

The Value of Promoting Rapid Reaction Forces to Pursue Multilateralism in Global Security

Stephen Buckley

Simon Fraser University

October 28, 2005

sbuckley@sfu.ca

Introduction

The preamble to the Charter of the United Nations asserts noble visions. “To reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights...[and] that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest,”¹ implies the necessity of acting with force to protect the most fundamental human right: people’s right to be alive, breathing in and out. In a post-Cold War world, with a multiplicity in sources and manifestations of conflict, it has been difficult to effectively deploy the United Nations collective security model to address human security concerns. The model was developed respecting the interests of the victors of World War Two and what was becoming a bipolar world with two superpowers. Today, the nature of conflict has changed greatly, with most conflicts being intrastate, leaving the UN paradigm insufficient as it primarily presumes conflict to be interstate.

Chapter VII of the UN Charter describes means to maintain collective security. Sadly, impediments to responding to acute humanitarian crises have left the world community in a position of practical impotence, thereby undermining the Grotian sense of state cooperation. The rapid reaction force (RRFs) for intervening to protect human security is a model the world community can use to address acute crises. So, it is worth exploring several reasons why RRFs can reflect a liberal institutional collective security paradigm. But as much as humanitarian intervention can enforce collective security, it is just as sound to criticize such liberal expectations from a realist paradigm before trying to arrive at a net assessment of the value of RRFs for humanitarian intervention. But before examining liberal and realist perspectives of RRFs, it is worth examining the nature of global governance in order to contextualize this whole debate.

In our attempt to define global governance, we must confront its nebulosity. Our world is complex. It has many tangible structures, institutions and regimes that reflect world order: the UN Security Council and General Assembly, state governments, World Trade Organization trade dispute mechanisms, and bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral international conventions. But at the same time, there seem to be situations in which tangible governing bodies act with inexplicable motivations. Are there elements of governance at the supranational level that are not clear? Is there a fog that surrounds some subtle systems of human activity that nevertheless have profound influence on decision makers? Are the interests of multinational corporations (MNCs) sufficient to sway decisions? Does the World Economic Forum contribute to new trends in states’ domestic policies? Do epistemic communities inadvertently build a critical mass of cohesive opinion that spills outward to massage priorities of lawmakers? Does the new superpower—civil society—have an authentic voice and was that voice a significant or dominant part of what has made human security a swelling tide?

With so many questions about how the tangible and intangible elements of global governance interact, we are left trying to blow away small pockets of fog to see inside at how systems truly function. Even when examining tangible elements like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), though, there is often little consistency or clarity about causation: at best, perhaps, all we can do is watch how elements of its structure interact and speculate on who all the actors are and how much sway each has. Within the process as well are our theoretical biases we bring to our analysis, leading us to see two mostly mutually exclusive, yet co-existing interpretations of the same phenomenon. This is the context in which we can examine rapid reaction forces and their usefulness in humanitarian intervention to promote multilateral collective security. From the liberal view, they are a sound tool. From a realist view, they are

useful only when states' self-interest are coincidentally served. From juggling the paradoxes in this analysis, we come closer to understanding the gravity and complexity of global governance. We blow through the fog.

Rapid Reaction Forces and Human Security

On a superficial level, RRFs can manifest a liberal institutional need to respond quickly to acute humanitarian crises. If the UN were to maintain, for instance, three trispheric RRFs to respond to acute situations in three pseudo-hemispheres—the Americas, Europe and Africa, and Asia—then there would be a more credible deterrent to states or sub-state actors that wish to threaten human rights. While there already exists moderate capability within the UN to rapidly deploy forces to support existing or new peacekeeping operations, it is worth examining the value of developing RRFs for humanitarian intervention. Inasmuch as states, especially the veto-holding five permanent members (P5) of the UNSC, may oppose RRFs for traditional peacekeeping situations via Chapter VI of the UN Charter, states may have even more incentive to oppose or even block RRFs being deployed for humanitarian intervention that could occur under more broad interpretations of threats to peace in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, in reframing global security from a Westphalian notion of security of nation-states to the security of people within states it is important to examine the expanded potential of RRFs to do more than just quickly arrive at a conflict that requires mediation where both parties welcome a peacekeeping force.

It is important to recognize that when a state abrogates its responsibility to protect its citizens, it loses some of its sovereign right to rule. In this situation, the world community has a responsibility to protect human security. The just released UN reform document, *A more secure world: Our shared responsibility; Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, contains a myriad of recommendations for reinforcing the effectiveness of the United Nations. The report includes core philosophies inherent in the Responsibility to Protect paradigm:

There is a growing recognition that the issue is not the “right to intervene” of any State, but the “responsibility to protect” of every State when it comes to people suffering from avoidable catastrophe.ⁱⁱ

The breadth of the responsibility to protect covers three elements.ⁱⁱⁱ It recognizes the importance of preventing the chronic and acute situations that lead to the kind of conflict that puts populations at risk. It recognizes the need to react with varying levels of intervention leading ultimately to military intervention if necessary. Finally, it recognizes the importance of rebuilding and restoring a sound civilization. Truly, profoundly powerful global systems of control and persuasion like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, are involved in maintaining the chronic situations that contribute to human insecurity. RRFs cannot address those. Similarly, the long-term commitment to restore societies to social stability—beyond containing acute human insecurity—are also beyond the scope of an RRF's ability. Thus, it is poignant to focus on RRFs' ability to subdue oppressive forces that make lives insecure:

Put simply, there is still no explicit provision in international law for intervention on humanitarian grounds. The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ is intended to fill this gap. It says that we should have the legal right to intervene in a country on the grounds of humanitarian emergency alone when the government of that country is unwilling or unable to protect their people from extreme harm as a result of internal war, repression or state failure.^{iv}

This sentiment is echoed in the UN’s More Secure World report:

The Council and the wider international community have come to accept that, under Chapter VII and in pursuit of the emerging norm of a collective international responsibility to protect, it can always authorize military action to redress catastrophic internal wrongs if it is prepared to declare that the situation is a “threat to international peace and security”, not especially difficult when breaches of international law are involved.^v

So, with a new focus on the legitimacy of the UNSC expanding its interpretation of Chapter VII intervention duties, the world community may then increasingly expect the UNSC to actually authorize RRFs for humanitarian intervention. Through this increasing profile of the Responsibility to Protect, global governance norms may evolve beyond mere state security to human security.

Rapid Reaction Forces Supporting Collective Security

From a liberal point of view, multilateral RRFs are a worthwhile tool to maintain collective security if states commit to cooperative deterrence over merely maximizing their self-interest. Collective security ideologies seek peace through delegitimizing aggression, enforced through the threat of collective response. Because the power of deterrence is spread so broadly in the world community, a state need not merely fear the largest nearby country that may or may not intervene against that state’s aggression. A state with aggressive designs should realistically fear the entire world community opposing its actions. Indeed, the number of interstate conflicts has declined over the lifetime of the UN, allowing us to plausibly credit the UN collective security regime, for in the absence of its deterrence it is quite possible that interstate conflicts would have continued or even accelerated. Further, most conflicts today are intrastate, perhaps indicating that since the UN collective security regime was designed primarily for interstate conflict, states or factions that have recently been more willing to use aggressive means to seek gains have restricted their operation to primarily a domestic level to avoid global deterrence. So, inasmuch as collective security has inspired states to alter how they have been willing to use force to achieve gains, the improved reaction time that one global RRF—or three trispheric RRFs—can provide, combined with an expanded scope of RRF application to domestic human security issues, could effectively deter states even more.

One consequence of a functional collective security regime may be the reduced need for arms accumulation. Granted, the bipolar cold war was capable of producing both an arms race and stepwise arms reductions; however, a collective security deterrence in the world allows individual states to spend less resources on defense than in a condition of global security anarchy, or even absent useful alliances. Obviously, Canada has been able to spend considerably

less on military security than if our military alliance with the USA did not exist. Conceivably though, even without that alliance, but with the UN collective security regime, Canada may similarly have been able to forgo greater military spending. Again, inasmuch as RRFs can expand the immediacy and credibility of collective security deterrence, they may also indirectly contribute to decreasing states' demand for arms.

Of course, there is the great problem of rogue states defecting from the collective security regime. With multilateral structures, whether in trade or security, the greater the number of states who commit to the regime, the greater the certainty that states can have in the stability of the system. Thus, through the regime, states must address defectors. Currently, however, the UN collective security regime is fraught with impediments to being able to clearly address defectors. Article 2.4 of the UN Charter precludes the use of force in states' international relations beyond occasions sanctioned by the UN itself. Since governments know collective security works best with universal involvement, they also know they will likely not be expelled from membership via Article 6 for "persistent violations," particularly because then the community of nations would have to contend with that state being designated a pariah. Similarly, state transgressions that lead to "preventative or enforcement action" against them can under Article 5 suffer suspension of UN membership rights. Realistically, though, states willing to risk UN sanction for seeking military gain would likely consider membership restrictions to be an acceptable cost. So, however much Articles 2 to 6 were designed to encourage all members to participate constructively in the community of nations, their lack of realistic or sufficiently punitive enforcement leaves the spirit of these Articles weak. Therefore, defining clear criteria for deploying RRFs to humanitarian provides a more effective stick to complement the carrot of encouraging good global citizenship. Further, since Article 2.7 asserts state domestic sovereignty above Chapter VII intervention, the onus is upon the world community to ensure there are clear criteria and a productive body of precedents that allow the UNSC to intervene via Chapter VII.

As well as being credible deterrents, having globally sanctioned, yet regionally focused, trispheric RRFs can capitalize on force members' regional knowledge that can be crucial in engaging in supporting human security. Further, allowing regions to supply RRFs means that the richest, most capable states are not shouldering the entire burden of providing a police force for the entire planet. "About one-third of the 24 countries participating in the US-led operation in Somalia [in the early 1990s] were not able to deploy any further than Mogadishu's main airfield,"^{vi} thereby indicating that there is certainly space to expand states' levels of involvement in missions. One method of doing so can be modeled on Canada's expenditure of \$20 million to fund and train African peacekeepers in the Sudan.^{vii} As a rich nation with already overextended troops, Canada can fund and supply troops who are more familiar with the region. As far as this funding model works for peacekeeping, it can work for financially underwriting trispheric RRFs for humanitarian intervention. Indeed, the cost of maintaining an African force in Africa is less than one-tenth of the \$10,000 per person per month cost of maintaining a European force in an operation.^{viii} Further, the Defence volume of Canada's recent International Policy Statement acknowledges the relevance of training other states' capacities to "undertake peace support operations" thereby reducing the "operational burden on countries like Canada."^{ix} Even with bold new, proactive planning for improving Canada's force strength, adding a modest 5,000 new troops and 3,000 reserves^x will leave our nation seeking opportunities to underwrite other states' RRF capacity. Ultimately, beyond Cold War bipolar detente, whatever role multilateral collective security has played in decreasing the number of overt interstate conflicts, a regional RRF that is globally funded and mandated can replicate those gains on a regional level:

A majority of African states now agree that there is a need for new security structures. This is not out of wishful thinking but plain necessity, with the sobering realization that nobody else will resolve Africa's problems but Africans themselves. Only with the creation of an African rapid-reaction force and the subsequent development of permanent regional security structures will the pessimism bred by the seemingly perennial conflicts in Africa begin to dissipate.^{xi}

The RRF model as a new, assertive element of the liberal collective security regime does not necessarily have to be a new invention altogether. States have extensive experience coordinating joint military operations within alliances. More recently, states that have made tentative steps in extending forces in rapid response have spent considerable time examining their organizational structural systems to see where there are efficiencies and bottlenecks. During their participation in rapidly deploying a battalion to Sierra Leone in 2000, the UK was able to examine means of streamlining command since they had moved to a permanent joint headquarters model in 1994 instead of designing a command structure on an ad hoc basis.^{xii} Because establishing a practical context for RRFs in the UN secretariat is a relatively groundbreaking exercise, there will need to be a great deal of sharing of experiences. More useful modeling has already been accomplished as the EU has explored merging already integrated forces for an EU RRF. Deployable forces from Benelux, Belgian-Portuguese, Spanish-Italian and Franco-British coordinated units all have contributed groundwork to an EU RRF.^{xiii} The same expertise and experience can be applied to trispheric RRFs.

Beyond acquiring expertise from states' joint operations, the UN itself has experience with similar kinds of short-term, mission-specific activities. The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) spent a year helping Namibia realize its independence through supporting free and fair elections from April 1989 to March 1990. Deploying just over 60% of their maximum mandated deployable force of 7,500, UNTAG spent \$389 million and suffered only 19 casualties.^{xiv} In addition, the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) is in place with dozens of states providing various levels of pre-commitment to deploy troops to new or existing peacekeeping operations, from information on the capabilities they could offer, to planning data sheets and generic memoranda of understanding allowing them to commit to deployment on a conditional basis without having to begin negotiating from scratch.^{xv} Despite information on their website being almost twenty-seven months out of date, and even if there have been no additional commitments, it is clear that the UNSAS has developed at least a rudimentary structure to support effective rapid deployment for peacekeeping operations. These same structures can be built upon to develop RRFs for humanitarian intervention.

Finally, recommendations 70-81 of the More Secure World report concern reform of the UNSC.^{xvi} Insofar as that body lacks democratic structures (with the P5 vetoes and lack of broad regional representation), the report contains two models to add more regional representation by increasing the size of the UNSC to 24 members, with one model including more permanent members. In either case, there is a strong will that there be no additional vetoes on the UNSC. Ultimately, without trying to develop a process to democratize the UNSC through some highly unlikely means of removing the P5 vetoes, expanded membership may encourage veto holders to exercise their veto less frequently since a 60% majority vote would be a more formidable, more representative reflection of global will. Exercising vetoes in a UNSC reformed with either of these models would require much more boldness and willingness to oppose more global opinion

than in the current arrangement. Conceivably, then, a new UNSC structure would be more likely to mandate Chapter VII humanitarian intervention, thereby enhancing the liberal collective security paradigm.

Realist Critiques of the Value of Rapid Reaction Forces

From a realist point of view, however, multilateral RRFs are not necessarily a worthwhile tool to protect human security primarily because self-interest reigns: when states join alliances or collective security mechanisms, they do so in self-interest. States designed and empowered the UN to act broadly, but not so broadly that it overrules domestic sovereignty. The UN Charter includes only narrow situations where states can violate sovereign integrity. From a realist position, then, quite simply, a state would see an RRF as useful only if it were in that state's interest. Regardless of whether we view states as acting purely rationally, or whether they act as a united whole or a coalesced unity with final decisions being made by the government or ruling faction, or even whether international relations exist in a state of pure anarchy or anarchy moderated by institutions, the realist view leaves us expecting states to act in their own interest, to increase their capability and potential in the short or long term, and to seek opportunities to improve their power relative to states with which they compete. However much Canada pursues the Human Security agenda, our recent International Policy Statement asserts our determination to act unilaterally if we deem necessary:

While we value multilateralism and know the great good that international cooperation can achieve, we must ultimately be committed to playing a lead role in specific initiatives and, on occasion, to resolving to go it alone.^{xvii}

Even though many states lack all the components that are traditionally used to define statehood (having a settled population in a defined territory, a government that has a monopoly on the use of force and the highest degree of political power to establish policy, and enjoys recognition from the international community), most still act in their self-interest to congeal their internal control and improve their external position. When they act collectively, it is because they choose to act so, even if it seems they have no significant influence over the factors that influence their decision. So, from a realist framework, the international system exists with inherent power asymmetries that require balances of power to maintain any kind of order, rather than the threat of a collective response to any violation of the peace. Inasmuch as collective security ideologies pursue democratic values, the reality of state power asymmetries means that all states are not able to exercise their voices equally. Conceivably, we can only have two kinds of worlds: one where the P5 have veto power in the UNSC (where they will not let any other state have a veto because it would not be in their interest to dilute their power, and where they will not give up their veto power voluntarily); or a world where there is no UN since the P5 would not participate in a collective regime without the power they currently possess. Under these Darwinian conditions, there are conceivably innumerable impediments to the UNSC mandating humanitarian intervention RRFs.

Further, consensus is difficult to achieve among competing states. It may not be possible to arrive at sufficient global consensus in defining the criteria to generate, amend and terminate an RRF's mandate. What, for instance, would be a sufficient trigger for creating a mandate for an

RRF? One recent example in the EU is instructive of the difficulty of even a relatively small body deciding on whether to initiate an RRF:

Operation Iraqi Freedom vividly illustrates the difficulty that European leaders had in developing a common consensus on the use of force; that recent difficulty portends a future in which developing that necessary European consensus may continue to be difficult or even unattainable.^{xviii}

Further, variations and changes in domestic defense spending, force size, defense postures, government changes, and reprioritizations between social and defense priorities are variables that can impede consensus in deploying an RRF.^{xix}

There are more questions that are difficult to agree upon. Once a group decides to mandate an RRF, what will be its operational goals? At what point would it be worth disbanding the RRF and accepting failure? What are the criteria for success and dissolution? More fundamentally, in determining criteria for each deployment, what mix of general policy and specific contextual circumstance ought to exist? Ultimately, while the RRF model exists for the global community to expedite decision-making to keep from missing key moments to intervene to minimize destruction in crises, there is a good chance that state self-interest can significantly hamper the development of effective criteria for deploying an RRF. At any rate, though not impossible, it will likely be difficult and expensive to create effective RRF logistics and command and control operations, as well as clear accountability between the RRF and the UN secretariat, which for some time to come will be highly inexperienced in the command of operations that extend so far beyond mediation peacekeeping based on Chapter VI of the UN Charter.

Also difficult would be meeting the sound operational principles^{xx} for intervention to support human security. There must be clear objectives with appropriate resources. The RRF must have a united military approach. There must be limits to the scope and escalation of military action to avoid putting the defeat of a violating state at a higher level than ensuring the security of people. The rules of engagement must meet the principle of proportionality. RRF force preservation cannot be the prime objective. And finally, there must be maximum coordination with humanitarian organizations. These standards are very high. They require P5 consensus (or abstention) and commitment among many states to put their soldiers in danger for a moral good.

These principles are also far from expedient. While few would argue that Saddam Hussein's regime excelled at maintaining domestic human security, instead of going to the great length of mounting an RRF to stabilize Iraq's domestic security condition, it was far easier for the United States to gather a coalition to merely invade and depose Hussein. American self-interest defined by a number of motivations, including the dubious connection linking Hussein to the 9/11 attacks, allowed them to justify an invasion that violated the UN Charter since the act lacked UNSC approval. While the United States could have acted more cooperatively and delayed military invasion until other avenues were truly exhausted, as at least France and Russia wished, they merely chose to exercise the option of undermining the collective security imperative, in part because they had the means to invade and occupy Iraq virtually on their own. Ironically, now that American military forces are overextended particularly after their hurricanes, it may now be in America's best interest to court collective support for any further interventions

in the coming years. So there may always be a temptation for powerful states to seek short cuts around the cumbersome process of consensus building for humanitarian intervention.

There are still more reasons why RRFs for humanitarian intervention are unlikely from a realist perspective. Many states with imperial designs or merely states with morally questionable foreign “possessions” may be not be highly motivated to facilitate the creation of RRFs, especially if those forces will be pointed at what they deem to be their “national interest”. The UK is involved in a currently relatively calm military dispute in Northern Ireland. China possesses Tibet and has designs on Taiwan. Russia has interests in maintaining the sanctity—if not growth—of its federation, particularly in Chechnya. The United States has acquired control of Iraq after destabilizing the Taliban in Afghanistan then leaving that country in a condition of near anarchy. The scope of RRFs for protecting human security could conceivably apply to any of the above situations. The only other P5 state, France, has no extremely high profile imperial designs in the world today, but that may change. So, the P5 may find it in their interests to simply veto RRFs that stray into their possessions.

Alternately, if there is no national interest incentive in a conflict area, a P5 state may simply not fund and supply it.^{xxi} For instance, the United States claimed to be supporting relief operations in Rwanda in 1994, but Romeo Dallaire disputes their assertion that they were flying any military relief flights at all.^{xxii} Dallaire also describes a painful truth about the nature of state interest. He describes the lack of commitment among states that take part in peace support operations to endure casualties. Extremists would target them, expecting that after a certain number of casualties, the states would withdraw—a situation borne out by the Americans in Somalia in 1993 and the Belgians and UN forces in Rwanda in 1994.^{xxiii} Even if the UN were able to mobilize significant international moral, troop and financial support for defining criteria for RRFs beyond mere peace support operations, and even if states developed significant domestic support, there would likely still be limits at home beyond which a state would not be willing to accept any further losses. National self-interest would perhaps ultimately overrule commitment to an RRF.

Less directly, the P5 has interests that go beyond their obvious dubious territorial possessions. In the mid-1990s, Russia and China both would have vetoed UNSC activity in the disintegration of Yugoslavia, leading NATO to act technically without UN approval. Presently, among other states arming Sudan, China’s arms and oil contracts there have led it to promise to veto UNSC sanctions,^{xxiv} suggesting that if a human security RRF were proposed (and able to be deployed) that China would similarly veto that if it would threaten their oil supply, unless perhaps a compensating arrangement can be brokered. Also, if the 2004 constitutional crisis in Ukraine became violent, instigating a call for an RRF to maintain human security then Russia could have easily vetoed the action because of its stake in the outcome. So, a UNSC handcuffed by P5 self-interest could conceivably drastically limit the likelihood of effective RRF deployment.

Further, if a P5 state, a significant ally or an MNC with leverage in a P5 state has economic interests in a region, state or sub-state region where there is conflict that may call for RRF intervention, that state may block an RRF. Similarly, regardless of whether or not it is on the UNSC at the time, a non-P5 member that has an economic interest in a conflict that would best be served without RRF intervention, may attempt to block the RRF or at the very least refuse to contribute financial resources or personnel to the mission. As well, tyrannical, failing or recognized ruling factions of failed states would quite obviously oppose RRFs in their territory or sphere of influence.

Michael Pugh adds a number of additional criticisms of RRFs being used for humanitarian intervention. NATO's bombing of Kosovo did not reverse humanitarian crises there,^{xxv} indicating that failure is a looming possibility. Linking military intervention with humanitarian organizations can undermine the credibility, neutrality and impartiality of the latter.^{xxvi} Focusing on the immediacy of crises neglects the long-term systemic political and economic causes of current acute crises^{xxvii} as well as the necessity of supporting social reconstruction. States can also co-opt RRF humanitarian intervention to promote ideologies,^{xxviii} as the United States has restructured Iraq as a privatized, neoliberal capitalist state, thereby buttressing support for its hegemonic economic ideology. Ultimately, Pugh sees humanitarian intervention as a tool for states to increase their relative power in the world. The P5 states especially benefit since they could veto deployments that impede their territorial or economic interests.^{xxix} A critical component, though, of the liberal ideology of collective security rests with states that offer human security support: they themselves must maintain the same level of moral behaviour as they fight for in other places in the world.^{xxx} But this is not always the case. The fact that the United States has violated international conventions by not safeguarding Iraqi museum artifacts while they began their occupation and by violating prisoners' rights at Abu Ghraib prison means there is little the world community can do to force states to actually respect the norms they intend to enforce on other states. Thus, the Grotian notion of states contributing to international moral norms is ultimately optional for states that pursue realist self-interested goals.

Conclusions

So, there are multiple theoretical arguments for why rapid reaction forces can be useful tools to protect human security in a liberal world of collective security. Indeed, the UN More Secure World report includes means to facilitate the emerging responsibility to protect paradigm. Sadly, though, the incrementalist nature of the report reflects the reality that little wholesale change can occur rapidly. Developing more morally informed and humane international norms is a long process. If we view the first sixty years of the UN as a success in deterring interstate conflict, we may need to spend the next few generations empowering its structures to address human security. The tentativeness that surrounds world leaders' public discussions about UNSC reform means we may have to be extremely patient.

In the meantime, states seem to continue to act in self-interest, cooperating when that is more effective than acting unilaterally. But as we develop structures to deploy humanitarian intervention RRFs, we can slowly change the context in which states act: the bounds of their self-interest may be massaged by new expectations from civil society about how we expect states—especially the most powerful states—to act. UN Security Council reform—even if it takes a generation to occur—allows the citizens of the world to expect greater efficacy in the institution. But as much as liberal and realist interpretations of RRFs are intertwined, so is the ultimate analysis of the effectiveness of RRFs for humanitarian intervention. While realist elements within states may sometimes resist RRFs, pursuing human security with this model is worthwhile to expand opportunities for expanding human rights and changing norms of international cooperation. As much as Canada may assert our realist right to act unilaterally, our restricted military capacity makes that course unlikely. So as much as we use realist frames, we would be far more effective pledging our increasing military capacity to support our liberal institutionalist advocacy of the Human Security agenda. And if the rate of increase in our

expanding military continues to rise, we may have even more success as a legitimate moral leader in evolving the collective security regime from state-centric to human-centric. Rapid Reaction Forces may be a useful tool in this evolution—one that Canada could effectively embrace.

ⁱ Kelly-Kate Pease, *International Organizations: Perspectives on Governance in the Twenty-First Century*, Second edition, (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, 2003), p. 283.

ⁱⁱ United Nations, *A more secure world: Our shared responsibility; Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, December 2, 2004, <http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf>, viewed on December 2, 2004, p. 65.

ⁱⁱⁱ Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, December 2001, IDRC, p. xi.

^{iv} Paul Martin, "Address by Prime Minister Paul Martin at the United Nations," September 22, 2004, <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp?id=266>, viewed on November 29, 2004.

^v United Nations, p. 66.

^{vi} Adekeye Adebajo and Michael O'Hanlon, "Africa: toward a rapid-reaction force," *SAIS Review*, 17.2 (Summer-Fall, 1997), p. 157.

^{vii} Amy Carmichael, "Canada must train peacekeepers in Darfur, send equipment: Martin", *Canadian Press*, November 13, 2004,

http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/cpress/20041113/ca_pr_on_na/martin_peacekeeping_1, viewed on November 29, 2004.

^{viii} Adebajo and O'Hanlon, p. 156.

^{ix} Government of Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence*, (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2005), p. 27.

^x Government of Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Overview*, (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2005), p. iii.

^{xi} Adebajo and O'Hanlon, p. 162-3.

^{xii} Richard M. Connaughton, "Organizing British joint rapid reaction forces," *Joint Force Quarterly*, 26 (2000), http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KNN/is_2000_Autumn/ai_80223318, viewed on November 29, 2004.

^{xiii} Dave L. Orr, "The Benelux Deployable Air Task Force: a model for EU NATO defense force integration," *Air and Space Power Journal*, 17.3 (Fall, 2003), <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/fal03/orr.html>, viewed on November 29, 2004.

^{xiv} UNTAG, "Namibia – UNTAG Facts and Figures," http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untagF.htm, viewed on November 29, 2004.

^{xv} UNSAS, "UNSAS – Current Status," *UN Standby Arrangements System*, July 15, 2003, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/milad/fgs2/unsas_files/status_report/statusreport.htm, viewed on November 29, 2004.

^{xvi} United Nations, p. 109-110.

^{xvii} Government of Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Overview*, (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2005), p. v.

^{xviii} Orr, 2004.

^{xix} Orr, 2004.

^{xx} Evans and Sahnoun, p. xiii.

^{xxi} H. Peter Langille, "SHIRBRIG: A promising step towards a United Nations that can prevent deadly conflict," *Global Policy Forum*, Spring 2000, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/reform/canada.htm>, viewed on November 29, 2002.

^{xxii} Romeo Dallaire with Brent Beardsley. *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*. (Toronto: Random House, 2003), p. 472.

^{xxiii} Dallaire with Beardsley, p. 240.

^{xxiv} Gethin Chamberlain, "China leads opposition to stronger action," *The Scotsman*, November 19, 2004, <http://thescoatsman.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=1331542004>, viewed on November 29, 2004.

^{xxv} Michael Pugh, "Maintaining Peace and Security," in David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds.) *Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance*, (Cambridge: Blackwell, 2002), p. 219.

^{xxvi} *Ibid.*

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- ^{xxvii} Pugh, p. 221.
^{xxviii} Pugh, p. 222.
^{xxix} Pugh, p. 225.
^{xxx} Pugh, p. 226.

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