

CDA Institute XVth Annual Seminar, 1999

***The Profession of Arms in Canada:
Past, Present and Future***

INTRODUCTION

Late 20th century technology and the uncertain nature of post-Cold War international relations have combined to make the job of today's military commander more complex than ever before. The challenges of modern operations come at a time when the senior echelons of the Canadian Forces find their professionalism coming under frequent attack in the media. These developments raise a series of questions about Canada's professional officer corps. How well are our officers prepared for today's demanding service? How does the evolution of the officer corps in the past influence the Canadian military profession in the present? What sort of training and education would best prepare our officers to face the challenges of the future?

The March, 1997, *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces* highlights the need for a full review of the training, education and professional development program for Canadian Forces officers. This year's seminar identifies the positive features of the Canadian military profession as well as areas in which change is required.

La technologie de la fin du 20e siècle et la nature incertaine des relations internationales après la guerre froide font que la tâche du commandant militaire est plus complexe que dans le passé. Les défis présentés aux échelons militaires supérieurs par les opérations militaires modernes coïncident avec les attaques fréquentes dans les médias, dirigés contre la profession militaire. Ces événements soulèvent plusieurs questions pour le corps des officiers. Par exemple, sont-ils bien préparés aux exigences du service d'aujourd'hui? Est-ce que l'évolution du corps a influencé leurs attitudes professionnelles? Quels genres d'études et de formation sont requises pour mieux préparer nos officiers aux défis auxquels ils auront à faire face dans l'avenir?

La Rapport au Premier Ministre sur le Leadership et l'administration dans les Forces canadiennes, de mars 1997, met en lumière le besoin d'une révision complète de la formation, des études et du développement professionnel des officiers des Forces canadiennes. Notre séminaire cette année identifie les aspects positifs de la profession militaire au Canada ainsi que les aspects ayant besoin de changement.

SUMMARY

In his keynote address, General Baril emphasized that the essential military virtues of love of country, professional values, duty, honour and self-sacrifice remain valid, but that they must be applied in a changing society undergoing a technological revolution. This requires forward thinking and flexibility on the part of the profession of arms, which must be constantly evaluated to avoid preparing for yesterday's conflicts. Higher education levels become mandatory, particularly for senior officers.

The need for multi-purpose combat-capable forces remains. Deployability and interoperability with allies are key areas for development in doctrine, training and equipment procurement. But throughout this planning process, the needs of our people remain paramount. This is a major part of *strategic leadership*, which must permeate the profession at all levels.

Dr. Granatstein reviewed the development of military professionalism in Canada, a process which took place through experience in war. This professionalism continued in peacetime, aided during the interwar period by lively professional debate, and carried on through the 1960s, despite government indifference. Since that time, professionalism has eroded among senior officers, who, through lack of higher command experience and education, no longer can match their allied counterparts.

Panel 1: The Evolution of the Canadian Officer Corps

Dr. Bland focussed on the dichotomy of views between political and military leaders regarding effective defence policy for Canada. Political leaders focus on maintaining a seat on allied councils while keeping Canadian military involvement to a minimum. Military leaders see alliance commitments as the only source of policy, and compete for resources to make their individual service the best servant of alliance plans. This dichotomy has led to disconcerted policies and decisions, exemplified by the Canadian reaction to the Cuban missile crisis, and a "commitment-capability" gap which was really a gap in perception by politicians and the military. Both sides must address this dichotomy, the politician by providing clear and realistic defence objectives and the funds to achieve them, and the military officer by recognizing that military objectives must conform to national objectives, and the paramountcy of *national* command.

General Evraire addressed the lack of *credibility* of today's military. Through failing to foresee the effects of Canadian social change, the military was forced to *react* to the demands of their environment. In the process, political and public support were lost. Mr. Young's *Report to the Prime Minister* revealed the extent to which the military had not kept current. It was lack of *vision* which accounted for the failure to provide adequate education and development and forced the floundering approach to gender integration, equal opportunity legislation and greater transparency. Two keys to correction of the situation were learning to work intelligently with the bureaucracy and active measures to gain public support. General Evraire noted that much work was in progress at DND, which already points to improvement in the military's credibility.

Panel 2: The Profession of Arms in Canada - the Way Ahead

General Withers stressed the need to address technological and societal change and the linkage between society and the military. Both require primacy to be given to professional development despite shrinking resources.

Admiral Murray felt that the necessary base of solid professionalism and dedication existed in the profession, but it was time for a renewal. Military missions now had complex political and humanitarian dimensions, and great technological change had occurred, particularly in communications. Much greater reliance would have to be placed on leadership and key decision-making throughout the chain of command, including junior officers and NCOs. Societal change is marked by economic uncertainty and a demand for transparency, giving rise to drastic budget cuts, a need for clarified accountability and a determination to keep all other activity subordinate to "sharp end" capability.

General Couture held *leadership* at all levels as the key element in force renewal. The military leader of the future must be grounded in the core values of the military, high ethical level, flexibility and skills in strategic management (which must no longer be seen as mutually exclusive with leadership.) Diversity, gender integration and rising education levels will be essential CF attributes. Changing career expectations force a focus on *employability* vice job security, and personnel will have a say in their own career development. In addition to higher technological demands, future leaders must be sensitive to cultural nuances and the impact of the media, and possess a cross-cultural capability with civil organizations.

Concluding the panel, Dr. Oliver stressed the need to maintain the essence of military professionalism during a time of tumultuous change. This involves some well-informed resistance to those taking advantage of turbulence to advocate changing the military's *raison d'être*. Willingness to be more open, transparent and accountable must be matched by corporate capacity, legitimacy and confidence to explain military needs. Focus must remain on the long term, on retaining the basic faith of the profession in its purpose, and on ensuring that limited funds address valid military needs. There is evidence that the distinction between military and civilian professionals is diminishing, and the profession of arms should take the best from both traditions.

Discussion

A number of themes recurred during the discussion periods. One was the need to balance education and development with operational experience and time with troops. Another was the need to develop a strategic vision and communicate it to all levels of the profession. A third was how to develop public support in a society which did not seem to care, and the reverse of that coin, which was developing military support for societal change as it impacted the military. It was generally felt that both would require a long-term approach and creative thinking. A major purpose of educating officers was to enable them to lead their people along the lines society required.

Another recurrent theme questioned the continuation of the civilian-military integration of NDHQ, given that a return to CFHQ and the DM's office had been recommended by various advisors. Dr. Bland identified the structure as a solution to a bureaucratic administrative problem

which had fared no better than other models. Dr. Granatstein felt that politicians preferred to have their military advice filtered through the civil service. Either way, there was no sign of change on the horizon.

The discussion also focussed in part on the changes in the Royal Military College which were making it the key institution for professional change. The College has over 1500 students in continuing education, and 600 graduate students, two third of whom are part time. Plans are under way for a Leadership Institute, and military trials and evaluations were routinely conducted.

SYNTHESES

Dans son discours pivot du Séminaire, le Général Baril souligne que les vertus militaires essentielles: d'amour de la patrie, de valeurs professionnelles, de sens du devoir, d'honneur et d'autosacrifice demeurent à l'ordre du jour, mais qu'elles doivent être appliquées dans une société en mutation qui traverse une révolution technologique. Dans ces conditions, la profession militaire doit savoir scruter l'avenir, s'adapter et rester soumise à une réévaluation incessante, afin de ne pas toujours être en retard d'un conflit. Le niveau d'éducation des forces armées, et en particulier des officiers supérieurs, doit impérativement être rehaussé.

La nécessité de disposer de forces polyvalentes aptes au combat demeure. La capacité de déploiement et l'interopérabilité avec des forces alliées doivent être au coeur de l'élaboration de la doctrine, de la formation et de l'acquisition d'équipements. Cependant, tout au long du processus de planification, les besoins de nos personnels restent la préoccupation première. Il s'agit d'un élément central du leadership stratégique, qui doit pénétrer la profession à tous les niveaux.

Le Docteur Granatstein passe en revue l'évolution du professionnalisme militaire au Canada, processus qui prend appui sur l'expérience de la guerre. Ce professionnalisme s'est maintenu en temps de paix, assisté durant l'entre-deux-guerres par un débat animé entre professionnels. Il a persisté durant les années 60, malgré l'indifférence des autorités gouvernementales. Depuis, on assiste à une érosion du professionnalisme parmi les officiers supérieurs, lesquels, manquant d'expérience comme de formation en matière de commandement supérieur, sont aujourd'hui à la traîne de leurs homologues des pays alliés.

Atelier 1: l'évolution du corps des officiers canadiens

Le Docteur Bland met l'accent sur la dichotomie de perception entre les responsables politiques et militaires sur ce qui doit constituer une politique de défense efficace pour le Canada. L'objectif des dirigeants politiques est de conserver un siège dans les conseils alliés tout en maintenant la participation militaire canadienne à un seuil minimal. Les chefs militaires, quant à eux, considèrent que seuls les engagements pris au sein d'une alliance sont viables et rivalisent pour obtenir les ressources permettant à leur arme d'appartenance d'être la meilleure au service des plans alliés. Cette dichotomie a conduit à des politiques et à des décisions dépourvues d'unité, comme l'a illustré la réaction canadienne à la crise des missiles de Cuba, et à un fossé entre les

engagements pris et la capacité de les honorer, ce même fossé qui sépare les perceptions des politiques et celles des militaires. Il convient donc que, de part et d'autre, on se penche sur cette dichotomie : les politiques, en énonçant des objectifs de défense clairs et réalistes avec, à l'appui, les crédits pour les atteindre; et les responsables militaires, en reconnaissant que les objectifs militaires doivent se conformer aux objectifs nationaux et en admettant la primauté du commandement national.

Le Général Evraire aborde le manque de crédibilité de l'appareil militaire actuel. Pour n'avoir pas su prévoir les conséquences des transformations du tissu social canadien, les militaires se trouvent forcés de réagir aux exigences de leur environnement. Ce processus s'est accompagné de la perte du soutien politique et public. Le Rapport au Premier ministre du Ministre Young met en lumière la profondeur du retard accumulé par les militaires. C'est l'absence d'une vision qui explique pourquoi l'on n'a pas su offrir une formation et un développement appropriés, mais aussi l'approche velléitaire adoptée face à l'intégration des sexes, à la législation sur l'égalité des chances et à la quête de transparence. Pour corriger la situation, une double approche s'impose: apprendre à opérer en bonne intelligence avec l'administration et ne ménager aucun effort pour se gagner le soutien du public. Le Général Evraire observe que le ministère de la Défense nationale

déploie de nombreuses initiatives dans ce domaine, ce qui laisse prévoir une amélioration de la crédibilité du corps militaire.

Atelier 2: La profession militaire au Canada: perspectives d'avenir

Le Général Withers met en relief la nécessité de tenir compte de l'évolution de la technologie et du tissu social, ainsi que du lien entre le corps social et le corps militaire. Dans les deux cas, il convient de donner la priorité au perfectionnement professionnel, malgré la réduction des ressources.

Pour l'Amiral Murray, la base nécessaire à un professionnalisme et à un dévouement fiables existe au sein de la profession, mais un renouvellement s'impose. En effet, les missions militaires présentent aujourd'hui des dimensions politiques et humanitaires complexes; en outre, la technologie a subi une profonde évolution, notamment dans le domaine des télécommunications. Il faut, par conséquent, davantage insister sur l'aptitude au leadership et à la prise de décisions importantes à toutes les étapes de la chaîne de commandement, y compris pour les nouveaux officiers et les sous-officiers. L'évolution sociale s'accompagne d'une incertitude économique et d'une exigence de transparence, ce qui entraîne des réductions draconiennes des budgets et rend nécessaire une plus grande clarté dans la répartition des responsabilités, parallèlement à la détermination de subordonner toutes les autres activités à l'obtention d'une forte capacité "de pointe".

Le Général Couture voit dans le leadership à tous les niveaux l'élément clé du renouvellement des forces. Le chef militaire de l'avenir doit être imprégné des valeurs fondamentales du corps militaire et d'une moralité irréprochable, savoir s'adapter et maîtriser la gestion stratégique -ce qui ne doit plus être considéré comme incompatible avec le leadership. Les attributs essentiels des FC devront être: diversité, intégration des sexes et amélioration des niveaux d'éducation. La transformation des profils de carrière oblige à mettre l'accent sur l'employabilité relativement à la sécurité de l'emploi, et les personnels auront leur mot à dire quant au déroulement de leur carrière. En plus de prêter attention aux exigences technologiques, les responsables de l'avenir doivent être à l'écoute des nuances culturelles et de l'impact des médias, et posséder une capacité de communication transculturelle avec les organisations civiles.

En conclusion de l'atelier, le Docteur Oliver insiste sur la nécessité de préserver l'essence du

professionnalisme militaire dans une époque de mutations tumultueuses. Il faudra, pour cela, surmonter la résistance aguerrie de ceux qui veulent profiter de l'agitation pour altérer la raison d'être du corps militaire. On devra donc, tout en sachant se montrer plus ouvert, transparent et responsable, mettre en avant la capacité du corps militaire, sa légitimité et en expliquer avec confiance les besoins. Il conviendra d'insister sur le long terme, tout en veillant à ce que la profession conserve sa foi en elle-même et en son objet, et canaliser des ressources limitées vers des besoins justifiés. Il apparaît de plus en plus que la distinction entre les professionnels militaires et civils tend à s'estomper; la profession militaire devrait prendre le meilleur des deux traditions.

Analyse

Les périodes de discussions ont fait apparaître un certain nombre de thèmes récurrents: le premier concerne la nécessité d'équilibrer la formation et le perfectionnement au moyen d'une expérience opérationnelle et de temps passé avec les troupes. Le second traduit le souci de renforcer le soutien de l'opinion publique dans une société apparemment indifférente, et, symétriquement, de renforcer le soutien apporté par le corps militaire à une évolution du corps social qui affecte en retour les militaires. On s'accorde à penser que ces deux mouvements nécessiteront une approche à long terme et une réflexion créatrice. La formation des officiers doit avoir comme ligne directrice le renforcement de leur capacité à diriger leurs personnels dans le sens requis par la société.

Autre thème récurrent: la remise en cause de l'intégration civilo-militaire du QGDN, étant donné que plusieurs conseillers ont recommandé un retour au sein du QGFC et au bureau du sous-ministre. Pour le Docteur Bland, cette structure n'est autre qu'une solution à un problème bureaucratique, qui n'a pas donné de meilleurs résultats que les autres modèles. Selon le Docteur Granatstein, les politiques préfèrent que les avis présentés par les militaires leur parviennent à travers le filtre de la fonction publique. En tout état de cause, aucun changement ne se profile à l'horizon.

Le débat a également porté sur la transformation du Collège militaire royal, qui en fait est une institution clé de l'évolution professionnelle. Le Collège accueille plus de 1500 étudiants en éducation permanente, et 600 étudiants gradués, dont les deux tiers à temps partiel. Des plans sont à l'étude pour la création d'un Institut du Leadership, et des essais et évaluations militaires sont effectués de manière régulière.

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ADDRESS BY THE HONOURABLE ARTHUR EGGLETON, PC MP

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

To the 62nd Annual General Meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations

Chateau Laurier Hotel, 29 January 1999

I'm happy to be back here again. In fact I notice, General Silva, you said that once again the Minister of Defence is here. I think that's an accomplishment because I remember when I got this job eighteen months ago they told me there'd been five ministers of Defence in six years, so I've actually lasted long enough to come back for a second time and I hope on this occasion I'm able to profit as we profit together for the benefit of the Canadian Forces from our being able to meet.

It's good to come here and to recognize the outstanding contribution that the CDA has made, continues to make on military issues, it's a partnership and it's one that's existed for some 67 years. You've offered some helpful suggestions over those years. You've told us how we might be able to do things a little bit better and I appreciate that. The continuity I think is important. At a time of tremendous upheaval it's important to have institutions that endure.

Il est bon de faire partie d'un organisme sur lequel on peut compter. I also appreciate the fact that your association remains firmly focused on the future, demonstrated by the symposium that you held last November and most recently yesterday when you issued the Strategic Assessment. Now I haven't had an opportunity to read it all yet but I did look over the executive summary and I must tell you something that particularly caught my eye, I was particularly gratified to see that you are recommending that the budget, that the Department of National Defence should go up to 10½ billion dollars and I think that's appropriate. (applause) I'll pass on your applause to Paul Martin.

As Minister I also value the resolutions which I received from the CDA and have been happy to report to Brigadier General Silva about the progress on many of them. These include the replacement since we last talked and I last got resolutions at this meeting, we've replaced the Oberon class submarines or at least we're well on our way to doing it and of course we've made a decision to acquire the Cormorant helicopters, we require more of the armoured personnel carriers and we're getting into the final stages of a procurement

strategy with respect to the replacement of the Maritimes helicopters, the Sea Kings. We're also actively pursuing the Aurora life extension and the CF18 modernization and instead of waiting until we need a big chunk of capital money to do all these things at once, we're doing them in a more depressed out-fashion which makes them more affordable and it means that we're able to get on with the work. The CF18 modernization for example, we're getting on with even faster than we had previously anticipated of course spreading it out over a number of years so that it is affordable.

I'm also pleased to say that we have listened to your concerns with respect to the reserves. We have demonstrated our commitment and our appreciation in the importance of the reserves as part of the defence team and we've improved both pay, the 85% formula and some of the retirement allowances, but that's only the beginning, there's more to be done there. So, what I'm saying is that your resolutions have had a real impact and I thank you for the input. Now as we, in this year of 1999, are approaching the new millennium I'd like to talk about some of my key priorities for the Canadian Forces.

I'd like to suggest four pillars, four essential elements which I believe must be re-enforced if we are to strengthen our military both in terms of capacity and morale.

Those four pillars are people, equipment, education and training and leadership. People are our most important asset. We must make sure that we treat them appropriately, that we look at issues such as the quality of life issues. We want to have, and I believe we do have, dedicated men and women, professional, very professional and very highly qualified in our Force. They need the tools to do the job, the proper equipment that is necessary, equipment that is going to, they're going to be able to use, to inter-operate with our allies and they need the education and training, proper education and training to be able to do the job and effective leadership is the other fourth and key component of these four pillars.

Now each is equally important to me and we cannot promote one at the expense of the other. Good equipment is of little use if we don't have people with proper training, higher pay is certainly not a substitute for effective and strong leadership. I am committed, ladies and gentlemen, to providing our men and women of the Canadian Forces with the quality of life they deserve and I am determined to ensure that a balance and a high standard of quality is obtained at each of these four pillars.

Now I'd like to talk about one of the pillars today, an issue which is of particular concern to me and I believe is of great importance to the Canadian Forces and that is education in the military. One of the reasons I wanted to talk about this today General Silva was I noticed a special edition of On Track this fall which was devoted to issues of education. There were a number, there were a number of articles. General Baril wrote one of them and another one of them was written by an old Toronto friend of mine, somebody that has now joined us in Ottawa at the War Museum and that's Dr. Jack Granestein and he expressed some very blunt concerns, that's Jack, very blunt concerns about the state of education within the Canadian Forces.

I have a very high regard for Jack Granestein and for the arguments that he made and I welcome his comments on education, not because I necessarily agree with all of them, but because it opens a debate and I think we need to have that discussion.

Comme première observation dans le cadre de ce débat sur l'importance de l'éducation chez les militaires, permettez-moi de dire que je suis fier des programmes et des projets que nous avons entrepris afin de favoriser une meilleure éducation au sein des forces.

For example, we are developing a solid track record of working in co-operation with a number of community colleges and universities across Canada to help our members attain a well rounded education. We have programs for post-graduate education. We've got a long standing continuing education program in association with the University of Manitoba et l'Université du Québec and at the Royal Military College we share seminars and courses with Queens University, a collaboration that is working well.

We also offer distance learning at both the under-graduate and graduate levels to all members of the Canadian Forces. And of course since the report of my predecessor Doug Young to the Prime Minister in 1997 it has been the policy of the department to require a university degree in order now to be commissioned as an officer.

We have undertaken also a number of specific initiatives to ensure that we meet that goal. It includes adjustments to our recruiting policy, new full-time bachelor degree sponsorship programs which have been put in place by the Chiefs of Maritime and Land Staff and changes to our internal programs which have been upgraded to reflect the increased requirement for broader education. These include enhancements to the RMC programs and more comprehensive officer professional development programs which now require significant mandatory training and educational courses at each of the four levels of officership. Just recently the new three month advanced military course, studies course graduated its first 23 officers.

All of these are steps in the right direction and I believe reflect the right priorities. Now one of Dr. Granatstein's concerns is that there may be an antique intellectual culture within the Canadian Forces. Well, if this is true then surely the best way to combat it is through the expansion of the intellectual capacity of our Forces.

Of course we know that degree alone, degrees alone do not impart wisdom nor do they bestow discernment and we would be short-sighted indeed if we judge the quality of our education efforts solely on the number of degrees within our ranks, but degrees do remain a widely accepted standard of academic achievement and are a useful means of measuring our progress.

It seems to me however that the real issue is not the number of degrees or the level of those degrees but the capacity for sound strategic thinking that either we're building or not building within the Forces. The bottom line is that today's military environment, in that environment higher education is important not for the letters it can add to your name but for the value it can add to our Canadian Forces.

This I would suggest is the real message that underlies the concerns of Dr. Granatstein and others. They recognize that education and training in the Forces must evolve if we are to meet the demands of a new day and I agree.

For roughly 30 years, the cold war period, our world was unstable but our purpose was plain, halt the expansion of communism. Our enemy was clearly identified and much of our strategic thinking was done for us but today we live in an international environment that is much more complex.

The world is changing rapidly, fundamentally, profoundly and power is more diffused, threats are more diverse, consensus is more difficult, the world is as unstable as ever. There's battles, there's wars raging around the world as we meet here today and when you add to this the, some of the new realities, the oncoming realities, the far reaching implications for example of the revolution in military affairs, RMA, you soon recognize the need for a fundamental re-thinking of nearly every aspect of military policy including the kinds of personnel that we produce.

In a knowledge based environment technical and tactical proficiency is not enough. In today's environment we need more than ever the capacity to think strategically and if we are to remain effective we need to ensure that our personnel are educated accordingly.

Une des nouvelles possibilités que nous examinons suppose un changement dans la façon dont nous assurons l'instruction du corps des associés. At the moment, junior officer training in areas such as military ethics and ethos occurs in a rather disjointed manner. Individual blocks of basic training are too short to effectively cover the required skills or even to properly evaluate candidates' understanding of this critical material.

Well, we are looking at a new approach, one which would provide all officership candidates with a solid grounding in ethics, ethos, leadership and basic military knowledge. The various officer entry schemes would be consolidated into one so that every officer in the Forces would receive the same fundamental education and training. Training programs would be enhanced so that for example military ethos would be reinforced by instruction in Canadian military history and Canadian civics. Following this period of officership training, appropriate candidates would then proceed to university, either RMC or a civilian institution.

Those who already hold degrees would go to the next phase of leadership and occupational training. We believe that a solid grounding in military ethos and ethics at the beginning of the process rather than scattered haphazardly over several years will result in stronger officers, better leadership.

Of course we also recognize that the requirement for better education does not apply only to the officer level. The nature of our engagements today demand new skills on the part of our non-commissioned members as well. This is true in both peacekeeping and combat roles.

Peacekeeping today often has more to do with negotiating and people skills than simply walking a line between two camps. Professor Albert Legault put it well when he said: "we need soldiers who are both educated and capable of discernment within an environment where most of the time the objective is no longer to conquer or destroy but to construct and participate in building peace."

But even in combat situations the nature of what we expect from our personnel is changing. Today's soldier's knapsack is as likely to carry a micro chip as a canteen. Equipment is becoming highly sophisticated. Anyone who watches what's going on in the Persian Gulf will soon become aware of the high tech nature of modern conflict. In this context, we cannot send our troops into action without anything less than the best possible education and training.

In an age of smart bombs and smart warfare, we need smart soldiers. Dealing with armed conflicts in the Balkans, icy storms here at home and everything in between, today's military must possess a wide range of skill and capability. So I take very seriously my responsibility to ensure that our Forces are prepared to perform against the best, alongside the best. That means not only requiring more formal and well rounded education but also ensuring that we have the capacity of thinking strategically and adapt to an increasingly complex theatre of operation.

It also means developing a culture of career long learning. We need to constantly renew ourselves and our capability in order to serve effectively in this ever changing world. Now one way to promote career long learning is through an enhanced relationship between civilian colleges and universities and our own military institutions and under aegis of the defence and security forum, centres of expertise are housed in 12 universities across Canada. This is another positive contribution towards improving education.

Ladies and gentlemen as I close, let me say that it is my belief that a better educated military will enhance both our competence and our credibility. As I mentioned at the outset that one of the key functions of the CDA is communicating military issues to the public. I believe that if we are to retain the support of Canadians, and that's vital to us, we must present a military that is flexible enough to change with the times and wise enough to know when it is the time to change.

In recent months and on a number of fronts we have demonstrated a willingness to change. That same commitment must now be brought to bear on the issue of education. I look forward General Silva to working with you, to working with your officers and members of the CDA to embrace what I think is an exciting new opportunity.

Thank you very much, merci beaucoup.

PRESIDENT'S INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Colonel S.E. Blakely, CD President, Conference of Defence Associations Institute

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I wish to express my thanks to our speakers and all those who registered as participants in this year's Seminar.

The purpose of the Annual Seminar of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute is to provide the education and information component to the Annual General Meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations. We expect our deliberations here today to be both thoughtful and thought-provoking.

Our subject could not be more timely. The profession of arms in Canada is at a crossroads. Times are changing very quickly, and nowhere is this more evident than in the Canadian Forces. A great deal of pressure is being applied to force the military to adapt to the perceptions of others of what it should be, and that pressure is not always well informed. The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces have already demonstrated that they are receptive to change. It behooves us all – since membership in the profession of arms does not end with retirement from active service, both regular and reserve – to provide our insight and assistance to create an atmosphere for positive change, while resisting pressures, well-meaning and otherwise, to discard those things essential to the health of profession of arms and the Forces in which we serve and have served.

To understand where we are going we must first understand where we are, and second how we got here. This is the intent of the format of this Seminar, which examines the past, present and future of the profession of arms in Canada.

No one could be better qualified to deliver the keynote address than our Chief of Defence Staff. General Maurice Baril joined the Canadian Officers Training Corps at the University of Ottawa in 1961. He received his commission in 1963, and on graduation in 1964 joined the Canadian Army Regular Force as a subaltern in the Royal 22nd Regiment. He served as platoon commander, adjutant, company commander and deputy battalion commander in that regiment, and on promotion to lieutenant colonel in 1980 he assumed command of its 2nd Battalion. In addition to regimental service, he served with the Canadian Airborne Regiment, attended the Canadian Army Staff Course, and in 1977 graduated from the École Supérieure de Guerre in Paris.

After leaving regimental service, his appointments have included command of the Infantry School in Gagetown, Deputy Commandant of the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College, and Commander, Canadian Combat Training Centre in Gagetown.

In 1992, he was appointed Military Advisor to the Secretary General of the United Nations, and was promoted major-general in 1993. In 1995, he assumed command of Land Forces Quebec Area, and on promotion to lieutenant-general that year he became Commander Land Force Command. He was promoted to his present rank on appointment as Chief of the Defence Staff in September 1997.

General Baril is the Canadian most qualified to lead off this 1999 Seminar, and we are pleased that he accepted our invitation to do so. Ladies and Gentlemen, please join me in welcoming General Maurice Baril.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS: THE STATE OF THE PROFESSION OF ARMS IN THE CANADIAN FORCES

General Maurice Baril, OMM, MSM, CD Chief of Defence Staff

Brigadier-General Silva, distinguished Guests,

Thank you for having me here today. I always enjoy the opportunity to speak to the Conference of Defence Associations.

As a long-established national organization devoted to the profession of arms in Canada, you have been important to the national defence effort. The CDA has also done a service to this country by promoting the well-being of the Canadian Forces and by reaching out to the public on defence matters. Your experience and wisdom in defence issues make a commendable contribution to the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. The Strategic Assessment you have just released is an example of the fine work you do and will provide Canadians in and out of government with much food for thought. I salute the CDA for your work.

The topic you have chosen for your seminar, *The Profession of Arms in Canada* is of course very dear to my heart. I, like most of you, have dedicated my adult life to the profession of arms. I thank you for giving me this opportunity to share my thoughts on some of the challenges our profession faces.

I want to frame what I will say today by examining some of the attributes that make up a profession. First, professions are guided by an ethical code. This provides them with a foundation and direction, a sort of signpost for conduct. Second, professions are characterized by being creatures of the wider society they serve. Thus, as changes in technology and the world around them occur, professions must adapt to these forces. Third, professions maintain and advance a very particular and specialized body of knowledge and skills. This intellectual base is key to a profession's ability to progress and evolve. And fourth, professions often place very rigorous and exclusive job demands on its practitioners. I'll close with some thoughts on strategic leadership and how it pulls all these attributes together.

Each of these attributes equally embodies the profession of arms. Let me take each of them in turn, and tell you about where we in the Canadian Forces stand today with respect to each.

Ethical values are the foundation of our profession. Love of country, professionalism, respect, duty, honour, and self-sacrifice are some of the values that guide the profession of arms. These are the core traditional values of the Canadian Forces. They are constants in a world dominated by change. The profession of arms in this country has a proud history based on these values, and this heritage shapes our commitment to the future. The values of the men and women of the Canadian Forces have always reflected the country they served. Few institutions in Canada are as truly reflective of our society as the Canadian Forces. Indeed, the profession of arms in this country is an expression of the Canadian identity.

We have recently reinforced our ethical foundation with initiatives such as the Defence Ethics Program. We have set out in plain language what we stand for. Our Statement of Defence Ethics denotes loyalty, honesty, courage, diligence, fairness and responsibility as signal qualities that will continue to guide us. These and other initiatives make solid our ethical foundation, which is our strength during times of change.

Being open to change is the second major characteristic of professions. Scientific and social forces continually transform the environments around professions, and to ensure their continued relevance or survival, professions must be flexible in response to these forces. We in the military know this only too well, because for us, change appears to be the only constant of our time.

We are being profoundly transformed by technology. The revolution in military affairs will transform the way we practice our profession and cooperate with our allies. We are also challenged by demographic changes and shifting societal values. These affect our people and how we recruit, train and treat them. We not only see change at home, but in the international environment as well. We have been re-evaluating the way we look at war, peace and security. Responding to developments abroad is becoming much more complex, costly and dangerous.

We are working hard to remain flexible enough to respond to all of these changes and to ensure that the profession of arms can come to terms with them. After all, they may significantly impact nearly every aspect of Canadian military life, including operations, doctrine, training, force structure, organization and procurement. The profession of arms in Canada ten or twenty years from now will no doubt be markedly different than it is today.

However, change is not just a condition. It is also a process, one that is ours to influence. We must use it as a way to ensure the continued relevance of Canada's military to the year 2020 and beyond. We must demonstrate the flexibility to adjust to emerging issues.

This flexibility can be illustrated by looking at how operations have changed recently and how the profession of arms in Canada has responded. For decades, we prepared for a major land war on the inter-German border. Since the early 1990s, however, we no longer prepare ourselves for that sort of conflict, because that threat doesn't exist any more. Low- to mid-intensity conflicts have become the norm. They involve higher levels of deployability, new environmental contexts such as "collapsed states" and "ethnic cleansing", and often involve us in responding to rapidly changing mandates.

Preparing for these new types of conflicts, which are plagued with unknowns was difficult. A way ahead, however, was necessary. Force planning had to be based on at least a few assumptions. We knew that these conflicts would take place thousands of miles from home, and that we would be working alongside allies. Beyond these and other basic assumptions, however, our picture of these new operations was less clear. We decided that flexibility was key to responding to vague future conflicts. This decision was reflected in the 1994 Defence White Paper, with its emphasis on multi-purpose, combat-capable forces.

And the operational flexibility that the Canadian Forces have continued to demonstrate is, in my view, quite strong. Despite the difficulties we have faced in recent years, the Canadian Forces

have done an excellent job in many complex and protracted operations around the globe. Today we are serving in 18 peace missions, in addition to our long-standing alliance commitments. In many respects, we have made the most of change and have adapted quite admirably.

But I want to expand on how we've responded to changes in our operational environment by talking about how we can maintain this level of operational flexibility in the future. We have to consider how we look towards future operations. To remain flexible, it's best not to be bound to static notions of conflict. We have to be careful of succumbing to the "fighting the last war" syndrome. Let's not specifically plan for another Korea, Cyprus or even another Persian Gulf War, as even they may not provide us with proper models for future operations.

We must consider innovative ways of continuing to increase our operational flexibility. The need to move our troops from one theatre to another will increase in the future, and thus the deployability of our forces must be examined. Strategic lift capability will be an issue to look at. Interoperability with our allies will have to be maintained or improved. We must also look at doctrine, training and equipment procurement with these issues in mind.

We're also going to have to exploit changes in technology. Technological developments will become more important to how we execute operations and how we prepare for them. These technologies will be expensive, so we will have to be selective, invest wisely and apply them appropriately. But if we do so, the revolution in military affairs has the potential to give us a much more powerful and effective Canadian Forces. The advantages of instant communication, computer targeting and force magnification can make a small force very powerful. The Canadian Forces must look at combat multipliers and other modern technologies that will increase lethality, protection, weapons precision and interoperability with our allies.

Exploiting the RMA requires intellectual flexibility. The impact of information technology has given us terms such as "dominant battlefield awareness" and "precision guided munitions". Our ability to collect and distribute massive amounts of battlefield data has grown exponentially. But the number of eyes and ears available to convert this data into useful information has not grown at a similar pace. Our personnel must be intellectually equipped to manage the flood of information and properly trained to make the right decisions based on that information. And as we apply increasingly sophisticated technology to the conduct of military operations, the knowledge demands on our people will increase.

This brings me to the third characteristic of professions ? the mastery of a particular body of knowledge and skills. In the military context, modern warfare is complex, and requires highly skilled and trained personnel. Formal education and training in the profession of arms are central to not only exploiting technological advancements but also to assessing information and understanding new operational concepts.

To ensure that our people have the skills necessary of the 21st century soldier, the Canadian Forces have embarked on a series of educational reforms and initiatives. We have recently made a Bachelor's degree a prerequisite for a commission, and expect the officer corps to be fully degreed within 10 years. I am particularly proud of the adjustments to our recruiting policies,

degree sponsorship and upgrades to our internal education programs. They will be instrumental in improving the intellectual capacity of the Canadian Forces.

I am also pleased to report that the first serials of the Advanced Military Studies Course and the National Security Studies Course have recently convened. These courses will prepare our colonels and navy captains for staff appointments at the operational level within national and international headquarters, and greater responsibilities in the development, management and implementation of Canadian defence policy. They will learn the principles of generalship and executive leadership, strategic management, leadership, ethics and advanced military strategy. These courses will arm our senior officers, the leaders of tomorrow's Canadian Forces, with the skills they need to look to the future.

We've also started thinking about graduate degrees for senior officers. How many do we need? And what kind? Night course and distance learning are options we encourage Canadian Forces personnel to pursue. Cooperation with a number of colleges and universities across Canada has also been successful in helping some of our personnel further their education.

Training also gives us the skills of modern armed forces. For example, different conflicts require the application of different doctrines. Our people will need to know how to fight any type of conflict. I don't want my people to prepare for the "next Gulf" or the "next Bosnia". I want them to be prepared for anything. I want to have the ability to take a unit from battling floods in Winnipeg and place them in a dangerous and complex peace support operation in Africa. And vice-versa.

Training has to complement education and reflect such goals. For the Canadian Forces, future training must involve enhanced simulations and field exercises. It must emphasize jointness among the fighting environments and combined operations with alliance partners. To exploit the revolution in military affairs, we must understand that the revolution is driven by the people using the technology, not the technology alone. Thus, as new technologies make their way onto the battlefield, they must be woven into doctrine and training practices.

Looking to the future, I see education and training in the profession of arms as a career-long process of development that requires learning, practice and experience. This is not an entirely new thing, of course, but times have changed nonetheless. The profession of arms must maintain an environment that encourages continued education and a learning organization. Only this will create the open, flexible minds we need, as individuals and as an institution, to think quickly and act decisively in our jobs.

I am putting a lot of emphasis behind my commitment to education and training in the Canadian Forces for a very good reason. Losing touch with the art and science of arms endangers the profession itself. We cannot risk that. One of my predecessors, General Allard, made some interesting comments on this in a 1969 report on officer professional development. Let me read them to you:

"It matters little whether the Forces have their present manpower strength and financial budget, or half of them, or double them; without a properly educated, effectively trained professional

officer corps the Forces would, in the future, be doomed at best to mediocrity, and at the worst, to disaster."

These words are relevant today, in the context of smaller budgets and reduced manpower. Education and training form the backbone of the military profession, allowing us to properly implement doctrine and make key decisions. They also allow us to be progressive and forward-looking, and to explore new methods and avenues, as developments warrant. Continual education and training will give us the skills to adapt.

The fourth attribute of a profession is about people. Professions place rigorous demands and responsibilities on their members. This is particularly true of the profession of arms. The job of a professional soldier is like no other. In addition to civilian laws, professional soldiers must also abide by the military justice system. And they have long hours, but a 9 to 5 salary. Their profession inherently involves risks to life and limb. They must also deal with frequent postings and lengthy periods away from friends and family. These are uniquely difficult conditions.

As I have long been saying elsewhere, our people are not in the Canadian Forces, they are the Canadian Forces. They must be afforded the quality of life they deserve, and improving that quality of life is of paramount importance.

Some of the reforms we have undertaken recently - ethical renewal, modernization of the justice system and gender integration - were all about improving the working life of all soldiers, sailors and air personnel. They are certainly steps in the right direction, but as the SCONDVA committee made clear last December, much more needs to be done. My commitment to implementing those recommendations cannot be understated.

I'm going to finish up with some thoughts on strategic leadership, which incorporates aspects of all that I've talked about so far today. Strategic leadership in the profession of arms requires a strong sense of ethics and values.

Having the flexibility to adapt to change is also imperative. Together with life-long education and training, and a commitment to the people of the profession, these qualities are key to successfully leading a profession.

Fostering leadership skills in general is an issue that we have been looking closely at. The March 1997 *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces* identified the requirement to provide the necessary foundation for the progressive development of ethical based leadership, responsibility, accountability, and a thorough grounding in the knowledge and skills required of an officer in the Canadian Forces.

In response to this recommendation, we have initiated a comprehensive program called *the Enhanced Leadership Model* that represents a significant shift with regard to how we develop our junior officers. An important aspect of this program is the improvement of the current Basic Officer Training Course. The Course is being refined to focus initial training and education of officer candidates on the ethics, ethos, leadership skills and fundamental military knowledge all Canadian Forces officers require. This goes to the heart of some of our most significant

difficulties regarding junior officer development. The Enhanced Leadership Model will help us "grow" the junior officers of the Canadian Forces. And, as their careers progress, many of them will build on these basic leadership skills to become our senior officers.

These men and women will be the strategic leaders of tomorrow's Canadian Forces. Strategic leadership is about maintaining a broad vision of the future and having a strategic plan for getting there, not about applying a rigid and narrow focus. Earlier this month I visited with the senior officers on the National Security Studies Course. I spoke with them extensively on the subject of strategic leadership. To these officers, our future strategic leaders, I stated that they must see themselves as "builders" rather than "maintainers". Rather than obsessing with the intricate details of today's duties, they must be concerned with the future picture of the Canadian Forces, what we should look like and how we should be organized, equipped and trained. Leaders innovate; they create; and they make things happen. They shape the environment around them. Strategic leaders must leave micro-management to their subordinates and concentrate their efforts on preparing the Canadian Forces for the future.

I am confident that the senior officers on the National Security Studies Course will make excellent strategic leaders. But bridging the gap between today and the future will be difficult. Tasks need to get done, and we cannot stop today just to think about tomorrow. The Canadian Forces of 2020 and beyond may hardly resemble the Canadian Forces of today, and it will take one hell of a transformation to get us there. We are constantly assessing the challenges in front of us, and thinking about how the Canadian Forces will be relevant to the future. This future view will help our senior officers make the decisions today on equipment, education, training and personnel that will shape the profession of arms tomorrow. It is the job of our senior officers to envision and fulfil this future view.

Because of all the changes in operations, technology and society, the new century represents an important point for the profession of arms in Canada. As I have noted, the momentum for change is coming from both external and internal sources. Responding to all the challenges we face requires a strategic vision. The CDA, I believe, has a unique opportunity (if not an obligation) to contribute to this vision. As long-standing members of the defence community, you can make a genuine contribution to the advancement of the profession of arms. You have vast experience and knowledge of the profession of arms and you have the potential to produce some quality thinking on it. I encourage you to examine some of the ideas I've discussed here today, and help us think about the future.

The Development of the Profession of Arms in Canada

Dr. J.L. Granatstein, OC, Director and CEO, Canadian War Museum

When I go into work at the Canadian War Museum every morning, I sit down at Sam Hughes' desk. The Minister of Militia and Defence from 1911-1916 worked from a partner's desk about six and a half by four and a half feet, with buttons for his orderly, stenographer, and military assistant. Sam Hughes, of course, was mad most of the time, and I fear his spirit is still in the desk, urging me to issue the orders for the militia to concentrate at Valcartier. I try to resist.

I begin with Sam Hughes because he was the antithesis of military professionalism in Canada. He was a militiaman and politician, and on both counts he was very suspicious of professional soldiers. They were layabouts, drunks, parasites living off the public revenue; if they were British, they treated Canadians as colonials, sneering at their accents and mocking their military skills; if they were Canadians, they were worse and should seek honest work. To Hughes, the best soldier was an ordinary Protestant Anglo-Canadian, fit and hardy, used to the outdoors, a natural master marksman. He didn't like the Royal Military College much—because it turned those ordinary Canadians into snobs; he didn't like Roman Catholics much or French Canadians—he was, after all, an Orangeman, and Liberals were definitely beyond the pale. As he wrote, "the kind of stuff we want in our army is good solid Presbyterian churchmen, clean-living religious men, good clean fighting men."

To Hughes, all Canada needed was armouries across the land (and he built them) and a lot of militiamen—and by 1914 Canada had almost 60,000 and in the summer of 1914, the largest concentration of militia ever. Yes, Canada had a Permanent Force of a few thousand, and yes there were a few capable officers among them—but only a handful could be called professionals, even fewer had staff training, and their primary task was as a training cadre for militia.

The point is that at the outbreak of The Great War, Canadian military professionalism scarcely existed and had never existed. This was a result of history—the sense that Canada was indefensible against the only possible enemy (the US) if the Americans ever seriously tried to invade; the popular and misguided sense that in 1812, when the Americans had tried to invade (how seriously may be in dispute), the sturdy yeomanry of the Militia, not the British regulars, had won the victory; and the politicians' sense through all the nineteenth Century that defence was expensive, too much so for a country that needed roads and railways and post offices and wharves. But I prefer to sum all these up as the Sam Hughes syndrome—the sense that military professionalism was unnecessary and indeed harmful.

It took the Great War to change this attitude (but not for Hughes). When the orders were issued (from my desk) for the Militia to concentrate at Valcartier, Hughes threw away the plans for orderly mobilization prepared by his Chief of the General Staff.. He appointed the first Division's officers himself, listening to his Tory friends and his son. In fact, by luck

he didn't do too badly; the choice of Arthur Currie as a brigade commander was a stroke of great good fortune. The Canadians who went overseas were effectively untrained. "The world regards you as a marvel," Hughes said in his farewell address to the first contingent—and it was indeed a miracle that more than 20,000 men were organized sufficiently to get them on ship and over to England. But they knew nothing of what was to face them in the trenches, they had almost no trained staff officers to do the necessary work, and the General Officer Commanding had to be provided by the British army. Someone, likely General Alderson the first GOC, had the good sense to attach Canadians as staff learners to the British staff officers, and the Canadians over time picked up the professionalism of their teachers (and they were good teachers, like Alan Brooke, Ironside and others who rose to high command).

But it was trenches that taught professionalism, and for the Canadian Corps the war was the ultimate test of meritocratic professionalism. The good—and the lucky who survived—learned on the job, learned what worked and what didn't, learned which of their subordinates and superiors were capable and which were not. By spring 1917 and Vimy, after two years in the line, the Canadian Corps was a very professional operation—and it is worth noting that this professionalism had been paid for in blood. Senior officers had been tested and tried. Currie rose from brigade to division to corps command; Sam Hughes' son Garnet was sidetracked—at much cost to Currie in the enmity of the former Minister of Militia and Defence.

The professionals of the Canadian Corps were largely Militia—it had to be thus, given that Hughes had sent the Royal Canadian Regiment to replace a British garrison unit in 1914. But it was also that the militia in all likelihood were less hidebound than the Permanent Force, more open to innovation, better educated, and generally men who had already made a success of themselves in civil life. The Curries, Mercers, Odlums, and McNaughtons were fresher and more creative than military professionals who still believed cavalry mattered and that the machine gun had no stopping power against the horse. McNaughton, an engineer from McGill University, could develop sound ranging and flash spotting as a way of counterbattery work, the best in the war. Colonel Naismith, a chemist, could in April 1915 smell that the gas being used against the Canadians at Ypres was chlorine and recommend urine-soaked rags as a hasty countermeasure. Currie as a shrewd man could do a study of French and German tactics and apply them to Canadian operational methods. In effect, the untrained mob of 1914 learned on the job and became the most professional army Canada ever put in the field.

Arguably Arthur Currie was among the most professional senior commanders Canada ever produced. Unlikely looking—a great fat man with a large body on pipestem legs and a weak chin—he had a brain and could use it. Currie was determined only to fight his men when every advantage possible was in their hands. This kind of approach was almost revolutionary among Great War commanders, and Currie ranks very high. Unfortunately, he was stiff, a bit pompous and largely unloved by those who serve in his Corps—though not by those who worked directly with him.

After the war, Currie did his best to try to persuade some of his best and brightest officers to stay in the Permanent Force—officers such as McBrien, McNaughton, Crerar—but most went back to civilian life. And why not? The war was forgotten by the government and people as quickly as possible. The Permanent Force was tiny, ill equipped, untrained, underfunded and largely devoted to training the militia. The militia was nominally quite large (50000) but even less well trained and equipped. There were only 2-3 officers a year sent to the British Army Staff Colleges at Camberley or Quetta and between 1919 and 1939 only 63 staff trained officers. But there was the Militia Staff Course which did give a modicum of training to many reservists—in BC, for example, there were 112 MSC-trained officers in 1940.

Perhaps what was critical was the Canadian Defence Quarterly which provided an arena in which ideas could be fought out. Sometimes this was whether horses were still useful in war, or whether uniforms should be the same for all; but when Captain Guy Simonds and Lieutenant Colonel ELM Burns argued about the proper employment of armoured divisions in war, then CDQ reached a level of professionalism that frankly has not been attained by any postwar Canadian military journal, and certainly not by anything published by the Canadian Forces today. When we consider that Permanent Forces' greatest strength was 4500 all ranks, that there were at most 450 officers, that two minds such as Simonds and Burns were in the Canadian Army, then something must have been done right.

Even so, just as in 1914, when we went to war in 1939, Canada was no readier. Sam Hughes had been dead for two decades but he still prevailed. There was effectively no base on which to build (though there were a few more staff trained officers). What was different was that the regulars were determined that this time no Sam Hughes would seize control, that the militia would not be given the key posts in the 1st Division and that the Permanent Force battalions would not this time be shipped off to garrison UK possessions. This time, the plans drafted at Army Headquarters were followed and the Permanent Force officers formed the heart of the 1st Division's senior leadership.

General A.G.L. McNaughton, who had been out of the army for four years after being CGS was named GOC of the 1st Division and successively rose to corps and Army command. McNaughton was idolized by the media and his soldiers at the onset of war, and he had been in the PF since 1919 after wartime service. But he was antithesis of professionalism in that he left the supervision of training to others, refused to weed out the inefficient among his senior officers, and did not always have a good eye for talent. When he was fired, the British—and Canadians—both sighed with relief.

His successor, Harry Crerar, like McNaughton an artillery man, was better, if less brilliant and more conniving, in that he believed training was important and ordinarily had few qualms about sacking incompetents or striving to advance his own career. He was more professional than McNaughton, in other words, if less personable, but he was no great commander, no Currie. If there was a great commander in the First Canadian Army in the Second World War, it was Guy Simonds or Bert Hoffmeister.

Even so the First Canadian Army, just like the Canadian Corps in the Great War, learned on the job and became very professional. From July 1943 in Sicily to May 1945 in Northwest Europe, it mastered its trade - with good staff work and good, if conservative, leadership in action. Still, as the bulk of the army was in action only from June 1944 to May 1945, there was less time to overcome the bad habits inculcated by three and one half years of idleness and training in England.

In the postwar period, it looked for a time as if the 1919 experience would be repeated and all the hard-won professionalism jettisoned. The army was to be given a strength of between 20,000 and 25,000—but in 1948 it was just under 16,000—which seemed a pathetically small number. Even so, the trappings of professionalism were nonetheless put in place—RMC re-opened, the Army Staff College was created, and the National Defence College opened. Notwithstanding these efforts, there was at best a trained company that could take the field.

The USSR changed matters. The coming of the Cold War, the USSR's development of the A-bomb, and the Korean War meant expansion. Before long the army had a brigade group in Korea, a brigade group in NATO, new equipment, money - and the nation's first ever professional peacetime army. To my mind, the period from the early 1950s to the early 1960s was the heyday of Canadian military professionalism outside of wartime. Canada worked with its Allies and learned from them; there was the money to get good equipment, and the government support to make the army the best it could be.

The golden age was brief, however, and from the Diefenbaker period onward, the slide downhill was inexorable. There were constant cuts in budget, aging equipment turned obsolescent and then obsolete, good officers left for other lines of work—and increasingly social experimentation became the driving force of military policy. For four decades, the army fought a rearguard action against these things - and it lost. I believe there is still a nucleus of professionalism in the 20,000 strong Land Forces, but there is, I fear, nothing larger than a battalion that could go into action - and only after a long workup period. There are no reinforcements to be found, unless the militia is raided. There is new equipment coming on stream but too little and probably too late. There is increasing doubt as to our capacity to handle peacemaking operations. I believe that the tactical professionalism of officers up to lieutenant-colonel is still there, but our senior officers, because of the lack of the opportunity to practise their skills in the field are suffering. Do we have real brigade exercises anymore? Do we concentrate anything larger than a brigade? Our generals, through no fault of their own, are simply not comparable to those of our allies. And of course because we have left NATO in all but name, our ability even to understudy our allies is disappearing. We also have an officer corps which is significantly less well educated than those of our friends. In effect, I think we might argue that we have reverted to the 1914 or 1939 situation once more.

Essentially, Sam Hughes rules. We have decided that either there is no war coming again, that someone else will look after us, or that every Canadian has a field marshal's baton in her knapsack. We even have militia advocates calling for the effective elimination of the

regulars except for a training cadre. What this suggests is what we all know: history repeats - the first time as tragedy and thereafter as farce.

DISCUSSION

Since the speaker had concentrated on the state of the Army, he was asked to comment further on the state of "professionalism" in the Navy and Air Force. Dr. Granatstein responded that the Navy was the most professional in every aspect – leadership, attitude toward the Reserves, doctrine and staffing. They had obtained the best equipment through good professional argument in the civilian-military environment.

The speaker was asked what could be done about the current state of affairs. Dr. Granatstein responded that effective lobbying was needed from organizations such as CDA and others. But would it work? Canadians have decided that defence really doesn't matter; someone else will protect us. We seem determined to make the same mistakes all over again, and pay for them in blood, because we were not willing to pay for "insurance."

In a repeat question, the speaker was asked what measures could be taken without *resources*. He responded that we could at least train our *minds*, try to participate as much as possible with our allies, and find a niche for specialization in the Revolution in Military Affairs. He stated that he still saw no real evidence of any real change toward education.

Dr. Granatstein was asked to comment on what support could be expected on Canadian college campuses. He was not optimistic. At a lower level, cadet corps still existed; they were not that good, but better than nothing. Unfortunately, the Vietnam War had changed everything on the campuses. The military had no real profile; the COTC, which had been a very useful program, had disappeared. With the exception of the University of New Brunswick, the University of Calgary and Wilfred Laurier University the teaching of military history had disappeared.

Given that all the "wise men" who advised Minister Young on his Report to the Prime Minister in 1997 had recommended that CFHQ be separated from the Deputy Minister's staff and be the only source of military advice to the politicians, the speaker was asked why this had not been implemented. Dr. Granatstein replied that Governments *like* the present arrangement; they do not want direct military advice, preferring it to be filtered through the Civil Service. On the other hand, perhaps the Civil Service is now better educated than the military, and hence can give better advice.

A question from the floor asked how the speaker would renew the defence debate in Canada. He felt that it would be very difficult. The United States Ambassador did his best, and that might be the most effective starter. It will take that kind of pressure. And the SCONDVA Report embarrassed the Government; that may have some impact. But perhaps only a bloody war will do.

Dr. Granatstein was asked how he defined "soft power." He replied that he did not consider it a valid doctrine.

A question from the floor queried the adverse effect on Francophone leadership of closing College Militaire Royale de Saint-Jean. Dr. Granatstein replied that he did not agree that there

had been any real adverse effect. The military can only afford to maintain one military college, and the Royal Military College was now truly bilingual.

PANEL 1: THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROFESSION OF ARMS IN CANADA

Canada's Officer Corps: New Times, New Ideas

Dr. Douglas L. Bland, Queen's University at Kingston

Canada's officer corps, under the direction of civilians elected to Parliament, is responsible and accountable for the control and administration of the Canadian Armed Forces in peace and war. Officers are given in law considerable discretion over significant resources, the use of lethal force, the lives of citizens, and the safety of the state. The chief of the defence staff is armed with vested rights that in some circumstances allow him, even compel him, to act according to his appreciation of events. However, political leaders are responsible for all aspects of national defence. Although some might wish to segregate the officer corps from politics, it is an instrument of politics and has been formed within this context.

Every commissioned officer is a member of the Canadian Forces officer corps, but not every one is equally connected to the political process. Junior officers serve mainly as unit leaders and technicians. Reserve officers, except for a select few, live and act outside the range of effective national politics—a modern condition associated with the advent of the regular force. Generally, the most influential segment of the officer corps is the senior echelon of regular force colonels and generals and naval captains and flag officers. They are the advisers to governments, have in law and custom of the service near unchallenged authority over every other member of the armed forces, and command major units and elements of the Canadian Forces. Members of this class are also responsible and accountable to each other and ultimately to the government of the day for their decisions and the actions of members of the armed forces under their command. It is this senior class of officers, therefore, that deserves particular scrutiny by the civil authority and scholars interested in the political role of Canadian Forces officers.

This paper examines the formation of the senior class of Canadian Forces officers in the context of Canada's social and political history. It is often said (unfortunately, sometimes without much reflection) that armed forces mirror their societies. However, armed forces, or important segments of them, may be isolated from their societies and look inwardly to their own values and interests. The relationship between a society and its military leaders, although usually dynamic, may be politically benign or a serious challenge to governments. Nevertheless, there are persistent patterns of behaviour that give any officer corps a national identity. These patterns arise from national experiences and myths, but ultimately from a framework of ideas concerning armed forces and society, civil-military relations, international affairs, and warfare.

Canada's senior, regular force officer corps has always been shaped by the attitudes citizens and political leaders hold towards national defence and the armed forces and by the traditional beliefs officers assume to be true and reasonable expressions of the world they live in and their place in Canadian society and politics. The officer corps is not politically inert and neutral. Its "belief system" always conditions the advice senior officers give to political leaders, officers' reactions to social and national security issues, and how officers control and administer the Canadian Forces at home and abroad. Understanding the development of the senior officer corps, therefore,

demands first a brief review of the ideas that shape political and military attitudes and decisions about national defence and, then, a consideration of the consequences that follow from this history.

National Defence: The Political Point of View

Canadian politicians hold consistently to a few notions about Canada's national defence. Although different parties may declare different policies, their actual policies---whose they enact and support when they are in power---are similar. This natural policy has been especially evident since about 1949 if only because national defence policy was highlighted for so long by the Cold War. The framework is composed of a few critical ideas (some tested by history and other simple national myths) concerning threats, international relationships and responsibilities, and the role of military professionals in the national policy process.

Few prime ministers (and they are the politicians who matter in this discussion) in this century have worried much about military threats to Canada. The greatest threat to national defence came from involvement in other people's quarrels meaning, generally, those engaging the British Empire and later those generated by the superpowers. Until about 1954 and the advent of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them over long ranges, Canadians could only become involved in wars by leaving Canada in search of them. The object of national defence policy, therefore, will always be "to speak quietly and giving no one cause for alarm."

Even as the Cold War intensified and North America faced credible threats from the Soviet Union, these attitudes did not change fundamentally. Most opinion makers were convinced that even if Canada were threatened, no amount of defence could change the outcome if nuclear warfare erupted worldwide. Moreover, politicians, and senior officers too, came to understand that national defence meant the avoidance of war and spent national resources to this end. In effect, Canada has never had obvious "war aims" other than to avoid international commitments.

Partner to this idea is the important notion that even if Canada were threatened and attacked, someone else would save the nation. National defence was initially in the hands of the British Empire and then the responsibility of the United States. Sir Wilfred Laurier laid down a benchmark of Canadian defence policy before the First World War. "You must not take the militia seriously," he wrote "for though it is useful for suppressing internal disturbances, it will not be required for the defence of the country, as the Monroe Doctrine protects us from enemy aggression."¹ No prime minister has been as forthright, at least in public, but they usually welcome Uncle Sam's defence. Certainly, Mackenzie King made no complaint when, in 1938 at Queen's University, President Roosevelt declared "that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire." Indeed, King supported the idea two days later with his "good friendly neighbour" policy promising that "enemy forces should not be able [to attack] the United States across Canadian territory."²

The foreign defence of Canada is a fact of national life, if not always a welcome policy. No government has overtly supported this notion, though most have implicitly, like Sir Wilfred, based their national defence policies on the assumption that someone will save Canada if saving is ever needed. Roosevelt surely was acting in the interests of the United States and even if King

had been inclined to refuse the offer, American arms would have saved Canada in any case. Nevertheless, this natural policy worries some Canadians who see a threat from "our neighbors to the south who . . . may offer us 'help' which we may not want but cannot reject." Canada, so the argument goes, requires a policy of "defence against help."³

Many politicians, like most Canadians in 1998, assume that Canada has no national interests that can be achieved through the use of Canadian military power, at least outside Canada. They come to this conclusion partly from a recently developed national myth that Canadians are an "unmilitary people" despite a history of Canadian involvement in wars in South Africa, Germany, Italy, and Korea, among other places. No matter Canadians long record of conflicts with Europeans, Americans, Japanese, Chinese, Russians, British, French, each other and native people, and the widely held opinion that Canada was "born" through military sacrifices in 1914-18, political representatives repeatedly declare that they are guided by Canada's nonaggressive, anti-colonial past. The general conclusion from this skewed history is that Canada never has and never will have much need for armed forces, except, perhaps, to shape the world in Canada's image.⁴ Even where armed forces are useful, the guiding assumption is that they will be used peacefully and, therefore, need not be extensively equipped for warlike operations.

An important contradiction runs through this political framework. Canada needs armed forces and employs them in combat from time to time within "a realist paradigm" to advance national interests and influence. Prime ministers are granted audiences with American presidents and diplomats are seated at NATO committees and United Nations Security Council tables partly because Canada makes contributions to the national and collective interests of other states. The dilemma for Canadian politicians and diplomats, as always, is to find ways to gain position and influence without acquiring military liabilities as a consequence. The Canadian experience is that if they do not join imperial or allied councils, then Canada risks being committed to international operations without much say about what those commitment entails. But access to such councils always requires payment in resources that Canadians are not inclined to make before a crisis. The preferred policy, therefore, is defence on credit, something allies tend to reject.⁵

The domestic compromise involves issuing promissory notes, "white papers on defence," on the assumption that they will never be called. Obviously, some collateral is needed to establish a line of credit with allies and so Canada maintains a professional, but small, armed force to deploy to Europe and in the Atlantic and North America or with the United Nations to serve this purpose. Few politicians in power, however, contemplated ever having to fulfil Canada's "commitments," as they are defined by their military advisers. Indeed, there is little evidence to suggest that many Members of Parliament fully understand what these commitments might be in fact. Generally, politicians assume that Canada's commitments are whatever Parliament decided they are at any given moment. Although this belief might reflect an admirable sense of democracy, it may not be a sound basis for defence policy or military planning.

Most prime ministers would agree with Mackenzie King who told "Herr Hitler" in June 1937, "no person dislikes everything that had to do with expenditures for defence purposes more than I [and], that the members of my party in Canada all felt alike in this particular."⁶ There is of course a rational explanation behind these types of remarks and this consistent political attitude. If there is no threat and if someone else is willing or obliged to defend Canada, then defence

expenditures are unnecessary. No prime minister would want to make unnecessary expenditures and it follows, therefore, that no prime minister would want extraneous factors to impose such expenditures on the national budget. It's better policy to keep defence issues out of the public eye.

It was for this reason that Brooke Claxton (MND 1946-54) emphatically warned the chiefs of staff that "I am all for silent soldiers as well as sailors" and threatened to remove any officer who "was not content to express his opinions in private."⁷ He worried also about over zealous junior staff officers and cautioned the Chiefs of Staff Committee against military planning that sought "ideal solutions" without due regard for "the facts of national life."⁸ Every prime minister and most defence ministers, before and since, have expressed similar sentiments at one time or another.

National Defence: The Military Point of View

The attitudes and policy choices of senior members of the Canadian Forces are shaped largely by their interpretation of Canadian history and by a "realist" view of international relations. The profession is characterized by a curious "little Canada" complex that is expressed in the willing subordination of Canadian national command to foreign officers. Add to this profile the typical conservativeness of the military mind, "nothing is ever secure," and the only question is not why do politicians and officers disagree, but why do they ever agree on any critical defence policy?

Canadian officers today are haunted by the unpreparedness of the armed services before both world wars and especially by the lack of government attention to the military in the inter-war period. Mackenzie King's government is held up as an example of what can befall the nation when civilian leaders fail to heed military advice. If only, so the argument goes, the government had begun in the early 1930s to prepare the armed forces for war outside Canada, war might have been averted or the armed services might have been fully prepared to fight and win in 1939. The sin of unpreparedness in 1939 is the penalty of political neglect and it is paraded before every government that ignores the opinions of their military advisers.

The argument, of course, is as much myth as fact and is severely weakened whenever it is placed in historical context. There is no space to review the counter-argument in this brief essay, but two observations help illustrate why advocates for this view might be more cautious in their conclusions. First, assuming that the government in 1929 had opened the treasury doors to unlimited military spending, what forces would have been produced? There is no evidence that Canadian military thinking was running in advance of British ideas and given Canadian military dependence on British mentors, defence spending would likely have been directed to outmoded concepts and tactics---horses rather than machines. The county militia, compared to the small regular force, was particularly strong then and so spending in the army would likely have been passed to inefficient militia units. The probability is that by 1939 the Canadian armed forces would probably have been, like most other armed forces in the world, over equipped with the wrong weapons, inappropriately trained, and imbalanced between the competing services.

This "what-if" discussion is hardly relevant in any case. The "facts of national life" simply prevented any government from active war preparations on the scale most hindsight critics think

were necessary. The government was struggling to recover from the great depression. There was no stomach anywhere for a return to the mud and blood of Flanders. Many influential elites, in and out of government, championed isolationism---arguably a rational concept on its own terms and time---and considered it a companion notion to Canada's growing nationalism. Finally, preparation inevitably meant that the government would have to at least consider national conscription and the deployment of the armed forces overseas. Both these ideas were anathema to the Liberal government not simply because the government was anti-military, but because such policies would surely have divided the nation, when, in the 1930s, there was no apparent reason for taking such a risk. In other words, the facts of national life disarmed military advice, even if it were sound and that soundness was not obvious to those in power at the time.

Today, the unpreparedness legend is closely entangled with what can be called the world war assumption. The two world wars of this century, horrific though they were, were anomalies. Warfare, even on the borders of major powers, has usually been limited in important ways. Yet the histories of the world wars are so strong that they obscure from many officers even half a century later, this more likely type of international and internecine conflict. The world wars were unusual also because for long periods they promoted the military aspects of national policy and this habit continued more or less throughout the cold war era as well. Officers, therefore, blinded by their view of history seem unable to see any other possibilities and assume, moreover, that if a state is prepared for global warfare, then it is effectively prepared for any conflict. It is a dangerous assumption and has unnecessarily dislocated national defence planning in many states, as it did in the United States prior to the Vietnam war and in the Soviet Union throughout the cold war era.

The allure of the great war image prompts another myth that affects how some officers think about defence policies. "Proper soldiering," is a myth centred on the romantic notion that warfare can be conducted according to military ideals, uncluttered by political interference, rules and laws, and civil interests. In other words, the mythical great war poses the armed forces of two competing states fighting to an unconditional surrender---one triumphant over the other. The issue will be decided by the force of arms and not by some untidy compromise. They ignore Lord Kitchener's famous observation, "we make wars as we must, not as we would like to,"⁹ for it offends doctrine and preferred ways of thinking.

Canadian officers, partly because they come from a minor state and obviously benefit from the ideas and experiences of officers from larger armed forces, and partly from choice, expect to be under someone else's command. They still are, as Adrian Preston observed in 1971, "admirably equipped with the gifts of a subordinate."¹⁰ At every important juncture in Canadian military history professional officers (though not always militia officers) have easily fallen into patterns of subordination to foreign officers and foreign strategies.¹¹ This habit can affect officers' advice to government, seriously distorting the national interest for some allied or military interest. Admiral Brock, for instance, on reminiscing about the Cuba missile crisis, thought that any hesitation by the Canadian government to implement allied plans "would have been too degrading and traitorous to even contemplate."¹² He seemed happily unaware of Mackenzie King's maxim that "Parliament would decide what is to be done," when Canada faced grave crisis — admirals' and generals' plans notwithstanding.

Finding comfort in the arms of foreign officers might be understandable, but it is doubly dangerous when it is linked to a Canadian tendency (and not just in the military) "of lending troops"¹³ nearly unconditionally to other states or international institutions, like the United Nations. For instance, when Canada offered troops for operations in Somalia in 1992 Canadian Forces planning and orders appeared intent only on getting the troops to the theatre. There was scant provision for operational orders, rules of engagement, logistical support, or a clear line of national command. Indeed, Lieutenant General Paul Addy, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff and the senior Canadian Forces operations officer at the time, when criticized by the Somalia Inquiry for not making adequate arrangements for the command or employment of the force, responded by declaring in his affidavit before the Somalia Inquiry that there was no command structure or operational plan because the Canadian Forces only had "an administrative concept of organization and command and control."¹⁴

The most persistent and deep-seated idea in the minds of Canadian Forces officers is that a tri-service organization of the Canadian Forces based on the army, navy, and air force is the preferred structure for the armed forces. This preference rests on the assumption that a strong navy/army/air force is, in all situations and in all times, good for national defence. The assumption is bolstered by the obvious benefit that flows to leaders of these institutions who usually see their main responsibility as protecting and enhancing their particular institutions. Thus, the commander of the army can argue that he advances the cause of a "strong army," not for personal or institutional reasons, but because a strong army is necessary for national defence. The strong service assumption perpetuates redundant missions and institutions, prevents the rational distribution of defence resources, and fuels the inter-service rivalries that at times discredit the armed forces before politicians and senior public service leaders.

The strong service assumption enhances personal reputations as well, at least within particular services. Commanders are honoured and promoted within their service as rewards for winning resources and prestige for their service. However, few senior officers would be so bold as to advocate the dismantling of a rival service, at least overtly, and they understand that appearing to share scarce resources protects them from criticism.¹⁵ Thus, they promote slogans such as "balanced forces" or "general purpose forces." But neither of these terms have any agreed meaning that might be used to decide how the forces would be balanced. Yet the terms provide a blanket of civility over the ongoing struggle for place and funding between services who are working for their own interests and not necessarily for the interests of national defence.

Few tendencies in the armed forces are as disruptive to the interests of national defence and the Canadian Forces than inter-service rivalry especially when it breaks out in the public policy arena. In 1937, then Colonel Maurice Pope identified the dysfunctional nature of this rivalry in the policy forum, when he noted that "From the standpoint of the Government, the problem of national defence has always been fundamentally a single one, incapable of complete division in terms of the fighting Services."¹⁶ Officers, therefore, can never be successful when they advance their cause over the heads of others and may only damage the reputation of the officer corps as policy advisers if they try such tactics.

Pope's lesson, apparently, is hard to learn. Years later, during the 1993-94 hearings of the *Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Canada's Defence*, committee

members complained privately that they were frustrated by the advice they received from members of the armed forces and their supporters. Every service presentation appeared to have only one aim, to discredit the others so as to win the largest portion of the defence budget for the side making its pitch.¹⁷ As the hearings progressed, other groups from outside the military/defence department establishment gained influence with the committee and that result brought agonized protests from officers and advocates who complained that the committee should follow "military advice." Members of the committee, on the other hand, responded in frustration asking, "what military advice?" and answering "We only received army or navy or air forces or militia advice!"¹⁸

If the armed forces wish to prosper in the public policy fora, then they need to follow Pope's suggestion and argue from a unified position. Ironically, it was Paul Hellyer, the nemesis of the strong service idea and champion of unification and the "single service," who pointed the way for leaders of the services and the Canadian Forces and offered them their greatest weapon against interlopers who seek to usurp the professional duties of military officers. Unfortunately, the deceptive power of the single service assumption blocks most roads towards a unified and coherent military position in the national defence debate and the services and the armed forces are disadvantaged as a consequence. Indeed, military leaders in Canada often begin policy debates thinking they will be ignored, and then act in ways sure to confirm that expectation.

The NATO experience changed the Canadian officer corps profoundly by professionalizing it. The advent of the standing peacetime armed force overwhelmed the common assumption that Canada's defence forces would be depend mainly on volunteer citizen soldiers. The natural tendency for professional officers to want to perform their missions on the leading edge of technology and doctrine, gradually at first, and then nearly completely, broke the contact between the regular force and the reserves. The break, never clean nor properly healed, was then, as now, perhaps most evident in the continual bickering between leaders of the two forces over the distribution of the defence budget.

"Growing up allied," divided the armed forces—never very united as a national force—into specialized services each harnessed to the commitments they preferred and to like-minded allied services and their leaders. But it also gave Canada a force that politicians could use almost without restraint. It was competent, generally compliant, and could be deployed anywhere and any time and neglected, unlike a reserve force with its strong ties to home towns and local politics. But the "force-in-being" brought its share of problems including great expense, criticisms of government policies, and the burdens of a strategy of commitments.

The civil-military problems occasioned by the NATO era were handled mostly by keeping the professional force employed and out of politics, out of the press, out of sight, and out of the country. Senior military leaders accepted these terms of employment because they enhanced the roles professional officers wished to protect and gave them a significant degree of freedom from political oversight. The end of the cold war ended also this happy coincidence of political and military interests.

Finally, the amalgamation of Canadian Forces Headquarters with the public service staff of the Department of National Defence in 1972 blurred and then distorted the chain of command and

accountability in the armed forces and the department. It also in time confused some senior officers who came to accept a public service view of civil-military relations. That is to say, they believed that they had a responsibility to protect the minister and the government from criticism which is a short step to acting in a partisan political manner. Some senior officers accepted the intercession of deputy ministers in the military chain of command and the control and administration of the Canadian Forces. As a consequence, civil control of the armed forces was compromised, military advice was buried in efforts to forge bureaucratic collegiality, and some officers in the headquarters lost touch with the operational and human needs of the Canadian Forces. Only the obvious failings of the Somalia deployment and the public exposure of the improprieties of certain senior officers and the "conditions-of-service" scandal alerted citizens to these serious national problems.

Disharmony In Purposes And Methods

The disharmony of political and military attitudes, interests and values — a clash of belief systems — lead invariably to disconcerted defence policies, decisions, and outcomes. This assertion is overwhelmingly evident in the operational histories of the NORAD agreements of 1956, the Cuba missile crisis of 1962, nuclear weapons policies over the years, in the defence policies of the Trudeau era, in the recent deployments to the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, and in the current disparate defence and foreign policies. Disharmony is evident also in the history of defence administration as, for instance, in the case of naval force development in the early 1960s and nuclear submarines and EH101 helicopter decisions more recently; in disagreements over the need for main battle tanks; the purposes and size of the militia; and in which military bases would survive and which would close.

Discord characterizes policies concerning force sizes, budgets, and deployments; indeed, in most every critical area. The much discussed "commitment/capabilities gap" of the late-1980s was, arguably, not a gap in capabilities as much as a gap in how politicians and officers viewed commitments. Present policies based on the white paper, *Defence 1994*, are as disharmonious as ever, with little agreement except on the need for an undefined, and undefinable, "multi-purpose combat capability."

The history of peacekeeping and the Canadian Forces nicely illustrates some aspects of the continuing clashes between the Canadian way and the military way in warfare. Canadians and their political representatives take great pride in peacekeeping for many reasons. It is a concept (as popularly defined) perfectly suited to Canadian's image of themselves as an unmilitary people, without war aims, or any national stake in international disputes. Peacekeeping sets Canadians apart from "power politics" and the aggressiveness of the great powers. Moreover, these types of operations do not demand sophisticated and expensive weapons. In this context, Canada is, according to Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, "a global power . . . [with] the capacity to act as an honest broker on a range of issues . . . a wielder of 'soft power'. . . building coalitions of the willing" around the world.

Officers and their supporters see some things differently. Certainly they take pride in the performance of members of the Canadian Forces in peacekeeping operations. But peacekeeping has always been a sideshow. The real action, the determining activities of the armed forces, was

in NATO and NORAD and, today, in preparations to fight a modern war. The defence program speaks to this point of view. Despite suggestions that submarines, for example, might be needed for peacekeeping operations, they are in fact intended to help balance the navy's "combat capabilities." The decision, therefore, is perfectly reasonable from a military perspective, but difficult to reconcile with most political perspectives.

Peacekeeping is not proper soldiering. Such operations can deflect soldiers from their real purpose and take the edge off combat readiness. Moreover, demands for the army, in particular, to change its training concepts from combat requirements to peacekeeping requirements has, until recently, been stoutly resisted. Since the first major peacekeeping deployments of 1956, officers have resisted changing policies, training, doctrine, organizations, and equipments to meet the demands of peacekeeping because they believe such changes might degrade the demands of proper soldiering and the army's ability to fight the future great war.

Political and military differences about peacekeeping, however, have important operational consequences for the Canadian Forces. For instance, in 1996, officers who tried to deploy the armed forces to Zaire complained that "[Department of National Defence/Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade] meetings held to develop a Canadian response to the developing crisis [in the Great Lakes region of Africa] were unproductive. This was due to the fact that there was a lack of senior leadership direction on the government's intent, the priority of the mission, and the general level of commitment required. The only result of the meetings was frustration."¹⁹ This was the result, also, of the long-standing schism between political and military leaders in Canada on defence policy and the use of force in international relations.

What Is To Be Done?

The fault, if it is a fault in the usual sense, arises from both camps. Political leaders fail to set out achievable defence objectives and to provide adequate funding for those they declare. Too often, rhetoric passes as policy with the hope, perhaps, that our allies can't count. Politicians fail also as overseers. They simply do not pay sufficient attention to their duty to guide and audit military leaders and programs nor do they spend time acquainting themselves with the details and the history of defence policy. As the late General Gerald Theriault observed, "the military requires [from politicians] a great deal more than the kind of weak, inconsistent, reactive, and insufficiently informed leadership that nearly inevitably results from the structural shortcomings of the political control machinery we have in Canada."²⁰

Ironically, some officers who complain about the inadequacy of politicians' attention are the loudest complainers whenever politicians actually give military leaders firm directions. The admirals' broadsides fired at Paul Hellyer were touched off because the minister insisted that he would direct the armed forces in ways he thought appropriate to the national interest and not necessarily in ways that served the navy's interests. At other times, and notably during the 1993-94 defence review, officers protested, alleging that their views were being ignored or discounted in favour of ideas brought forward by groups from outside the profession. Politicians, and the defence minister especially, grumbled that officers were only content with political direction if it followed their notions of what that policy ought to be. According to General Theriault, the officer corps at times "has great difficulty differentiating between its own institutional interests

and aspirations and the real interests of the state, viewing both as coincident when, in fact, they are often very different."²¹

Unfortunately, these cramped views suffocate worthwhile debates and aggravate the disharmony in Canadian defence policy. Although senior leaders from both sides usually agree that they should overcome this division, each likes to encourage the other to make the first and most significant concessions. The resulting stand-off simply prolongs the difficulty. Politicians walk away to seek counter-experts more to their liking and officers hold out for the next election and the opposition's promised better times.

There are no better times ahead for senior military leaders. Not only must they live with the government of the day, but they should understand that new governments tend to follow old formulae. Harmony will only appear when officers change their views on the conditions and requirements of national defence and bring them into line with mainstream Canadian political thinking. This prescription requires officers to reconsider the framework of ideas that has until now shaped their belief system.

For instances, is the "world war model" with its demands for "preparedness" and mobilization still an appropriate planning assumption? Is it reasonable in the circumstances to insist that the Canadian Forces should be capable of fighting a first-class enemy in a high-intensity combat environment and that no other model is appropriate to Canada's defence needs? Is it always in the national interests to harmonize Canadian plans, force structures, doctrine, rules of engagement, and others policies to fit the needs of allies? Should Canadian officers continue to embrace allies and look to their ideas and directions as models for the Canadian Forces?

National military command is indivisible and cannot be delegated to foreign officers and mechanisms for national military command of the Canadian Forces should be built on this premise. Moreover, officers should accept that Canadian politicians are not interested in the details of the national command mechanism officers build, until Canada faces a crisis and then they want a system that matches their needs and not the military's doctrine. Therefore, when planning for national defence, senior officers might be guided by Bernard Brodie's advice and "take into account the orders that the [prime minister] is *likely* to give the military during a crisis, as distinct from those he may have promised in some general fashion to give."²² Officers should also prepare themselves and the Canadian Forces for the orders Canadian leaders are likely to give as distinct from those officers might wish them to give.

The system for the national command of the Canadian Forces outside Canada cannot be separated from the system for the control and administration of the Canadian Forces inside Canada. It is time, therefore, to build a mechanism for national command that will be effective and efficient in peacetime *and applicable without change* to crisis and wartime. Before 1972 the Canadian Forces system was built on military concepts and this "command era," though not perfect, clearly identified authorities, organizations, and decision-making processes.²³ Although National Defence Headquarters should continue to serve as a policy-integrating structure, the essential differences of its component parts, the Canadian Forces and Department of National Defence, must be respected. Now is the time to case off the organizing concepts advanced by

public servants in 1972 and to unify, from the top down, the national military command structure on basic military concepts of command and administration.

One fact of national life seems immutable; military concepts and doctrine cannot change, substantially, political ideas and attitudes concerning national defence. The immediate challenge facing the senior officer corps, therefore, is to establish within the Canadian Forces a set of ideas that will bring the officer corps into line with the way most Canadians think about national defence. This means that officers will have to rethink their assumptions about threats, defence objectives, capabilities, organizations, relations with allied military leaders, and operational methods.

Some pieces of this new framework have already been erected following the turmoil and inquiries into the Somalia affair. Much is left to be done. But the most trying test will be overpowering officers' tendencies to discount in quiet periods the "the facts of national life" and their habit of substituting in their place unrealistic and unworkable military interests and aspirations. Canadians are fortunate, however, because Canadian Forces officers at this moment seem ready to meet the challenge, well armed with a fresh appraisal of their professional responsibilities and a willingness to be guided by the ethics of their profession and the interests of Canadians.

Panel One

Endnotes

1. As quoted in George Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers: The Military History of An Unmilitary People*, (Toronto: Macmillan Company, 1960), p. 294
2. James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Appeasement And Rearmament*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967) p. 183
3. Nils Ørvik, "Canadian Security and 'Defence Against Help'" *International Perspectives*, (May/June 1983), p. 3. Professor Ørvik, of course, was arguing for an appropriate defence budget to forestall any American response to defend themselves in Canada because Canadians could not or would not do the job. Others have treated the United States as though it were an enemy much like the Soviet Union.
4. See for example, Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada and Human Security: The Need For Leadership," *International Journal*,
5. James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967) pp. 128-153
6. Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Appeasement And Rearmament*, p. 227
7. Canada, National Archives, Brooke Claxton, *Memoirs*, Vol 221, p. 21

8. Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied*, p. 132.
9. As quoted in Trevor Royle, *The Kitchener Enigma*, (London: Michael Joseph Ltd., 1985) p. 327
10. Adrian Preston, "The Profession of Arms In Postwar Canada, 1945-1970" *World Politics* 23 (January 1971): p. 197.
11. Douglas I. Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government And The Unified Command of The Canadian Armed Forces*, (Toronto: CISS, 1995), pp. 9-13 and pp. 175-210.
12. J.V. Brock, *Memoirs of a Sailor: The Thunder and the Sunshine, Vol. II*. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1983). p. 108.
13. Stephen Harris, "Service Headquarters In Past Wars And Crises," Department of National Defence, NDHQ Study S1/88, p. G13.
14. Lieutenant General Paul Addy, "Affidavit - Written Submissions," before *The Inquiry Into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia*, May 1997.
15. A notable exception to this habit was Vice Admiral "Chuck" Thomas who advocated that the lion's share of the budget should go to the navy based on his assessment of the national interests and the military threats to it. Thomas' proposal was attacked as a naval plot that upset the "balanced forces" rule. No one argued for or against his strategic assessment. See Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, pp. 206-207 and pp. 270-271.
16. See Maurice Pope, "Memorandum On A Canadian Organization For The Higher Direction Of National Defence," March 1937, in Douglas L. Bland, ed. *Canada's National Defence: Volume II Defence Organization*, (Kingston: Queen's University School of Policy Studies, 1998) (forthcoming, autumn, 1998.)
17. Interviews, members, *Special Joint Committee On Canada's Defence*, Ottawa, 1993-94.
18. Interviews, Ottawa and Kingston, 1997-98.
19. Canada, Department of National Defence, "Lessons Learned Questionnaire: Op Assurance," Access To Information Request, #1463-A, 97/0732.
20. Gerry Theriault, "Democratic Civil-Military Relations: A Canadian View," in *The Military In Modern Democratic Society*, Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, November, 1996, p.10.
21. Theriault, "Democratic Civil-Military Relations," p.10.
22. Bernard Brodie, *Strategy In The Missile Age*, (Princeton: Princeton, University Press, 1959), p. 260. Emphasis in the original.

23. Douglas Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy In Canada, 1947-1985*, (Kingston: R.P. Frye & Co., 1987).

The Canadian Military Profession: A Question of Credibility

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The Canadian Armed Forces currently face enormous challenges. They must be prepared to fulfil a long list of different missions assigned to them by the Federal Government. In carrying them out, they are expected to achieve high standards of operational effectiveness and efficiency, and to do so in an environment of shrinking budgets, ageing equipment, personnel reductions, social change, rapid technological advancements and a relatively low level of public and political support. A look at the record of late shows that despite these difficulties, and except for a few notable but isolated incidents, the missions have all been carried out in an efficient and effective way.

Most of you are probably saying...so what's new, that's the way it's always been! But you and I know that something is wrong! What is it? What caused it? How can it be put right?

In my view, Ladies and Gentlemen, over the last seven or eight years, the Canadian Forces have been going through what I choose to call a *culture shock (or warp)*. Since the Korean Conflict and up until the early nineties, despite unification and integration, a number of Force reductions, and changes in roles and missions in NATO, the Official Languages Act, Exercise Brave Lion which proved we couldn't deliver on our promise to support North Norway, the SWINTER trial, the adoption of distinctive environmental uniforms, Human Rights Legislation, withdrawal of almost all stationed forces from Europe, ...and so on, the Canadian Military were still living in the same relatively isolated and cosy world I had come to know in my early years in the military back in the fifties and sixties. These and other changes occurred at a relatively slow pace and were manageable and absorbable. Then all of a sudden, the first serious set of operational missions in a long while, coupled with a blur of modifications to the conditions of service, changed everything. Oka, Former Yugoslavia, the Gulf War, and Somalia, inadequate and insufficient equipment, inadequate and insufficient training, unclear missions, muddled chains of command, insufficient numbers of trained personnel, serious discipline problems, inadequate administrative support, media scrutiny, calls for transparency, access to information, questioning of the military justice system, exponentially escalating O&M costs, the pay freeze, unacceptable quality-of-life conditions, the advent of two-income service families, moonlighting... The chickens came home to roost. There was simply too much happening in too short a time, and the Forces were simply unprepared and unable to cope. The Canadian Forces had, in fact, seen some of these issues coming, but were able to only partially mitigate their impact. Worse still, we failed to properly forecast and identify a large number of these issues and were caught fighting rear-guard actions or playing catch-up ball. Why did this happen? Where did we go wrong?

Without wishing to sound glib, I believe the Forces lost their way. We were caught flat-footed! After decades of peace, we lost our edge, our focus. We lacked the fortitude and the ability to convince the Canadian public and elected officials of the necessity of a number of essentials without which a viable and credible military force was not achievable. Typically, the senior leadership and the vast majority of the other members of the Forces were doing their utmost to make things work, but our best wasn't good enough.

A simplistic characterisation and diagnosis? Perhaps! But do allow me to focus in on the *three major reasons* I believe caused this state of affairs to exist.

First, the Forces were lacking in a number of elements of basic professionalism, and still are; second, they had - and continue to have - little or no capacity for looking beyond the immediate; and third, the Forces did not, and still do not have, solid public and political support.

Put another way, the Forces need to regularly and thoroughly examine the basic requirements of the Profession of Arms and correct shortcomings - such as the lack of a pervasive career-long training and development culture, with emphasis on where the need is greatest, at the most senior level of the Forces. They must obtain and dedicate the resources necessary to gain a better understanding of the social and operational environments they currently live and operate in, and be capable of planning for inevitable change; and they must develop much greater public and political support. In the short time I have left, let me briefly look at each one of these points in turn.

The term *profession* is used to describe an occupation with a distinguishable body of specific technical knowledge and doctrine; a more or less exclusive group coherence; a complex of unique institutions; an educational pattern adapted to its own needs; a career structure of its own; and a distinct place in society. Using this admittedly rather loose definition, it is rather easy to conclude that the members of the Canadian Military do belong to a profession. Would it surprise you that there are many, belonging to that hard-to-define, small but important segment of our Society called "Thinking Canadians" who hold the view that the Canadian Military do *not* constitute a Profession. It either didn't occur to them, or they believe that the Canadian Forces do not satisfy the requirements to merit the designation.

If, as I suggested a moment ago, a profession is a self-regulating body, the detractors I mentioned a moment ago were no doubt encouraged in their beliefs when Defence Minister Young launched an in-depth, and amazingly short-duration, study into many aspects of the Canadian Military. He subsequently came forward, in 1997, with over one hundred recommendations for change. Was the profession in such disarray as to warrant so many changes? My assessment is that it was. Admittedly, some of these changes had been long sought after by the military, but some were not. This process was no doubt welcomed by the military, but at what cost to the credibility of the Forces and to its image as a self-regulated profession, in the eyes of members of the Forces themselves, as well as from outside the Forces.

And speaking of credibility, why this decades-long resistance, in the Forces, to the setting of the requirement of a university degree for eligibility to an officer's commission, a resistance that lasted till two years ago. The incorporation of the requirement had to be forced onto the

Canadian Officer Corps. For goodness sakes, in the company I currently work for, entry as a member of the administrative staff requires the candidate to have a university degree. A post-graduate degree is an entry requirement for aspiring research assistants. I am delighted with former Minister Young's decree, and with the Withers report, and with a number of other initiatives such as the RMC off-campus programs. But what took so long? A lack of funds, no doubt, but unfortunately and more devastatingly for the Canadian Forces, a lack of vision, and a loss of credibility. Thank goodness we appear to be well on our way to restoring the serious loss of the National Defence College through the development of new programs at the Command and Staff College in Toronto. The NDC was an easy target, since the military and civilian hierarchy of DND were not prepared to support this unique senior professional institution, nor did they consider it important to design an alternative to it before offering it up as a cost-cutting budget reduction option some four years ago. Vision, you say! Go figure!

What do Canadians expect of the Canadian Military? Simply put, they want the Canadian Forces to be the best at what they do, whether it's assistance to civil authority (where the approval ratings are the highest), or being warriors (participating in high intensity combat (such as the Gulf War) for example). To protect the Canadian Force's ability to achieve and retain that capability, the Forces also need a complement of Senior Officers who can work effectively within the Federal bureaucracy. You will recall those nasty comments levelled, not so long ago, at what were termed "careerists", that horrible group of officers who try their best to do what NDHQ is supposed to do and who were viewed as uninterested in a "proper" sort of military career, but rather only interested in advancement within the bureaucracy. If we want to preserve the Canadian Forces' ability to do its thing, we had better change our view on this issue and be prepared to train and develop a cadre of officers capable of getting what the Forces need. I believe the Canadian public will be grateful.

The second part to the remedy for what ails the Forces is the need to develop the ability to adapt, while at the same time protecting the fundamental elements of military professionalism. To do that, the Forces must be thoroughly plugged in to Canadian society.

Over the last two to three decades, we have seen the Forces *react* to the greater integration of women into the military. We have seen them *react* to equal opportunity legislation. We have seen them *react* to the call for transparency, to greater media scrutiny and to many other issues that impact on the Force's ability to get the job done. In a lot of instances, the reaction of the Forces was slow and negative. Some of these reactions were warranted. But they *were* reactions, and they gave the impression of an inability, on the part of the Forces, to adapt, to be pro-active, and aware of trends. They also conveyed the notion that the Forces were incapable or unaware of the importance of presenting, before their introduction, cogent and believable arguments for or against changes that would impact on the fundamental elements of military professionalism. Not being prepared for or not foreseeing change, in my opinion, is a sign of a lack of professionalism.

By the way, in a recently published article on the question of professionalism in the Canadian Forces, Official Languages legislation was another of those issues to which the Forces were believed to have *reacted* inappropriately. I agree! The Forces should have understood that the requirement to be able to communicate with one's subordinates is a basic element of leadership,

not something that needs to be legislated. What could be more fundamental to military professionalism?

The third and final element to the remedy I propose is, without a doubt, the most difficult to put in place. I speak of the need for the Forces to develop strong public and political support.

You all realise, I know, that if you gain strong public support, the odds are heavily in your favour that political support will follow. Grey power versus the Federal Government's efforts to claw back a part of senior's pension benefits is a well-known example. Why are health care funding and tax reductions two of the top three Federal Government fiscal priorities these days? Canadians have been screaming blue murder about these matters, that's why! Am I suggesting the Forces gain support the same way? No!

Let me lighten up a bit, here, and take a slightly tongue-in-cheek and somewhat irreverent look at the problem, as I come to the end of my presentation and make a point about gaining public and political support.

Did you know that Major Dan Cooper, a fictitious Canadian Forces fighter pilot, has been featured in a series of popular illustrated glossy comic books of the *Tintin* or *Asterix* variety in Europe for at least fifteen years now? Not in Canada, you say? Pity!!! *Due South*, a TV series featuring a Canadian Mountie, made it as a popular Canadian TV series, and Disney is now into promoting the RCMP. Every single Boy Scout in the world knows what a Swiss army knife is. Are the Canadian Forces so uninteresting that we would not want to popularise them in some way? How on earth do you get at kids, these days, if it isn't through music, video games and the Internet? How do you get at young adults if it isn't through popular entertainment programs, extreme sports and the Internet? How do you get at adults if it isn't through intelligent argument or crass commercialism (depending on the adult), and slowly, through the Internet?

The Forces obtained good mileage out of the *Top Gun* competition public relations exercise a year ago. There must be a hundred good-news items that would gain popular attention, and by osmosis, political support for the Forces. Why not pepper the Canadian Forces web site with them, and use them as opportunities to publicise what the Forces are doing for Canadians on a daily basis? The current Canadian Forces web site attempts to do that, but it is too tame by half.

Ladies and Gentlemen, do you remember when all of us were complaining that the media were ignoring the Canadian Forces? You will have noticed that in the past five years or so, members of the Canadian Forces have been featured on television, on radio and in the written media more than I can certainly remember happening before. A lot of this focus has been about bad news. But, thankfully, a lot of it has been good news as well. There hasn't been that much of it, you say! You're right! And more of it is needed. What the Forces really need is an aggressive and imaginative public relations program. Hamstrung by the 1961 Glassco Commission Report that effectively disallowed Federal Government Departments from advertising their own wares, are we? How antiquated, and how totally devoid of innovation. Surely, good arguments can be mounted to convince the powers that be of the benefits to be derived from this sort of activity. Thankfully, there are good examples to follow out there. What was your reaction to the outpouring of grief and the participation, by Police forces across the country, at the funeral

service of a Toronto Police Officer, this past summer? You were no doubt impressed with the expression of sympathy and support, broadcast on television across the country! In contrast, the death, at approximately the same time, of a Canadian Forces soldier serving with the UN force in Bosnia went almost unnoticed, except for a short news clip in some major Canadian newspapers. It is true that a few weeks later, a special annual wreath laying ceremony was held at the Peacekeeping Monument here in Ottawa to honour all those who fell in the cause of Peace. But believing that that is enough is missing the public relation and public support idea entirely. Do I need to remind you that the "In your face" approach to gaining public and political attention and support seems to work best? Will the Federal Government provide all or at least a substantial portion of the Quality-of-life funding shortfall? A strong case has been made, and the media have picked up on it. Let's see if it works.

We should not have to rely on natural disasters and body bags to get the message across to Canadians of the importance of the Canadian Forces to Canada and the need for appropriate public and political support in peacetime, without which preparedness for periods of conflict cannot be achieved. Our military history makes the point eloquently.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the Canadian Military Profession needs to pull itself up by its own bootstraps. It must come through this culture shock (or warp), this makeover, convinced of the need to ensure that:

the essentials of military professionalism are in place;

that the profession is constantly keeping an eye on the future; and

that it expends serious energy in gaining public and political support.

I am aware of the fact that the process has begun, and I applaud the efforts of the CDA in assisting *the* person responsible for the profession's and the Force's state of health, the Chief of the Defence Staff, and his senior officers, in their already laudable efforts. Let us not forget, however, that attempting to do so while at the same time holding on to borrowed, antiquated, overly conservative principles simply won't do. To be innovative, and with it, all the while accepting no compromise on professional military essentials, such as respect for the chain of command is, in this humble servant's view, the way to go. The credibility of the Canadian military profession, in a decidedly weakened state at this point in time, will be strengthened, as a result.

DISCUSSION

Dr. Bland was asked to comment further on the reasoning behind the amalgamation of CFHQ and the Deputy Minister's office into NDHQ. He replied this was no part of Mr. Hellyer's plan. It was a solution to a bureaucratic administrative problem, *not* a solution to the problem of providing a single voice for military advice. The current structure has been no more successful at managing the Department than the military.

The panel was asked where is the Canadian Forces' *strategic vision*, this being a basic feature of civil life. General Evraire responded that we need military personnel involved in creating one. Unfortunately, the military is too ready to rely on others to provide it. And if one *is* made, then all must work together to achieve it.

The panel was asked what the impact would be of better public relations. Given that we cannot buy support, how can we most effectively use public relations to gain support? How can the young generation be made familiar with military history? General Evraire replied that this cannot be neglected, but we would probably need to start at the community level. Dr. Bland responded that creative thinking was required. As an example, Hungarians were "sold" the advantages of NATO entry using a soap opera. But it must be borne in mind that it is easier to gain support for what the *people* want, rather than what *you* want.

A participant asked why the "older generation", as represented by the speakers, provided no strategic vision to those now serving. General Evraire replied that it was not through lack of trying.

The panel was asked whether or not education was being over-emphasized. Is a junior officer necessarily a better officer because he has a degree? In reply, Dr. Bland used General "Shan" Hackett as an excellent exemplar of the virtue of civil education. Perhaps the real maxim is not "All officers should have degrees" but rather "All officers should be educated." Education is needed to permit the officer to interact with the rest of society and lead his men in the same way. This is an operational necessity.

PANEL 2: THE PROFESSION OF ARMS IN CANADA: THE WAY AHEAD

THE PROFESSION OF ARMS IN CANADA – THE PRESENT AND FUTURE

**By Vice-Admiral Larry Murray, CMM, CD (Retired)
Associate Deputy Minister, Department of Fisheries and Oceans**

It is both a privilege and a pleasure to be able to participate in the 1999 Conference of Defence Association Institute's Annual Seminar on the subject of "The Profession of Arms in Canada: Past Present and Future".

I will begin my remarks with my assessment of the overall state of the Profession of Arms in Canada, then provide a few contextual comments on why reform is necessary in some areas and finally outline the nature of the change that I believe is required. The latter draws very heavily on the recommendations that former Defence Minister Young made to the Prime Minister in his Report of March, 1997. As Acting Chief of the Defence Staff at the time and, together with many other individuals and organizations both within and outside the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, I provided input to former Minister Young. I also strongly supported all the recommendations made in his Report to the Prime Minister. I still do.

In a speech to the CDA as Acting Chief of the Defence Staff in January, 1997 I stated that: "The Canadian Forces continue to perform their operational missions in a consistently professional and highly effective manner. They could not do so if our morale was rock bottom and if we did not have many excellent leaders from Master Corporal to General."

I then defended that opinion by providing a detailed review of the actual operational accomplishments of the Canadian Forces at home and abroad throughout 1996. Since that time I have observed the Forces consistently excellent performance at home during the Manitoba flood, the central Canada ice storm and the Swiss Air disaster, as well as during countless other smaller operations, and abroad in Haiti, in Bosnia, in Africa and elsewhere. My personal assessment has not changed. I believe that the Canadian Forces is a fundamentally sound organization blessed with fine people at all levels doing generally excellent work in often difficult circumstances.

I also stated in my 1997 speech to CDA that: "There is no doubt that this is a difficult period in the history of the Canadian Forces. It's a time for renewal ... We do have problems, but reform is underway. It's comprehensive and a lot is happening." Based on my observations since leaving the CF, I also believe that statement remains valid.

Given the turbulence and dramatic changes both globally and in Canada, in the last ten years, it should not be surprising that the Canadian Forces has experienced some difficulties.

The global context has changed dramatically for the Canadian Forces in the last decade, driven by the end of the Cold War, tremendous advances in technology, instant communications, and a significant increase in the number and complexity of UN and other multi-national peace support operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. In addition to producing an extremely demanding operational tempo, all of these operations were unique and brought new challenges.

Missions were no longer purely military operations; most now have a complex political, humanitarian and/or economic development dimension. Further, the nature of recent peace support operations also invariably placed tremendous leadership and key decision-making demands throughout the chain of command including on very junior officers and NCOs at the unit and sub-unit level.

Canadian society also underwent significant change with the implementation of the Charter; dramatic economic restructuring and fiscal and employment uncertainty; and a more questioning public that requires openness and transparency on all fronts.

A combination of the changing geo-strategic situation and the pressing need to address the country's growing deficit and debt crisis led to dramatic Defence budget cuts and attendant downsizing in the Canadian Forces from 1989 through 1996. This in turn generated significant internal uncertainty; a variety of major restructuring and re-engineering exercises; evolving roles and not always clear accountability; and a significant effort to try to maximize operational or "sharp end" capability at the expense of less essential infrastructure and bureaucratic overhead. All of this was superimposed on the extremely challenging and dynamic operational scenario described earlier.

Minister Young's Review was conducted within this overall context and with the aim of producing a comprehensive response in a relatively short time frame; that is, from January to March, 1997. The subsequent report to the Prime Minister was the product of the efforts of many dedicated Canadians. The resulting 100 recommendations included:

- a significant emphasis on ensuring strong, effective and ethical leadership at all levels;
- much greater emphasis on education on entry and from recruit to General Officer;
- improved individual professional military training including increased emphasis in areas such as rules of engagement and the laws of armed conflict;
- increased emphasis on ensuring adequate collective and joint military training across the spectrum of conflict;
- improved standards for selection, promotion and retention of military personnel;
- clarified accountability within National Defence Headquarters;
- much more open and transparent public and internal communications; and
- a major reform and update of the Military Justice System and Military Policy Investigative Services.

As noted at the outset, as Acting Chief of the Defence Staff

I strongly endorsed all of these recommendations. My understanding is that implementation of most of them is well underway. In my view that should ensure that Canada continues to be blessed with Armed Forces that are among the best in the world and at the individual member level, second to none.

THE PROFESSION OF ARMS IN CANADA – THE WAY AHEAD

Major General J.M.C. Couture, CD
Acting Deputy Minister (Human Resources – Military), Department of National Defence

C'est un plaisir de vous revoir et d'avoir une deuxième occasion de vous entretenir d'un sujet qui me passionne: l'avenir des Forces canadiennes. J'ai eu l'occasion et le privilège de participer à votre symposium du mois de novembre. J'aimerais remercier l'Institut du Congrès des associations de la défense, d'avoir organisé ce symposium annuel pour commencer un débat sur les défis qui nous attendent aujourd'hui et demain. Tout au long de la journée, des conférenciers très distingués vous ont déjà parlé de certains de ces défis.

I enjoy this privilege of speaking before such an esteemed audience. I am well aware that my words, and the words of others here today may well spark debate. This debate will occur, as often happens during and after CDA conferences, so that you may continue to raise concerns in order for us to be prompted and respond to the concerns of this nation with regards to the CF.

Juste avant moi, l'Amiral Murray a indiqué son soutien aux recommandations de l'ancien ministre de la Défense, M. Douglas Young, faites au Premier Ministre dans son rapport de mars 1997. Nous avons déjà commencé à mettre en oeuvre plusieurs de ces recommandations.

When I was asked to speak for this panel, I was asked, "Where are we going? What obstacles do we have to overcome? What initiatives are in place?" Both The Minister of National Defence and the Chief of Defence Staff addressed the latter by describing the challenges we are currently facing and the education initiatives currently underway, as well as the steps we have taken to provide greater professional development.

What I would like to address with you today is the future, and our place in it from the HR perspective. I would like to stress one point that will be a major factor in our future, and that is flexibility. Flexibility will be one of the strongest and most meaningful concepts for a successful CF of the Future. We must have the ability to continuously re-invent ourselves.

Minister Eggleton suggested the four core pillars for strengthening our military are people, training, leadership and equipment. Today, the Minister chose to stress education. This is a very strong and necessary factor in the future of our defence force. It is necessary to educate our leadership. However, this does not mean only the higher echelons as leadership can be found throughout the CF. Leadership is at the core of the Profession of Arms, it always has been and it always will be. As we all know, the world is changing rapidly, our big challenge is to prepare our leaders for a dynamic, evolving, uncertain future. We must ensure that our leaders are adaptable, flexible, professional and informed. Their behaviour must be effective while remaining consistent with fundamental Canadian values. We need leaders prepared for the tactical, operational and strategic requirements of the future.

Du point de vue tactique, nous devons s'assurer que nous pouvons diriger, motiver et développer un militaire de plus en plus diverse et habile.

To address all issues and ensure that we are prepared for the future, the profession of arms in Canada, must have a strategic focus to professional development. We have to take a broad perspective on a wide range of factors that are going to influence the "people" aspect of this profession.

Let's discuss our people. Who will be our CF of the future? It is a mission imperative that the CF of the future is representative of Canadian society. To develop a strong and reputable profession of arms we have to be able to attract and retain quality individuals. As General Baril stated, "We need the right people with the right skills." These people must be flexible, capable career learners that can adapt to the challenges set before them.

It is difficult to predict Future Force requirements. Reductions have affected the representation of women and minorities, as well, has had an impact on the average age of officers and NCMs. It is therefore necessary to study demographic changes to maintain the force. As Canada is becoming a society representing the diversity of the world's peoples and cultures, we must aim to attract from this diversity. Education levels are continuing to rise which means that we should be able to raise the standards for recruiting. We must ensure that the CF and the diverse and educated recruit will represent the ethics, the values and the practices consistent with core Canadian values, as well as incorporating and reflecting changes in Canadian legislation.

Flexible Human Resources programs, responsive to the defence objective and tailored to the individual's needs, service specific and operational requirements, will attract, develop and retain quality personnel. This can no longer be based solely on the 35-year cradle-to-grave employment plan, but rather the flexible learning oriented mission. One size does not have to fit all. To be fair to all, we have to have several ways to approach every problem.

The employment contract must shift away from a focus on job security to a focus on employability. One of our primary training goals must be to ensure that we have a strong learning organisation supportive of lifelong learners. Knowledge management and the fostering of human capital will become key resource management functions. Renewed policies must enable learning that is continuous and not limited to formal training. Implementing these changes will take time because to do it right, strategic thinking is necessary to avoid mistakes. The leader of the future will be skilled at strategic management. Leadership and management cannot be mutually exclusive terms.

Given that CF missions and the CF are becoming more complex, we have to attract quality individuals, train them to succeed and adapt to a wider range of missions. Providing our members with the care and support necessary to accomplish their missions will also be more complex. However, with a continuously developing CF, personnel will have the opportunity for professional development as the learning organisation will support continuous development and facilitate employment transitions. Allowing for this flexibility will make DND an employer of choice capable of innovation, productivity and effectiveness within a flexible integrated work environment. We are striving to become more open, and more transparent, and changes do not happen overnight.

Presently members are able to have a say in their careers, but we are striving to give members a stronger voice and helping with their own employability. Implementing the recently detailed Quality of Life recommendations will also raise retention levels, but we must also ensure that flexible tailored HR programs develop career flexibility and retain our members.

In the future we envision career flexibility that will allow members to serve, leave, then return to service. Career flexibility will allow for transitions between the CF and the public service, and other government departments or secondments to non-governmental organisations, or even the corporate world resulting in a stronger and more diverse member. These short and/or long term transfers would raise the degree of both satisfaction and employability of our members and continue to be a profession of choice, and sustain and motivate people throughout their careers and post-service activities.

Career flexibility should allow for an increased emphasis on civic training. Operationally, this will foster an expansion of leader development to handle the complexity of the modern mission. We must be able to work with Non Governmental Organisations, other Government Departments, and be able to do so inter-culturally. We must be prepared for the future by providing members with the skills and competencies necessary to prepare them for the range of missions they may face. They will be required to handle the increasingly complex technology that is a part of RMA.

Le Général Baril vous a dit ce matin que la Révolution des Affaires Militaires change notre façon de voir la chose militaire. La nature changeante de la guerre et telle que la technologie a des répercussions plus importantes qu'auparavant. Il est probable que nous ne réalisons même pas à quel point ce changement sera bouleversant et quelle en sera exactement la nature. La technologie évolue sans cesse. Un des changements le plus évident est la vitesse et la facilité de l'accès à l'information, ce qu'on appelle l'Age de l'Information. La visibilité grandissante de CNN, nous permet de saisir un des effets de cette technologie. Our leaders must be prepared to work with that influx of information from all sides. RMA and the impact of technology must also include the changing role of nation states around the world. This affects how we deal within different forums.

Both the Chief of Defence Staff and Minister of National Defence addressed RMA as a great part of the Forces of the future. What our military will encounter is not known but we know that with sound strategic thinking and planning we can meet the changes and the challenges of the future. Strategic thinking brings changes that take time to implement. These changes require the intellectual and technological flexibility necessary to meet and address any situation. Our CF will be a part of these changes whether we want it or not, thus we must prepare our people for rapid decision-making by avoiding information overload through skilled application of knowledge. This can be done by establishing strategic leadership and adequate training programs to ensure exceptional levels of professional development of our people well into the future. One such program is the Enhanced Leadership Model currently being studied for the Junior Officers professional development. Knowledge and skills must be continuously developed to meet the requirements of an information age.

The CF has been involved in the international security arena for many years. Our military must be prepared to go to war as we have that obligation. This however is not our only obligation. Our past contributions on the world stage have laid the foundations for future assistance.

Within the global defence environment, we must have future leaders able to understand the intricacies of governance, international relations and the roles of all the actors involved. Using this knowledge will allow us to maintain the contributions being made in the world. As General Baril touched upon, one of the significant factors of the future is that we must be operationally flexible. Preparation for war alone is not sufficient, we are meeting a different age and we must be prepared for new operational developments linked to a wide range of missions, including humanitarian missions. Providing advanced training and education will form leaders that will enhance the power of their people and the effectiveness of technology by providing vision, developing strategic directions, monitoring results, and acting accordingly. The Strategic leader will be flexible and skilled at strategic management; leadership and management should not be mutually exclusive terms. Their core values and high ethical standards will help them lead the way of the future as mentors, facilitators, and embodied as the CF itself.

La flexibilité est la clé du futur. Flexible HR programs support intellectual and career flexibility which in turn leads to flexible leadership and operational capability, and thus a successful Canadian Forces able to meet the future.

Canadian Military Professional Development: The Way Ahead?

Dr. Dean F. Oliver, Senior Historian, Canadian War Museum

As today's proceedings have repeatedly reminded us, professions - and the professionals within them - are not created equal. Nor do they remain static over time. Professions exist in a tumultuous world, buffeted by the same winds that occasionally chill us all, like demographic trends, budgetary priorities, scandal, and lapses in public interest. How professions assess or even reinvent themselves in response to such trends is vitally important; some will do well in periods of uncertainty, and some will not. The study of such struggles, both by scholarly examination and by impassioned advocacy, is an endless fascination. The modern literature of professionalism in arms, for example, is related closely to the attempts of American military officers, intellectuals, and defence analysts to come to grips with the US military's then ongoing experience in Vietnam.

Amidst what is often rapid professional change, however, kernels of stability usually remain, sometimes even more so than we might like. In the legal profession, for example, the debate over paralegals has not done away with lawyers, who continue to beset the land like a Biblical blight, even as the nature of their function, the internal workings of their profession, the extent to which it enjoys public confidence, and its relationship to outsiders with related skills, like law enforcement officers and legal aid workers, all remain aspects of the debate.

Recent years have witnessed this truism with respect to the Canadian Forces: that transition periods can generate both far-reaching changes in professional training, values, organization, and ethics, and at the same time uphold key elements of structural stability, corporate identity, and professional purpose. There is no inherent contradiction in this. Some would argue that failure to effect fundamental structural change, or reluctance to revisit the basic missions and objectives of the organization, put paid to any notion of professional rejuvenation. A revamped training regimen, they would argue, is merely tinkering if it does not come as part of a wholesale change of doctrine.

But one of the defining characteristics of a profession surely is that it retains the capacity for internal monitoring, peer assessment, training, and freedom of corporate choice. The fact that the profession seems to reject, in whole or in part, some elements in the carefully crafted reform plans of even the best-intentioned outsiders is not, in itself, indication of unprofessionalism, much less is it proof positive of an 'anti-intellectual' predisposition. It may even indicate the reverse. We should neither ask nor expect the mother herself to throw the baby out with the bath water.

We saw this process unfold in the aftermath of Somalia. That the specific charge that misdeeds there were directly attributable to bad officers, soon generalized into a broad questioning of contemporary Canadian military professionalism, was understandable. Other suggestions were not. Amidst the cacophony of voices crying havoc across the land could soon be heard the faint hint of axes grinding, as the disgruntled, the frustrated, the omniscient, and the scandal-hungry chased the roaring ambulance of reform to the Mackenzie King entrance and stormed inside to drag out victims, whether unhealthy or not.

NDHQ found itself under siege in this period just as surely as if the armies of Tamerlane or Ghenghis Khan had ensconced themselves along the far bank of the canal, and its residents, like those of Samarkand, faced a similar dilemma: resist and be slaughtered slowly, or surrender and be butchered in one fell swoop. As a friend of mine once remarked, what would you sooner have: a boil or a goiter? Public Affairs officers stood to the walls with commendable courage, but from outside the bombardment never ceased.

Why look backward, however briefly, to this trail of tears in a panel asked specifically to look ahead? Because a clear assessment of the present and the recent past, in addition to the history Dr. Granatstein spoke of earlier, is critical in charting the course the department now claims to seek.

The first point to be made here concerns institutional capacity and discernment. The avalanche of opinions, recommendations, and proposals which emerged from the Somalia debacle highlighted the need for an enhanced professional capacity, both within the defence department and the government more generally, to differentiate between valuable opinions and just plain noise. Many of the proposals advanced so earnestly during these debates were wholly justified, others were necessary, and a few were absolutely vital. But some were none of the above. By sheer weight of argumentation, by - sometimes - personal charm and charisma, and occasionally from the department's new-found understandable desire to appear reasonable and correct, many of the latter nevertheless gravitated towards the epicenter of what, at times, was a swirling, unfocused

debate. A department desperate for good press was occasionally willing to sanction heresy by embracing it, however briefly, while a media generally indifferent and poorly read on military affairs offered a level playing field for the brilliant and the boorish, the insightful and the insane. Foolishness became ordinary and folly, good sense. Media careers were made overnight; most of us have cabinets full of CBC and Canada AM coffee mugs to prove it. Lacking adequate capacity for assessment and response, and hampered by an ineffective, and at times counterproductive, public relations policy, the department floundered and chaos reigned.

If some of the ensuing defence discourse proved positively ridiculous, however, a great deal of it did not. The notion that a crisis of military professionalism lay at or near the heart of the Somalia crisis, and indeed at the heart of the Canadian military's more general malaise, must thus be counted among the more useful of Somalia's side-effects, difficult though it might be to justify, either intellectually or practically, the manner in which that debate occasionally spun out of control and the extent to which 'military bashing' became a spectator sport. Somalia clearly revealed flaws in training, professional ethics, and leadership and the debate, whatever its outcome, was clearly worth having.

Again, it was easy for critics to make their case, and even to exaggerate it, when the military at first seemed unaware of the growing conflagration. Its quick reaction to Somalia was a somewhat wry, somewhat disingenuous combination of 'awe shucks' on one hand and 'mea culpa' on the other, neither of which acknowledged the possibility that structural or environmental factors - including the military's professional ethos - might have been at fault.

Whether or not this was true is now something of a moot point, although, on balance, there were clearly more problems, and deeper ones, than the institution was at first prepared to admit. Somalia and its aftermath confirmed the impression, more common in the press perhaps than elsewhere, that a narrow-minded, unprofessional clique now led the unfortunate, bungling Canadian Forces, and that this situation could not be permitted to continue. The killing of Shidane Arone was hardly the only catalyst for this. Hazing videos, the corruption of some senior officers, a flawed public relations and access to information machinery, archaic attitudes toward women, and the actions of some CF personnel on other peacekeeping missions, played their part, but all coalesced in the public mind around the Somalia example, and all were epitomized by it.

Of equal importance in understanding developments in this period, however, is the fact that the military's alleged flaws and misdeeds also corresponded with a contemporaneous and more broadly based assault on Canadian defence organization and policy, an old and familiar tirade in many particulars, to be sure, but one which drew new life from the department's Somalia-induced travails. This challenge, which ranged from the suitability of general purpose military training to the Canadian Forces' appropriate role in a post-Cold War world, came mainly from those who would have been delighted to eviscerate Canada's defence establishment under almost any circumstances, regardless of probable cause, though it now included segments of the so-called 'defence establishment' as well whose ranks were both split and polarized by Somalia. Somalia, in short, both incorporated and legitimized all aspects of the defence debate at precisely the same time that departmental resources, expert opinion, and societal patience were - respectively - strained, divided, and sorely tested. Whenever the din of grinding axes slackened

for half a moment, faint whispers of ‘Gotcha’, as Denis Stairs noted recently, or ‘I told you so’ could be heard above the happy crunching of morning granola and the delicate rustle of tie-dyed shirts.

With media maestros, ersatz academics, and instant experts leading the charge, disgruntled ex-military personnel, many of them from the long-suffering reserves, followed in train. In the ensuing encounter, however, almost no one noticed the significance of the fact that the military had even offered battle. Eschewing perpetual siege, it had taken the field.

The physician had begun, belatedly perhaps, to heal itself but by now no professional establishment could hope to satisfy all its critics. The wisdom of Solomon, and perhaps two or three Solomons, would clearly have been required; NDHQ had one or two Caesars in this period, but no identifiable Solomons. Yet the fact that it moved so far so quickly (under political fire to be sure) and against most expectations for success, is a tribute to all involved, and hard indication that professionalism, found wanting in many outside assessments, was (and remains) alive and well in what the sharp-tongued continue to call Fort Fumble, and as much incidentally in the civilian ranks as in the military.

Do not assume from the foregoing that I wish to whitewash the department’s tortuous response to Somalia, or to privilege too greatly certain segments of the ensuing debate. Let us be clear on both: Somalia revealed an organization with profound weaknesses, the debate over which, while painful, has been - arguably perhaps - among the longest, deepest, and most productive in this country’s military history. The debate does lead, however, to important observations about the likely future of Canadian military professionalism. Paramount among them is the need to be transparent, accountable, and open to periodic, even sweeping, change, to echo points made this morning by General Baril. But equally important is the corresponding need for corporate capacity, legitimacy, and confidence in the face of external challenge to both explain the nature of the evolving profession of arms in a clear-headed, sensible way to fellow Canadians and, where necessary, the courage to defend vigorously professional prerogatives and sound policy against those wolves who, in sheep’s clothing, would reform the profession to death. The latter point has critical implications for the military’s professional organization, structures, and liaisons with other stakeholders, including Parliament and the Canadian public; the former has implications for training, officer development, and professional ethics.

Another vital piece in this puzzle, of course, is the question of what exactly the post-Somalia, post-Cold War Canadian military should be for. To a certain extent, of course, professionalism exists (or not) independently of specific missions and objectives - all doctors, after all, subscribe to the same professional ethic - but political direction, adequate support, and long-term commitment are critical to everything from basic training to logistical infrastructure. Would a professional gendarmerie require the same professional ethos as an all-purpose, flexible combat force? What about them would be different? And what the same? What of a military structured to do ‘human security’?

Nothing I have read or heard yet convinces me that a better alternative exists to the general purpose force we claim currently to possess, but neither does anything yet convince me that we will be able to protect it for long against budgetary depredations, short-sightedness, and

conflicting societal priorities. Perhaps, in the short-term, more money is coming, which is good, provided it does not come at the expense of fewer troops, but what of the longer-term? As the Conference of Defence Associations' Strategic Assessment correctly notes, it is the long-term that really counts. Professionalism, however we construct it, will slowly wither in the absence of resources, but it will wither with breakneck speed in the absence of hope and in the absence of faith. This means not only protecting essential missions, budgets, and kit, but keeping alive in the soldiery a faith in common purpose that can weather the odd storm of political indifference or a scandal now and then. Indeed, for this reason, and for many others, implementing SCONDVA's recent recommendations on pay and personnel matters are vital components in the CF's professional rejuvenation. Canada's soldiers are not like the rest of their whiny, indifferent, neurotic, insecure fellow citizens; their capacity for quiet endurance and patient humility is infinitely greater. It is not infinite.

This need to focus far greater attention on personnel is most often associated with the March 1997 recommendations on military education and, in particular, with the decision to make possession of a university degree essential for the modern Canadian officer. Degree suppliers are now, predictably, lining up to meet the military's new-found demand.

Beware of geeks bearing gifts.

While there can be no doubt that more degrees are no burden to carry around, and that better-educated personnel are essential to a modern military establishment, it is equally true that all universities, programs, and departments are not created equal and that simple personal accreditation on its own does little to enhance professionalism. As cash-strapped university officials come thronging up the Rideau hawking their wares, it might be useful to assess more carefully, than I would argue has been done to date, what precisely the military profession hopes to gain by the "enhanced relationship" with the academy mentioned by Minister Eggleton this morning.

An "enhanced relationship", whether limited to those institutions currently affiliated with the Security and Defence Forum or not, is clearly beneficial to all concerned, in theory, but there are institutions capable of providing high quality, relevant, timely education and there are those that are not. In an environment where ticket-punching might well be encouraged by both poverty stricken university presidents and by benchmark-hungry military managers, great care must be taken to monitor real progress and to assess the value-added which derives from the exercise. Going madly off in all directions to sign MOUs with local institutions, at whatever command level, makes for great press and happy professors, but does it achieve the broader goals of an educated, professional military? Professionalism, after all, was a state of mind well before it became a convocation scroll. If this sounds like a call for greater central direction and long-term planning in the implementation of the military's laudable and necessary education project, then that is exactly what it is.

To the extent that the profession itself will now likely be challenged at least as much by developments from without as by inertia from within, it also becomes imperative to understand and respond to external stimuli, preferably before they become threats. The challenge posed by advanced military technology is one of these; the evolving nature of warfare is another. They are

sometimes lumped together, inaccurately, under the rubric of the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA).

The RMA is an interesting test case for the evolving professionalism of the CF, as well as the political conditions which permit professionalism to flourish; what the RMA might require of the military profession, however, is not as obvious as a quick take on military high technology might suggest. While technology is indeed the catalyst driving the RMA, and it must be noted that not all commentators even admit that an RMA currently exists, it is equally clear that the real challenges posed by RMA are, first, intellectual, and, second, political. The intellectual demands derive, of course, from the flexibility of thought and habit which will be occasioned by rapid changes in weapons technology, communications, and delivery systems in the years to come, regardless of the particular systems and technologies involved. The political challenges arise from accommodations likely to be necessary (or at least desirable) in military organization and training, alliance partnerships, and inter-service coordination as the RMA unfolds. Canada’s future role in NORAD is already generating debate of this type as the United States moves ahead with its National Missile Defence program.

Finally, as the technical and educational requirements of the RMA make clear, many future professionals will likely operate in a much broader middle ground between the old categories of civilian and military, thanks in part to what we might call knowledge proliferation, both horizontally and vertically, and thanks as well to the growing cost of maintaining semi-permanent expertise across a wide range of highly competitive fields. Specialization of military function, so much a part of the profession of arms in the last two centuries and so indicative of professional, industrial-era armies, might now be breaking down. Mercenaries, Alternative Service Delivery, contracting out, and changes in the prevailing definition of international security might thus be seen as pieces of the same pie: indications perhaps that a professional military establishment of the future might, of necessity, depend more directly and to a far greater extent on constant interaction with and service and advice from the host civil society.

Sir John Hackett and others have argued that the advent of the mass citizen army brought the civilian and military worlds into greater alignment, even as industrialization and military labour specialization drove them farther apart. We might now speculate that the post-modern profession of arms will borrow from both traditions: an elite, professional army of military specialists possessed of unique abilities and awesome capabilities, yet one tied closely to civil society by accountability, transparency, and personnel and technical dependence. It will be a small but fabulously well-trained cyber-citizenry-in-arms, both emboldened and ensnared by intimate connections with civil society.

D Pol Dev had better get ready, and it had better hire more PhDs!

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DISCUSSION

It was questioned whether it was realistic that the Canadian Forces should reflect society when most Canadians don't really care. Do quotas and targets make sense? General Couture pointed out that Canadian society is changing, and the military must reflect it if it is to remain viable. New groups must be made welcome. Admiral Murray responded that a longer look is necessary to implement a complete attitudinal change. Start working on attitudes with cadets and the Reserve, and eventually it will "percolate" through to the Regular Force.

A participant considered it ironic that education was being pushed, while at the same time schools – Staff School, NDC, Militia training centres – were being closed. Admiral Murray replied that the leadership had not foreseen the extent of budget cutting between 1989 and 1998. As for the National Defence College, it simply wasn't cost-effective. Very few military graduates were being produced at very high cost. The money was needed to spread across the educational spectrum.

A participant in a recent study of the rank structure asked if this should not be looked at now, given the change in emphasis from "job security" to "development". General Couture stated that the study had not been thrown away, but that the Department was not ready to implement the recommended changes at this time.

It was asked whether the Department had really kept an open mind about the future of the Royal Military College. They still only produced about one third of the Canadian Forces' officer needs. Why not look at requiring a degree for entry, then have everyone complete a one-year program at RMC? General Withers, who had chaired the recent review of the undergraduate program at RMC noted that RMC had become *the* Canadian Forces university to a surprising extent. The extension program is very active, and many other programs – such as all forms of tests and evaluations – were also done there. The Review Group recommended even wider use of the College facilities; for example, it could be the site of a Canadian Forces Leadership Institute. General Couture stated that the Leadership Institute was under development and it will be the cornerstone of the military education system in the future. Tasking has been given to study a one-year graduate course, and the study is now under way.

Concern was expressed over the time required for all this development. Is there a lifetime training plan? How do the Reserves fit in? Admiral Murray agreed that this was a problem; time and money must be invested in the development system, but time with operational units was equally essential. Perhaps it is time to look closely at the American model. Vigilance is needed to ensure that operational expertise and leadership must not suffer for education and development. General Couture replied that a four-phase career development program is being developed, with a selection process preceding each phase. The first phase would cover the ranks of second lieutenant and lieutenant, the second captains and navy lieutenants, the third majors and lieutenant-colonels, and the fourth colonels and above.

Dr. Haycock, Dean of Arts at the Royal Military College, closed off the discussion with a report on the latest activities at the College. He demonstrated that RMC really has changed. The continuing education program had over 1500 students enrolled, and half of these are non-commissioned personnel. There are 200 postgraduate students at the College, plus 400 part-time

graduate students. Seven graduate and seven undergraduate courses are being taught off-campus at NDHQ. Courses are also being provided to staff colleges and other military schools.