

A MILITARY VIEWPOINT

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It is a very great pleasure to provide this key note presentation to start off this second day of the symposium. I would like to take this opportunity to thank CDA for organizing this conference and generating the kind of debate needed to address the challenges that we are facing – today and into the future.

When I say "we" - I mean all of us – there are certain issues that the CF must address, there are others which the academic community must consider and there are others which organizations such as CDA must take up. Ultimately, the "we" is the Canadian people. While one of the fundamentals of the Huntington-Janowitz military-civilian relations debate is that the people have the right to be wrong about what kind of military they need – it is the duty of professionals - both the professionals who understand the theories and writing on military issues - and - the professionals who understand the practice of the art - to ensure that the people make fully informed decisions concerning their military. Let me now provide a military perspective on where we have been and where we are going as we prepare for the next century. In doing so, you will note that there are some areas in which Dr. Granatstein and I agree – and some where we don't. If you did not hear his presentation yesterday, you may wish to look in latest edition of On Track. The issues of professionalism in the military and the hallmarks of the military profession into the next millenium are topics on which we agree - and we don't.

Many of the presentations during these two days revolve around the issue of the security environment and the kind of military that we will need to face the next century. I am reminded of the immortal words of Yogi Berra – the future ain't what it used to be.

What did the future used to be? To start with: the Soviets. We spent thirty years of the Cold War defining at the tactical level the responses needed for a war that, thank goodness, never materialized. We knew the enemy's capabilities, their doctrine, their points of attack - we even had a sophisticated system of indicators for when the balloon was going to go up. So – we thought we knew what the next war was going to be like – although we might have found ourselves standing-to on a modern Maginot Line if push had ever come to shove.

When we weren't preparing for the next war, we were busy making our mark on the international stage through peacekeeping. We planned out our rotations to Cyprus four years in advance, the troops knew the good beaches, the best market places and we knew fully well the intentions and capabilities of both sides – in short it was both foreign duty and advanced field training as well as R&R for some.

So what did this nice, neat predictable future allow us to do? - and, more importantly, what did it distract us from doing? It allowed us to think that the future was predictable which, in turn, meant that we could develop the right force structure, the right doctrine and the right tactics,

purchase the necessary equipment and run the appropriate training – the last point is important – we conducted set piece training - that is - ensuring a specified response to a predicted situation.

However, we didn't have to deal with uncertainty. - We didn't have to face issues of strategic thinking or creative responses or agile leadership – we didn't have to place a premium on education – which in contrast to training – is to enable a reasoned response to an unpredicted situation. Did we pride ourselves on our inability to think – I hope not. But did we encourage the open and vigorous debate needed to maintain a profession? Did we seek out partnerships with the academic community and invite learned colleagues in? Did we value higher education and encourage officers to attain graduate degrees. No. Have we begun to change ? – I hope so. There will be a professional military journal which will generate open and vigorous debate – it will have independence but will also receive CF funding to ensure its viability. There were military officers who also recommended a degreed officer corps when the Minister asked for input – and I am pleased to note that within ADM (HR-Mil) – ADM (Per) as you know it – we have four officers with PhDs and about 30 with Master's degree plus those in CFRETS at RMC and Staff College.

So if we got ourselves off track when we thought the world was predictable, where are we now? First of all, we realize that it is impossible to accurately predict the next war – unless you start it. As is evident throughout these two days, the international security environment is increasingly complex, unstable and unpredictable. While we can debate whether there truly is an RMA, whether it will be possible to have a Nintendo war and whether you can win a war without putting boots on the ground; we do know that the nature of warfare is evolving and the potential missions are varied, demanding and expensive.

What has replaced the Soviet threat? - Everything from the American Army After Next or Marine Urban Warrior type high intensity warfare, through an ever increasing number of regional conflicts which could occur on virtually any continent – let us not ignore Chiapas - to the possibilities of asymmetrical warfare covering electronic or chemical attacks, kidnappings or assassinations to weapons of mass destruction.

We must determine our place in this new order and we have to learn how to lead, how to fight and how to win. Let me give you a question for each of those – leading, fighting and winning – under RMA. Given that RMA is intended to produce a perfect picture of the battlespace – how do you lead when the troops know as much as you do – or more? - How do you fight a battle when you have too much information instead of too little? - If NATO will have the lead in information dominance, who will be second? The answer might surprise you – it will probably be the same as today - CNN. How do you fight a battle in the perfectly wired world when the folks back home have as much information as you do – or more? Think about it – on what basis was the Gulf War ended. Were the military objectives met – the Republican Guards are still standing. Were the political objectives met – Saddam is still in power and still capable of destabilizing the region. What stopped the war? – a major factor was the response of the American public to the image of destruction on the highway – public pressure.

Now lets turn to peacekeeping. What has happened to that good old predictable rotation to Cyprus every four years. On the one hand, it has become the peace enforcement type mission

such as in the Medak pocket. On the other, it has become the humanitarian missions such as currently being staged in Honduras. And, in the middle, is the helplessness of Rwanda. We are already facing the consequences of failed states - the drug tsars, war lords and bandits - the stateless actors who have no interest in diplomacy - who won't go to Geneva to negotiate - who view Soft Power as only being soft. We also are seeing countries with massive threats to civilized life: not just military threats but disease, refugees, ecological disasters, financial ruin, destruction of democratic institutions. To use the current business speak phrase: what the clients want is an integrated solution. They don't really care who brings the food, who brings the medicine or who chases the bandits away - and in many countries they don't really care how its done.

So where are we going: we have to become informed on the changing definition of international security, we have to be more closely linked to emerging global governance and we have to understand how national policy is evolving especially given our seat at the Security Council. We also have to learn how to work in closer cooperation with other government departments, with non-government organizations - did you know that there are over twelve hundred NGOs accredited to the UN now - and we have to learn how to work with local agencies in each country not arrive like a conquering colonial power. But - if those in need don't really care how we accomplish our peace missions (*pause*) the Canadian people do. The Canadian Forces remains one of the most visible government institutions on the international stage. We must conduct ourselves at all times and in all circumstances in a manner which is consistent with fundamental Canadian values - when we don't, we will be called to account - with the media in the lead. That is a reality - a reality which makes the task of a commander on the ground that much more difficult.

We used to assume that our training and preparation for war ensured that we were trained and prepared for lesser demanding missions. Is that still the case? Are commanders prepared to lead troops into battle, equally prepared to handle the moral and ethical questions of - whether to disregard UN direction, - when to risk the lives of their troops for a humanitarian mission, - how to handle the multiple pressures of competing NGOs, media inquiries, human rights observers and local factions, - how to lead a coalition of the reluctant with each national contingent marching to its own political and military directions? The solution is what Dr. Granatstein and others have been calling for: flexible, agile leadership based on a reinforcement of the military profession, a broadening of professional development and a recognition of the importance of advanced education.

As you are aware, the RMC Board of Governor's Study Group presented a comprehensive review of the RMC Undergraduate program this year. Gen Withers has provided an excellent summary of this review in On Track. The CDS has affirmed his commitment to RMC and has directed that action be taken to address the sixty-seven various recommendations contained in the report. This is a good first step. The new Advanced Military Studies Course and the National Security Studies Course, the expansion of the RMC extension program and various initiatives with Canadian Universities are all contributing to establishing the basis for an increased focus on advanced education and a renewal of military professionalism.

But, we should all be aware that these initiatives take time and money. We don't have the luxury of either – and we have some competing priorities which include re-equipping our force and addressing the needs of our members. I cannot leave today without mentioning a few words on what is our most critical challenge today – addressing the quality of life issues which our troops brought forward during the recent SCONDVA hearings. I would remind you of the statement made by Gen Baril at the final public presentation to SCONDVA: "There are four dimensions to operational effectiveness: good equipment, good training, good leadership and good conditions of service. Resolving the military's quality of life challenges is the number one priority of the CF and DND." During this last year, we created a Quality of Life Project Office and based on the SCONDVA report, we are now in the process of addressing the one hundred and five recommendations, initiatives or projects which have been identified as critical to restoring a suitable quality of life. The support of CDA both in previous submissions and your comments on the SCONDVA recommendations are greatly appreciated.

Ultimately, we need to address the central question - why should we expect our members to put their life on the line to protect a standard of living in Canada which they, themselves, don't have? Quality of life contains five pillars: fair compensation, adequate accommodations, support to the military family, care of those injured and reasonable work expectations. To again quote Gen Baril before SCONDVA: "To be a profession of choice, the CF must remain an institution characterized by professionalism, treating all members with dignity, honesty and respect." Clearly this professionalism must be based on effective leadership which does mean an informed, educated officer corps. It is evident that those who are informed on defence matters consider this to be a high priority and I can assure you that the CF is committed to producing a professional, educated officer corps. I would ask, however, Do the Canadian people want an educated military? Is there a sufficient understanding of the complexities of military service, the role of leaders and the value of broad academic learning? And, most critically, will this translate into a realignment of government spending to ensure we can maintain a viable and effective Canadian Forces. I am most interested in keeping you informed of our internal initiatives and in working with you as you inform the public on National Defence issues. As I stated in opening; while the Canadian people have the right to decide what kind of military they want – it is the duty of professionals – military and civilian – to ensure that the people are well informed.