

HOMELAND DEFENCE AND THE RE/TERRITORIALIZATION OF THE STATE

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There is a constantly stated that the world has changed in some fundamental fashion because of the events of September 11. That this is a generally unsupported contention does little to mitigate the effect of the discourse. On the contrary the continued articulation of the argument reconstitutes the world we live in, and thus serves to bring about the change that supposedly occurred with the terrorist attacks. It is my intention, in writing this paper, to put forth that the “common sense” arguments that have emerged to support the “homeland defence” initiative within the United States, and the apparent move by Canada to support this drive, are not contingent on September 11, and that the logic underpinning the Canadian participation is not reducible to economic or military “facts”. In order to illustrate the manner in which the discourse of homeland defence has emerged, this paper will argue three main points: that the territoriality of the state has not been fading, that globalization is not about de-territorialization, and that homeland defence, which was alive and well before Sept. 11, has only been accelerated, not altered in any profound way. These three points will allow me to assert that the Canadian desire to join into homeland defence has nothing to do with making Canadian society more safe, or to protect its economy, but is rather about a need to be inside the “democratic” house which is clearly delineated and ascribed by the homeland perimeter.

The topic of territoriality has been the subject of a significant amount of research, rooted primarily within political geography, but has found more recent expression within critical approaches to international relations. This literature has attempted to come to terms with the manner in which the territorialized state is constructed, and the manner in which that construction in turn affects international politics. “Human societies create territory out of meaningless space.... A given territory is, by definition, separate from the territories of others, not only physically but, by and large, also ideologically...” For the most part, authors working on this subject have rejected the naturalistic manner in which the state has been superimposed on to a geographic space, recognizing that the connection emerged within, and is thus inseparable from a West European political context. While territoriality has been studied from a number of different perspectives, the approaches that this paper will draw upon are broadly

deal with the issue of the discursive creation of the territorialized state.

By stating that the territorialized state is a discursive creation the argument is being put forward that territoriality is historically contextualized and lacking in any objective grounding. Furthermore, as a discourse that is meant to capture "reality" it is constantly being exposed as inadequate to the task of containing all meaning; meanings that are ascribed to territoriality are unstable and require constant rearticulation. This is not to say that the discourse can contain any meaning, a degree of continuity with previous conceptions of the term is expected. In particular Ruggie has traced the development of territoriality in governance, a process which he argues was not functionally determined. "The modern mode of differentiation resulted from changes in several domains of social life, which are irreducible to one another." Territoriality is not "natural" in any meaningful manner. In spite of the way in which physical geography obviously exists, our understanding of this physical space is entirely ascribed. This ascription is neither perfect nor permanent; societies do change the manner in which they relate to geography. However, these changes are generally slow processes which contain echoes of past articulations. Following on the language that has developed in post-structural approaches, there is a constant process of both de/territorialization and re/territorialization that takes place.

The construction of the meanings of communities and their boundaries occurs through *narratives*: 'stories' that provide people with common experiences, history and memories, and thereby bind these people together. Narratives should not be comprehended only as modes of representation but also as discourses that crucially shape social practice and life.

According to Mathias Albert "For territory to be meaningful it has to be reproduced by the enactment of challenges to it, by questionings and erasures of boundaries as markers of space, but also through the inscription of new boundaries." Given the centrality of security and identity to territoriality, any assault on either is bound to lead to a reformation of our conception of territoriality. However, what is of interest is the degree to which any particular challenge is likely to result in a significant shift in the understanding of territoriality. It is unlikely that a security threat will result in a re-articulation of territoriality that differs substantially from previous understandings.

The modern territorialized state is the heir of the Westphalian state, which is a sovereign political entity that is geographically delineated. The sovereign entity becomes the primary referent for security; it is the state and its sovereignty that must be defended. This is the understanding of security that is prevalent in neo/realist approaches to international relations. However, the reductionist expression of the Westphalian state can no longer be passed off as representative of today's states. Any approach that relies on such a simple articulation is incapable of providing an adequate understanding of the complexity of the current western connection between state, society and territory. In order to understand the modern territorialized state it is essential that we recognize that the notions of citizenship and

nationalism have been grafted onto the state, and that these concepts are now often treated as inseparable. The result of this union is that the geographic boundaries of the nation and state are expected to coincide, the result of which is that the territorialized state has a much larger significance than demarcating the boundaries of sovereignty. As will be demonstrated the territorialized state is central to the interconnected notions of security and identity. On the one hand the territorial state is constructed as the primary referent of security, of a body that must be protected from harm. At the same time the state also denotes the limits of social identity, demarking who does and does not belong to a particular community. While this paper will proceed by examining these two concepts separately, they are largely co-determinous, each relying on the other.

Territorialization and Security

Territoriality continues to be the dominant context within which security is conceptualized. While there have been attempts to broaden the referents of security, the geographically bounded state continues to be the central object of analysis. The work of Barry Buzan is explicit in the manner in which, in spite of a move to increase the breadth of security, the state remains at the centre of analysis. His argument rests in large part on the assumption of sovereignty, that the state is the sole body permitted to wield military force. As this simple “fact” continues to describe the ordering of force within the world today, there is a certain elegance in Buzan’s movement to recognize the contingent nature of social organization while dealing with it as a sedimented reality. However, such an approach ultimately reinforces those categories and does little to expose opportunities for change.

Much of the confusion that emerges with any discussion of the state comes from a drive to essentialize the concept. The difficulty is that the idea of the state is multi-faceted and irreducible to a single phenomenon. The state is not just a form of political organization but is today a geographically delineated entity. The state, as a referent of security is then more than the ruling elite, or the “people”, but incorporates the soil, water and air of a country. Political governance, security referent and identity source are all delineated with the same geographic boundary. Due to this geographic groundedness of the state, and thus the relations between states, geography continues to be relevant to the study of international relations. The problem is that this connection between geography and state has in the past been treated as natural and inevitable.

While the Darwinist inspired naturalist approach to the study of geopolitics of Ratzel and Mackinder has thankfully receded to a footnote, the articulation of a “body” politic continues within public discourse. The United States, for example, is not just a political arrangement or a community of peoples, it can only make sense by considering the country as a geographic space that corresponds with the governance of the state. An attack on the territory of a state is considered an attack on the political community, and must therefore be prevented. In this manner geopolitics, the study of the relation between geography and political communities,

remains important. Gerard Ó Tuathail makes a compelling case for the continued examination of geopolitics, though from a more inclusive perspective. "...[M]odern geopolitics can be thought of as a regime of power/knowledge that produced international politics as an objective global spatial drama, a ceaseless global struggle between predetermined geographical entities, and as a vision of territorial states dominating global space." Because geography continues to matter to politics, both domestic and international, geography must continue to be considered in international political behaviour.

The fields of international relations and security studies generally take the territorialized state for granted, abandoning the analysis of politics within the state, focussing rather on cross-border inter-state relations. The realist "billiard ball" models treats states as geographically discreet entities that interact across borders. However, this model only makes sense when the notion of the balls are constrained by a fixed billiards table, without a set geographic space states could conceivably act at will without ever bumping up against others. The idea of states operating in a fixed geographic space is then central to this model.

The manner in which militaries are oriented, and the strategies and tactics which dictate their use are also tied into the same territorialized reasoning. The role of modern militaries is largely about the need to control space, which is evidenced in their doctrine.. In short, geography has underpinned modern thinking about the roles of militaries. Prior to the Cold War the territorialized state was primarily vulnerable to other states at its borders. The role of militaries (the control of space including land, sea and air) informed the perceived threats to states, and was in turn a response to the perceived threat. Armies were designed to penetrate into a country, to seize the control of land, and to exert control over territory. This in turn dictated the response to other militaries and predetermined military/strategic thinking.

The re/territorialization of the security of the state does not end with the orientation of a state's armed forces. We can in fact see a concomitant move to territorialize threats to the state. In effect as the geographically bounded state is the object of reference, when a threat to the state is perceived, it in turn becomes territorialized. In part this may emerge from the need of militaries to treat the world in geographic terms. However, more importantly this territorialization of security is dependent on the manner in which territory is central to our understanding of what is to be defended. Because our understanding of international relations relies on territoriality it is difficult to remove ourselves from the assumptions that are built into our understandings of war and conflict. This becomes particularly acute once the language of "War" is used. States go to war with other states, or with portions of society that are seeking their own country (civil war). In both cases the forces are broken down into geographic entities, reproduced in the multitude of maps used in media broadcasts to show where the "enemy" lies. The current response to terror has followed this model, with states seeking to link terrorists to geographic entities, striving to show a connection between foreign states and terror. Recent history is replete with examples of punishing states for terrorist activities. The most obvious example is the current war in Afghanistan in order to prevent further terrorist

attacks. This is in spite of the obvious global links of Al Qaeda, and the substantial evidence that the organization is able to operate within liberal states such as United States, Canada and Germany. The territorialized discourse of security forces a response against another territorialized actor, thus Afghanistan stands in as a surrogate for the terrorists. Territoriality remains crucial to the understanding of security within the West.

Territorialization and Identity

Identity must be considered in a discussion of security as it determines who is to be protected from whom. Furthermore, it delineates who within a state may constitute a threat, thus who essentially is scripted as being external to a particular identity. The concept of identity is easily one of the most complex terms used in political studies, and unsurprisingly is approached from a broad range of theoretical positions. At the core of its usage is a sense that "identity" signifies the essence of an object; it attempts to fix an object's meaning. Obviously the complexity increases dramatically when it is applied to the analysis of people and societies. With respect to social meaning, identity is how people feel they relate to their physical and social environment, defining how a person is to relate to "others". This paper takes the position that these identities are inherently groundless, and as social constructions require constant re/articulation. Any identity can be revealed to be a simplification will inevitably be shown to be contradictory due to the elimination of complexity. Crucial to this understanding of identity is to recognise that at its core identities must be constructed around the relationship between the Self and Other. David Campbell describes this as a relationship between identity and difference, and as one of "inside/outside". Identities are then necessarily constructed in opposition to a constructed "other" a person or people that is alien and foreign.

As we have seen, the discourse of security is reliant on territoriality; the second significant aspect of "territory" is the manner in which it has become a central context for identity creation. Identity, as it has been linked to the development of the territorial state, itself became dependent on territory. The "place" from which a person emerged became a key marker in defining "who" that person or was. According to Lothar Brock "...territorial demarcations and control are the prime differentiating and organizing principles of the Westphalian system of states, and ... territorialisation is a central mode of coding social practice..." This seems to be largely taken for granted in current conversation. The geographic boundaries are used as one of the main markers to signify who is and who is not a part of a given society. The boundaries are expected to separate groups, effectively separating "inside" and "outside", the "civilized" from "uncivilized", "US" from "them".

The modern nation-state is premised on the notion that its geographic boundaries delineates belonging, which then defines a state's identity. The role of the discourse of territory in identity formation goes beyond the simple indication of where a person may claim citizenship. The geography of the state is linked to identity in a much deeper way, it is organically part of what it is to belong to a particular state. To be Canadian is to be connected

with a particular geography which is constantly reproduced in discourses of visual arts, music and literature, all of which contribute to the notion that to be Canadian is to be in some way connected with the Canadian geography. "Because territory forms a part of the state identity and a part of the identity of many human groups, it is valued independently of its strategic or economic benefits." While national identity is not entirely constituted by geography, certainly territory plays a central role.

The centrality of geography in identity is in many respects inevitable given the interest of the state apparatus in perpetuating and re/inventing an identity where the state itself is territorially bounded. Roxanne Doty is clear in showing how boundaries are central to the nation-state.

...the inside/outside boundary is a function of a state's discursive authority, that is, its ability, in the face of ambiguity and uncertainty, to impose fixed and stable meanings about who belongs and who does not belong to the nation, and thereby to distinguish a specific political community - the inside - from all others - the outside.

Thus, as with our discussion with security and territoriality, when the physical body of the state is attacked, our very identity is assaulted. In essence an attack on the soil of a country is an attack on the people. This was seen in the manner in which the United States reacted to the horrific attacks on the American embassies in East Africa on 8 August 1998. According to international law embassies are to be treated as the sovereign territory of the embassy's state, however, this convention does not have popular resonance. Therefore, the attack on the embassy in Mozambique was not viewed as an attack on American soil, thus while horrible, the event did not result in a similar public emotional response as the attack on the World Trade Center. While both cases resulted in massive loss of life, only one was an attack on American soil, and thus only one was an attack on the American people.

Identity formation is clearly not a fixed process, it is continuously confronted by alternative identity formations and is constantly exposed in its arbitrariness. "Constructing the identity of a people is a continual and never-completed project, but it cannot appear as such. In other words, the people must simultaneously be presumed as given and at the same time be continually reproduced." The territorialized identity of the state is no different from any other identity formation. However, the state, with far more resources at its disposal is much more effective in perpetuating identity formations. Furthermore, as David Campbell illustrated through his discussion of the centrality of danger to the state's identity, any evidence of danger reinforces state identity.

The nexus between identity and security is seen most clearly in responses to attacks on a state. September 11 could have been seen as evidence that territoriality has lost its relevance. However, the attack on the World Trade Centre was written as an attack on Americans, it was validation that there was a violent external "Other" lurking outside of the state. This in turn

re/vitalized territorial identity which fed into the re/territorialization of the state's security discourse. The "Other" was outside of the state in terms of both territory and identity, and had to be denied entry to America.

Globalization and Deterritorialization

This paper has so far presented territoriality as if it was an uncontested concept, and that there is a general acceptance that we live in a world within which geography is a significant if not the most important form of security and identity delineation. In fact, since the early 1990s the centrality of territorialization has been a hotly debated topic. There is a great deal of literature cross-cutting theoretical perspectives which point to the deterritorialization of the state. This literature generally argues that territory is losing its relevance as an identity and security marker, and that other referents are emerging that are replacing the territorialized state. In particular, the processes of globalization are seen as undermining the state system of organization and identity. Anderson and O'Dowd, recognizing that there are different understandings of globalization, categorize them into two general categories of 'strong' and 'weak' globalization. The strong globalization group, represented by Ohmae, Castells, Giddens, Fukayama and O'Brien, generally emphasize economics and technology over culture. They see an imminent demise of the relevance of the territorial state as a central marker of identity. On the other hand, Hirst, Thompson and Mann all argue that 'weak' globalization has not led to the significant eclipse of the state. "Weak globalization perspectives point, implicitly or explicitly, to the adaptability of state territoriality as new macro-regional borders develop around (and within) the EU, NAFTA, and looser, weaker associations such as Mercosur...." This second grouping focusses on regionalization as a gradual changing of the territorial state.

This paper will pursue the critique of territoriality that is found within the "strong" globalization school. The manner in which globalization impacts on territoriality is explicitly laid out by Paasi:

It is now increasingly being argued that capitalism and the processes of globalisation will give rise to new global geographies and increase all manner of links (cultural, political, economic, informational) across boundaries. This will detract from the role of state boundaries and sovereignty and lead to the de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation of the territorial system.

The causes of this deterritorialization have been well documented, and confront us on a daily basis. Increases in cross-border traffic, the growth of a supposed transnational managerial class, the internet and the liberalization of trade, are all supposed to be undermining the state system; a process that some see as leading to a new global civil society which has little or no territorial grounding. New patterns of social relations are argued to be emerging which provide an alternative to geographically based identity. The ability of mass media to propagate cultures across geographic divides is supposed to be signalling the demise of territorially based

identities.

Just as globalization is altering identities, it is also supposed to be leading to a deterritorialization of security threats. The growth of non-territorially based identities is related to a move to non-territorial based conceptions of security. The internet as a source and target of security concerns, and the environment are both models of deterritorialized security issues. As states become less territorially grounded, and identity loses its geographic boundedness then territorialized security must be expected to further erode. Furthermore, the referents of security can be seen as being either sub-state or trans-state in nature. Ó Tuathail does an excellent job of showing how security has become deterritorialized, providing a long list of examples of non-territorialized threats. At the same time he acknowledges that militaries continue to have to “negotiate territory and place”. Whether the referents are Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) or various sub-altern groupings, the state is supposed to have lost much of its relevance. Threats are described as no longer being rooted within geographic borders, such as terrorism and environmental degradation, or not targeting geographically bounded phenomenon, such as the internet or transnational capital. Security is then seen as no longer being a territorial phenomenon, as being uprooted from its previous grounding.

The arguments supporting the deterritorialization of security and identity have been over-stated. In order to demonstrate that territoriality is losing its relevance it is essential to be able to empirically demonstrate two related phenomenon. First, it must be shown that the territorialized state is losing its relevance as a security referent in public discourse; that it is no longer the state that is being defended. Secondly, it must be illustrated that there is a move to alternate levels of identity formation which are incompatible with, and have eclipsed the state. If these two points can be empirically validated then we can accept that deterritorialization of the state has occurred and that any re/territorialization that may have occurred has been limited. However, while globalization has been happening, its impact on the geographic rooting of identity and security has been quite limited.

In discussing the impact of globalization on issues of identity and security, there is a tendency to exaggerate and confuse the situation, and to assert that it is more universal than evidence would support. Even if it is accepted that changing trade patterns may have an influence on identity formations, the dramatic change which has been the basis of the strong globalization school must be demonstrated. In fact, many of the arguments that put forth globalization as an inherently modern phenomenon are lacking in nuance and fail to recognize that trade across communities has occurred for millennia. “Trade has always flowed across cultures, civilizations, and states, binding economic fortunes together as well as acting as a conduit for ideas, technologies, and social practices.” While there may be little doubt that the liberal state is being opened up to business, and that the boundaries to the trade of goods have been stripped away, this has not occurred in every sector. There is actually a significant body of literature which argues that modern trade flows continue to be territorially constrained. Goldblatt *et al.* show that the rise in global trade and investment practices, while significant has

not changed the fact that the majority of economic activity still occurs on a more restricted spatial scale. Local linkages for trade still account for the majority of the flow of goods and services. At the risk of over-simplifying this argument, while the clothes an individual may purchase could have been sewn in Sri Lanka, packaged in Taiwan and sold by an American franchise, the fact is the person who purchased the item probably bought them in a local store. That the garment is the result of an internationalized mode of production is of no immediate relevance. As a result, global patterns of production and capital flows, while obviously having profound effects on the lives of people, are abstract for the individual and do not have to lead to any "deterritorialization" of identity.

Related to the free movement of goods that has emerged through globalized trade is the associated notion that the increased mobility of peoples is resulting in a de/territorialization of identity. Certainly, there has been a steady increase in the flow of peoples across state borders; the more important question is who is able to, or allowed to participate in this movement, and who has benefited from this particular aspect of globalization. It is the business class that has increased its traffic and movement. The "Lonely Planet" audience is the affluent sector of society that comes from the developed "North". Putting aside the limited manner in which globalization has facilitated the flow of peoples, we can turn to the other ways in which globalization has been purported to be de/territorializing identity. Even the internet, the supposed force of democratization and emancipation is seldom a tool of liberation. It is expensive to maintain a computer and web-access - especially when significant portions of the globe can not rely on a steady electrical supply. Those individuals who are able to reach out into cyberspace to escape the restraints of borders are extremely limited. There are also initiatives to spatialize the Net, evident in the legal requirements of sites to abide by government controls and in the site extensions which designate country of origin. What we find is that many aspects of territoriality have in fact been reinforced by the processes of globalization. Forsberg points out that the internet, and the increased mobility of peoples has allowed many to choose where to live, thus increasing and not decreasing territorial attachment. Further, he uses the example of the Silicon Valley to illustrate how the internet can in fact strengthen local communities. The globalized world is not about de/territorialization of either identity or security. In essence only acid rain, car parts and business men have the ability to flow with ease over the ascribed state boundaries. The process which Forsberg observed and which even some strong globalization advocates such as Castells witnessed is that there is an ongoing reterritorialization of identity. Unlike Castells I do not feel that the construction of a particular local identity necessarily contradicts, undermines, or in any way makes a territorialized state identity irrelevant.

The connection between globalization and the end of territoriality is quite tenuous. This argument can in fact be taken further, while neo-liberal patterns of business may have freed economics from territorial commitments, for most people the territorial state has, if anything, become more relevant in the modern world. I am not arguing that globalization has had no effect on territoriality, rather I am saying is that the de/territorialization of both identity and

security that accompanies the processes of globalization have been followed by a re/territorialization that has re/inscribed territoriality's relevance to identity and security. What this hints at is that the de/territorialization of the state, in both its roles in identity formation and security, has been followed by a re/territorialization that has re/entrenched the role of the state.

Homeland Defence

If globalization results in a re/territorialization of the state then the issue of homeland defence must be considered carefully with regards to how it is a response to these processes. "Homeland defence" even the very title is provocative, conjuring images of a house under siege. The discourse of "homeland defence" has been argued by many in the U.S. defence community to be a relatively new concept that has been necessitated by the globalized world. The concept itself did not enter into common usage within the United States until 1997, though it can be traced to a Presidential Directive issued by Clinton in 1995. Even more recently there have been three major commissions, the Bremer, the Gilmour and the Hart-Rudman Commission, all written between 1999 and 2000. These three reports reached the same general conclusion that the American state was vulnerable to attack. The Hart-Rudman Commission stated:

America will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland, and our military will not entirely protect us... States, terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction and mass disruption, and some will use them. Americans will likely die on American soil in large numbers.

Thus as Gerard O'Tuathail stated "A postmodern geopolitical imagination is evident but it still resides in a world established by the modern geopolitical imagination. Transnational threats are specified but layered upon a state-centric and territorially delimited 'national security' problematic." The era of state versus state conflict seems to have waned for the authors of these three reports. Rather than focusing on the risk of warfare as we came to understand it in the "modern" era of interstate conflict, the new warfare will use new tactics with very different characteristics.

The U.S. security establishment, in trying to identify the source of the next threat to America, was unable to readily identify any states with the capacity to attack and win a war against the West's military machine. It is quite telling that the threats are perceived as being "out there", that they are outside of the American state and are merely awaiting identification. What the strategic analysts were able to locate were *potentials* to do damage to American property and people if those launching an assault were willing to be hunted down or in the case of a country, annihilated. Thus the vulnerability of the state was taken to represent the risk. Essentially, if it was possible for a particular analyst to imagine some horror, then there was a real risk that some organization would attempt to perpetrate that abomination. The next step

for the analysts was to examine potential capability which was linked up to vulnerability. In a simplistic expression of the logic, if a site could be damaged, and if the capability of doing so was within reach of any given organization, then it is necessary to assume the group would be willing to take the action. Crucially, it must be realized that the security analyst need not concern one's self with the motivation or intention of the various groups. This disconnect between capacity and motivation now bears the official label of an "asymmetric threat". The term "asymmetric threat" is used to refer to situations where a state, weak in a traditional reading of military strength, develops a capability that offsets its inferior position. As an example modern computers systems combined with technical expertise are said to provide states with the ability to harm another country far more than its military strength would lead one to predict. With the focus on the capabilities of actors, any attention that was provided to intentions has faded to the background. Through this logic rogue states, terrorists, hackers, drug traders and presumably WTO protestors, all become identifiable as threats. However, in order to see these as threats the notion of *what* is threatened must also be altered.

The territorial state, which has in the past been seen as vulnerable at its borders, of being threatened by invasion, must be re-conceptualized in light of the emerging asymmetric threat. Security and strategic studies traditionally relied upon the notion that the state, much like a body, is at risk once something has the potential to pierce the boundary or skin of the state. This boundary between inside/outside is what protects those within from invasion, subversion, infection, and death. This threat was normally conceived as being posed by foreign militaries with the numerical or technological might to push through the boundary. The threat has not always come from outside the body, but can often emerge from within, like a pestilence to infect and destroy the state. The "red" threat, where anyone within the state that had affections for Marxist thought, or simply behaved outside of societal norms, is a textbook example of how America had to be defended from a threat that might be living amongst "us" but never a part of "us".

Another security threat that led to de/territorialization and subsequent re/territorialization was the emergence of the threat of ballistic weapons and long range aircraft capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction with very little warning. In the face of such a threat, territoriality as it had been understood prior to the age of strategic weapons, was of little objective relevance to the state in providing a context for security. Missiles and long-range bombers were able to ignore geographic boundaries, destroying the protection conferred on a state by its territory. The development of strategic weapons, with their purpose of the destruction of the war-fighting capability of a state was the recognition within military and policy circles that the state as a territorially defined body was losing its centrality to defence circles. No longer was the control of territory and the elimination of opposing armies the sole goal of militaries, rather the aim came to be the destruction of the industrial capabilities of a state, on its ability to sustain a military. The entire state became susceptible to attack, moving the front-line to the backyards of all of the United States. This discourse played out in American cinemas during the cold-war. The apocalyptic movies of the 1980s that

showed young Americans fending off communists in the backyards of the nation illustrates how the concept of the territorial state had been altered. A re/territorialization has taken place that has seen territory remain central to both identity and security, but through a new articulation of the boundary being everywhere, ground-zero could be next-door.

While the state is no longer an entity that can be defended entirely in the traditional sense of marching an army to the borders, it has not lost all relevance within the discourse of security. The state, as a geographic entity maintains its role as the primary referent of security, it continues to demarcate what and who is to be protected – who is “inside” and who is “outside” a state’s identity. The stark manner in which this articulation is done is clear in the adoption of the metaphor of “home” to describe what is to be protected. When we talk about a home it is clear that there is a notion of who belongs and who is excluded. To carry the metaphor forward, it is understood who is family, who is born into the group, who are “in-laws”, and thus who are the “outlaws”. This can in fact be read as a dramatic intensification of territoriality, it is no longer just the boundary that must be defended, but rather now the entire physical space of the state; every inch of it is suddenly vulnerable. It is this “logic” which is inherent in the homeland defence discourse.

The historical context of the discussions surrounding homeland defence is extremely important. In the mid to late 1990s a number of critical events unfolded that were written as security and defence threats, as opposed to criminal acts. The first bombing of the World Trade Centre was proof of the terrorist threat, and the arrest of Ressaam in December 1999, put a racially identifiable face on the threat and served as proof that there was a concerted effort to attack the U.S.. At the same time the rush to change over the two digit date to a four digit number was produced as a security threat. In Canada the Canadian Forces (CF) was deployed according on Operation ABACUS, with weapons, prepared to defend the country against some ill defined threat. However, the headlines and military thinking called our attention to the vulnerability of infrastructure. The need to defend the networks that drive the Western economy became a crucial concern. No longer were the companies who owned the equipment responsible for its maintenance, it was now the military’s role to “defend” it. If attacks could be carried out anywhere within a state then everything within the state had to be secured. Finally, the Oklahoma city bombing provided further proof of the need to defend the homeland from external threats. As Matthew Sparke has demonstrated, the discourse surrounding the event passed quickly from McVeigh and came to focus on the risk that Oklahoma city revealed. In fact Sparke argues that the discourse of “inside/outside” was ironically strengthened by McVeigh. The acts of McVeigh were used to illustrate the threat of terrorism in general, a threat that was inevitably assumed to emerge from “outside”.

Post 9-11 Territoriality

After September 11th, the media was quick to explain how the world had changed dramatically through the act of terrorism, relating the event, without a sense of irony to Pearl

Harbour - a day of infamy for the globalized world. These comments were repeated in countless conversations, providing a widely disseminated discourse which reified the threat and naturalized both the interpretations of the act and the subsequent Western response. In particular there was a loss of innocence coming from the violation of the American territory, and a general acceptance that civil liberties would have to be limited and the state would have to strive to secure itself from the "asymmetric threats" wishing to topple the American state.

The extent to which territoriality is still a deeply rooted aspect of security within the West was clear in the nature of the immediate response of the United States government. In securing the borders and shuttering the state behind an armoured wall the old territorial assumptions were clearly being reinforced. While these actions were unprecedented and dramatic there is no proof that this prevented any further assaults on the U.S. territory. This fortress America, with its drawbridge raised did not, and could not last long - after all, like an old walled city that has grown and reached out to its neighbours, it had long since torn down and made its walls obsolete. While the percentage of the American economy that depends on globalized trade is small in comparison to most other countries, it presents itself as the epitome of the globalized state. Thus while the U.S. could perhaps have weathered a contraction of international trade and a slowing down of imports, this is not what was witnessed. In fact, since Sept. 11 there has been an apparent acceleration in the drive to speed up the free movement of goods and to a lesser extent services. Examples of this include the move to conduct customs checks at sea ports of origin rather than ports of entry. The move along the Canadian/American border is the most telling. There are plans now for designated lanes across borders for transport trucks that would facilitate rapid clearance across the border. Discussions have now been launched to pre-clear trucks at factories. There are even discussions of accelerating custom checks for business men who frequently transit the border (presumably this will be dependent on the non-racial profile of the individual). The December 12th, 2001 Border Security Declaration and the 30 point plan that emerged out of it, aims at establishing a "smart border" and as Tom Ridge stated "to do everything we can do to eliminate the wait and hassle for no-risk travellers so we can focus on stopping high-risk individuals".

According to the globalization literature, the vanguard of the neo-liberal world order are the corporate elite. Surely then we should expect to see a significant reticence, outside of the defence industry, to a re/territorialization of the state and a increase in defence spending and increased government penetration into business. What September 11th has shown is that in fact business leaders are heavily invested in security, without which their businesses can not operate efficiently. When the geographic state, which businesses are still heavily reliant on, are threatened businesses are quite willing to pay a modest cost to ensure stability. Following the attacks, CEOs of major corporations have stepped into the debate around homeland defence, stating clearly that they were willing to accept higher taxes to provide security, and that they believed borders had to be secured. Within Canada the CEOs of Enbridge and Canadian Pacific have both been quite outspoken in their support of a North American security perimeter. For O'Brien, the CEO of CP, "It's really a matter of deciding on whose side you're on". The

re/territorialization of the state has ignored international trade. Global trade is not central to the new identity and security formations.

The manner in which the US response to terrorism is reliant on identity re/formation is quite evident in the titles given to the various acts that make up the Homeland Defence initiatives. Of greatest interest is the "USA Patriots Act" which effectively limits immigration, the title of which clearly defines who does and does not belong to the United States. It is then effectively delineating in a geographic manner who is the "other". Americans must be on-guard against all those who live "outside" of the US, these aliens are subjected to substantial security checks and are considered threats to America until proven otherwise. Dalby and Campbell have both explored at length how this construction of the "other" is a necessary component of identity formation.

Drawing from numerous intellectual sources, the construction of 'Others' as enemies allowed the formulation of the 'domestic' identity that was constructed as the antithesis of the external threat to be examined in ways that circumvented the conceptual straitjackets of both structural neo-realism and techno-strategic discourse

We must then come back to the role of identity formation and the inscription of who belongs to a society. The proclamation of the U.S. that societies were either "with us or against us" provides a stark articulation of how this binary of inclusion/exclusion operates.

Canadian Participation in Homeland Defence

Canada has been struggling with these same phenomena, attempting to come to terms with the emerging security environment and how best to defend the state. The discourse of American homeland defence is of central concern to Canadian planners intent on securing the Canadian state. While homeland defence, as a concept was slowly gaining credence within the U.S. security establishment, there have been quiet but intense debates within Canada over how to engage the United States on this issue. Numerous conferences were organized and consultations were held with "experts" on terrorism, urban warfare and crime. Notably, a conference organized by Stephane Roussel on "Perimeter Defence and Canada" was in hindsight eerily prescient in identifying the threat of terrorism, yet woefully inadequate in predicting the nature of the attack. More importantly, it was expressed at the conference that Canadian cooperation with the United States was largely pre-ordained, necessitated by the asymmetrical relationship of the two countries. The logic of the conference was also quite telling, illustrating the territorialized assumptions that underpin the mainstream in Canadian and American security studies. The very term perimeter defence illustrates the need to keep the alien "other" outside of the state which is clearly seen in the argumentation surrounding the need to secure airports. Rather, than representing a demise of the language of borders, the airports are instead ascribed as the new "front line", which simply rearticulates and reascribes the borderland. The fact that much of the security literature recognizes that the boundary is

conceptually complicated does not invalidate the point that security remains imbedded within a territorial discourse.

It is within the context of the American identity construction that we must consider why Canada is so driven to join in with the Homeland Defence project. As with the American debate around homeland defence, the Canadian debates about whether to join and cooperate with the U.S. predates September 11, 2001. As mentioned earlier there have been conferences organized within Canada that have dealt with this specific issue. In fact the existence of these debates largely set the limits of the post 9-11 debate within Canada. The arguments that are put forward that explain why Canada should participate with the United States in HD can be placed into three general groupings. These groupings are intertwined, and most arguments that are put forward touch on two if not all three of the following:

1. Canada must join out of economic necessity;
2. Canada must join out of strategic necessity; and
3. the Canadian/US relationship necessitates co-operation.

The lack of empirical evidence supporting the economic argument has already been laid out. There is no apparent basis for the argument that a refusal to participate in homeland defence would result in a significant reduction in the flow of trade across the Canadian/American border.

In contrast to trade, the strategic/security arguments are much more complex and hit a more visceral nerve. The creation of the terrorist threat to Canada is quite interesting. In spite of the apparent lack of evidence that Canada is being directly targeted by terrorist forces, the fear of such threats is palpable. While hardly "scientific", casual conversations make it quite clear that Canadians do perceive a risk. However, even the initial hysteria that Canada was a base for the terror attacks on the United States now seems to have been quite overblown. However, the event was sufficiently horrendous to strike an emotive chord, shaking people out of their ambivalence. It was virtually impossible to achieve distance from the event. When the event was written as an attack on democracy, and on the "west", then it became an attack on Canadians. To understand the manner in which this happened, the way in which 9-11 became a security threat for Canada we must look past the logic of traditional security studies.

What this leaves is the issue of identity, Canadian participation in homeland defence can only be understood within this context. The drive to be included in the homeland defence project takes on a very different light in relation to identity formation. The extension of the boundary between U.S. and the threatening other is pushed outward to embrace Canada and the United States. As politicians and the media have strived to make clear, we are more than neighbours, we are in some important ways family. This language draws us into the American home and ties Canada/Canadians to the security concerns of the U.S. Canadian territorialized identity is then reworked to include a North American aspect. The continent is not the source

of terror, the terror comes to the continent from “outside”, which in turn demands a continental response to security concerns. As politicians and the media have strived to make clear, Canada and the United States are more than neighbours, we are in fact family. This language ties Canadian identity to the United States, and ties our security with American security interests. Living beside the U.S. with a nice picket fence is no longer viable under this language, we are rather brought into a common house, the fence is moved to keep people out. Canada is then re/territorialized, the geographic boundaries remain relatively stable, but with the goal of keeping out terrorists and rogue agents. At the same time, the U.S. is re/written as crucial to Canadian security, Canada is expected to join into homeland defence in order to protect itself from the new post-modern threats.

Contrary to predictions of its demise, the territorialized state remains a central referent for identity formation. Globalization has not led to the demise of territoriality and has not had any impact on its centrality to discourses of security. This is not to say that the concept has been stable. The state has been undergoing a process of de/territorialization and re/territorialization. The new articulation which underpins homeland defence is simultaneously distinct from previous understandings of the state, and yet maintains a connection with the past. Geography continues to define who belongs to a state and who and what is to be secured. So long as territoriality is a defining feature of both identity and security, it will be virtually impossible to break free of the modes of response to violence that we have come to expect. At the same time there is hope that the incongruities of the discourse of territorialization and homeland defence, as it applies to Canada, will become apparent, providing space for alternative security postures.

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For a good cross section of this literature read the works of Gerard Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, John Ruggie and David B. Knight.

Knight: 1994, p.76

There have been a number of excellent studies that have illustrated the manner in which territoriality has changed and developed over time. Interested readers should look at the works of Marc Zacher and Gerard Ó Tuathail.

Ruggie: 1993, 168

The categorization of poststructuralism is obviously problematic. The grouping is identified more along the lines of a common research interest and commitments to post-positivist analysis than to a common epistemological position. The grouping is in many respects defined here as in opposition to positivist social science.

Paasi: 1999, p. 75.

David Campbell (1998) provides a crucial reading of the emergence of the principle of the sovereign state.

I use the term "modern understanding" consciously to illustrate that the state is firmly rooted within what has been broadly described as "modernism". Neoliberalism and globalization has

not resulted in a pluralistic or postmodern turn for the role of the state.

Buzan, et al: 1998

Examples of the naturalist approach to geopolitics can be seen in the work of Ratzel and Mackinder in the late 1800s, early 1900s. Their work is linked to the later thinking that underpinned the American containment of communism.

Ó Tuathail: 1997, 41.

These concepts of the strategic roles of militaries have evolved along with the modern state and the sciences that underpin them.

The work of Mahan illustrates how the territorialization of space was ascribed onto oceans. This resulted in a change of military strategy that saw Navies become oriented along a similar principle of territorial control as armies.

Lothar Brock

The thinking used on identity creation contained in this paper is deeply indebted to the thinking of David Campbell; in particular Writing Security, 2nd ed. has informed this study.

Forsberg: 1996, 367

Roxanne Doty, p. 122.

Ibid., p. 127.

Literature on de/territorialization and globalization covers the range of perspectives from neoliberalism with its individualist pre-occupation, through the range of social-movements studies which touch on nearly every theoretical perspective, to neo-Gramscian perspectives. Laying out the diverse explanations of these studies is not possible within this paper.

Anderson & O'Dowd, p. 600.

Paasi: 1999, p. 70.

Ó Tuathail: 1998, p. 32.

Goldblatt *et al.*, p. 272.

Ibid., p. 269.

E. Castells argues that the individual loses faith in the state as the governing structure is increasingly unable to control capital flow or provide social security. This, however, assumes that the main source of identity is tied to the efficiency of the state, which I feel is an untenable proposition. (Castells: 1997, 309)

Castells, calling on a study by Klinenberg and Perrin, demonstrated that the internet is actually subject to significant control by elites and is not yet open to wide public participation. (Castells: 1997, 351)

While the .com extension may be universal it is generally represented by "Western" sites. Beyond these extensions are the state extensions such as .uk, .ca, .nk etc. all of which designate the state of registry.

Forsberg: 1996.

Ibid.

Col. Randall J. Larsen (USAF Rtd), and Ruth A. David. "Homeland Defence: State of the Union". ANSER Institute for Homeland Security, (May 2001).
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GOTOBUTTON BM_1_ www.nssg.gov/Reports/reports.htm

The recent proclamations of the U.S. President of an Axis of Evil might indicate a return to the dynamics of state versus state warfare. However, this can also be more usefully read as an attempt to deal with non-state threats within a territorialized security framework.

This is ironically found in the Hart/Rudman Commission Phase I report which stated that "...a global competitor to the United States is unlikely to arise over the next 25 years..." (New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century" p.4.)

In part this results from the manner in which "threat assessments" are conducted by intelligence agencies. These assessments begin with locating vulnerabilities and then move to identifying which groups might be capable of such action. The question of whether the group is

likely to perform the act is asked last.

This "logic" is clear in the CIA assessment of the threat of a ballistic missile attack on the United States; the Agency recognizes that capability does not equal willingness, yet they develop their assessment based on this assumption. "The probability that a missile with a weapon of mass destruction will be used against *US forces or interests* is higher today than during most of the Cold War, and it will continue to grow as the capabilities of potential adversaries mature.... Although the missiles used in the Gulf war did not have WMD warheads, Iraq had weaponized ballistic missile warheads with BW and CW agents and they were available for use."

"Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015" National Intelligence Council, Dec 2001.

http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/Unclassifiedballisticmissilefinal.htm

I do not wish to imply that this risk of boundary penetration has been a constant discourse, it has in fact been quite unstable.

The territoriality of the first and second World Wars was dominated by the logic of a field that had to be progressively invaded. This logic underpinned both trench warfare and the blitzkrieg.

The discourse screams for a gender analysis that is beyond the scope of this paper. The role of the man in defending the home is immediately obvious.

Matthew Sparke, "Outsides Inside Patriotism: The Oklahoma bombing and the displacement of heartland geopolitics"

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U.S. Department of State, "U.S., Canadian Officials Sign Border Security Declaration", 12 Dec 2001. GOTOBUTTON BM_3_ <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01121202.htm>

There is a tendency to assume that business leaders, like the corporations they operate are free of territorial affiliations. However, as individuals they are obviously as prone to the discourses of identity as everyone else. Identity is not mechanistically linked to an individual's functional role.

I am not trying to assert that the businesses were motivated solely by economic interests,

certainly we can assume a disgust with the violence and a fear of future attacks on friends and loved ones were also important components of the reactions by business leaders.

Dalby, drawing on Campbell, 298

I am not arguing that terrorist cells are non-existent in Canada, nor am I asserting that Canada has not been a base for planning. Rather, the evidence clearly illustrates that terrorists are capable of residing within the United States, and that being "abroad", such as in Germany, does not preclude planning and preparing terrorist attacks.

