

Toward a Comprehensive Canadian CIMIC Doctrine: Interagency Cooperation and the Influence of Allies in the Balkans

By: Stacey Douglas

Submitted to The Canadian Military Journal

Date: 12 November 2002

Since the beginning of the multi-national intervention, nearly 40,000 Canadian soldiers have served in the Balkans. More generally, since the end of the Cold War, not only has the frequency of interventions increased, so too have their complexity and scope. Several Canadian Forces initiatives in Civil-Military Cooperation [CIMIC] have occurred as a result of the need to be interoperable in the Balkans and yet CIMIC cells remain relatively uncoordinated at the national level. In recognition of the need for a more systematic approach to intervention, many allies' armed forces have instituted national-level civil affairs groups. The augmentation of Canadian peacekeeping forces to include larger CIMIC elements is not necessarily an option, nor will it be, necessarily, the most effective solution in the future. But regular cooperation at all levels with other government agencies, experienced in reconstruction and the provision of humanitarian aid, will allow the CF to lever its capabilities and strengthen its contribution to future multi-national interventions.

The Beginnings of Interagency Cooperation

Most military operations have elements of civil-military interaction in the field, but training and posting specific to civil affairs in the CF has been quite limited¹ since the return of the Canadian contingent from occupied European territory after the Second World War². Many nations' armed forces, including those of the US³, Britain⁴ and France, have significant historical experience in civil affairs through occupations and colonial wars, but these experiences have had varying effects on present day force structure. The nature of the planning of Canadian contributions to UN peacekeeping missions has required close cooperation between the once named Department of External Affairs and DND, but regular civil-military cooperation at higher levels was not extended to the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) nor to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) until relatively recently.

In the Canadian context, development and post-war reconstruction predating CIDA evolved quite separately from the military through the Colombo Plan, which involved projects of construction, the provision of commodities and a civilian exchange of expertise between Commonwealth nations.⁵ Since CIDA's inception in 1968, its support for conflict-ridden areas and refugees has coincided on a number of occasions with the deployment of CF personnel as UN peacekeepers.⁶ These funds, as well as other instances of emergency and humanitarian assistance were donated either bilaterally or through relief and humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). On a few occasions, CIDA has cooperated with DND directly.⁷ But, until the peacekeeping and humanitarian activity in the Balkans of the past decade, development aid workers' and peacekeepers' mandates were growing along parallel lines of a security/development continuum and organisations other than DND were gaining experience in aiding displaced persons and returnees.

In 1968, CIDA created an NGO Division with a \$5 million budget to be distributed on a matching-grant basis.⁸ Commensurate with rising number of NGOs, CIDA now spends approximately \$186 million (or approximately 11.9 per cent of its budget)⁹ on the voluntary sector, not including the funds channelled through organisations such as the ICRC for humanitarian assistance. As well, more money is now spent on peacebuilding and sustainable development projects¹⁰ such as those directed by Canadian soldiers in the Balkans, thus "Canadian aid contributes to global security by tackling threats to human security, such as human rights violations, disease, population growth, environmental degradation, and the growing gap between rich and poor."¹¹ Moreover, although the humanitarian imperative of NGOs supported by CIDA requires they maintain their independence, focussing national peacebuilding funds on specific regions allows for the earliest withdrawal of the costly military presence.

Developing Precedents in Interagency Cooperation: CIMIC in Bosnia-Herzegovina

On 20 December 1995, following the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was replaced with the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in support of resolution 1031 adopted by the United Nations (UN). Within its mandated year, this multinational force, comprising some 60,000 troops, took part in various projects of reconstruction. Although IFOR focused on Annex 1 of the GFAP, "IFOR commanders and forces looked almost from the first day to conduct various projects to benefit the local population."¹² National contingents administered the funds for reconstruction in their areas of responsibility that were donated by their respective governments or national development agencies; agencies of other nations contributing to their sectors; and regional organizations; although some money was made available directly through the North Atlantic Council.¹³ In the development of the CIMIC strategies of all actors involved, operations in the Balkans have proven grounds ripe for lessons-learned. As IFOR Commander Admiral Leighton Smith explained in April of 1996: "In November (1995), we had never heard of CIMIC, we had no idea what you did... now we can't live without you."¹⁴ For Canadians, working alongside allies more experienced in CIMIC, these operations were particularly experimental in civil-military and

interagency cooperation.

When Canadians were first posted to the Balkans on CANBAT 1 and 2, and subsequently on IFOR, Public Affairs officers and Liaison officers, numbering two to three per brigade, fulfilled various tasks including reporting to NDHQ and liaising with humanitarian International Organisations (IOs). Because of the US experience in Civil Affairs during the Cold War, a large proportion of the CIMIC element in IFOR and the subsequent Stabilization Force (SFOR) was initially American:

Many SFOR troop-contributing nations have deployed CIMIC personnel, but the United States — through its regular and reserve Civil Affairs units — has provided the majority of CIMIC capability available to IFOR and SFOR commanders. Over the past two years this commitment has amounted to some 1400 civil affairs officers and non-commissioned officers. The majority of these soldiers are reservists and are mobilised for 270 days then placed under the operational control of the IFOR/SFOR for six months. Until December 1997, approximately 320 United States Army Civil Affairs personnel were under SFOR control at any given time.¹⁵

Although the first Canadian CIMIC cell was not formed until 1997 at 1 Canadian Division Headquarters,¹⁶ Canadian troops successfully implemented over \$1.8 million worth of assistance on CIDA's behalf between the years 1996 and 2000¹⁷ including a 'roofs and windows' project in Bihac during IFOR (\$300 000). Cooperation in KFOR was slightly more ad hoc,¹⁸ but CIDA and DND worked together in the rehabilitation of Rinas airport in Albania and continue to work together on reconstruction projects.

While Multi-National Division South West (MND SW) was under British command, the British Department for International Development (DFID) offered funding to all military contingents for two projects: the first, The Western Bosnia Rehabilitation Program (WBRP), through which humanitarian aid was delivered, and, secondly, the Return and Reconciliation Project, designed to encourage the return of displaced persons into integrated communities.¹⁹ An evaluation of the WBRP undertaken by the Centre for Defence Studies at King's College, London found that, although well suited to the initial stages of intervention in an emergency, military ownership of development assistance and civil-military relations in general were "conceptually flawed for a peace-support mission's long-term goal: civilian rule."²⁰

At the request of the Canadian commander of MND SW in 2001, CIDA offered \$2 million for the Community Improvement Project (CIP), half of which was to be allocated to four Canadian rotations and the other half to all other national contingents. Apart from the exclusion of business development, the interagency CIP is a virtual "photocopy" of the tried and tested British initiative. In July 2001, the first instalment of \$250 000 was made available to Rotation VIII—an excellent opportunity for Canadian soldiers but small relative to other contingents in the division.

The Dutch Ministry of Development supplied approximately \$2.79 million in annual

funding to the Dutch Battle Group.²¹ As well, Dutch reservists were deployed for short terms in an innovative manner through a “programme to assist in small business development. They teach locals how to develop business plans, how to apply for business loans and how to market their goods.”²² Although Canadian reservists were not deployed in such a manner, more regular and reserve officers have since been trained in CIMIC through the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and at Fort Bragg, and theatre-specific training was developed on Rotation IX.²³ The question left to be answered by those currently developing a new CIMIC strategy is whether Canadian soldiers should become ‘more interoperable’ and in doing so take on more of the onus and develop a greater institutional capability for reconstruction and peacebuilding.

Developing CIMIC Doctrine: Maximising Partnerships and Organising for Efficiency

Development projects are a single aspect of CIMIC but their direction by military personnel broaches issues at the heart of the current debate about civil-military cooperation in general. Certainly, the concept of military personnel performing development work or functions of civil administration is an “over-militarisation” inasmuch as soldiers present competition for limited funding. What remains for debate, and could be determined on a mission-specific basis, is the relative importance of winning the confidence of local civilians to promoting the earliest withdrawal of a military presence. In the absence or unavailability of civilian actors or organisations there is little question that able military personnel should execute the needs of civil administration.

A 1999 study by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) found that in most cases civilian organisations were better suited to providing development and humanitarian aid. If, at any place and time, it is cost-effective for militaries to be doing reconstruction work it is in the Balkans, and right now, where the scope and scale of the established peacekeeping operations are almost without compare. Accordingly, the DAC study recognises that “the military units for such repairs were already on-site and their involvement constituted an add-on cost. In these cases, the military may very well have been the cheaper and most readily available alternative.”²⁴

Reconstruction activities in support of returnees will remain essential to peacebuilding regardless of whether they are directed by CF personnel. Once needs have been assessed, the extent to which they can be fulfilled by civilian organisations will depend on the level of interagency cooperation. Allies’ CIMIC doctrines, reflecting force structure and

informed by historical experience including that of the Balkans, vary in operational and tactical level flexibility and the provision for interagency cooperation.

Undoubtedly best prepared of the allies for the challenges of civil-military cooperation in Bosnia Herzegovina, Americans, in their Civil Affairs (CA) operations, are first guided by the distinction between “substantial troop deployments” and “complex contingency operations” through Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56).²⁵ Although the U.S. Army had an extensive military government capacity by the end of World War II, “the civil affairs function of the U.S. Army evoked bitter debate in every major war from the war with Mexico to World War I.”²⁶ After just eight years of post-World War II experience in civic action projects in Korea and elsewhere, the Presidentially appointed Draper Committee recommended military and economic aid continue to be given to nations “under the gun” of communism. Aid was ensured thereafter through the Mutual Security Act to nations such as Vietnam and several in Latin America. By the end of the Cold War, both American civil affairs theory and capabilities were well developed.

Currently, a “unity of effort” is achieved through military cooperation with a variety of participating national agencies and departments.²⁷ Since August 2000, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), and the Department of Defense's Office of Democracy and Governance have had a memorandum of understanding delineating their respective capabilities in the conduct of “civilian-military relations and other democracy building programs, and defining areas of future collaboration.”²⁸ American CA personnel are largely reservists and involved in many facets of peacebuilding. Indeed, “[i]n Haiti, [American] civil affairs soldiers performed activities that ranged from restoring electricity throughout the countryside, to serving as expert advisors to 12 government ministries.”²⁹ Similarly, new British doctrine will make use of CA personnel to fill the administrative vacuum resulting from complex emergencies.

The new British Civil Affairs Group is composed of approximately 10 regular officers and another 100 members of the Territorial Army. At the start of a future operation, officers from the core group will deploy for three to six months “to assess the impact of civilian activity on military plans”, originally filling the vacuum of humanitarian and government functions with reservists until such functions can be performed by civilian organisations.³⁰ CIMIC doctrine, in the final stages of development, emphasizes “extensive liaison with the civic leaders within the jurisdiction. Likewise, the individual soldiers within each patrol are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that gains them credibility and respect with the local population,”³¹ as per the historical experience of aiding the civil powers in Northern Ireland. British doctrine concerns itself with interagency cooperation insofar as its dedicated specialists will liaise regularly with other government agencies and IOs but French doctrine is distinguished by its division of levels of cooperation.

French civil affairs doctrine, rewritten in 1997, entrenches the importance of civil-sector considerations at various stages of intervention. Interagency cooperation is to take place at four separate levels, encompassing Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Military-

Civil Affairs (MCA), and Civil-Military Relations (MCR)³²: political, strategic, operational and tactical.³³ At the strategic level, cooperation is further divided into three areas of consideration: inter-ministerial relations, the concept of control, and the impact of military action on the civil environment.³⁴ The origin of French civil-military action is related to two impetuses: new operational factors and the American experience.³⁵ Until 1955, French soldiers continued to be trained for military government functions but the new doctrine, based on the American practice, was first written in 1996, then again in 2002. As well, a new inter-army group for civil-military actions comprising 96 regular force soldiers 434 reserve personnel will be fully operational by 2003. A typical French CIMIC expert cell in Kosovo includes officers with the following expertise: economics/finance, energy, education, transport logistics, telecommunication, water/environment, infrastructure, petroleum products, public administration, air traffic, industry/mines, agriculture. In total, 17 officers per cell will provide many of the necessary functions for the initial reconstruction of conflict-ridden area.

DND policy is one of arm's length from reconstruction. The White Paper states: "Over the long-term, however, reconstructive activities--be they the administration and enforcement of civil law, the provision of medical care, or the distribution of humanitarian aid--are best left to civilian organizations."³⁶ DND began cooperating with these civilian organisations through CIDA's NGO Division in 1994. An NGO working group, convened to share lessons and "codify these lessons through policy dialogue with government and other players,"³⁷ culminated in the creation of the Canadian Peacebuilding Contact Committee (CPC), comprising NGOs and academics, as well as CIDA, DND and DFAIT representatives. In 1996 the CF was involved with an exercise simulating a complex emergency in Gagetown,³⁸ proposed by CIDA and a number of the NGOs.³⁹ Although no further exercises of this type have since taken place, NGOs regularly brief CF peacekeepers⁴⁰ and an exchange programme has been set up between the CF and CARE Canada.⁴¹ This flurry of activity and the participation of Canadian troops in Balkans prompted the writing of a Canadian CIMIC handbook.

During the 1996-1997 writing of *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War*, the author consulted widely with CIDA, DFAIT and NGOs. The handbook is essential as a political statement in describing relatively organically the importance of the 'New Partnership,' but arguing: "[t]he CF has no formalized CIMIC structure at the strategic, operational or tactical levels. This situation must be remedied by the CF to become more effective and efficient, particularly when employed in complex emergencies."⁴² Apart from the fact that more CIMIC officers have since received training, in the five years of its existence, little has been done to ensure the essence of this policy statement be translated into doctrine. In fact, since this document has not yet been translated into French it is not an official publication and acts as a reference for those already experienced in CIMIC.

Since 2001, many more reservists have been trained in CIMIC at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre.⁴³ Because reservists presumably have a stronger affinity with the civilian work force, their deployment in a Canadian CIMIC capacity has been advocated in the past but efforts to guarantee

their civilian employment upon return have yet failed. It would be curious to require that Canadian political and other advisors be under military command and have undergone military training to interface with another civilian government, especially since this task has been performed by CIDA in the past.⁴⁵ Judging by the number of NGOs currently working as civilian specialists and supported by CIDA in the Balkans, the concept of replacing civilian expertise with military specialists might also be a misuse of resources. Currently, a list of civilian specialists ready for deployment is held by CANADEM, an NGO that screens candidates for eventual selection by IOs. A recent German initiative has gone farther, preparing civilian specialists with the standardised training deemed necessary to deploy in complex emergencies. If a combination of Canadian civil and military peace builders is to be present in future complex emergencies, a dedicated national-level CIMIC cell and further interagency cooperation at the strategic level would ensure not only adequate funding for the areas of CF responsibility in the future but provisions for a more systematic approach to intervention.

When making a case for NATO's need for strategic civil-military cooperation, Dick Zandee, former member of the Bosnia Task Force of NATO's International Staff, argues:

Lack of relevant and accurate information on the potential roles and tasks of other organizations involved in peace operations, on their capabilities, procedures and working methods will lead to incorrect assessments and inadequate decision-making. It will have a detrimental effect on mission planning and execution.⁴⁶

On a similar inclination, Strategy 2020 affirms the need to “maximize [DND’s] *strategic partnerships* through the most effective collaboration with Other Government Departments.”⁴⁷ Among the past initiatives of such strategic partnerships is the creation of the successful Disaster Assistance Response Team. Yet, the experiment with an Interdepartmental Task Force for planning the mission to Zaire, with representatives from the Privy Council Office, DFAIT, CIDA, and DND, has not been replicated since.

Peacekeeping is but one stage in the long process of reaching and maintaining forward security and, ultimately, CIMIC is inherently limited to supporting the force commander’s objectives. Well-trained and suitable Canadian CIMIC operators are essential to interacting with civilians in the field and to promoting a unity of effort. Regardless of the nature of future interventions, and as suggested by the French example, interagency coordination would encourage planners to account for civil-sector considerations at the political, strategic and operational levels. A standing committee similar to the interagency contact group for the mission to Zaire would allow for lessons learned on the intervention in general, or for the entire lifecycle of the conflict. Furthermore, greater cooperation would ease the decisions of when to safely replace soldiers with their less costly civilian counterparts and whether or not it would be beneficial to focus on a particular Canadian comparative advantage.

Notes

1. Although I have not done an exhaustive study of operations during the Cold War, a few examples are indicative of the *nature* of Canadian civil affairs. Depending on the size of the Canadian contingent and their place in UN command structure, relations with civilians varied: ONUC HQ included a public relations section, although it is not clear that Canadian officers took part since very few were posted to the HQ, (see *Report No. 8, Directorate of History, CFHQ, Canada and Peace-keeping Operations, The Congo, 1960-64*) and Canadians shared a headquarters with civilian UN personnel in UNEF 1, employed many local civilians, and one Canadian was posted as a Public Relations Officer (*Report No. 78, Historical Section (G.S.), Army HQ, 2 Jan 59, Some Impressions of UNEF, 1957-1958.*) An A5 was posted to Germany for much of the Cold War. These officers, whose job it was to smooth over relations with local authorities during Canadian exercises, were trained in an American school in Germany, see Sean Maloney, *War Without Battles: Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany, 1951-1993*, pp. 419-420, and subsequent interview with the author, 12 Sep 02.

2. For the occupation in Europe, Canadian Civil Affairs Officers were trained at Wimbledon, UK, Charlottesville, US and at the Royal Military College in Kingston and by the end of February 1945, there were 340 Canadian officers employed in Civil Affairs on various missions abroad. See *Report No. 9, Historical Section (G.S.), Army Headquarters, 08 Oct 46.*

3. For a short history of American civil affairs before the Second World War, see the Training Packet No. 8, Civil Affairs Studies: Illustrative from Cases 1 Military Occupations, <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=169>. Training related to civil affairs was not considered essential until the Second World War, when it appeared that civilian agencies were not willing or prepared to take on the task of governing occupied territory, see *U.S. Army in World War II, Special Studies, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*, by Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Wrinberg.

4. More recent experience in the United Kingdom relates to deployments in Northern Ireland. See Major David Last, "The Importance of Peripheral Conflicts to Military Thinking: PRIVATE The Case of French Colonialism," US Army Command and General Staff College, 21 January 1995 for an example of how experience affected force structure.

5. Aid and Cold War containment policies were, at the very least, complementary, as wealthier Commonwealth nations supported less developed ones on the periphery of Soviet influence. Although the original members of the Colombo Plan were Australia, Canada, Ceylon, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Malaya, British Borneo and the United Kingdom, membership was extended to the United States, Cambodia, Laos, Nepal, Thailand, the Philippines, Japan and Vietnam by 1960. In the first ten years of the Colombo Plan, 48 per cent of Canada's contribution was expended in construction projects, 45 per cent in the provision of commodities and 3.4 per cent in technical assistance. See Annual Reports of the Colombo Plan, specifically, *The Colombo Plan*,

Tenth Annual Report, Kuala Lumpur 1961, p. 214, for this data.

6. To name a couple of instances: in 1978 CIDA granted \$1 200 000 to the Lebanese for 'civil conflict' at the beginning of UNIFIL and in 1990-91 CIDA spent \$4 560 000 on the 'Gulf Crisis,' see CIDA's Annual Reports.

7. For a current spent total of \$6 153 266, projects have included, (provided by CIDA's vendor database, dollar numbers in brackets are CIDA's contribution): Reconnaissance Mission – K.S. Carter (\$12 000) Yugoslavia; English Language Training for the Polish Armed Forces (\$77 379), Rwandan Airlifts (\$800 000), Mozambique Airlift of Relief Items (\$340 000), El Salvador Airlifts (\$185 001), Kinsmen African Medical Relief Ethiopia (\$149 068); Angola- Sawatsky Trips (\$22 360); Mozambique, Flood Monitoring, Radarsat (\$15 028); Civilian Peacebuilding Advisor in Eritrea and Ethiopia (\$1 820). The rest of the funds spent in the Balkans: Rehabilitation of Rinas Airport, Albania, (\$1 715 462); Community Improvement Program, Bosnia and Herzegovina (\$1 799 929); IFOR BIHAC Reconstruction (\$300 000); and KFOR Reconstruction (\$670 235), Data Entry Clerks, Kosovo (\$64 984). These figures do not include instances of DND supporting CIDA as part of Canada's foreign policy in general. Sean Maloney shows the Navy has supported CIDA in "Maple Leaf Over the Caribbean: Gunboat Diplomacy Canadian Style?" in *Canadian Gunboat Diplomacy: The Canadian Navy and Foreign Policy*.

8. CIDA, *Canada and Development Cooperation: Annual Review, 1975-76* CIDA, p. 77.

9. CIDA, *Canada and Development Cooperation*, http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/8949395286e4d3a58525641300568be1/83c8bc6f2bc7c006852568ec00634ac2?OpenDocument.

10. Over the years, CIDA's expenditures have changed in another significant way: while in 1975-76 24.6 per cent of its budget was dedicated to Food Aid, that figure stands at only approximately 13.1 per cent today, see Annual Reports and *ibid*.

11. CIDA, *Canada and Development Cooperation*, http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/8949395286e4d3a58525641300568be1/83c8bc6f2bc7c006852568ec00634ac2?OpenDocument#6.

12. Adam B. Siegel, "Associating Development Projects with Military Operations: Lessons from NATO's First Year in BiH," in *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 8, No. 3, p. 99.

13. See *Ibid*.

14. See Colonel William R. Phillips, Chief, Civil-Military Cooperation SHAPE, "Civil-Military Cooperation: Vital to peace implementation in Bosnia," in *NATO Review*, WEBEDITION, Vol. 46 - No. 1, Spring 1998, pp. 22-25.

15. Ibid.
16. Lt. Sean Pollick, "Civil-Military Cooperation: A New Tool For Peacekeepers", *The Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 61.
17. Jason Hollmann, current CIDA representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina, in telephone interview by the author, 30 August 2002.
18. The Army Lessons Learned Centre, p.10. In KFOR, the level of cooperation was often based on personality as has shown Major Doug Delaney in "CIMIC Operations During Operation "Kinetic," in the *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 29-34.
19. AIA, letter from Stephen Wallace to Col. W. Natynczyk, 5 Mar 01, "Administrative Arrangement with the Department of National Defence for the Community Improvement Program (CIP) through the Canadian Contingent (TFBH) to the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Multi-National Division South West (MND SW), Bosnia & Herzegovina."
20. Ibid.
21. Sgt. Peter Fitzgerald, in *SFOR Informer#125*, October 31, 2001.
22. Centre for Defence Studies, King's College London, "Evaluation of the Western Bosnia Rehabilitation Programme 1996-1998," Nov 25, 1999, p.19.
23. A course was developed by Major Colin Robinson on Rotation IX, telephone interview with the Major by the author, August 2002.
24. Development Assistance Committee, *Report No. 1, Civilian and Military Means of Providing and Supporting Humanitarian Assistance During Conflict*, p. 20.
25. Kurt E. Müller, "Toward a Concept of Strategic Civil Affairs," in *Parameters*, Winter 1998, pp. 80-98.
26. Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *U.S. Army in World War II, Special Studies, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, p. 4
27. Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Feb. 1, 1995).
28. <http://www.usaid.gov/democracy/cmr/usaidprogs.html>
29. H. Allen Holmes, "Civil Affairs: Reflections of the Future," *Issues of Democracy: An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State*, Vol. 2, No. 3, July 1997.

30. Major Peter Cottrell of the British Civil Affairs Group, telephone interview conducted by the author, 9 September 2002. As well, at the national level, “[t]he Netherlands has become more and more active in CIMIC and is, for instance, in the process of forming – together with our German allies - a CIMIC Group North (consisting of a permanent core of some 40-60 personnel),” see “The Dutch Experience of Civil-Military Relations, 09-05-2001”, Speech by the Minister of Defence of the Netherlands, Mr. Frank de Grave, on the occasion of the conference “Taking stock of civil-military relations” (organised by the CESS, the CSDS and the GCDCAF), The Hague, 9 May 2001.

31. James J. Landon and Richard E. Hayes, “National Approaches to Civil-Military Coordination in Peace and Humanitarian Assistance Operations,” for The Command and Control Research Program (CCRP) within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, <http://www.dodccrp.org/>.

32. Instruction 2900, “Concept interarmées de l’action civilo-militaire,” Directive approuvée par décision 00227/DEF/EMA/EMP. 1 du 18 mars 2002.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Le Groupement Interarmées Actions Civilo-Militaires, “le GIACM: une unite au service des autres,” p. 3.

36. Chapter 6: Contributing to International Security, http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/pol_docs/94wp/six.html

37. See the CPCC’s website, <http://www.cpcc.ottawa.on.ca/about.htm>.

38. See *1996 Report of the Auditor General of Canada*, Chapter 7 Peacekeeping, National Defence.

39. Jennifer N. Ross, “Civil-military co-operation in humanitarian interventions,” Prepared for the Second Annual Graduate Student Seminar, April 30-May 5, 2000, Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cfp-pec/OtherAnnualEvents/Jennifer_Ross-en.asp.

40. Ibid.

41. Telephone interview by the author with Maj Luc-André Racine, 6 September 2002.

42. *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War*, 103-4 of the handbook..

43. Telephone interview by the author with Maj Luc-André Racine, 6 September 2002.

45. Canadian advisers on assignment abroad have worked in such areas as: economic planning, public administration, and industry. See CIDA's Annual Reports for numbers and functions of advisers abroad.

46. Dick Zandee, *Building Blocks for Peace: Civil-Military Interaction in Restoring Fractured Societies*, p. 74.

47. Chief of Defence Staff, *Strategy 2020*, emphasis on original, http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/cds/strategy2k/s2k05_e.asp.