

The Kurtz Factor:  
Charismatic Leadership in War and Terrorism

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INTRODUCTION

Military history, and one could argue all of human history, is rarely recorded in terms of unfolding events and their consequences alone. Rather, the retelling of history, its intellectual reconstruction, very often comprises a cast of characters who, through their leadership, their vision, and their personality, hover heroically above the fold. Inherently, one cannot divorce the invention of the aircraft from the Wright brothers, transatlantic flight from Charles Lindbergh, or radium from Marie Curie. The laws of historical reconstruction which govern the description of armed conflict do appear to operate in the same way: from Adolph Hitler, Winston Churchill, and Franklin D. Roosevelt in World War II, to Ho Chi Minh and Diem in Vietnam, Fidel Castro in Cuba to Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the paths of war are seemingly defined by the leaders who emerged at the time.

What is less obvious, however, is whether these wars would have been the same—or in fact would have been fought in the first place—absent such leaders. It is important to be conscious of the fact that the writing of history is in many ways similar to the act of storytelling, and that plot, morality, a cast of characters, are all part of the process. As a result, the historian, with the benefit—or perhaps the hindrance—of hindsight, may be inclined to ascribe events to certain characters, and in the process make it appear as if those events would not have happened, or would have taken a different shape, had those characters not been participants. Hindsight can therefore be an intellectual trap because it forces the historian to consider the outcome before analysing the variables which existed before, and led to, the event. Contemplating the burning cities of Europe, or reading through lists of names of civilians who were swallowed by the Nazi concentration camps, it is nearly impossible not to attribute these atrocious events to the evil mind of Hitler, and it is also a near intellectual impossibility to conceive of these atrocities being committed without having that individual in charge. Still, might it not be cognitively irresponsible to blame the artisan who lays the last brick at the top of a spire for the deadly collapse that ensues?

This paper attempts to determine if indeed strong, charismatic leadership is a prerequisite for states or sub-state groups to go to war. For the purposes of this paper, charismatic leadership is defined as the “Big Man” who, through the manipulation of image, “chauvinistic mythmaking,”<sup>1</sup> powerful oratory skills, or the quasi-religious, if not cult-like reverence the leader inspires in his followers, can lead to an explosion of organised violence. Drawing from history, political science, psychology, philosophy, and literature, Part I endeavours to explain which character traits in leaders can give rise to a willingness, in the population, to follow someone through the descent into violence. This section also draws upon speeches delivered by a number of leaders, or description of such leaders by the state-run media, which gives us an insight into the linguistics of strong leadership. It is the author’s belief that the criteria used in this paper to assess charismatic leadership represent a good start; however, they should not be considered to be the only criteria by which to make such an analysis.

It is incumbent upon us, at the outset, to differentiate between mere conflict (or protracted conflict) and armed conflict: conflict is inherent to existence; nature constantly vies against itself, as do snow crystals and the sun. Armed conflict, on the other hand, is an intellectualised decision to push a state of conflict over the edge and to use violence to bring about a result (the terms war

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<sup>1</sup> Van Evera, Stephen, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*, An International Security Reader, Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), p. 48.

and armed conflict will be used interchangeably throughout this paper, and both are intended to have the same meaning). What this paper attempts to define, in Part II, is not whether charismatic leadership is a prerequisite for conflict—it is not. What needs to be determined, however, is the subtler question as to whether charismatic leadership is required for a people to make the jump from conflict to armed conflict. The underlying theme to this paper is that charismatic leadership is, in most cases, a prerequisite for conflict to degenerate into armed conflict. This section presents a number of arguments, mostly at the psychological level, supporting the contention that it actually makes sense for people to wait for the emergence of a leader before engaging in violence.

For reasons both academic and resulting from constraints in length, this paper focuses on intrastate armed conflict since the end of the Cold War (in other words, from circa 1990 to the present). Every now and then, however, telling references will be made to non-interstate conflicts that occurred over the past fifty years. One advantage which derives from a focus on intrastate armed conflict, which opposes a government to one or more groups within the state in question, or groups against each other, is that charismatic leadership as war leader is not as obviously recognisable as would be the case in an interstate armed conflict, where one head of state is inevitably pitted against another head of state. In intrastate armed conflict, one side needs to see the emergence—not through elections, not through a coup d'état—of a form of leadership. If that side is opposed to the government in power, then one form of leadership has already been determined: that of the government in power. If two or more groups are warring among themselves, such as warlords within a failed state, then the accretion of grievances, added to charisma and the right circumstances, will help explain the emergence of a leadership strong enough to push part of a population to war.

For the purposes of this paper, a list of 67 conflict-prone regions has been adopted. This list, which appears in Part III, is taken from the August 2005 edition of the Crisis Watch newsletter, published by the International Crisis Group, a non-governmental watch dog. Based on this list and the matrix that emerges from it, we will attempt to answer the question as to whether charismatic leadership can explain why certain states have made the leap from conflict to armed conflict, or are about to do so. This exercise should also allow us to see if it is possible for armed conflict to happen in spite of the absence of such leadership—or the reverse, wherein strong leadership did not lead to war. This paper concludes with a discussion of the impact of the findings issuing from this exercise on contemporary terrorism and insurgency.

...the sense of his power as a personal thing, to which we were all attached as with strings, which he might pull or let dangle.

— V.S. Naipaul, *A Bend in the River*<sup>2</sup>

You can't judge Mr. Kurtz as you would an ordinary man [...] he wanted to shoot me, too, one day—but I don't judge him.

— Joseph Conrad, *Heart of Darkness*<sup>3</sup>

The title of this paper was inspired by the mysterious character in Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*. Through his mystical appeal, Mr. Kurtz, the manager of a trading station in the Belgian Congo, has managed to create a society of abject followers, and all of those individuals—the Congolese and Europeans alike—who have fallen under his charisma have abandoned their individual will to his cruel bidding. While this does not occur in the famous novel, it is quite likely that had Mr. Kurtz decided to launch a war against a neighbouring colony, another country, or the encroaching Europeans, members of his society would have willingly joined in the murderous endeavour.

This paper intends to demonstrate that in most cases there is a need for strong, charismatic leadership to transform conflict into war. Before we make the case, however, we must define what charismatic leadership is, where it comes from, what its symptoms are, and how it manifests itself. This is what this section intends to accomplish. It is hoped that by determining that which makes charismatic leadership, policymakers will be better positioned to identify emerging leaders before a situation plunges into armed conflict. This way, the symptoms described below, attendant to the emergence of charismatic leadership, could serve as alarm bells signalling that a conflict is on the brink of becoming violent; third-party actors may therefore decide to shift their policies or, if so required, act preventively. This section is broken into four subsections, which follow, in linear fashion, the birth of charismatic leadership in a conflict environment.

### The Man of the Moment

“Men,” writes historian Marc Bloch, “are more the sons of their time than of their fathers.”<sup>4</sup> Beyond genetics and that which is intrinsic to an individual's personality, one's social environment has a powerful influence on character building. While a series of factors contribute to making a person who she is—in other words, genetic factors and one's environment—as a general rule children who are reared in a stable and peaceful environment are less likely to develop murderous pathologies than would individuals who develop under less fortunate, and more violent, conditions. Childhood trauma, growing up in an environment of poverty, despair, humiliation, violence, or insecurity will inevitably shape an individual's personality. These traumas, Richard Rhodes argues in *Why They Kill*, may lead to what he calls the process of

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<sup>2</sup> Naipaul, V. S., *A Bend in the River* (New York: Random House, 1997), p. 278.

<sup>3</sup> Conrad, Joseph, *Heart of Darkness* (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 79.

<sup>4</sup> Quoted in Maalouf, p. 101.

“violentisation,” or “dramatic self-change.”<sup>5</sup> By exposing a malleable individual long enough to trauma, he will be shaped by it and will become a product of that environment, of the underlying conflict.

While Rhodes explores the family unit as the shaping environment, sectors of a state can, too, serve as negative nurturing environments. Repressed minorities, from those whose fundamental rights are systematically violated to those who over generations have been subjected to ethnic cleansing or genocide, will over time give rise to individuals whose self-definition is the offshoot of that system. But that, in and of itself, is not sufficient to give rise to “Big Men” such as Ernesto Guevara, Paul Kagame, or a Foday Sankoh. Where charismatic leadership emerges is at the nexus of nature and nurture, at the point where one’s innate leadership skills, his talents as an orator,<sup>6</sup> allow one to seize a protracted grievance by the reins and lead the entire caravan in an altogether different direction: that of mass violence.

Before we continue, a brief aside is in order. The above argument forces us to confront the inevitable question of the impact of single individuals on the course of history. Following the logic of the argument, one could be tempted to make the seemingly reasonable argument that the catastrophe of World War II could have been avoided had Adolph Hitler been removed before he could unleash his evil upon Europe and, to a lesser extent, Africa. Of course, since we cannot go back in time to conduct this experiment, this question is only of partial value. Nevertheless, we can safely assume that the course of World War II may have been different without a Hitler to shape it. But this only explores half of the problem: the removal of Hitler does not address the poverty, the humiliation, the racism, and the social unease which characterised German society in the 1930s—the underlying pressures which allowed a Hitler to seize power and make history. Now, one must be cautious not to seem to condone Hitler’s skewed world-view, let alone excuse his murderous behaviour, by blaming the environment in which he evolved. True, Germany was in a desperate state, and the crushing war reparations that had been imposed upon it following its defeat in World War I were partly to blame, but by no means was this a reason to spark the most murderous war in the history of humanity. What this means, however, is that the environment had become desperate enough to allow for the emergence of such a leader. It may not have been Adolph Hitler, but someone with a similar perspective on the situation, and with enough charisma to lead his country to war. Every society, after all, has enough natural leaders to fill that vacuum, though it may take years before the right leader meets the right circumstances. Absent a Hitler, the course of history would likely have differed, but probably not that dramatically. One single person can only achieve so much.

It may seem that the above argument undermines the theory of charismatic leadership we have proposed so far, but it does not. It simply shows that a catalyst, in the form of a leader, is necessary for protracted conflict to turn violent. The leader’s personality itself is not so important, as long as that individual has enough charisma to capture his followers’ imagination and thereby become a symbol to their cause. And it goes without saying that absent a conflict, the potential war leader does not have the ammunition that will propel him to a position of power. In other words, protracted conflict gives rise to war leadership, not the other way around.

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<sup>5</sup> Rhodes, Richard, *Why They Kill: The Discoveries of a Maverick Criminologist* (New York: Vintage, 2000), p. 283.

<sup>6</sup> Oratory skills are in fact part of followers’ appreciation of their leader, and the media will often be quick to analyse the nature of a leader’s speech in qualitative terms. See, for example, *Media Reactions to President Mugabe’s Hero’s Day Speech in FBIS*, August 16, 2002, where it is pointed out that Mugabe, who is “an inimitable orator,” “...did not sound like himself” and that his speech “didn’t flow smoothly” and “lacked [his] favourite phrases.”

Finally, as this paper focuses on intrastate conflict, it is important at this point to recognise that we are likely to encounter two main types of leadership: that of the president or prime minister and his immediate clique, or what Stuart J. Kaufman calls government jingoism<sup>7</sup>; and the guerrilla leader, political opponent, insurgent, or terrorist, or, to use Kaufman's language once more, the elite conspiracy.<sup>8</sup> It is principally this type of leadership that we are interested in, as it is the representative of the repressed side that is likely to want to change the status quo and redress a grievance.

But what is it that pushes someone with the natural skills of a leader to emerge from the homogenous cesspool of grievance, to become the face of a conflict, and transform it into an instrument of war?

### From "Che" to Shoko, or Why Do Leaders Want to Lead?

"Every man would like to be God, if it were possible," wrote Bertrand Russell. "Of the infinite desires of man, the chiefs are the desires for power and glory."<sup>9</sup> For some leaders, power and glory will indeed be the coveted goal. For other, more altruistic leaders, power and glory will be attendant to no less humble objectives, such as the liberation of their people. Suffice it to say, there probably are as many motivations as there are leaders out there. For the purposes of this paper, however, four principal motivators are used to explain why potential leaders will decide to make the leap into history. We shall not dwell too long on these, but it is nevertheless important to go through them as they will help explain the motivations of followers, which we discuss in Part II. The reader should note, too, that charismatic leaders are not immutably driven by a single motivator type, and that these motivations can change over time.

The first motivator, which is closest to Russell's "impulse to power," is the need to occupy a place in history. The desperation of one's people provides an opportunity to bypass the natural progression to power. While armed conflict may, once hostilities have ceased, lead to better conditions for the peoples represented, it is a mere means to an end for the leader, with the presidency and the attendant power and glory the main objective. Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, Liberia's Charles Taylor, the Congo's Joseph Désiré Mobutu and Laurent Kabila, and Haiti's Jean-Bertrand Aristide are examples of this type of motivator. After defeating or overthrowing their opponents, these leaders did very little, if anything at all, to improve their people's lot, and did everything in their capacity to stay in power.

The second, sometimes more altruistic motivator, is what we could describe as the "Robin Hood" syndrome. While victory in arms may lead to their becoming head of state, the principal objective of these leaders' endeavours is the liberation of their peoples or the redressing of a historical grievance. In some cases, these leaders may indeed be reticent to become heads of state. Had he chosen the path of violence, Czechoslovakia's Vaclav Havel would be such a leader, as were Rwanda's Paul Kagame, Afghanistan's Hamid Karzai, Cuba's adopted Ernesto Guevara, Nicaragua's Manuel Noriega, Sudan's John Garang, Lebanon's Hassan Nasrallah, the Palestinians' Yaser Arafat, Northern Ireland's Michael Collins, or South Africa's Nelson Mandela. As a general rule, these leaders, once in power, try to ensure that their people reap the

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<sup>7</sup> Kaufman, Stuart J., "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War," in Brown, Côté Jr., Lynn-Jones and Miller, p. 171.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Russell, Bertrand, *Power: A New Social Analysis* (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 3.

benefits of victory, and will usually exit the political scene via more diplomatic means. However, as Havel himself remarks in *The Art of the Impossible*,<sup>10</sup> one must note the potential for power to corrupt the initial intentions of these leaders.

Inversely, the third motivator is greed, not in terms of reaching the pinnacles of power (which may nevertheless be a desirable consequence), but rather greed in economic terms. Such leaders may use the language of grievance and historical injustice to rally people to their cause, but the ultimate aim is either resource capture (e.g., diamonds, oil, timber) or a position in the existing government which will give them access to substantial sums of money. Sierra Leone's Foday Sankoh, Colombia's Pablo Escobar and Manuel Marulanda, Somalia's Mohamed Farrah Aidid, Afghanistan's Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, or Angola's Jonas Savimbi, are examples of leaders who were driven by this type of motivator.

Finally, another motivator is mental illness, or nihilism. Rarely explored in political science, a field which tends to operate under the assumption that all actors are rational, mental illness, sociopathic behaviour, religious fanaticism, megalomania, and nihilism—the belief that the world needs to be destroyed to save it—could help explain why some individuals become charismatic leaders. Their apocalyptic vision of the world, which oftentimes is couched in religious rhetoric,<sup>11</sup> takes no one's wellbeing into consideration, and the motivation comes more in the nature of the act itself—mass murder—than what comes after it.<sup>12</sup> Japan's cult leader Shoko Asahara,<sup>13</sup> Cambodia's Pol Pot, Uganda's Joseph Kony, and to an extent al-Qaeda's Osama bin Laden, are examples of leaders operating under such motivators. Given that mental illness or megalomania are the “motivators,” the leaders in this category will less likely need to be the product of protracted grievances than are those who belong to the other three categories. However, their followers, who undoubtedly cannot all be of such deranged minds, will likely be the products of some form of grievance, such as poverty, unemployment, regional disparity, or a societal malaise—and it is those factors which will allow a swath of that population to follow a nihilistic leader.

### Mythmaking

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<sup>10</sup> Havel, Vaclav, *The Art of the Impossible, Politics and Morality in Practice* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), p. 72.

<sup>11</sup> For example, see Profile: Uganda's LRA rebels, by Martin Plaut, BBC News UK edition of February 6, 2004 [<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3462901.stm>] which describes the Lord's Resistance Army's leader as “mysterious” and who “uses biblical references to explain why it is necessary to kill his own people.” The LRA is also well known for its abduction of children, whom it turns into child soldiers. In his memoirs, former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, who visited Northern Uganda in 2002, refers to the LRA as “semi-spiritualist” movement, whose members “smeared butter on their bodies to ward off bullets.” *Navigating a New World: Canada's Global Future* (Toronto: Random House, 2003), p. 13.

<sup>12</sup> It has long been a subject of debate as to whether Adolph Hitler was mentally ill. Some argue that he suffered from schizophrenia. Nevertheless, there is no arguing that the leader of the Nazi Party “deliberately cultivated religious-style charisma” and made frequent references to “the words of the prophet.” See Glover, Jonathan, *Humanity: A History of the Twentieth Century* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1999), p. 329.

<sup>13</sup> “Chizuo Matasumoto, also known as Shoko Asahara, a partially blind, self-proclaimed ‘only person who has acquired supreme truth’, is a very charismatic Yoga instructor [...] ‘for the followers [...] to live through Armageddon, they had to become one with [him]. This meant ‘physical infusion of the leader’s power, energy and knowledge into the believer.’ *Extremist Groups: An International Compilation of Terrorist Organisations, Violent Political Groups, and Issue-Oriented Militant Movements*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Huntsville: Office of International Criminal Justice and the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups, Sam Houston University, 2002.

The term symbol was used earlier in this section to describe charismatic leadership in a conflict environment. After years of protracted conflict, a certain status quo usually installs itself, and despite the ebb and flow of pressures, the situation remains static. That is, until someone—the charismatic leader—emerges, at which point he comes to symbolise not only his people’s grievance, real or imagined, but also the drive to change the status quo, which has become untenable (more on this in the next section). This, of course, does not happen overnight, and a leader’s charisma aside, a mythmaking apparatus usually needs to come into play. The emerging leader’s name will increasingly appear in programs on radio, television, and in the newspapers. Another means by which we can identify the emergence of a new leader, of someone who may decide to lead his people down the road to violence, is the appearance of catchy surnames to describe the leadership. One should note that these sobriquets can either be adopted by the leaders themselves, or given them by others, supporters and opponents alike. All of a sudden, the media begins circulating news about “Che” (Ernesto Guevara), “Vuk” (Draskovic), “Sureshot” (FARC leader Manuel Marulanda), “Papa Doc” (Duvalier), “Pol Pot” (Saloth Sar), “El Cura” (ELN leader Manuel Perez), “Supreme Leader” (Ayatollah Khomeini), “Lion of Panshjr” (Ahmed Shah Massoud), “Commander Zero” (Sandinista leader Eden Pastora), “Father of the Nation” (Gandhi), “President for Life” (Turkmen president Saparmurat Nyazov), “Dr. Death” (Karadzic) “Al-Khityar” [“the Old Man”] (Arafat), “Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga [“the warrior who knows no defeat because of his endurance and inflexible will and is all powerful, leaving fire in his wake as he goes from conquest to conquest”]<sup>14</sup> and so on. Other leaders will attribute themselves military titles which were never granted by any recognised armed force.<sup>15</sup> A cult of personality, sometimes giving the leader superlative attributes,<sup>16</sup> generally accompanies the emergence of a charismatic leader, as does a change in or the adoption of a recognisable way of dressing. As the leader builds his image, his use of language—including recurrent keywords—can be quite revealing. Such leaders will often come to see themselves as the saviours of, or some form of surrogate father figure to, their people. A heightened sense of paranoia oftentimes accompanies such leaders’ speeches. As they come to personify the conflict, these leaders inevitably become the conflict, and as a result any threat to their cause becomes a threat to their person, and vice-versa. (As we shall see in the next subsection, this sense of paranoia is exacerbated by the “other side” also referring to the conflict in terms of personality.)

In a way, for leaders to become charismatic leaders symbolic to a people, they must become someone else, actors on a stage—hence the surnames. Furthermore, for the illusion to be maintained, for the symbol to persist, the leader cannot waver from that acquired persona. Over time, we can expect to see what we might call the “slide into mythmaking,” whereby the leader loses sight of reality and truly becomes the personification of the conflict, losing his identity to, and his emotional distance from, it. In the process, the leader’s very existence, his *raison d’être*, becomes dependent upon that conflict. A leader could also feel “locked in,” meaning that his

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<sup>14</sup> In Meredith, Martin, *The Fate of Africa, From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair: A History of 50 Years of Independence* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), p. 296.

<sup>15</sup> For example, during the conflict in Sierra Leone, Foday Sankoh was oftentimes referred to as Corporal Sankoh (see Ninjas interview with Foday Sankoh, April 28, 1999) while he admitted himself to having left the military long ago (“We are all brothers. I joined the Army during colonial days, 1956. I am no longer a soldier, I am not a professional soldier...” in Freetown Concord Times, “Sankoh’s Speech in Makeni,” February 1, 2000.

<sup>16</sup> For example, in Nazi Germany it was said that “The sun shone all the time he was there, in proverbial ‘Hitler weather.’ Before his arrival and after he left, it rained so hard we were drenched.” Quoted in Glover, p. 329.

followers—immediate and more distant—will not allow him to waver from the initial image that he created for himself. Both the “slide into mythmaking” and the “locking in” may have deleterious consequences for attempts to prevent, mitigate, or end an armed conflict, in that the leader may have reached such a point in the myth as to make certain actions impossible.

Finally, the mythical charismatic leader may also transform the original conflict into a greater cause. Examples of this are provided by Zaire’s President Mobutu and Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, who over time came to see threats to their leadership through the lens of White conspiracies targeting all of Black Africa; or Osama bin Laden taking it upon himself to “liberate” the entire Muslim world.

### Superlatives, Sobriquets, and False Analogies

Another way through which analysts can determine that a charismatic leader has emerged, or is about to, is by analysing the use of language by the opposing side to the conflict, or by the world media. Usually, the presence of superlatives and analogies, both in the media and in leaders’ speeches, indicates that whoever it is that symbolises the other side is being demonised. In this tradition, both Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic have drawn comparisons to Adolph Hitler,<sup>17</sup> descriptions which, while they may succeed in isolating the opponent, are false analogies at best. Conversely, there are emerging leaders who have also been portrayed by the media in similar overstatements, as was Paul Kagame of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), who was given the sobriquet “Napoleon of Africa.”<sup>18</sup> As was mentioned above, this tendency to describe leadership in such terms reinforces the personalisation of conflict and contributes to the mythmaking. It may also, as was the case in Rwanda, be used to inspire enough fear in a people that the latter will choose to “kill the ‘enemy’ before he kills you,” a reinforcement of the classical security dilemma. While the wider uses of language is beyond the scope of this paper, it would be interesting to investigate the above phenomenon within the context of uses of language as a process of dehumanisation of the other, which is another indicator that conflict may be on the brink of becoming violent.<sup>19</sup>

Now that we have looked at the salient symptoms and characteristics of charismatic leaders in protracted conflict, let us examine how the foregoing traits will turn those leaders into catalysts for armed conflict—in other words, conflict accelerators.

## PART II: CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP AS A PREREQUISITE

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<sup>17</sup> See Herring, George C., “Analogies at War: The United States, the conflict in Kosovo, and the uses of history,” in *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship*, Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur, ed., (New York: United Nations University, 2000), p. 348-9.

<sup>18</sup> See Dallaire, Roméo, *Shake Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Toronto: Random House, 2003), p. 67.

<sup>19</sup> See Ignatieff, Michael, *The Warrior’s Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience* (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1998), p. 56.

“Not having to think for myself or make any decisions was a big factor. Just leave it up to them, and since the order comes from Mr. Asahara, who’s enlightened, you know everything’s been well thought out.”

— Aum Shinrikyo member, in Murakami Haruki,  
*Underground*<sup>20</sup>

## Torchbearers

Despite all the character traits which have been discussed in the previous section, the charismatic leader will be an impotent one unless he has a cause that has festered long enough that, once exploited, can be used to justify the need for violence. In *In the Name of Identity*, novelist Amin Maalouf writes:

In the midst of any community that has been wounded, agitators naturally arise. Whether they are hot-heads or cool schemers, their intransigent speeches act as balm to their audience’s wounds. They say one shouldn’t beg others for respect: respect is a due and must be forced from those who would withhold it. They promise victory or vengeance, they inflame men’s minds, sometimes they use extreme methods that some of their brothers may merely have dreamed of in secret. The scene is now set and the war can begin.<sup>21</sup>

Beyond providing a “balm to the audience’s wounds,” the charismatic leader can in fact use these wounds to espouse and, more to the point, inspire a population with increasingly extremist views which support the use of violence. Kaufman writes, “To be effective, extremist appeals must also fall on willing ears, so outbidding can only work when the preconditions for mass hostility also exist.”<sup>22</sup> “Outbidding,” Kaufman explains, is the process wherein “belligerent elites contribute to [...] conflict through a process [...] in which they compete with each other to promote increasingly extreme [...] positions.”<sup>23</sup> In other words, in the marketplace of ideas potential leaders vie for their peoples’ attention, and the more extreme the position, the better are the chances that such a position will be selected for and adopted—provided, that is, that the status quo has become untenable and that action, no matter the consequences, is perceived as a better alternative to inaction. As Maalouf writes, “The only thing that counts is the point of view of ‘our’ side; a point of view that is often that of the most militant, the most demagogic and the most fanatical members of the community.”<sup>24</sup> This, of course, encourages and compounds the development of all the idiosyncratic character traits discussed in the previous section. The outbidding process involves actors on a stage, with all the props, costumes, and special effects required to sway the audience. As the charismatic leader is one who promises to address the issues proper to that community, it would be difficult to imagine a people choosing a charismatic

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<sup>20</sup> Murakami, Haruki, *Underground: The Tokyo Gas Attack and the Japanese Psyche* (New York: Vintage, 2001), p. 337.

<sup>21</sup> Maalouf, Amin, *In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong* (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), p. 27. [My italics.]

<sup>22</sup> Kaufman, p. 175.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170.

<sup>24</sup> Maalouf, p. 31. [My italics.]

leader who does not come from within that community. Differently put, the leader has to be indigenous to the conflict.

Evidently, extremist views alone will not suffice to push a population towards armed conflict. After all, almost anybody can espouse extreme positions, or voice them out in some fashion. For extremist views, however irrational, to turn from smoke into a bonfire, though, they must be proposed by a leader with a power of persuasion strong enough, or as psychologist Neil Kressel calls it, enough “hypnotic appeal,”<sup>25</sup> as to sway the masses. This would explain, therefore, why charismatic leaders, as mentioned above, are generally good orators. It is the force of their words, the aura of might that surrounds them, all compounded by the tools of mythmaking, that allows potential leaders to harness the power of the ebullient masses and transform it into an instrument of violence.

One interesting observation, made by Van Evera, is that “the less legitimate the governments or leaders of nationalist movements, the greater their propensity to purvey mythical nationalist beliefs, hence the greater risk of war.”<sup>26</sup> One way by which “illegitimate” yet charismatic leaders may be identified therefore lies in the appeal to the mythical, the religious, and the supernatural—again, all traits which were discussed in Section I. Charismatic leaders who are motivated more by greed than by a will to serve one’s people would probably fit that category. Since resource capture is unlikely to ameliorate the fate of a large proportion of a population and will rather enrich but a few individuals close to power, the rhetoric that is necessary to rally a people to such a greedy cause must be of such persuasive power as can probably only be achieved through references to the magical or the religious. While this lies outside the scope of this paper, it would be interesting to determine if groups that are historically more religious are in turn more susceptible to manipulation of this kind, which would make armed conflict more an irrational act than the more “understandable” attempt to address a wrong.

Now that we have looked at the aspects of the charismatic leader, it is incumbent upon us to touch on the psychological impact that the leader has upon the masses, for beyond persuasion, above the unlocking of built-up anger, lies the liberating power of anonymity.

### The Anonymity of the Flock

In his treatise *On Aggression*, behavioural scientist Konrad Lorenz refers to the “anonymity of the flock,” a phenomenon which he explains as follows: “[...] even the simple and seemingly innocuous mechanisms of anonymous flocking can turn into something not only inhuman but truly terrible. In human society [...] there is one contingency in which [mechanisms] erupt with the uncontrollable power of a volcano and gain complete mastery over man, causing behaviour that can no longer be called human.”<sup>27</sup> This is the power of anonymity, of the facelessness that comes from being part of the masses. However, it is important to remember that in and of itself, the anonymity of the flock is not sufficient for the emergence of armed conflict; a spark, a catalyst, a symbol that will goad the masses and lead them to adopt violence, is required.

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<sup>25</sup> Kressel, Neil J., *Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror* (New York: Westview, 2002), p. 121. Writing about Hitler’s effect on ordinary Germans, Kressel notes that “they were drawn to Hitler himself in a way they cannot understand, explain, or justify. They recall themselves screaming furiously at rallies and they do not recall why they behaved in a matter than now seems ridiculous, even to them.”

<sup>26</sup> Van Evera, p. 30.

<sup>27</sup> Lorenz, Konrad, *On Aggression* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 143.

“There is a widespread human willingness to obey even terrible orders,” writes historian Jonathan Glover.<sup>28</sup> A people’s acquiescence to the use of violence is the result of a number of pressures, which include vertical and horizontal pressure. Vertical pressure, Glover writes, is the need to obey orders that come from the leadership. It is probably safe to assume that the more charismatic the leader, the more yielding his followers will be to vertical pressure. Horizontal pressure, on the other hand, is the need to conform with members of the group, to ride the wave of the masses. Given seemingly shared grievances and a process of mythmaking that through skill of manipulation becomes part of a people’s identity, the pressure to conform to the group becomes overpowering. In fact, this type of need to demonstrate one’s “identity” may have played a large role in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, in which Hutus who refused to participate in the genocidal designs of the government were also slain. One demonstrated his Hutu-ness, therefore, by taking part in the violence against the other group, the Tutsi. In situations where the charismatic leader has such hypnotic appeal as to become the identity of his people, “the pressure to obey and to conform,” Glover writes, “can reinforce each other.”<sup>29</sup>

The intertwining of group identity with that of the charismatic leader could provide a clue into tyrants and totalitarian regimes. In fact, it is the process of disconnecting from one’s historical identity and the adoption, instead, of the charismatic leader’s mysticism—religious or ideological—that may explain why large numbers of people will choose to follow the orders, however extreme, of a single individual, or build an architecture of state, such as in the Stalinist Soviet Union or under Romania’s Ceausescu regime, whose sole function it is to serve the leader.

Once the myth is in place, and once the individual has reached a point where he is willing to abandon his personal identity to that of the group, the charismatic leader, like a puppeteer, will be in a position to pull the strings and command his people to war. The loss of one’s identity also implies the loss of one’s lines of morality; like the leader, the individual becomes an actor on stage, his grasp of reality whittled away by the myth created by the charismatic leader and, if such is the case, the apparatus that gravitates around him. This explains why so many combatants will later rationalise their actions by claiming that they were merely “following orders.” It is the deresponsibilisation that comes from the flock mentality that allows for mass violence to explode.

On their own, and in spite of the accumulation, real or imagined, of grievances, iniquity, poverty and other injustices, the individual will rarely adopt the path of violence, let alone violence on a large scale. In fact, it would seem that human beings tend to accept their fate, however deplorable it is, rather than pick up arms in an attempt to alter their situation. Only the emergence of a charismatic leader will inspire them to do more, and the masses follow because someone has picked up the garb of responsibility—and all that this implies—for them.

## Downfall

Evidently, the charismatic leader who, for whatever reason, decides to lead his people into violence, must accept the responsibility that comes with that decision. When his actions succeed, the charismatic leader reaps the glory, the love of those he leads, and the bounty. However, when the use of violence results in defeat, the consequences will largely weigh upon his shoulders and

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<sup>28</sup> Glover, p. 332.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 333.

those individuals who were close to him. This, too, is part of the crucial role the charismatic leader plays in a people's decision to transform a conflict into an armed conflict: when things fail, it is easy to blame the architects ("I was following orders"). Suddenly, the revered leader becomes the sacrificial lamb. The charismatic leader is either executed or sent to a tribunal, his sins are exposed in the international media, and he is reviled. Meanwhile, the followers meekly look away. This is another result of the anonymity of the flock guided by a charismatic leader: when the campaign fails, only the identifiable leaders will suffer the immediate consequences of defeat. Despite the fact that a large number of people engaged in acts of mass violence, it is nigh impossible to punish them en masse; instead, only the symbols—the high leadership—are targeted by the victors. It therefore becomes quite feasible for a normal individual to follow orders and to kill when he knows that, in case of defeat, the consequences of his actions to himself will likely be minimal, if not nil. In a way, this is very symptomatic of the process of mythmaking we have discussed throughout this paper: by prosecuting the leadership, the victorious opponent, or the international community, as in the cases of Rwanda and Sierra Leone, buys into the myth, knowing (or hoping) that the removal of the charismatic leader and his immediate apparatus will likely lead to a cessation of hostilities.

Modern history is rife with examples of such settlements of armed conflict: from Germany, Italy and Japan in World War II, to the leaders of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, Milosevic in the Former Yugoslavia and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, conflicts have been personalised. While tens of thousands of people willingly engaged in violence, only the charismatic, identifiable leadership suffered the consequences of defeat. While an alternative to this type of settlement may be elusive, it is nevertheless fair to say that this historical example is a recipe for repetition: as long as it appears to be safe to follow a leader into the spiral of violence (other than the immediate risk of being maimed or killed in the process, that is), the flock will continue to rally round the charismatic leader.

Does this mean, then, that the downfall of a charismatic leader after armed conflict has come to an end is too late a point to single him out? Are there alternatives to this approach? Should we not, therefore, try to rid ourselves of a charismatic leader before a conflict turns violent? Based upon our findings so far, it would seem that the removal of a charismatic leader through assassination, kidnapping, or arrest, while the conflict has not been resolved, will not substantially alter the course of a conflict. For example, Israel's strategy of assassinating the leaders of various Palestinian extremist organisations, such as Sheikh Ahmed Yassin of Hamas in 2004, or the Turkish government's kidnapping, in 1999, followed by a public trial, of Abdullah Ocalan of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), both proved far less productive than had been hoped. As long as these drastic measures are not accompanied by an honest effort to resolve the root causes of the conflict, policies of assassination, kidnapping, and arrest will only be temporary solutions, at best—solutions which furthermore can only have an effect on the violent phase of a conflict. In time—months, years—new leaders will emerge to replace the departed ones, as has happened in the Occupied Territories, and the fighting will resume.

### PART III: CURRENT CONFLICTS

Now that we have looked at the various traits, motivations, and psychological ramifications of charismatic leadership, the time has come to put these theories into practice, in an attempt to demonstrate if charismatic leadership as described in the previous sections indeed is a prerequisite for violent conflict. In order to apply the theories we have explored above to current conflicts, we will draw from the list of 67 conflicts observed by the International Crisis Group in its monthly Crisis Watch publication.<sup>30</sup> All of these conflicts are internal and involve internal actors, from dissident movements to terrorist organisations. The period covered for this exercise spans the end of the Cold War, in 1990, to the present. In most, if not all cases, the conflict already existed in 1990. What is important to demonstrate, therefore, is whether during that 15-year period instances of violence coincided with the presence of one or more charismatic leaders.

The methodological approach chosen for this section consists in combining these conflicts with the Revolutionary and Dissident Movements of the World database,<sup>31</sup> which provides us with the key internal players—both leaders and organisations—involved in the conflicts. After having identified the key players, each was searched in open source databases and the Internet, thus allowing us to make a qualitative and a quantitative assessment of the leaderships involved. The qualitative assessment, which is inherently subjective, involves certain keywords used by the media to describe the leaders, or the uses of language those leaders make in their press conferences, speeches, and writings.<sup>32</sup> The quantitative assessment, on the other hand, involves the frequency in which those leaders are mentioned in the media, or recurrence of characterisation. In other words, a single mention of a leader as charismatic is not sufficient for that leader to be assessed as such.

The table (see Table 1) that emerges from this method identifies the conflict (the state or the region involved); the presence of a charismatic state leader (CSL); that of a charismatic non-state leader (CNSL); and whether we are dealing with a protracted (that is, non-violent) conflict (PC) or an armed conflict (AC). For the purpose of this exercise, an “armed conflict” is defined as a political conflict in which at least 1,000 people were killed as a result of violence or violence leading to a substantial refugee outflow or population displacement.<sup>33</sup> For each conflict, bottom notes will provide sources of information, quotes, and, when applicable, the keywords used to make the assessment. This table should help demonstrate whether, as this paper argues, the presence of one or more charismatic leaders is indeed a general precondition for conflict to turn violent. Furthermore, this exercise should allow us to determine if the types of charismatic leadership—that is, state or non-state—and the interactions between them have an additional impact on whether a conflict will turn violent or not. While the brief historical period covered in this exercise inherently makes this an imperfect system, it is, hopefully, a step in the right direction, one that will encourage future research on the topic. The key findings drawn from the table are provided further down.

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<sup>30</sup> International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, August 2005.

<sup>31</sup> Revolutionary and Dissident Movements of the World, 4<sup>th</sup> edition. Bogdan Szajkowski, ed. (London: John Harper, 2004).

<sup>32</sup> Keywords include “charismatic,” “extremist,” “hard-liner,” and “revered.” Superlatives, sobriquets and various descriptors are also utilised to assess the charismatic value of the leadership observed. For most African conflicts, keywords were searched in both English and French. Despotic, “bigger-than-life” authoritarian leaders with a ubiquitous presence (e.g., Saddam Hussein) also fall under this category.

<sup>33</sup> See Nicholas Sambanis, “A Note On the Death Threshold in Coding Civil War Events,” <http://www.duke.edu/web/licep/4/sambanis/sambanis.pdf>.

Table 1. Conflict matrix

Conflict	CSL	CNSL	PC	AC	Conflict	CSL	CNSL	PC	AC
Afghanistan		X <sup>1</sup>	X	X <sup>2</sup>	Kosovo	X <sup>3</sup>	X <sup>4</sup>	X	X <sup>5</sup>
Albania		X <sup>6</sup>	X <sup>7</sup>		Kyrgyzstan	X <sup>8</sup>		X <sup>9</sup>	
Algeria		X <sup>10</sup>	X	X <sup>11</sup>	Lebanon		X <sup>12</sup>	X <sup>13</sup>	
Angola	X <sup>14</sup>	X <sup>15</sup>	X	X <sup>16</sup>	Liberia	X <sup>17</sup>		X	X <sup>18</sup>
Armenia (non N-K)			X <sup>19</sup>		Macedonia		X <sup>20</sup>	X	X <sup>21</sup>
Azerbaijan (non N-K)	X <sup>22</sup>		X <sup>23</sup>		Mauritania			X <sup>24</sup>	
Bahrain		X <sup>25</sup>	X <sup>26</sup>		Moldova			X <sup>27</sup>	
Bangladesh			X <sup>28</sup>		Myanmar	X <sup>29</sup>	X <sup>30</sup>	X <sup>31</sup>	
Basque Country			X <sup>32</sup>		Nagorno-K.			X <sup>33</sup>	
Belarus	X <sup>34</sup>		X <sup>35</sup>		Nepal	X <sup>36</sup>		X	X <sup>37</sup>
Bolivia		X <sup>38</sup>	X		Nigeria			X	X <sup>39</sup>
Bosnia	X <sup>40</sup>	X <sup>41</sup>	X	X <sup>42</sup>	N. Ireland	X <sup>43</sup>	X <sup>44</sup>	X <sup>45</sup>	
Burundi	X <sup>46</sup>		X	X <sup>47</sup>	Pakistan (N-K)			X <sup>48</sup>	
CAR			X <sup>49</sup>		Papua N. Guinea		X <sup>50</sup>	X	X <sup>51</sup>
Chad			X <sup>52</sup>		Philippines	X <sup>53</sup>	X <sup>54</sup>	X	X <sup>55</sup>
Chechnya	X <sup>56</sup>	X <sup>57</sup>	X	X <sup>58</sup>	Rwanda	X <sup>59</sup>	X <sup>60</sup>	X	X <sup>61</sup>
China		X <sup>62</sup>	X		Saudi Arabia	X <sup>63</sup>		X <sup>64</sup>	
Colombia	X <sup>65</sup>	X <sup>66</sup>	X	X <sup>67</sup>	Serbia & Mtng.	X <sup>68</sup>	X <sup>69</sup>	X <sup>70</sup>	
Côte d'Ivoire	X <sup>71</sup>	X <sup>72</sup>	X	X <sup>73</sup>	Sierra Leone		X <sup>74</sup>	X	X <sup>75</sup>
Cyprus			X <sup>76</sup>		Somalia	X <sup>77</sup>	X <sup>78</sup>	X	X <sup>79</sup>
DR Congo	X <sup>80</sup>		X	X <sup>81</sup>	Sri Lanka	X <sup>82</sup>	X <sup>83</sup>	X	X <sup>84</sup>
Ecuador	X <sup>85</sup>		X <sup>86</sup>		Sudan	X <sup>87</sup>	X <sup>88</sup>	X	X <sup>89</sup>
Egypt	X <sup>90</sup>		X <sup>91</sup>		Swaziland	X <sup>92</sup>		X <sup>93</sup>	
Georgia	X <sup>94</sup>	X <sup>95</sup>	X	X <sup>96</sup>	Syria	X <sup>97</sup>		X <sup>98</sup>	
Guinea			X <sup>99</sup>		Tajikistan	X <sup>100</sup>		X	X <sup>101</sup>
Guinea-Bissau			X	X <sup>102</sup>	Thailand	X <sup>103</sup>		X <sup>104</sup>	
Haiti	X <sup>105</sup>		X	X <sup>106</sup>	Turkey	X <sup>107</sup>	X <sup>108</sup>	X	X <sup>109</sup>
India			X <sup>110</sup>		Turkmenistan	X <sup>111</sup>		X <sup>112</sup>	
Indonesia		X <sup>113</sup>	X	X <sup>114</sup>	Uganda	X <sup>115</sup>	X <sup>116</sup>	X	X <sup>117</sup>
Iran	X <sup>118</sup>	X <sup>119</sup>	X		Ukraine			X <sup>120</sup>	
Iraq	X <sup>121</sup>	X <sup>122</sup>	X	X <sup>123</sup>	Uzbekistan	X <sup>124</sup>	X <sup>125</sup>	X <sup>126</sup>	
Israel/OT	X <sup>127</sup>	X <sup>128</sup>	X <sup>129</sup>		Venezuela	X <sup>130</sup>		X <sup>131</sup>	
Kashmir	X <sup>132</sup>		X	X <sup>133</sup>	Yemen			X <sup>134</sup>	X <sup>135</sup>
					Zimbabwe	X <sup>136</sup>		X <sup>137</sup>	

## Key Findings

From the above 67 x 4 grid, we can establish the following: out of the 67 conflicts that took place over the past 15 years, 31 were armed conflicts (46.3%), and 36 were protracted, non-armed conflicts (53.7%). For armed conflicts, 7 had CSL only (22.5%); 6 had CNSL only (19.4%); 15 had both CSL and CNSL (48.4%); and 3 had neither CSL nor CNSL (9.7%). For protracted, non-armed conflicts, 12 had CSL only (33.3%); 5 had CNSL only (13.9%); 6 had both CSL and CNSL (16.8%); and 13 had neither CSL nor CNSL (36%).

10.4% of conflicts with a CSL only were armed; 9% of conflicts with CNSL only were armed; 22.4% conflicts with CSL and CNSL were armed; in other words, 41.8% of conflicts with one form or another of charismatic leadership were violent, whereas only 4.5% of conflicts with neither CSL nor CNSL were violent.

What we can derive from these numbers is as follows: 90.3% (28 out of 31) of armed conflicts had one or more charismatic leader; and nearly 50% (15 out of 31) of armed conflicts involved interaction between CSL and CNSL. Of the 21 conflicts involving CSL and CNSL, 71.4% (15 out of 21) were violent. Only 36.8% (7 out of 19) conflicts involving a CSL only were violent; and 54.5% (6 out of 11) conflicts involving a CNSL only were violent. Finally, 18.7% (3 out of 16) of conflicts involving neither form of charismatic leadership were violent. More than one-third (16 out of 36) of non-violent conflicts have neither CSL nor CNSL; and one-third had a CSL only. Of these, five (Egypt, Swaziland, Venezuela, Turkmenistan, and Zimbabwe) would likely turn to armed conflict provided that there emerged a CNSL.

More often than not, protracted conflicts with only a CSL are of the totalitarian type. Such regimes (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), or states with strong security apparatuses (Egypt, Saudi Arabia), may prevent, or at the very least slow down, the emergence of CNSL. China and Myanmar present us with pacifist CNSL; their actions may in fact mitigate the likelihood of violence. Given their mass appeal and the hope that they provide to the disenfranchised and the repressed, however, their arrest or assassination could very well prompt a spontaneous violent response.

Without too much intellectual effort, this model should allow us to forecast which protracted conflicts will likely turn violent in the coming years. Twice as many conflicts involving CSL and CNSL were violent than when there is only one form or the other. Very few conflicts are violent in the absence of either type of charismatic leadership. As such, analysts seeking to “predict” when a protracted conflict is likely to turn violent should well pay heed to the media. Talk of leadership, the use of superlatives and sobriquets, mythmaking, and analogies to past “big men” are all indicative of the emergence of charismatic leadership. Conflict turns violent when grievances long held intersect with charismatic leadership. When both sides of the divide are represented by such leaders, there is a strong likelihood that violence will erupt.

## Terrorism and insurgency

It should be noted that this paper only looked at charismatic leaders within states; in the current age of immediate, electronic media, however, it may very well be that non-state charismatic leaders need not be within the state in conflict in order to encourage a population, or groups within the state, to resort to violence. Trans-national, charismatic leaders such as Osama Bin Laden, for example, nowadays rely upon releases to the televised media, the press, and Internet Web sites to rally individuals to their cause, and their appeal can find its way around the globe, from Afghanistan to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia to Yemen, Great Britain to the United States. As our world becomes increasingly interconnected, the argument could be made that terrorism is one sweeping way of fighting a civil war at the global level. If seen in this fashion, charismatic leadership harnessing the power of the electronic media, along with their state-based opponents, could be similar to the leaders surveyed in the model above, only that the CNSL would not have to be within the same state as the CSL (e.g., Bin Laden and George Bush). The statelessness of international terrorism may signify that rather than the state being the battleground, the world is.

We should also be wary of the current emphasis on terrorism emerging from the Middle East. Too much focus on that region is short-sighted and in the long run could be problematic. It is only a matter of time before other regions and countries—Africa and Latin America being but two examples—begin to export their conflicts. Terrorism is a call for attention, and should conflicts in otherwise forgotten corners of the planet continue to be ignored, some individuals may see it necessary to bring their conflict to our shores. The iniquities, injustices and jingoism that gave rise to catastrophic terrorism out of the Middle East exist elsewhere. If war and conflict are precursors to terrorism overseas, then the instrument proposed in this paper could represent a tool, among many, with which to prepare ourselves. Intelligence on those countries, including intelligence on existing leaders and emerging ones, as well as monitoring of the media and the language used in it, should be part of this preparation.

Finally, it is important to remember that terrorism is but a tool and that it can be adopted and adapted to various kinds of conflicts. Increasingly, as strong states wage wars against smaller non-state actors, the latter will likely rely on unorthodox—or asymmetric—techniques to level the playing field. Terrorism is a definition of an armed struggle, and while tactically it differs from the usual means of waging war, the principles of leadership continue to apply. It is therefore capital that we continue monitoring the emergence of charismatic leaders around the world, especially so in areas that are conflict-prone. While the focus since September 11 has been on the Middle East and parts of Asia, other regions promise to give rise to the dynamics that resulted in catastrophic terrorism here at home. We may very well have entered a period in history where the emergence of charismatic non-state leadership abroad represents a threat to domestic security here in North America. More research, though, is needed in order to determine if the dynamic relationship between CSL and CNSL that has been observed above applies in the same way to international terrorism.

Notes to Table 1:

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<sup>1</sup> The period of fiercest fighting in Afghanistan, prior to the US invasion following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, occurred at a time when various warlords, including Ahmad Shah Massoud, the “charismatic commander of the anti-Taliban guerrillas,” and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the “great Afghan warlord” [Teheran Iran, “Teheran paper analyses decline of Hekmatyar in Afghan political equation,” March 6, 2002] vied for control over areas of Afghanistan. Other leaders with charisma, including Mullah Omar, of the Taliban, and Ismail Khan [see Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil & Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (London: Yale, 2000)], also fueled armed conflict. The absence of an elected leader whose influence extends throughout Afghanistan (Hamid Karzai being portrayed as the “mayor of Kabul” rather than head of state), results in no CSL being attributed to Afghanistan.

<sup>2</sup> Civilian deaths in Afghanistan in the 1990s estimated at 400,000 [Christian Science Monitor, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0920/p1s3-wosc.html>]

<sup>3</sup> “Charismatic politician” [BBC News, “Milosevic: Serbia’s Fallen Strongman,” March 30, 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/931018.stm>]. The demonisation of Milosevic by the Western media compounded the Balkan leader’s image of the charismatic leader. See, among others, “The New Adolph Hitler,” (Timothy Garton Ash, CNN.com, March 29, 1999) [<http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/time/1999/03/29/hitler.html>].

<sup>4</sup> Hashim “The Snake” Thaci, KLA Leader, “rising star,” “hard-liner” [BBC News, March 24, 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/293283.stm>].

<sup>5</sup> 10,000 Albanians killed during the three-month war [New York Times News Service, July 18, 1999].

<sup>6</sup> Ali Ahmeti [leader of the National Liberation Army], “a charismatic figure whom one diplomat pointedly described as ‘the man who keeps Macedonia together.’” Albanians in Macedonia Crisis Centre News & Information [<http://www.alb-net.com/pipermail/amcc-news/2004-February/000065.html>]. “Ali Ahmeti, the dashing war hero, [ ... ] captured the hearts of Albanians last year [2003].” [<http://www.balkananalysis.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=226>]

<sup>7</sup> The presence of charismatic Ahmeti, who came on the scene in 2003, does not coincide with the outbreak of violence in 1997, so this results in a negative for AC.

<sup>8</sup> Askar Akayev, “charismatic former scientist” [International Herald Tribune, “Where Was the West All That Time?” March 30, 2005, <http://www.gmfus.org/publications/article.cfm?id=95>]. New president Kurmanbek Bakiev, who came to power after Akayev fled the country, does not display signs of charismatic leadership.

<sup>9</sup> Suppression of dissent, lack of media freedom, poor human rights record. Radical Islamic militant organisations, such as the Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), have a presence in southern Kyrgyzstan, but as of this writing this has not resulted in conflict within the country.

<sup>10</sup> Antar Zouabri of the Armed Islamic Group, emerged as the new leader of the GIA in 1995. “Under his leadership atrocities on an unprecedented scale took place in 1997” (Revolutionary and Dissident Movements.” “It is difficult to gauge the extent of the blow which the killing of Mr Zouabri represents to the GIA. He was the longest serving of eight leaders which the group has had in its 10-year history. The organisation, believed to be a loose structure of groups operating in different parts of the country, has always managed to replace slain leaders, even when they have been killed in factional infighting” [BBC News, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle\\_east/1811194.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1811194.stm)]. “Mr Zouabri for his part in a series of massacres and for encouraging GIA soldiers to kidnap thousands of girls to use as sex slaves in mountainous tunnels and caves.” [BBC News Online, [http://212.58.240.35/1/low/world/middle\\_east/1810839.stm](http://212.58.240.35/1/low/world/middle_east/1810839.stm)]

<sup>11</sup> 1992-2002, 100,000+ deaths [AFP, quoted in Twentieth Century Atlas: Death Tolls, <http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat4.htm#Algeria2>]

<sup>12</sup> “Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah [Secretary-General of Hizballah] is one of the most powerful and charismatic figures ...” Al-Jazeera, Profile: Hassan Nasrallah [[www.aljazeera.com/cgi-bin/review/people\\_full\\_story.asp?service\\_id=6849](http://www.aljazeera.com/cgi-bin/review/people_full_story.asp?service_id=6849)]. “by far Lebanon’s most charismatic leader,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, “Lebanon Dodges Bullets of Another Civil War,” May-June 2001 [<http://www.wrmea.com/archives/may-june01/0105021.html>]. “Charismatic” former army general Michel Aoun, BBC News, “Aoun success jolts Lebanon poll race,” June 15, 2005 [[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/4093924.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4093924.stm)]. Head of minority Druze Jumblatt is a well-known, outspoken, and charismatic politician,” Council on Foreign Relations [<http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=8156>].

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<sup>13</sup> Sectarian violence, terrorism. Given Hizballah's strength, its failure to comply with UNSCR 1559 on disarmament, and the presence of an aggressive, very charismatic leader, added to the presence of other charismatic leaders representing other sectors of the Lebanese population, Lebanon may well represent a test case for charismatic leadership as a transforming factor. Lebanon's long history of civil war has been marked by such influences.

<sup>14</sup> Angolan President José Eduardo Dos Santos. Strong media presence, reviled by opposition for allegations of corruption.

<sup>15</sup> Jonas Savimbi: "his charismatic nature, his character, and his strong personality." "The Older One." AFP, "UNITA Secretary General Views Upcoming Congress, Other Issues," June 21, 2003.

<sup>16</sup> 500,000 killed, 1992-1994 (Washington Post, December 15, 1998, quoted in Twentieth Century Atlas: Death Tolls, <http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat3.htm#Ang75>)

<sup>17</sup> "The charismatic but ruthless [Charles] Taylor," AFP, Ex-Liberian Warlord Urges Rebels to Lay Down Arms Following Taylor's Exit, August 12, 2003. "Charismatic showman [...] Taylor, who had earlier compared himself to Jesus Christ and to a sacrificial lamb," AFP, Taylor's Weeping Supporters Throng Monrovia Airport to Bid Farewell, March 11, 2003. The Liberians United For Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) leadership, under Sehon Damate Conneh Junior, has not displayed characteristics of charismatic leadership.

<sup>18</sup> By November 2002, 130,000 internally-displaced persons (IDPs), increased by 70,000 by the following year; 230,000 refugees in neighbouring countries; by June 16, 2003, 200-300 killed [<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/liberia-1997.htm>]. Given the severity of the refugee emergency resulting from armed confrontations, Liberia is placed in the Armed Conflict category.

<sup>19</sup> "Internal stability was most recently shaken during several weeks of opposition protest in April 2004, which revealed the intensity of a segment of the population's dissatisfaction with the regime and its policies. Yet, the numbers that turned out were relatively small and did not represent the totality of those unhappy with existing economic inequalities, high unemployment, worsening access to social services, and corruption. While the present opposition -- divided and seen by many as more interested in regaining power than truly fixing the system -- does not have wide popular resonance, the situation could become much more explosive if a charismatic leader emerged [International Crisis Group, Armenia: Internal Instability Ahead, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3076&l=1>]

<sup>20</sup> See note 6 on Ali Ahmeti. Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski does not display charismatic leadership and was in fact accused of being too soft on the Albanian UCK, which launched a rebellion in 2001 [BBC News, Profile: Boris Trajkovski, June 26, 2001]

<sup>21</sup> 170,000 people were displaced as a result of the conflict in 2001, of which 74,000 were IDPs [Relief Web, Macedonia: Country Profile on Internal Displacement, 26 February 2004, <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/SKAR-646KS8?OpenDocument>]. There are no available statistics on the number of people killed during the conflict.

<sup>22</sup> President Haidar Aliyev ("charismatic personality," on <http://resources.net.az/d/dp0901.htm>)

<sup>23</sup> Talysh independence movement: Shia secessionist movement, under the leadership of Colonel Alikram Humbatov. Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, under the leadership of Alikram Aliyev; proponent of an "Iranian model." No indicators of charismatic leadership, other than imprisonment [Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, 2004].

<sup>24</sup> African Liberation Forces of Mauritania (FLAM), opposes the alleged Arabisation of Mauritanian society and perceived discrimination against the black population [Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, 2005]. President Moaouia Ould Ahmed Taya was overthrown during a bloodless coup led by military officers in August 2005. Critics have also accused Taya of using the US war on terror to crack down on Islamic opponents [BBC News, Mauritania officers "seize power," August 4, 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4741243.stm>]. No charismatic leadership identified.

<sup>25</sup> "Sheikh Ali Salman, the charismatic leader of the Islamic National Wefaq Society [opposition]" [Gulf News Online, October 24, 2002, <http://www.gulf-news.com/Articles/news.asp?ArticleID=66539>]

<sup>26</sup> Sunni minority (35%) ruling over Shia majority (65%). Conflict is sectarian. King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa succeeded his father as Emir in 1999. No indicators of charismatic attributes.

<sup>27</sup> The Dniester Moldovan Republic (Transnistria), a self-proclaimed autonomous region within Moldova. No charismatic leadership identified in DMR leadership (Igor Smirnov) or the Moldovan presidency (Mircea Snegur, Vladimir Voronin). Russian military intervention in summer of 1992, resulting in approximately 800 casualties [Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, 2004 (casualties from Twentieth Century Atlas: Death Tolls, <http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat7.htm#Moldova>)]

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<sup>28</sup> Chittagong Hill Tracts. Hill people, demand for political and economic autonomy. 1997 peace accord [Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, 2004]. The United People's Party (PCJSS) emerged as pro-peace, while the United People's Democratic Front (UPDF). Since 1997, clashes between the two ethnic groups have killed 300 people and injured many more. The conflict is now intensifying with both sides openly accusing each other of abducting their supporters.

UPDF leader Sushil Chakma claims, "PCJSS activists have abducted 253 of our supporters and killed more than 200."

Denying the allegation, PCJSS vice-president Rupayan Dewan says, "On the contrary, the UPDF has killed more than 50 of our men and abducted more than 100 people since 1997." [OneWorld South Asia, January 2004, <http://southasia.oneworld.net/article/view/76728/1/>] No indicators of charismatic leadership.

<sup>29</sup> "Mr Than [Shwe] is said to be introverted and superstitious, frequently seeking the advice of astrologers," [BBC News, Country Profile: Burma, June 29, 2005, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/country\\_profiles/1300003.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1300003.stm)]. "Powell hits out at "despotic" Myanmar General Than Shwe," [Asian Tribune, May 1, 2003, [http://www.asiantribune.com/show\\_news.php?id=4031](http://www.asiantribune.com/show_news.php?id=4031)]

<sup>30</sup> "the charismatic Nobel Peace Prize Laureate from 1991 Aung San Suu Kyi," [Human Rights House Network, <http://www.humanrightshouse.org/dllvis5.asp?id=3334>]. Suu Kyi, "Burma's own Mandela," [The Independent, June 18, 2005] is leading a pacifist struggle against Myanmar's military rulers. "Icon for democracy," [The Standard (China), June 17, 2005, <http://www.thestandard.com.hk/stdn/std/Focus/GF17Dh01.html>].

<sup>31</sup> "Burma is ruled by a military junta which has been accused of gross human rights abuses, including the forcible relocation of civilians and the widespread use of forced labour, which includes children" [BBC News, Country Profile: Burma, June 29, 2005]

<sup>32</sup> Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) aims to establish a Basque homeland in Basque areas of northern Spain and southwestern France. No charismatic indicators found. Armed conflict threshold not met.

<sup>33</sup> "The ongoing bitter rivalry for control between ethnic Armenians and Azeris has roots dating back well over a century into competition between Christian Armenian and Muslim Turkic and Persian influences," [BBC News, Regions and territories: Nagorno-Karabakh, June 15, 2005, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country\\_profiles/3658938.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/3658938.stm)]. Fighting during the twilight of the Soviet Union resulted in 20,000-30,000 casualties, and to this day Azeris resent the loss of their territory to a now predominantly ethnic Armenian NK. No charismatic leadership (Dashnak Party leader Hrair Maroukian, president Levon Ter-Petrossian, president Arkadiy Gukasyan).

<sup>34</sup> "Europe's last dictator," as the Bush administration has aptly tagged him, is up to it again. This time, President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus has gone after ethnic Poles living in western Belarus, accusing them of 'fomenting revolution.'" [International Herald Tribune, "The Tyrant of Belarus," July 29, 2005. A regime of "totalitarian control" and "system of personal rule" [Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, 2004].

<sup>35</sup> The opposition is mostly that of the Belaruski Narodny Front (BNF), under the leadership of Vincuk Viacorka. No indicators of charismatic attributes. Demonstrations.

<sup>36</sup> The Maoist movement, "led by the charismatic Pushpa Kamal Dahal [aka Comrade Prachanda]" [The Times of India, [timesofindia.com/articleshow.asp?catkey=2114117552&art\\_id=612387108&sType=1](http://timesofindia.com/articleshow.asp?catkey=2114117552&art_id=612387108&sType=1)]. "A sort of personality cult was sought to be imposed by Prachanda," [South Asia Analysis Group, May 9, 2005, <http://www.saag.org/%5Cnotes3%5Cnote262.html>]. A split has opened between Prachada and another Communist Party leader, Baburam Bhattarai (no charismatic attributes). No charismatic leadership found within the Nepalese government and monarchy.

<sup>37</sup> Maoist rebellion: more than 11,000 casualties, and upwards of 100,000 displaced since 1996 [BBC News, Country Profile: Nepal]

<sup>38</sup> "Evo Morales, a charismatic leader of mass demonstrations, congressional investigations and popular confrontations with the state, who campaigned in Quechua, as well as Spanish, on national, international and local issues. As a result of the elections, the MAS became the leading opposition party in the Congress, including numerous Indian, women and working-class deputies." [Canadian Dimension, "Bolivia: Between Colonisation and Revolution," January/February 2004, [http://www.canadiandimension.mb.ca/v38/v38\\_1jp.htm](http://www.canadiandimension.mb.ca/v38/v38_1jp.htm)] "Angry over what they saw as a giveaway of natural resources to non-Bolivian interests, a powerful coalition of impoverished Aymara Indians, labor unions, coca farmers and peasants, led by a charismatic socialist legislator, Evo Morales, undertook a series of protests, roadblocks and deadly riots that led to Lozada's downfall" [Newsdesk.org, March 18, 2005, <http://www.newsdesk.org/archives/000159.php>]

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<sup>39</sup> 53,787 killed since September 7, 2001, mostly Christian farmers vs. Muslim animal herders in the Central Plateau state (BBC, October 7, 2004). No charismatic leadership identified at the state and sub-state (Christian and Muslim) levels. The only charismatic leader to emerge in the past 15 years was Moshood Abiola, the “charismatic opposition leader” whose suspicious death in 1998 resulted in violence [CNN.com, “Nigeria Waits to Hear About Political Future,” July 13, 1998]. The level of unrest, however, did not meet the armed conflict threshold.

<sup>40</sup> Slobodan Milosevic (President of FRY), Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic.

<sup>41</sup> Alija Izetbegovic (“[...] he changed into a sort of paramilitary outfit, complete with loose khakis, a scarf, and a beret bearing a Bosnian insignia” in Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Modern Library, 1998), p. 96.) “charismatic cosmopolitan leader of a small nation somewhere in the Balkans” [Oneworld Southeast Europe, <http://see.oneworld.net/article/view/70871/1/3332>] “Many Bosnians called him ‘Dedo’ [Grandpa]” BBC News, Obituary: Alija Izetbegovic, October 19, 2003 [<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3133038.stm>]

<sup>42</sup> U S State Department: 250,000 killed [[http://www.state.gov/www/global/human\\_rights/1996\\_hrp\\_report/bosniahe.html](http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/bosniahe.html)]

<sup>43</sup> British Prime Minister Tony Blair: “Handsome, charismatic, and possessing a determination to modernize progressive politics,” Encyclopedia Britannica Online [<http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?tocId=9113185>].

<sup>44</sup> The “IRA [Irish Republican Army] had many dreamers. Gerry Adams’ charismatic leadership alone could have marginalised them [...] The people guiding the organisation were long sighted, bright, talented, dedicated, determined, pragmatic, cunning, and all too often duplicitous. They were also utterly ruthless in their mission, which above all else was to survive and prosper, and were devoted to their leader and inspiration, Gerry Adams,” *Frontline: Diplomacy in Insurgency* [<http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2025/stories/20031219001207400.htm>]. Ulster Unionist Party leader David Trimble does not exhibit charismatic leadership traits.

<sup>45</sup> Does not meet the armed conflict threshold. Occasional terrorist act.

<sup>46</sup> The “charismatic Melchior Ndadaye founded the FRODEBU, which, despite its moderate character and its openness towards the Tutsi population, has become a rallying force for Hutu conscience building,” in Stefaan Calmeyn, “Prospects of Conflict Resolution in Burundi,” p. 50 [<http://www.conflicttransform.net/Burundi.pdf>]. Upon Ndadaye’s assassination in October 1993, the Forces for Defence of Democracy (FDD) movement was founded by Léonard Nyangoma (an extremist Hutu). This leadership was then followed by that of Jean Bosco Ndayikengurukiye and Pierre Nkurunziza. In 1994, the FDD launched a campaign against the Tutsi-dominated armed forces [Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, 2004]. None of these leaders, however, presented overly charismatic traits.

<sup>47</sup> 150,000 civilians killed [BBC, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country\\_profiles/1068991.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country_profiles/1068991.stm)]

<sup>48</sup> Sectarian violence in South Waziristan and Giglit and other parts of Pakistan (around 4,000 killed since the 1980s; BBC); extremist Islamic groups banned by Musharraf, including Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (founder Riaz Basra killed in May 2002), Lashkar-e-Toiba, and Harakat-ul-Mujahedeen. Neither Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif nor President Pervez Musharraf have displayed traits of charismatic leadership. No Islamic group appears to have a charismatic leader, though some of them are suspected of having ties to al-Qaeda.

<sup>49</sup> Attempted coup d’états. Ange-Félix Patassé, President; François Bozizé, main opposition. No indicators of charismatic leadership.

<sup>50</sup> “Francis Ona, the charismatic leader of a bloody secessionist movement in the Papua New Guinea province of Bougainville,” AP, August 24, 2005 [<http://legacy.com/Obituaries.asp?Page=APStory&Id=9877>]. No charismatic leadership in Papua New-Guinea (Sir Julius Chan, Sir Rabbie Namaliu, Sir Michael Somare).

<sup>51</sup> Bougainville secessionist movement; guerrilla, insurgence beginning end of 1980s. 10,000 killed in seven years of armed conflict (Daily Telegraph, July 15, 1996 [<http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat6.htm#Papua>]).

<sup>52</sup> Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT) launched in October 1998 by Youssouf Togoimi. Opposition to President Idris Deby. Fighting from November 1998 through 2001. Togoimi died in September 2002 replaced by Hassan Mardigue [Revolutionary and Dissident Groups, 2004]. No indicators of charismatic leadership.

<sup>53</sup> President Joseph Estrada: “His action movies, plus some comedies, molded his eventual political image as a man of the masses,” CNN.com, *The rise and fall of Joseph Estrada*, May 2, 2001 [<http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/04/22/estrada.profile/>]. No other charismatic leaders identified.

<sup>54</sup> “one of [the] most charismatic leaders [of the Abu Sayyaf Group], Abu Sabaya,” [Strategic Forecasting, October 2, 2002, “Philippines: Violence Surging Against US Interests?”] <http://www.drumbeat.mlaterz.net/October%202002/Abu%20Sayyaf%20nd%20front%20in%20terror%20war%201>

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00202a.htm]. ASG founder, Khadaffy Janjalani, “a charismatic Islamic fundamentalist,” [World Press Review, February 19, 2002 <http://www.worldpress.org/Asia/401.cfm>]. Another ASG leader, Galib Andang, better known by the name “Commander Robot,” was killed in March 2005. “Salamat [Hasmim], a charismatic religious leader schooled at the Al-Azhar University in Cairo [...] established the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in 1984,” [The Mindanao Peace Talks

Another Opportunity to Resolve the Moro Conflict in the Philippines, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 131, February 2005, <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr131.html>]. Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) leader Nur Misuari, “mustached and charismatic,” [Manila Times, February 14, 2005, [http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2005/feb/14/yehey/top\\_stories/20050214top10.html](http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2005/feb/14/yehey/top_stories/20050214top10.html)]

<sup>55</sup> 120,000 killed (1969-1996) [Dictionary of 20 Century World History]; Jolo violence (ASG): 15,000 people have fled their homes [BBC News, February 14, 2005].

<sup>56</sup> Russian Soviet-style quasi-authoritarian leaderships of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. “Charismatic” Chechen leader Dzhokar Dudayev [The Canadian Encyclopedia, <http://www.canadianencyclopedia.ca/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=M1ARTM0010661>]. “Dudayev was charismatic, and he was a very good speaker,” [The Eurasian Politician, October 2003, <http://www.cc.jyu.fi/~aphamala/pe/2003/tsets-3.htm>]

<sup>57</sup> “Charismatic” Chechen leader Shamil Basayev [BBC News, <http://newsrss.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/459302.stm>]

<sup>58</sup> 20,000-30,000 killed (Amnesty International, <http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/1996/EUR/44602096.htm>)

<sup>59</sup> “Habyarimana was a charismatic figure, who carefully cultivated his popularity by creating a vacuum of rival leadership in the armed forces and in politics” [Democracy in Africa, <http://www.warc.ch/dcw/rw984/04.html>]

<sup>60</sup> “General Paul Kagame, the quietly charismatic leader of the rebel army, which crushed a force twice its size and then had to rebuild a destroyed country. Kagame’s victory was certainly one of the most brilliant military campaigns of the modern era,” [The Washington Monthly, Book Review: Heart of Darkness, November 1998, <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/books/1998/9811.hammer.darkness.html>]. Kagame was also given the sobriquet “Napoleon of Africa” [Dallaire, see footnote 18].

<sup>61</sup> Estimated 500,000-800,000 slain in 1994, with ensuing massive population displacements [BBC News, Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, April 1, 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1288230.stm>].

<sup>62</sup> 1. “Li [Hongzhi, founder of the Falungong movement] writes he can personally heal disease and that his followers can stop speeding cars using the powers of his teachings. He writes that the Falun Gong emblem exists in the bellies of practitioners, who can see through the celestial eyes in their foreheads. Li believes ‘humankind is degenerating and demons are everywhere’—extraterrestrials are everywhere, too—and that Africa boasts a 2-billion-year-old nuclear reactor. He also says he can fly” [Time Magazine, Asia, “Spiritual Society or Evil Cult?” <http://www.time.com/time/asia/news/magazine/0,9754,165166,00.html>] The FG reportedly has 70 million adherents in China [Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, 2004]. 2. Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama, charismatic, internationally renown proponent of peaceful opposition. 3. In 1990, Zahideen Yusuf, a “charismatic” religious student, launched a “holy war” against the “infidel Chinese” in Xinjiang Province, leaving 22 people dead, including Yusuf. [Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, 2004].

<sup>63</sup> “Charismatic” Crown Prince Abdullah, de-facto ruler of Saudi Arabia during the past decade, UPI, August 1, 2005.

<sup>64</sup> Islamic extremism opposed to Saudi regime; many loyal to charismatic Saudi-born Osama Bin Laden; al-Qaeda leader in Saudi Arabia, Saleh Awfi (killed, August 2005), did not display traits of charismatic leadership. Mostly terrorism targeting Westerners and Saudi authorities; threshold for armed conflict not met.

<sup>65</sup> “[Alvaro] Uribe’s charismatic, plain-speaking style and willingness to defy international criticism for his sometimes draconian policies to combat ‘terrorism’” [Wide Angle, <http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/shows/colombia/briefing.html>]

<sup>66</sup> 1. Manuel Perez, or “El Cura,” “oversaw all aspects of the ELN’s [National Liberation Army] growth and development. His death [in 1998] had huge implications for the ELN, as he was considered the only leader capable of reconciling all ideological differences within the group.” [Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, April 25, 2005]. 2. FARC leadership: Raul Reyes, Simon Trinidad, Joaquin Gomez and Fabian Ramirez. No overt signs of charismatic leadership. 3. United Self-Defense Forces (AUC) leader Carlos Castano “is a charismatic, media-savvy leader” [AP, “Fate of Colombia Paramilitary Boss a Mystery,” on <http://colhrnet.igc.org/newitems/june01/clmnews.603.htm>]

<sup>67</sup> 40,000 deaths in 1990s (Ploughshares, 2000)

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<sup>68</sup> Slobodan Milosevic. His successor, Vojislav Kostunica, did not exhibit traits of charismatic leadership. Prime Minister of Serbia, Zoran Djindjic (assassinated in March 2003), was described as “charismatic and youthful,” [BBC News, Obituary, March 13, 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2844081.stm>].

<sup>69</sup> Zoran Djindjic (see above) “spearheaded the popular demonstrations which toppled [...] Milosevic,” [BBC News, Obituary, March 13, 2003].

<sup>70</sup> High degree of polarisation in Montenegro over relations with Serbia. Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (LSGC) main opponent of the Milosevic regime in the 1990s. Presidents Slavko Perovic and Miodrag Zavkovic did not display signs of charismatic leadership.

<sup>71</sup> Laurent Gbagbo is “charismatic, a man of the people” [Eye on Africa: The Ivory Coast Illusion, World Security Network, [http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article\\_id=10826&topicID=52](http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=10826&topicID=52)]

<sup>72</sup> “the president seems caught between the two young men who were, politically speaking, his two prodigal sons. Mr. Gbagbo plucked both from the student movements at the national university here, where he once taught. He groomed both for greatness. Today both are fiery, charismatic orators, lauded as among a new generation of West African leaders [...] Guillaume Soro, leader of the largest rebel group, calling itself the Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire [...] The other, Charles Blé Goudé, leader of the group known as the Young Patriots, is working harder than ever before to see that the president remains in place” [Ivorian President Caught Between 2 Leaders He Groomed, February 5, 2003, at <http://www.genocidewatch.org/cotedivoirefebruary5.htm>]

<sup>73</sup> 3,000 deaths [AP, 2003]

<sup>74</sup> “Those who have met the tubby leader of the Revolutionary United Front, Foday Sankoh, remark on his charismatic, ebullient character. They pinpoint this as a key factor behind his ability to rally thousands of impoverished youths behind his rebellion against the wealthy Freetown political class,” [BBC News, Foday Sankoh: Rebel Leader, May 12, 2000, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/737268.stm>]. “Charismatic,” “ruthless,” “cruel,” and “cult-like” are all terms used to describe the leader. President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, on the other hand, is not considered charismatic.

<sup>75</sup> More than 50,000 dead (BBC, August 17, 2005).

<sup>76</sup> Turkish Cypriot Leader Rauf Denktash and Greek Cypriot Leader Glafcos Clerides have both long been in power, but no indicators of charismatic leadership were found.

<sup>77</sup> Siad Barre, president of Somalia, was dubbed the “architect of misery,” “dictatorial,” and “tyrannical” [The Guardian, January 3, 1995].

<sup>78</sup> Warlord Mohammad Farah Aidid: “Charismatic,” “devious,” [PBS, Frontline, Ambush in Mogadishu, Interview with Walter Clarke, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/clarke.html>].

<sup>79</sup> 50,000 killed and 300,000 dead by starvation in 23 months following 1991 [Encarta, on <http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat3.htm#Somalia>].

<sup>80</sup> Mobutu Sese Seko, Laurent Kabila (“Laurent Kabila seemed like a saviour when he and his supporters fought their way across what was then the devastated nation called Zaire in 1996 and 1997, on BBC News, Profile: Laurent Kabila, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1121068.stm>). The main opposition groups, the RCD and the MLC, have no clear or charismatic leadership. Keyword searches for Jean-Pierre Bemba (MLC), Ernest Wamba dia Wamba (RCD) and Emile Llunga (also of RCD), did not return hits indicative of charismatic leadership. It is interesting to note that even after moderate and “non-charismatic” leader Joseph Kabila came to power, armed conflict persisted.

<sup>81</sup> International Rescue Committee, newest study (8 April 2003): 3,300,000 excess deaths in D.R. Congo due to civil war. [<http://www.theirc.org/index.cfm?section=news&wwwID=1704>]

<sup>82</sup> “President Chandrika Kumaratunga of Sri Lanka is a strong, authoritative and charismatic leader with big ideas and the determination to shape directions,” Frontline, December 1998 – January 1999 [<http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1526/15260040.htm>]. “From the beginning of her meteoric rise to power, from a simple state minister in 1993 to prime minister a few months later, Kumaratunga has been a divisive character. Supporters called her charismatic and bold, while her critics considered her reckless and short-sighted,” [Christian Science Monitor, November 7, 2003, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1107/p08s01-wosc.html>]. Under her leadership, a major offensive was launched against the LTTE in 1993.

<sup>83</sup> The “LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] 43-year old charismatic leader and military commander, Velupillai Prabhakaran (whose nom de guerre is Karikalan), is a highly disciplined, dedicated, self-taught, military genius,” [Jane’s Sentinel, quoted in Tamilnation.org, September 10, 2000, <http://www.tamilnation.org/forum/shanmugalingam/>].

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<sup>84</sup> 65,000 killed in 19 years [AP, February 7, 2003].

<sup>85</sup> Lucio Guterrez, a “populist” leader who “sided with the poor” [BBC News, November 25, 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2511113.stm>]. “Prabhakaran is charismatic, physically brave and his commitment to the cause of an independent Eelam is beyond doubt. Although he would like to see himself as a leader of not only Sri Lankan Tamils but also of Tamils in southern India, the events of nearly two decades of civil strife have shown that he lacks the political skill, temperament and flexibility of response to lead the Sri Lankan Tamils out of the vortex of violence into which he has led them,” [South Asia Terrorism Portal, [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/idr/vol\\_17\(2\)/sp\\_sinha.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/idr/vol_17(2)/sp_sinha.htm)].

<sup>86</sup> One-third of Ecuador’s population consists of indigenous Ecuadorians. It is also disproportionately the poorest. Opposition, under Leonidas Iza, has taken the form of demonstrations [Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, 2004]. No indicators of charismatic leadership.

<sup>87</sup> Hassan al-Turabi, the Islamic power behind Omar el-Bashir’s seizure of power in 1991, is described as “multilingual, charismatic, and western-educated” and also as “the pope of terrorism,” “ally of Saddam Hussein and Bin Laden’s long-time friend,” [The Daily Standard, July 25, 2005, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/880qqeoh.asp>]. No charismatic characteristics for el-Bashir, though Parade Magazine ranks him the world’s seventh worst dictator [The World’s Ten Worst Dictators, [http://archive.parade.com/2004/0222/0222\\_dictators.html](http://archive.parade.com/2004/0222/0222_dictators.html)].

<sup>88</sup> “[John] Garang [leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, SPLA] has kept control of the estimated 60,000-strong SPLA through a powerful personality and determination [...] When he felt that to get the support of America he had to win the Christian fundamentalists, his statements and utterances shifted to Christianity...” [Reuters, Ex-Sudanese Rebel Led Fighters to Peace Deal, July 31, 2005]. Justice and Equality (JEM, Darfur) leader Khalil Ibrahim Muhammad, on the other hand, does not exhibit charismatic characteristics.

<sup>89</sup> 1.5 million from 1983-1999 (AP, April 29, 1999. 180,000 dead in Darfur [UN official, quoted in <http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/wars21c.htm#Darfur>]. It should be noted that in spite of the armed conflict, there is no CNSL for the Darfur region, though the CSL is the same as that for the Sudanese civil war.

<sup>90</sup> Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt is a one-party state, with little room for dissent.

<sup>91</sup> Al-Gama’a at Islamiyya Spiritual Leader Sheikh Umar Abdurrahman; Islamic Jihad Political Leader and Osama Bin Laden’s right-hand, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahri, do not fit the description of charismatic leader, though the latter, through his association with Bin Laden, has gained a certain aura of mysticism. The conflict is more terrorist in nature and does not meet the threshold for armed conflict. Egyptian state security is extremely repressive, which, for the time being, may prevent the emergence of charismatic leadership.

<sup>92</sup> “[...] an anachronistic absolute monarchy with desperate humanitarian problems,” [International Crisis Group, Crisis Group Africa Briefing no. 29, July 14, 2005]. Parade Magazine ranks him the 10<sup>th</sup> worst dictator [[http://archive.parade.com/2004/0222/0222\\_dictators.html](http://archive.parade.com/2004/0222/0222_dictators.html)]. “King Mswati III is a dangerous dictator who is spoiling for a civil war, and he will get it,” [The Star, Swaziland’s Constitution is a Step Backwards, August 12, 2005, <http://www.thestar.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=225&fArticleId=2833790>]

<sup>93</sup> Echoing the complaints of a younger generation of political activists, [Roland] Rudd [a field officer with the banned political group People’s United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO)] called for new leadership in labour and pro-democracy groups. ‘The leadership is weak, and needs visionary and strategic-minded individuals who are committed to an ‘all or nothing’ resolution in 2005,’ [IRIN News.org, Swaziland: Opposition Becoming More Militant, August 25, 2005, [http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=44951&SelectRegion=Southern\\_Africa&SelectCountry=SWAZILAND](http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=44951&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa&SelectCountry=SWAZILAND)]. This conflict presents the perfect template to prove the “charismatic leader” theory proposed in this paper. Should the theory hold, the emergence of an opposition charismatic leader in Swaziland (of which there are none at present) would transform the conflict into an armed conflict.

<sup>94</sup> Zviad Gamsakhurdia, “the charismatic, ultra-nationalist” President [[opendemocracy.net/content/articles/PDF/1606.pdf](http://opendemocracy.net/content/articles/PDF/1606.pdf)]

<sup>95</sup> “The charismatic, combative [Vladislav] Ardzinba shows no sign of softening his stance and remains staunchly pro-independence [for Abkhazia], despite the poor prospects for international recognition” [<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/3485.html>]

<sup>96</sup> 2,500 killed in 1992-93 clashes between Georgia and separatist Abkhaz movement (SIPRI, 1994)

<sup>97</sup> Hafez el-Assad, who “installed a brutal, dictatorial-like regime in Syria” [Amnesty International, August 23, 2005, <http://www.amnestyinternational.be/doc/article5612.html>]. “Hafez Al-Assad was a real charismatic leader. His people owed him loyalty. And it is due to this charisma that he managed to spare Syria from the turmoil of

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political disturbances that it had known before him,' comment[s] one Egyptian diplomatic source," [Al-Ahram Weekly, Prioritising Syrian Stability, June 15-21, 2000, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2000/486/foc61.htm>]. Asad's son, Bachir al-Asad, does not display traits characteristic of charismatic leadership, though he does share some of Asad Sr.'s dictatorial inclinations.

<sup>98</sup> Targeting of political critics, restrictions on expression, media, arbitrary arrests [Human Rights Watch, Dangerous Backlash in Syria, September 7, 2001, <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/09/07/syria2076.htm>]. Repression on non Alawite Islamic groups.

<sup>99</sup> Rebel forces, led by Major Gbargo Zoumanigui, launched attacks in Guinea in 2002, in an attempt to overthrow President Lansana Conté (a similar attempt was made in 1996). Rebels trained in Liberia, with support of Liberian President Charles Taylor. [Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, 2004]. No indicators of charismatic leadership.

<sup>100</sup> "In Tajikistan, the [Emomali Sharipovic] Rakhmonov government that took power after a fierce civil war was engaged during 1993 in a ruthless campaign of revenge against those who sympathized with or supported the opposition," [Helsinki Watch Overview, Human Rights Watch, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/WR94/Helsinki.htm>]. "Cruel," "ruthless," [Eurasia Research Centre, August 11, 1998, <http://eurasia-research.com/taj0811.htm>]. No charismatic leadership traits for Rakhmonov's predecessor, Rakhmon Nabiyev, under whose leadership the civil war began.

<sup>101</sup> Civil war (pro-government vs. Islamic and pro-democracy movements) beginning in 1992 results in 20,000 dead and displaces 600,000 [BBC News, Timeline: Tajikistan, June 15, 2005, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/country\\_profiles/1297913.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1297913.stm)].

<sup>102</sup> Civil War in 1998. Hundreds of civilians killed, and as many as 200,000 refugees. Although this does not meet the threshold for armed conflict, the humanitarian catastrophe warrants this conflict being categorized as armed in nature. Neither of the leaders, President Jodo Bernardo "Nino" Vieira, and coup leader Ansumane Mane, have displayed traits of charismatic leadership [Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, 2004].

<sup>103</sup> "Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a charismatic leader who has often thrived on controversies [...] The stamp of 'Thaksinisation' - a mix of populist policies, a certain willingness to 'think the unthinkable' and a high measure of self-esteem that his critics see as the arrogance of power," [Frontline, A Political Wave in Thailand, February 26 - March 11, 2005, <http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2205/stories/20050311000105900.htm>].

<sup>104</sup> Southern Thailand, Muslim insurgency; does not meet armed conflict threshold. No charismatic militant organisation leader identified (Haji Da-oh, Dr. Wan Kadir).

<sup>105</sup> "En 1990, des élections démocratiques se déroulent enfin. Candidat de la dernière heure, le charismatique père Jean-Bertrand Aristide est élu président de la République avec 67 % des voix." [Haiti, entre dictature et pauvreté, Radio-Canada, nouvelles. <http://www.radio-canada.ca/nouvelles/dossiers/haiti/histoire2.shtml>]

<sup>106</sup> 1,500 dead (1992) [Toronto Star, March 22, 1992]

<sup>107</sup> Turgut Ozal "charismatic" [Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Spring 2002, <http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume1/number1/ataman.htm>]. "Both Tayyip Erdoğan and Turgut Özal are charismatic. Because other people are enjoying themselves to be close to them and they spread their energies. They also bring faith to people, motivate them and encourage them with their moods and attitudes. Both of these two leaders have followers," [Amrop Hever Turkey, June-July 2003, <http://www.amrop-tr.com/Leaders.htm>].

<sup>108</sup> Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK, later renamed Kadek, then Congra-Gel), described as "charismatic," "bloody murderer," (AFP, <http://radiobergen.org/terrorism/pkk.html>) and a "charismatic leader, but also a dictatorial figure who did not permit the growth of an alternative leadership," [Ely Karmon, "The Arrest of Abdullah Ocalan," February 17, 1999, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, <http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articleDet.cfm?articleid=72>]. Currently in detention.

<sup>109</sup> 37,000 from 1984-1999 (AP, April 29, 1999).

<sup>110</sup> Sikh separatist group, Babbar Khalsa International (current leader Wadhawa Singh Babbar); Naxalite separatism; Hindu-Muslim riots. No charismatic leadership identified; does not meet armed conflict threshold.

<sup>111</sup> Sapamurat Niyazov, "president for life," "despotic," [Martha Brill Olcott, "Turkmenistan's Place in the Global Community," Eurasianet.org, November 21, 2003, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav112103.shtml>]. "Appointed President for life, Saparmurat Niyazov, who likes to be called "Turkmenbashi", the father of all Turkmenis, has stamped out the opposition and exercises total control over state structures and the media in this old central-Asian Soviet Republic. He is lionised by a personality cult. Huge portraits of him decorate all government buildings, and numerous monuments have been

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built in his honour, including a fifty-foot sculpture in the capital,” [Reporters Without Borders, <http://www.rsf.org/rsf/uk/Predateurs/html/niyazov.html>]

<sup>112</sup> “One of the most repressive states in Central Asia [...] by 1992, opposition within the country had effectively been silenced,” [Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, 2004]. Nascent opposition, under Khudaiberdy Orazov and Alexander Dodonov; no charismatic traits.

<sup>113</sup> Jose Ramos Horta, “leading figure in the campaign against Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor [...] he was jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize alongside Bishop Carlos Belo, the leader of East Timor’s majority Catholic population.” [BBC News: East Timor, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special\\_report/1999/05/99/east\\_timor/378959.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1999/05/99/east_timor/378959.stm)]; “the charismatic former guerrilla and symbol of East Timor’s struggle, Xanana Gusmao” [Australian Broadcasting Corporation radio transcript, May 20, 2002; <http://www.abc.net.au/am/stories/s559021.htm>]; “GAM’s [Free Movement of Aceh] founder, the charismatic Hasan di Tiro” Michael L. Ross, “Resources and Rebellion in Indonesia,” March 29, 2002 [<http://www.indopubs.com/in3.html>]. There are no indications of charismatic leadership for presidents Suharto, B. J. Habibie, and Megawati Sukarnoputri.

<sup>114</sup> East Timor: 7,000 (1999) [UN World Food Program]; Aceh: “over 10,000 since 1989” [Ploughshares 2000 Report]

<sup>115</sup> “Charismatic and affable, Museveni is regarded as one of the most influential leaders in Africa. However, his thirst for power and quest for a controversial third presidential term may return Uganda to its dictatorial past,” [IrinNews.net, Uganda: Nation Decides on Political Parties, July 27, 2005, [http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=48324&SelectRegion=East\\_Africa](http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=48324&SelectRegion=East_Africa)].

<sup>116</sup> See Profile: Uganda’s LRA rebels, by Martin Plaut, BBC News UK edition of February 6, 2004 [<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3462901.stm>] which describes the Lord’s Resistance Army’s leader Joseph Kony as “mysterious” and who “uses biblical references to explain why it is necessary to kill his own people. The LRA is also well known for its abduction of children, whom it turns into child soldiers. In his memoirs, former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, who visited Northern Uganda in 2002, refers to the LRA as “semi-spiritualist” movement, whose members “smeared butter on their bodies to ward off bullets.” Navigating a New World: Canada’s Global Future (Toronto: Random House, 2003), p. 13.

<sup>117</sup> 100,000 (BBC, November 4, 2004, in <http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat6.htm#Ug87>].

<sup>118</sup> “The charismatic [Iranian President] Mohammad Khatami,” Radio Free Europe, August 3, 2005 [<http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/08/028eb6bf-eb0b-47c7-9d3f-ce68783a0e0c.html>]. The Iranian Revolution was launched, inspired, and made possible by Ayatollah Khomeini, who is often described as a charismatic leader.

<sup>119</sup> Leader of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) “the charismatic Mrs [Maryam] Rajavi, 49, known as the ‘Sun of the Revolution,’” Guardian Unlimited, Special Report: Iran, June 23, 2003 [<http://www.guardian.co.uk/iran/story/0,12858,983076,00.html>].

<sup>120</sup> In 2000, a plot to overthrow the government by military force, by a group called Union of Soviet Officers in Ukraine, was uncovered by the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU).

<sup>121</sup> Saddam Hussein’s one-party, dictatorial rule had all the elements of a cult of personality, and the instrument of state undisputably revolved around him. Hussein was instrumental in the crushing of Kurdish separatists in 1991. The US Government’s insistence on capturing the Iraqi dictator after the 2003 Gulf War is also an indication of his “charismatic” nature. There is no Iraqi leader, at present, who displays traits characteristic of charismatic leadership.

<sup>122</sup> “Massoud Barzani, the charismatic leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party” [AFP, May 5, 2005, <http://home.cogeco.ca/~kobserver/9-5-05-jaafari-pledges-federal-irq.htm>]. With regards to the insurgency, Shiite religious leader Muqtada al-Sadr’s fiery, religious-laden speeches managed to rally a number of anti-Coalition elements, resulting in a number of clashes with US forces. Al-Qaeda’s man in Iraq, Jordanian-born Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, does not display charismatic traits. It is his quasi mythical aura, resulting from his association with Bin Laden, and his standing up to American might, that confers him leader status. Though beyond the scope of this paper, it would be worth exploring how the electronic media, as well as the Internet, may alter the face of charismatic leadership in future conflicts. Bin Laden’s and Zarqawi’s disappearing acts, combined with the occasional rumour that they were killed in action, or are ailing, may in fact contribute to the mystical aura that gives those leaders such authority.

<sup>123</sup> 10,000 Kurds killed in 1991 [23 May 1999 Denver Rocky Mtn News]; 48,000-58,000 (incl. Civilians, Coalition, and insurgents) [<http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/wars21c.htm#Iraq03>]

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<sup>124</sup> Islam Karimov: “dictatorial rule,” [Committee to Protect Journalists, [http://www.cpj.org/cases05/europe\\_cases05/uzbek.html](http://www.cpj.org/cases05/europe_cases05/uzbek.html)], “Infinitely more brutal, despotic tyranny than Cuba,” [Eric Margolis, Bush and the Uzbek Communists, April 5, 2004, <http://www.bigeye.com/040504.htm>].

<sup>125</sup> Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s “charismatic military commander, Juma Namangani,” [EurasiaNet.org, Central Asia Authorities Keep IMU Threat Alive September 16, 2002, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav091602.shtml>]. Namangani was killed in a US bombing in northern Afghanistan. “Namangani's charismatic successor, Tahir Yuldashev,” [The Telegraph, December 15, 2004, [http://www.telegraphindia.com/1041215/asp/foreign/story\\_4130563.asp](http://www.telegraphindia.com/1041215/asp/foreign/story_4130563.asp)].

<sup>126</sup> Repression of Islamic movements (IMU, Hizb ut-Tahir, Muslims in general); 500 killed during demonstration in May 2005 [CNN.com, “Thousands of Uzbeks fleeing, Human rights monitors report hundreds of people killed,” May 15, 2005, <http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/05/14/uzbekistan/>]. While the number of dead and displaced does not grant the Uzbek conflict armed conflict status, this is yet another example of a state where there is a high potential for mass violence should there emerge a strong, charismatic leader who will manage to rally a large proportion of a repressed population.

<sup>127</sup> The “charismatic [Benjamin] Netanyahu,” [Yahoo News, [http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20050811/ap\\_on\\_re\\_mi\\_ea/israel\\_big\\_bang\\_1](http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20050811/ap_on_re_mi_ea/israel_big_bang_1)]. The other Israeli leaders during the period of covered in this paper, Yitzhak Rabin, Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon, pale in comparison to Netanyahu in terms of charisma. The demonisation of Ariel Sharon as a “war criminal” for his actions in Lebanon, however, are indicative of his symbolic value to the Palestinians.

<sup>128</sup> “The charismatic Arafat, acclaimed by Palestinians as the father of their nationalist struggle while branded by most Israelis as an irredeemable ‘face of terror,’” Miftah.org, November 11, 2004 [<http://www.miftah.org/display.cfm?DocId=5468&CategoryId=14>]. “While [Palestinian Authority Leader Mahmoud] Abbas has campaigned as the faithful aide and heir to Arafat, he is strikingly different in many ways from the charismatic Palestinian leader who died Nov. 11. Abbas wears a suit, not the military uniform and kaffiyeh that were Arafat's trademarks. While Arafat loved crowds and was considered a master showman, Abbas has shunned the spotlight.” Who Is Mahmoud Abbas, CNN.com, January 7, 2005 [<http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/01/07/who.is.abbas/>]. “Led by Ahmed Yassin, a charismatic Gaza leader, who was a religious leader by study but not formal theological training, Hamas catalyzed physical confrontation against Israelis and Israeli institutions.” MSN Encarta [[http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia\\_761580639/Hamas.html](http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761580639/Hamas.html)]

<sup>129</sup> Despite the focus that the conflict attracts on the world stage, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not achieve the threshold for armed conflict. The conflict is characterised by sporadic bursts of violence (First and Second Intifadas) and “terrorist” attacks targeting civilians. According to Twentieth Century Atlas, Death Tolls statistics, there were 1,465 fatalities during the First Intifada and approximately 1,500 in the Second Intifada [<http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat4.htm#Pal48>].

<sup>130</sup> Hugo Chavez, “charismatic [...] in control and calling the shots,” [Signing On to Challenge Hugo Chavez,” Washington Post, July 9, 2004, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A37649-2004Jul8.html>], “charismatic populist,” [Chavez Defeats Recall Attempt, Washington Post, August 17, 2004, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A4208-2004Aug16.html>]. ““There is no democracy here [in Venezuela] [...] his is a despotic government,” [Cardinal Chavez Needs Exorcism, CNN.com, August 1, 2005, <http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/americas/07/31/chavez.cardinal.ap/>].

<sup>131</sup> “Venezuela, the world's fifth-largest oil exporter and wealthiest member of the Community of Andean Nations (CAN), is in deep political crisis, with high risk that its democratic institutions could collapse, and some possibility of civil war,” [International Crisis Group, Venezuela: Headed Towards Civil War? Latin America Briefing No. 5, May 10, 2004, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2738&l=1>]. Opposition to Chavez rule: under the umbrella Democratic Coordinating Instance (Coordinadora Democratica, CD), clashes with National Guard (2004). CD leader Diego Bautista Urbaneja does not display charismatic traits.

<sup>132</sup> “One of [India's] most durable and charismatic leaders” BBC News Profile: Profile: Atal Behari Vajpayee, May 13, 2004 [[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south\\_asia/463000.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/463000.stm)]

<sup>133</sup> The US State Department records approximately 1,100 (524 Indian soldiers, 696 Pakistani soldiers) casualties during the Kargil confrontation in 1999 [<http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat7.htm#Kargil>]. No charismatic traits found in the leaders of the Kashmiri separatist organisations Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM). General Pervez Musharraf is not characterised by the media as a charismatic leader, though his rule within Pakistan is close to dictatorial.

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<sup>134</sup> Violent protests over fuel prices and discontent with state leaders lead to violent, nationwide protests in 2005. 36 killed [International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, August 1, 2005: Yemen].

<sup>135</sup> Yemeni president, Ali Abdallah Saleh, and opponent in 1994 brief civil war, Ali Salim al-Baid, both do not display characteristics of charismatic leadership. At most, Saleh, who has been in power for 27 years, is referred to as “strongman.” Estimates of 4,000 dead and 12,000 wounded for the whole war [in Paul Dresch, *A History of Modern Yemen* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 252 n. 23]. No

<sup>136</sup> “Archetypal African Dictator,” [South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu of Mugabe, in *Mugabe: Going Strong After 25 Years*, BBC News, June 9, 2005]. “Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga [“the warrior who knows no defeat because of his endurance and inflexible will and is all powerful, leaving fire in his wake as he goes from conquest to conquest” [Meredith, p. 296]. Mugabe launches “Operation Murambatsvina [“Drive Out Rubbish”] (use of language) [Crisis Watch, August 1, 2005].

<sup>137</sup> Operation Drive out Rubbish, land grabs, disregard for democratic process. Opposition, under Morgan Tsvangirai [...] “is seen as representing a younger generation of Zimbabweans, particularly urban workers, who are less interested in Mr Mugabe's historical role as Zimbabwe's founding father than what they see as his recent record of economic mismanagement,” [BBC News, Profile: Morgan Tsvangirai, December 14, 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/713207.stm>]. Tsvangirai does not display traits characteristic of charismatic leadership. Zimbabwe presents yet another case where the emergence of a strong, charismatic leader could lead to armed conflict.