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***TOPIC/SUJET:*** The Annual General Meeting and the CDA will hear a panel discussion:  
Where are they now?

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### **The Annual General Meeting and 18th Annual Seminar and the Conference of the Defence Associations will hear a panel discussion: Where are they now?**

Moderator: This panel will be looking where we are now and where we expect to be in the near future. Contrary to what the program suggests our panel moderator is not with the War Studies programme at RMC but in fact Dr. Joel Sokolsky is Dean of Arts and a professor of political science at the Royal Military College. He also holds a cross appointment as a professor of political studies in the political studies department at Queen's University and is a senior fellow at the Queen's Center for International Relations. Dr. Sokolsky received his MA from the School of Advanced International Studies at John Hopkins University in Washington, DC and earned his PhD with the Department of Government of Harvard University.

Dr. Sokolsky has taught at the Canadian Studies Center at the School of Advanced International Studies, Dalhousie University and also at Duke University. His areas of interest and teaching include Canadian foreign defence policy, Canadian government, international security relations and American foreign and defence policy. Dr. Sokolsky is the author, co-author and co-editor of a large number of books and monographs. And is the recipient of several scholarships and awards including two NATO fellowships. He's a member of the secretariat working group of the NATO partnership for peace consortium of defence, academics and, or, academies and strategic studies institutes. Ladies and gentlemen we are very pleased to introduce to you our first panel chairman Dr. Joel Sokolsky.

(Applause)

Dr. Joel Sokolsky: I'm very pleased to be able to moderate this panel and express my appreciation to the CDA for the opportunity. As we go into a defence review which hopefully will be, involve a public debate it's going to be particularly important to bring together expertise from a wide variety of areas concerned with defence issues and I think our panel this morning reflects very much the expertise and the quality of debate which hopefully we can look forward to.

On the panel is our first speaker will be the Honourable John Fraser who in 1996 became the first Speaker of the House of Commons to be elected by secret ballot. As speaker he undertook a number of initiatives including the creation of the House of Commons public information office. And the establishment of the central and east European parliamentary cooperation program. A member of the bar, a former member of the Canadian Armed Forces, he has a long history of association in support of the Canadian Forces. In October 1997 Mr.

Fraser was appointed a member of the national defence Ministers monitoring committee on change. And he is currently it's chair.

Our second speaker Martin Chadwick has been a lecturer on international relations and Canadian foreign policy with the department of political science at York University. And a senior research fellow with York's Centre for International and Security Studies. He has been an advisor on to the Canadian military journal. A number of DND panels including the defence industries advisory committee. And a noted expert on defence industry.

Our final speaker this morning is Dr. Richard Gimblett, a 27 year veteran with the Canadian Navy who served in a number of different operational posts including during the Gulf War with the Canadian Forces. He's a graduate of the Royal Military College. And holds a PhD from Laval University. He is also a published author not only contributing to official publications, most recently Lead Mark, the Navy's strategy for 2020. But writing the official history of Canada's participation in the Persian Gulf War. And is currently working with the Directorate of History and Heritage in writing the official history of the Royal Canadian Navy.

So please join me in welcoming our speakers who I think will bring to this discussion of combat capability which ultimately if policy is going to be effective must translate into and our speakers this morning are going to bring various perspective on this question. So please join me in welcoming first to the podium the Honourable John Fraser.

(Applause)

John Fraser: I was once asked by a reporter when I was chair of the, when I first became chair of the Ministers monitoring committee how I could be without any bias because I had a modest military background. And I said to the reporter I said I have a bias. But a very real bias. He said well what is it? I said I'm a hundred percent in favour of the Armed Forces. And I said why don't you take that down and put it on television. He had the good grace to laugh and leave me alone.

However modest experience in the Armed Forces or not I know that anyone who is asked to speak to an audience such as this ought to be a little bit in awe. And also ought perhaps to justifiably think that there's not really very much that I can tell you about the Armed Forces that you don't all know.

But sometimes over-assuming what your audience knows can get you into trouble. And it reminds me of a story I was told when I was a young lawyer about the young barrister who got his first case and took it to the trial court. And he was much convinced that his cause was just and his client was right and after a spirited presentation he waited for the judgement which finally came down. And to his astonishment and dismay he lost.

He rushed off, found the rule book, got in front of the court of appeal and eventually there he was in the court. Now there were three judges looking down on him. The Chief Justice and two puny judges. And he started off by saying my Lord Chief Justice and My Lords I want to

open this case by explaining the law. And the Chief Justice looked down at him and said council you can assume that we know the law. Oh he said, My Lords that is the mistake I made in the lower court.

(Laughter)

So I'm not going to assume anything about any of you. I was also taught as a young soldier never assume, always anticipate. I've been trying to teach subordinates for all my life that fundamental lesson. Well sometimes it may lead to caution it also can keep you out of trouble. Now for the past few years the combat capability of the Canadian Forces has been a topic of some interest in the media, parliamentary committees and academic papers.

In 2001 a sometimes heated discussion ensued between senior defence officials and members of the defence community over whether the CF was more combat capable then it was in 1990. Several key reports from various organizations making recommendations on what to do about what seemed to them the unrelenting slide of the Canadian Forces into operational irrelevance figured in the debate. And let us remember after all that 1990 is in the past.

Now having as I said served modestly in the Canadian Forces I can claim only some knowledge of strategy, doctrine tactics and other concepts which are second nature to the military professional. However as chair of the national defence Ministers monitoring committee tasked with monitoring reforms in the military. And having had some time in public life I can tell you a little about what is politically required to ensure the Canadian Forces are supported by the government and the people of Canada.

They require and deserve truth about our military based on facts. Truth about our capabilities. Truth about our deficiencies. And truth about our commitments. These are all essential to ensure our combat capability. But without a clear understanding of the state of the Armed Forces the public support essential in a democracy just will not be there when it is needed.

Defence officials insist that the Canadian Forces are now more combat capable then they were during the Gulf War because of increased fire power and new platforms that have come on line since. The LAV3, the Coyote, frigates, coastal patrol vessels, Griffin helicopters, smart bombs, CF18 upgrades all represent capabilities that the Canadian Forces can exploit. But they go further then that, some of them.

And it can be very misleading to the ordinary citizen or elected member. For example the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, the then Vice Chief of the Defence Staff in an article which was on in your publication On Track in June of 2001 said quote "Military capability is no longer a simple function of the number of personnel in uniform". End quote. Well when was it that simple? And who today says it's that simple. He went on to say we can't go forward and build a new current imaginal(sp) line. Well who in the name of heaven was ever talking about doing such things.

When the CF, when the Canadian Forces are down to sixty thousand regulars as established numbers and in fact of course well below that with all the difficulty and the consequences

resulting how can anyone suggest that technologically improved kit justifies further reductions in personnel. Yet some do. On March 10<sup>th</sup>, 1999 the Globe and Mail carried a two page story headlined, this is the headlines, "Forces Take Aim at Lowly Reputation. The Military Bristles at it's Lack of Respect Insisting that Critics Take a Closer Look. The High Tech Solution".

In the face of criticism the article highlighted two senior defence officials. One civilian and one military who insisted that leaner and meaner forces could hurtle more firepower at an enemy then they could during the Persian Gulf War. Or the first war. Or the second war. The senior civilian official stated I'm saying this because of all the chaff being put out there on a daily basis by people living in a different world. As reported the senior defence official argued that new technology allows fewer troops or aircraft to do more damage. And no doubt he was refuting critics of any further troops reductions by stating so shrinkage is not necessarily loss.

Later that year on December 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1999 the Ottawa Citizen carried a front page story entitled "Cut Troops by Half Advisor Tells Army. Military Urged to Use Fewer People, More Technology". Now I have some sympathy for Colonel Howie Marsh and I expressed this to him earlier this morning who in fairness was trying to find a solution to insufficient financial resources. But look at the headline. That's what the public, that's what Member of Parliament, that's what Cabinet Ministers and bureaucrats see. Which is not necessarily Colonel Marsh's fault. And the impression is left that if we only had more technology we could cut an already too small army even further. Now that's the army.

But what Canada's national commitments. In January 2000 Minister Eggleton was honest and realistic when asked whether a reduction from sixty thousand to fifty thousand would affect white paper requirements. He was asked directly, and I quote "Could the Military meet those requirements if troop levels were cut as low as fifty thousand?" The Minister said probably not. It would be very difficult to do that and still meet white paper commitments. So much for shrinkage, it's not necessarily loss. But you know there is a terrible loss.

There's a loss of our commitments. There's a loss of the respect of our friends and allies. There's a loss of our capacity to do something which is essential to Canadian values. And to the well-being of other being. And there's loss of our own self respect. It is ironic that months after this senior official complained about chaff it was now the Minister who asserted exactly what the senior official was bent on denying. Shrinkage is in fact loss.

Now let us leave headlines and refer to testimony before the standing Senate committee on defence and security. But consider the following exchange from last July concerning whether we can deploy a brigade. This is a senior official in the department of national defence. The Senator who asked the question, would we be able to deploy in good time either within Canada or elsewhere a brigade now. The answer, we must situate your question in the context. A brigade has not had to be deployed by Canada since the Korean War. The likelihood given the current international situation of Canada having to deploy a brigade is almost nil. Indeed the white paper said either as a brigade or as a three battalion group.

Over the past fifteen years or so we have noticed that deployments take place on the scale of a battalion, not a brigade. Now if we pause at a situation that required Canada to deploy a brigade we would also pause at a level of unpleasantness in the world that would create a crisis. As I said in my presentation all the intelligence analysis, ours as well as those of our allies indicate that if there were a crisis of those proportions there would be ample warning. I have no doubt whatsoever that in those circumstances Canada could deploy its brigade.

Now to suggest that Canada has not deployed a brigade since Korea is simply not true. I was in fact in Germany as part of the 27<sup>th</sup> brigade in 1953. That was later the 4<sup>th</sup> brigade. And that formation remained in Germany for about 40 years. But I suppose in a different context.

So these Parliamentarians and anyone who listened to this are left hanging. Maybe we could deploy a brigade if there was a crisis. If it was unpleasant enough. If we had ample warning, etcetera. But nothing in this officials response indicates any necessity to actually plan and prepare for such a deployment. Or even to seriously contemplate having to do it. But a brigade is a commitment. Now let's now examine recent testimony of the Chief of the Land Staff who comes much closer to giving us an understandable answer to the brigade question.

The Senator asked a question. If you were called upon now, this is a different Senator, to deploy a full brigade with its heavy equipment, one that has trained on a regular basis and in which each member knows the others including men and women, to deploy outside of Canada could you do it? How long would it take as a nation to respond. Lieutenant General Jeffrey, to answer that question one has to bear in mind some givens. The first one is that we currently have a large mechanized battle group deployed in task force Bosnia Herzegovina. That battle group is just shy of two thousand. And about fifteen hundred are from the army. I have an immediate response force battalion on standby for another theatre.

Currently I am in the order of fourteen hundred trained soldiers short of my full establishment. Right now we are in the middle of a modernization program that takes a part of the army out of the order of battle. Out of its operational readiness level. For a significant period. I have six mechanized infantry battalions for example. Each one has to be reequipped with a new LAV3. One is reequipped and the others are going through a three to six month process. Depending on the circumstances that unit is not prepared for operations during that time period for understandable reasons. All of that has to be considered in the equation. Can the army deploy a brigade. Yes it can. However it cannot be done without significant cost. Because of other commitments and the other sustainability of the army it will take all of the army to do it and there will not be much to spare to get that done.

Will they have been trained together. No. We have not done significant brigade training in a good number of years. Is that all things considered acceptable. It depends on the circumstances. Assessing risk has to be done in the context of the mission that they're being asked to perform. I cannot give you an assessment of that. Clearly it is of concern. On the issue of time as the lever again I cannot tell you without knowing the specific mission, how long it would take. I am required to have a brigade on 90 days so that we meet the white paper commitment. As long as we are talking about a light brigade similar to the immediate response force capability then it can be done. If we are talking about anything heavier then

that given the current state of modernization it cannot be done.

You notice the difference in response. The army commander is not brushing off the brigade question. He's giving us facts backed by his professional judgement. The deployment of a brigade is possible but only a light brigade. And Canadians have to understand the cost and repercussions of trying to do that. What is so dangerous however is that some of what officials say about technology is true. We cannot ignore technology. Some missions are technology intensive. Our navy, air force and army need the state of the art kit and no one is suggesting otherwise. But we are dealing with today. And today we have commitments.

Can we fulfill the objectives of the white paper? Of course this might not matter. As some have already abandoned the white paper and peacekeeping, peacemaking, occupying ground to stop massacres, restoring and maintaining order and meeting domestic emergencies. Their thesis won't work in Bosnia, East Timor, the Golden Heights, an Oka, the next ice storm or the war against terrorism. But he plays right into the hands of those who, misguided or unrealistic want to ensure that the shrinkage continues.

These people can now argue having listened to these senior officials that you see. Even the Armed Forces say we don't need all these troops. That is why it is so very dangerous. We should paid heed to the words of retired General Charles Belzile as he testified last October.

Finally contrary to popular belief technology does not replace people beyond well defined limits. I want to end these few minutes with a quote from a reasonably qualified military authority about the importance of maintaining real military thinking and I suppose the importance of saying exactly what the facts are to your superiors.

It's a letter. It starts off, Gentlemen, while marching from Portugal to a position which commands the approach to Madrid and the French forces my officers have been diligently complying with your requests which have been sent by His Majesty's ship from London to Lisbon and then by dispatch rider to our headquarters. We have enumerated our saddles, bridles, tents and tent poles and all matter of sundry items for which His Majesty's government holds me accountable. I have dispatched reports on the character, wit and spleen of every officer. Each item and every farthing have been accounted for with two regrettable exceptions for which I beg your indulgence.

Unfortunately the sum of one shilling and nine pence remains unaccounted for in one infantry battalion's petty cash. And there has been a hideous confusion as to the number of jars of raspberry jam issued to one cavalry regiment during a sandstorm in western Spain. This reprehensible carelessness may be related to the pressure of circumstances since we are at war with France. The fact which may come as a bit of a surprise to you gentlemen in White Hall.

(Laughter)

This brings me to my present purpose which is to request elucidation of my instructions from His Majesty's government so that I may better understand why I am dragging an army over

these barren plains. I construe that perforce it must be one of two alternative duties as given below. I shall pursue either one with the best of my ability but I cannot do both. One, train an army of uniformed British clerks in Spain for the benefit of the accountants and copy boys in London. Or perchance to see to it that the forces of Napoleon are driven out of Spain. Your most obedient servant, Wellington. A classic lesson of why frankness helps. Thank you very much.

(Applause)

Martin Chadwick: Well good morning. Thank you. Merci beaucoup. I would like to express my thanks first of all for the opportunity to return to this particular forum. Given that academics are trained at great expense to only know how to speak in installments of fifteen minutes, fifty minutes at a time I would also like to acknowledge the courage and optimism of the organizers in letting me get to the podium this morning.

I think the best use of the time is to map out some general observations some of which you may agree with, some you may well wish to challenge. And then proceed on to some schematic areas in terms of how certain forthcoming or potentially forthcoming developments might affect the combat capability of the Canadian Forces. The impact of the pending defence review regardless of what form it may take, the repercussions of growing salience of the homeland defence, the entire, the totality really of the Canada US defence relationship and it's impacts on Canada's combat capability. And finally some concluding comments on public opinion and combat capability for the Canadian Forces.

I'm going to start somewhat unconventionally by broaching for a moment the question of balance between the military or combat capable requirements and functions of the Canadian Forces and how they relate to the various non military and quasi military roles of the Canadian Forces. By that I mean terms that we now tend to lump under this broad category of constabulary tasks whether it's fisheries patrol, search and rescue, disaster relief and so on. Something of a heretic perhaps in this area but I would argue before plunging into the purely combat capable component of this presentation. But I think that if those non military and quasi military functions are selected with great care very judiciously they have the potential rather than eroding the combat capability of the Canadian Forces to selectively enhance or help to preserve those capabilities.

I would quickly add though that that is not a commercial for the constabularization of the Canadian Forces or perhaps I should say given what some of our friends down under are doing the New Zealandization of the Canadian Forces because the route the Kiwi's have opted for. Effectively. It really is a question of keeping those non military and quasi military roles in perspective as secondary tursory functions of the Canadian Forces. And to seek out the synergies where they exist.

In other words the architects of the 1994 white paper got it right when they concluded that Canada was best served by a multi purpose combat capable defence establishment. And if I might inflict upon you they did it quite eloquently I thought in just a couple of sentences. I'll just quote here from the '94 white paper. "Over the past 80 years more than one hundred

thousand Canadians have died fighting alongside our allies for common values. For us now to leave combat roles to others would mean abandoning this commitment to help defend commonly accepted principles of state behaviour. In short by opting for our constabulary force, that is one not designed to make a genuine contribution in combat we would be sending a very clear message about the depth of our commitment to our allies and our values and one that would betray our history and diminish our future." Unquote. That's as close as you're going to get to eloquence by the way in a Canadian white paper on defence.

(Laughter)

But it was nicely phrased. And of course the point has been touched upon this morning by other speakers the fundamentals of the '94 white paper are still reasonably intact. The problem has been chronic under funding or perhaps in some cases the misdirection of funding that we did have available into other areas. So we really have had although we're not talking of a new review mechanism in effect since '94 the Forces have been in a constant state of review slash turmoil as adjustments were made to compensated for limited and until recent years diminishing budget lines by cutting people, equipment, and increasingly outsourcing certain functions to the private sector.

Some of those transfers have themselves exacted a toll in the sense of lost combat capability. At least indirectly for the Canadian Forces and that's an area we're taking a look at. Third by way of just quick general observation I would concur with the findings of the report that the University of Calgary quarterbacked essentially for the Council for Canadian Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century last year about being somewhat incredulous of the claims that the Canadian Forces today are more combat capable then they were a decade ago.

Clearly if one modifies the statement to be some elements of the Canadian Forces are more combat capable there would be no argument. The navy of course springs to example, springs to mind as the best example of that. But to be able to make and sustain the argument of the forces as a whole are more combat capable requires adequate quantities of modern equipment, adequate numbers of well trained personnel. And the numbers of course are very important here in terms of critical mass so that we have enough people to be able to respond particularly in times of high operational tempo to the demands placed upon the Canadian forces by the government of Canada.

Sufficient people so that we do not run into under problems in terms of quality of life and retention, loss of good people. And also reducing or even eliminating collective training which is after all a key component of combat capability. I might add as well very quickly that even state of the art status is fleeting without timely upgrades. And even our friend the Coyote which has become the poster child of the modern Canadian forces was in fact ordered a decade ago by the Mulroney government. And the first of the patrol frigates is now about a decade old.

In terms of the three themes I wanted to look at very quickly the first one I think necessarily deals with the question of a defence review. The format we're going to see remains to be determined. Is this a program review, policy review, force structure review. Would it be an

internal process. Would it be a more broadly based process with more inputs along the models of the 1994 white paper. Would it be accompanied by a concurrent foreign policy review. Would there be ultimately a white paper in there somewhere. I might add on the margins that it is indeed possible at times to produce enormous shifts in defence policy without actually ever getting around to producing a white paper. And the best example of that was the Trudeau year of defence structure review in 1975 which in theory was force structure oriented but in effect gave us a brand new policy. But it was never repackaged in the context of a white paper.

I must admit too that academics do have a bit of a built in bias in favour of reviews and white papers. I mean if nothing else it gives us something to critique, analyse, write about and lecture about. At times as a cautionary note beware of academics bearing white papers is sometimes good advice to keep in mind. That said though there are some obvious reasons for a policy review.

The '94 white paper has avoided the fate of its three predecessors. I mean Canadian white papers on defence have a nasty habit of imploding shortly after they're released. Certainly '64, '71 and most spectacularly '87 that was the case. The '87 white paper at York at least we consigned to the science fiction section of our library less than two years after it was published.

But having said that and although acknowledging a moment ago that the '94 white paper has aged reasonably well and its fundamentals are essentially intact certainly it needs a freshening and update. There's no mention of the revolution in military affairs in there. There's no discussion of strategic lift. One can also argue I think in terms of a review then money is tight a review becomes even more important to make sure that the money we do have is targeted correctly and is spent wisely. Of course the really optimistic interpretation of a new defence review is that it might be so compelling to the government in its logic that it will open the floodgates of more money. But that too probably is in the science fiction category.

I would like to flag a couple of cautionary notes very quickly. First of all if we get into a fresh wide open defence policy review process we are going to to some extent reopen the debate that we saw in 1994 of the merits of the multipurpose combat capable model versus the constabulary type of model for the Canadian forces. The events of 9/11 have reduced that risk but they have not eliminated it and in fact that risk may come back again. And I'll come back to that theme momentarily.

A second cautionary note if we get into a review. Because with a review especially if it's wide open which inherently one favours of course but one has to be prepared for surprises and the fact that a debate may go in directions that one does not anticipate. In 1994 for example the question of the Canada US defence and security relationship was effectively a non issue. A few innocuous pages in the 1994 white paper. Today of course times have changed. We have national missile defence. Even pre September 11<sup>th</sup> to consider. The new command structure with the Americans. Indeed the broader aspects of the new era Canadian

US security relationship.

There are ways of managing that relationship that indeed do protect our sovereignty. There are ways that we can get that right. And we have to work in that direction. But I would also simply point out for the record that when one opens the floodgates there's, you're dealing here with a potentially volatile mix of security and sovereignty issues. Which could ignite a public debate which in some cases may be counterproductive. It may hijack the wider defence policy debate focussing in on the minutia of the Canada US defence relationship. And that carries risks of it's own.

Secondly in terms of the other themes homeland defence and the Canada US relationship specifically. Both in terms of it's domestic model, the North American, the purely North American component. And the broader question of our overseas relationship with the United States in the coming years. I would point out that on the domestic front clearly there's a role there for combat capable forces. That's a given. But I would also remind you that a great deal of the initiatives that have been taken to date and might be taken in the future are really more of a law enforcement, constabulary type of activity. There's a potential there that a government playing the homeland defence card may want to direct defence resources increasingly into what are effectively constabulary law enforcement type activities. And look at the allocations of money that DND got in the 11 December budget.

The money that DND did get by and large went into things like OCPEP, communications security establishment, that type of thing rather than pure combat capable forces. This also raises the question too of the relationship between DND and other government departments. It is little known for example that the budget in December made provision for additional money to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans to buy flying hours from it's contractor that provides fisheries surveillance off the coast. But the additional flying hours are not for fisheries. They are multipurpose security related flying hours. That's the sort of area that one might wish or might not wish to see DND give. But there's potential there for homeland defence to go constabulary. That threatens to some extent combat capability within the Canadian forces.

There's also the risk too that even if one keeps a very robust combat capability for use at home that we could wind up for going expeditionary capabilities. And I'm not thinking Afghanistan type models but simply peace support operations and other models where we might wish to keep combat capable forces to serve our own ends.

Then of course we have the overseas dimensions. And I'll move through this very, very quickly for you. We have there that volatile mix in terms of how the Canada US defence relationship develops in coming years. There's way of working that, would keep public support on side. But is also the potential there for a nasty backlash. If the Canadian public gets nervous about sovereignty quote unquote and that we're getting too cozy with the Americans that could splatter back on DND. So hooking our cart to the American wagon isn't necessarily a public relations or financial panacea for the Canadian forces.

And finally just a few moments on public opinion and combat capability. It was noted this

morning that some of the more recent public polls are trending in the right direction. Canadians do seem to be a little more willing to spend money on defence. Sadly those polls were, apparently did not make their way into the Prime Ministers office on the eve of the budget.

But I would caution again here that Canadians are a decidedly fickle lot. Public opinion polls for decades have shown an enthusiasm for a solid Canadian role on the world stage. But a marked reluctance to actually pay for it. We get terminal writers cramp when it comes time to actually paying for that. And I would simply point out less one become too optimistic about these polls that only three years ago one public opinion poll which asked, which gave Canadians choices. They were given a set of about fifty policy choices and where they would like to spend public revenues increasingly in the future. And you had to pick between two choices. Defence appeared once on that list. And the choice that was given to the respondents was would you, are you prepared to spend more money on defence or would you be prepared to spend more money on increased subsidies for film and television production in Canada. Defence lost.

Now if you lose out to increased spending on health and education that's understandable. But losing out to increased subsidies for film and television production is something else again. So that blip that we've seen may be just a blip in the early wake of 9/11. So simply put for the forces to retain the sort of multipurpose combat capability that I suspect most people in this audience believe we should have will require from the defence community at large clear cogent and compelling arguments to try to reach Canadians and their political leaders. Thank you very much.

(Applause)

Richard Gimblett: Combat capability in the Canadian forces, where are we now and in the foreseeable future. I set out to pen some thoughts on this subject last November against the backdrop of the so called war against terrorism. It was with some trepidation. The daily changing panel of events has led to the ritual humbling of media and academic pundits which I have now become I understand. Who had predicted precisely the opposite of what has transpired.

If one cannot forecast with any certainty what the Americans will be up to next week why even bother for the Canadian Forces. Predicting the future can be a mugs game unless you have an honest assessment of the past and can relate it equally honestly to the present. Indeed some long term trends already are crystallizing. In this presentation the identification of consistencies or any anomalies with the past and present experience will serve as the basis for discussion of those capabilities that should merit attention for future development.

As the author of the official history of the Gulf War of 1990 to '91 I've attempted elsewhere to define what I've called a Canadian way of war in light of that experience. Nothing in the present operations against Afghanistan mitigates against the overall pattern except in detail. In essence as Dr. Granatstein ran through this morning the Canadian preference in peacetime has been to be suspicious of large standing forces. Three times in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup>

century, in 1914, 1939 and again in 1950 Canada was caught unprepared for the outbreak of global war, only to prove capable of mobilizing forces that distinguished themselves in action and out of proportion to the nations size.

That Canada chose to maintain a professional permanent force through the Cold War was due as much to the continuing nature of the Soviet threat as to the new found status as a middle power of some influence in the United Nations and NATO. But after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 normal peacetime inclination returned. The professional corp of the forces was maintained only to the level required to satisfy our allies. And the national pension for peacekeeping originally an outgrowth of the middle power principle of functionalism was not sufficient to stem that tide. And indeed became an end in itself.

The hot piece that has followed the collapse of the Soviet Union has served to confirm that military capability has both qualitative and quantitative dimensions. It is the commitment of capable formations large enough to warrant an independent command. That is an army brigade, an air wing, or a naval task group that qualifies Canada for effective representation on the allied councils. And witness the lack of representation on the contact group for the former Republic of Yugoslavia.

None of the foregoing should be new to this audience. But there are three additional points that tend to be overlooked. Firstly while overseas military contributions tend to be defined in terms of the army the navy has been the first to be deployed upon the outbreak of the war. And the role of the air force has grown commensurate with the precision of aerial bombardment and the degree of the manned bomber threat against North America in whatever guise that takes.

Secondly, because the border with the United States is undefended and there has never been a credible conventional threat against the North American homeland Canadian military operations by definition are expeditionary. As such as our moderator Dr. Sokolsky has argued elsewhere they require only the commitment of the country's disposable military force commensurate with the perceived threat. And Canada can afford to be selective in the application of military force.

Finally with only one exception Canadian naval, land and air forces have never had to operate in battle jointly as an independent force. At either the operational or the tactical level. The experience instead has been to combine effectively with allied forces. And the one exception was the RCN RCAF combined HQ in Halifax established in 1943 to command the Canadian northwest Atlantic theatre in the Second World War.

It's still unclear as to how long the immediate crisis in Afghanistan will last, what it's final resolution might be and where the Americans will direct their attention next. But it is not too early to assess the Canadian response in comparison with the traditional experience. Once again the navy was the first to deploy. And did so in sufficient strength to warrant an independent task group commander. Some observers have quivelled that there is little point to a naval contribution against the land locked opponent. But they overlooked two factors.

The developing American understanding of littoral warfare. By their definition encompassing up to one thousand kilometres inland. And also that Canadian naval units can integrate seamlessly in United States navy carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups from which a large portion of the war has been prosecuted. Indeed without any secure local basis on which to operate even the US army and air force have been restricted until only very recently to the very particular operations of long range bombing and special forces.

Since the Canadian forces possesses neither of those specialized and very expensive capabilities it was a God send that a capable navy exists to make a meaningful initial contribution. Still in the final analysis a nations contribution always will be remember and measured by it's contributions of fighting troops on the ground.

As such the decision not to become involved with the United Nations operations in Kabul and instead to dispatch the PPCLI Lord Strathcona Horse battalion group to join with the US army's 101<sup>st</sup> airborne division as a stabilization force is entirely appropriate. It provides the army an opportunity to practice the interoperability concepts with which the navy and air force have been familiar for over a half century. Nonetheless an argument still can be made that anything less then brigade strength is a squandering of national military and diplomatic treasure.

In the longer paper and the summary of it reproduced in the latest issue of On Track I discuss a number of strategic considerations that also tend to be overlooked in official promulgations and even in most analytical critiques of Canadian defence policy. In the interest of time I just want to highlight a couple of those points.

First, most critiques spring from the premise that a gap exists between the operations to which the Canadian forces are committed. And their capability to undertake and sustain them. That commitment capability gap generally is considered to be a problem of funding. I put to you instead that it is a credibility gap. The root of the problem perhaps has been the failure to address in a Canadian context the fundamental question posed by Samuel Huntington of NE Military. And I quote, "What function do you perform which obligates society to assume responsibility for your maintenance." End quote.

Only after having answered that question clearly and succinctly can any attempt rationally be made to develop and implement a procurement policy. And then to employ the resulting forces. Second, implicit in all official and analytical work on Canadian defence policy is the notion that there is a national strategy. But if one does exist no where has it ever been articulated.

As Dr. Sokolsky indicated in introducing me I was a collaborator in writing "Lead Mark, the Navy Strategy for 2020" In it we attempted to bridge the credibility gap by developing a strategic framework to explain why Canada sends it's forces abroad. In essence we conducted some trend analysis to deduce that ours is not an inward looking nation. And with our territorial boundaries safe from direct conventional assault Canada is made more secure by seeing to the resolution of global problems at their source. Before they can expand to

threaten the Canadian heartland.

The tragedy of September the 11<sup>th</sup> only throws the matter into sharper relief. Suddenly the terms homeland defence and forward security can be spoken openly. Now more than ever Canadian security can only be measured through a judicious combination of the two. On the Maritime staff we answered Huntington's question in the naval context with a further analysis that the foreign and security policies of past, present and future Canadian governments require what we called a medium global force projection navy. In a typology of navies in Lead Mark and there's copies of the summary version outside I saw in the way in, but anyway in the typologies of navies that we developed on a descending scale of one through nine this medium global force projection navy equated to a rank 3 force coming below those of the United States in rank one obviously. And Britain and France in rank 2. But equal to our Australian and Dutch allies.

It gets a little more complicated when throwing air and land forces into the mix. But I submit for the purpose of discussion that this can be extrapolated to the Canadian forces as a whole. Taken in combination with the notional Canadian way of war these strategic considerations lead to the conclusion that Canadian armed forces exist fundamentally for two reasons.

The first is to keep the United States out. That is not to defend the border against them. But in the sense that we must safeguard the northern approaches the continent so that the Americans do not feel they have to do it for us. The second is to give Canada leverage on the world scene. As such after providing adequate forces for homeland defence any excess capacity is directed to expeditionary forces mandated for forward security. Effectively the government uses the Canadian forces as a medium global force projection military. And this definition is important. That is it's the military that may not possess the full range of capabilities but has a credible capacity in certain of them and consistently demonstrates a determination to exercise them at some distance from the homeland in cooperation with other force projection militaries.

This is not that far removed from the vision for the Canadian forces of 2020 described in Strategy 2020. And as developed from the themes of the 1994 defence white paper. But one is reminded of the commitment capability gap highlighted by the various studies over the past years. Caught in the Middle in particular exposes the harsh reality that the military foundation of these medium power pretensions is a sham. The present crisis has highlighted the inability of either the Canadian air force or the army to deploy and sustain forces of any meaningful size to a distant theatre. And even the navy is stretched to its sustainable limit.

Following the Lead Mark typology further on a descending scale of one to nine whereas the assessment of the navy at rank 3 might for the moment be accurate the air force presently qualifies as a rank 5 adjacent force projection military. And the army only as a rank 7, territorial defence force. Barely above a constabulary force.

In part the resident capacity of the services is driven by Canada's geo-strategic position. The sheer vastness of the land mass and the offshore state requires an oceanic navy on each coast and an air force with continental reach. But without a direct land threat there is no national

sovereignty rational for a fighting army. The problem is that during the Cold War the army was deployed over four, overseas on the front lines against the Soviets. Canadian governments got use to employing the excess capacity of the overseas army for peacekeeping operations and in the aftermath of the so called peace dividend typically it is the army that has had to bear the brunt of both cut backs and a sustainable operational tempo.

How then to make it right. That of course is the one billion dollar question. That being the amount calculated by a caught in the middle at the annual shortfall in defence spending. The trick is not simply to restore funding to cover the shortfall but to deliver to Canadians a military deserving of their upkeep. That can only be accomplished when the paradox of the neutrality of the Canadian state of mind is rationalized with the demonstrated needs of their government leading to a fashioning of a structure for the Canadian forces capable of realizing those needs. Understanding the perception and making it the reality is the key.

The longer paper that I've prepared describes a notional force structure and goes into a general discussion of capabilities. It doesn't pretend to be comprehensive. But it does point to some of the essential way points on the way to recovery. Again in the interest of brevity I shall lessen that pretension somewhat more and just hit a couple of the highlights. They're not given in any particular order of priority other than to start with what is at once the toughest and the most important. And that first point is strategic direction.

Until Canadians and their politicians admit to a general strategic framework for the employment of their military any attempt to transform the Canadian forces let alone to identify future capabilities for it will be an exercise in frustration. Admittedly it is unrealistic to expect a clear and detailed statement of strategic intent. If only because the natural inclination of all governments is to keep their options open. However even within that need for ambiguity it is not unreasonable to expect basic guidelines and assured funding.

An admission of Canada's intended role in the world would provide a somewhat more focussed rationale for the Canadian forces then exists at present. And presumably it would inspire a greater government commitment to achieving the necessary capabilities. To secure a nation the analysis published by the University of Calgary Centre for Military and Strategic Studies makes a powerful case for the issues that need to be addressed in a comprehensive foreign and defence policy review.

But a realistic appraisal of Canada's security interests could be a double edged sword where such a review might lead to the conversion of the so called left to the notion of a rank 3 medium global force projection military. We and the CF should be prepared for a confirmation of the peacekeeper role at the rank 6 or 7 level. Still it would be nice to know. If only so we could all stop pretending otherwise.

The second point. Numbers count. The process of determining force levels must recognize that there are two dimensions to capability. Qualitative and quantitative. Each service is able to boast at certain of their elements to reflect the very best of Canadian high technology. But if those capabilities do not exist in sufficient numbers to deploy and sustain substantial formations, that is an air wing, a naval task group or a brigade they are of little practical

military or diplomatic utility. The vastness of Canadian sovereign territory and the evolving nature of the threat demand a certain minimal structure. The probable need to sustain deployed forces for some years, not just as a matter of quick in and quick out, will require additional forces to establish and maintain credibility with our allies.

And those forces must be able to do more than just show up and be counted present. They must add materially and be able to integrate effectively with their allied counterparts. Indeed as our larger allies work to streamline their forces into small formations the potential exists that the presence of Canadians in substantial numbers can constitute a significant proportion of the allied or coalition force, qualifying for a meaningful place at the political councils.

Third point. Deployability. Naval and air forces are by their nature essentially self deployable. But that is contingent upon the maintenance respectively of fleet replenishment and long range air to air refuelling capabilities. Again the army is more problematic because it must rely on a hefty combination of air and sea lift to deploy in any significant capacity. And neither of those exist presently in the Canadian forces. But it's not just a problem of lift capacity. Recognizing that it's a complex matter the solution must start from a change of organizational attitude.

The present administrative structure of the Canadian army is all right for a (Inaudible) like the US army. But it is not very effective for a force that would like to style itself as rapidly deployable. We must ask ourselves very seriously what is our preference. Administrative efficiency or operational effectiveness.

Restructuring along the lines of a marine expeditionary unit as has been proposed from several other quarters follows the logic that troops can deploy with sufficient quantities of equipment to be immediately operational upon arrival in theatre. Recognizing the Canadian governments sometimes may not wish to immediately commit forces to action, sea basing offers the advantages that transit times can be extended as desired. And that a secure rear area is immediately available.

In wrapping up then Canadians have been slow to recognize the enormity of the implications of the events of September the 11<sup>th</sup>. Indeed the response generally has been very much in keeping with the traditional Canadian way of war. But various studies have pointed to the diminishing effectiveness of Canada's military. And the present operations against Afghanistan have exposed the fault lines in the Canadian forces. The signs already exist that our allies and the United States in particular will soon push us to get our house in order.

Canada's national response to world events has not always been haphazard and need not be so in the future. It has however lately been undertaken more as instinct than as rational determination. If the Canadian forces are to have any hope of realizing the development, funding and employment of a viable military the renewal process must begin with a full appreciation of the national grand strategy. Just for the sake of discussion let's call it forward security. With a requirement for a rank 3 medium global force projection military. Thank you.

(Applause)

Dr. Joel Sokolsky: We'll now move to questions from the floor. I'm advised by the organizers that we're facing one of the great strategic imperatives of live which is lunch at 12:30. So we should be able to get in a range of questions before then. Invite people to come to the microphones.

Question: I'm sorry to do this again but I've been reading a bit about this business of Canada begging the US to go with them instead of with the British and Europeans. And others, the Turks for example. And I have to wonder if Canada hasn't in fact done a rather clever thing. Not very nice but clever. And that is the Americans have a tendency, the 90 day rule. 30 in, 30 to fight, and 30 out. And that means the Canadians can do it too. Whereas the British, Europeans, Turks and others would be left holding the bag afterwards. And I have to wonder what that effect has on the way you gentlemen have been characterizing what you're saying about the Canadian Armed Forces and the future.

Richard Gimblett: I think the quick answer would be is that the Americans have a very different strategic view of the world then we in Canada. And I don't think that's wrong even as we strive for greater interoperability with them. The Americans have set themselves up and established themselves as the premier fighting force. They will fight and they're quite happy to let everybody else pick up the pieces afterwards. And that's not to say that picking up those pieces and sorting things out is going to be easy or does not require a combat capability. But I think the Americans quite rightly are focussed at a different level then us. And I think we should be prepared to sustain operations overseas like away from home for a longer period then 90 days.

John Fraser: I can't help but comment about the rush among certain people in the defence establishment to talk about early in early out. Now I don't know where this is coming from. But it sounds to me as if that's coming from people who are concerned about how much it cost to stay a little longer. And to get out early. But quite frankly if you've got a real problem outside this country that Canadians have said needs to be righted, needs to be fixed and it's going to require combat capable soldiers, airmen, sailors to do it you just cannot build a strategy on early in early out.

The Americans have about thirty thousand plus troops in Korea. And they have been there since 1953. We were going to, there was a lot of talk about us going in to the former Yugoslavia for a little while. We're still there. I'm not going to bring up the Cypress thing because that's different. But the people who are talking about light, early in, early out, Canadian forces don't seem to have their minds attached to any of the reasons why we put Canadian forces in those places in the first place. It's to do a job.

Now if all our allies said early in and early out the job wouldn't get done. And as the gentleman said we pull out and leave it to others. I don't think we'll get away with it. And whatever the American rollover system is I don't think we can take that into account when we decide what commitments we're going to make. And I think the great danger in this is that early in early out sounds wonderful. But who came up with it. Was it people who were

thinking in terms of what is Canada's responsibility given a situation outside the country. Or is it somebody in government who's thought you know we can get away with it cheaper if this is the way we went at it.

Question: I'm Anton Deschampeau(sp) from Senator Day's office. In addition to that I'm an army brat. So I've seen the military from a different aspects. After the tragic events of September 11<sup>th</sup> there was much demand for expanding JTF2 new equipment for the forces. Even bringing back the airborne regiment. JTF2 is being expanded. The clothe the soldier operation. The items are suppose to be fielded by next year. But after this when we do get to a peak how would we keep it so that the Armed Forces will remain at that peak so that they can go to the peacekeeping operations in addition to possible combat operations in Afghanistan.

Martin Chadwick: You raised an excellent point. The short answer of course is that there's no sure thing at all...

(Tape flip)

...if you will somewhat more substantial improvements from DND one wonders what it would take to truly do that. And again I would reiterate the point I made that to the extent that I think the reason the government didn't take a bit hit on that is the total security and defence package in the budget from December was actually quite impressive if you look in billions of dollars. It was a quite impressive number. A huge percentage of that, the bulk of it did not go to DND. It went to other agencies of government who naturally are involved with this. And the components of the budget that did find their way to DND went into OCPEP, CSE, NBC rapid reaction teams, JTF2. JTF2 is a bit fudgier because you can say that the green part of the JTF2 is part of multipurpose combat capable or the black part is more constabulary. Admittedly constabulary with a hell of an attitude but constabulary nevertheless. So breaking out of that model is going to be the real challenge.

Question: Clive Milner(sp). Colonel Commandant of the Army Corp. When the discussion is combat capability and the term multipurpose combat capable is used in the defence paper and it's been used by I think all of the speakers so far a single rifleman is multipurpose and combat capable. And I think the valuation of combat capability unfortunately is looked at too simply in terms of numerical, it's quantified rather than qualified. In simple stark terms when I joined the army in the late '50s the population of Canada was fifteen million and there were about a hundred and fourteen thousand total army, navy and air force. Here we are 45 some years later the population is doubled and the size of the force is now in half. Our commitments are considerably more now then they were then.

But the big concern that I have in terms of combat capability is the leadership. The problems that the army and I can speak primarily to the army, not the navy and the air force. We now have brigades commanded by brigade commanders who in fact have not commanded a battle group. We have some battle group commanders who did not command the combat team. In our haste to promote officers to the rank of brigadier general and make them area commanders they bypass command of a brigade. And yet in that position surely they're

responsible to see, to direct, to assess a brigade commander never having done it themselves.

We have senior uniformed personnel in NDHQ who have commanded nothing. They've been advisors all of their career. This is a major concern. The army is about to embark if it hasn't already on a cyclical training cycle whereby a brigade, one of the three brigades will get to train each year. Therefore the numbers indicate that brigade commanders, some of them will not command their brigade in the field. And likewise battle group or battalion level commander the same thing. The brigade will only be, receive sufficient funding for one of the battle groups to receive training.

We have raised in the dark decade of the 90's a senior military hierarchy that are singularly unqualified to command a brigade group. And if the (Inaudible) John Fraser as he stated if the tooth fairy wave your wand and a hundred billion dollars were thrown at the army, the navy and the air force as well I suppose and all the tanks and the howitzers and all of the equipment were purchased there would be nobody capable of commanding that brigade to deploy it on short term notice. You cannot produce a battle group commander and a brigade commander overnight. Even with the best computer assisted training facility that we use. It takes time, it takes experience to do that. The Canadian army is lacking that experience at the present time.

Unknown Male: There's not a question there.

(Laughter)

John Fraser: Well first of all I think we probably all benefit from what may not have been a question but which is an observation. But surely what Colonel Milner has said reinforces the point that I was trying to make and that others have made. Is that we are down to so few soldiers, sailors and airmen in our regular force and in our reserve forces that we don't have the numbers to do the exercises. To do the brigade that the, the battle group training, to do the battalion training, to do the brigade training. Or for that matter naval and other matters the navy may be a little bit better off. And maybe the air force is to a degree. But if we keep cutting the numbers below what we've got now we aren't going to have any capable numbers of people who could do anything. If we had to meet our commitments. We will just have bits and pieces.

The other problem is if you cut the numbers any further then you do now you can't train. And you come right back to the point that's just been made. You get officers that are going up in rank, not just officers but non commissioned members as well who haven't commanded because they don't get a chance to do it. Just a few minutes ago I referred to General Jeffrey's comments to the Senate committee. And he, in answer to the question he said will they have been trained together. This is a brigade that might be deployed. And he said no. We've not done significant brigade training in a good number of years.

But this is no secret. But my point earlier was that despite this we have had senior people going around saying that we can figure out ways to get rid of more and more personnel and still come up with some kind of a jim dandy Canadian unit that can go about abroad and be

combat capable along with the best and against the best. And I don't believe it can be done if we go any further in reductions.

Now what about leadership. That requires leadership to say to the superiors if we are asked to reduce any further then we have to tell you and we may have to tell you publicly, certainly we'd have to do it in front of a parliamentary committee that this is the list of things that Canadians have been expecting us to do when they're needed and we can't do them any more. Now this is, this is a hard line. But when you get to where we are somebody has got to say that there such things as the hard facts. This may not as humorous as Wellington's letter but I think it's needed.

Martin Chadwick: You're going to get three responses to a non question which is an interesting development. The I would simply add that although these problems perhaps most profound and obvious the case of the army certainly had air force and navy analogs the erosion of critical skills and how the experience levels of say one might find in the typical Aurora crew in the long range patrol business for example but you could cite many others. Frigates and destroyers which have gone a long time without seeing a Sea King for example. That gets us admittedly into a ten part miniseries right there. But I mean the idea of, I mean if, I mean some frigates in recent years have had no more then the odd training exercise where a Sea King drops by for a little while and then it's gone again and there's no really assigned helicopter detachment on board the ship. I mean at this sort of rate we might as well convert the hanger and flight deck into floating casino space and make some money while the ships are on Great Lake cruises during the summertime.

(Laughter)

Richard Gimblett: I want to dissenting, a somewhat dissenting view on this. I come from a service, the navy that puts a very high premium on command. Now I have nothing wrong, I have no problem with that other then the fact that the selection process for command is geared to picking somebody who can command a frigate. And commanding a frigate is a very different prospect then commanding the Armed Forces. Commanding the navy as a whole or commanding the Armed Forces. And if you tighten up your gene pool so that you're letting commanders of frigate run the Armed Forces or I put the same to a battalion or an air force squadron.

Okay you're doing a disservice unless you then take and redevelop those people after they have held that command. But if you're looking at selecting people for tactical command and then throwing them into a strategic headquarters you'll run into problems. And that not to point fingers at anybody who may or may not be in those positions now because I think you know we're a victim of a process. But we need more.

I think the more important thing is operational experience. You want to have people running the forces who have not just been staff weenies all their life okay. Who have actually been out in the field. Done their twenty years before the mast. Or done the requisite number of flying hours to know what it's like to be operational. I think that's a better way of looking at

it.

Question: Yes hi my name is Claude Bachand. I'm a member of Parliament from Saint Jean and a critic for the Bloc Quebecois in the House of Commons. I'd like to touch on three issues very rapidly. First of all I'd like to tell Mr. Fraser that he's right. Early in, early out or any kind of philosophy linked to any department especially with National Defence it's a budget issue usually. And I categorize that as probably a political self protection because when something occurs and you look at the budget the morning when the Minister comes over and you know you'll be under attack what you tend to do usually to try to develop a new philosophy or something else that can justify these cuts or this non increase in the budget. I wouldn't say it's only national defence. I'd say it's all departments that usually do that.

Second issue I'd like to talk about is the combat capability or state of preparedness. I just came back from a NATO meeting in Brussels. And there's an enormous gap being created between the United States and the international community. Canada is not different. And this extremely important gap is creating all sort of distortion. There's a lot of discussions now at NATO level as specialization of role. I mean some countries cannot maintain of course the strength of the United States. And there are even some states that are really not only concerned but they'd like to find another way of impacting or having their words to say in the international community. Their only way to do it is probably to do some peace mission or peacekeeping mission. So it's a very important role and I think we should take a look at it also.

And the last thing I wanted to talk about was the white paper. I've heard since I've been here this morning we should, we must, we ought. But I think it's the taxpayers that we have to listen. I'm not saying that if we listen to the taxpayer and he says lets cut the army we'll cut the army. Before going in front of the taxpayers reviewing the white paper the government should make some sort of information to the public. Tell them how it's important to intervene on international issues. Tell them how it's important for the army to be there to intervene in their own ridings. I'm from Saint Jean. I was a victim of the ice storm. And I really thank the PPCLI to have come and helped us out. So the people usually don't know that unless they're in a crisis. But you have to predict crisis I suppose when you're national defence.

And I think for the government and for the army especially for CDA it's important, you have a task I think to put forward this issue to convince the population that an increase in the budget is kind of important. We were all together in the (Inaudible) demand of increasing one billion dollars a year for the next five years. We had one point two billion for five years. We didn't agree with that because it was all diluted in security and defence. And security had the major part of it, not defence. So I think that I want to thank the CDA to have invited me here. And I'd like to listen to the panellists on what, how they'd like to react to my three issues please.

Dr. Joel Sokolsky: Due to the time I think we're going, if the panellists could hold their response to that certain questions and have a question from General MacKenzie and then we'll, they'll respond to both questions and have a concluding statement.

Question: Thanks very much and I won't take long because it was Clive Milner's comments that stimulated me to come up here. I just don't think with great respect that the panels response was comprehensive enough. If the response is yes we have to stop the hemorrhaging because you know shrinkage is less Clive's point is that we have that situation now based on the current status quo. Forget about shrinkage. You need expansion or you need a change of policy in order to provide our leadership with adequate and fair preparation. So we're not going to change this crisis that he has eloquently outlined by maintaining even the status quo. And we have constantly repeated over and over we need X billions of dollars to stop the hemorrhaging, that won't be enough. We have a crisis in preparation of our leaders which they would like to see resolved too. Thank you.

John Fraser: Well I'd be the last one to quarrel with General MacKenzie. I mean when I say that we are, we can't reduce any lower than the sixty thousand plus the reserves that doesn't mean I think that that's adequate. I think we should have more. But what I'm getting at is that for a number of years now we have been bit by bit fed a line coming I think from bean counters, not soldiers that somehow or other if we just get enough of the right technology we aren't going to need all these personnel. And that will cut the defence costs.

And I think the whole thing is fallacy. If you really intend to meet any of the commitments in the white paper. Or for that matter even intend to meet the commitments that most Canadians will tell you they expect us to do or expect us to be able to do if you go to a Rotary Club meeting in my city at noon on Friday.

Martin Chadwick: Yeah just a quick comment. It seems to me we're in a situation somewhat analogous today to the state of the forces in the early '70s during the Trudeau period where my later boss, the late Rod Byers observed circa 1974 that the forces were on the brink of the abyss. And were ceasing to be militarily relevant. That's perhaps not a perfect analogy for the present day situation but it's coming uncomfortably close. And I would simply make the point that time is not on our side and I would note that even when Trudeau in 1975 turned the ship around and started to spend what in Trudeauvian terms were substantial additional monies on defence, particularly on the capital side look back at how long it took to get that injection of new equipment. I mean some equipment arrived fairly quickly. It took 20 years to get the frigate, more than 20 years after initial approval to get all of the frigates delivered. We don't have that luxury this time around.

Richard Gimblett: I think we're all fundamentally in agreement and the question from here is essentially the same as the previous one. We have to decide how much military or rather yeah how much military can be bought with how much money. And you don't start with what the funding envelope is. I think you've got to decide with what military you want. But you've got to be able to explain it in really simple terms so that people can hoist it in. And that's why well being rather simple people in the navy we went for our 1 to 9 scale.

You pick a level that you like that you're comfortable with that seems to be what we're doing and from that define the capabilities that are required to do that task. And then put, then you start putting the price tags against the capabilities. But it requires a fair bit of honesty, self honesty in your assessment of what it is that you're doing. I was going to make another point.

That's all.

John Fraser: Well I'm intrigued by that response because if I was deciding what kind of military we want and I was going to go out and tell the Canadian public about it I would take a look at recent experience and current situations and I would say these are the things which we think you want us to do something about. And what I got to tell you that we haven't got enough, we haven't got enough personnel, we haven't got enough equipment to do it now. Now which do you want us to back away from? And who do you want us to go and beg that they take over what we should be doing. Who for instance is going to look after you in an ice storm. Who's going to deal with an Oka. Who's going to stop a massacre in some other country that hasn't started it yet.

We've had lots of experience. I mean an awful lot of time is used up trying to figure out what is our quote strategic approach. Instead we should take a look at the world around us. And take a look at at least our recent experience and say what are we likely to have to do. And I would, this is where I would differ with the senior official who came in front the Senate committee and said well we haven't had to do any of this for 15 years. And could we deploy a brigade. Well yes if there was a crisis and if we knew all about early enough and mumble, mumble, mumble. The fact is the Canadian public does expect us to be able to do things. And it's in those expectations that you start to define what it is you want your Armed Forces to do.

Richard Gimblett: And actually that leads me to the point that I forgot I was going to make. It comes down to the environmental chiefs to have the gumption I think to be able to tell the chief and the Minister that there are certain things we are not capable of doing instead of making the staffs work overtime at night trying to figure out a way to shave a bit more off the ice cube. I think that's where you need the leadership and I think that's where we come together. But somebody has to occasionally be able to tell the Minister and Cabinet that sorry we don't have the resources to do that.

Question: Well if I didn't get up you'd wonder why. But I, you talk about the resources John. And I don't know if you're aware that Senator Michael Meighen was over I believe it was in Bosnia or Kosovo. It was one or the other. And some of our peacekeepers were coming back and on the plane with Senator Michael Meighen when they were about to land here in Canada they were told to take their boots off. And they said take our boots off. They said yes, we have to give them to your replacements that are going over, the men to replace you because we don't have enough money to buy boots for them. Now when we hit that we have hit rock bottom and we have a lot of work to do. And we, and that is a total embarrassment for Canada. It truly is.

Michael Meighen was in shock. And so I have to tell you was that gentleman that wears a uniform for us in the military to think that he had to take his boots off and give them to someone else. So when we go that low boy I'm going to tell you there should be no question, no question whatsoever we should do just what President Bush does. He doesn't go out and do a poll to find out whether the people want him to put money in the military. What he does is he puts the money in the military. And then all the people love him for it. Well I can tell

you if Chretien some money in the military everybody is going to love him. How we get that message to him I don't know.

(Applause)

Dr. Joel Sokolsky: Do you want a final... go ahead.

John Fraser: I just wanted to share with you a little story. Very brief. Back in 1984 when I was a sitting member and it, my party, the Progressive Conservative party hoped that they would form a government in the coming election we held a weekend retreat at Mount St. Marie. And every critic had to present to the caucus the state of the, that department and what needed to be done. And of course defence was one of the foremost presenters. The presentation went through a litany of woes. And when it was finished there was a long silence. And Mr. Mulroney said well is there any comments or any questions. And we have a member of Parliament then named Frank Overly(sp) who was born in Germany.

And he even was in a Hitler youth unit and was saved by some sensible officer who turned him back in Germany instead of, to Germany instead of sending him out to get massacred in the last few months by the Soviets. But he came to Canada and he worked very hard and he was successful and he got elected to be a member of Parliament. And he was sitting with us as one of our colleagues. And there was a long silence. As I say Mr. Mulroney said well any comments or any questions? And finally Frank got up and he said Mr. Leader he said I don't know what to say except that listening to all this I'm going to be on the losing side again.

(Laughter)

Dr. Joel Sokolsky: Well I think it's, if we look at the future of the Armed Forces and how combat capable they are it seems to me that the Canadian government and the forces are facing a new environment but an old problem. And that is there will be and I think (Inaudible) there will not be as much money as the Armed Forces need. And there will be more, the government will make more commitments then it should given the money it's going to spend. Which comes down to the greatest problem in a democratic government which is the need to choose.

We've heard a lot about the combat capability. And the white paper is going to relook again at the Canadian defence task, defence of Canada, North America, NATO and peacekeeping. But I'm in this context I think a problem which hasn't been around for a while which is homeland security of North America may now compete for the resources that we had formerly believed were disposable to send overseas. And if that is our key relationship that may draw down available forces.

But I do think it is important at this point and it's something that the CDA does is to gauge public opinion. To listen to it as one American commentator put it. You may be surprised that the know nothings know something. And in the context of defence certainly I think the Canadian public senses it's time to make, have to make the decisions and to put more resources where they're needed. And I think the panel discussions this morning has furthered

that debate. So I thank our participants for their expert insights. And understanding. And for you all for participating in what has I think been a worthwhile beginning to the discussions. Thank you.

Moderator: Ladies and gentlemen there but remains for me to thank our moderator and all the members of the panel, Dr. Sokolsky, Richard Gimblett, Martin Chadwick and the Honourable John Fraser. A plug, there have been a couple of plugs for books and things. There is a very important document on the street just recently and that is the Honourable Mr. Fraser's 2002 report on land force reserve restructure. Documents are available in the hallway behind the ballroom here. I urge you to grab a copy.

We now have a superb basis on which to start our second panel this afternoon. A panel that will follow the CDS's presentation which will occur immediately after lunch. The panel as you will have noted from the program has the Canadian Forces or combat capability and the Canadian Forces, where should we be in 20 years. I repeat our panellists were I think extraordinarily good in preparing us for a look at the future.

A couple of administrative announcements very quickly. First of all lunch will be served in the Adam Room down the hallway just behind where the registration desk was this morning, starts at 7 minutes ago. I do urge you also to be back in the room here for 2 o'clock. CDS does have a tight schedule. We will not be able to expect them to stay longer then the scheduled time. Please be seated at 2 for his presentation.

During lunch the Parodis(sp) trophy will be presented. We're delighted this year that General Parodis himself will be with us to make that presentation. And I think a final point. An announcement. On behalf of the Canadian Forces personnel support agency. The agency is holding a draw for three pieces of luggage. A lot of you with the documents we provide at this conference will need certainly one piece of luggage extra. You're invited to drop off your business cards into a glass bowl at the Canadian Forces personnel support agency display out in the hallway. The drawing for the three lucky winners will be made at 5 o'clock this afternoon in the Laurier Room at the beginning of the cocktail period.

Thank you very much. And finally please look around there. The billboard or the whatever it is, the notice board, the sheets are up there for signing up for the various syndicates for tomorrow afternoon. Again please have a look, make a choice. We do urge your participation in one of the six syndicates. Do sign up. And a final on behalf of the CDAI a final thank you for this excellent preparation given to us by the panel this morning for our panel this afternoon. Thank you.

(Applause)