

20th Annual CDAI Seminar 26 February 2004
Panel #1: Policy and Practice – The Capabilities of the Canadian Forces
FUTURE CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE CF
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Preamble

WHEN A WELFARE MOM HAS NO FOOD FOR HER CHILDREN SHE YELLS, “ I HAVE NO FOOD; MY KIDS ARE STARVING. A DEFENCE OFFICIAL IN THE SAME CRISIS WOULD REPORT, “SOMETIME IN THE NEAR FUTURE THE CHILDREN ARE LIKELY TO ADAPT TO A LESS ROBUST DIET.”

IS THE MOM OVERSTATING HER CASE? IS THE DEFENCE OFFICIAL TOO DETACHED? WHO IS THE MOST CREDIBLE IN COMMUNICATING THE LACK? CREDIBILITY, PASSION AND CLEAR SPEECH ARE REQUIRED WHEN EXAMINING CANADA’S MILITARY CAPABILITY, ITS LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE.

INTRODUCTION

THERE ARE NO SHORTAGE OF REPORTS THAT DESCRIBE IN PAINFUL DETAIL THE FORTY-YEAR DECLINE OF CANADA’S MILITARY. THE RECENT CLAXTON STUDY, CANADA WITHOUT ARMED FORCES? IS PROBABLY ONE OF MOST COMPREHENSIVE AND PREDICTIVE IN ITS 140 PAGE ASSESSMENT OF CANADA’S MILITARY DEMISE AND PROJECTED FUTURE CAPABILITIES 2003 TO 2018.

LET ME QUICKLY HIGHLIGHT SOME OF THE REPORT’S MAJOR FINDINGS SO THAT YOU MAY BE AWARE OF THE LIMITATIONS THAT GOVERN CAPABILITY'S FUTURE. THE THREE STANDARD HEADINGS OF PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT AND OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE PROVIDE THE FRAMEWORK.

LIMITATIONS OF PERSONNEL

FOR THE NEXT SEVEN YEARS, (2004-2011) FOR EVERY 100 QUALIFIED SERVICE MEMBERS REACHING 20 YEARS OF SERVICE, THAT RETIRE, ARE PROMOTED, OR MOVE Laterally to SENIOR STAFF POSITIONS, ONLY 44 QUALIFIED MEMBERS ARE AVAILABLE TO FILL THEIR VACATED POSITIONS.

THE INTERNAL WAR FOR TALENT STARTS THIS SUMMER. WILL COMMAND RETAIN ITS PRIORITY FOR QUALIFIED PERSONS AND REDUCE TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS, OR WILL HEADQUARTERS GO TO SKELETON MANNING AND TRAINING HAVE PRIORITY? WILL THE ARMY REDUCE THE 800 REGIONAL SUPPORT STAFF TO MILITIA UNITS IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN BRIGADE UNITS? A COLD SHOWER OF REALITY IS ABOUT TO RESTORE MILITARY FUNDAMENTALS TO THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES.

UP UNTIL RECENTLY, THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF YEARS OF SERVICE FOR JUNIOR LEADERS IN ARMY COMBAT UNITS WAS 16 YEARS. EXPERIENCE MAKES A CONFIDENT SOLDIER. STARTING IN 2004 THAT EXPERIENCE LEVEL WILL DROP AND REACH A NEW AVERAGE OF 6-8 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE BY 2007. INEXPERIENCE MAKES A NERVOUS SOLDIER.

DURING THE YEARS OF THE FORCE REDUCTION PROGRAM, 1994-1999, THE CANADIAN FORCES RELEASED OVER 500,000 PERSON YEARS OF EXPERIENCE VALUED AT \$30 BILLION. IN THE YEAR 2000, SURGE RECRUITING STARTED TO REPLACE THEM. TODAY FIFTY PERCENT OF THE MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE CANADIAN FORCES ENROLLED AFTER 1999

THE CANADIAN MILITARY DEMOGRAPHIC, FOR THE NEXT SEVEN YEARS, WILL REASSEMBLE THAT OF AN AFRICAN VILLAGE RAVISHED BY AIDS—FEW ELDERS, WITH MANY YOUNG LEADERS SUPERVISING THE NEW ARRIVALS.

RESTORING LEADERSHIP, TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL EXPERTISE IS THE FIRST MAJOR LIMITATION TO MILITARY CAPABILITY. THE SECOND IS...

LIMITATIONS OF CAPITAL (EQUIPMENT)

DURING THE COLD WAR YEARS DEFENCE MANAGEMENT RESTRICTED ACTIVITY LEVELS IN ORDER TO SAVE MONEY FOR ACQUIRING NEW EQUIPMENTS. IN THE COLD WAR ONE COULD RESTRICT FIELD DAYS, SAILING DAYS AND FLYING HOURS, BUT AS THE NEW WORLD DISORDER BROKE OUT MANAGEMENT WAS GRIPPED BY THE NEW COST DRIVER—THAT OF PEACE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS (a euphemism for low intensity combat or war). SHIPS, UNITS, AND PLANES ON REAL OPERATIONS DEMAND FULL COST SUPPORT. AND SURPRISE, AN EQUIPMENT OPERATING 24 HOURS A DAY WEARS OUT AT MORE THAN THREE-TIMES THE COLD WAR DAILY RATE.

THE CAPITAL ACCOUNT, (THAT IS THE PORTION THAT BUYS NEW MILITARY EQUIPMENT), THAT AT ONE TIME IN THE 1980S APPROACHED 20% OF THE DEFENCE BUDGET, HAS RECENTLY SLIPPED TO THE 6-8% RANGE. ALTHOUGH DND DOCUMENTS CLAIM A CAPITAL INVESTMENT RATE OF ABOUT 15%, THE REPAIR AND OVERHAUL PROJECTS, THE HUMAN RESOURCE REMEDIAL PROJECTS, THE ENVIRONMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS, NOW FOUND IN THE CAPITAL ACCOUNT ARE DISPLACING NEW MILITARY EQUIPMENT PURCHASES. OPERATIONS ARE EATING THE MONEY DESIGNATED FOR NEW EQUIPMENT. WITH EACH BITE THE FUTURE FORCE GETS SMALLER AND VANISHES INTO THE DISTANT FUTURE OF 2025.

WITH ABOUT \$800 MILLION PER YEAR FOR NEW EQUIPMENT THE CANADIAN FORCES CANNOT REPLACE EQUIPMENT ON OPERATIONS LET ALONE TRANSFORM THE FORCE. WITH THE STRATEGIC CAPITAL INVESTMENT

PROGRAM, (2003-2018), CURRENTLY FUNDED AT 43 CENTS TO THE DOLLAR, THE CLAXTON STUDY CONCLUDES THAT AROUND 2008 THE AIR FORCE WILL FADE AWAY. IN THE FIVE-YEAR WINDOW, 2008-2013, THE NAVY OR ARMY WILL EMERGE AS THE FUNDED SERVICE. THE UNFUNDED SERVICE WOULD LIKELY LOSE ITS EXPEDITIONARY OR OFFSHORE CAPABILITY.

THE LACK OF MONEY TO BUY NEW EQUIPMENT IS THE SECOND LIMITING FACTOR TO MILITARY CAPABILITY. THE THIRD IS.

LIMITATIONS OF OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE (O&M)

THERE ARE SEVERAL OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE ACCOUNTS. THE BUSINESS PLAN O&M ACCOUNTS HAVE BEEN, ON AN ANNUAL BASE, ABOUT A BILLION DOLLARS SHORT. THIS DEFICIT SHOWS UP IN UNTRAINED SERVICE PERSONNEL AND LACK OF FACILITIES SUPPORT.

PRIOR TO LAST SUMMERS ANNUAL TRAINING SURGE THERE WERE OVER 8,000 PERSONS IN OR WAITING TRAINING. GIVEN THAT MOST OF THE ARMY AND AIRFORCE O&M BUDGET IS SPENT IN BASE SUPPORT, AND THAT BOTH SERVICES ARE BROKE, INFRASTRUCTURE REDUCTION OFFERS POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS, BUT HISTORICALLY HAS BEEN A LIMITATION.

IN YEARS 2003 AND 2004 THE ARMY IS ONLY ABLE TO MEET 50% OF ITS TRAINING REQUIREMENT IN LEADERSHIP, ADVANCED AND BASIC QUALIFICATIONS. WHEN AN ORGANIZATION IS FORCED TO SUSTAIN OPERATIONS AND SACRIFICE FORCE GENERATION ITS DEMISE IS NOT FAR OF. THE ARMY IS IN A DEATH SPIRAL.

THE RECENT ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE ARMY CAN ONLY PROVIDE 500 TRAINED SOLDIERS IN SEPTEMBER 2004 IS INDICATIVE OF FUTURE FORCE CAPABILITY. THE ARMY IS IN A TRAINING-QUALIFICATION DEATH SPIRAL THAT, SHOULD ALL OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS CEASE, WILL TAKE 3-5 YEARS TO RECOVER THE FIELD FORCE TO 11,000 TRAINED SOLDIERS.

THE NATIONAL PROCUREMENT ACCOUNT IS WELL FUNDED. IT HAS TO BE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN OLD EQUIPMENT ON DEMANDING OVERSEAS OPERATIONS. UNFORTUNATELY IT IS SPENDING VAST SUMS OF MONEY ON VERY OLD EQUIPMENT. THE DEPARTMENT IS SPENDING \$1.8 BILLION/YEAR TO REPAIR OLD EQUIPMENT AND IS SPENDING \$800 MILLION ON NEW EQUIPMENT. SOMETHING IS SERIOUSLY WRONG. LET ME ILLUSTRATE THE REPAIR TO REPLACEMENT DYSFUNCTION.

THE MEDIUM LIFT TRUCK (MLVW) COST \$3.00/KM TO REPAIR. ITS CAPITAL ACQUISITION COST IS 85 CENTS/KM. THE REPAIR TO REPLACEMENT RATIO FOR MLVW IS CURRENTLY 3:1.

THE REPAIR TO REPLACEMENT RATIO, ACROSS ALL EQUIPMENT FLEETS,

AVERAGES 2:1. IF I WAS PAYING \$600/ MONTH TO REPAIR A 20-YEAR-OLD CAR THAT I COULD REPLACE NEW WITH A \$300/MONTH PURCHASE, I THINK I WOULD.

IT IS TIME TO STOP, SCRAP ALL FLEETS THAT HAVE A REPAIR TO REPLACEMENT RATIO GREATER THAN ONE AND START AGAIN.

THE OPERATIONS AND OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE MONSTER IS THE THIRD LIMITING LIABILITY OF MILITARY CAPABILITY.

LIMITATIONS SUMMARY

THE FOREGOING SUMMARY OF LIMITATIONS PERSUADE ME THAT IT IS WISER TO MAKE A PLANNED STOP THAN TO BE STOPPED. RECOVERING FROM AN EMERGENCY LANDING IS MORE ASSURED THAN RECOVERING FROM A CRASH LANDING. THE PERSONNEL, CAPITAL AND O&M ACCOUNTS ARE IN NEED OF MUCH ATTENTION. THESE THREE ARE THE "MAIN THING". THEIR DEPLETED STATE RENDERS CANADA'S MILITARY CAPABILITY QUESTIONABLE AND DEFERS MEANINGFUL TRANSFORMATION TO THE END OF THE NEXT DECADE.

FUTURE CAPABILITIES

CHECK YOUR WATCHES. IT IS FEBRUARY 2004. THERE ARE ONLY 70 MONTHS REMAINING IN THIS DECADE. FROM A NEW OR TRANSFORMED, MILITARY CAPABILITY PERSPECTIVE THE DECADE IS OVER. GIVEN THAT IT TAKES, ON AVERAGE, 150-180 MONTHS TO EXECUTE A MAJOR CROWN PROJECT AND THAT FROM THE SIGNING OF CONTRACT TO OPERATIONALLY READY TAKES THE LION'S SHARE OF THOSE 150+ MONTHS. WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN SIGNED IS THE CAPABILITY OF THIS DECADE. SEA KING REPLACEMENT AWAITS A SIGNED CONTRACT, THEREFORE NEW MARITIME HELICOPTERS ARE UNLIKELY TO BE OPERATIONAL UNTIL THE NEXT DECADE.

WHEN EXAMINING FUTURE CAPABILITIES IT NEEDS TO BE UNDERSTOOD THAT FUNDED CHANGE IS 10-15 YEARS AWAY. TO THIS REALITY IT IS WISE TO APPRECIATE THAT MILITARIES KEEP EQUIPMENT FOR 30-40 YEARS.

IN OTHER WORDS FUTURE CAPABILITIES THAT ARE PLANNED TODAY WON'T ARRIVE MUCH BEFORE 2020 AND CANADA'S SERVICE PERSONNEL WILL OPERATE THEM WELL INTO THE MIDDLE OF THIS CENTURY (2050).

WHAT WILL THE WORLD BE LIKE IN 2050? WHAT ARE CANADA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS 40 YEARS HENCE? IT WOULD BE FUN TO SPECULATE AND MANY WHO RESEARCH THESE THEMES PUBLISH REPORTS. IN SUMMARY THE RESEARCHERS ADVISE THAT THE FUTURE IS GETTING MORE UNCERTAIN AND MORE DANGEROUS. THEREFORE FLEXIBILITY AND REDUNDANCY NEEDS TO BE BUILT INTO EVERY CAPABILITY. WE ARE ADVISED TO NOT SPECIALIZE. NETWORKS ARE MORE ROBUST THAN CENTRALIZED SYSTEMS. VITAL SYSTEMS SHOULD BE

DECENTRALIZED. EVEN THE BEST EARLY WARNING WILL BE FOILED OR IGNORED THEREFORE PLAN ON CONTAINMENT, REINFORCEMENT AND MITIGATION WHEN FAILURES OCCUR.

WITHOUT A LONG JUSTIFICATION OTHER THAN TO RECOMMEND DR(S) BLAND AND MALONEY'S RECENT BOOK CANADA'S DEFENCE POLICY AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY, I WILL NOW JUMP TO FUTURE CAPABILITIES BASED ON THREE IMPERATIVES.

- WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HE WANTS
- WHAT THE TIMES DEMAND
- THE DOCTRINE OF DEFENCE AGAINST HELP (NILS ORVIK 1981)

NUMBER 1: A NATIONAL COMMAND AND INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY. THIS AUTHORITY WOULD NETWORK AND/OR HAVE ACCESS TO OTHER NATIONAL SYSTEMS AND BE SUFFICIENTLY CREDIBLE TO RECEIVE INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. THE MAIN AND DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING CENTRES SHOULD NOT BE IN VULNERABLE LOCATIONS.

NUMBER 2: A NATIONAL SURVEILLANCE AND DEFENCE CAPABILITY. IN ADDITION TO SURVEILLANCE THIS CAPABILITY MUST HAVE THE MEANS TO RESPOND. GIVEN OUR GEOGRAPHY WE MUST TAKE TO THE AIR. GIVEN THE LONGEST COASTLINE IN THE WORLD WE MUST HAVE THE MEANS TO PATROL THE MARITIME APPROACHES. AND GIVEN THAT FIVE URBAN HUBS GENERATE 70% OF THE NATIONAL WEALTH DEFENCE MUST PROVIDE IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE WHEN PROVINCIAL ASSETS ARE OVERWHELMED.

NUMBER 3: A MULTI-FACETED MARITIME OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. SEVENTY PERCENT OF THE WORLD IS COVERED IN WATER. EIGHTY PERCENT OF GLOBAL COMMERCE MOVES BY SHIP. NINETY PERCENT OF THE WORLD'S POPULATION LIVE WITHIN 200 KILOMETERS OF THEIR COASTLINE. GETTING ANYWHERE WITH ADEQUATE RESOURCES AND RESOLVE REQUIRES SHIPS. A MARITIME OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY PROVIDES AN ESSENTIAL DIMENSION OF FLEXIBILITY.

NUMBER 4: A UNIFIED, SUSTAINABLE "EXPEDITIONARY" FORCE CAPABILITY. ALTHOUGH PRIMARILY DESIGNED FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS IN COMPLEX TERRAIN THIS FORCE CAN ADAPT TO OPEN TERRAIN AND URBAN WARFARE. FOR THE MOST PART UNIFIED ENCOMPASSES TACTICAL AVIATION, LAND UNITS, DIPLOMACY, DEVELOPMENT AND OTHER ASSETS. THE HEADQUARTERS AND SUPPORT OF THIS CAPABILITY HAS THE CAPACITY FOR A COALITION MANDATE. DEPENDING ON THE GOVERNMENT'S APPETITE FOR SUSTAINMENT THIS CAPABILITY SHOULD BE ABLE TO GENERATE AT LEAST FOUR, IF NOT FIVE, TASK GROUPS.

IN CONCLUSION:

THE CANADIAN LEGACY OF DEFENCE-NEGLECT WILL IMPOSE EMBARRASSING LIMITATIONS ON MILITARY CAPABILITY FOR THIS AND THE NEXT DECADE. FUTURE CAPABILITY DEPENDS ON A DEFENCE RESTITUTION OF ABOUT \$70 BILLION OVER THE NEXT 15 YEARS AND/OR A MASSIVE INTERNAL REALLOCATION ALONG WITH THE SUSPENSION OF MANY, NON-DEFENCE OBJECTIVES.

THE LACK OF MILITARY CAPABILITY WILL DRAW NATIONAL LEADERSHIP BACK TO THE PRINCIPAL FOUNDATION OF STATES—ARMS AND LAWS.