

**The Responsibility to Protect – Humanitarian Intervention and the Use of
Military Force**
Keynote Address at 20th Annual Seminar of the CDAI on 26 February 2004

Introduction

In 2001 I had been invited by the Canadian Government to serve as a member of ICISS, an international commission which produced after a year of discussion and committee work a report which was given to the Secretary General of the United Nations in December 2001. The report is in my view a document which really deserves to be read since it touches on some of the real hot potatoes of the international law and it may well have triggered a debate at the end of which we may see changes of international law on issues such as sovereignty and the ban on intervention.

I do not want to dwell at length on legal issues but I believe I would be remiss if I did not recall for you why this effort was launched and what the report's basic conclusions were before I discussed the military dimension.

The Intervention Dilemma

“Humanitarian intervention” has been controversial both when it happens, and when it has failed to happen. Rwanda in 1994 laid bare the full horror of inaction. The UN Secretariat and some permanent members of the Security Council knew that officials connected to the then government were planning genocide; UN forces were present, though not in sufficient number at the outset; and credible strategies were available to prevent, or at least greatly mitigate, the slaughter which followed. But the Security Council refused to take the necessary action. That was a failure of international will – of civic courage – at the highest level. Its consequence was not merely a humanitarian catastrophe for Rwanda: the genocide destabilized the entire Great Lakes region and continues to do so. In the aftermath, many African peoples concluded that, for all the rhetoric about the universality of human rights, some human lives end up mattering a great deal less to the international community than others.

Kosovo – where intervention did take place in 1999 – concentrated attention on all the other sides of the argument. The operation raised major questions about the legitimacy of military intervention in a sovereign state. Was the cause just: were the human rights abuses committed or threatened by the Belgrade authorities sufficiently serious to warrant outside involvement? Did those seeking secession manipulate external intervention to advance their political purposes? Were all peaceful means of resolving the conflict fully explored? Did the intervention receive appropriate authority? How could the bypassing and marginalization of the UN system, by “a coalition of the willing” acting without Security Council approval, possibly be justified? Did the way in which the intervention was carried out in fact worsen the very human rights situation it was trying to rectify? Or – against all this – was it the case that had NATO not intervened, Kosovo would have been at best the site of an ongoing, bloody and destabilizing civil war, and at worst the occasion for genocidal slaughter like that which occurred in Bosnia four years earlier?

The Bosnian case – in particular the failure by the United Nations and others to prevent the massacre of thousands of civilians seeking shelter in UN “safe areas” in Srebrenica in 1995 – is another which has had a major impact on the contemporary policy debate about intervention for human protection purposes. It raises the principle that intervention amounts to a promise to people in need: a promise cruelly betrayed. Yet another was the failure and ultimate withdrawal of the UN peace operations in Somalia in 1992-93, when an international intervention to save lives and restore order was destroyed by flawed planning, poor execution, and an excessive dependence on military force.

These four cases occurred at a time when there were heightened expectations for effective collective action following the end of the Cold War. All four of them – Rwanda, Kosovo, Bosnia and Somalia – have had a profound effect on how the problem of intervention is viewed, analyzed and characterized.

The 2003 intervention in Iraq could easily be added to this list although the rationale the American and British Governments preferred to provide had nothing to do with humanitarian reasons. But looking at Iraq’s internal situation one could well have used humanitarian reasons which might have made things worse for the UN.

The basic lines in the international debate have been clearly enough drawn. For some, the international community is not intervening enough; for others it is intervening much too often. For some, the only real issue is in ensuring that coercive interventions are effective; for others, questions about legality, process and the possible misuse of precedent loom much larger. For some, the new interventions herald a new world in which human rights trumps state sovereignty; for others, it ushers in a world in which big powers ride roughshod over the smaller ones, manipulating the rhetoric of humanitarianism and human rights. The controversy has laid bare basic divisions within the international community. In the interest of all those victims who suffer and die when leadership and institutions fail, it is crucial that these divisions be resolved.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan recalled the failures of the Security Council to act in Rwanda and Kosovo, and challenged the member states of the UN to “find common ground in upholding the principles of the Charter, and acting in defence of our common humanity.” He warned that “If the collective conscience of humanity ... cannot find in the United Nations its greatest tribunal, there is a grave danger that it will look elsewhere for peace and for justice.” In his Millennium Report he repeated the challenge: ... if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity? When he established the High Level Panel in 2003 he launched another effort to find answers to the unresolved issue what should be given priority: the sovereignty of a nation or the protection of human rights. ICISS gave a relatively clear answer and it attached priority to human rights. On the other hand the Commission had no illusions that an armed intervention will rarely be seen as a humanitarian effort. We therefore decided not to use the term humanitarian intervention any longer and we called the range of actions which might be taken to protect human beings from genocide the responsibility to protect.

Basic Findings

We saw no need to give up sovereignty as a principle but we looked at state sovereignty as a responsibility and concluded that the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. We concluded that where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect. This is a dramatic departure from the interpretation of international law which prevails today throughout the world and it could at the end of the day well mean that a state which fails to meet its responsibility to protect could no longer invoke the protection enshrined in Art II of the Charta. Although the idea of the responsibility to protect is to some extent new, possibly revolutionary, we based it on well known guiding principles such the concept of sovereignty, the responsibility of the Security Council, under Article 24 of the UN Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security and specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection declarations. On the other hand we could not leave aside the developing practices of states, regional organizations and the Security Council itself. When we identified what the responsibility to protect means we saw three specific responsibilities:

A. The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk.

B. The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention.

C. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.

Obviously, Prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect. All prevention options should be exhausted before intervention is contemplated. It also goes without saying that the less intrusive and coercive measures should be exhausted before more coercive and intrusive ones are applied.

The last resort is a military intervention, an exceptional and extraordinary measure for human protection purposes. To be warranted, there must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur, of the following kind:

A. large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or

B. large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.

In addition to the justification for such an intervention some principles need to be heeded such as the right intention since whatever other motives intervening states may have, the intention must be to halt or avert human suffering.

The principle of Last resort was already mentioned. Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option has been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not have succeeded. Such operations have to be proportional, i.e. the scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the protection objective. Finally, there must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction.

Politically the most sensitive issue is the question of the right authority. The Commission was unanimously agreed that there is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations Security Council to authorise military intervention. The task is therefore not to find alternatives to the Security Council but to make the Security Council work better than it has.

We stated in our report that Security Council authorization should in all cases be sought prior to any military intervention being carried out. Those calling for an intervention should formally request such authorization, or have the Council raise the matter on its own initiative, or have the Secretary-General raise it under Article 99 of the UN Charter.

In the light of recent events two other points made in the report deserve to be mentioned:

1. The Security Council should deal promptly with any request for authority to intervene where there are allegations of large scale loss of human life or ethnic cleansing and it should seek adequate verification of facts or conditions on the ground that might support a military intervention.
2. The Permanent Five members of the Security Council should agree not to apply their veto power, in matters where their vital state interests are not involved, to obstruct the passage of resolutions authorising military intervention for human protection purposes for which there is otherwise majority support.

The report lists the options which are left if the Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time but this element can be left for those who wish to read the report since the task I was given is to focus on the military aspects of such interventions.

The military dimension

As our world full of instability and indeed new risks and dangers is and will remain for quite some time to come politicians will probably have to consider military interventions as the last resort of crisis management more often than our societies who are not really aware of the dangers may wish to see it. Some of these interventions will aim at keeping risks at a distance from the own territory, others, presumably the most controversial ones, may seek to prevent proliferation of WMD or the establishment of terrorist bases and, last but not least, others may aim at the protection of people which suffer from brutal suppression and in the worst case such interventions may aim at the prevention of genocide or mass killing of human beings. This latter category is often called humanitarian intervention although this term may lead to misperceptions.

Military interventions for human protection purposes have different objectives than both traditional war fighting which is the hallmark of most interventions and they are different from traditional peacekeeping operations. Such interventions therefore raise a number of new, different and unique operational challenges. Because the objective of military intervention is to protect populations and not militarily to defeat or destroy an enemy, it differs from traditional war fighting. While protective intervention operations require the use of as much force as is necessary, which may on occasion be a great deal, to protect the population at risk, their basic objective is always to achieve quick success with as little cost as possible in civilian lives and inflicting as little damage as possible so as to enhance both recovery prospects and the chances to win the population in the theatre of intervention for cooperation in the post-conflict phase. In war fighting interventions, by contrast, the neutralization of an opponent's military or industrial capabilities is often the instrument to force surrender.

On the other hand, military intervention operations – which have to do whatever it takes to meet the responsibility to protect – will have to be able and willing to engage in much more robust action than is permitted by traditional peacekeeping, where the core task is the monitoring, supervision and verification of ceasefires and peace agreements, and where the emphasis has always been on consent, neutrality and the non-use of force. The Panel on United Nations Peace Operations compiled in 2000 a thorough review of the operational challenges facing United Nations military missions, but for the most part that panel focused on traditional peacekeeping and its variations, not the more robust use of military force – not least because there is not within UN headquarters the kind of logistic planning and support, and command and control capacity, that would make possible either war fighting or military interventions of any significant size. Their report confirmed that “the United Nations does not wage war. Where enforcement action is required, it has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing states.”

The context in which intervention operations take place also has important operational significance. Military intervention to protect endangered human lives should and will occur only as a last resort, after the failure of other measures to achieve satisfactory results. Inevitably, it will be part of a broader political strategy directed towards persuading the targeted state to cooperate with international efforts. Any intervention to protect will thus be preceded by a series of efforts to prevent the use of force. Some these preventive steps may include the employment of military forces but definitely not on the territory of a state which did not consent to the temporary stationing of foreign forces on his territory.

The “preventive deployment,” which involves the positioning of troops where there is an emerging threat of conflict, with the consent of the government or governments concerned, for the primary purpose of deterring the escalation of that situation into armed conflict falls into that category. The main example of such a deployment was UNPREDEP in Macedonia, from 1992 until its untimely withdrawal in 1999. The operational problems confronting any such deployment are essentially the same as those involved for a traditional UN peacekeeping operation.

The second category of preventive operation are actions which may be intended as a show of force to give added weight to diplomatic initiatives, or perhaps serve as instruments to monitor or

implement non-military enforcement actions such as sanctions and embargoes, including in humanitarian crisis situations. Such preventive military action can provide a firewall as it may help keep a conflict in a neighbouring country from spreading. It may also help to deter trouble and simultaneously it can provide a rapid response capacity should trouble arise.

As prevention may fail such forces should be deployed and equipped in such a way that they could easily be designated as part of an intervention force.

To tell you that careful advance planning is a prerequisite for success means to carry coals to Newcastle. But the planning of such operations is complex and multi-faceted. There are many challenges to be surmounted, including the need to build an effective political coalition, to work out agreed objectives including a political end-state, to provide a clear mandate, to devise a common plan of operations, and to marshal the necessary resources. The military planner has to bear in mind is that the intervention phase is only one element in a broader political effort.

The military intervention phase may, as mentioned earlier on, be preceded by military measures such as, for example, sanctions or embargo enforcement, preventive deployments, or no-fly-zones. The military intervention as such will likely be followed by post-conflict operations which in most cases will include the deployment of peacekeeping forces for often substantial periods of time. The planner has to keep in mind this continuum of crisis management and accordingly the operational concept for an operation to protect needs therefore to provide a smooth transition from pre-intervention efforts to post-intervention activities. Most interventions have involved in the past, and are likely to in the future, multinational coalition operations. The cohesion of an intervening coalition – politically and militarily – is critical to the prospects for success, and the fragility of the intervening coalition has thus been one of the most vulnerable aspects of past interventions. Coalition operations are bound to produce lasting military disadvantages but they are partly compensated by the stronger political impact of a coalition as compared to operations of a single country. As the unity of the coalition is crucial it is at the same time the Achilles heel of any coalition which spoilers have been ready to target.

As you remember, the weakness of the coalition and the failure to establish authority and to provide a secure environment have also led at times to the institution of parallel enforcement missions in the middle of a process – such as Unified Task Force's (UNITAF) arrival amidst the first UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), NATO's insertion of a rapid-reaction and bombing capacity amidst the UN Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), and more recently the British Army in Sierra Leone.

Effective coalition building means creating and maintaining a common political resolve, and working out a common military approach. In particular enforcement actions have to take into account the politics of participating states and the impact of the media. The NATO intervention in Kosovo demonstrated that the pace and intensity of military operations may be seriously affected by the lowest common political denominator among member states. Moreover, coalition warfare entails other restrictions on military conduct and political decision-making that results from differing national legislation. Moreover, coalition operations entail the risk that different militaries acted independently and without coordination. Then the result would likely be failure.

This risk is higher today than it was in the days of the Kosovo operation. Was it then the

difference whether the use of ground troops should publicly be ruled out or not so it may today be differences which are the result of the conceptual as well as capabilities gap which exists in NATO. The first and in my view most important step to mitigate if not to overcome such differences is to agree on the objectives to be achieved through the intervention action. Ideally, the process of making a decision to intervene, the formulation of the mandate and the allocation of structures and means for implementation should be related. But harmonizing the views and interests of differing states in each regard is often a protracted and complex undertaking. Moreover, multilateral decision-making bodies require consensus to succeed, and vagueness and incrementalism, rather than specificity, are inevitable outcomes of multilateral deliberations during which the limits and boundaries of intervention may become significantly obscured in order to secure agreement about an authorization. There is little to no hope to overcome these handicaps but there is every reason to make the best effort to reduce the vagueness and replace by clarity.

This is in particular true for the end –state which drives the “exit strategy”. Some partners will emphasise the need to address the underlying problems while others will focus on the earliest possible withdrawal. How an intervention will ultimately play out is always hard to determine. Unexpected challenges are almost certain to arise, and the results are almost always different from what was envisaged at the outset. In addition, many military operations begin with fairly simple and straightforward goals, only to have them expanded to the pursuit of military, political, and developmental objectives as operational circumstances changed or as new peace agreements and deals were struck. Yet, mission creep has been the rule, not the exception. This uncertainty is what drives some intervening countries and their militaries to define an exit strategy in terms of an arbitrary withdrawal date.

A clear and unambiguous mandate is one of the first and most important requirements of an operation to protect. However well or ill-defined the end-state of intervention, political vision should encompass what it will take to get there – conceptually, as well as in terms of resources. Without such calculations from the outset, a problem of mustering sufficient “political will” to see the intervention through to a successful conclusion exists. The objective of the mandate should be to allow the executing military commander to identify his mission and his tasks properly and to propose an operational concept which promises quick success, paramount for an operation which aims at the protection of humans under attack. This will allow the commander to propose the size and composition of the necessary forces and to draft appropriate rules of engagement (ROE) and to ask for political authorization and the allocation of the resources necessary to mount and to sustain the operation. The mandate should therefore define in clear language what the aims of the intervention in the different phases of it would be and it should spell out that the desired end state is the restoration of good governance and the rule of law.

Without going into the details I have to remind you that the best planning is doomed to fail unless sufficient resources to conduct and to sustain the operation are allocated. The level of resources committed sends a clear signal of resolve and intent to all concerned and it may thus be the last instrument to be used in an attempt to avoid an armed conflict. It should also indicate to the opponent that the intervening side is able to escalate to any level of combat intensity as necessary.

Turning to the conduct of operations I should begin with command and control. Well all experienced time and again that clear and unequivocal communications and chains of command, and unity of command is essential for the successful conduct of operations. It is achieved best if there is a single chain of integrated command and if nations are prepared to transfer the authority over the forces they contribute to the fullest extent possible to the force commander they appointed to execute the intervention. The differing national interests and the legal differences which exist due to different national laws will never allow transferring full authority to the officer charged to conduct the intervention operation, and they will result in limitations with respect to the use of deadly force. However, the fewer the national reservations on the employment of the national contingents in such an operation are, the greater is the capacity of the force commander to act decisively and flexibly.

This brings me to political control. Tight political control of such operations is mandatory, but political control does not mean micro-management of military operations by political authorities. Political leaders need to set clear objectives for each phase, within defined operational parameters. Military commanders should carry out these objectives, seeking further guidance when the objectives have been completed, or significant new challenges arise.

Political guidance may be needed most in the Civil-Military Relations.

The intervening military forces, civilian authorities (local and external), and humanitarian organizations are likely to be working side-by-side to bring assistance and protection to populations at risk. No magic solution has been found so far for the coordination and collaboration between military forces, political civilian authorities, and humanitarian agencies, often the result was little more than trying to minimize turf wars. Much of what I said so far will be laid down in rules of engagement. They are critical to responding and protecting populations at risk. They guide the application of the use of force by soldiers in the theatre of interventions. The rules of engagement must fit the operational concept and be appropriate for the type of military action that is anticipated. The use of only minimal force in self-defence that characterizes traditional peacekeeping would clearly be inappropriate and inadequate. Activities such as arresting criminals (in the streets or indicted war criminals), halting abuse, and deterring would-be killers and thugs require clear and robust rules of engagement. Precise rules of engagement can help to diminish the need for individual countries to issue additional clarifications – something that can be a significant impediment to the conduct of multinational operations.

The rules of engagement should also reflect the principle of proportionality. Proportionality in this context ought not to exclude the option to escalate as appropriate, but should lead to restraint in the use of destructive power of modern weaponry. Proportionality should also not have the effect of paralyzing the military forces on the ground, or trap them into a purely reactive mode denying them the opportunity to seize the initiative when this may be needed. In the context of interventions undertaken for human protection purposes, the rules of engagement for a military intervention must reflect a stringent observance of international law, and international humanitarian law in particular. They should include an acknowledgement that certain types of arms, and particularly those which are banned under international agreements, may not be used. Probably the most difficult issue for the military is the reconciliation of the principles of war

with operations which aim at the protection of human life. Quick success in military operations can best be achieved by surprise, by applying overwhelming force and through the concentration of all military efforts. However, in the context of an intervention for human protection purposes, it will be virtually impossible to rely on secrecy and surprise or to make maximum use of the full and devastating power of modern weapons. Achieving surprise at the strategic level must be balanced against the value and need to try to persuade the target state to comply before the resort to force is required. Moreover, democratic societies that are sensitive to human rights and the rule of law will not long tolerate the pervasive use of overwhelming military power.

Military planners will wish to compensate for the lost option of strategic surprise by resorting to a concentrated use of military power. Political circumstances and the conditions on the ground may or may not permit this. A critical factor which will impact on the intensity of operations is the need for cooperation from the civilian population once the immediate objective of stopping the killing or ethnic cleansing has been achieved. This means first and foremost not to conduct military actions which will result in widespread hatred against the intervening nations. To win the hearts and minds of the people under attack is presumably impossible but planning has to be done in such a way that not all doors will be closed when the armed conflict comes to an end. This means accepting limitations and demonstrating through the use of restraint that the operation is not a war to defeat a state, but an operation to protect populations in that state from being harassed, persecuted or killed. This means accepting some incrementalism as far as the intensity of operations is concerned, and some gradualism with regard to the phases of an operation and the selection of targets. Such an approach may also be needed politically to keep the coalition together. Obviously, this is a clear violation of the principles which we learned and taught at war academies but after all we discuss operations other than war.

Military operations can never be conducted without casualties on both sides. Politicians who decide on the use of force must know that and they have to tell it the public. The military who advise politicians have to tell them with utmost clarity that “la guerre sans morts” will remain an illusion. They should also tell them that force protection of the intervening should never be allowed to become the principal objective.

A new area of reflection is the military and the media. The omnipresent media and the worldwide near real time coverage of military operations will expose everyone who uses overwhelming military power too excessively to worldwide criticism. In operations other than self defence such use of military power will reduce the degree of public support for military operations which is the more needed the less the average man on the street understands why his country had to intervene. Modern communications and media coverage have an impact on enforcement in that there is a new capacity for the public to monitor the impact of military action on civilians. Enforcement is likely to receive widespread public support if deadly force is applied in a way that can, if not approved, at least be tolerated by the majority of the populations in the countries of a coalition. Therefore, operational planning for an operation to protect should contain a fairly detailed sub-concept for public information. It is not only critical to maintaining public support for an intervention but also to maintaining the cohesion of the coalition. The difficulty in designing this concept will be to reconcile the requirements of accurate, comprehensive and fast information with the necessities of operational security. The easier part in such operations may increasingly be to force the opponent into surrender but to win the hearts

and minds of the people who were supposed to be saved or liberated through the intervention may turn out to be more demanding than fighting.

The mission of military forces in post-intervention operations is to provide the safe environment necessary for the restoration of good governance and the rule of law. Additionally military forces may have to assist in reconstruction in areas which are too dangerous for non-military personnel to enter. The conduct of such operations means often that the forces will increasingly have to do what under normal circumstances police would do, at least initially. In addition, the forces have to be prepared to enforce compliance and, if necessary, to defend the country they had invaded. These tasks are more complex and cover a wider range than combat operations normally do. Moreover, the chain of command will be increasingly blurred although the need for clear-cut responsibilities and a transition of responsibility from the military authorities to the civilian authorities, as soon as possible after hostilities have ceased was never greater. While it may be necessary for a short period immediately after hostilities have ceased for the military commander to assume complete administrative authority, the transition to civilian authority should take place with minimum delay.

Again, psychology plays an important role. The intervening side has to signal with utmost clarity that it will see the intervention through which means to remain engaged until self-sustained stability will be achieved.

Past experience demonstrates that, if the internal security challenge is not handled early, “old” habits and structures will prevail and undermine other efforts to enhance post-conflict peace building. The immediate aftermath of any civil war spawns organized crime, revenge attacks, arms proliferation, looting and theft. UN civilian police officers deployed alongside peacekeepers, in order to assist in the resuscitation of national law enforcement agencies, have not been equipped to address the issue of law enforcement in a “not crime-not war” environment. The military has remained the only viable instrument. I should not discuss this aspect in detail but I recommend the respective parts of the ICISS Report for your reading as it contains a few points which are day by day shown as important in Iraq.

In summary, the responsibility to protect means that human protection operations will be different from both the traditional operational concepts for waging war and for UN peacekeeping operations. The Commission recommended in 2001 to embody the principles laid out in its report in a "Doctrine for Human Protection Operations". I am convinced that this is still a valid advice.

I feel I would be remiss did I not briefly address what the consequences of such an approach towards interventions to protect would mean for NATO and the armed forces of the NATO nations. Starting with NATO I have to say that I do not belong to those who tell everybody that NATO recovered from the wounds it was inflicted during this disastrous year 2003. I see two reasons for that:

First, there are still many, I should say too many, in the U.S. who believe that the alliance should be a tool box from which its leading nation can choose and pick allies to form coalitions of the willing. To this end some of our American allies urge to develop niche capabilities while others argue in favour of a division of labour in which the U.S. fight and the allies do the sustainment

and nation-building operations.

Secondly, although NATO decided that it will take on the challenges of the 21st century and it will act there where it will be necessary, be it inside or outside the NATO Treaty Area, not too much has been achieved in acquiring the matching capabilities as laid out in the PCC. Well, the NATO Response Force (NRF) was established but whether it will achieve FOC by 2006 is still a very open question.

NATO thus appears to be handicapped at a time of unprecedented challenges as do the UN and the EU. But the strategic situation of the world does not tolerate handicapped organisations; it calls for organisations which are able to take pre-emptive as well as preventive military action as well as interventions to protect. The main reason for this gloomy outlook is the reality that legitimate national governments have lost their monopoly on the use of force while determined individuals and groups of individuals, referred to as non-state actors, can lay their hands on weapons with which they can inflict huge, even irreversible damage to entire societies. In addition rogue states, non-state actors, are they terrorists or criminals, or actors who took control of failing states may get access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or options of waging cyber war. Moreover, proliferation of missile technology and of WMD seems to progress.

The advent of non-state actors, of WMD and of cyber war constitutes a dramatic change of the international situation and it proves that the international law including the provisions of the UN Charter do simply not match today's situation nor does the old discrimination between peace-enforcement and peacekeeping. The situation also proves that no country should concentrate on one of these two approaches exclusively. The continuum of crisis management I mentioned earlier on speaks against such an approach as does the necessity to understand what the forces need to do when they get the mission to either protect or to keep the peace.

Should politicians decide in this world to resort to the use of military force then the execution at the battalion level will in most cases mean to fight. The differentiation I made earlier on when I addressed interventions to protect will not be felt as decisively at the unit level as it will at the level of headquarters and ministries. And fighting in our times will range from distant engagement in cyberspace to fighting tribal warriors man to man, from soft kill through hard kills of materiel and infrastructure to killing human beings in close combat.

Everybody understands that fighting will determine interventions operations which I would prefer to call enforcement operations but not too many understand that interventions will more or less smoothly transit into post conflict stabilization operations. Peace-enforcement is the sharp end of a continuum of military operations which begin when first efforts are made to prevent an armed conflict, which peak during the peace enforcement intervention and which continue at varying degrees of intensity throughout the post conflict phase until the time has come to hand over responsibility to indigenous forces or UN mandated police forces. It is important to note that this continuum of operations characterizes crisis management. Nations who wish to be a fully fledged player have to be capable of seeing this continuum of operations though. Nations which are not capable of doing that will have less influence on the decision to intervene. The formula "the US fight, the UN feed and the EU fund" or similar arrangements are therefore hardly acceptable to any nation which wishes to be a player. Most importantly, however, the

threats nations will have to cope with in the future do not allow seeing peace enforcement and peacekeeping as alternatives, they are ingredients of the continuum of crisis management and conflict prevention. Moreover, military experience suggests that those who are trained to fight can easily be prepared for peacekeeping operations.

In conclusion, I should say that interventions to protect will indeed require a deeper and better understanding of an operation which should at the end of the day be seen by the people whom we wish to protect as help. This will impact on planning, on ROE and to some extent on the execution but not too much on the way in which a battalion or a squadron will fight. Moreover, one should always keep in mind that intervention as well as peacekeeping forces must be able to escalate the intensity of conflict in order to prevail. This means, that nations are best prepared to meet the challenges the future will bring if they trained and equipped their armed forces for high intensity operations in a network centric operation. This will secure political influence in an alliance such as NATO as well as in Washington and will lead to some degree of interoperability in NATO which in my view will remain the option of choice in crisis management when common interest of the North American and European nations are at risk.