

Remarks by John J. Noble on Canada/US Defence Relations to the Conference of Defence Associations Institute's 21st Annual Seminar, Ottawa, March 3, 2005

It's a pleasure to be with you this morning and to share some thoughts about the state of Canada/US defence relations with you and the other members of this panel whom I have known over the years. With all the ink being spilt on BMD, I could spend my entire time on that issue, but I won't. I should say that it is not the first time that a Canadian Prime Minister has said "no" to a request from the United States to participate in missile defence. I will talk about that but first I want to step back and bring somewhat of an historical and personal perspective to the discussion and to perhaps identify some lessons which might be appropriate to some of the key issues on the immediate horizon, particularly since our Ambassador designate told the truth last week on Canada's role in BMD. As to the Ambassador's reported comments yesterday linking the BMD decision to Canadian frustration on major trade files, I hope that isn't the truth because that is a lose/lose proposition for Canada. We will lose with the Department of Defence, we will lose with USTR/Commerce and we will certainly lose with the White House. My remarks will not just look at bilateral issues since in the defence and security field Canada and the United States have a large degree of commonality and interface in many multilateral defence and security fora.

Canada/US defence relations go way back to the French/English battles for control of the continent in the 1750's. Attempts to capture Montreal during the American Revolution were repulsed. We declared mutual victory in the war of 1812-14 and came out with our territory intact. American proclamations of "54 40 or fight", "Manifest Destiny" and the Fenian raids during the Civil War helped to encourage what remained of British North America to become Canada in 1867. I understand that the last American plans for an invasion of Canada were quietly shelved in the early 1930's. Some Canadian nationalists still fear absorption by the United States and don't realize that there is no interest in the US in such a project for a variety of reasons, one of which involves upsetting the balance in the US Senate.

The recent debates in Canada as to whether or not there should be a North American perimeter strike me as increasingly sterile and miss the point that a perimeter has existed for many years in the defence field. That perimeter is steadily being strengthened in other fields in light of the changing nature of the security threats to North America.

Proposals for various sorts of a North American security perimeter have been around for some time, and can be traced back to 1823 and President Monroe's unilateral declaration that "the American continents, ... are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." In 1904 President Theodore Roosevelt stated that the United States was justified in exercising "international police power" to put an end to chronic unrest or wrongdoing in the Western Hemisphere. This so-called Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine contained a great irony: whereas the Monroe Doctrine had been sought to prevent European intervention in the Western Hemisphere, the Roosevelt Corollary justified American intervention throughout the Western Hemisphere. One could argue, therefore, that those aspects of President George W. Bush's National Security Strategy of September 2002 which deal with pre-emptive action and unilateralism are merely a modification of the Roosevelt Corollary by expanding it from the Western Hemisphere to the entire world, i.e. the new Bush Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. (I originally made that point in a paper prepared for the IRPP last April and later discovered that Richard Pearle and David Frum made the same point in their book *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror*).

In August 1938 on the eve of World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt's acceptance speech for an honorary Doctorate at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario included the following

commitment: "The Dominion of Canada is part of the sisterhood of the British Empire. I give to you assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other Empire." Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, in response to President Roosevelt's pledge to protect Canada, said "we too have obligations as a good and friendly neighbour and that enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way either by land, sea or air to the United States cross Canadian territory." That two way commitment has been the essence of Canada/US defense co-operation from that time on and MacKenzie King's commitment, which no subsequent Canadian Prime Minister has ever renounced, is even more relevant in the post 9/11 era. Dwight Mason, a former DCM at the US Embassy here, and thereafter the US Chair of the PJBD, has suggested that Prime Minister Martin's decision not to be part of BMD (I will say more on that later) is an opting out of one aspect of North American defence in the knowledge that the United States would have welcomed such cooperation and that it is therefore a backing away from MacKenzie King's commitment in 1938.

In 1940 Roosevelt and McKenzie King went on to create the Permanent Joint Board of Defence, on which I sat as the External Affairs member from 1988 to 1990 (I will say more later) and the 1941 Hyde Park Agreement coordinated economic war mobilization of the two countries. Canada was involved in Project Manhattan which developed the atomic bomb and much Canadian uranium made its way into the American nuclear weapons program up until the mid 1960's when it was stopped by Lester Pearson.

At the start of the Cold War Canada and the United States worked closely together in to create the North Atlantic Treaty Organization where an attack on one member was considered an attack on all. The Canadian Forces deployed in Europe from the early 1950's until 1994 were not there as peacekeepers. It was a fighting force of army and air units to help deter the Soviet threat.

Canadian and American forces fought together in the UN authorized peace making operation in Korea. Lester Pearson worked closely with the United States during the Suez crisis and he notes in his memoirs that it was an American draft which he used to obtain the General Assembly's agreement for the creation of UNEF, for which he was subsequently awarded the Nobel Peace Prize

From 1954 until the mid 1970's Canada was the Western representative in the International Control Commission in Vietnam, along with Poland, representing the East Bloc and India the non-Aligned countries. A vignette told at the time had three observers in a field when the Canadian shouted "look there's a North Vietnamese tank". The Pole said, "No, it's a South Vietnamese tank" and the Indian said "what tank"? Canadian diplomats, including Blair Seaborn passed messages between the Americans and North Vietnamese. Pearson got pulled up by his shirt collar by a furious Lyndon Johnson after he called for a pause in the bombing in a speech in Philadelphia. Johnson's fury had more to do with the fact Pearson had made his comments in the US than anything else.

NORAD was created in 1958 as a joint command to deal with the Soviet manned bomber threat. The DEW line agreement had been signed in 1955 creating a line of radars across Northern Canada, built and manned mainly by Americans. Just as NORAD came into being, the world witnessed Sputnik, the first Soviet satellite in space and a new threat from intercontinental ballistic missiles from which there was no direct defence. NORAD created a formal defence perimeter around the United States and Canada which had existed informally since the Roosevelt/King exchange of 1938. It was expanded to include the threat from space and missiles and renamed the North American Aerospace Defence Command.

At the time of the Cuban crisis, PM Diefenbaker refused to put Canadian forces on alert and discovered to his astonishment that the Canadian military had already done so. (Kennedy also had trouble with his military during the Cuba crisis). Bobby Kennedy's reaction to Diefenbaker was that "in times of crisis the Canadians promise all help short of real assistance". Diefenbaker got into even bigger trouble with the US government and military when he refused to arm the Bomarc anti-aircraft missiles which he had chosen as a replacement for the cancelled Avro Arrow, with the nuclear weapons for which the Bomarc was designed. His government imploded with several ministers including Douglas Harkness, the Minister of National Defence resigning on the issue. Pearson reversed the Liberal Party stance on nuclear weapons and won a minority government in the 1963 election in which anti-Americanism played a key part. Pearson not only armed the Bomarc with nuclear weapons, he also gave our forces in Europe, nuclear tipped short range Honest John missiles and nuclear bombs on CF-104 Starfighters for offensive use. Pearson's reversal of Liberal policy on nuclear weapons earned him the title "the defrocked Prince of Peace" from Pierre Elliott Trudeau and was not popular inside parts of the Liberal Party.

I did my COTC officer training at Shilo, Manitoba in the summers of 1963 and 1964 at the Royal Canadian School of Artillery under the command of Colonel Leslie, father of General Andrew Leslie and son of General McNaughton. We watched a test flight of an Honest John missile minus the nuclear weapon. It had a range of 16 to 20 miles and I wondered about what would have happened to us if the missile had had a nuclear weapon on it. In 1965, I was a CFB Pettawawa with 4 RCHA and arranged a visit to the Canadian NORAD bunker at North Bay via an uncle who was the base engineer there. We also got to inspect the Bomarc missiles installed there. I was always struck by the two guards armed with sub-machine guns who never left their eyes off of us while we were near the missiles. They weren't Canadians, but Americans. Perfectly natural since the weapons were American weapons. My Commission as a Second Lieutenant was signed by the then Minister of National Defence, Paul Hellyer, not a hero to many military men and General Georges Vanier, who was a true military hero who was then Governor General.

Canada's early participation in the UN Force on Cyprus (UNFICYP) was a direct response to a request by US President Lyndon Johnson. We stayed there for 28 years and left because our forces were required in other hot spots like Namibia, Cambodia, Somalia, and Bosnia where people were getting killed.

Pierre Trudeau started off his government in 1968 with a review of our commitment to NATO and a very public debate among ministers. Ross Campbell, our Ambassador to NATO at the time tells a wonderful story about Trudeau, Ivan Head and NATO in 1968. He says both believed that, if Canada withdrew from NATO, the Czechs would leave the Warsaw Pact! What happened, of course, is that we announced a cut of 50% of our troops stationed in Europe and the Russians then invaded Czechoslovakia! The Europeans at the time feared that such a reduction might encourage a similar move by the United States.

I joined External Affairs in June 1966 and after some language training and a short stint at the UNGA, my first real job was in what was then called Defence Liaison One (DL 1) Division arranging over flight clearances for Canadian air force flights around the world. Then I had to do a study on the Canadian Forces capability to provide military assistance in French to the newly emerging francophone countries of Africa in a manner similar to the military assistance being offered to Commonwealth African countries. I wasn't able to identify much capacity for such training but I think DND was directed to develop such a capability to help further. It was the start of a long and rewarding relationship with DND.

From 1982 until 1993, I spent a good deal of time on Canada/US relations including defence relations as Departmental and Ministerial Spokesman, Director for Canada/US Relations, Director General for the US Relations Bureau; DG for International Security and Arms Control; a sabbatical year at Harvard during the first Gulf War, and Director General for International Organizations Bureau. In the early 1980's the American Ambassador in Ottawa was a big man named Paul Robinson. His nickname was "Bullmoose". Canada was just as far down the scale of NATO countries in GNP percentage terms in 1982 as it is today, and Paul Robinson was constantly publicly harping for an increase in defence expenditure. During one of the quarterly meetings between Canadian Foreign Minister Allan MacEachen and Secretary of State George Shultz, MacEachen noted that it would be a lot easier for the Trudeau government to increase defence expenditure if Robinson would stop making demands in public. Shultz said he understood perfectly and that was the way the Administration felt with respect to the public lobbying of Congress by then Environment Minister John Roberts on acid rain. On another occasion just before MacEachen went on a trip to Central America, George Shultz asked him to include a stop in El Salvador. MacEachen didn't say no, but after Ambassador Robinson went out and blabbed Shultz's request to the press, no further thought was given to a stop in El Salvador.

At Joe Clark's first meeting with George Shultz in Toronto in October 1984, Shultz told Clark that "if you want to kick us in the shins, do it in private, we get the message just as well". Clark replied that if he did have occasion to disagree he would do so without being disagreeable.

I understand that Foreign Affairs had recently planned a conference on Diefenbaker's foreign policy, but somewhere at the political level it was felt best to postpone it for fears of analogies being drawn between Diefenbaker and the Bomarc and Paul Martin and BMD. My original reaction to this was that there was no real analogy between the Diefenbaker indecision on arming the Bomarcs and the Martin dithering and finally saying "no" to BMD. Rather I thought the real analogies were with Pierre Trudeau and his highly unpopular decision to test the cruise missile in 1983 and Brian Mulroney's decision to say "no" to President Reagan's invitation to participate in the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1985.

In 1979, Canada along with all other NATO countries adopted a two track decision in response to the Soviet deployment of intermediate range missiles to target cities in Western Europe. The first track was to counter this deployment with a NATO deployment if the Soviets did not dismantle their INF forces. The second track was to seek ways to get the Soviets to dismantle those weapons. Crunch time came in 1983 when in the absence of any Soviet pull back, NATO decided to deploy Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe. At the same time the US government asked Canada for permission to test its air launched cruise missile in Canada over northern terrain which closely resembled that of the Soviet Union. Mark McGuigan claims in his memoirs, which were published posthumously, that the decision to test the cruise was made while he was foreign minister (1980-82) and that his successor Allan MacEachen just didn't understand this. MacEachen has told me that McGuigan's claim is plain wrong and I am sure that the Cabinet records will confirm MacEachen's version when they become public. The green light was not given by Cabinet until July 1983.

Pierre Trudeau faced the same sort of majority public opinion against testing the cruise missile back in 1983 that Paul Martin faces today, except the threat of a nuclear conflagration with the USSR has receded and BMD is not aimed at Russia, whereas one of the prime targets of the ALCMs was to have been the Soviet Union. In the run-up to his decision to ignore majority public opinion and the views of some of his caucus and Cabinet, (Lloyd Axworthy mentions this in his recent book) Trudeau published an open letter to Canadians in May 1983 in which he said "Canadians want to benefit from the American nuclear umbrella, but they don't want to hold onto

the umbrella's handle. To that extent, the knee jerk anti-Americanism of some Canadians verges on hypocrisy." That is not the type of statement which most Canadians associate with Pierre Trudeau, but he issued the letter. At the Williamsburg G-7 Summit in June 1983 Trudeau told his fellow leaders that "we should be busting our asses for peace". Margaret Thatcher looked at him and replied: "Pierre you're such a comfort to the Kremlin". In July 1983 late on a Friday afternoon, after a Cabinet meeting, Foreign Minister Allan MacEachen and Defence Minister Gilles Lamontagne announced the Cabinet decision to test the cruise to the press (I was there). Shortly afterwards the Americans told us that they really didn't need to test the cruise until the following year. Having been forced to walk through the fiery coals of opposition to testing the cruise, the Canadian government made sure that the Americans went through with testing before the end of 1983.

I think Trudeau's public letter to Canadians has stood the test of time and the hypocrisy he saw in parts of his Cabinet and caucus is still there today in even greater numbers. The key point here is that Trudeau was not only prepared to exercise leadership, he was prepared to try to sell the decision to Canadians before it was announced.

I have always felt that Trudeau's ill-fated Peace Initiative was the quid pro quo for his agreement to test the cruise. It sought to dampen the megaphone diplomacy between President Reagan and an increasingly ill Soviet leadership. The Americans didn't like what they perceived as Trudeau's "moral equivalence" between them and the "Evil Empire". The timing was off, but with the arrival of Michael Gorbachev in the Kremlin and Ronald Reagan's conversion to the premise that a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought, the two of them achieved much of what Trudeau had been suggesting. Trudeau used his visit to Washington in December 1983 to try to convince Ronald Reagan that he wasn't getting out the right message and it wasn't being understood by either allies or the Soviets.

Brian Mulroney promised to increase defence spending, which in fact started in Trudeau's last year in office. Mulroney did increase the size of the forces, but ran into stiff opposition from the US Navy when he decided to acquire some nuclear powered submarines. Mulroney got the Administration to over rule the Navy's objections, but he was forced to cancel the project in the 1990 budget along with a large icebreaker which was also known as the world's largest flag pole.

Mulroney had earlier said "no" to Reagan's invitation to join the Strategic Defence Initiative. The initial invitation had been conveyed to NATO Defence Ministers in Brussels behind close doors by Casper Weinberger and Defence Minister Eric Neilson ordered our Ambassador not to report this back to Ottawa, because he wanted to report directly to the Prime Minister. Neilson didn't realize that The American Secretary of Defense had left the NATO ministerial meeting to tell the press about the invitation. Astute members of the opposition in Ottawa had a field day embarrassing Joe Clark who had no information from their representatives in Brussels about the event. Mulroney handled the invitation by asking a special parliamentary committee to look at it along with issues related to trade liberalization with the United States. (That's a far cry from the way the current BMD issue was handled when PM Martin's promise to allow a vote in Parliament evaporated in the wake of Ambassador McKenna's revelations!) Mulroney also appointed a special advisor, Arthur Kroeger, to report to him on whether or not we should join. While some of us had predicted that Mulroney's decision might cause problems for us in Washington, that did not happen, in large part because Mulroney had already established good relations with President Reagan and he hadn't dithered on the issue. Nor had the American Ambassador in Ottawa made this a touchstone of the relationship.

Mulroney worked closely with President George H.W. Bush on many issues as outlined in the memoirs which Bush and Brent Scowcroft published several years ago. On his first trip to Ottawa in January 1989, the Mulroney government announced a decision to permit the testing over Canadian territory of the advanced "stealth" cruise missile. The Mulroney government had delayed a decision on this matter for over 18 months. In January 1988 at the Calgary Winter Olympics, Joe Clark had told President Reagan's Chief of Staff Ken Duberstein that the government could not make a decision on the issue until after the free trade issue was resolved. The American Administration accepted that at face value and did not make it a public issue. The Free Trade Agreement was secured in November 1988's general election. One of the first jobs I had as Director General for International Security and Arms Control was to ensure that Joe Clark's commitment was honoured. The fact that there were only 12 protestors out to denounce the decision must have made Americans wonder why Mulroney had been so sensitive. But times were changing.

Jim Baker accompanied George Bush to Ottawa in January 1989 and was told by Joe Clark that there had to be some progress on the issue of Short Range Nuclear Weapons, an issue which was dividing NATO between the US and the most Europeans (except of course Margaret Thatcher). That debate continued throughout the spring of 1989 on the front pages of the New York Times and European newspapers. At the same time the Bush Administration made known it was looking for initiatives with respect to the Soviet Union. My team in the International Security and Arms Control Bureau had been developing a proposal to revive Eisenhower's 1954 "Open Skies" proposal for aerial surveillance of WTO territory by NATO and vice versa. The CFE negotiations had started in Vienna and would require some strict verification methods. Satellites have certain limitations. I went to Washington in late April to speak to my American counterpart in State and also people at the NSC and the Pentagon. We were knocking at an open door. Prime Minister Mulroney subsequently sent a letter to President Bush recommending this proposal and he and Joe Clark discussed it with the President in early May when we went to Washington to open the new Canadian Embassy. The telling argument used by Mulroney was that if Bush didn't suggest it, Gorbachev might propose it himself. Three days later Bush made a major speech on East/West relations which included the Open Skies proposal. There was no great enthusiasm for it in the American media, which prompted Joe Clark to write an op-ed for the New York Times, saying don't dismiss the Open Skies proposal. In late May the NATO Summit endorsed the idea and I went off to Eastern Europe to try to sell it to the Hungarians, Czechoslovaks, Poles and Russians.

By late summer the Russians and Americans had agreed and official invitations were sent out for the first Ministerial meeting between NATO and WTO Foreign Ministers in Ottawa in February 1990. For a ministerial meeting to be held less than a year after a proposal is first made was most unusual. The Ottawa Conference was most remembered because we witnessed first hand the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, when the Foreign Ministers of the Pact took issue with the position of the Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze on almost every issue. The Ottawa conference also saw the announcement of the 2 +4 exercise on German unification and an infamous NATO ministerial meeting where much angst was spilled over the "Berlin four" leaving the other NATO allies out of the process. We had suggested to Jim Baker that he should at least inform his NATO colleagues before the decision was announced. Baker agreed and the ensuing meeting got rather testy with German Foreign Minister Hans Genscher telling the Italian Minister "you're not in the game". During a diplomatic pause in the meeting called by Joe Clark, Baker came over and said to me "you're the smart aleck who wanted this meeting". I said yes and aren't you glad the Ministers have had a chance to vent their spleens to you directly before returning to their capitals and at least having you give them an assurance they would be kept fully informed of the process. Baker didn't argue on that score.

The Open Skies Treaty took several more negotiating conferences to be completed and its relevance declined significantly after the demise of both the WTO and the Soviet Union. But up until the Ottawa Convention on Anti-personnel Land Mines it was the only major arms control treaty driven largely by Canada, with close cooperation from the United States.

At the 1989 NATO Summit, the debate on SNF reached the boil and an impasse and the leaders sent off their foreign ministers to try to resolve it at a midnight meeting. Before doing so Prime Minister Mulroney turned to President Bush across the NATO table and publicly reminded him (in the words of US Supreme Court Justice Learned Hand) that "leadership to be effective has to take into account the views of others". Bush and Jim Baker did a lot of listening and during the late night session, one of Baker's aides, Dennis Ross, came over to Joe Clark and asked that he put forward some of the ideas for bridging the gap which Mulroney and Clark had first discussed with Bush and Baker in Washington and later in a letter to him just before the Summit. I had some real problems getting DND to agree that we should become involved in a Trans-Atlantic nuclear debate since we had no nuclear weapons of our own. But we were part of an Alliance which had a nuclear strategy and I believed (as did my superiors) that we had every much right as anyone else to try to find a compromise solution between our major allies. The eventual compromise did include some of our ideas and Mulroney gave credit to Joe Clark's "deft pen".

The Mulroney government also participated in the first Gulf War in light of the clear violation of international law by Iraq in its invasion of Kuwait. The Chrétien Liberal Opposition, with the sole exception of former PM John Turner, voted against Canadian involvement in an operation authorized by the UN Security Council. Canada was on the Security Council at the time and supported the authorizing resolution.

I want to say a word about my experience on the Permanent Joint Board of Defence from 1988 to 1990. The PJBD brings together representatives from all of the military services in Canada and the United States (at the two and one star level) as well as representatives from State Department and Foreign Affairs (at the DG/DAS level), and the civilian side of DoD. The co-chairs are appointed by the President and Prime Minister and usually are from outside government (former MPs or Congressmen or retired military). The PJBD is a consultative body without any decision making capacity, but it can make recommendations to both governments. Meetings are held alternatively in Canada and the United States. When in Canada, the American delegation stopped in Ottawa to pick up the Canadian delegation (always a jet). The Canadian delegation used to lumber to Washington on a two engine turbo prop Cosmopolitan. We visited some fascinating US bases including Central Command in Tampa, Florida and the desert base in California where the U.S. forces did their training for fighting in the Iraq desert. In Canada we went from Goose Bay to the torpedo testing range on Vancouver Island. A lot was happening in terms of East/West security and we heard briefings from the first USAF pilot to fly a MIG-28 and from then Major General Lee Butler about the first meeting between Admiral Crowe (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and his Soviet counterpart Marshall Akromeyov. The 50th anniversary took place in Kingston at Fort Frontenac and also at the site where Roosevelt and MacKenzie King met to sign the Ogdensburg Declaration in 1940, complete with a 1940's railway car in the style used by FDR. This one had in fact been used by Ronald Reagan during his election campaigns and was so heavy that many of the bridges and trestles from Florida to northern New York State had to be reinforced to permit it to cross them. The meeting took place just after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and we discussed what the reaction should be. The Canadian side urged that the Americans should get UN Security Council authorization for such a clear violation of the UN Charter. PM Mulroney said the same thing to President Bush. Not everyone on the US side agreed but that was the course adopted by the Bush Administration.

Throughout the 1990's the Balkans Wars resulted in some tension and ultimately close cooperation between Canada and the United States. After PM Mulroney ensured that Canada had the second largest contingent in UNPROFOR in the summer of 1992, there ensued a debate between the Canadian and American Chiefs of Defence (Generals de Chastelain and Powell) about how many troops Canada needed to secure the airport at Sarajevo. General Powell, using traditional American war fighting strategies suggested 6,000 while General de Chastelain, using Canadian peacekeeping experience, suggested 600 and he was right, at least in the short term. As long as the United States didn't have any troops on the ground, Canada and other NATO allies resisted American efforts to have NATO bomb the Serbs and their Bosnian allies. We feared having our soldiers getting taken hostage and that was exactly what happened after the first American bombings, when Canadian soldiers were handcuffed to telephone poles as human shields. Gradually the Clinton Administration realised that the only way to extricate UNPROFOR (which had a large number of NATO troops) was to get involved itself. Hence the Dayton Accords and the replacement of UNPROFOR by NATO's SFOR and ultimately the NATO intervention in Kosovo where Canadian CF-18's flew ten percent of the missions without authorization by the UN Security Council.

I had retired before 9/11 happened but there certainly was close cooperation between the two governments in the immediate post 9/11 era in terms of tightening up security in North America with the Smart Border Declaration and Action Plan and Canada's participation in the war on terror in Afghanistan. The Chrétien's government's decision not to participate in the Iraq War had us on a different wave length than our two closest traditional allies, the United States and the United Kingdom. At the time we had more forces in situ than most of the other members of the "coalition of the willing" on naval patrol in the Gulf. They could have been double hatted in support of US operations in Iraq, but we hid behind the "smoke and mirrors" of needing a UN Security Council resolution. This was the same government that only a few years earlier had deliberately snubbed the Security Council on Kosovo at a time when we were actually on the Council and as the Official Opposition in 1991 voted against Canadian participation in the first Gulf War which was authorized by the Security Council.

On BMD there are lots of things one could say. For over 15 years I have regarded BMD as a high tech Maginot Line, because anyone wanting to attack the United States with a nuclear weapon would not resort to delivering it by a missile which is the most readily detectable and identifiable means. It would be the equivalent of waving a red flag in front of the most powerful bull in the world. NORAD's longstanding detection and tracking capability and the American retaliatory capacity (conventional or nuclear) are all that is required to deter any state, rogue or otherwise from using a missile to attack the United States. We learned from 9/11 that low tech means can wreak havoc in North America. BMD does not provide defence from a nuclear attack on North America, but only from a nuclear attack by missile. In my humble view we would better serve the objective of protecting North America from nuclear attack by concentrating a lot more effort and money on the dangers of nuclear proliferation and the hordes of existing nuclear weapons rather than on the one delivery system least likely to be used. That being said when the United States decided to proceed with BMD we should have supported it.

NORAD's early warning and tracking information is an essential element to any BMD system. By agreeing that the NORAD information could be provided to the BMD system last August, Canada became part of BMD, whatever the Minister of National Defence or the Prime Minister may claim. If they really didn't want to have any part in BMD, they should have denied use of the NORAD information. That wouldn't have stopped BMD, since the Americans could certainly replicate NORAD's capacity elsewhere. What it would have done is to make NORAD totally

redundant and clearly the Canadian government of last August didn't want to do that. The government is claiming it has said "no" to BMD, when in fact it has said "yes" to the only thing that the United States needs from Canada from a technical viewpoint. While the American Administration would have liked to have political support for a project designed to provide defence for North Americans, they don't need that for the system to become operational.

I don't believe that the US system will be capable of differentiating between missiles aimed at Buffalo or Toronto, or Detroit and Windsor, or Vancouver or Seattle and that the vast majority of Canadians will be protected by the system just as much as Americans will be. Many Canadians seem comforted by their belief that we are not threatened by a nuclear attack on the United States without realising the horrible consequences to many Canadians of a nuclear attack on many centres in the United States. They, and the government which is supposed to lead us, are sleepwalking through history or living in cloud cuckoo land.

The decision shows that there is no taste in the Martin government for leadership in the face of public opinion (contrary to what Lester Pearson did with arming the Bomarc and Trudeau did with respect to cruise missile testing in Canada). I have come to the opinion that the analogy between BMD and the Bomarc is perhaps the right one, but in that case, Mr Diefenbaker's Minister of National Defence had the courage to resign on the issue, whereas Minister Graham is now trying to have us believe we are not part of system which can't work without the information provided by NORAD.

If you go to the Web site of the Prime Minister you find all of his press statements. Most of them say what they deal with. His announcement on BMD is there but there is no mention that it deals with BMD. Here is what one part of that statement says: "Canada remains steadfast in its support of NORAD, which is essential to continental security and our national sovereignty. That's why we agreed last summer to enhance our longstanding commitment to track missiles through NORAD. We stand by that commitment. It underscores an important ongoing partnership with the United States and most of all, it is in Canada's strategic national interest". I believe that supports my analysis that we are part of BMD and that it is in our national interest, as stated by the Prime Minister, whatever his Ministers of Foreign Affairs and National Defence may say. Indeed almost everything in the statement could have been used in a Prime Ministerial statement saying "yes" to BMD, and I believe that he wanted to say "yes", but he wasn't prepared to take the risks and the leadership role that it would have entailed. I encourage all of you to read that statement and make your own conclusions as to whether the logic would lead to a "yes" or "no" decision on BMD.

Two days ago in his column in the Citizen, Andrew Cohen, whom you will hear from later, said that the BMD decision was putting politics ahead of principles. I think it was worse than that, it was putting politics ahead of our strategic national interests, just like John Diefenbaker did on the Bomarc.

I should also say that Mr. Harper lost a golden opportunity for statesmanship by not standing up in the House some time ago and assuring the Prime Minister that his party would support BMD, even if members of the Liberal Party would not. The stance he has taken on BMD since last July is not one of leadership either and just as dithering as the Prime Minister's, despite his rejection of this very criticism by a National Post editorial last week.

But I am also not a Cassandra predicting the end of NORAD or dire consequences for the Martin government in Washington as a result of the BMD decision. The relationship is too deep, too diversified, and too important to the national interests of both countries for that. As outgoing our

Ambassador to the United States, Michael Kergin said earlier this week we are "indispensable neighbours", even if that isn't always recognized by some people on either side of the border. But the decision certainly won't help build the type of relationship that Mr. Martin has said he wants with the United States. The PM and President Bush committed themselves on November 30, 2004 to an ambitious bilateral and multilateral programme of cooperation which started off by stating: "Canada and the United States are two great nations bound by a common commitment to protect our citizens and promote democracy, human rights, prosperity, economic opportunity, and the quality of life". It also committed the two leaders to "strengthen our global collaboration in support of our common values" and recognized that "our prosperity, our open societies, and the well-being of our democratic institutions are inextricably linked to our security". How you square that with the BMD decision is beyond me.

There are lots of other examples I could use, but my time has already expired.

So what are some of the lessons I want to suggest for you today:

- 1) Canada/US defence relations has a long history of co-operation. There have been times when that cooperation has been strained mainly by political actions on either side of the border. The decision on BMD is not the first and certainly not the worst example on the Canadian side of the border. The relationship has withstood the test of time because we are both part of North America and neither of us can defend the continent without the active support and cooperation of the other. That is embodied in the November 30, 2004 joint statement. Here I am thinking beyond traditional defence co-operation to include security in a wider context and the real threats which North America faces today which don't come from traditional military power. We have a border with 15 smart points and 5,000 miles of the forest primeval. Experience has shown that the United States is unable to prevent massive illegal penetration across its southern border which has ten times as many American officers patrolling it as along our much more vast and remote land and water frontiers.
- 2) Two of Canada's cherished Liberal leaders, Lester Pearson and Pierre Trudeau, didn't shy away from taking politically unpopular decisions on defence issues with their caucus and public opinion. Even MacKenzie King, the original Mr Dithers, promised that no one would be allowed to attack the United States from Canadian territory. Similarly Brian Mulroney wasn't afraid to say "no" to Ronald Reagan on his Strategic Defence Initiative because he had established a clear working relationship with President Reagan and had increased defence spending and addressed other American preoccupations.
- 3) Interpersonal relations are important between Canadian and American leaders as they establish the basis on which differences can be better understood and accepted. Mr. Martin wants to be seen in Washington as different from Mr. Chrétien, but his BMD decision casts him in the same light.
- 4) The US will never be satisfied with the level of defence spending by Canada which is only ever taken seriously in Canada in times of real crisis. If the United States really wants Canada to do something involving difficult domestic political decisions, its perhaps best to do that behind closed doors rather than through public admonishments from their Ambassador in Ottawa which only make such a decision more difficult. George Shultz made clear that the United States also is sensitive to public admonishments and you can get things done better on the QT. Public diplomacy has a role to play in both Ottawa and

Washington, but so does quiet diplomacy. The United States needs an ally like Canada which doesn't always see issues through the same prism and isn't afraid to make its views known in a constructive manner in private. But Canadian governments also need to avoid falling for the knee-jerk anti-Americanism which pervades part of our culture and political process.

- 5) Our Ambassador designate in Washington precipitated the announcement of the BMD decision by his honesty. In future he may have to be more careful in his public statements unless he is absolutely certain what the real intentions of his political masters are.
- 6) Sometimes Canadian objectives can be best achieved by privately urging the President of the United States to make proposals rather than coming from the PM of Canada. Pearson used to say you can get a lot more done if you give someone else the credit and Mulroney proved that with the Open Skies proposal.
- 7) Don't count the welcome commitments in last week's budget on increased defence spending as money in the bank. Most of it won't come until after one or two more budgets and perhaps another federal election.
- 8) NORAD remains in the strategic interest of both countries. Indeed the extension of NORAD type arrangements for our land and sea forces, which also have a long history of co-operation, would clearly be in our strategic national interest. This proposal figures in the recommendations of the recent CIIA Canada/US Conference at Arden House. But they recommended supporting BMD too and so did Jennifer Welsh who has been contracted out to write the International Policy Review!