

Youri Cormier
M.A. Candidate – War Studies
Royal Military College
Kingston, Ontario

Human Security and Terror in Canada and Peru

How ‘National Security’ is Variable in Nature
and the Theoretical Effect of this on achieving a ‘Mature’
International Anarchy

The idea of ‘national security’ is by no means static. If security is a response to such factors as fear, technology, culture and expectations, to name but a few, then it must be fluid in time and space, because of the way the two encompass these factors and render them variable. How a country defines its own concept of security can therefore be quite divergent from that of others, or even its own only a few years prior.

Security’s fluidity in time is self-evident. Much like the Hollywood horror flicks of 1950’s, with all their stringed spaceships and werewolf makeup, would not spook a five-year-old today; the definition of national threat must also evolve with changes in technology and human expectations. While the threats of the past do not necessarily vanish, they may be pushed back in terms of priorities. The nuclear scare of the Cold War may be over, but the threat of apocalyptic nuclear war remains. The principle danger is

no longer perceived as emanating from either Russia or China so much as those states which have recently acquired the technology or are in the process of doing so. Furthermore, with the advent of mass-distributed communications technology and easily available small arms and explosives, the risk of non-conventional warfare is heightened by the relatively small costs of inflicting great damage. In fifty years, the world has seen its conception of threat turned upside down. This is well described in President Bush's 2002 State of the Union Address, "States like these [North Korea, Iran and Iraq], and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. [...] America is working with Russia and China and India, in ways we have never before, to achieve peace and prosperity."¹ Enemies of the past were strong states with powerful means. Today it is the weak state and relatively small means in the hands of non-state actors that tops our list of priorities.

The fluidity in space and distance requires a closer analysis. Here it is useful to make a distinction between the material and the immaterial aspects involved. There are certain areas where violence is a regular event, this being particularly true in the Middle-East, Sub-Saharan Africa and the cocaine producing areas of South-America. These areas will have a different understanding of what constitutes security from, say, Iceland and the Netherlands, where global warming and rising waters may be seen as a greater threat than the risk of a terrorist attack on Reykjavik or Rotterdam.

On the immaterial side, culture, history and perceived threat may alter the equation. In the United States, the fear of surprise attack has been aroused by Sept. 11, but has deep roots in the War of 1812 (the sacking and burning of Washington) and Pearl

¹ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>

Harbor. When coupled with a culture of Puritan righteousness, a historical fear of surprise attacks can easily lead to concepts of pre-emptive strikes and immaterial wars on such things as terrorism, poverty and drugs. While Canada might follow the US for the purpose of its own national interest, there is practically no example of Canada ever taking part in a pre-emptive strike and definitely no example of it conceiving an immaterial war.

The interesting implication of fluidity in our conception of fear and security is that if one takes two entities with sufficient cultural, historical and physical differences, while isolating them within a specific time, a comparative analysis between the two and how they define 'security' will most likely shed some light on its nature and constitution. Keeping this in mind as an overarching theme for this paper, we shall delve into an extremely dichotomous pair, Canada and Peru.

Canada has a long history of democracy and stable liberal institutions. It is composed of an ethnic mosaic with one of the highest levels of social mobility in the world. Canada's economy is highly developed technologically. It's only experience with military violence inside its national territory is limited to the 15 minute battle at the Plains of Abraham, the skirmishes of the War of 1812, which ended in a status quo ante bellum treaty, a few conscription riots, labor strikes, and more recently the October and Oka crises which resulted in casualties that can be counted on one's fingertips. Unsurprisingly, Canada's internal stability has led, as we shall explore later, to security policies which are more closely linked to external threats.

Peru is at the other extreme. It has flirted with democracy in the past and has only recently attempted to institutionalize it. Fujimori's autogolpe in the 1990's demonstrates

how wobbly this institution remains.² The ethnic breakdown is composed of roughly 50% indigenous, 35% mestizo, and 10% white, with small pockets of newly arrived East Asians.³ Historically and to this day, social mobility has been practically nil. The white upper class controlled the military, the political scene and the economy 500 years ago and still does today, which accounts for a history of class-driven politics and dissidence.⁴ The economy remains underdeveloped, agrarian and only modestly automated and mechanized.⁵ Most significantly, structural and eruptive violence inside its territory has been a permanent reality from the Conquista onwards, leading to wars, insurgency, political exclusion, slavery and dependency.⁶ During the intense guerrilla war waged from 1980 to 1995, between 30 000⁷ and 59 000⁸ Peruvians died at the hands of the Sendero Luminoso, the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) and the State as all three fought for control of the countryside, with the occasional car bomb and assassination in the capital, Lima.⁹ Unlike Canada, Peru's concept of security has been molded primarily by severe internal threats.

This essay explores whether or not these two different realities have broadened or narrowed the states' conception of security. To do this, we shall frame the discussion within three tools of analysis. First we will consider the trend towards broadening the scope of security on an intellectual level. Secondly, we will review the 'international standard' of this broad-scope approach, embodied by the United Nation, in order to gauge

² <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pe.html>

³ Ibid.

⁴ Stern, p. 17

⁵ <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pe.html>

⁶ Rudolph, pp. 22-24

⁷ Sanchez, p. 1

⁸ This larger number is a more recent evaluation made by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.. Source: The Shining Path Revisited, The Economist, 9/6/2003.

⁹ Stern, pp. 1-8

each country's security conception, relative to a single point. Thirdly, we will look into actions taken by each country, how they were derived from the conception of security and to what extent they have been successful in coping with perceived threats. This three-pronged approach will allow us to study the pair in terms of an absolute or static idea of security, the dynamics of either divergence or convergence and of course, how each conception of security applies to its respective material world.

In the end, the goal of the essay is to demonstrate that the concept of security is indeed fluid, on the grounds that spatial and temporal variations are noticeable. From this we shall consider two effects, first whether these distinct formulations, when applied, fulfill the security needs of either state; and secondly, how the concept of fluidity impacts theoretical ideas of international security, particularly Barry Buzan's vision of 'mature anarchy'.

Broadening the Scope of Security

One of the foremost advocates for broadening the scope of security is Barry Buzan, professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics¹⁰ and author of *People, States and Fear*. He suggests that "the idea [of national security] cannot be properly comprehended without bringing in the actors and dynamics from the societal, economic and environmental sectors. The concept of security binds together these levels and sectors so closely that it demands to be treated in an integrative perspective."¹¹ His fundamental reason for broadening the scope of security is an answer to the 'rising

¹⁰ www.lse.ac.uk/people/b.g.buzan@lse.ac.uk/

¹¹ Buzan, p. 363

density’ of the world system, which is “driven by the combination of increasing population, and increasing technological, organizational and financial capabilities and incentives for action.”¹² It means that “people’s activities are more likely to impinge on the conditions of other people’s existence.”¹³ In brief, he proposes a quasi-tautological view that in a complex world, security must also be complex.

Buzan proposes that putting a broad notion of security at the forefront of international relations has practical and analytical benefits. First of all, it allows us to break away from the “obstructive, and in some ways false, constructs of Realism and Idealism. The notion of security offers much, both to those whose main concern is peace and to those whose main concern is self-protection.”¹⁴ While it does widen the debate to include both views and gives them a common tool upon which to argue, there is little evidence that it solves the debate or even brings us closer to an end. How one interprets a wide notion of security will remain essentially dependent on their Realist or Idealist leanings.

Secondly, it has the added benefit of terminology which leads to effective action. “The word itself is therefore a powerful tool in claiming attention for the priority items in the competition for government attention.”¹⁵ This is true, but only to the extent that what is claimed to be a security actually has some credibility as a security issue, which is not necessarily the case as the notion of security widens.

Finally, Buzan also argues that a broad notion of security has integrative intellectual qualities. It allows the academic like the policy maker to understand

¹² Buzan, p. 151

¹³ Ibid, p. 151

¹⁴ Ibid p. 370

¹⁵ Ibid p. 370

intellectually a variety of interrelated issues, which are too often considered in isolation. These include human rights, international relations, international development, strategic studies, international political economy, peace and conflict research, etc.¹⁶ This argument is compelling, but entirely dependent on what one actually manages to synthesize from the belvedere of security, looking down on such a wide variety of topics.

There are inherent dangers in branding as security too wide an array of non- or mildly- security-related issues, namely the risks of militarizing non-military issues and diffusing the significance of the word security. Nonetheless, the proponents of wide-scope security have attracted many adherents. It is particularly appealing to the powerful, who may find, within the scope of such generalization of security, a morally and intellectually acceptable justification for the upkeep and use of coercive forces. And if one can find a proper catchphrase to encompass the idea, then it becomes as marketable as it is practical. Enter the United Nations.

When the UN Development Programme (UNDP) coined the term ‘human security’ in 1994, it argued, “The concept of security has been for too long interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust [...] Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives”¹⁷. Analytically, this was a major shift from the realist constructs which had dominated the scene during the Cold War. Putting the individual at the forefront meant that security would have to be broadened in scope, because while traditional security

¹⁶ Buzan 372

¹⁷ United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, 1994 (New-York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 22.

tends to be narrow as described above, the individual has a far wider variety of vulnerabilities.

To address these vulnerabilities, the UNDP report suggested seven categories of security: 1) economic security (e.g. from poverty); 2) food security (e.g. from hunger); 3) health security (e.g. access to health care); 4) environmental security (e.g. from pollution); 5) personal security (e.g. physical safety); 6) community security (e.g. survival of traditional culture); 7) and political security (e.g. enjoyment of civil and political rights).¹⁸ Shifting from the state to the individual had in effect altered not only the locus of security, but also its nature, its scope and its breadth.

Critics of the new conception have noticed that “this list is so broad that it is difficult to determine what, if anything, might be excluded from the definition of human security.”¹⁹ The problem takes on even more significance when jumping from the analytical to the political, that is, when attempting to formulate policy based on these notions. For instance, when the international community was negotiating the Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998, defining a ‘crime against humanity’ became a heated debate. Western powers argued for the inclusion of ‘massive abuses of human rights’, whereas many African and Latin American countries proposed to include the ‘overthrow of a democratically elected government’.²⁰ There is always interest at play when an analytical debate attempts to narrow or broaden what constitutes fair reaction by the international community when facing some humanitarian issue. When one attempts to define the boundaries for justifying the indictment of a head of state, the imposition of

¹⁸ Paris, p. 90. (quoting from the UNDP report)

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Weiss, p. 139

economic sanctions or full intervention, issues of power abuses and sovereignty are bound to surface.

Thomas Weiss speaks of the risk that great powers might use the humanitarian excuse in order to intervene abroad.²¹ The example he uses is Washington's "broad and loose application of the humanitarian rhetoric to Afghanistan and Iraq."²² This has prompted concern from third world countries, perhaps best summed up (whether one likes the despot or not) by Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, "We do not deny that the United Nations has the right and the duty to help suffering humanity, but we remain extremely sensitive to any undermining of our sovereignty, not only because sovereignty is our last defense against the rules of an unequal world, but because we are not taking part in the decision-making process of the Security Council."²³

When we take the concept from the international to the national, the same potential dangers described above remain and are perhaps enhanced. A state, particularly, because it has the end right and usage of the military apparatus, may fall into the self-fulfilling prophecy of declaring a broad array of social problems as security threats and then militarizing the issues in order to address them. Furthermore, the same risk of diffusion of the word security remains since it may generate skewed conceptions of priority in terms of security. While on the international scale, these are serious problems, on the national scale they are so great that errors are unpardonable and can place the country at great risk internally as well as externally.

Yet, no country is doomed to take that road as a consequence of choosing a broad scope of security. The opposite is equally possible, especially when the security threats of

²¹ Weiss, p. 42

²² Ibid. p. 144

²³ Ibid. p 145

the country are complex systems of insecurity, which may be better addressed by understanding the socio-economic underpinnings of the conflict. The more broadly security is interpreted; the greater the country may opt for social policies in response to problems that are deemed security-related. In either this case or the self-fulfilling prophecy case, the common thread is that the distinction between what is social or security-related is, to those who approve, made less discriminate and more holistic, or, to those who disapprove, made blurry.

Many legitimate questions challenge the broad interpretation of security, but in the end, what matters is the practical outcome of such a notion. That is why it is particularly relevant to study countries specifically and how their conception of security has affected their security policies and related actions.

The Canadian Notion of Security

The Canadian example cannot be considered in the same terms as the Peruvian, because its threats have simply not been experienced in the same powerful and internal way. Threats to Canada have not only been far more benign but generally external. Hence to understand the evolution of the Canadian notion of security, with the exception of health security, it is more effective to review its foreign policy than its historical record of internal threats as will be the case in our analysis of Peru. When that has been done, we will have the proper footing to review Canada's national security policy.

Canada's security has historically been threatened by United States. Throughout the first one hundred years after the American Revolution, we feared invasions from the

south. And we have today elaborate fortifications in Kingston, Quebec and Halifax left in testimony of this fear. Even as our closest ally today, American policies and our mutual perception of the relationship remain threatening. This of course does not mean that Canadians perceive a physical or military threat from the Americans, but rather consider that the relatively one-way dependency of Canada's economic relationship to the United States, if spoiled, could jeopardize the maintenance of its peoples' standard of living. Hence this plays an important, if not determinant, part in establishing Canadian policy choices. Or as Pierre Trudeau once told the National Press Club in Ottawa, "[living next to the U.S.] is in some ways like sleeping with an elephant. No matter how friendly or temperate the beast, one is affected by every twitch and grunt."²⁴

Unless our borders are deemed secure by the United States, from health, terrorist and trafficking threats to them, there is a risk of cross-border trade being slowed or halted. Furthermore, sour relations with Canada can be used by protectionists as political ammunition for justifying such embargoes as those recently experienced in the lumber and beef export industries. While officially both sides deny this allegation, even CNN and Reuters raise the question as to whether failure to cooperate in defense is affecting the two countries' ability to cooperate in trade.²⁵

During the Cold War, Canada was very closely involved in security matters with the NATO alliance and the United States. Its 'helpful fixer' role in world affairs was particularly well upheld throughout the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956-57.²⁶ Meanwhile, it maintained a fairly independent foreign policy placing itself regularly at odds with its southern neighbor, particularly because of strong stances on the issues of Cuba,

²⁴ http://www.cbc.ca/canadaus/pms_presidents1.html

²⁵ <http://edition.cnn.com/2005/BUSINESS/03/23/us.madcow.reut/>

²⁶ Malone, p 4.

Indochina and Central America. With the end of the Cold War, Canada embarked on an economic restructuring of its fiscal and spending policies, cutting back massively on its international activities. While it continued its involvement in G8 summits and the Summit of the Americas, the lowered ability to act abroad affected its reputation and international profile.²⁷

Throughout the 1990's, Canada defined its interests with far more emphasis on economics than defense or security. Its participation in the trade forums named above and the impressive Team Canada trade missions crystallized this prioritization. "Defense policy, security policy more broadly, largely ran out of steam in Ottawa in the 1990's as cost cutting and the absence of a serious security strategy took their toll."²⁸ The de-prioritization is best exemplified by the fact Canada hadn't reviewed its policies since the 1980's.²⁹ And during this time, its military budget was slashed by 30 percent as the number of troops was reduced from 84 000 to 60 000.³⁰ By the end of this fifteen-year period, Canada's influence on American grand strategy had become minimal to nil.³¹

However, in the post-Sept. 11th environment Canada had to shift its policy in answer to the American changes, and worldwide changes, in priorities. Since then, Canada has sent an important contingent to Afghanistan, and numerous issues have returned to the forefront of national debate, including the war in Irak, foreign aid, ballistic missile defense and investment in the military.³²

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid. pp 10-11

²⁹ Ibid. p. 11

³⁰ Ross, pp. 7-8

³¹ Ross, p. 3

³² Malone, pp 12-18

By 2004, this newly revived interest in security matters had materialized in the creation of a new national security policy. Surprisingly, while Canada had played an important role in developing the concepts of human security and advocating for a broader interpretation of security in its dealings with the United Nations and in its foreign policy in general, when it comes to defining its own threats, Canada recoils into very traditional terms.

In the first pages of *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, Canadian security is categorized into four segments: public health, transportation, border security and international security.³³ While the threat of terrorism post Sept. 11 permeates from cover to cover, other specific experiences and concerns also play a major role in the developing the list.

In the case of public health, which is the only primarily internal threat, the document develops the need to “[protect] Canadians against many current and emerging threats, including contamination of our food and water, major disease outbreaks such as SARS, natural disasters, major accidents like chemical spills, and even the terrorist threat of a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack.”³⁴ It exposes the challenges which revealed themselves in 2003 when the SARS outbreak hit Toronto, including a lack of clarity in leadership and legislative authority, problems of coordination between jurisdictions, as well as a shortage in public health human resources to cope with a surge capacity.³⁵ This demonstrates how an issue can become a security priority when a major event occurs and the country is caught off-guard. Whether Canada will be better prepared

³³ *Securing an open society*, p. ix-x

³⁴ *Ibid* p. 29.

³⁵ *Ibid*. p. 29.

when and if another outbreak occurs is a matter of speculation, but in terms of learning, the document does suggest that weaknesses were identified and (possibly) addressed.

Transportation, border security and international security are the more external threats. They were crystallized especially by the attacks against New York, Bali and Madrid. As a consequence of the new security agenda of the world and particular the United States, Canada has had to adapt in order to remain relevant on the international field as well as sustain strategies and tactics which guarantee easy access to the American market. It is therefore no surprise that many segments of the Canadian security policy place cooperation with the United States as a priority. This is particularly noticeable in plans to standardize to the American ‘smart border system,’³⁶ cooperating on drugs and criminal activity,³⁷ as well as plans which would involve Customs Canada, the Coast Guard, the RCMP and CSIS in more closely integrated activities with the United States.³⁸

The new Canadian stance on international security is actually the old stance revisited. It emphasizes the importance of cooperation within NATO, the UN and the G8. The document plays up the Canadian experience in building peace, engaging dialogue, defusing conflicts, and of course, reviewing its international policy.³⁹ It also reaffirms the Canadian commitment to the 3D approach to international security: defense, diplomacy and development.⁴⁰

What is most striking about Canadian security is that despite (or maybe because of) the lack of immediate threat, the choice of wording at times seems, if not grandiose, at least littered with big words in vague sentences. Examples include: “Strengthen the

³⁶ Securing an Open Society, p 41

³⁷ Ibid. p. 46

³⁸ Ibid. pp. 38-45

³⁹ Ibid. p. 47

⁴⁰ Ibid. pp. 47-52

security of marine facilities,” or better yet, “beginning with the establishment of a dedicated capacity-building fund, Canada will leverage its experience in building peace, order and good government to help developing, failed and failing states.”

Even John McCallum, former Minister of Defense noted that “Canadians do not believe they are true targets of anyone’s hostility – despite 25 dead at the World Trade Center and another four killed in Bali.”⁴¹ This leaves us to wonder why our government would go through the troubles of reviewing national security altogether. The most likely answer, though it is speculative at best, is that Canada’s greatest threat is also its greatest ally. It is important to appear well prepared and defended against immaterial threats, if that allows us to reassure not only the population, but more importantly the American decision-makers, who have it in their power to sow great economic havoc if they perceive threats to the United States emanating from Canada.

The Peruvian Notion of Security

Peru’s White Paper on National Security, published in 2002, gives us a good indication that the government has integrated a broad idea of security into national policy. In the third chapter of the document, security is expanded to include the defense of: 1) the individual, 2) the fundamental rights of the individual, 3) the constitution, 4) independence, 5) sovereignty, 6) territorial integrity, 7) patriotic symbols, 8) the historical legacy and national traditions, and 9) natural resources and national heritage – particularly biodiversity.⁴² While these seven give us a sense of Peru’s broad notion of

⁴¹ Ross, p 19. (Citing Minister of Defence, John McCallum. Speech of Sept. 12 2003.)

⁴² Libro blanco de la defensa nacional de Peru, p. 4 of ch. 3.

security, it is the first two which are particularly relevant to this study. By putting the individual first, Peru is acknowledging the idea of ‘human security’.

In Peru, history explains what kind of learning curve led the government to realize that security goes hand in hand with development. Having suffered from a broad mix of interacting border, drugs and insurgency problems in the last twenty years, the government understands the importance of filling areas of power vacuum, which according to the white paper, “can be filled by the subversion of narcotraffickers, or some delinquent interest groups.”⁴³

It is the realization that power vacuums are the prime threat to Peru which generates a wide understanding of security. One cannot solve the problem by simply poking at it sporadically using coercive forces. A power vacuum must be filled by legitimate governance, economic development, state services and the potential for self-betterment through socially acceptable channels. If the government does not respond to such needs, others will.

During the 1980s and 1990s, Peru was faced with two powerful insurgencies, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), and the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA), of which the former was particularly powerful and destructive. For the sake of brevity, we will focus on the Sendero and forego discussing the MRTA which was smaller and similar enough to the Sendero in methods that it need not full attention within the scope of this essay.

⁴³ Libro blanco de la defensa nacional (Perú) p. 2 of ch. 3.; translated for the sake of this essay by Y. Cormier: “Ese vacío puede ser llenado por la subversión, el narcotráfico, o cualquier grupo de interés delinencial.”

The Senderistas emerged in the late 1960's as an offshoot of the Peruvian Communist Party. Defining itself closely with Maoist doctrine,⁴⁴ it advocates a violent renewal of society somewhat reminiscent of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge.⁴⁵ It has been described as an anachronistic organization in that as the world's left was retreating in the 1980's the Sendero was making its forceful advance.⁴⁶

In May 1980, the Senderistas inaugurated their 'revolutionary phase', which meant they would take their war to the urban centers. The public awoke to find that dead dogs had been hung from lampposts and traffic lights across Lima, near and around state buildings.⁴⁷ "The accompanying signs proclaimed, 'Deng Xiaoping, Son of a Bitch,' as if mention of the architect of counterrevolution in China were a sufficient and relevant political explanation."⁴⁸

Fifteen years of extensive fighting ensued, with casualties in the tens of thousands. The Sendero engaged in particularly brutal forms of terrorism, including the indiscriminate use of bombs set against diplomatic missions of several countries including Japan and the USA. It also planned and executed numerous selective assassinations.⁴⁹ Even following the capture of its leader Abimael Guzman Reynoso (known as Presidente Gonzalo), the insurgency continued its activity and actually intensified in the first few months in reprisal. The movement has nonetheless died down

⁴⁴ Marks, p 25

⁴⁵ Ibid. p 32

⁴⁶ Hinojosa, I. Ed. Stern p. 60

⁴⁷ Stern, p. 1

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ International Counter-Terrorism Academic Community
http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/orgdet.cfm?orgid=42#history

considerably in the last ten years. Some estimates place the number of active Senderistas as low as a few hundreds or even dozens.

What made the insurgency strong in the 1980's keeps it alive today is its association with narcotraffickers. Knowing how the two sources of insecurity interact is essential to understanding the need for a broad view of security, which does not focus so much on fighting one or the other problem, but on the dynamics within this system of threats which sustains itself in mutualism. Both the Sendero and the narcotraffickers benefit from the growth of coca in financial terms; the latter for obvious reasons and the former because it is an essential economic component of the areas it controls as well as a means to empower the peasant base economically and culturally (coca is closely linked to the Inca culture as a medicinal and ceremonial plant⁵⁰). While the Sendero does not necessarily participate actively in the narco-trade, it is able to tax the trade in exchange for securing the territory. The narco-taxation has allowed the Senderistas to get a hold of powerful weapons machine guns, mortars and grenade launchers.⁵¹

While cocaine had been a popular drug at the turn of the 20th century in the United States, its consumption dropped dramatically following its inclusion in the list of narcotics to be outlawed by the passing of The Dangerous Drug Act of 1920.⁵² Its return as a fashion drug in the late 20th century was the result of two important factors, the effective control of amphetamine abuse in the US and the opening of a new agro-industrial horizon in the high jungle of Peru. The former opened up a market for

⁵⁰ Garcia-Sayan, pp. 20-21

⁵¹ Marks, p 40.

⁵² Ibid.

stimulants and the latter generated a capacity to produce. The laws of supply and demand did the rest.⁵³

By the early 1990's Peru had become the largest producer of coca leaves, supplying approximately 60% of the world market. However, American pressure led to a series of eradication policies which reduced the production drastically. "The United States estimates that Peruvian coca cultivation [in 2002] was about 84,000 acres; the United Nations figures it at 114,000 acres. Peruvian government officials concede the figure may be as much as 173,000 acres, far below the high in the early 1990s of 370,000"⁵⁴ Between 1995 and 2002 the total production had fallen by 60%.⁵⁵ The potential cocaine output remained high in 2002 despite the reduction – it was estimated at 160 metric tons per year by the United Nations.⁵⁶

The crop-eradication tactics which is an important component of the American War on Drugs also generates upheaval in the peasant class which can be reaped for ideological purposes. In 2003, major strikes and protests organized by the cocaleros (coca growers) were joined by other labor movements, fueling fears of insurgency revival.⁵⁷

The Peruvian security experience led to a conceptualization of threat which considers the interaction of specific threats as a system. The harder one fights the cocaleros, the more one fills the ranks of dissent, and the more effort is placed on subjugating the insurgency, the fewer resources are available for fighting narco-

⁵³ Lerner, p. 7

⁵⁴ http://www.csdp.org/news/news/colombia_arch.htm

⁵⁵ www.usembassy.it/file2001_01/alia/a1012308.htm ; and <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pe.html>

⁵⁶ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Global Illicit Drug Trends 2003" (United Nations: New York, NY, 2003), p. 22. <http://www.drugwarfacts.org/interdic.htm>

⁵⁷ Sanchez, p. 193

traffickers. The solution for the Peruvian government has been to use an approach to security which attempts to split the nodes of insecurity one from the other, whereby it fights the upper ranks of the criminal groups, but sustains a policy of rebuilding an inclusive society bottom-up to avoid resurgence of the problem. By investing in economic development, health, education and crop substitution, in the country-side, Peru is demonstrating a new and broader vision of what constitutes security, taking into consideration the root causes of both the drug and insurgency problems and the interaction among them.

Comparative Analysis and Impact Analysis

There is a clear divergence between the Canadian and Peruvian experience and this seems to have affected their notions of security. On the surface, the Canadian view strikes us as being narrower than the United Nations view; and the Peruvian one seems much wider than either. Beyond this we notice a significant difference in terms of tone and objective. While Canada asks itself what would happen and what could happen, Peru considers what did happen and how it can be avoided in the future. The effect stands out particularly well in the choice of language and analytical approach in either paper.

On the Canadian side, words are vague and investments to be made cannot be conceptualized in terms of results. What does it mean to invest 300 million dollars on health security?⁵⁸ The document makes no attempt to redefine overarching notions of security or for that matter any notion which may fall under the scope of security. Rather,

⁵⁸ Ibid. p. 33

the document looks at the constitution of threats and plans out specific tactics to address them.

On the other hand, Peru's Libro blanco does more than mere categorizing and planning. It attempts to redefine concepts associated to its security. The best example of this is the notion of 'development', an essential aspect of Peru's new vision for security. Development is no longer seen in terms of GDP and economic gains, but rather as the expansion of liberty and the "elimination of all obstacles which deprive the citizen of his or her full actualization as a human being."⁵⁹ The effect of this reconsideration of an old problem under a new light will allow the government to measure those negatives which it must eliminate, rather than only the positive improvements in economics which cannot as easily be isolated or even equated to improvements in the quality of life.

We are left with the question: have the conceptions of security and the responses they have generated fulfilled the security needs of each country? To avoid a catch 22 by which security needs are fulfilled because they are defined in such a way that the responses fulfill them, and the security responses are validated because they are defined in such a way that the security needs validates them; we will review outcomes in terms external to both systems of definition. In the Peruvian case, we will look at the outcomes of government policies to eradicate power vacuums as well as tangible measures of development in these regions. The Canadian case is more difficult to evaluate since no major event has occurred upon which we could base measures of success. At best we can consider reactions by the Canadian population and the American government.

⁵⁹ Libro blanco, p. 30. Translated by Y. Cormier, "la eliminación de todos los obstáculos que privan al ciudadano de su plena realización como persona humana"

In Peru, the government has come a long way in the last fifteen years. Instead of fighting head on with the insurgency, it realized that it could achieve much better results with a policy of insurgency decapitation (not physical, but by removing the leader), coupled with social development, and reforming political institutions to break apart the historical exclusion of the peasant class. This is a lesson learned from the fifteen years of civil war, where peasants could hardly feel safer in the hands of either the government or the rebels, given the gross violations of human rights both sides were committing.⁶⁰

The Sendero and the MRTA were both decapitated, first, Abimael Guzman of the Sendero Luminoso was captured in 1992, and secondly, the army raided and killed major leaders of the MRTA when it put an end to the hostage-taking in the Japanese embassy (this however, was done by executing all the assailants, which somewhat goes against the idea of building a lawful state). The same thing occurred as recently as January 2005. A small insurgency which emerged in Southern Peru, the Ethnocacerista, was also weakened when its leader, Ollanta Humala was arrested in 2005.⁶¹

With the departure of Fujimori, “both the interim administration of Valentín Paniagua and the new government of President Alejandro Toledo took important steps in 2001 to strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law, while starting to address long neglected human rights problems.”⁶² The fact that Toledo is the country’s first native president also gives some hope that progress is seriously underway.

In terms of social and economic development, there are many indicators, which demonstrate clear efforts by the government from 1990 to the present day (2005). Between 1990 and 2002, education spending rose from 2.2% of GDP to 3.3%; health

⁶⁰ Degregori & Munoz, H. Stern ed. pp. 143, 147, 163, 399, 452, 459

⁶¹ http://www.agenciaperu.com/reportes/2005/ene/humala_fin.htm

⁶² <http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/americas9.html>

spending doubled from 1.3% to 2.6% of GDP, which in absolute terms means the budget was approximately quadrupled; and undernourishment fell from an affliction rate of 40% of the population to 11%.⁶³ As recently as April 2005, the government of Peru's Statistics and Information Department announced that child mortality rates in rural areas had dropped in only five years from 47 / 1000 to 31 / 1000, a 34% decrease. Furthermore improvements in sanitation, clean water, literacy rates in children and availability of communication technologies are highlighted in the UNDP Human Index Development report.⁶⁴ In ten years, the overall social spending has increased in Peru and generated clear results, while military expenditures have subsided to levels comparable to Canada's (1.5% GDP Peru; 1.2 % GDP Canada).⁶⁵ A final testament to this new wave of inclusion and bettering the indigenous populations is the election in 2001 of Alejandro Toledo, the country's first native president. While his neo-liberal economic policies have been ragingly protested,⁶⁶ if his social reforms manage to break some of the old shackles of exclusion, the security environment of Peru will be forever altered.

Some critics of Canada's security policy, particularly the Fraser Institute claims that the military has not received sufficient resources to carry out the goals established in *Securing an Open Society*. It notes that between 2004 and 2005, Canada failed to provide national security when Denmark laid claim to an Arctic island in Canadian territory, that its DART response to the Tsunami was tardy, and that it continues to require help from the USA and Russia for aerial transportation.⁶⁷ It is not surprising that the goals in

⁶³ This number is achieved by using a GDP growth rate of 2.4% annually from 1990-2001: source: http://globalis.gvu.unu.edu/indicator_detail.cfm?IndicatorID=45&Country=PE

⁶⁴ http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/cty/cty_f_PER.html

⁶⁵ http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indic/indic_185_1_1.html

⁶⁶ Sanchez, p. 194

⁶⁷ <http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/admin/books/chapterfiles/Mar05ffballistic.pdf> (Barry Cooper and Mercedes Stephenson)

security as stated in the policy are not necessarily achieved within a year. But even if within ten years they remained improperly addressed, it would not necessarily invalidate the claim that the policy served its purpose. This depends on what the real purpose is. If it is reassurance to stakeholders within and outside Canada, then the outcome is not as important as the wording.

In both countries the notion of security seems to achieve at least partially what is needed from it. The fact that both are very different interpretations of security is essential. Canada could not place the idea of ‘liberty’ at the forefront of its policy for the same reason Peru could not place SARS before power vacuums. A narrow conception of security in Peru would lead the country to another round of forceful and ineffective attacks against cocaine or insurgency, rather than the more inclusive fight against power vacuums through development, inclusion and liberty enhancement. In Canada, a narrower conception of security, coupled with vagueness, allows it to reassure both its population and its threatening ally, against those threats it cannot materially protect itself from, except through planning and organizing possible responses.

The outcome of this comparative study is that security has evolved in both countries as a consequence of experience and the different ways this experience has been internalized by the state. It demonstrates that both countries have different security needs, different security notions and different methods of applying it. The only unifying aspect of security is that no matter where and when one focuses on, it remains the absolute priority of the state. And this has serious theoretical implications.

Effect of Variability on Theory

The variability of security in nature is what makes it applicable in reality. As was shown in the previous section, the fact that each state defines and redefines its own conception of security is precisely what allows it to deal effectively with problems as they surface and in ways that are domestically conceivable and acceptable (if not to the entire nation, at least the decision-makers). Yet, this same beneficial aspect of the nature of security is problematic to some theoretical constructs, particularly Barry Buzan's ideal world, the 'mature anarchy'.

Buzan's dichotomy spreads from the immature to the mature anarchy. The former consists of a chaotic interaction of states, which do not admit legitimate states other than themselves, where countries vie for power and dominance, generating endless war.⁶⁸ The other pole, mature anarchy is composed of states which are "firm in their own definition, and can project their own inner coherence and stability out into the community of states."⁶⁹ The interaction in a mature anarchy is guided by mutual respect and internationally accepted norms. "Non-interference in internal affairs, avoidance of force in the settlement of disputes and adherence to a variety of international institutions for dealing with problems of international scale, would complete the societal machinery of the mature anarchy."⁷⁰

While it may be possible to organize some aspects of interdependency such as trade, travel, immigration and some very limited portions of state policy in general into

⁶⁸ Buzan, p. 175

⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 176

⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 177

an institutionalization of norms and bodies, security is another ballgame. For the same reason used by Buzan in his conclusion, “The word itself is therefore a powerful tool in claiming attention for the priority items in the competition for government attention”⁷¹; the idea that states will moderate their notions of security as they themselves have defined it for their own needs is highly improbable. While a ‘world state’ would be better equipped to define security on the world sphere because it would have the end right and usage of military powers and the structure to react to security threats, a mature anarchy would not. The concept of security would remain national in conception and application, especially if the states are to be firm in their own definition.

In order to answer to this major conceptual problem with his thesis, Buzan does what academics do best: he makes a quick and dismissive comment in the hope that readers will not notice. “State and system are so closely interconnected that security policies based only on the former must be both irrational and inefficient.”⁷² This however, is simply wrong. In the Peruvian case, the methods use to solve security problems were not at all synchronized or based on international notions of security. They were rational and efficient reactions to the interconnectedness of internal threats. In reality, security is above all a national phenomenon, because the state is the ultimate instrument of security and consequently infused with internal and external expressions of this instrumentality. International security is not an entity which runs parallel to or above national security; it is a whole constituted of multiple national parts.

The problem of state security in an international sphere is quite detrimental to Buzan’s argument. The reason why it is detrimental is that if states cannot agree on what

⁷¹ Ibid. p. 370

⁷² Ibid. p. 175

constitutes security, then struggle is bound to be an outcome, even within a so-called ‘mature anarchy’. For the mature anarchy to exist, it must allow for the existence of a universal concept of security. There is also place for state-defined security, but it must exist in parallel, if not in subordination, to the universal notion which stabilizes the mature anarchy as a whole.

This explains why Buzan must widen the scope of security in his analysis. If the notion is wide enough, it will give the illusion of solving the problem. Only by encompassing the whole fluidity of national security in an international universal can Buzan fulfill his theoretical end. Otherwise international anarchy, be it mature, immature, childish or senile, will have to subordinate its security to the whims of states and their conceptions of security as these vary from one place to another and time after time.

Conclusion

To paraphrase Alexander Wendt, security is what states make of it.⁷³ It can be made specific if it helps those who are providing security conceptualize and focus on priorities. It can be made vague to gloss over problems that are either too hard to address or too unpredictable to effectively prepare. It can be made infinitely wide and all encompassing if that can help an academic achieve the pride of having elaborated a credible, though rather unimpressive, ‘synthesis’ of all things international. In the end, the only real measure of how useful, applicable or valuable one’s conception of security

⁷³ Wendt, p. 391

is 'what you make of it', because only an honest review of outcomes can offer a valid critique.

In this essay, we found that by studying security as it evolves through time, within different spatial determinants such as geography and culture, one can identify its fluidity as an outcome of experience and internalization. Peru and Canada have significantly different conceptions of security, and while Peru's has generated much more change in policy than Canada's, this cannot amount to a demonstration that one is better than the other. In both countries, the security policies fulfill at least in part what the country needs them to fulfill, whether that is vague or conceptual.

The theoretical effect of fluidity is that security is and must be a relative concept. One can isolate it in time and discover that it varies in space, or isolate it in space and discover it varies in time. The only exception is when one isolates it both in time and space. Here, it takes on an absolute form because it is deemed so by the state. Since national security is always the top priority, as soon as one decides what this national security entails, then, at a specific spatio-temporal coordinate, nothing can invalidate it except something more threatening.

In the end, Buzan's mature anarchy, which offers an end goal towards which international society should advance, can only be possible if it does not challenge this fundamental fluid and absolute nature of security. It only gives the illusion of achieving this. One cannot achieve a synthesis of the firm-state versus system-based security dichotomy with a wider notion of security, because it becomes a race between a universal concept and the growing inclusion of all variations until the synthesis becomes too wide to be credible.

Since Buzan cannot reconcile the universal with the absolute and the universal with the fluid, there can be no “mature anarchy” in this world. Any struggle or clash between two states motivated by their distinct and conflicting concepts of security will necessarily destabilize the mature anarchy – at which point it effectively ceases to be mature.

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