

ADM Ed Giambastiani Remarks

Presented to Canadian Defense Association Institute

Ottawa, CA, 26 Feb 04

Thank you **LTG (r) Rick Evraire** for that kind introduction. **Senator Day** it was nice to meet you. **GEN Henault**—its good to see again and I look forward to your visit next week to Norfolk. I believe it will be just a bit warmer there. There are lots of friends here—great to see you all as well.

I'm happy to be here to share our perspectives on military transformation and our view on a "Way Ahead" for the Armed Forces of the 21st Century. To do this, what I'd like to do is share with you some insights on what we have learned from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and, more importantly, on how we are acting on those lessons learned to develop new capabilities both in the United States and, with my hat as Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, in NATO.

Your conference theme—the Way Ahead for Canadian Foreign and Defense Policy—is timely and relevant. It speaks to how Canada has been—and continues to be—an invaluable and essential partner in the NATO Alliance and to the United States.

Canada has clearly stepped forward as a leader within the NATO to meet some of the most pressing security challenges around the globe. Canada's own **LTG Rick Hiller** now commands the Alliance's International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. He is joined by over 2200 Canadian troops there—and I understand that there are some 1700+ Canadian Soldiers, Sailors and Air Force personnel deployed elsewhere around the world conducting peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. This is a significant contribution from a combined military force of just over 60,000.

What Canada might lack in numbers is clearly balanced by its long and deep experience in expeditionary operations. The Canadian Forces, unlike the majority of other NATO military, has always had a tradition of expeditionary warfare and operations. Its forces were never static. Operating in the second largest nation in the world—any domestic deployment is expeditionary!

I also want to thank **GEN Henault** for sending me Canada's "best and brightest" to help "man the ship" at Allied Command Transformation, or "ACT" as we say it.

My chief of staff, **LTG Michel Maisonneuve**, was instrumental in standing up ACT in June of 2003 and has completely re-designed the HQ to be more attuned in skill sets and organization to deliver new operational capabilities to a transforming NATO force. He knows exactly how to partner with our many customers in a way that makes sense for them. In American parlance—Michel is someone who "gets it" and we're lucky to have him.

Also at ACT, we are very fortunate to have three superb officers in **CAPT Norm Jolin**, **CDR Stu Moors** and **LTC Wayne Buck**. Sitting here today is also **LTC Tony Battista**—Canada's Liaison officer to Joint Forces Command—and a key member in my Joint Experimentation Directorate.

So in terms of being a committed partner to NATO and to both Joint Forces Command and Allied Command Transformation, Canada has stepped up to the current operational challenges and development of the future force in a BIG way. Thank you!

This level of engagement and commitment is important because “Joint Transformation” is something that is still not well understood within the military—both in the United States and in NATO. It’s particularly difficult to measure when you’re at forefront of that effort. As one of my senior mentors described it, “Joint Transformation is something that is easier to see from the rear view mirror than looking through the windshield.”

To help tell the story on what we mean by “Joint Transformation,” I’ve brought just three slides as handouts. I should make clear that when I use the term *Joint Operations*, I mean the BIG “J” in Joint—which refers to a seamless integration of joint forces, interagencies and multinational and coalition partners.

Let me first state right up front *three* of the key operational insights we have learned from a U.S. perspective:

1. The U.S. DOES NOT send any individual Service to conduct major operations but instead deploys its military as a Joint and Coalition Force.
2. The power of a Coherently Joint Force is now greater than the sum of our separate Service, interagency and coalition capabilities.
3. “**Speed kills**”—not just physical speed, but mental speed and situational awareness. It reduces decision and execution cycles, creates opportunities, denies an enemy options and speeds his collapse. You’ll hear me come back to this point again and again.

Arriving at these insights—which are now taken almost as an article of faith with our forces overseas—was actually not all that easy. They had to be proven in the caldron of actual combat—and took a significant change in Service culture to accept the message that the power of a Joint Force is far greater than that of any individual Service. I suspect that we may face similar cultural challenges within NATO among the various Nations.

This brings me to the **first slide** in the handout—our Joint Lessons Learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom. The insights and observations outlined here—which I will touch on shortly—are listed under three categories, sort of the “Good, the Not-so-Good and the Ugly.”



To understand these insights require some context. When I said earlier that the “joint lesson” wasn’t simple to come by—what I was referring to was that we had never before stood up a **Lessons Learned team** expressly for the purpose of capturing insights and observations at the Joint operational level of war. All our Services, including the Air Force, have long

experience in forming teams to capture service-specific lessons from operations . . . and the Services do this exceptionally well.

But during Operation IRAQI FREEDON, for the first time, we instituted a lessons learned team for the express purpose of gathering joint operational insights on a comprehensive scale, in real time, with a mandate to assist in operations and effect change.

Why did we do this? The simple reason is that our commanders realized that the key to harnessing the full power of Jointness begins at the operational level of command and control. It is at that level—the level of the Combatant Commander, the Joint Task Force commander and the Air, Land and Sea Component Commanders—where the real work for seamlessly integrating Service capabilities into a Coherently Joint and Combined force takes place.

We examined how well service and special operations force warfighting systems and methods actually worked together as a coherent joint and combined team, including operations with other U.S. Federal agencies and with our coalition partners.

This is why our Joint Lesson Learned team was present in Iraq BEFORE, DURING and AFTER major combat operations. They remain there still—and the head of my team just went back last week and is already back briefing his latest insights and observations to several senior DoD leaders. Our team had complete access to every facet of U.S. Central Command’s **GEN Tommy Frank’s** operations and, in turn, they provided GEN Franks and

his staff with real time insights and observations that were actually used to help in their adaptive planning. In other words, because we had a dedicated Joint Lessons Learned team embedded at the operational level they were able to reduce the overall reaction time our forces and assist in the precision of our actions. This ties directly back to the point I made earlier that “**speed kills**”—it’s not just about weapon systems; but also about a persistent situational awareness.

This type of unfettered access and interplay is simply unprecedented and speaks to my earlier comment about how Service cultures had changed to accept a new way of conducting business. From my experience in the Navy, the **two biggest lies** are when the inspection team comes aboard and the ship’s captain says, “welcome aboard,” and then the inspection chief says, “we’re here to help.” This time around, GEN Franks really welcomed our Joint Lessons Learned team.

We have begun the process of instituting this type of Lessons Learned integration in Afghanistan with ACT’s Joint Lessons Learned Team, which I will come to shortly.

Getting back to the first slide, let me touch on the significance of some of these lessons learned. I won’t cover all of them just those that will help give you a better sense of why we are focused on Coherently Joint operations.

You can see under the first category of “**Capabilities that performed well**” that Joint Integration and Adaptive Planning tops the list. **Joint Force Commanders today will tell you “it’s not the plan, it’s the planning.”** They understand that the ability to plan and adapt to changing circumstances and fleeting opportunities is the difference between success and failure on the modern battlespace. Many leaders of the past understood this—and it remains true today. Tom Franks and his staff practiced this and became masters of adaptive planning. The same is true of the new commander of Central Command, **GEN John Abizaid’s** and his staff.

Essential to the power of adaptive planning and execution is an ability to conduct large scale, vertical and horizontal collaboration. **Frankly, the required collaboration is on a scale that dwarfs any existing commercial application or the commercial world’s understanding of collaboration.** In today’s collaborative information environment, every level of command—throughout the entire force and including coalition partners—is electronically linked to the Combatant Commander’s decision-making process. Subordinate commanders and staffs understand the context behind key changes across the battlespace and are fully aware of changes in the commander’s intent to guide their actions during

specific missions. This does not mean that everyone knows what is happening in the battlespace every time—but rather they all have a clear understanding of the commander’s intent and a persistent awareness of the operational environment. In short, the entire joint and combined force is acutely sensitive to any nuances that occur in the battlespace and are highly adaptive to change, seizing opportunities as they arise or preventing mishaps before they occur.

We are also creating synergies with the closer integration of our **Special Operating and Conventional forces**. In Desert Storm, for example, we had about **30 operational detachment teams** of Special Forces working separate missions from the conventional force. **In OIF**, we deployed over ***100 operational detachment teams***. They were closely wedded to our conventional forces, and in many cases merged the combined capabilities of both ground and air forces.

The net result is that we not only had precision munitions launched from air and ground but also ***“precision decision and execution”*** to guide the integrated Special Forces and Conventional campaign.

In total, what these lessons learned indicate is that our traditional military planning and perhaps our entire approach to warfare have shifted. The main change, from our perspective, is the shift ***FROM*** deconflicting Service-centric forces designed to achieve victories of attrition ***TO*** integrating a joint and combined force that can enter the battlespace quickly and conduct decisive operations with both operational and strategic effects.

One general observation that seems to summarize this shift, which has been going on since Desert Storm is based on what we have come to see as the competing notions of **Overwhelming Force** versus **Overmatching Power**.

As an example, in Desert Storm, our military thinking was to field Overwhelming Forces to ensure victory. Certainly Overwhelming Forces also meant fielding well-trained and well-equipped forces, which is as important today as it was back then—but the emphasis was on numbers.

What our observations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM tell us is that there is another approach to modern warfare—an approach that we like to characterize as the employment of Overmatching Power.

Under this construct, the emphasis is no longer just on numbers—which remain important—but rather on harnessing all the capabilities that our Services bring to the battlespace in a coherently joint way; the point now is on the effectiveness of joint capabilities. What I am suggesting to you is that advances in technologies, coupled with innovative operational warfighting concepts that are glued together by a new joint culture, are enabling a new level of coherent military operations that we have never seen or been able to achieve before.

The difference in approach is Overmatching Power—and it is based on the combined output of new ways of joint warfighting, greater integration of conventional and special operations forces, the use of old and emerging capabilities by new methods—and all integrated through new schemes of joint training.

This brings me to the **second slide** in the handout—it depicts some of the key attributes of a Transforming Joint Force:



There are three points I want to make here:

FIRST: Joint Transformation did not happen over night in the United States. We must not expect that it will happen as quickly or easily in NATO. The U.S. military underwent a painful process of progress through the four phases of

“Deconflict—Coordinate—Integrate—Coherently Joint.” And there is probably a 5th box after that . . .

We went from a period when our integration was so poor that in order to avoid killing each other we deconflicted our forces simply by saying “Army you go here; Navy you stay at sea; Air Force fly over there; and Marine Corps you land over there.” We now envision the future from an information age perspective where operations are conducted in a battlespace, not a battlefield. We are eliminating the artificial boundaries that were established to de-conflict Service areas of responsibility and are transforming to a seamless battlespace to allow a Coherently Joint force to create effects throughout the depth of the battlespace—massing of effects when and where we choose versus the massing of personnel and equipment as dictated by geography and boundaries.

We are now at the cusp of creating decision superiority, which is enabled by networked systems, new sensors and command and control capabilities that are producing unprecedented near-real time situational awareness and an ability to deliver precision munitions throughout the breadth and depth of the battlespace. We view the operational attributes of knowledge centric, coherently joint, fully networked and Effects-based as weapons systems—and they form the key elements of our Transformation “Way Ahead.”

SECOND: We clearly recognize that we have a unique opportunity today—and in the near future—to develop powerful asymmetric capabilities if we can focus on developing the attributes described on the right side of the chart.

But we must first develop an adaptive, dynamic change process that is **comprehensive**, that links concepts to the acquisition process and that integrates the lessons we learn in near real time.


THIRD: The desired attributes on the right have application beyond just warfighting. Any organization that hopes to succeed today or in the future—whether military, governmental, commercial or even non-profit—must move to the right side of this chart. They must also have a clear understanding of Supported and Supporting relationships.

At various times you may have to operate across the chart. But at all times—from peace through major combat operations to stability and, as today, peace support operations—you

must be able to operate in a real-time collaborative environment and with network centric capabilities to achieve the asymmetric power we began to witness in OIF.

The "Big Question," of course, is how can we develop a process that produces the required capabilities in a comprehensive and coordinated way?

This brings me to the **third slide** in the handout.



This slide gives you a sense of where we are transforming our Joint Forces. As you can see, the conditions that we want to establish are at the far right—a continuum of change leading to a condition where our Joint and Combined Forces can conduct **Coherently Joint and Combined Effects-Based Operations across the**

full range of military operations—where the scope, speed and richness of operational knowledge can quickly lead to precision decisions. And where our commanders share and collaborate on near real-time information adaptively to the point of synergy.

In short, we want to create the capabilities that will enable us to achieve asymmetric advantages in **Knowledge, Speed, Precision, and Lethality**—advantages we began to glimpse in OIF.

Let me now turn to some of the initiatives we are instituting to move the Joint Force over to the right—and how ACT is working to establish similar processes and capabilities in NATO for the NRF.

I've listed just five of our initiatives on the bottom of the slide—again, to give you a sense of how we are connecting the "process and product" of Joint Transformation.

The first initiative—perhaps the most important—is to establish a **common joint context** where we can move our understanding of the future warfight from a stovepipe view to a commonly shared

understanding of the future joint environment that all the Services must operate in—as a Coherently Joint team.

In establishing this **Common Joint Context**, we have actively partnered with each of the Services to assist them in embedding a joint context in their Wargames. We visited all the Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs—and their staffs—to help us focus on producing a list of challenges affecting future joint operations that Joint Forces Command could work on. We took their insights, perspectives and recommendations as a mandate to produce the joint operational concepts and capabilities that would enable Coherently Joint, Effects-Based Operations. These inputs led to the development of the common joint context that we have embedded into Service Wargames.

The **Joint Context** allows Services to examine for themselves how well their future capabilities can operate in a Joint environment. They can then begin to acquire Service capabilities that are “**Born Joint**.” This process is a fundamental shift in the force development paradigm.

In May of last year, for instance, I co-hosted with the U.S. Army Chief of Staff the first ever Joint/Army wargame—**UNIFIED QUEST 03**—that had an embedded **Common Joint Context**.

We followed that event up with a similar co-hosted event with the U.S. Navy called UNIFIED COURSE 04 in October 2003. This year the U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff **GEN John Jumper** and I will co-host the Joint/Air Force wargame called UNIFIED ENGAGEMENT, and then later we’re planning a similar event the Marine Corps.

To a large extent, we have begun a similar process in NATO.

Just last month, Allied Command Transformation co-hosted with Allied Command Operations an executive seminar called **ALLIED REACH 04** in Suffolk, Virginia to discuss the future challenges of deploying, employing and sustaining an expeditionary NATO Response Force. We assembled an impressive gathering of virtually all the senior military leadership in the Alliance—as well as delegates from 26 Nations.

ALLIED REACH 04 was important to NATO Transformation because it allowed us the opportunity to examine the multinational deployability and operational capability issues that NRF Commanders will face in 2007.

That means we had the opportunity to start the process of assisting our future NRF commanders prepare for the challenges ahead—*today*—as well as [set a common framework](#) for our activities to produce the broad set of capabilities we will need to overcome these challenges and execute this mission.

I should mention that ALLIED REACH 04 was very much a Strategic-Operational event. It was intricately connected to and built upon the Colorado Springs Informal Defense Ministerial Exercise Study called **DYNAMIC RESPONSE 07**. In DYNAMIC RESPONSE 07, our political leadership had the opportunity to better understand the operational challenges ahead and the types of forces and capabilities we will need.

In other words, what these two seminars represent is NATO's attempt to close the gap between the political and strategic imperatives for committing an NRF and the operational requirements and capabilities needed to conduct those missions.

This is hard work, no doubt. Much of the work to develop such operational capabilities will have to be done by the Nations. That is why the establishment of a [common framework](#)—which parallels the U.S. example of the [Common Joint Content](#)—is key to the Transformation process—particularly in establishing alignment in NATO and the Nations in our various efforts.

This is just one example of the **"process" end** of Transformation—both in the U.S. and NATO context. |

On the "product" side, you can see that we have focused our efforts in the U.S. on moving the force from a force based on attrition warfare to one that is designed and trained to conduct Effect-Based Operations.

Concurrently, we've expanded our [Joint Experimentation](#) efforts to develop *prototypes* like the **Standing Joint Force HQ**, which we are instituting within our Combatant Commands. The SJFHQ capability will allow for the rapid stand up of an operational JTF because it can bring to a Service HQ an established, robust and persistent **Collaborative Information Environment**. The CIE will enable a new form of Command & Control and is designed to quickly provide situational awareness of the adversary, the battlespace and the Joint Force. *The CIE allows for a persistent, robust 360° situational awareness of the operational environment and top-down clarity of the commander's intent.* What results is a joint force that is empowered to act and create strategic opportunities because it has unity of effort at the top and trust and confidence throughout the force.

On the training end, we are delivering a **Joint National Training Capability** that we used in the first-ever Joint training event three weeks ago. It's important to note here that the

Services in the U.S. have done a marvelous job in launching the first wave of Training Transformation. This is when they established training complexes and ranges like the *Navy's Top Gun*, the *Air Force's Air Warrior and Red Flag* or the *Army's National Training Center* in the Mohave Desert, California. And now the Services are helping Joint Forces Command to take us to the next level.

What the joint community has been able to do with the JNTC is begin the second wave of training transformation—where we can now link the Service ranges with forces around the country—and in time, around the world—to a common joint environment at the operational level. In a sense, this new training transformation is producing “**Born Joint Training**” that seamlessly brings together a combination of live, virtual and constructive capabilities to create a common joint training environment. An important aspect of the JNTC is that is to avoid any additive requirement to Service training.

On my recent visit to the Army's Joint National Training Center, an Army major participating in the JNTC exercise summed up the value of this new capability best. He had fought with the 3rd Infantry Division in OIF and had participated in many training rotations. When I asked him what he thought was different about the JNTC exercise, he said: “Well, sir—the only time we ever get to play with all the ‘toys’ is in war. Now we get to play with everything in training.” That, to me, is the way we ought to train.

On the Allied Command Transformation side, we are working to establish a similar capability within NATO with the standup of the **Joint Warfare Center** in Stavanger, Norway in October 2003—and the commissioning of the **Joint Force Training Center** in Bydgoszcz, Poland scheduled for this July. The Joint Warfare Center has already begun to prove its worth in our transformation work. It provided training and education to **ISAF IV** and is currently conducting training of **ISAF V**, including lessons captured by our **Lessons Learned team in Afghanistan**.

Similarly, Allied Command Transformation is examining *the NATO Defense Planning* system to develop new processes for NATO and the Nations to generate the right forces with the right capabilities. Our aim here is to link **Force Planning** to **Force Generation**, specifically in the context of

the NRF. In our view at ACT, this will help the Nations to align their national resource processes with NATO's force generation process.

In summary, you can see that both in the U.S. and NATO, the "Way Ahead" must be aimed at developing and delivering new capabilities to help move our transforming Armed Forces to the right side of the chart.

The keys to transformation are in the operational attributes that we have learned from the best laboratory of change—actual combat. What our lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq tell us is that to dominate the modern battlespace the Armed Forces of the 21st Century must be "knowledge centric," "coherently joint," "fully networked and collaborative"—interdependent in organization and employment—and uniquely designed for "Effects-Based Operations."

Again, an important operational insight from OIF is **warfighters don't care where capabilities come from**—they just care that it is timely, responsive, integrated and effective.

These attributes provide the insights and implications of a "Way Ahead" and the basis for Joint Transformation in the U.S. and in NATO.

Thank you again for your attention.

I'll be happy to take your questions.