 4, (Summer 1984), pp. 135-136.

<sup>105</sup> Belkaoui, *Qaddafi: The Man and his Politics*, p. 36.

<sup>106</sup> St. John, *Libya and the United States*, p. 135.

<sup>107</sup> Tanter, *Rogue Regimes*, p. 130.

<sup>108</sup> St. John, *Libya and the United States*, p. 126.

<sup>109</sup> To some extent, there has been a trans-Atlantic schism in the threat perceptions between the US and Europe. “Washington perceives threats and is less concerned with the targeted states’ capacity to absorb penalties. Brussels perceives the same situations as only potential threats: they lie dormant unless exacerbated by Western sanctions or military intervention”. Tanter, *Rogue Regimes*, p. 29. “Washington perceives threats from miscreant states, while members of the European Union see ongoing relationships with potential for expansion.” *Ibid.*, p. 22.

<sup>110</sup> St. John, *Libya and the United States*, p. 126.

<sup>111</sup> Davis, *Terrorism, and the Origins of the US Attack*, p. 58.

<sup>112</sup> Wright, *Headlong into Confrontation*, p. 39.

<sup>113</sup> El-Kikhia, *The Politics of Contradiction*, p. 135.

<sup>114</sup> St. John, *Libya and the United States*, p. 121.

<sup>115</sup> Arnold Beichman, “Qaddafi’s Safe House for Terrorism”, in *National Review*, Vol. 34, Issue 3, February 19, 1982, p. 164.

<sup>116</sup> Davis, *Terrorism, and the Origins of the US Attack*, p. 18.

<sup>117</sup> Dennis Piskiewicz, *Terrorism’s War with America: A History*, (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2003), p.48.

<sup>118</sup> St. John, *Libya and the United States*, p. 122.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 123. Also see: Tanter, *Rogue Regimes*, p. 131.

<sup>120</sup> Davis, *Terrorism, and the Origins of the US Attack*, p. 66. Also see: Anderson, *The Makeover*, p. 32.

<sup>121</sup> Anderson, *Makeover*, p. 47. Also see Belkaoui, *Qaddafi: The Man and his Politics*, p. 37, and Tanter, *Rogue Regimes*, p. 131.

<sup>122</sup> Wright, *Headlong into Confrontation*, p. 29.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 32.

<sup>124</sup> St. John, *Libya and the United States*, p. 131.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.* All of these 1985 events are concisely highlighted on pp. 131-132.

<sup>126</sup> Eight years earlier, Libya had declared that the waters in the Gulf of Sidra south of thirty-two degrees, thirty minutes north latitude as Libyan territorial waters. The United States and other western powers refused to accept this claim and insisted on maintenance of the twelve-mile territorial limit. Reagan used this exercise to challenge Qaddafi in Libya’s own hemisphere. See: Dennis Piskiewicz, *Terrorism’s War with America: A History*, p. 47.

<sup>127</sup> Belkaoui, *Qaddafi: The Man and his Politics*, p. 39. Also see: Tanter, *Rogue Regimes*, p. 164.

<sup>128</sup> Ganor, *Libya and Terrorism*, p. 3. Also see: St. John, *Libya and the United States*, p. 136, for additional details about this incident.

<sup>129</sup> El-Kikhia, *The Politics of Contradiction*, p. 140. Also see: Austin Granville, “The Libya Raid and the Arab-Israeli Dispute”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 15, Issue 4, (Summer 1986), p. 100, which claims that one of the boats sunk was just a Libyan fishing boat. Whereas, Zepenuer claims that two Libya Coast Guard vessels that were sunk killing all 72 Libyan sailor onboard. Zepenuer, *Boomerang*, p. 47.

<sup>130</sup> Davis, *Terrorism, and the Origins of the US Attack*, p. 115.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 107.

<sup>132</sup> Alexander M. Haig, *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy*, (New York: Macmillan, 1984). P. 109.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 110.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 116. Also see Tanter, *Rogue Regimes*, p. 164.

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<sup>135</sup> Ganor, *Libya and Terrorism*, p. 3. Although, this book provides a very biased interpretation of the events, more accurate figures of 130 civilian casualties, including 37 killed, are given in R.A. Davidson, *Reagan VS Qaddafi: Response to International Terrorism?* (USA: Booklocker.com, 2002), p. 89.

<sup>136</sup> Donald M. Snow, *Distant Thunder: Patterns of Conflict in the Developing World*, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 157.

<sup>137</sup> Anderson, *The Makeover*, p. 30.

<sup>138</sup> Belkaoui, *Qaddafi: The Man and his Politics*, p. 40.

<sup>139</sup> Snow, *Distant Thunder*, p. 145, or as one of the military planners of the raids, Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver North, the National Security Council's resident anti-terrorist expert, stated, "killing him was never part of our plan ... but if Qaddafi happened to be in the vicinity of the Bab al Aziziya Barracks in downtown Tripoli when the bombs started to fall, nobody would shed any tears." Piskiewicz, *Terrorism's War with America*, p. 64. Thirty-two tons of bombs were dropped on Qaddafi's known headquarters. *Ibid.* p. 66.

<sup>140</sup> Davis, *Terrorism, and the Origins of the US Attack*, p. 143. There have been two sides in the resulting debate on the validity of this American attack on Libya. On the one side, it is claimed that the Americans arbitrarily selected Libya as a target because of its weakness and that, to justify its actions, Washington manufactured a "Libyan threat where there was none". On the other hand, there is the claim that Qaddafi brought this raid upon himself. He was inspired by the success of the Iranian-sponsored terrorism, especially in Lebanon, and, as a result, intensified his own terrorist activities, especially against the Americans. See *Ibid.*, p. ix. However, a third view is that the Americans were looking for any excuse to attack Libya and fabricated Libyan involvement when there were much stronger evidence connecting Syria and Iran as the state sponsors of these series of terrorist attacks. See: Zepenuer, *Boomerang*, p. 45.

<sup>141</sup> Wright, *Headlong into Confrontation*, p. 30.

<sup>142</sup> Davis, *Terrorism, and the Origins of the US Attack*, p. 121.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, 122.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>145</sup> Stanik, *El Dorado Canyon*, p. 239.

<sup>146</sup> Davis, *Terrorism, and the Origins of the US Attack*, p.180. This appraisal is from a quotation provided by a noted Israeli terrorism specialist, Ariel Merari.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 104.

<sup>148</sup> Many observers have suggested that, Operation El Dorado Canyon was really "an assassination attempt against Qadhafi." Jonathan Bearman, *Qadhafi's Libya*, London: Zed Books, 1986, p. 288. Also see: George Wilson, "Colonel was the target", *The Guardian*, London, 19 April 1986.

<sup>149</sup> Ronald St. John argues that this American Raid on Libya was actually counter-productive precisely because: it did not lead to his regime's overthrow; it garnered Qaddafi Arabic and African support; it confirmed American hostility towards the Libyan leader; and, eventually, it turned Qaddafi into a leader who wanted only to regain a place for Libya within the international community. See. Ronald St. John, *Gaddafi's World Design: Libyan Foreign Policy, 1967-1987*, (London: Saqi Books, 1987), p. 184.

<sup>150</sup> St. John, *Libya and the United States*, p. 148. While some analysts have argued that this was an act taken in retaliation for the 1986 Operation El Dorado attack, St. John suggests that it is more likely that the Pan Am bombing was in retaliation for the accidental July downing by the USS Vincennes of an Iranian Airbus over the Persian Gulf, which killed all 290 passengers. Similarly, Libya has been blamed for the bombing of Union de Transports Aeriens (UTA) Flight 772 over Niger on 11 September 1989, which was claimed to be in response to the rout of Libyan forces by French-backed Chadian troops in 1987. Stanik, *El Dorado Canyon*, p. 232.

<sup>151</sup> Ganor, *Libya and Terrorism*, p. 3. Also see El-Kikhia, *The Politics of Contradiction*, p. 142, and Schweitzer, *Superterrorism*, p. 225. Interestingly, following Abu Nidal's death in August, 1992, it was reported that he had admitted that, "reports which link the Lockerbie case to others are false. We are behind what happened." Zepenuer, *Boomerang*, p. 48.

<sup>152</sup> Following completion of the investigation on Wednesday, November 27, 1991, the American and British governments demanded that Libya turn over the two suspects. Both Mubarak of Egypt and Asad of Syria urged them not to take any further military action against Libya, but to proceed through the UN and International Court. This proposal was eventually accepted and the UN took charge of the extradition and prosecution of these suspects. Belkaoui, *Qaddafi: The Man and his Politics*, p. 44.

<sup>153</sup> El-Kikhia, *The Politics of Contradiction*, p. 1. Also see the superb Chapter 5 "Limiting Libya" in Meghan L. O'Sullivan, *Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism*, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), pp. 173-231.

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- <sup>154</sup> Geoffrey Grenville-Woods, writing in the Bulletin of the UN Association of Canada suggested that the sanctions placed by the UN against Libya in this instance set a questionable precedent. Because Libya did not have an extradition treaty with either Britain or the United States and because it was willing to try the suspects in Libya under its own national laws, in accordance with the Montreal Convention – the principle UN-linked instrument for combating terrorist attacks on civilian aircraft, it was under no obligation to send the two suspects abroad. For political reason, “Washington and London ignored international law whereas Libya was meticulous in its observance.” Simons, *Libya and the West*, pp. 142-143.
- <sup>155</sup> Beichman, *Qaddafi’s Safe House*, p. 164.
- <sup>156</sup> Anderson, *The Makeover*, p. 33. Also see Tanter, *Rogue Regimes*, p. 132.
- <sup>157</sup> Anderson, *The Makeover.*, p. 32.
- <sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>159</sup> St. John, *Libya and the United States*, p. 188.
- <sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 191.
- <sup>161</sup> Matar and Thabit, *Lockerbie and Libya*, p. 239.
- <sup>162</sup> U.S. State Department, 2004 Country Report on Terrorism, p. 89. Libyan officials also publicly called upon the United States to pay compensation for their own victims from the 1986 American air raids.
- <sup>163</sup> El-Kikhia, *The Politics of Contradiction*, pp. 119-120.
- <sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 143. This quotation is taken from an article written by Qaddafi that appeared in a Libyan government publication. It was entitled, “We Could Have Lived Like Princes”. This article also later appeared in *Middle East*, Vol. 25, (August 1992).
- <sup>165</sup> Davis, *Terrorism, and the Origins of the US Attack*, p. 151.
- <sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>167</sup> El-Kikhia, *The Politics of Contradiction*, pp. 116-117. Libya had lost entanglements in support of the regimes in Uganda (1977-78) and Chad (1980-87), resulting in the death of 5000 Libyan soldiers and the destruction of millions of dollars in military hardware. Qaddafi had also been the only global player who had been willing to invest in the poorest countries in the world in Africa. Following its economic collapse in 1992, Chad invited Qaddafi back in to help and the same Libyan economic support was given during similar situations in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Uganda. Again, in each instance, Qaddafi showed that he was willing to put his money to good use.
- <sup>168</sup> Stanik, *El Dorado Canyon*, pp. 236-237.
- <sup>169</sup> Anderson, *The Makeover*, p. 44.
- <sup>170</sup> Zepenuer, *Boomerang*, p. 48. Also see: Matar and Thabit, *Lockerbie and Libya*, p.236.
- <sup>171</sup> Lee and Perl, *Terrorism, the Future, and the U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. CRS-2 and CRS-3.
- <sup>172</sup> Stanik, *El Dorado Canyon*, p. 242.
- <sup>173</sup> Lee and Perl, *Terrorism, the Future, and the U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. CRS-2 and CRS-3
- <sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 49.
- <sup>176</sup> “U.S./UK Negotiations with Libya Regarding Nonproliferation”, *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 98, No. 1, (Winter 2004), p. 195.
- <sup>177</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 196.
- <sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 197
- <sup>179</sup> “Libyan Payment to Families of the Pan Am Flight 103 Victims”, *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 97, No. 4, (Fall 2003), p. 987.
- <sup>180</sup> Lillian Craig Harris, *Libya: Qaddafi’s Revolution and the Modern State*, (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1986), p. 52.
- <sup>181</sup> Anderson, *The Makeover*, p. 33.
- <sup>182</sup> Matar and Thabit, *Lockerbie and Libya*, p. 160.

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