

*Civil Society and the Military:
The Tension between Individual and Collective Rights*

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“As soon as any man says of the affairs of the State, ‘What does it matter to me?’ the State may be given up for lost.” Rousseau, *The Social Contract*

Trying to balance the needs of the individual with the requirements of the military has increasingly become an issue for most Western nations. The maxim of ‘God, Queen, and Country,’ is in competition with ‘What’s in it for me?’ It is tempting for military figures to dig in and reply with romantic longings for ‘the good old days.’ Just as tempting, it seems, is the opportunity for some members of the public to place the military under intense scrutiny and expect miracles of social engineering to occur overnight, without any serious effect on operational capability.¹ Others, including leading academics and commentators urge the military to mirror the wider societal norms. As Jack Granatstein said recently,

...our CF must reflect Canadian values. It was this that doomed the Canadian Airborne Regiment after Somalia. The gung ho, macho style of the CAR as it tried to emulate the worst of the US Special Forces style was profoundly unCanadian, and the public, parliament, and the media saw this at once. The Canadian style is not tattoos, Confederate flags, and racial sneers and killings; the public prefer a more emphathetic style that comes from 40 years of peacekeeping.²

In its most elemental form the question becomes how much can an army mirror the society from which it is drawn, and which it ultimately serves, while remaining an effective combat force? The issue can be boiled down to one of individual and collective rights, and the delicate balancing act armies must perform between the two.

In order to assess the options open to contemporary armies with regards to the debate, this paper will look at the value systems that are at stake, highlighting the fundamental bases of each example and the contrasts between what is valued in civil society and what is held dear in the military. Included in this section will be a description of how armies in the West have traditionally gone about changing the value systems of their recruits, and how military values are inculcated. Secondly, a description of the erosion of this moral base will be addressed, keying on such areas as specialisation, and the current shift of societies from modern to post-modern entities. The issue of how an individual identifies itself within a group has a significant impact on the behaviour of that individual. A short study of that process will form the third part of this paper. The consequences of the differences identified previously will be discussed at greater length in the fourth segment. Finally, a course of action for the future will be suggested, highlighting the possibilities for change and resolution.

Values

Armed forces, while drawn from the societies within which they are situated, are unique entities; they have a monopoly of violence vested in them by the state. They are separated, sometimes geographically, always by virtue of what they do, from other organs of the state and from the general population. They are expected to perform tasks that

require immediate execution, in stressful and uncertain circumstances, involving the risk of death or injury to large bodies of people. Most importantly, they are given the responsibility for committing acts that are contrary to what is considered acceptable in Western nations; they must be prepared to kill. Because of these expectations “the values of the army [are] not entirely... congruent with the values extant in the larger society.”³ Attributes that seem out of place in today’s world of political correctness retain currency in armies around the world; aggression, toughness, and predictability are qualities in which soldiers take pride.

It is common to describe the role of a country’s armed forces as that of safeguarding the values of its parent society. Waggish retorts along the lines of ‘the army is here to defend democracy, not practice it’ go a long way towards describing both the role of the army and the tension that exists between society and the military. The Canadian Forces (CF) 1999 “Defence Strategy 2020” White Paper lists one of the roles of the CF to be the “defence of Canadian values” and describes them as such:

1. Democracy and the rule of law
2. Individual rights and freedoms as articulated in the [1986] Charter [of Rights and Freedoms]
3. Peace, order, and good government as defined in the Constitution
4. Sustainable economic well being.⁴

If armies must recruit from societies where individual rights have such primacy, how do they create their operative value system, and instil some kind of respect for, and dominance of, the collective? For centuries armies have relied on periods of socialisation largely achieved during two key developmental stages. The first is during basic training when “the new members are integrated into the group [and] they internalise its values and attitudes and learn what is appropriate behaviour.”⁵ Because the army must rapidly immerse the new recruit in this environment, basic training has been characterised by total and constant ‘attention’ from the trainer on the trainee. “It has been shown that the greater the degree...the target is under the control of the influencer, the more likely the target is to incorporate the values and norms of the influencer.”⁶ This dominance is achieved largely at the expense of certain individual rights and freedoms; recruits are not free to neither move, assemble, nor express themselves as they see fit. This is clearly in opposition to the existing norms in civilian life. Group punishment and team-building exercises are also introduced to make individual recruits identify with the larger group, namely their peers undergoing the same uncomfortable treatment. The routine of inspections, reduced privacy, and absolute uniformity assist in reducing the individual nature of each recruit during the gradual transformation from civilian into soldier. As Hankey explains

The...army...was built in such a way as to relieve the strain on the individual. The dogmas were firm, the discipline strong, the procedures stereotyped. Those who joined it knew what it was they were joining, and that they must conform or be expelled.⁷

The second development stage that helps transform a civilian is the introduction to the Regiment. Here, the total control of the recruit school is largely absent, but the tools of peer pressure, group expectation, and tradition are used in much the same manner. The individual is placed in a context that runs back through time, in some cases hundreds of years. Individuals *qua* individuals do not matter here, only members of the team, and ultimately, only the team itself. The trappings of the Regiment, its Colours, its VC winners, and its Battle Honours serve to provide the new soldier with constant reminders of the group that has been joined, and in which the soldier (usually) wants to advance and succeed, or at least belong.

The military is not alone in its desire to subordinate the individual to the group. The idea of a Social Contract formed much of the 18th and 19th centuries' political debate and called for just such surrender. Rousseau, for example, demands

...the total alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community; for in the first place, as each gives himself absolutely, the conditions are the same for all.⁸

Such sentiment would fit in nicely at any recruit school.

Erosion of Military Values

As mentioned in the introductory remarks, there is a tendency for people to long for the 'good old days' where citizens joined the military and needed little or no socialisation to become effective members of a regiment. Folkloric descriptions of tough Coeur de Bois, Prairie farm boys, and hardy coal miners instantly fitting in abound. On closer inspection, however, it seems that these days never existed, at least not to the extent popularly believed. As early as "before the First World War many British officers were apprehensive that what they regarded as the traditional military values were being eroded in the population by, *inter alia*, excessive individualism..."⁹ This trend has continued to this day and can be attributed to three main factors.

First is the rise of the business ethic within civil society. The growing trend amongst the military to equate 'leadership' with 'management', 'combat' with 'business', and 'objectives' with the 'bottom line' has the effect of diverting attention from the traditional military thinking. While economy of effort has long been a principle of war, the swing to embrace all things economic brings with it an emphasis that runs contrary to the team atmosphere, where imperatives other than financial ones reign supreme. As Reynolds notes, "with the military's absorption of this perspective, the traditional values of community, sacrifice, service, and dedication to one's comrades has surely been undermined."¹⁰ Snyder and Watkins assert simply that

Due to an excessively organizational perspective, the [US] Army has borrowed aspects of human resource systems from corporations, and then wonders why the members of the profession are acting like employees.¹¹

The second change has been in the recruiting pool, the portion of the population that finds its way into the military. Recent decades have seen differing demographic groups accept the military as a desirable career option. These groups have included women and visible minorities, and in some cases, people with physical limitations that have never before considered the army as a viable place to work. The challenge becomes, then, the army's ability to *accept* these groups into their fold. This challenge is further compounded by two factors. First, while the various non-traditional groups have taken years, in some cases decades, to find the army an attractive option, the army is forced to move in double quick time to respond to, and indeed welcome, these 'newcomers'. To date, most armies have not risen to this challenge. Second, these new groups bring with them a variety of associated needs and requirements with which armies are unaccustomed. To say that these challenges are insurmountable is overstatement; to say that they require a re-examination of the fundamental premises, routines, and traditional perspectives of an organisation is not. As these considerations are often (at least at first) associated with only a few 'interlopers' into the world of the army, these pioneers are often tarred with the brush of 'individualism'. While the right to express oneself is an individual right, identifying oneself (for example) as a Sikh, or a member of the First Nations, is obviously tied to an association with a larger collective as well. The friction felt by both the newcomer and the army stems from the fact that the two collectives are not the same. As the traditional recruiting base shrinks, and armies find themselves relying more and more on new constituencies, "issues of diversity, gender, lifestyle, disability, and family support will increase in importance."¹²

The final trend that has eroded the relevance of the group has been the increased specialisation of military forces. In the past, a soldier had a few simple weapons and roles to master; therefore, every member of the infantry could be expected to fill every job. Rotating from rifleman to driver to anti-tank gunner was something that a soldier could expect to do within the first three years of his employment within an infantry battalion. This led to a feeling of familiarity with all those soldiers within his branch; all gunners knew what all the other gunners did, in the same way that all tankers understood what their peers were up to. A Regiment or Corps was a nearly monolithic entity, and therefore an 'imaginable' family, a group easily identified, and therefore, something with which one could easily identify.

In a world of digitised battlespace and computer operated weapon systems, there is a need to train one soldier to do an increasingly difficult job, requiring skills that take months or years to learn. This longer 'ramp up' period required to make a soldier a contributing member of the army means that it is unlikely that soldiers will rotate through as many different posts as has been the case to date. Today, someone crewing a cutting edge sensor equipped reconnaissance vehicle takes nearly a year to master the jobs required—and that is just for one vehicle type.¹³ In essence, these soldiers are sequestered from their comrades within their Regiment, still establishing bonds, still sharing experiences, but with a smaller group. These skills, and the experiences incurred in acquiring them, are less widely applicable, less universally appreciated; not all soldiers within a unit understand what the person beside them does on the battlefield anymore. As armies get more specialised, individuals feel more isolated within the larger group.

As these new skills are highly reliant on computer literacy and technical competence, another difference arises. The old attributes of a 'strong back and a weak mind' are long gone. Instead the new "processes [have] increased the military's interdependence with civilian society, and altered its internal social structure...They [have] also emphasised the skilled individual, whereas the unit [had been] traditionally...the fundamental element of ground combat."¹⁴ High tech is replacing brute force, and this is reducing the amount of common ground that is covered by all soldiers.

On a wider scale, and by way of putting these three factors into some kind of context, societies themselves are heading in new directions. Around the time of the French Revolution as Europe entered into the Modern era, societies split private matters from public affairs. Military endeavour was hived off into the public realm, as evidenced by increased meritocracy, the rise of the professional officer corps, and an end to the purchase of commissions. The *armee en masse* was a public army, an army of citizens owing allegiance to the state, not serfs with personal ties to individual lords. The Industrial Revolution accelerated the change from family driven economies to impersonal firms as the key economic engines. In short, Modernity did not see individuals as individuals, but rather as necessary parts of overarching ideologies.

Lately, beginning anywhere in the last twenty to thirty years, Western societies have been characterised as 'post-modern', revisiting the public-private divide, and stressing the private over the public in most cases. There has been a general trend towards privatisation in several fields, including health, transport, and education. Private 'police' and paramilitary organisations are gaining currency throughout the West. Reynolds warns that "society is entering the post-industrial age and the emphasis has shifted towards social liberties and rights. This liberation has created moral and ethical challenges for the military."¹⁵

Not the least of the problems that these societal changes bring about is a sense of alienation within the ranks of the forces: "soldiers will not be inclined to defend...values, particularly at the risk of death, unless they hold them dear, as being worthy of their individual and corporate self-sacrifice."¹⁶ This theoretical prediction is evinced in the Canadian Forces, as seen in the recent 'Debrief the Leaders' report.¹⁷ Several commanders, when asked, stated that the traditional hierarchical concept of 'mission, men, self' no longer provided them with the context they needed to conduct operations; it no longer made sense. It is suggested that the reason for this new found doubt is that "it was frequently difficult to identify any national interest to be upheld when leaders were faced with placing themselves, and especially their troops, in harm's way. There was no apparent threat to homeland or Canadian values for which the unlimited liability contract should be invoked."¹⁸

We can see here, then, that changes in values and interests in society may translate to similar changes within the military. The consequences of these changes have yet to be revealed under the pressure of combat, but they appear to be significant, nonetheless. Two concurrent and opposite trends may be observed. First, new recruits

and younger members of the military are coming into the Forces with the values and interests extant in the larger society. This is in opposition to the older generation, now predominantly in positions of authority or influence, who are experiencing a sense of *Weltschmerz* or 'world pain', a form of cognitive dissonance between what they have been taught and expect, and what they are currently experiencing. This leads to real tensions, both between the military and society and within the military itself.

Conflict Inherent in the System

If the tension is present, why doesn't the military just change then? If societies can change, why can't armies? At first look this question seems extremely simple; however, it contains several pitfalls. The then Chief of Defence Staff, General Maurice Baril, noted the difficulties that militaries face when attempting to make large social changes:

Implementing "Building Teamwork in a Diverse CF" [a ministerial advisory committee's report] may be one of the hardest and most challenging tasks undertaken by the CF. I realize that it may touch a service member's emotions, values and beliefs and will require some to question and make changes to their behaviour. It will also force us to review many policies, systems, and practices - many of which have never before been questioned.¹⁹

First of all, the evolution of society into a new phase is not occurring easily, nor is it occurring without consequences. The social fabric of many Western nations is beginning to show signs of strain under the tensions of this new development. As noted by Inglehardt in his wide-ranging survey of World Values

Postmodern values emphasize self-expression instead of deference to authority and are tolerant of other groups and even regard exotic things and cultural diversity as stimulating and interesting, not threatening...[as a result] hierarchical, centrally controlled bureaucratic institutions are becoming less acceptable in postmodern society.²⁰

These changes mean that trying to parallel the developments made in society can be counter-productive for militaries. In some cases it may mean that 'you can't there from here'.

Secondly, in addition to society's drift into a postmodern condition, militaries have always had a conservative element to them. As the Canadian Army's keystone document notes:

Armies by their nature are traditional in outlook and relatively slow to change. In some respects this is positive in that it ensures a degree of stability in an otherwise tumultuous world. As well, a cautious approach to change allows specific changes to be assessed in terms of their effects and outcomes, especially those with the potential to harm operational imperatives.²¹

The I/O Thesis

In 1976 Charles Moskos, an American military sociologist, developed a theory that helps to explain some of the motivations behind military service, and has direct relevance to the question of the individual versus collective argument. Moskos says that people are attracted to, and remain in, the army for one of two key sets of reasons. The first of these are *institutional orientations*, which “correspond to a calling and represent a purpose transcending individual self-interest.”²² People who lean towards the institutional tend to identify with conditions that bind them. In other words, it is something about the ‘job’ itself that motivates these kinds of people. They are content to be a part of something like a Regiment, and their loyalty is enduring as long as that institution remains more or less the same. On the other hand, there are *occupational orientations*, which “represent ‘marketplace’ values and convergence with civilian norms.”²³ People so inclined value their ‘job’ for transient factors, such as pay, working conditions, and the people with whom they work.

Clearly of the two ends of the spectrum identified by Moskos the institutional factors are the most supportive of the collective interests. It is the group that defines the profession, and this collective has permanence to it. The Regiment or the army, in this case, does not have to keep changing in order to retain the interest of the institutionally motivated. Tradition, honour, and the solidarity of the group are sufficient motivators. Institutional soldiers feel a sense of duty to the group, not to individual members within it. Their loyalty transcends ‘the Colonel’, the section or the mates; it is seated in something more eternal. While this kind of loyalty can be quite enduring, once shaken, it can very rarely be regained. A disruption to the Regiment, through disgrace or even significant administrative change, can mean the end of any sense of belonging felt by institutionally driven soldiers.

The more individually oriented perspective is Moskos’s occupational one. This kind of loyalty can be equally as passionate and just as powerful as institutional loyalty; however, it depends on circumstances that can easily change. Peers come and go and, unfortunately, not every Commanding Officer is worthy of the undying respect of all his flock. To the occupational lot, working conditions in the here and now are more relevant than the honour and glory of battles won and lost ages ago.

Moskos indicated that there has been a definite shift in value systems, away from the institutional and towards the occupational. This trend, it seems, is manifest in all walks of life, but has special relevance to the military. The consequences of this perceived erosion are explained below.

Consequences

What are the results of these changing, and in some cases, incompatible value systems? The most significant consequence is the changing locus of legitimacy. As Rousseau warns, “if individuals retained certain rights, there would be no common superior to decide between them and the Public [good].”²⁴ If the soldier *qua* individual

holds the Trump card, rather than the Army, what will become of discipline and uniformity, and the predictability these bring to military operations? On the small scale of the parade ground or the battlefield, the results are catastrophic enough, but as Rousseau extrapolates, “As soon as public ceases to be the chief business of the citizens...the state is not far from its fall.”²⁵ This may at first appear to be hyperbole, but the sentiment that without a sense of duty to the group (the Regiment, the army, or the State) individual pursuits will lead to a level of chaos and self-indulgence that makes collective action of any meaning more difficult to achieve is quite a convincing hypothesis.

For the army, catering to individual considerations can take away from the focus of training the group, from getting units and formations prepared for duty in defence of the interests of the state. The myriad of personal concerns that are beginning to occupy the time of Western armies, ranging from dress policies to medical and fitness standards to spousal benefits, not only provides this distraction, they amplify the wants of the individual. Each time an individual is treated as an individual, and not as part of the team, a piece of the group is lost. The attention is removed from the group as individuals vie for the spotlight. The collective must remain the paramount concern of the citizens, and the army must remain the focus of the soldiers. As Hegel reminds us, “In contrast with the spheres of private rights and public welfare...the state is...an external necessity and [the] higher authority.”²⁶

What is to be done?

These changes amount to no small obstacle to Western armies at the beginning of the Twenty First century:

Military institutions are being challenged at the very heart of their mission: they must decide how to strike a balance...between individual and advancement and the collective good, as well as between the transmission and regard for the collective good, as well as between the transmission and regard for the traditional values and the action necessary for change.²⁷

If the prognosis above is accurate, what can armies do to prevent their collapse? How can the erosion of the collective prevented? In order to halt this process, a change in perspective is necessary. It is easy to examine the sides of this debate as the poles of a dichotomy (as I have done thus far in this paper). It enables us to more clearly understand the contrasts between the two positions. However, it can mask any hope of finding a way forward. The first step towards preventing individualism-cum-chaos is to appreciate, as the Australian General Monash did, that

The conception of discipline is, after all, only a means to an end, and that end is to secure the coordinated action among a large number of individuals for achieving a definite purpose. It does not mean...suspension of the individuality.²⁸

Understanding that individuality is not an evil, and realising that collective *action*, not collective *dominance* is the endstate, it is easier to see ways that the two can coexist.

It seems, then, that individualism and collectivism do not form a dichotomy, but rather dialectic. What is key, therefore, is to place the individual rights into a collective context. Hegel highlights the dialectic relationship of the two positions:

Particular interests should not, in fact, be set aside or completely suppressed; instead they should be put in correspondence with the universal, and thereby both they and the universal are upheld.²⁹

It is this synthesis of two seemingly polar opposites that represents the way forward.

Philosophical arguments, no matter how eloquent, are of little practical help to policy makers or military officials. What is helpful are measures that take philosophical stances as their starting point and allow for real people to take positive steps forward. The first of these is to re-emphasise the importance of the group, and begin to rebuild confidence in the army as a worthwhile organisation. In essence, it is time to rejuvenate the institutional factors in Moskos's model. Signs of this are evident in Canada where one of the five strategic imperatives spelled out in the latest defence policy document is to "nurture pride in the institution."³⁰ This, as paradoxically as it may seem, has to be done through improving the occupational aspects of the army that are causing individuals to lose faith. Pay must be competitive, working conditions must be equitable, and significantly, the particular needs of a growing number of non-traditional groups must be addressed. What is needed is a new, dynamic, healthy pride in a revamped and relevant collective, which is inclusive and diverse. Traditions or policies that exist merely to single people out or exclude, or reduce someone's ability to fulfil complementary personal goals, should be abandoned immediately. In creating an institution that takes people's occupational needs into account, thereby realising the synthesis mentioned above, one creates a stronger more relevant organisation. More importantly, one creates an organisation to which people can identify, belong, and towards which they can feel loyal. Take for instance, this comment from a recently retired junior artillery officer. It was made as a way of explaining why he left the CF: "I was fully prepared to be a career member, but at the end of the day, any employee needs to feel that they are valued, and not just a statistic."³¹

The second step towards achieving the synthesis between individual and collective rights is to elevate the role of the army within civil society. This is by no means an easy feat, but by trying to demonstrate that the largest collective—the population at large, or the state—appreciates the efforts of the individual (soldier), a great deal of loyalty can be realised. Hegel's words must be re-emphasised to society as a whole: "individuals have duties to the state in proportion as they have rights against it."³² The US Army understands the importance of this relationship, as is evidenced in their promotion of "values that distinguish our soldiers, and the bond between the Army and the Nation."³³ Without that bond, individuals within the military are more likely to think they need to fend for themselves. Cognizant of this relationship, and the power it holds,

the German Army stresses that “the soldier’s readiness to serve, and in wartime, even to risk his life, is closely interrelated with the will of the people as a whole to defend the integrity of its State and of its free and democratic constitutional order.”³⁴ Another comment from a junior officer, this time from the Navy, help to illustrate this point: “I felt that the CF was very distant from the surrounding social network. I never felt a part of the community...always away and the public was very uninterested in the CF...in some cases, even surprised we had a Navy and why we would have one. This took away any feeling that we were respected for the sacrifices we made being away from home for extended periods.”

If armies wish to regain their role as relevant and robust institutions, the third step they must take is to abandon the approach—and the jargon—taken by business. Obviously, the financial aspects of defence should be conducted in a business-like manner; however, as cautioned above, the ‘bottom line’ does not belong on the battlefield. The Canadian defence staff warns that “the performance of military functions should never be equated with the manufacture of a product, not should it ever become a purely commercial or bureaucratic enterprise.”³⁵ People are not willing to endure hardship or give up their lives for business. The army must rise above the business world if it wants to gain and retain the extraordinary loyalty it requires to be effective

Western armies must take an active role in modernising themselves. Mumbling on the margins about ‘times gone by’ and ‘the way it used to be’ will achieve nothing. Societies are changing rapidly, and armies have no choice but to keep up. Individualism is becoming more prominent as the roles individuals play in both civil society and the military are altered. Today, more than ever, one person can make a difference—whether positively or negatively. This rise in individual power must be viewed against the backdrop of how an army operates; it needs group cohesion and sacrifice or it cannot function. Rather than seeing individual and collective rights as opposites, and the relationship between them a zero-sum game, armies must capitalise on the dialectic dynamic that exists. Individuals must be made to feel necessary to the group, and the group needs to be made vital to the individual. This can only be achieved by truly valuing individual contributions and appreciating individual needs.

The regiments of yesterday boasted about being ‘families’ to their soldiers; the regiments of today have to assume that role again, recognising that the patrimonial “father-knows-best” family is quickly becoming a thing of the past. Through considerate personnel policies that aim to make the institution more responsive to individuals, and thereby negating the need for individuals to rebel, armies can make soldiers feel like part of the team. The stature of the army itself must be boosted; the collective must seem like something to which individuals will want to be loyal. If the State does not value the army, then no one in their right mind will give up a great deal of their liberty in support of it.

Only by taking positive and progressive steps such as these can armies survive. In doing so, it may be possible to come closer to the ideal expressed by Hegel: “In duty the individual finds his liberation.”³⁶ Without such changes, the collective will find itself

unpopulated and unregarded. While it is the individual who is now gaining power in Western societies, as far as armies are concerned, the power to regain relevance, and maintain effective combat capability, rests squarely with the military. It is hoped it is used wisely.

Notes:

An earlier version of this paper was awarded 2nd Place in the the UK Army's Bertrand Stewart Essay Contest in 1999.

¹See, for example, Robin Highham and Gilles Paquet, "The challenges of 2020: A citizens' perspective," Center of Governance, University of Ottawa (March 2000). One passage states that "In a pluralistic, heterogeneous, fractured and turbulent social context, the need for legitimacy by the CAF requires that it becomes more adaptive to change, more representative of this social reality and capable of maintaining more rigorous ethical standards than the general citizenry." p. 1.

²J.L. Granatstein, "Through a Glass Darkly: How the Public Views the Canadian Forces." Feb 22, 2001. CDA Institute—17th Annual Seminar.

³ Anthony Kellet, "Combat Motivation," Operation Research and Analysis Establishment (ORAE) Report No. R77 (Ottawa: 1980) para 221.

⁴ Canadian Department of National Defence, "Defence Strategy 2020," (Ottawa: 1999), p 2.

⁵ Anthony Kellet, "Motivation and Behaviour: The Influence of the Regimental System," ORAE (Ottawa: 1991) p 25.

⁶ Anthony Kellett, "Motivation and Behaviour" p 25.

⁷ Hankey, quoted in Kellett, "Combat Motivation," para 381.

⁸ Rousseau, "The Social Contract," in Michael Curtis, editor, *The Great Political Theories, Volume 2*, (Avon Books, New York: 1981) p 18.

⁹ Kellett, "Combat Motivation," para 220.

¹⁰ David C. Gardam, "Canadian Military Professionalism: Are We Losing?" Canadian Command and Staff College Paper (Toronto: 1995) no page numbers.

¹¹ Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins, "The Future of Army Professionalism: A Need for Renewal and Redefinition," *Parameters*, Autumn 2000, p. 13.

¹² "Defence Strategy 2020" p 4.

¹³ For the Coyote Reconnaissance Vehicle in order to be trained as a driver, turret gunner, and surveillance operator takes over ten months. Add to this the basic infantry course, the basic reconnaissance patrolman's course, and the basic driver course and the soldier is in *training* to do his primary combat function for over 18 months.

¹⁴ Kellett, "Combat Motivation," para 181.

¹⁵ Reynolds, as quoted in Gardam, no page number.

¹⁶ Don Snyder, "America's Postmodern Military," *World Policy Journal* (Spring 2000) cited in http://www.majorbates.com/links/spring2000_wpj.htm, accessed 17 July 2001, no page number.

¹⁷ Canadian Armed Forces, "Debrief the Leaders Project (Officers)," May 2001, downloaded from http://www.dnd.ca/hr/pdf/pdf/DebriefLeaders_e.PDF, accessed 12 June 2001

¹⁸ Debrief the Leaders, p. 11.

¹⁹ Department of National Defence, Minister's Advisory Board on Canadian Forces Gender Integration and Employment Equity, "Building Teamwork in a Diverse CF", March 2001, downloaded from <http://www.dnd.ca/menu/press/Reports/CFGIEE/INDEX-E.HTML>, accessed 6 July 2001.

²⁰ Ronald Inglehardt, "Globalization and Postmodern Values," *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2000, p. 223.

²¹ Canadian Armed Forces, "B-GL-300-000: Canada's Army," (Ottawa: 1997) Chapter 6, no page number.

²² Moskos, quoted in Kellett, "Motivation and Behaviour," para 110.

²³ Moskos, quoted in Kellett, "Motivation and Behaviour," para 120.

²⁴ Rousseau, in Curtis, p 19.

²⁵ Rousseau, in Curtis, p 31.

²⁶ Hegel, "The Philosophy of Right," in Curtis, p 98.

²⁷ Reynolds, quoted in Gardam, no page number.

²⁸ Monash, quoted in Kellett, "Combat Motivation," para 383.

²⁹ Hegel, in Curtis, p 99.

³⁰ "Defence Strategy 2020," p 5.

³¹ Taken from a series of confidential interviews conducted on the subject of retention in the CF. See Chris Ankersen and Losel Tethong, "Retain or Perish: Why Recruiting Won't Save the CF," CISS Strategic Datalink Number 95 (March 2001) and Chris Ankersen and Losel Tethong, "Birds In Hand: The Need for a Retention Based Strategy for the CF," *Canadian Military Journal*, 2.2 (Summer 2001) http://www.journal.dnd.ca/vol2/no2_e/policy_e/policy2_e.html.

³² Hegel, in Curtis, p 99.

³³ US Department of Defence, "Army Vision 2010," (Washington: 1997) p 2.

³⁴ German Army, "HDv-100-Command and Control in Battle," (Bonn: 1996), Chap 7, Sect 1.

³⁵ "Canada's Army," Chap 6, no page number.

³⁶ Hegel, in Curtis, p 94.

