

Who is in charge?
The need for a comprehensive model of Civil-military cooperation

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For the last fifteen years, peacekeeping operations have increased considerably in complexity and in variety. Several new actors are now performing roles that have been ignored in the past and most of all; a practical doctrine has been developed by different countries. Today, most armies share a common view about Peace Support Operations, even if there are slight variations from one country to the other. The Canadian Forces are no different. After several adaptations to the successive new generations of peacekeeping and international environments, Canada's army has to face new challenges proposed by an all new policy.

The issue related to the doctrine of 3D (Defence, Diplomacy, Development) outlined by the Canadian government in its International Policy Statement published last April, has been so far difficult to operationalize. As outlined by some scholars¹, with this policy, the government wishes to join up these three departments to reach on a common picture so it can fully apply the 3D guiding principle. To better assess Canada's activities abroad, a strategic view and a better understanding of what is 3D is needed.

In the field, the 3D would be translated by military collaborating with civilian actors in a way to better address the challenge of failed States. Following this high level coordination, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) applies the 3D principle by better assessing defence, development and diplomatic issues at the tactical and at the operational levels. In this regard, more attention should be devoted to CIMIC, first as a military function and also because it can be one of the better tools to address the 3D.

Unfortunately, CIMIC is still poorly understood and is not a very popular academic subject. This military practice developed during the 1990s was based on Western's Peace Support Operations experiences, but it does not correspond to any theoretical model. This situation has caused different misinterpretations about what is CIMIC and what it does. In order to avoid misperceptions and to better understand what it can do for Canada's 3D policy, a theoretical model is needed. In this research, we propose to develop a CIMIC typology based on four different forms in which collaboration between military and civilian actors can occur. Hence, we will first of all define what CIMIC is. Secondly, we will develop and explain four notional types of CIMIC practices and finally, we will provide specific examples related to these types.

What is CIMIC?

For hundred of years, armed forces have been maintaining relations with civilian agencies, contracting with companies, providing support to civilian authorities, and in some cases, governing conquered territories. What has changed in the last fifteen years is the increased number of interactions with civilian elements on a regular basis within theatres of operations. This recent relationship is now required to address the issues associated with the new multiple dimensions of security and complex environments associated with the changes in the nature of conflicts². This phenomenon has been produced by a number of factors, within Peace Support Operations, the main consequences were an increased importance of

¹ FITZ-GERALD, Anne M., Adressing the Security-Development Nexus : Implication for Join-up Government, in Policy Matters, July 2004, vol .5, no.5

² GORDON, Stuart, «Understanding the Priorities for Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)», The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 13 July 2001: <http://www.jha.ac/articles/a068.htm> (27 May), p.1.

the civil dimension, and a greater complexity in the structure of civil-military relations³. Similarly to other non-combat functions that are now available to military commanders, such as Information operations, Media operations and Psychological operations, CIMIC appears to be an essential function that needs to be performed by armed forces⁴

When one looks at CIMIC, one can see that the practices vary according to the type of mission and the attitude of the civilian actors involved on the field. The type of mission will surely influence the decision related to the better model of CIMIC that needs to be performed. In parallel, the willingness of the civilian actors to cooperate with armed forces will largely depend on the type of mission performed and how they feel in regard to preserving their neutrality and their impartiality when they work with the armed forces. As there is not a single type of CIMIC, one should keep in mind the different models associated with its practices. Their evaluation can then help the military community to better assess the situation by setting up the adequate model.

In order to be able to fully assess the benefits of CIMIC, let's look at the definition given by NATO:

“The immediate purpose of CIMIC is to establish and maintain the full co-operation of the NATO commander and the civilian authorities, organisations, agencies and population within a commander's area of operations in order to allow him to fulfill his mission. This may include direct support to the implementation of a civil plan. The long-term purpose of CIMIC is to help create and sustain conditions that will support the achievement of Alliance objectives in operations⁵.”

As we can see, CIMIC might be perceived as an interface between the military component of a Peace Support Operation and its non-military environment. In today's situations, the environment is no longer something that can be ignored in order to concentrate on the enemy. A contemporary complex environment must be taken in consideration in order to reduce its negative effects on military activities and to maximise its positive effects. Hence, the environment is not only composed of geographical or climatic data, but also a multitude of actors. In today's context, these elements add-up to or in some cases, replace physical force, in solving numerous problems. CIMIC is then a mean to use these non-military resources and thus is perceived by the American Army as a «Force multiplier».

So far, it has been noticed that CIMIC was not the product of a theoretical thought process, but rather resulted from customary practices aimed to solve the pragmatic problem of managing the quantitative increase of relations between military organizations and their civilian environment. From the indications observed about CIMIC uses and performances, we tried to develop four theoretical models corresponding each to a specific set of criterions. The type of decisional process, the form of cooperation and coordination that exists between both communities, on one side, the armed forces and on the other NGO or CIDA

³ GUTTIERI, Karen, Toward a Usable Peace: United States Civil Affairs in Post-conflict environments, Doctoral thesis presented to the University of British Columbia, July 1999, p.322.

⁴ RANA, Raj, Contemporary Challenges in the Civil-military relationship: Complementarity or incompatibility?, Humanitarian Info.org, p.9:
<http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/darfur/uploads/military/Challenges%20in%20Humanitarian%20Military%20Relationship%20by%20Raj%20RANA.pdf> (25 May 2005).

⁵ NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, STANAG 2509, Op. cit., p.1-3.

representatives and diplomatic representatives, and the level in which the decision to cooperate is taken are some elements used to categorise CIMIC actions. These four models will be known as: the independent (1), the collective (2), the bottom-up (3) and the top-down (4) forms of CIMIC. We shall now describe them in more details.

The independent model

The model (1), the independent occurs when both communities come together in cooperation due to mutual interest. It is what Stuart Gordon calls the “complementarist approach”⁶. In Peace Support Operations context, we prefer to qualify this variety of cooperation as the “independent method” where military and NGOs work in separately specialized silos towards the stabilization of an area. They mutually understand and respect each other; but they both recognize that cooperation with the other can be used in some instances, in order to better achieve a specific objective. Such actions appear to be adequate for disaster relief missions, traditional peacekeeping and short term military stabilization operations.

This method corresponds to most CIMIC tasks and doctrines within NATO countries and is the most common style observed. It is mainly observed through the Civil-Military Action (CMA) performed by the French Army. CMA as a military function is also perceived as a political tool that helps to achieve military ends⁷. As there is more and more contacts between civilians and militaries in 2nd and 3rd generation peacekeeping, both in humanitarian context or in stabilization effort, CMA teams need to be created in order to formalize relations with the outside world.

However, in this independent model, the degree of interaction between both communities is clearly limited. The priority of the CMA teams is to achieve the military goal but nothing excludes that they can seldom work with civilian interest whenever the need is felt. In order to avoid the controversy about a possible militarization of humanitarian aid, they clearly separate the humanitarian from the military world. In such a model, militaries and civilians each have their own leader, they have their own decisional process and they work together when they need each other’s help for a specific mission. In this perspective, each organization may accomplish its own objectives according to its priorities. For some, this form might be counter-productive since cooperation is limited. The second model might better address this concern.

The collective model

This first theoretical CIMIC form, based on military effectiveness, must be distinguished from a second type called Civil-Military Affairs or what we call the collective model (2). The aim of this second approach is to unite State and Private actors. It has been observed when both groups initially deployed in a crisis situation under a military operational cell in order to collaborate to resolve the situation by joining military and civilian

⁶ GORDON, Stuart, Op cit., p.7.

⁷BRAEM, Yann, «Les relations armées-ONG, des relations de pouvoir ? Caractéristiques et enjeux de la coopération civilo-militaire française : le cas du Kosovo», Doctoral thesis, Centre d’études en sciences sociales de la défense, Université de Paris 8, février 2004, p.20

capabilities⁸. In this case, there is a clear common objective, a shared consensus about actions to be performed and a concern for one organization not to become subordinate to the other. This model is a lot more holistic and the goal of the cooperation is to unite at the operational or strategic level a number of private, bureaucratic, civilian and military actors. This model is based on inter-departmental cooperation in order to manage the crisis but also to advance the national interest of the intervening country.

This form emerged from the British counter-insurgency tradition which now considers CIMIC as being a component of a broad strategy for transition from a crisis or conflict situation to peace. British military leaders and civil authorities recognized the need for a common understanding of a crisis and that its management must be coherent and ordered through a multidimensional response and well thought out, long term solutions that address the underlying causes of conflict. Some NGOs shared this vision and participated in the development of an approach providing harmonized political, military and humanitarian actions in countries in crisis, in the belief that a joint approach will be more likely to keep the peace, resolve conflicts, and restore normality⁹.

Stuart Gordon called this method the «integrated approach» of CIMIC. Its test bed implementation required strategic involvement from the British Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as well as the Department for International Development (DFID) which represents the security, the political and the construction/re-building of a State. According to this model, plans are developed in consultation, almost on a consensual basis. Military and civil servants can be integrated in other organizations in order to maintain a continuum in the aim. Interventions occur in cooperation with all actors, or in sequence, where military organizations might provide emergency humanitarian actions and civil actors later continue the plan initiated by military forces¹⁰.

In relation to our CIMIC theoretical model, we will call this “integrated approach” the “collective method”. As we already saw, this form of CIMIC is less attached to military success, but rather is understood in a more comprehensive crisis response that could be related to Peacebuilding¹¹ since this type assumes a common focus on sustainable peace and developmental objectives. Within this style of CIMIC, soldiers, civilian actors, and NGOs develop a concerted response to an identified problem and work together to implement the solution. For Stuart Gordon this approach can be defined as a common understanding of a problem that can be resolved through a coherent or ordered multidimensional response by military and civilian actors¹². It seems that this form of actions is suitable for all types of missions, from disaster relief to stabilization operations. This style of CIMIC corresponds to a more global and elaborated doctrine involving greater military tasks. Traditionally, this version has been observed in the United-Kingdom and more recently in Canada¹³. The 3D doctrine is closely connected to this type of CIMIC; it aims to foster cooperation between

⁸ BRAEM, Yann, Op. cit., p.29.

⁹ GORDON, Stuart, Op cit, p.6.

¹⁰ BRAEM, Yann, Op. cit., p.30.

¹¹ Here, we understand Peacebuilding in its broadest sense of «initiatives which foster and support sustainable structures and processes which strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence, or continuation of violent conflict. BUSH, Kenneth, «Commodification, Compartmentalization, and Militarization of Peacebuilding». KEATING, Tom and W. Andy Knight (ed.), *Building Sustainable Peace*, Edmonton, University of Alberta Press, 2004, p.25.

¹² GORDON, Stuart, Op cit , p.8.

¹³ Canada's 3D approach (Diplomacy, Development and Defence) has been announced in the Canadian International Policy Statement released in April 2005, but has been partially practiced within Canada's public institutions for some years.

departments at the strategic level in order to achieve a specific political or development goal. In the case of such cooperation, decisions are made conjointly at the strategic level. At the tactical level, the actors could work separately but always in order to implement the strategy previously discussed. According to this model, all departments are equally important in the decision-making process. Their cooperation at the tactical level is not simply episodic or specifically goal oriented; rather it is part of a grand strategy which understands the notion of human security as being in the core of crisis management. In the case of such a form of CIMIC, cooperation is far more comprehensive because it is thought of at the strategic, the operational and the tactical levels.

Despite this well intentioned vision, the assumptions underpinning the integrationist approach are not shared universally. Some NGOs still argue that it is of prime importance to limit the military role to that of supporting the humanitarian community through the provision of physical protection (extended to the civilian and humanitarian community) or through the liberation of logistical assets in order to maintain civilian (i.e. humanitarian) supremacy in the definition of priorities¹⁴. New realities of war, Peace Support Operations and humanitarian interventions affected non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and their abilities to conduct their actions¹⁵. These new situations constrain their freedom of action. In case of a third party intervention, such as in peace enforcement missions or stabilization operations, the situation becomes even more difficult. During these actions, even though humanitarian workers seek to remain neutral, they risk easily to be associated with the third party involved. This actor is not always welcomed by the local population, since he is often considered as one of the fighting factions¹⁶. In such a situation, CIMIC poses a problem. Since some NGOs collaborate with military force; they might be negatively perceived by local residents. In short, for a number of humanitarian workers, collaboration with CIMIC or any military force is believed to erode their pretension for humanitarian impartiality¹⁷. In case of humanitarian interventions, the problem is even more acute, as Stuart Gordon declares: "...there is an inherent contradiction in using even the threat of force in order to deliver assistance. In this respect there are obvious limitations on the degree of 'integration' that is desirable"¹⁸.

While "humanitarian impartiality" may have protected NGOs in traditional Peacekeeping scenarios, today's security situations, aggravated by fourth generation warfare characteristics¹⁹, makes everybody a target; humanitarian workers, even more, since they

¹⁴ GORDON, Stuart, Op. Cit., p.8.

¹⁵ There are several dimensions to this problem. One aspect is the colossal increase in the number and variety of NGOs since the 1990s with different proficiencies, resources, priorities and affiliations. An other dimension is a greater than ever determination to conduct humanitarian relief and development activities in very sensitive security situations. For the purpose of this study, we limited our interest to humanitarian relief/aid related NGOs. In this very specific context, NGOs and humanitarian workers may be used as synonyms and does not necessarily refer to organizations operating in other development aspects.

¹⁶ GORDON, Stuart, Op cit., p.8

¹⁷ We do not intend to debate on the validity of this perception. Our aim is to indicate the consequence of this belief which results in a negative perception of NGO and CIMIC collaboration.

¹⁸ GORDON, Stuart, Op cit., p.8

¹⁹ New type of warfare where the enemy might not be a State, but a non-national organization or networks of organizations. The method used will avoid direct confrontation with an army by using asymmetric or guerrilla tactics. In consequence, the distinction between 'civilian' and 'military'" ceases to exist and the difference between war and peace is blurred to the vanishing point. GOULD, Harold, A. and Franklin C. SPINNEY, Fourth-Generation Warfare is Here, October 2001: http://d-n-i.net/fcs/gould_spinney_4GW.htm. (26 May 2005).

constitute the most vulnerable elements in unstable countries²⁰. In some situations, such as today's Iraq, the dilemma for NGOs becomes to accept military protection or to stop operating. For Samy Cohen, in cases where security is needed, a military force is often essential for the effective delivery of humanitarian aid. In Afghanistan, for example, French NGOs were aided by the army in the region of Mazar-el-Sharif. It was also done earlier in Bosnia, where small NGOs enjoyed security provided by UN blue helmets²¹. In this context, more often than not, NGOs agree or even seek military protection or collaboration in order to perform their work. This initially hesitant association at the tactical and operational levels helps in changing mutual perceptions in a more positive way. However, in situations where the military mission is rather coercive, NGO or civil elements will rather prefer to collaborate following the independent model (1) which is based on "complementarities". Thus, NGOs or civilian aid workers will appear to be independent from the intervening body, and it will make it easier to win the heart and mind of the local population.

In this second model, NGOs will fear to be associated with the conduct of the military mission at the strategic level. In order to preserve their neutrality or to avoid cultural and value confrontations NGOs could be reluctant to collaborate with military forces²². Nevertheless, more than often, it is noted that at the operational and tactical levels, both organizations cooperate in order to overcome obstacles obstructing the conduct of deeds on the field²³. However, in order to keep a maximum of leadership on the conduct of humanitarian affairs NGOs will favour the following model.

The bottom-up model

This type of CIMIC action, basically localized at the tactical level, relegates CIMIC to a secondary role of support to the NGOs. In this form, the initiative and vision should emanate from the humanitarian community, and the military component of a mission would respond to the needs of the NGOs and the civil society. Such an approach is based on the conviction that peacebuilding is not about the imposition of solutions, but rather the creation of opportunities²⁴.

For modelling reasons, we called this form of CIMIC, the "bottom-up method". In very specific scenarios such as peacebuilding and long-term development, NGOs seem to prefer this approach. According to this image, CIMIC would limit its tasks to liaison and support. This vision however does not correspond to most of the doctrines currently used within NATO countries. For the humanitarian community fond of this approach, the leadership should emanate from the civilian community. They fear to be subordinated to the military. As stated by Nick Stockton from OXFAM, military forces should engage in CIMIC

²⁰ GIGUÈRE, Richard, Colonel, «Who leads, who follows», Weak States and Sudden Disasters and Conflicts. The Challenge for Military-NGO Relations, conference pronounced in Ottawa, Institute for Research on Public Policy, 7 June 2005.

²¹ COHEN, Samy, *La résistance des États*, Paris, Seuil, 2003, p.122.

²² GORDON, Stuart, *Op cit*, p.8

²³ STEIN, Janice, «Sudden disasters, Weak States and Their Implications for Military and NGO Intervention», Weak States and Sudden Disasters and Conflicts. The Challenge for Military-NGO Relations, conference pronounced in Ottawa, Institute for Research on Public Policy, 7 June 2005; This collaboration may be required as a «pragmatic» way to achieve each other's objectives as stated by BURKLE, Frederick, M., *Op cit.*, p.35.

²⁴ BUSH, Kenneth, «Commodification, Compartmentalization, and Militarization of Peacebuilding», in KEATING, Tom and W. Andy Knight (ed.), *Op. cit.*, p.25.

only for the purpose of providing physical protection or through the provision of logistical assets²⁵. He also argues that this is the only way:

“...to maintain civilian (i.e. humanitarian) supremacy in the definition of priorities... This also represents a prescription for limiting the militarization of humanitarian efforts both in terms of extent and duration. Nevertheless, given the central role of CIMIC in facilitating military operations of many types such a simple subordination is unlikely to occur generally”²⁶.

OXFAM also adopted this attitude in Kosovo. Through press releases, it asked for logistical support from NATO forces, while insisting that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) should coordinate all humanitarian efforts²⁷. Seven important French NGOs made a similar demand, asking NATO not to adopt a humanitarian role.²⁸

Another reason explaining why the civilian leadership is primordial in the conduct of humanitarian mission is the one regarding the instrumentalization of the humanitarian aid for political or military reasons. For some academics such as Alain Joxe, CIMIC and humanitarian military actions are often used by countries to legitimize interventions²⁹. On the basis of morality, in order to stop a genocide or a humanitarian catastrophe, the international community seems to tolerate military intrusion like NATO's Kosovo involvement and operation JUST CAUSE in Somalia. Some countries have also been accused of using humanitarian reasons in order to modify public opinion in favour of an unpopular or UN sanctioned intervention³⁰.

The same pessimistic assessment is noted, when authors perceive humanitarian interventions as a modern form of colonialism. Etienne de Durand shares this opinion of humanitarian interventions and CIMIC, since he perceives these actions as an attempt to promote economic interests of the occupying power³¹. David Rieff resumes this disapproving stance by announcing the end of the humanitarian actions performed by NGOs, since the military are not simply happy to play a role in the humanitarian sphere but also seek to occupy this space³². Finally, other scholars understand CIMIC within its very specific origins of counter-insurgency by summarizing it to “controlling civil actions as an instrument in a strategy aiming at the stability and the reduction of security risks for the population in the crisis area³³”. These types of critics have pushed the NGO community to frame a different

²⁵ The simple fact that CIMIC is used here as a synonym of «humanitarian aid», demonstrates a specific misperception about civil-military cooperation.

²⁶ GORDON, Stuart, Op. cit., p.8

²⁷ STOKES, Christopher, «De la logistique au leadership: l'intervention militaire dans l'espace humanitaire» in Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité (collectif), *Militaires Humanitaires. A chacun son rôle*, Bruxelles, Editions complexes, p.126.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ PECLOW, Valérie, «L'OTAN : acteur humanitaire incontournable?», in Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité (collectif), Op. cit., p.77.

³⁰ JOXE, Alain, «Les opérations de paix face à la menace holistique», *Cahier d'études stratégiques*, no 20, 1997.

³¹ PECLOW, Valérie, Op. Cit., p.80.

³² STOKES, Christopher, Op. Cit., p.126.

³³ VAN IERSEL, Fred H.M., Desiree Verweij and Erhan Tanercan, «The Domestic Role of the Military: Civil-Military Co-operation in Foreign and Domestic Crisis Areas as a Test Case for the Acceptance of the Military in Dutch

model in which CIMIC plays a complementary role by performing actions dictated by humanitarian and development worker. But again, there are also critics about the idea of «creative chaos» or multilateralism as a tool for State building. They believe that a plan must be decided and applied in order to achieve some success. The next form of CIMIC corresponds to such a scheme.

The Top-down model

A fourth approach can be identified with Civil-military Operations that are part of a wider military strategy. The best example of this CIMIC strategy is given by the US Civil Affairs doctrine. The Civil Affairs Branch of the Army originated as a military government created to meet military requirement in occupied area following the German and the Japanese defeat of World War II³⁴. The name Civil Affairs gradually replaced Military Government as the customary terminology. Although Civil Affairs doctrine, tasks and importance varied over forty years in the US Army³⁵, its essence remained relatively unchanged and came to be known as “...the management of military-civilian relationships to the interest of the military and its mission”³⁶. Today’s Civil Affairs in American strategy is described as a leavening action between combat³⁷, the transition to peace, and the reconstruction of government under the rule of law³⁸. It constitutes a civil-military interface, but represents more than simply managing the relations with others or “outsiders”. The US Army doctrine defines Civil Affairs as:

“The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military and civil authorities, both governmental and non-governmental, and the civilian population in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives³⁹.”

The aim of this CIMIC style is to achieve political and military goals within a specific theatre of operation. In the bounds of this doctrine and organisation, politico-military decisions are centralized at the highest strategic level, often with the National Security Council or the President himself⁴⁰. Once the orientation has been determined, all civilian and

society», Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics, Washington, Conference pronounced January 2001, p.2: <http://atlas.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE01/Tanercan01.html> (27May 2005).

³⁴ BINGHAM, Bruce B., RUBINI, Daniel L., CLEARY, Michael J., “U.S. Army Civil Affairs-The Army’s “Once of Prevention”, The Land Warfare Papers, no.41, march 2003

³⁵ British and other Allied armies abandoned Military government/Civil Affairs capabilities after World War II, but the US Army maintained Civil Affairs units to assume specific roles in Germany and Japan.

³⁶ GUTTIERI, Karen, Op. Cit., p. 31.

³⁷ The first contemporary civil-military cooperation action apparently occurred between United Nations Forces in Cyprus UNFICYP and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1974. But it’s only with a military-NGO operation assisting the Kurdish population in northern Iraq in 1991 that the US Army Civil Affairs awoke from its Cold War lethargy. BEAUREGARD, André, Civil Military Cooperation in Joint Humanitarian Operations: A Case Analysis of Somalia, The Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, Doctoral thesis presented to the University of Guelph, April 1998, p2.

³⁸ GUTTIERI, Karen, Op. Cit., p.2.

³⁹ UNITED-STATES ARMY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, Washington, 2000. p.1-1.

⁴⁰ BRAEM, Yann, Op. cit., p.30-31.

military actors adopt the same line of conduct which runs down to the lowest tactical level as a global vision to resolve the situation.

Even though this mode of action resembles the “collective method”, since the Department of Defense (DoD), the US Department of State and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) interact together, there is an important difference that needs to be noted. This distinction rests on the fact that with the US Civil Affairs style, cooperation is rather imposed from the political authority and becomes a collaboration of parent agencies. We called this method «top-down».

In recent years, the US has been the only military force to exploit this CIMIC approach. There are many advantages to possessing such a unity of vision for the resolution of a conflict or crisis. But since it does not build consent among the actors, this method could be somewhat counter-productive. It might be too early to propose some conclusions, but we might hypothesize that since decision is centralized to an almost unique decision circle, there is a greater risk of adopting an inappropriate course of action. The events of the War in Iraq might provide some insights on this in the future.

In the “top-down” model, soldiers, civilian actors and some NGOs perform joined actions to implement the solution. We propose that this style is more appropriate for disaster assistance, short term stabilization operations and combat missions. This style of CIMIC matches a doctrine elaborated for military tasks and efficiency and is principally used by the United-States Army. We also have to add that this model requires plenty of resources to be allocated in order to be effective.

So we can sum up by saying that there is no such thing as a single CIMIC identity, but multiple aspects to this military function. The most difficult part for a military organization is to determine which form it will apply. In the same way, the humanitarian community will have to identify which type it faces and most of all, if they are willing to cooperate with this military method.

Example of operations

It is easier to assess each of these models by associating them with a particular situation when this particular type of CIMIC was put forward. In the case of the first model, the “independent” (1), we have noticed that it has been performed primarily by the French army but also by other NATO countries. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the effort in de-mining made by NATO and many NGOs in Kosovo. The Mine Action Coordination Center established a protocol of action for the de-mining process. First, information had to be collected on the areas where de-mining was necessary. The NGOs set up an education campaign to explain to the population what the effort was about. Following that, specialized NGOs and expert private enterprises but especially armies undertook the work of de-mining. However, armies de-mined areas of strategic military interest while civilian de-mined civilian zones⁴¹. In this case, there was a strict repartition of the tasks between civilian workers and soldiers. Both communities had a common objective, the one of de-mining, but they undertook separately different portions of the work.

⁴¹ BRAEM, Yann, Op cit. p.128

As an example of CIMIC following the “collective model” (2), we can see the effort made by the German civil-military cooperation cell in Kosovo. In the Prizren zone, they had the mission to distribute humanitarian help, to re-construct houses, schools and local infrastructures, to gather information on some villages and life-condition, to liaise with NGOs and international organisation and to give advises on economic and commercial matters. The battalion responsible was divided in different teams, each responsible of a specific mission. They were really professional and had knowledge on certain matter such agriculture, emergency aids or structural development. The CIMIC cell received most of its funding from the GTZ, the organ of cooperation of the German State (the CIDA equivalent). Both organisations collaborated at all moments during the conduct of the mission. Also under the umbrella of the mission UNMIK, many meetings of coordination were organized between armies and NGOs representative, allowing coordination at the operational level. No competition existed between militaries and NGOs in the conduct of humanitarian affairs; however a strict division of the task was observed. The German were very professional and the humanitarian activities of CIMIC were integrated into the wider humanitarian plan for the zone⁴².

When we come to the “top-down” model (4), the United-Sates Army can give us plenty of situations in which this specific sort of CIMIC was performed. The American Army is clearly professional in the conduct of their affairs. They operate within a strict code of procedure. Agencies such as USAID or the Pentagon are responsible to allow the budget for humanitarian aid. NGOs can apply by submitting a project proposal for a specific matter and they need to mention the other partners that are going to play a role in the conduct of this project. The decision to carry on with the project is taken by the Civil-Affairs branch of the army and they have to agree on all the aspect of the mission. Such organisation is hierarchic and answers to the logic of sub-contracting⁴³. The decisions are taken at the highest level, and the NGOs are greatly integrated into the wider structure. The leadership is greatly centralized at the governmental and political levels. Also, contrary to French and German CIMIC branches, the American CIMIC seems to develop a great understanding of the local environment. The military contingents are specialized on certain regions; soldiers generally know the language spoken, the local culture and the geography of the country in which they are posted. This form of CIMIC has been practiced in Panama but also in Kuwait (during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm), in Somalia, in Haiti, in Bosnia, in Kosovo and in Afghanistan to provide ministry assistance, functional team assessment and humanitarian assistance.

It appears difficult to give specific examples of application of the “bottom-up approach. Militaries have been involved in CIMIC activities more or less constantly during crisis since the last 15 years. So far they have not decided to put themselves at the service of NGOs. Despite occasional frictions, they use civilian and humanitarian workers at least to gather information on the local environment. Also, taking into account the role that the State wish to play in the conduct of humanitarian affairs in the belief that human security is clearly link to traditional security, we can clearly doubt that the military will agree to refrain its role in this field. However, when stakes are not military, such as in the case of long term development or disaster relief, we can imagine that the military would prefer to play a supportive role and will leave to civilians the conduct of humanitarian relief programs.

⁴² BRAEM, Yann, Op cit p.134

⁴³ BRAEM, Yann, Op cit p.137

Therefore, higher is the stake in security term, higher the level would be for the decision making process. Nonetheless, there were some instances where NGOs were more than happy to receive the support of the army. In the Tsunami of December 2004, the French Red Cross received the help of the army and because it was a humanitarian catastrophe, they were not worried to be seen to lose their neutrality⁴⁴. In such an operation, the humanitarian relief was the priority. However exposed by some of the workers, the coordination between the different bodies was not always easy.

Table 1.1 summarizes the different types of models that we have described. It summarizes the manner in which the cooperation is performed. The type of decision making process, the level, either strategic, operational or tactic in which the decision for cooperation is taken, the type of actions for which each type of CIMIC can be useful, the type of operations for which is it better suited, and finally some examples in which this particular form of CIMIC was performed.

Table 1.1:A typology				
<small>(Julie Boileau and Richard Garon)</small>				
	Independent	Collective	Bottom-up	Top-down
Coop	Common specific interests Short term	Continuous Joint Civ/mil actions	forced	Imposed Collaboration
DMP	Independent (silos)	Collegial by Consensus	Loose, multiple and ad hoc	Centralized highest echelon
level	Operational (theatre of ops)	Strategic	Tactical	Strategic
Actions	Complementary or competitive	Medium to long term Integrated	Episodically combined	Integrated (within controlled orgs)
Types ops	disaster relief, peacekeeping, military stabilization	disaster relief, stabilization, peacebuilding	disaster relief, Long term development	military stabilization, War
example	France's CMA NATO in Kosovo	UK German in Prizen	Tsunami	US Civil Affairs

Conclusion

Throughout this paper we described four types of CIMIC approaches some of them used as specific national doctrines. Our theoretical model presents these four methods named: independent, collective, bottom-up and top-down. Each of these styles corresponds to specific modes of actions, military tasks, and decisional processes. Each type would be more appropriately applied to certain types of operations and levels of actions. Such a variety of CIMIC methods demonstrates a very flexible organization and doctrine which is somewhat contrary to Michael Pugh's position about strict institutionalisation of CIMIC⁴⁵.

⁴⁴ Fédération internationales des sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant Rouge, <http://www.ifrc.org/fr/publicat/wdr2005/chapter4.asp>

⁴⁵ PUGH, Michael, Op cit., p.2.

From this analysis, it appears that CIMIC's original aim and functions was not to conduct humanitarian aid or to replace the NGO community. Initially, this function was developed to improve the effectiveness of a military contingent confronted to new situations, mandates and tasks resulting from the end of the Cold War. CIMIC quickly demonstrated secondary benefits which proved to be appealing to senior military leaders, political authorities and even the humanitarian community. Other advantages than the achievement of the military mission shaped an evolution of the CIMIC practice which can now be conceived in a larger context than its original background and even become a mission in itself.

This theoretical scheme also enclose all current different employments of the CIMIC function within NATO countries and should provide explanations for other emerging forms such as the British and Canadian approaches. Such a model could then help Canada to think concretely about which model is better suited on one side for the conduct of its missions and which one should be preferred on the other side to address its national interests.

If the 3D approach remains the Canadian doctrine to cope with threats coming from failed States, the question remains about the best way to operationalize this doctrine on the field. So far it has been claimed that the 3D should resemble the collective model, however at the present stage, the Canadian Forces style of CIMIC shows features apparent to the independent model.

These insights about the different forms of CIMIC can probably help our understanding of the challenges resulting from the cooperation between communities in appearance so differently structured and so differently goal-oriented. Moreover, the creation of a Provincial reconstruction team in the Kandahar province of Afghanistan could be an excellent opportunity to put in practice this set of guidelines and to reinforce dialogue and cooperation between the different departments involved. Nonetheless, when the stake is primarily to maintain security, we could imagine that the Defence department is probably the one who is going to take the lead.

As we saw, this new field of research requires more practical application in the future. Thus, work still needs to be done in order to understand the best way to integrate civilians and militaries on common projects. It is only after assessing seriously what are the factors that play into this cooperation that we will be able to choose which CIMIC is better suited for specific needs.