

CDA Institute for Security and Defence Studies

XII Annual Seminar

THE FUTURE OF THE RESERVES

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PREFACE

Ian Cameron

In January 1996, the Department of National Defence, like all other Federal departments, entered a new year of budget reductions. At the same time, our troops were assigned new international peace missions including contributing forces to the NATO Implementation Force in the former Yugoslavia. To balance these conflicting directives, the Canadian Armed Forces must be significantly re-organized so as to provide increased cost-effectiveness.

One component of the effort to improve efficiency involves Canada's Reserve Force. The Special Committee, set up to study this problem, recently submitted their report to the Minister of National Defence. The report calls for a dramatic restructuring of the Reserves including the elimination of several units as well as sharp reductions to the administrative machinery. The controversy created by these suggestions provides the background for our 1996 seminar; *The Future of the Reserves*.

The past three decades have been difficult for Canada's Reserves. Canada has the dubious distinction of being the only country in the Eastern world whose Reserves are outnumbered by its Regular forces. By comparison, in 1993 the United Kingdom had 293,000 Regulars and 353,000 Reserves; Norway had 32,700 and 285,000, respectively; Canada weighed in with 84,000 in the Regular force and only 29,700 in the Reserves.

This is to say nothing of the training and equipment problems faced by the reserve forces. Legion are the stories of inadequate training facilities and access to proper equipment. The payment system for the Reserves remains in disarray. Now, with defence budget cuts looming ever larger in the future, the prospect of permanently eliminating several distinguished reserve units from the order of battle has emerged as a likely, if unhappy, scenario for the future.

The reasons for this downturn in the fortunes of the Reserves are as wide ranging as they are complex. The integration and unification experiments with the forces in the 1960s devastated the Regulars and nearly destroyed the Reserves. The Militia, as well as the Naval and Air Reserve lost many units, and much of their autonomy as functional components of the Canadian military community. Changes in the nature of military training, with more sophisticated weaponry and longer lead times for procurement, not to mention the escalating cost of equipment and facilities for training, have meant fewer resources available to reservists at the same time as there are more demanding training standards to be met.

The changing nature of Canadian society has also caused problems for the Reserves. Canada is a very different place than it was in the days after the Second World War. Canadian society is much more cosmopolitan, diverse, mobile and complex than it has ever been. Today, there is less emphasis on community where the reserves have always been focused. Small town Canada in which the local militia unit was an integral part, is gone.

The generation since the Second World War has also not inherited the same sense of security as their forebears. Fewer young people wish to devote their time to the defence of their nation. With the end of the Cold War and the memory of Canada's involvement in the Second World War fading fast, many younger Canadians see defence spending only as a drain on social programs.

The fortunes of the Reserves are therefore inextricably linked to the dramatic social upheaval in Canadian society in the past generation or so. Canadian society has become more fragmented than it has ever been as the nation struggles to redefine itself. Similarly, Canada's reserves have been confronted with a myriad of changes which have left them in a state of existential and material crisis for which there is as yet no obvious solution.

Crisis or no, the truth is that Canada needs its reserves. In two World Wars, Canada's reserve forces bore the brunt of fighting on land, at sea, and in the air. They have provided the core for mobilization and training for most of our nation's history, and we need them to continue doing so. It is a received truth in Canada that we cannot nor would we try to maintain a full-time armed force large enough to sustain our military needs, particularly in time of national emergency.

So the questions that confronts us are: what do we do about our reserves? How do we preserve this invaluable national institution? What do we want them to do for us? How do we provide them with the resources they need to do what we ask them to? The answers are not likely to be easy ones, but they are answers that we have to find.

Opening Remarks

MR. NICK STETHEM **The Strategic Analysis Group**

Since we are looking forward to the future of the Reserves at this conference I, in typically perverse fashion, am going to look backwards; because you cannot know where you are going unless you know where you are. And if you don't know where you have been, you really don't understand where it is you are starting from.

I guess this goes back to a theme that to some of you will be extremely familiar, since we have discussed it many times: the failure of military culture in Canada, a failure which affects the Army most, perhaps because it is probably the most primitive of the Armed Forces organizations. Not a great deal there has changed since Corporal Smith was given instructions to take out the cave on the left with a stone axe. The fact that Corporal Smith now may carry a death ray does not change the fundamental social structure that causes Corporal Smith to carry out that job.

That failure of military culture is perhaps blindingly public in the Somalia Inquiry right now, not of course around the incident itself - the death of Shidane Arone - but in the apparent breakdown within the officer corps that one sees, rightly or wrongly, through that inquiry. The thought occurs to me that, in looking at some of the questioning and discussions that have gone on in that inquiry, there are two things that a young Officer Cadet graduating from RMC should be issued with on entering into that society. The first is a tape recorder and the second is a lawyer, because the sense of what is done and what is not done, the sort of unwritten cultural dimensions of military society, appear to have broken down.

It is interesting that in parallel with being concerned about that issue, of course, one launches into the question of defence policy and the breakdown of policy - the assumptions, the goals and objectives behind policy. And that is something that I have been arguing about for years.

In foreign and defence policy Canada has truly failed to define its direction for the past 20 to 30 years successfully. That became obvious in the Gulf when we attempted a bizarre finesse of sending forces, but in fact doing our best to avoid a fight that might cause casualties, or cause us to create casualties.

This seemed apparent the other day in the commitment to Bosnia, when the Minister came out of Cabinet and announced that we were sending 1,000 people. And when asked what we were sending he said that he thought it might be a brigade headquarters and a company of infantry. That sent me off to my old copy of Staff Duties, trying to figure out how that added up to 1,000. But what really intrigued me was that the British - this was in the Financial Times two weeks after that announcement - were still expecting 1,500.

So my thought was that perhaps somehow we had given the indication that we would be sending 1,500. One assumes that there is a logic behind that, a foreign and defence policy logic. That figure was taken in to Cabinet, and a few hours later emerged from Cabinet chopped down to 1,000 by some sort of bean counting exercise, rather than by the kind of analysis that leads to the conclusion that [this effort] is precisely what we must do in the case of Bosnia because that is to Canada's advantage.

Well, those are arguments in terms of the culture and the policy that we are familiar with, and some of you have heard me rattle on about it for years and probably don't want to hear it again; but it relates to something larger. The larger failure was apparent only in the lead up to the referendum when, for me, there was a revelation that what we were dealing with here, in the failure of military culture, in the failure of foreign and defence policy, was in fact a failure of history. That failure of history was apparent in the last couple of weeks before the referendum, when the rest of Canada could not pull together a vision to compete with the absolutely brilliant demagoguery of Lucien Bouchard; when the rest of Canada tried to come up with some reason to be there, some vision to counteract the mythology being peddled by the separatists. It was simply not there.

In the last few days there was that sort of mass move. Whether it was spontaneous or coordinated I don't pretend to know, but that rather inchoate mass move to the City of Montreal for a rally - an inarticulate move, though very powerful, very emotional - was not the expression of a sense of place, a sense of vision, a sense of direction as a nation.

At that point I realized that many of the things that we have been arguing about, and certainly that I have been arguing about for 20 years now, come down to the way in which we lost our history through several changes since the Second World War. In other words, the ways history is rewritten. Nations always rewrite their history. One looks back into history to find the roots of today's popular issues. One can have a politically correct lens looking back through history and say that the really important thread in Canadian history is the position of women in Canadian society, perhaps. That is done all the time. Historians make their living finding different lenses to look back at the same past.

What we did, though, was begin to develop a series of ever narrower lenses that allowed the past that defined us to fall away entirely. We looked back through two sets of lenses, really, two major changes of lens.

The first lens that cut things away was put into place after we had had 15 years of getting it very nearly right - the 15 years which followed 1945. Canada, recognizing that it was coming out of a world of empire, was managing a brilliant transition, from Canada building its position, with empire and with the levers of empire, into Canada building its position with the levers of the Atlantic Alliance. What made this one of the most elegant ages of transition is that we did this in conspiracy with the Brits who were our old partners in empire. We conned the Americans into an alliance with Europe, set ourselves up in a position that maximized our power, maximized our room to manoeuvre, and did very well within that position. You can then follow on into other foreign policy initiatives related to the United Nations and others. But NATO was the key building block in establishing Canada's international position.

Then suddenly, from about 1957 to 1963 - at the time of the Pearson/Diefenbaker debates, the time of finding a new flag, and finding a new way to look at ourselves - in that series of debates, dimensions of Canadian history were shed as we tried to redefine ourselves. This was the first shedding and it was essentially the shedding of empire and the shedding of the "Britishness" of Canada. What that did was cut us off, particularly in the military, oddly enough, from dimensions of history which were parts of our modern definition of ourselves.

I suppose I am a little biased here. In my own family I can look back and see that before 1945 the people who wanted to go off and have an adventure, the military adventurers of Canadian history, very often went off and did it outside of Canada. If you look back and you say Canadian military history is that narrow line which is the Reserves, those parts which took place inside Canada, that is one vision. But there was a larger vision associated with the Canadian military establishment, and that was the vision of empire. [There were] members of the Canadian military establishment who soldiered on the North-West Frontier, fought in the Ashanti Wars, fought in virtually all of the conflicts of the British Empire and then came back to Canada. So you had a leavening in Canada of a much larger military experience, and also a larger military vision in Canadian society. There was an accepted flow. That fell away with that first change of lens.

That would have been eminently manageable: it was just a bit of manoeuvring and reshaping; and had it led to problems it would have been correctable. Unfortunately, we then crashed into the age of Aquarius - the vision of a new society, a new world defined in new ways - turned out to be a disaster for Canada, because it came along just at the time when we were redefining ourselves, when we were trying to invent a new image of ourselves. I can remember in the summer of 1967 the age of Aquarius was real and I knew it. I had just discovered politics, I had discovered life. It was great.

I was willing to believe that, yes, the rules of the world had changed. We know now that that was an extremely transient vision, that it was a vision that didn't make it even into the early '70s. In fact, when the smoke cleared - and in this case it probably [did so] literally - what had been seen as a great change turned out to be a rather trivial blip in social development.

But it was during that trivial blip, bracketing 1967, that we went through our redefinition. There was the vision that we followed with Prime Minister Trudeau of a new world and a new order. There was everything down to the trivial level of saying, "Let's have a new uniform that fits the latest style". It is like assuming that Air Canada stewardesses still wear that Pierre Cardin creation they had in 1967. When one looks at it now it is utterly ugly.

In other words, what we did in so many areas of national life was fall to the dictates of fashion rather than real change. In that exercise the lens shifted and narrowed again, and we lost the sense of how we got where we were. It was almost as though Canada had become an immaculate conception, something that sprang full blown from ourselves, not from our past, but from some sort of revelation that we had gone through.

Thereby we came to, I suppose, a real belief in Canada as the good state, the peace maker,

Canada as the country that is in some way unique, that is not a product of conscious building over a couple of hundred years, but is a young, new vigorous country with brand new ideas, such as those that the Prime Minister was trying to deploy in the Foreign and Defence Policy Review at that time.

The unfortunate thing is that the world did not turn out as it should have, and by 1971 defence policy had gone well off the rails. I can remember unification being put to me as a great service to the rest of the world, and that the rest of the world was extremely glad Canada had done it because now they could all avoid it. That was actually said to me by an Australian Officer during their defence review.

When the White Paper of 1971 was published the strategic analysis in it was out of date six months before its publication. It was already evident at that time that the world being anticipated in the '71 White Paper had six months before it become totally impossible.

The Trudeau foreign policy review, this sort of revision of Canada's place in the world, I would imagine went off the rails sometime around 1974, and I bow to those who are expert in foreign policy to tell me when it was. But all of the visions that we had been pursuing from '68 did not come together. After 1974 Canada basically rattled around going in no particular direction, having no sense of forward motion in its foreign and defence policy, in its vision of its place in the world.

What concerns me about the next 20 years following that failure is the profound dishonesty that one can find in Canadian policy. That was the failure to acknowledge that perhaps we might have been wrong, the failure to take into account Cromwell's dictum, "I pray you, gentlemen, in the bowels of Christ, think that you may be wrong". [It was not possible] to think that you might be wrong, and as one of those who was out there standing up on the soap box saying, "hold on a minute," I had a good close-up look at all of those who would not acknowledge the possibility of being wrong, whether at the political level, at the bureaucratic level, or within the military itself. There were constituencies and individuals who were determined that the possibility of mistake not be acknowledged. What this did was again create a lens that caused us to distort our past and to look back and see what was not there.

I suppose you could say we ended up in 1987 with the White Paper that we should have had in 1967. That is a rather interesting idea to play with, because in that there was an attempt to turn around and come into focus with the real world which we had moved away from in the early 1960s. But it was 20 years too late, and in fact the had world changed again, catching us by surprise.

That leaves us in a truly awkward situation. What we are dealing with now is not a failure of defence policy, not a problem of the misunderstanding of the Reserves, not a problem of the misunderstanding of the Regular Force, but the problem of national dimension. [It is] a failure of the self which, I suppose in historic terms, is probably far more important at the grand political level than it is at the level of discussion we are having in this room. But it is all part of a piece.

The failure of national vision means, for an organization like the Reserves, the failure of the ability to remember the past which defines us, to remember how we got here; to remember, for example, in our mythologies, people like Gilles Roy and Joliet de la Pinière, fine old Quebec names who built the British Empire and who were part of a larger Canada, as opposed to the narrow mythology of the son of the Habitant who was abused at Eaton's.

The difference between those two mythologies in the vision of Quebec, is the same on the larger scale. What has happened is that in our vision of the past we have come to accept the CBC historic minutes as the definition of the past, which is a very narrow vision seen from the interests of the present. We have forgotten that sort of larger canvas, that tremendously powerful canvas from which we arise.

When the Reserves then look back at society and say, "Hey, we are a part of Canadian history, we are part of the fabric of society, we have always been one of the greatest expressions of Canadian society," you are talking to people who don't know the history that you are referring to, who have no sense or feel for that history, and who have a very indistinct sense of what the nation is that you are talking about preserving. It becomes an incredibly difficult exercise. Before you can make your argument, something has to happen on the national scale that creates the sense of the nation that [the Reserves] can then appeal to, that you can then say you support; and you press forward.

For the Regular Force the implications are equally disastrous. It depends upon a vision of Canada's place in the world which gives it a role and defines its direction. Without that definition of direction, then, defence policy falls to the accountant. It becomes an exercise in accountancy rather than an exercise in policy, and that has been the case in Canadian defence policy for a number of years. The simple fact is that without that sense of place, vision and direction to appeal to and relate your policy to, we are talking policy in a vacuum. We are talking policy in a theoretical construct, and with the arguments of the accountant who says, "Look, here is the bottom line." That argument will always be stronger.

The one good thing emerging from this national crisis we have gone through in trying to find that vital national vision and sense of place and direction for the country to stay together, is that a by-product of it is the blessing of foreign and defence policy with a direction and sense of place against which it can be measured. It has given to defence policy a direction and a reason to be, a reason to spend beyond a theoretical construct.

In other words, defence has a target; foreign and defence policy have a target; and those targets can be measured against a vision of what the nation is. That vision of what the nation is arises not from the discussions of policy, but from the raw need for that vision to be there if the country is to survive. In a way we are in a position of looking down a long, dark tunnel: we see the light at the end of the tunnel and hope very much that it is a light at the end of the tunnel and not an express train headed straight for us.

I think, remembering our past - the real past, not the politically correct past, the past of those who when you forget your real past inherit the game of history - here I look at the McKenna

brothers; the reason the McKenna brothers and their documentaries were so successful is they were going into foreign territory. Canadians had forgotten their history and the McKenna brothers went back into it and they discovered that you can have stupid commanding officers. What a revelation!

Most of us interested in history would be shocked by such a thing.

When that history falls away and you have people looking back through their politically correct lenses, that too begins to fragment the sense of national place. But remembering the real past, remembering the roots of ourselves that sink into the bedrock of the country; that spread out to encompass the empire and the world that was ours; that reach out to pull in all of the other visions which have come with immigration into this country; that feed into the great central tap root that should be there - that is ourselves.

I suppose we can go back even so far as to remember the original structure of Canada - and this is an interesting example of our failure of our sense of history, and perhaps one of the first failures. We can go back and remember that Canada is a triple alliance. What is this "two founding nations" garbage? Yes, that was there, but we Canadians, should remember that it was a triple alliance, that without the alliance with the Six Nations the revolution might have turned out a different way. Without the alliance with the Cree and the Blood and the Sarcee, the west would not have been there. It wasn't held by 12 Mounties, it was held by thousands of Indians whom 12 Mounties happened to administer.

Think about that. When did we lose that root and dimension of our history? Probably back around 1867 when the political structure was created. It isn't a new problem. But it is a problem which, in the 1960s, became extreme, became acute. It is a problem that, if we cannot come to terms with, we will be looking at a case where not only does defence policy not survive, not only does foreign policy not make sense, but the country itself does not survive.

Remembering the past will make the problems in the present perhaps more difficult, but it will also make them soluble.

Keynote Address

DR. HAL KLEPAK Royal Military College

I hope you won't be wondering after this talk why the CDA invited me. That's a rather worrying thought for a public speaker. It is particularly worrying for this public speaker. Normally when you start early in the morning, and you think you have to wake people up a bit, you are more than a little concerned as a public speaker; and the only reassurance I had was that Nick was coming before me, and now I am absolutely certain that there isn't anybody sleeping. And I would like to be the second to congratulate him on a masterly survey of Canadian history and what it has meant.

At the same time, as I am now looking at my notes, I can't help thinking about public speaking in another sense. Some wag - I'm not sure who it was - once said that the human mind is a wonderful instrument. It starts working the very moment we are born, and it only stops working the very moment we stand up to do public speaking. But as I look down at my notes I realize that I have a more serious problem, even, than the usual one of having my mind stop, and that is that the podium is exactly at the place where it is too far from me for my glasses to work properly; but if I take them off I can see even less. So you will see a lot of this (removal of glasses) over the next little bit, and it is not academic presumption and pomposity, although you may hear that as well today. It is something else.

I also was wondering why anyone would think about asking me to speak on this subject. I have been out of the business directly of being in the kilt for some time, but I haven't lost my interest in it. I hope it is because we are all interested in getting the Reserves to a higher state of readiness for the things we might like [them] to do, and we are trying to do this in an era which we call one of reform, but which is probably much more accurately called one of questioning and cuts. I like the word "cuts," because I think it actually says what you mean. I find "down sizing" a rather unusual way of expressing what you are about to do.

But speaking of getting Reserves up and about, my last thought when listening to Nick was how far we have come in some senses in this regard. After all, this is not the first time the Reserves have been looked at and tried to become a little more responsive to national requirements. I am also a '60s person and I remember very well on the American television channels, which were by then visible in much of Canada (I was living in Montreal in the late '60s) there was a wonderful last minute blurb on American television which I thought was very pro-Reserve. Many of you may remember it. After the national anthem was played and all the rockets red glare stuff had gone on, you had a one blip of a Minute Man statue: the militiaman in Lexington, Massachusetts standing there, which I'm sure you've all seen, and the last words before you went bleep and had the screen go gray said, "Sleep tight America, your National Guard is awake".

Well, of course being in the Black Watch, with a lot of young subalterns who considered

themselves wags even if they weren't, [we had] one person who of course said, "this is great. Canada should have something like this. We can have "the Queen" and "Oh Canada" played and the flag goes down. And then there can be a last blip showing a militiaman, and we can say, "Sleep tight Canada, your militia is."

I don't, of course, believe that. I don't believe the militia was asleep, but I have been asked to speak today and I am frightened of the topic, very frightened of the topic. I am particularly frightened by the topic because, as was just mentioned, I have the problem that I am a historian by education; and historians, of course, are not supposed to look forward, they are not only not enjoined to look forward, but they are told specifically "Do not look forward, that ain't your job. Your job is to explain the present through a thorough knowledge of the past", along the lines that Nick was just mentioning. And if he does dare to try such a thing his colleagues down the hall will soon make short work of him.

So I am more than a little nervous, number one, because several levels of bosses of mine are sitting in the room, which is always disconcerting at times like this. Some of them are historians.

It is also difficult because it is such a charged subject at the moment. People take stands, people feel very strongly about the way things go. But mostly what is troubling me is of course this: why should I be here and you there, when all of us have probably spent our working lives thinking about Reserve problems, thinking about where the Reserves should go?

However I have been invited to do so and I have been promised a free lunch. Academics, in their state of pay at the moment and their likelihood of surviving in their positions at the moment (at least in the Province of Ontario), have to accept any luncheons that we are invited to. I will try not to get too bogged down in too much detail, and I won't try to show any khaki biases. You already assume I have them, I'm sure.

Of course it is Robbie Burns Day, and so as a Highlander I have to be allowed one or two indulgences. The first one I would ask you for is that I could define my terms, being an academic; and I hope that won't bore anyone terribly. I hope you will also see that I have a reason for it. I will also go back a bit to basics, if you will excuse me for doing so, with the intention of "reculer pour mieux sauter", which I hope - I know I will "reculer." You will decide if I've "mieux sauter."

I would like then to ask what Reserves are, and the base of that word, (surprise, surprise), "reserve" and I would like to say what the Oxford Concise says about that particular word. Well, as you all know, "reserve" can be a verb or it can be a noun, and I would like to say somewhat ponderously what it comes out to be as a verb, according to Oxford. "Reserve: to postpone use; to set apart; to hold over; to keep back for a later occasion or use."

As a noun: "something reserved for future use; extra stock; being kept unused but available; military" - (I'm still quoting Oxford - and I am sure you are most impressed with being here at this hour of the morning and having the Oxford Dictionary quoted at you. It won't be long, I assure you.)

Military: troops withheld from action to reinforce or cover retreat... - (that was naughty laughter I heard) - ...forces outside the Regular army, navy and air force liable to be called out in emergencies.

Reserves are, therefore, not deployed tactically until they are needed, and then are used to exploit success or plug up disaster. This I think applies - several people in the audience who have reason to, have their rotten eggs and tomatoes already in reserve - whether you were Napoleon, Jellicoe or Harris.

If they are not seen as these things which they are (at least in the definition), then in my view we may be able to explain much of what could be considered a tragedy of the Canadian Reserves; as I think Nick was suggesting, a tragedy - I hope I'm not putting words in his mouth - in the national life more widely. We have to remember what Reserves are, and from that we will possibly be able to decide what they can do and what they cannot be asked to do.

Our own experience in Canada, of course, is not a surprise to anyone here, and not new to anyone here. Reserve success tends to reflect government interest, or government lack of interest, or the open ground in between those two extremes. We have a remarkable tradition - largely forgotten unfortunately - that of "la milice de la Nouvelle France", a militia which was able to deter, even defeat, but most particularly for the interests of today's discussion, was able to mobilize an extraordinary percentage of the population, deploy them rapidly, officer them from their own cadre and indeed operate with remarkable efficiency. After all, at 40 to 1, la Nouvelle France survived for over a century and a half. Forty to one is not particularly good odds, although Canadians are probably used to thinking in those terms.

From that kind of high point we have seen all the shambles and shambolic periods that I don't have to remind you of, both in the colonial and post-colonial context.

A Reserve for us, of course - since we are on history - reflects just what Nick was saying: it reflects before 1946/47 the bulk of Canada's military potential. Reserves were there as Reserves for imperial armies, not for regular armies of our own, constituted by a few squadrons or a few battalions, constituted by a couple of ships, and a couple of squadrons of aircraft. It was Reserves which provided Canada's defence. Again, - that's no surprise to anyone here in this audience - tiny Regular forces with large, if not very well trained Reserves, were Canada's armed forces.

The Reserve Army in particular [was] created out of that something called the militia myth - something very much sustained by the Sam Hughes' of this world - that somehow in 1775, before the gates of Quebec, and from 1812 to 1814 with exceptional valour and skill, the militia had defeated the American hordes and assured a Canadian defence. Well, while there are elements of that which are no doubt true, the suggestion that Regulars had no role, that Royal Navies had no role, et cetera, is probably fairly wide of the mark.

But what Nick was referring to, of course, was that key moment post-1945. I think it did have lots of positive sides. But it had one very negative side. We started to talk about wars which would probably, and relatively rapidly, go nuclear. We started to talk about wars that were going to be "come as you are" wars. We started to talk about "forces in being" to the exclusion of forces not in being, as opposed to our traditional idea that there would naturally be a mix of those.

That kind of thinking occurred at a time (which is perhaps hard to imagine now) of plenty, of expansion of the Regular Force, of creation in many ways of the Regular Force. And the Reserves - I don't think it is too much of a suggestion that will surprise you - came to be poor cousins. Now you would argue that most of the time in the previous centuries they had been poor cousins as well, but there wasn't any other cousin before, really, to speak of. There was only the Reserves and the imperial armies and then the very small Regular Forces deployed by the Dominion in its early days.

At the same time, of course, there was the idea that the Regular officer represented a profession, something with which I am in absolute agreement and have tried to spend my life working for. I worked for the Regular Forces myself, after all. But the idea that it was some kind of a profession, absolutely necessary to anchor in military psychology - in that process it seems to me we lost sight of the fact that it does not mean that amateurs cannot stay in the game, or try to. In any case, sorry, "faute de mieux", there ain't no choice. Canada would never have a Regular Force, nor would Britain, nor would the United States, nor would most countries, that would be able to respond to all imaginable consequences of all imaginable international situations. Hence, whether one liked it or not, chances were that Reserves would still probably be useful.

The long atrophy of the Reserves, I think, began in earnest despite [what was a] very positive time overall. It was easy [for this] to happen because of course we had the kit; after the war we had the numbers; we had people who wanted to stay in units; we had all kinds of things going our way. But perhaps because I'm a Quebecker I would suggest that there were two solitudes here. Not unnaturally, but most assuredly unfortunately, after the '40s two solitudes grew up among the Services, if I may use the term "Services". I like to use the term "Services" with the Officer Cadets because it does remind them that they are not only in the business of the employment of force, but also in the business of the provision of service.

I think we forgot also - forgetting seems to be the key note this morning - that we have never got it right. Historians are not allowed to use the word "always" or "never". It is not common for us to be well prepared in wars or for the empires of which we have been part to be prepared for war. I am always charmed by the British expression that the British Army loses every battle but the last. That's charming and that's very nice; it's much better than the opposite, but it does have the inconvenience of meaning a lot of blood gets spilled and a lot of people have very unpleasant ends to their lives.

I think even the humour left to some extent. Before the war, "Oh, why don't you get a real job?" was the standard Reservist line to a Regular; and the standard Regular's line to a Reservist - and I'm not telling you anything new again here - was "Well, you guys just do this on the weekend"; "weekend warriors", and all the other arguments or discussions or points that one well knows.

Militia self esteem, [and] I think to some extent also Naval and Air Reserve self esteem, suffered greatly in these years after the war, and this despite three incredible experiences of war in this century, largely, handled by mobilized Reserves. There is no sense of humour, frequently, because Reservists looking at their own list of casualties, et cetera, sometimes say, "Our job in national defence is to receive battle honours and to win medals, yours is to soldier on and criticize us in times of peace." That's not the kind of context which provides for the growth or the sustainment of anything other than two solitudes.

On the question of medals, I can't resist a story I heard, which is supposedly about a Cameron [Highlander]. Perhaps some Camerons will tell me if it's true; [it's about General] Montgomery, on one of his visits to the battle areas in '45 where he did inspections. Before he did his usual getting everybody around he went up and down the ranks, as inspecting officers do. As most of you have been commanding officers or similar things in your time, you know that inspecting officers never stop at the soldier who is fully self confident, absolutely sure of himself, ready for any question to be posed. They always stop at the most nervous, most unsure of himself, most confused bugger who has no idea why he's there, or even probably the name of the officer who is currently inspecting him. Sometimes I think that royal visits are invented so that we can be sure that at least the soldiers will know who it is out there.

In any case, the story goes that Montgomery went up and down the ranks and, unfortunately, he stopped at a particular soldier who had come into the Camerons rather late in the war. Therefore on [the soldier's] chest was a different picture of service than most of the other chests that Montgomery had gone by. Unfortunately, this soldier was also the most nervous chap on that Guard of Honour. When Montgomery asked him, "Soldier, where did you start the war?" he said, "Sir, I didn't start the war," absolutely certain that that was the end of his military career.

This decline extenuates at this stage, I think, the word "under". We were increasingly under-strength; we were increasingly under-equipped, we were increasingly under-paid, and we were increasingly under-trained, although I think that has to be nuanced. In fact, the only "over" I can find to express the last few decades would be [that we were] over-studied, which I think does apply.

That reminds me of another story. Michael Mitchell, who isn't in the room today, has written on the Canadian infantry a good deal. I remember on the subject of underpaid and under-equipped, et cetera, that he had a rather wonderful idea, which some of you have probably heard about; I don't know if we still have Block 13s. That is all the weekends you have to do before you can finally go to Kingston to do the staff course for command. At one stage, (and I see Guy Gosselin is already laughing because he knows the story,) Mike was with some officers who were doing this incredibly boring - I'm sorry, incredibly exciting military administration course - and [this was] one of the questions: which element of the defence budget provides the militia budget? He replied, thinking himself absolutely in the right: "Petty cash".

There is little doubt that wherever we stand, whatever the past and whatever the reasons for the past problems and the present problems, we stand in an era of great reform. There are going to be changes. There is going to be a rethink, and it will probably be Finance Ministry driven, as was

just said by Nick. Nonetheless I don't think we should then sit on our hands and assume that there is nothing we can do. Many of the people in this room have been doing something very active recently. The trouble with criticizing studies is that if you don't study it, and you don't come up with any solutions, you are sure to leave the finance people in an even better position to go at it.

I don't think I have to tell anyone here that there is nervousness in this room, there is concern in this room. Nobody knows what is coming. The Regular Force doesn't know what is coming and it has been very, very hard hit. I, myself, was at College Militaire Royal in a city slightly larger than Kingston until very recently. Although I am very delighted with RMC, to say the least, at the same time these changes in life are very brusque and sometimes rather surprising. But these changes which are coming - why would we be frightened? Why would there be any concern in a room like this about the changes to come? I can't help thinking that it is because - of course Regulars are often very puzzled about this; these changes are meant for the Reserves, after all - we have a recent and not so recent past of disappointment. We have a history of being promised things and not having them delivered, of reforms under the guise of efficiency, which in fact are not followed up by the means with which those efficiencies can be brought to bear, and the only thing which does happen is the "cut" part. That certainly happens.

I think the years of neglect have taken their toll on Reserve confidence in the Regulars, and on Regular Force confidence in the Reserves, and I think we should say that. I think we should say that the two solitudes are powerful solitudes; this despite closer contact in the last 15 years than certainly from many years before. Regular confidence in the Reserves ain't very high either, and very good reasons can be trotted out by many people for that.

I have been asked to talk about the future of the Reserves and to the question of what the future of the Reserves is. In order to keep my job at RMC in the history department, I have to say, "I haven't the foggiest idea." But I do think one could imagine three scenarios, three possible ways, (rather than getting thrown off the podium already for not having anything to say) three possible futures for the Reserves that won't be very clear, but which might help somewhat to organize thinking.

One of the scenarios is, of course, more of the same. We are good at that, we're Canadians after all. One of my students horrified me the other day by telling me - you know all those jokes about how you get 15 Scotsmen into the Volkswagen, or how you get a 20 this' or 20 that's into a Volkswagen - he said, "how do you get 25 Canadians into a Volkswagen? You ask them."

We can probably do more of the same. We are good at that. As I say, we are good at stumbling along and making do. After all, that is our strength, muddling through is Canada's approach to things. Unfortunately it is only in periods of crisis, like the ones that Nick was referring to, that muddling through has its own costs. We could do that and continue to slip and continue to slide and continue to barely manage.

We could go in for root and branch drastic reform, although I will suggest that it is probable that that would tend to [lead to] forgetting the definitions I was suggesting should apply before. We could hope for moderate reforms, hopefully remembering those definitions.

In the first one I think we would stumble on as we are now, not fulfilling either a mandate to be a Reserve properly, a mobilizable base properly, or our mandate to be effective augmenters. The Navy side and the Air Force side, of course, are less affected by this.

The second possibility, that of drastic reform: well, we could probably either be great at mobilizing, or at least good at mobilizing, or reasonably good at augmenting. I'm not sure how good we will be at both without looking at that issue.

A third one, what I have called moderate reform - there would, I think, be some significant changes in any moderate reform - is to accept that we need both, that we should be working for both, but understanding that the essential value of Reserve Forces is as a reserve. We don't know what the world is going to be like. The '71 White Paper may well have been overtaken by events. I suppose none of us would argue that the '87 White Paper was anything but overtaken by events. But

Canada is not the world's hegemony. We are a country which, as all middle powers, largely reacts. We can be proactive within reason, but can only be proactive to the extent of our own resources, of our own capabilities to influence, of our own interests. We don't know what the world is going to look like. It is normally thought that when you don't know, when there are question marks, you do exactly what the definitions suggest: you hold back more. You give more emphasis,

ladies and gentlemen, not less, to your Reserves, whether it be your pocket book because you don't know what the times may bring, or whether it is to your foreign and defence policy because you know even less. Well, since a number of us are civil servants we probably know someone who knows less about the future than civil servants at the current moment, so perhaps I am overstating that.

We must remember that a primary responsibility [of the Reserves] - very easy to forget, because we have real problems - is that the Regular Force is not being sustained sufficiently so that it can do without augmentees. It needs the augmentees, it's not an invention, it's not an idea that is false, it is absolutely true. How can we provide this without losing the capability to mobilize and to be present at the national level in a way that would allow real mobilization?

I personally think the White Paper has got it right in the essentials. It says we don't know where we are and where we're going, and that is not our fault. It may be partially our fault, but only in the sense that nobody else knows where we're going either, or where they are going very much. Perhaps the Americans have the best idea at the current moment, and even they are far from sure. We don't know what this international scene is going to look like. We don't know how war is going to change. We have, as you all know, absolutely ferocious debates in messes and even in conferences about what The Falklands meant, what Lebanon meant, never mind what the Persian Gulf War meant. But does this mean that air power has these capabilities now? What does that mean for us? What does it mean for navies and armies? What does that mean for personnel and equipment?

Finally, referring back to what Nick was saying - I'm not finished yet, but finally on the White

Paper - we don't know what is going to happen to this beloved country.

As a person who likes a sense of humour, and as a person who has a name which is Czech and therefore has seen enough disaster to federal states, loosely termed, in this century, I can't help but be charmed that in our federal capital we have on one side of the river a regiment whose motto is "Advance", and on the other side of the river we have a regiment whose motto is "ils e passeront pas." I think there is a charm and a sense of the degree to which national unity in the past

was taken as a given; you could be humorous about it. There have been many things in recent months in this country, but humour wasn't on the front line anywhere, was it? Perhaps that would be an interesting place to start. I also am impressed by demagoguery, but it has its limits when it gets overly serious, as a certain gentleman in Berlin discovered.

The White Paper is right to suggest that the closest answer we can come up with in this era where we don't know anything about the future must be to some extent to sacrifice depth for breadth, for being able to answer a lot of different scenarios, about which we know very little, rather than having tremendous capability to answer one or two which may or may not be right.

The first circumstance, as I was suggesting, or the first principle of such circumstances in our past and in the past of strategic thinking is the greater importance of Reserves. We have to have something held back, in store, additional but not used. We can no longer talk of wars which are "come as you are." We don't know. And merci, mon Dieu, we seem to find ourselves in a situation where nuclear weapons are less likely to be used. We will see; there are a lot of people in the former Soviet Union who may be thinking differently.

Those arguments are history, they are not the conditions in which we are living. Armed forces exist to give flexibility to governments. That's why they exist, to give flexible options to governments. Talleyrand, Napoleon's Foreign Minister, a bit of a rat fink, said, "vous pouvez tous faire avec la ba<onnette sauf s'asseoir dessus." I am as charmed and amused by that expression as anyone else, but the odd thing is, it's only so right. Many regimes in this century and before have succeeded in sitting on their bayonets for quite long periods. Politicians have been able to resolve problems with a bayonet, at least for the duration of their five years in power. In my view Armed Forces are not about to be abolished, although they are likely to be reduced still, until times change, but this essential point that Armed Forces exist to give flexibility to governments, I think, is true. Reserves give greater flexibility, more options to government; longer term options to government. It seems to me, therefore, that it should not be the bean counters or the fiscal authorities alone deciding on where we are going. There has to be input in terms of strategic thinking, input in terms of ingenuity.

Now, perhaps more than ever (that's a famous expression that one always throws out when one is at the podium), but perhaps it is not more than ever; I think 1939 would be classified as a fairly important moment; 1914 as well, but nonetheless [today] it is true as well. We must be able to augment, because the Regular Force is not likely to be in a position not to need us. We must be able to mobilize because that is what will give a possibility for Canada to act in a powerful way or in a significant way if the circumstances present themselves.

The first of those, "augment", means we have to become more efficient. The second means that cuts to units, while necessary, must, in my view, be kept under control to retain a real mobilization base. That has to be the "point de d,part." The studies which will matter now will be those which discover, or point out more clearly perhaps, what districts can provide and which areas need Reserves.

Many people criticize the British territorial army and the British approaches since '67 on some of these issues, but I think in some cases there have been quite inventive ideas put forward which have allowed unit names and unit ideas, I think it is fair to say, to continue to exist; and I think we might look at those. We have to think depth as well as breadth because we are not there; the Reserves are not there to provide breadth necessarily, but they are definitely there to provide depth.

Some examples, so that this doesn't just seem like drivel. Intelligence services: most of you probably know that one of the difficulties when you have been in the same alliance and the same system, the same essentially one-threat arrangement for going on half a century, is that we are all humans; we only have the capability to learn so many languages, to become experts in so many countries. And we, of course, have had wonderful divisions which always insult everybody else because we have for many years divided the world into NATO, Warsaw Pact, rest of world. Wouldn't you love to be a "rest of worlorder!" it would just give you a sense of real pride!

The problem is, of course, that the concentration on Russian and on Slavic languages has run up against that reality that Nick was mentioning. The problem is also, of course, that the kind of retreading, retraining, language instruction, et cetera, is expensive, time consuming and troubling. Yet we have a Reserve Force spread across the country - in a country where the third group is bigger and bigger, where our potential is bigger and bigger. We could think of that as an area where there might be some possibilities.

In the British Army after 1967, as most of you know, I'm sure, (there will be people to correct me on this later on in the conference), there was a feeling that some capabilities could be retained in the Reserves that could not be retained in a small Regular Army and that it was perfectly logical to have that happen, since those capabilities would be called upon mostly in times of crisis.

Those are just a couple of examples, but I think there are more; and I think we have to put our heads to the grindstone on this, not keep calling one another names, but rather work towards national defence.

The Reserves, I think, are also about values and the retention of values. (I saw a t-shirt in Miami recently which reminded me, as an old Conservative, that "Hate is not a family value".) I thought that was rather necessary, to remind ourselves in these difficult times, that there are values that we want to retain, there are things I think which we would all be in agreement on. Rarely before - and Nick was referring to this just a moment ago -- have the links between Armed Services and nation been at the same time so important and so vulnerable. Often they have been more

important. Perhaps on occasion they have been more vulnerable, but it is rare that those two come into this particular relationship it seems to me, and the Reserves surely can help here. Yes, we're not in the 1890s; yes, we're not on every street corner; yes, it doesn't have the same social role as before; yes, it's not as important in communities, - this is not questionable. But at the moment we are dealing with "faute de mieux" situations.

It was necessary to cut the number of bands from the levels of before, but any Reserve Commanding Officer, particularly in rural units, knows that for many people that is the military's [only] presence, perhaps in the whole county. Certainly it is the only visible presence that people have for their defence buck. That kind of decision, anything that affects local presence, I think, we have to keep very much to the fore and not considered as a secondary issue. The Reserves can help, but they have to be given the option of helping, and presence, I think, is the key to that.

This is not an appeal for blindly following tradition. I can be accused of many, many things. Many of you know some of them and are preparing your rotten eggs already; but I don't think I would suggest following tradition blindly. Viscount Slim is right: tradition is a wonderful servant and a terrible master. In any case we can't afford them; we can't maintain them; and it would be very difficult to suggest to Treasury Board that it is tradition that is impelling you to follow certain activities.

Slim's dictum is right, but it is equally true that in periods of great transition, in periods of questioning of fundamental values, in periods of weakening - and there is no question about it, [there is] a weakening both relatively and overall of the strength of the country - tradition can be of immense value.

I am reminded also of a story - I know some of this is dangerously khaki - which always strikes me as really capturing tradition, the other side of Slim's argument, if you like. It is one which we tell in the Black Watch, and I'm not sure if it's true, like most stories we tell in the Black Watch. When we were getting something of a kicking in Crete in '41, Admiral Cunningham, Commander of Mediterranean, was given the job of taking the troops off. Unfortunately the Germans had got both the headlands forward of the port from which the troops were being taken off. I think it was the 8th Black Watch or Imperial Black Watch (I'm not pushing my own regiment), but the British Black Watch was left as rear party (what else is new?) and of course this was not a particularly pleasant prospect for the Navy, to send the ships back at this stage into the port and past those headlands where the Germans had established themselves.

The story goes that Cunningham sent the signal to the Commodore, "cease and desist, and stop the mission," and the response of the Commodore was, "It takes three years to build a ship, it takes three centuries to build a tradition". And he went right in and he took the Black Watch off.

I think none of us would deny that you had better succeed, because that is a great one-liner to send back to Alexandria if everything goes well, but if everything doesn't go so well you had better be on one of the ships which goes down, because it will be much easier for you, won't it?

In this case it worked. In this case he got the troops off, and of course the Black Watch still uses

that traditional British Army expression every time everything goes badly, "Thank God there's a navy", which I think surely in the British Empire should have been slammed on top of all of our staff colleges, even though we like nothing more than a good defeat and a good evacuation, as Churchill said.

This is not an appeal for blindly following tradition. It is, however, unabashedly an appeal for using our traditions: not slavishly, but [in a way] that I hope we can throw together as a clear view to their future and, indeed, present utility.

That, I think, is enough for controversial views. I know people would like a coffee or perhaps something even stronger, given that it is Robbie Burns Day. I had hoped to find a really sexy quote from Robbie Burns to start. I thought I really should start with something from Robbie Burns and prove to my Honourary Colonel that I haven't forgotten the regiment, but I couldn't find anything particularly appropos for Reserves, which is probably not surprising given the state of Highland

Reserves at that particular time in Scotland. This is, of course, the bicentenary of his death, as well as his birth date today.

The only one I got, which I quite enjoyed and was very short, was: "freedom and whisky gang together". I thought to myself: you know, when I was first called by the Conference of Defence Associations to give this talk they said, "Take absolute freedom. Say whatever you want. Whatever you want to say is fine." Now they're regretting that. But I thought, you know, they gave me all of that, and in order for me to get the whisky part I suppose I have to now stand here and take questions, which I gather we have about ten minutes for. I appreciate the freedom; I appreciate your time; I think that my last thought before your questions and insults and telling me what I'm full of would be that we do have to look seriously at what each of us, Reserves and Regular, can bring to this job of national defence, and I think, other than a sense of humour, perhaps, the thing that we most need is to get back to something called mutual respect. Things are bad for both sides of the family; and squabbling within the family is definitely not the answer, whatever the future of the Reserves is.

Je serais tres content de prendre des questions en francais si vous preferez ou... or if there aren't any I will scamper away, but if there are some... es are needed, to be able to explain where we might be going. My own view is that that should be. If anything is a growing industry, that and intelligence services should be, and that is not the case.

Questions:

Mr. David Code, Executive Director, CDA Institute: You have commanded a regiment. What future do you see or hope for, then, for the regimental system?

DR. KLEPAK: Well, what I hope for is the easy bit. I think the regimental system has served Canada superbly; absolutely superbly, and working with young people all the time now, and having on the odd occasion, when they let me near an armoury, seeing them, there are a lot of things that have changed since the '60s. But I think young people are just as much looking for a place to be, a sense of being in a group that is doing something important; I think that

community is as valuable as ever, perhaps more valuable now that we are more mobile. I do see problems for the regimental system: people are very, very mobile, people do shift. If you ask someone with 20 years in now, chances are he has served in more than one regiment. In my time, chances are he might have, but it would still be someone a little unusual 20 or 30 years ago who had served in two or three regiments. Nowadays that's not the case. In the Navy, of course, or in the Air Force I suspect it affects people rather less because of the system.

The regimental system itself I think has proven itself wonderfully. Of course the constant and undeniable other side of it is that we do tend, as Tony Kellett keeps telling us, to become very parochial and very inward looking, and that is, no doubt, a problem which we should try to address.

Perhaps equally serious is the fact that of course in today's war, or in historic wars, a regimental system invites very heavy casualties at particular places. Combat may hit a particular regiment particularly hard and may lead to the sort of Verdun Black Friday where there wasn't a house in Verdun in Quebec in 1916 which didn't have black crepe, not a single one on the street that didn't have black crepe hanging from the doors, not to mention Newfoundland.

Those are real issues but in terms of military efficiency, and in terms of testing that military efficiency, there is no better way out.

One of the things that most concerns me about this modern business, travelling around, is whether it is Peru, Ecuador or mountain warfare, is how lonely it has got out there. I know our military psychologists at RMC are working on just this subject. Whatever else war was in the past, it was a group affair.

If we go to Fort Henry the troops are literally touching each other as they march in battle formation. The sense of being in it with a lot of other people is obvious to all and sundry, whereas modern warfare is not just the five yards to keep people dispersed so that one grenade or round won't have as much effect.

At the same time, there is no doubt that modern warfare - and we saw it again even in the Falklands - is getting people. On many occasions that terror is faced absolutely alone. It would seem to me that a regimental system, if it's ever been of any use, would be of use now.

So my hopes would be that we would retain it, but my fears for it are significant in the sense that in a way, it is under as much pressure as it ever has been at the same time when, in my view, it would never be more necessary.

Mr. Bob Mahar: In the last few years we have seen a number of conferences like this one, and they are extremely helpful for all of us within the family to frame our thoughts and articulate, perhaps, some of the ideas and the frustrations that we have. But it seems to me that there is an element missing, and that is: you are a successful Reservist, you are employed by the Department of National Defence; you are one of the family. So is Nick Stethem. We served together in years gone by.

We are talking to one another, and we are forever telling each other how we feel. Who is it outside our culture that needs to hear these things? What vehicles, if you will, do we have to explain to those who are imposing these changes upon us, the elements of our frustration and where we think this country should be going nationally? We live in a country that thinks about things regionally; and forming a national consensus on almost anything seems to be a great chore. How do we, within our culture, express these feelings and thoughts to those who are imposing change?

DR. KLEPAK: The \$64,000 - or is it with inflation - \$64 million question? I would say on the one side - which will never go any further of course because it's not as if we have cameras here - that the government has a responsibility here on the national side. Governments actually are supposed to govern. I think that is part of the verb, and gouvernement comes from something that a ship has. Steering is what they are supposed to do.

I am struck and I completely agree with you, we think regionally, but I'm not sure that Nick wasn't on in suggesting that - and again I hope I'm not putting words in his mouth - that there are responsibilities out here. One of them is to capture what is real national sentiment, really there, and exploit and develop and nurture it, not sit back.

I was struck that before the referendum debate and all the folderol, that in Alberta and British Columbia in September of 1994 (not 1974), 80 per cent in the one case and 79 per cent in the other case wanted the country to be bilingual. That doesn't sound very redneck to me. Almost exactly the same figures, although slightly higher in those two provinces for: do you want your son or daughter to be bilingual?

I think, yes, we are encouraged to think regionally and everybody slams it down our throats that we are supposed to think regionally. But you know there is still a nation there, for the time being, and I think something can be done but it's government which does it.

On the other question I would have something less general to suggest, and something where I, and I think many of us, have not done what we might have done, perhaps because we find it somewhat unsavoury. The answer to the first part of your question, I think, is: first, the press; second, the press; third, the press. Those would be my three areas of interest where I would like to see our emphasis going. Ninety-five per cent of the television, radio, newspaper and magazine press is ignorant of the issues, as Nick was saying. They are perfectly charmed and delighted to find people who know something about it and who might like to share something about it; about their regiments' histories, when events occur or when celebrations occur, about the story of a local person who has done good, about what is happening in Bosnia and its effect on the unit, about one of a thousand things. We do not have a press which is not interested, I don't believe, and if I may say so I think I've had quite a lot of exposure to it over the years. I do not find these people in any way negative. Curious, prepared to become very negative with a sort of "arriver pens,e negative" somewhere back there, but rarely strident. I mean, I lived in the '60s, many of us lived in the '60s. There you had a press which was negative. The new generation is completely uninformed. I don't say ignorant in any negative sense, simply uninformed.

If we do not tackle - not through bureaucratic, heavy-handed nationally organized arrangements, but rather through local unit, local initiative, local people arrangements - if we can't tackle that, then we will continue to drift in the ways which, I agree with you, our conferences tend to be: "Don't you think we should spend more money on the...", "Absolutely, George, I completely agree with you." "Well, why don't we do that?" "I don't know why we do that. What a very great shame." Then we have several more drinks and it gets a little less clear, but nonetheless we have the same message that we're passing to one another.

A lot of people are interested in the security of this country. A lot of people don't feel safe. A lot of people question; what kind of world? who is this Zhirinorsky, what is this China? -- I'm not suggesting any of those are places where threats will come from. What is this crime wave? What is happening to society? Where are we going? Armed Forces, and particularly Reserve Forces are insurance policies and nothing else. If you are absolutely sure that there is never going to be another

problem then excuse me, let's go home. It is only because I'm not very sure that there are not going to be any problems that I have a fire brigade, that I have a police force, and that I have armed forces and particularly Reserves. In an era where I have no answers to what kind of world I am going to see, or what kind of street I am going to see, that I live on, I'm quite interested.

I have my own experience, and I can only share that with you. Far from being negative, far from being unwilling to talk, they are normally delighted, and where not delighted in most cases quite willing to be convinced that there is a story, that there is something interesting, there is a local angle, that there is something there. I don't suggest that we all run off and start calling people in and talking about defence policy, "Boy, the Minister should have said this and I wish that this had happened." I suggest that units that are local have connections locally and have things that they can say about their histories, about their future, about their present which will stimulate interest and stimulate things that also answer Nick's problems about why we don't know who we are.

MR. GOODMAN: Doctor, my name is Goodman and my regiment is the Queen's York Rangers.

I agree totally with the answer you gave to the last question about getting into the press. But the Royal Military College is, of course, the leading university on military matters in the country. Has the Royal Military College or various individuals - other than you, of course, who we all appreciate being here - been going to or trying to make the country realize what the problems are that they are about to face if they go along the way they seem to be headed?

DR. KLEPAK: Would you ask my Dean and my Principal to leave the room, please? I'm sorry, had you finished?

MR. GOODMAN: No, I have completely finished.

DR. KLEPAK: Have you - I'm sorry.

Let me say that I think the College, like DND as a whole, has had a very productive, but a very safe existence for many years in the sense that defence was getting some priority. Budgets were

reasonably good, there was one threat, it was a comfortable world for DND as a whole and RMC, I think, shared in that.

I have just come from College Militaire Royal, so it is quite new. My experience is that the College is being recharged with vigour on these issues, both because it has become bilingual truly in the last few months, and that of course opens you up more as a true national university; also because it, like all defence establishments, can see pressures that it had not seen in the past. There is nothing like a good kick in the pants to get everyone moving at DND and more specifically at RMC.

I think there are a number of people - we of course do not have a very large staff and it is quite a busy staff - but I think there is a feeling at the College that, yes, we should be doing more with the press, that we should be doing more to explain defence, and we should be more active. It is fair to say that the whole of military education at the current moment is under review.

I was very disappointed, not so much just that Collège Militaire Royal was closed or that Royal Roads was closed, but that military education itself took such a blow. That National Defence College being closed, Junior College being closed, and two of the three military colleges closed, shows that of all the branches - if you could divide the activities that the military is involved in, its own education took by far the largest percentage of cuts of any single element.

That I think is dangerous in the same sense of what I was saying about intelligence. We have to start thinking now. We have to start being as proactive as a country like Canada can be, and as Armed Forces and as DND, and not sit waiting. If we let the initiative be seized by people who are not well disposed, particularly holding the financial controls, and if we can't explain why a security force and security capabilities are important, then we have only ourselves to blame.

I think that is very definitely seen at RMC, but RMC is becoming one of very few institutions that do this kind of thing in the country; that worries me because I think military education is important and I think it is going to be more and more important for younger officers to be able to face a camera, to be able to explain to people why forces are needed, to be able to explain where we might be going. My own view is that that should be. If anything is a growing industry, that and intelligence services should be, and that is not the case.

MR. GOODMAN: Well, thank you. May I suggest that the best way to become the next casualty is to remain quiet.

DR. KLEPAK: Well, that's pretty clear.

FUTURE OF THE NAVAL, AIR AND LAND RESERVES:

Session A

CMDRE. R.N. BAUGNIET
Commander, Naval Reserve

Monsieur le president, ladies and gentlemen, it is my privilege and pleasure to be here this morning to talk about the future of the Naval Reserve.

A couple of very quick things before I start. Appreciating, as I do, that I am talking to people with varying backgrounds in the military, I thought it would be important to make sure that if there is a word I use that you don't understand that you put your hands up very quickly and ask for clarification. Commodore Ken Mason, the Commandant of Canadian Forces Command and Staff College in Toronto, told me this story which I would like to share with you because it is important that we communicate effectively. For example, suppose you say to four different parts of the Forces, "secure that building". Now, if you turn to the Navy and say, "I want you to secure that building" we will go over, we will check that there are no cigarette butts behind cushions, we will close all the windows, turn off all the lights, lock the door and leave. If you turn to the Army and say "secure that building" they will probably attack it in company strength, 120 people or so, surround it, defensive perimeter, go room to room making sure it's absolutely empty and clear, maybe break a few windows and do a couple of other things, but essentially after a little while they will declare the building secured. If you call the United States Marine Corps in to secure a building they will attack it with bombers, AV-8Bs, long-range missiles, and when it is flattened they will be pleased to report back that the building is secure. If you say to the Air Force, "secure that building" they will take a three-year lease with an option to buy.

Talking about options to buy, may I make it very clear that I have nothing to do with the Rolls Royce Car Company. If on the other hand you want an engine to remove dust from headquarters or anything, we now have aero engines up to 90,000 pounds of thrust and I am prepared to offer you a special on those.

My presentation today is to talk about the future of the Naval Reserve, which I intend to do. I have been given ten minutes; we are already running late, so would you listen quickly please, because I will try and get through my time.

But before the first overhead goes up let me just point out that if the Reserve Commission had done its task 15 years ago the Naval Reserve would have come out dramatically different than it does now. Fifteen years ago, when I had just taken command of York, there were 18 Naval Reserve divisions across the country. I had just attended a CO's conference where I was told that the augmentation role of the Naval Reserve had been eliminated because the new ships did not require Reserves, thank you very much. The five training vessels that we had (the gate vessels) were sort of useful because they had thick hulls and we could bang them around; and that was about all we did with them. The only real role that the Naval Reserve had 15 years ago

was that of Naval Control of Shipping.

In the last 15 years things have changed fairly dramatically, and I would like to now put up the first overhead, please, if we may. (This is a joint operation. I have young Corporal - you should be promoted Corporal, if you're not - Headly from the gunners, 30th Bytown.) I cohabited with them for a while and if anything goes wrong with the overheads it is my fault; if it works brilliantly it's his. The numbering system has all been changed.

What I am going to talk about is the Naval Reserve and its future. You can't read the motto of our headquarters (it was selected by somebody before me) but it does refer to the "l'audace, et encore de l'audace et toujours de l'audace", and if I am too audacious today, I'm sorry about that.

The important thing for the Naval Reserve to understand what it's doing is for us to understand what the role of Maritime Command is. This overhead, taken straight from a presentation by the Maritime Commander, tells you quite bluntly what Maritime Command's mission is.

Within that mission what is the role of the Naval Reserve? Within that overall role the Naval Reserve's mission is quite clear and straightforward.

While it says "Recruiting, Training and Retention", because that historically tends to have been the role of the Naval Reserve - and I am going to talk a little bit more about that - the note at the end or at the bottom I would just bring to your attention. "By 1999 the Naval Reserve will represent 30% of the Navy total establishment (4000/9200 ratio)".

We have put these eight specific tasks on small cards, and every single naval Reservist across Canada has one of these in their wallets. Now hey do we do that? So that a young kid, who has just joined, when the mother father, or schoolmates or the unemployed brother ask "why did you join the Navy?" this kid will be able to reach into his wallet and answer that fairly easily. It must fit in. And when a CO asks, "we really would like to go on a winter training course, camping in the winter wonderland?" I can say "good idea. Where does it fit in our list of specific tasks? Where does it say we are going to spend money on taking people out to go camping in the mud? Unless that's (part of our mandate) people won't do it." So within that context the Naval Reserve has set out to fulfill its mandate, and in 1995 the Naval Reserve has met some of its specific tasks: for instance, it was very successful in providing manning of maritime coastal defence vessels. Naval control of shipping we did, by the way, during the Second World War, but now we are at it again.

As far as harbour defence is concerned, the Naval Reserve has done work-ups in Halifax, and is working with the RCMP on security measures. And then there is the work of the Regional diving centre at Halifax. So the Naval Reserve is active, doing what it's training for and has been tasked to do.

We are divided into four Regions. There are four Regional Coordinators. They have no staff. They are not headquarters; they are coordinators, and their job is to facilitate and to assist and counsel the COs in their respective regions. One of the things that has happened is that, of the 24

COs I have reporting to me 19 of them are Lieutenant Commanders. So we have lowered some of the ranks. It is now no longer automatic that when you are appointed a commanding officer of a Naval division you become a Commander.

The four regional coordinators, on the other hand, have the responsibility of helping and working with the COs in their regions; and specifically, where a specific tasking (represents a problem) those regional coordinators have a responsibility to draw from all over their Regions those resources that are necessary to meet the specific task.

The Naval Reserve is managed from the Pointe- Carcy naval complex. It comprises three elements: the Fleet school, HMCS Montcalm naval division and the fascinating Naval Museum are one; the student residence, wardroom and messes are another; and the Naval Reserve Headquarters is the third. We have a Deputy Commander and his small headquarters staff - (about 100 people) - to manage the entire Naval Reserve.

We put 1500 young Canadians through that school last summer. There was not one instance of a negative nature between the local community and the Naval Reservists from Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, or wherever - not one single incident with a negative implication.

HMCS Kingston, as you know, is launched, and - what better credibility to the fact that this program is to continue? - I would draw your attention to this Tuesday's Globe and Mail, page A4, which reports that HMCS Glace Bay is being launched. Glace bay is the second. These vessels number 12. Recently a visitor was in the shipyard, where one of these MCDV's was still on the slipway, and he asked "where's the rudder?" There ain't no rudder. "Where's the wheelhouse?" There is no wheelhouse. ..."the wheel?" There is no wheel on this ship sir. (It is steered by pivoting the screws, so these small ships are modern, rather different from the ones we used to know.)

Crews for four of the ships have been identified. Three of them are under training. We already have 200 applications for people to work in these ships that we haven't called upon yet.

At the same time that we are waiting for these new ships, the old Moresby and Anticosti are of course also operational, and four minesweepers on the west coast and four of the gate vessels are operational. So we are starting to hear the "I'm not sure you guys are going to be able to man them," to which I say "excuse me, we are doing 10 of them right now".

The minute that young Canadians see these ships, see that the promises that were made many years ago are finally being delivered upon, I think we are going to have a selection problem rather than a recruiting problem.

It is important that the Reserves realize that we are now providing an operational capability, one which is needed, not only a training capability. It is vitally important that we meet the commitment of manning these ships, and having visited half of the Naval Reserve divisions across this country - by the end of April I will have visited them all - I am absolutely confident that we will be able to meet our tasks.

I have also made the commitment to the Admiral that if we are not able to meet a specific task that he will know well in advance, rather than too late, so that he can make alternate plans.

Very quickly, a couple of more overheads and then we are done for me. Last summer, out of 4,000 people in the Naval Reserve, we had 2,513 students on various sea operations and support courses; 182 failed; 92.75 per cent success rate. In other words, in addition to the people on courses we had another 590 people, or thereabouts, on on-the-job training: the 2,500 previous plus 500 here, that's over 3,000. That's better than 75 per cent of the Naval Reserve that was out doing their thing last summer.

These are just some of the trades in which we employ people, and you can see that it is starting to get pretty esoteric now. There are still the traditional ones - boatswains - but then we get into naval control, NCIOP, we still have FIN [finance] clerks; we definitely need cooks; and then we get into MARS and other good stuff like that.

While I do not own Canadian Forces Fleet School Quebec, because obviously it is part of the training program, I in fact own the CO of the school who reports to me administratively. Functionally, obviously, [he reports] to the headquarters, but the CO of Canadian Forces Fleet School Quebec is one of mine. These are some of the 41 courses that are being offered in the summer of 1996 to ensure that we will have the right trained people in the programs.

What is interesting is that some of those courses are for permanent Force people, some of them for Reserves. Quite frankly I don't know which is which, and more importantly I don't care.

By the same token, when I sit around the table with my 26 COs, 24 Naval Reserve divisions, CO of the Headquarters, and the CO of the school, I think a third of them are Permanent Force, but I'm not sure, and quite frankly I don't care. They are COs under my command, doing a job.

I repeat, 15 years ago if the Reserve Commission had done its study then, the Naval Reserve would have been embarrassed, and I'm not sure that I could have told you what our future was going to be. I feel more comfortable and confident now that we have a future. There is, however, one big question mark and that is if somebody decides that we are not going to get the 12 MCDVs, because for budget reasons we are going to cut, the Naval Reserve will die and credibility will be zero.

I do not wish, however, to end on a negative note. The plan is there; the ships are being launched; the ships are being built. Thank God they are modular, which means that about the first seven have already got bits that are in the yard, and it would be very hard to cancel that program.

If the roles and missions are changed we will accommodate them. But at the moment I am fairly comfortable that we know where we're going and what we're doing, and what I can say without any hesitation or reservation is that the young Canadians who serve in the Naval Reserve at this point in time are individuals of whom you could be phenomenally proud.

Thank you very much.

FUTURE OF THE NAVAL, AIR AND LAND RESERVES: Session B

BGEN PAUL A. HAYES (Ret'd) (Air) CDA Vice Chairman

I want to make one thing very clear for those people who don't know me. I am Paul Hayes, I am not John Neroutsos. I have received several iterations of this itinerary for today and it kept saying John Neroutsos, my good friend who was the Commander of Air Reserve Group until about 12 years ago, and who was going to do this presentation on the Air Reserve. John got on to me on the Internet right away and said, "Hey, hey, I've been out of uniform for 12 years. What do I know about the Air Force or the Air Reserve any more? You are more current; you only left six years ago; so maybe you had better do it." I lost. He said he was going to be out of the country anyway. So I took on this presentation with some mixed feelings about what I was going to say.

On the positive side, after 39 years in the Air Force, both Reserve and Regular, there is nothing I like to do better than stand up and talk about the Air Force and boost the Air Force. I think it's a wonderful organization, and it sure treated me well.

On the other hand, as I said, I have been out of uniform for six years and things have changed an awful lot since, as you will hear today; I am assured, even as we meet, that things are continuing to change.

What I have done from some reading and looking at some briefings and listening to a few people is put together a few thoughts on the Air Reserve and where it might be going. I am going to take a bit of a step from Nick Stethem and talk about the history of the Air Reserve.

What I find out, going around the country and talking to various groups, is that it is maybe one of the best kept secrets in Canada. I think it is worth looking a little bit at where the Air Reserve came from over the past 60 years, and some of the major contributions they have really made. Some of it was touched on this morning - the whole notion of the Reserves in a national emergency situation. These are my own personal thoughts, I am going to throw up a few slides at some point, but I'm really not talking from the position of representing the Air Force. They are my own ideas. I hope at the end to leave you with several questions or considerations that I think should be looked at further in the development of the Air Reserve over the next few years.

History shows that the first units of what was then known as the RCAF Auxiliary were approved in 1932. The number of units and personnel gradually expanded over the next few years until, at the declaration of World War II in 1939, the total RCAF was made up of just over 3,000 Permanent Force people, and about 1,000 auxiliary members, under 4,100 in total. That was not a hell of a lot to go to war with in 1939, was it?

The Air Force at that time was organized into 20 squadrons, of which eight were Permanent Force and 12 were Auxiliary. All but one of the 20 squadrons were equipped with aging aircraft

that in no way could be considered first-line machines. When I looked through the history books I saw things like: 19 of these 20 squadrons were flying Tiger Moths and a few other types of aircraft that I can't even identify, so it was pretty old.

Of the 12 Auxiliary squadrons six were mobilized and went on to make major contributions to the war effort, while the other six were disbanded, although some were reformed later during the war to serve new needs. Two of the mobilized Auxiliary squadrons that still exist today, are worth mentioning in terms of their contribution to the war effort; you have to remember that these were principally Reserve squadrons or Auxiliary squadrons at the outbreak of war.

110 Squadron, formed in 1932 as an armoured cooperation squadron, went on to become 400 City of Toronto Squadron. There were 14 officers and 140 auxiliary airmen on strength in 1939. 110 of the airmen, and almost all of the officers stepped forward and volunteered for active service. After conversion to Lysander aircraft in Ottawa, the squadron went overseas in February 1940. It was the first Canadian squadron to go overseas in World War II. During the war its pilots flew some 3,000 sorties on fighter reconnaissance operations against the enemy using P-40s, Mustangs, Mosquitoes and Spitfires. And, as I said, 400 still serves today as the City of Toronto Squadron.

115 Squadron, the other one I wanted to talk about, was formed in 1934 as a fighter squadron. Called out to active service in September 1939 it was combined with 1 Fighter Squadron of the Permanent Force and went to England in August 1940. That was the only squadron that had any kind of reasonable aircraft at the outbreak of war. It was flying Hurricanes.

It was the only non-RAF squadron to fight in the Battle of Britain, and was the first RCAF squadron in World War II to engage the enemy, to score victories, to suffer combat casualties, and to win gallantry awards. During the war the pilots flew over 12,000 sorties on fighter reconnaissance operations on Hurricanes and Spitfires. It was eventually renumbered 401 Squadron and it still serves as the City of Westmount Squadron.

It is interesting to note that of the large number of Canadians that served in the RCAF during the war, some 263,000 were in service at the end of the war. Of these, by far the majority had joined after the outbreak of hostilities and were classified as Special Reserves. They even had to volunteer to be sent overseas, and had to sign a form that they agreed to go overseas.

At the end of the war most were demobilized and designated as Special Reserve Class E, which kept them available for call-up for some 10 to 15 years, very similar to what we have now in the Supplementary Reserve.

Following the end of World War II the establishment of Auxiliary squadrons was begun again in 1946, and by the early 1950s there were 12 squadrons in operation across Canada. It is interesting to note that six of the squadrons were equipped with Vampire jets and eventually F-86 Sabres on fighter operations, and formed the majority of Canada's air defence capability in North America. The Regular Force F-86 squadrons that were being formed in the early and mid-1950s were all designated for service to Europe as part of Canada's contribution to NATO.

This Auxiliary squadron responsibility lasted until the mid-to-late 1950s when sufficient Regular Force squadrons equipped with the CF-100 were in place in Canada.

To describe the Auxiliary - or the Air Reserve as we now know it - which subsequently became the Air Reserve in the post-war period, is much like a ride on a roller coaster, as you can see from this overhead.

From the Cold War peak of 5,700 personnel in 1955, with its 12 flying squadrons, Wing Headquarters, radar squadrons, medical units, and technical training units, the strength fell rapidly to 750 in about 1965 with the closing down of many units under the presumed scenario of nuclear deterrence and the need for only Forces in being, which was talked about earlier this morning.

In fact, the Air Reserve at this time was in jeopardy of being shut down completely. Only timely work by Brigadier Generals Barry Howard and Bill Draper of Toronto, both former Chairmen of the CDA, to form their Reserve association and begin an intensive program of lobbying, saved the day. The Association, of course, subsequently became a constituent member of CDA.

In the late 1970s the size of the Air Reserve had again begun to increase with the formation of Air Reserve augmentation flights, which I will talk about a little later, and the start up of 420 Squadron at CFB Shearwater, flying Tracker aircraft on maritime patrol. The start up of 420 Squadron, which had been closed down as an Air Reserve squadron in 1956, as part of that cutback, heralded the start of the twinning concept in which Air Reserve squadrons shared aircraft with a Regular Force Squadron. In this case the Regular Force Squadron was a former Naval Squadron, 880, and by 1989 the Air Reserve had reached a strength approaching 1,700.

The present plans, as you can see from that chart, call for the Air Reserve to continue to grow from the present level of about 1,700 personnel to an end state of about 3,000 by the year 2000. This comes at a time when the Regular Force, as you well know, is being reduced drastically in size.

This is a slide that was kindly provided by Air Command, but it really shows the picture of the relationship between the Air Reserve, as it is projected to grow over the next few years, and what is happening to the Regular Air Force.

From being approximately 6 per cent of the Regular Force in 1989; by the year 2000, if the 3,000 number is achieved, the Air Reserve will be about 20 per cent of the Regular Air Force. But with this increase in size the Air Force Reserve is developing into a much different looking animal than it was in former days. If you look at those previous slides you can see the concentration was on flying operations and aircraft operations and maintaining aircraft and units to support that type of operation.

As part of this change the new mission or role for the Air Reserve has been defined as being to

augment the Regular Air Force where and when needed. This definition signifies a shift to a greater proportion of Air Reserve people working in a supporting role, rather than an operational role.

For convenience I have taken what I understand the development of the Air Reserve to be and divided it into four components which is shown on the next slide.

You can see the four parts, the Flying Operations, the Air Reserve Augmentation Flights, a new feature of the Contingency Support Elements, and an Industrial Reserve. Those numbers I have generated are some of my own estimates, from some of the stuff I read and was provided. I'm not sure how accurate they are, because there may be some flow across from one to the other from time to time. So they are only approximate, a ball park estimate.

The Flying Operations would be, to some extent, what we would have looked to as the traditional Auxiliary or Air Reserve role, which I talked about in the first part, except that the number of Reserve squadrons was reduced from the present five to three; but a number of Regular squadrons will have substantial complements of Reservists.

As an example of where Air Reservists would be located in this scenario - that is, Regular squadrons having a fair number of Reservists on board - I prepared the next overhead just as an example to show what the six Squadrons in 10 Tactical Air Group might look like.

This, in terms of approximate percentages, is of the split between Regular Force personnel and Reserve personnel. The top two squadrons are the two remaining tactical helicopter squadrons that would be in force, and you can see that there are about 25 per cent Regular Force people in there and about 75 per cent Reserve people. Those are the approximate numbers. There are four Regular Force squadrons in 10 Tactical Air Group, and you can see the percentages the other way; but there is still a substantial number of Air Reservists in there.

The way these squadrons are set up typifies the approach being taken by the Air Force to Total Force, where the total Air Force comprises a new, combined establishment of Air Command units and formations comprised of Regular and Reserve personnel and components. Units of the total Air Force can be made up of any mix of Regular and Reserve Force personnel and equipment. For example, the squadrons on the slide, as I understand it, are no longer called Regular or Reserve; rather, they are termed Regular-heavy or Reserve-heavy, depending on the mix of Regular Force to Reserve Force.

The task of the Commander, in this kind of a scenario, or a Squadron Commander, or a Group Commander, is to arrive at the right blend of Regular and Reserve personnel in any formation for the job or mission to be done.

Looking back to the previous slide, the second component is the Air Reserve Augmentation Flight, or Air RAFs as they are frequently referred to, which were started in the late 1970s while I was still serving. They are small cadres of trained personnel located at Air Force bases and

stations to fill designated Air Force establishment positions, in order to provide a base for expansion in wartime or in national emergency. In peacetime they continue to serve and keep up their training and are seen as providing the Base or Wing Commander with a cost-effective augmentation resource so he can meet his assigned peacetime or non-emergency missions.

The third component, the Contingency Support element, is a new concept that the Air Force has embarked upon to enhance its capabilities for deployment and sustainability. Essentially, it involves the identification of people who will provide capabilities in such areas as airfield engineering, airfield defence, medical, rapid runway repair, communications and administration and logistics support.

This concept is rather innovative in that it involves the Air Force forming something like a joint venture with a host community, in some cases, for the provision of services, facilities and personnel. This is a mixed Regular and Reserve structure, and a unit could be Reserve-heavy or Regular-heavy on a particular deployment.

The final component is the Industrial Reserve. This too is a relatively new approach. In this concept, affiliations are formed with industries that have strong linkages to Air Command equipment and activities. Companies like Bombardier, Bristol Aerospace and CAE are candidates for this type of operation, and there may be others. The companies are asked to permit a number of employees who are trained and working on Air Command aircraft, under contract, to join the Air Force Reserve. The employees would be called out for some period each year with an Air Command Squadron that is flying the type of aircraft that the Reservist is working on in his company in his civilian occupation.

If you remember the number of 3,000, what we see is a substantially changed - larger, but changed - Air Reserve than we have known before. It is great to see the projected larger number of people in the Air Reserve, but it leaves me with a number of uncertainties or questions as this develops, which I think will be the subject of further discussion.

The approach to a total Air Force and the mission of the Air Force Reserve as augmenting the Regular Force when and as needed, leaves a sense of loss of identity as Air Reservists. The notion of the recognition of their contributions to Canada in both their civilian as well as their Reserve capacities, sometimes referred to as being twice the citizen, seems to have been overlooked to some extent in putting it all together.

With the planned closing down of Air Command, and the relocation of the Commander to Ottawa as the Chief of Air Staff, it might be suggested that the ability to have the case of the Air Reservists adequately represented at an appropriate level in an Air Force could be difficult in future. Perhaps an even greater issue is that there will be a much reduced capability to provide an adequate source of candidates to fill the single Air Reserve Brigadier position, which I assume will be retained.

As I indicated above, the number of Reserve-heavy squadrons is being reduced to three from five. If you do the arithmetic on that, this may only leave three Reserve Lieutenant-Colonels in

the system, and at best maybe only one or two of those might rise to the rank of Colonel. So your resource for bringing somebody up for the Brigadier-General and the choice you have may be quite limited. I think it may be a bit of a shot to the lower ranks as well, when they look forward to the expectation of the opportunities for progressing to senior rank if they are so inclined.

It appears that the structure and defined mission of the Air Reserve we see deals with only the first two stages of mobilization set out in the 1994 White Paper on Defence - that is "Force generation" and "Force enhancement." The approach seems to be oriented to addressing short-term requirements and may not provide the Air Force with the basis for meeting longer-term stage 3 and 4 requirements that go beyond short-term peacekeeping or that type of operation.

Finally, I'm glad Robert Baugniet mentioned the little card that is provided to all Naval Reservists. I had thought of these points but he really crystallized them in my mind. When you get past the "ships" in the missions and tasks, I believe the last three are equally applicable as Air Reserve tasks as part of our total Air Force: provide a recruiting base, ensure an Air Force presence in Canada's major cities, and undertake community and public relations on behalf of the total Air Force.

My good friend, Peter Desmedt who is here today - he and I talk often about the role of the Reserves in nation building, and I think this goes to some of that notion of nation building as other things that Reserves do. What I'm suggesting is that, as we develop the Air Reserve, we have to look at what kind of an Air Reserve we really need, how robust it should be, and what kind of structure it should have, to go beyond some of the planning that is going on right now.

That is what I have to say and I thank you again very much for having me here today.

MGEN F. MARIAGE (Ret'd)
Former Chief of Reserves, Canadian Forces

Before giving you my thoughts on the subject of the day - which is the future of the Reserves - I would like to take a few minutes to talk about our Armed Forces in general. Soldiering, especially when one is an infantryman, is not easy today. Grinding work, physical hardship, homesickness, and operational hazards have never been obstacles to an infantryman in either the Regular Force or the Militia. The leadership exercised within the ranks when engaged in dangerous missions is exemplary. All over the world are heard words of praise for the quality of our soldiers, the training they receive and the versatility of their skills, both in professional and humanitarian terms, in every corner of the world. Except in our own country, where every day journalists and broadcasters go on and on about the deplorable and reprehensible events that continue to tarnish our image, despite the fact that they are the results of the actions of a few marginal individuals who do not in any way reflect either the values or the traditions of our institution that is our Armed Forces.

What is cause for concern, however, is that no one seems to be speaking out in defence of this institution; and I think that this has an impact on the morale of our soldiers who must also worry about their future as they read and hear about more cuts, scarcer resources and fewer personnel, at a time when the public seems so well informed about the value and merit of its Army.

The respect of our Canadian passport, which we have talked so much about lately, and the privilege that this passport gives us when travelling abroad - well, who do you think has earned these privileges for Canadians? Our politicians? Our business people? Our artists? Our sports celebrities? No, it is our Armed Forces members through the First and Second World wars, Korea, and participation in every peacekeeping mission since the beginning. Cemeteries where Canadian soldiers are buried are a constant reminder of this contribution.

Let's get back to the subject of the day, "the Future of the Reserves" or, by altering words, what the Reserves of the future should look like.

Both components of the Forces, full time and part time, face re-engineering because of shrinking resources and deficit reduction. A shrinking permanent Force relies more and more on the Militia for individual reinforcement; and despite inherent difficulties and problems the Total Force is making its way; and training standards, especially on the soldier and young officer level, are similar to their Regular counterparts.

A special commission has come forward with specific recommendations for the Reserves and the Militia in particular. I fully support their findings and the bulk of their recommendations. These recommendations reinforce the fact that Militia has to become more cost efficient through

increased use of technology, increased professionalism, and increased productivity. Militia has also to get closer and closer to the community that is its roots. To make best use of my time, I have chosen the subject of how to get closer to the community.

The Commission also outlines the fact that the officer/soldier ratio is much too high, that operational status of some units is very weak, and that the cost of keeping these units alive is just too high, especially when some supporting bases are closing. The logic, then, is to undertake a rationalization of units through a restructuring of headquarters.

Dans ce scénario, qui est peut-être inévitable, la milice va perdre l'expertise de nombreux officiers et de sous-officiers, et nous savons tout le temps nécessaire pour acquérir formation, expérience et grade. Nous allons perdre aussi une présence dans certaines parties du pays. La disparition aussi d'infrastructures nécessaires à une mobilisation éventuelle ou peut-être même certaine un jour.

Il nous faudrait donc trouver un rôle secondaire à la milice, car si la logique fiscale veut que l'on rationalise le passé nous dit, "soyons prudents." J'ai été frappé par le fait que le mouvement des cadets est en péril, et ce à juste titre, comme un mouvement important qui mérite d'être protégé, prolongé et même augmenté. Ce mouvement n'a pas subi de coupures majeures depuis le début de la lutte au déficit. Pourquoi? Parce qu'il apporte quelque chose à la société. Et c'est à que la milice doit essayer de faire; prouver qu'elle peut contribuer à la société. Cette société qui a les problèmes suivants: problème de familles mono-parental, la disparition des valeurs traditionnelles, le décrochage scolaire, la formation déficiente, le chômage chronique, une délinquance accrue. Vous souvenez-vous de Katimivik et des programmes d'emplois d'été, pour étudiants qui, étaient financés par d'autres ministères que la Défense? Pourquoi ne pas envisager, compte tenu de la situation actuelle, de mettre la milice et certaines de ces ressources à la disposition de cette société, en quête de solution de ces problèmes?

Treasury Board, provincial governments and municipal governments might be interested to initiate and support a program that will give a part-time job to a desperate young Canadian, provide him or her with additional training in order to compliment his or her scholarship, teach basic values of good citizenship and pride, and reinforce team spirit and leadership skills. The primary role of the Reserves does not change and must not change. First, it is to serve as the basis of augmenting the Regular Force in the first and second phase of mobilization. Secondly, it is to serve as the basis for full-scale mobilization. Thirdly, it is to serve as the link between the military and the community at large. By designing a secondary role we can protect our mobilization base by contributing in [solving] today's society problems. If not, if we can't achieve that, I am afraid that there is no other way than to rationalize with the consequences that we might incur in the future.

Thank you.

QUESTION PERIOD

Mr. David Code, Executive Director, CDA Institute: Perhaps, if there is an opening I will ask one of General Mariage. Your comments about the use of the Cadets and the link to the community; I wonder if people who read their Vanguard Magazines faithfully will notice that I made a suggestion that was replied to by someone in Calgary about voluntary national service - not conscription but voluntary national service. Is this something close to what you had in mind?

GENERAL MARIAGE: Well, I have been told that the government is looking at a kind of a youth program because society, as I have outlined, has a problem. So what I am saying is that if the government is to come up with a program for the youth in this country they have to build a structure to hire people, and whatever, to conduct this program. So what we should be doing, because it is all a matter of funds here, is to offer and make sure that we sell our project; we should offer the government the use of some of our facilities in order to bring this program to life, if that is the intent of the politicians. That's what I'm saying.

THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE RESERVES

**THE RT. HON. BRIAN DICKSON, Chairperson,
LGEN. CHARLES BELZILE (Ret'd)
PROF. JACK GRANATSTEIN**

JUDGE DICKSON:

During the last year - well actually from April the 8th until October the 30th - my fellow Commissioners, General Belzile and Dr. Granatstein and I have conducted an intensive study of our Reserves at the request of the Minister. We were pleased to be able to deliver a report of which we are proud and which appears to have drawn a substantial measure of acceptance by the Regular and the Reserve Forces of our country.

I am also pleased to be able to tell you that we have received nothing but the greatest possible support and cooperation from all members of our Armed Forces. We were particularly impressed with the quality of the submissions which were made to the Commission. We also received much advice from retired, Regular and Reserve Force members, from members of the defence associations, and from ordinary Canadians.

We received this advice through the formal hearing process, through letters, some very impressive written submissions - we had something over 800 written submissions and documents - and even through the Internet, which of course seems to be used mostly by the younger section of our Canadian population.

You will not be surprised, I am sure, that we also received some learned advice through numerous phone calls, as well as in person, wherever we happened to be. We had hearings in each of the provinces: 14 cities during a period of six weeks.

The information which we received, along with the formal testimony of over 300 witnesses across the country, and hundreds of documents that we studied, helped us to make recommendations that we believe are good for the Reserves, good for the Canadian Forces, and good for the nation. We believe that if implemented intelligently, as we are sure they will be, they will result in a much improved defence instrument.

I should point out also that from the very beginning the Commission endeavoured to use every possible opportunity to receive the advice of the members of our Reserve Force. For example, our staff was almost wholly made up of Reservists. We were also pleased that the Command readily agreed to our suggestion that we be supported by Reservists, that we use Reserve installations when we travelled the country.

As well, the Commission was given carte blanche and offered all possible assistance to visit with the Reserve units. This enabled us to meet literally scores of Reservists with whom we were able

to converse very candidly outside the formal hearing process.

We are pleased to report that the country has every reason to be very proud of these young men and women. They unfailingly showed admirable dedication to their work. They were ready, willing and able to meet challenges, and they want to be considered full members of the Canadian Forces, not only in words but in deeds. This appears to be very important to them. They have been recently exposed to operations. Those who have not have looked with envy at the medals on the chests of their comrades that were more fortunate. They have a strong desire to be trained to high standards and to be recognized as professionals. We are confident that our recommendations will reflect much of their views and meet their expectations.

You will note that we recommend that our Primary Reserve be made as large as possible within any funding envelope available, with the fundamental criterion being that it be formed of effective units that provide a proper training platform for the soldiers, its NCMs and its officers. This, we believe, is absolutely vital for our Reserves.

We also recommend that our Supplementary Reserve be made much larger, as we believe this country can no longer afford to waste the very large investment made in providing superb training to its service men and women, especially to those who retire at an early age. History has also taught us - and I am pleased to mention it to this audience - that even the older members of the Supplementary Reserves can also make a vital contribution in the event of mobilization. Our Forces will need the expertise of their more experienced members to be prepared for and to conduct the complex business of modern warfare.

As could well be predicted, although there is very substantial support from the Militia and its honorary Colonels for the recommendations, there is criticism directed at some of them. The Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans' Affairs and the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs made their recommendations to the Minister. Some of these recommendations, we believe, may cause undue and unnecessary delay and therefore may negate much or all of the benefits of the other recommendations we have made. It is now for the government to decide the way ahead and to choose the best course of action based on the advice it has received and on the fiscal envelope it is ready to provide for defence.

I am now going to ask General Belzile and Dr. Granatstein to give you a very broad summary of our main recommendations. Professor Granatstein will begin by speaking about our views on mobilization and the Naval, Air and Communications Reserves. He will then address the Supplementary Reserves before giving the microphone to General Belzile. General Belzile will address you on Militia matters and he will then give the microphone back to Professor Granatstein who will touch on the generic recommendations contained in our report. When that is done we will be very pleased to respond to your questions and to discuss any issues arising from our report. Dr. Granatstein.

DR. GRANATSTEIN:

Ladies and gentlemen, I know that you have read the report, or at the very least read the summaries and the piece on the report by General Belzile in the current issue of Vanguard, so I will be very brief.

On mobilization, we tried to correct what was clearly an omission in the White Paper of 1994. The Reserves should be understood to be the basis for mobilization in the event of any future war.

For the Naval Reserve, in general we were exceedingly impressed. The Naval Reserve has a clear role, it knows what it's doing, and the equipment to let it carry out that role is on the way as we speak.

For the Air Reserve, we suggested - it wasn't a recommendation, we suggested - that the Air Reserves should provide, as much as possible, air transportation for the other Reserve components; and we expressed admiration for the innovative approach that the Air Reserve is using in creating units, especially in the Maritimes at the moment.

The Communications Reserve also struck us as being in very good shape. The one substantive recommendation we made was that the Field Signallers should be transferred back to the Land Forces where they belong, rather than as at present, remain under the Communications Reserve.

Our recommendations on the Supplementary Reserve have not received very much notice yet; but in many ways they are, I think, perhaps among the most important that we have made. We think the Supplementary Reserve, as the Chief Justice said, is an under-utilized resource; and we suggest that it should be a condition of enrolment in the Canadian Forces, on retirement or on leaving the Forces, that you then join the Supplementary Reserve, providing you have completed your training, providing that you have been honourably released.

We think that the Ready Reserve, which would consist of those up to age 55 or who have been out of the Forces for no more than five years, could serve as a substantial pool of trained personnel. As it exists now it is a heavy concentration of Senior NCOs and Officers. We think that if the recommendations we have made are implemented the Supplementary Reserve could number 100,000 or more in a very few years. It could form an essential component of mobilization. It could be used to fill existing headquarters and units up to establishment. It could fill reactivated units. It would provide a significant pool of leadership and expertise.

Very simply, it is much too valuable to be allowed to continue in its current disorganized and almost untraceable state, and if the recommendations that we have made on the Supplementary Reserve are implemented, we think the country will have a very good string to its military bow.

LGEN. CHARLES BELZILE

It will be no surprise, I'm sure, to anyone here that when we discussed how we were going to proceed with this that the Militia, being probably the one with the most contentious statements, would be the one Reserve for me, (to discuss) and of this I am particularly happy and proud.

Basically we have looked at the Reserves within three major problem areas. The first one has to do with training which we consider, in its present setup, is mostly inadequate because of inadequate training funds that reach the armoury floor, particularly. There is limited individual training possible; there is even more limited collective training that is possible, and there is limited training equipment available to the Militia.

In the solutions that we see for this, our recommendations mostly cater to an approach of reducing overhead. Stove piping, or giving directly to the armoury floor, guaranteed four days of training a month for the period September to May, and also in restructuring the Reserve, any redundant infrastructure that should come out: we strongly recommend that those savings be turned into training capabilities or equipment.

The second problem area in our mind was unit size and structure, and it relates directly also to some of the training problems. Inadequate training platforms - in the sense that a lot of units are barely viable and have effectively the same strength as one subunit, instead of being the two or three subunits at minimum, with the net result that the attrition of 25 or 30 per cent that we have seen in the Militia - causes a constant turnover of training, leads to the incapacity of these units to absorb this attrition, to be able to progress the collective training. It results directly in dull, repetitive training because of the simple fact that you cannot progress because of numbers that stay there.

Our answer to those is to go along the path that was already started by the Army, to use total Army establishment; but a total Army establishment that must be explained to people so it is well understood: that if you have a unit that has the strength of only a company or a squadron, that doesn't necessarily mean that you should have the full establishment of a Lieutenant-Colonel, five or six Majors, an RSM and a variety of Master Warrant Officers. What we are saying is that you need the strength similar to the Regular Force; you need the Officer strength to cater to the size of unit that you have, plus a complement which we accept, as indeed do the territorials in the UK, a model that we have tipped on quite a bit, that you actually have redundancy to allow for mobilization expansion, to allow for the capacity to grow, and to allow for leadership training particularly.

So we have come out with a recommendation that units should be larger than they are now, by and large, and as such should really comprise at least two full subunits as a minimum.

We feel that the Militia is over-headquartered and over-officered, leading directly to it being expensive - with qualifications. It is not expensive when compared to the cost of the Regular units, we accept that, but it is perhaps a little more inefficient than it should be and we don't think that the structure that exists right now, with the headquarters set up between area and the units, is particularly well designed for staff training particular, which should be for Staff Officers a good preparation for mobilization.

Our recommendation dealing directly with that is to close the 14 district headquarters that exist now in the country and to replace them, restructure them into seven Brigade Group Headquarters, reducing the number of headquarters by at least 50 per cent.

Why are we recommending some of this? If I could have slide 9 please, Jack, I would like to show you something.

One of the reasons that we are saying that TAE with discretion must be applied is shown right on that slide. If you look at the core ratios that you see there in the Infantry, with 1 to 15.3 officers for other ranks, in the Militia it is 1 to 6.4. We are saying it is somewhere in between: maybe 1 to 8 in the Militia, or maybe 1 to 10 in the Militia. This gives you a capacity to expand, as was suggested, the number of people that you can actually pay, because we have taken the 14.5 (incidentally, a figure given to us) as a funding level. We say effectively that you can probably pay adequately some 16,500 or 17,000 people with that kind of money. That is just an example.

We have recommended that they be Militia Brigade Groups instead of Districts, and we have recommended a certain limit to the number of units that should be in there, in order to allow for the units that will remain to be larger, for the reasons that I stated before.

If I could have slide 10? I just want to bring up something ahead of time here because I know this has been the object of a certain amount of soul searching and criticism as a result of the publication of our report.

Note the word "typical", note the fact that there is a smaller line - the 3rd Infantry Battalion. You must look at this not as a total or exact model; you must look at this as a guide; and you must read the text that we have recommended - that this should be dealt with with discretion. If you want, in seven or eleven units, to give yourself a little flexibility, there is nothing that prevents a reconnaissance squadron, for instance, from being part of the Armoured Regiment, without necessarily changing the badges of what unit it comes from. There is nothing that says that the Military Police unit that you see there should not be in the Headquarters and Signal Squadron and/or in the Service Battalions. There is nothing that says in there, also, that if you happen to live in a part of the country where perhaps you require a few more engineers, as we say in the report, using an example such as B.C., that you can't have an additional Engineer unit there, perhaps at the expense of somebody else.

Absorptions of some of these smaller units into the larger ones are the kind of discretion that should be used. For your information too, we did not list all the types of units that should be in there. We have also stated that some of the units should be in a Divisional troop concept or in a corps concept for mobilization purposes, activated when needed. But there is nothing that would also prevent some specialist organizations directly under the area or indeed the Brigade Headquarters from existing, which should normally be Divisional or Corps assets. In this I talk about an Intelligence Company, Low-Level Air Defence, Divisional Engineers, Divisional Artillery, Divisional Anti-Tank Unit and, loaned from the Air Force aviation resources and Divisional recce. All of those things are left as flexibility and discretion, in our recommendations to the Commander of the Army.

What this means to the Militia in strength: remember, we are talking about 14,500 as a paid ceiling - a figure, incidentally, given to us despite the press or people that are trying to say that we have recommended 14,500. We never recommended 14,500, it was given to us.

If you go to a 1 to 8 ratio only, you increase that by about 500 or 600. If you go to 1-to-10, I will leave it to your imagination to calculate where that second slide would go. If you eliminate 14 district headquarters, and replace them with a Brigade Group Headquarters that gives you additional strength there on the floor, up to about 16,500 or 17,000. The Regular Land Forces that exist now amount to about 21,000 or 22,000 and are intended to be about like that at end state.

Now for our main generic recommendations.

DR. GRANATSTEIN:

One of the things we felt strongly about is, I suspect, something that all of you feel strongly about, which is pay. As you know, the system has been screwed up for a long time. The organizers of this conference sent us a kit that included a speech made by Barney Danson in 1978 which talked about the insoluble pay problems. They remain apparently insoluble. We think they must be solved. We think, if necessary, money must be handed out by hand if it can't be done any other way.

We think that the 85 per cent level that the Reserves are supposed to be paid out of - 85 per cent of the Regular pay scale - should be adhered to as a minimum for all ranks. Some ranks now get 68 per cent, or in some cases less, of the pay for their comparable rank in the Regular Force. We think that benefits for Regulars and Reserves should be as comparable as they can be.

We think that there should be job protection for the Reservists. The one recommendation from SCONDVA that I found most upsetting, frankly, was that SCONDVA said - on the basis of talking to perhaps 50 people, at most - that there were divided views on the question of job protection. We talked to hundreds of Reservists, and there was absolute unanimity on the part of junior NCMs and Officers on the need for job protection. Very simply, we do not believe that people should be discriminated against because they want to serve their country.

We think that the ease of movement between the Regular and the Reserve Forces should be enhanced. The membrane that divides the two Forces is now not permeable enough, it should be easier in this modern job market in which we live for a Regular, for example, to say he could not continue to serve in the Regular Force as a full-time soldier for family reasons for two years, say, but he would want to keep his connection up by serving in the Reserves. That seems to us to be something that should be administratively possible and is necessary. Vice versa, a Reservist who wanted to serve with the Regular Force ought to be able to make that transition too. In other words, the administration needs to be made more simple, the membrane made more permeable between the two Forces.

JUDGE DICKSON:

Ladies and gentlemen, that concludes the summary of our recommendations in the report which we delivered to the Minister. We would now be very pleased to entertain your questions and your comments.

QUESTION PERIOD

LT-COL. JIM HUBEL, Royal Canadian Artillery Association:

First of all, I would like to congratulate the Commission on this wonderful study and document which is turning out to be an epic in Reserve history. My question, which will be in two parts, concerns your recommendation that there be seven Militia brigade groups.

Firstly, is this, in your mind, a finite number, or do you consider it a flexible starting point which could be adjusted slightly after deeper consideration?

The second part of my question concerns the decision-making process by which you arrived at the number of seven brigades. General Belzile gave us some insight a moment ago on that, but I am sure that your deliberations took many factors into account. Specifically, what weight did you give to the population base?

I live in the Province of Ontario, which now has 37.5 per cent of the Canadian population, yet LFCA has been allotted only two Reserve brigades. I think there might be some basis, simply on that factor, for three in Ontario. Could you comment, please?

JUDGE DICKSON: General Belzile will respond to the question.

GENERAL BELZILE: If I may, Colonel Hubel, I find those two questions are really so interwoven that I find it difficult to answer them separately, so bear with me and I will try and work my way through.

The population obviously was a factor. The number of units that existed was a factor. The ability or the capabilities of a man of modern command and control systems was a factor. But the major factor was really to try and increase the strength, not of headquarters, but of the strength of the units under them at the next level.

You will remember, as I said during my remarks, that we wanted a minimum of two subunits. So what we are really talking about is Militia and major units that should be, in our minds, something along 300 or 350 - as close to that as possible - which gives you the capability to get on to more collective training that exists now.

We went to seven purely and simply because, within the numbers that were allocated, as opposed to say nine or ten, if you had more than that, you were perpetuating what we feel is the major problem that exist now, i.e. we would be stuck with smaller units.

We recognized that this is not done on an equation which is equal across the way. We also know that there was a very heavy recommendation that way, made to SCONDVA and to the Senate

Veterans' Affairs Committee; and suggestions were made, and indeed some supported by SCONDVA, that this number should be changed.

So when you ask me "is it finite?" we are not the decision makers. We are saying that, if you go above (seven) you are going to perpetuate one of the major problems that exist now. I realize that this is at the expense of (perhaps in certain areas) more units, but I want to come back to that flexibility that we tried to leave in there, that discretion that we tried to leave in there, that perhaps a lot more of these units can be salvaged as Divisional troops kept smaller strength, or some specialist cells that you manage to keep.

I think of something like the Intelligence Company in Toronto, for instance, probably the only one in the country that I am aware of. We are not saying that you need to do away with that particular unit. We are saying that perhaps, you can attach it to a Brigade, and perhaps as a Divisional unit and you recognize it as such at the outset.

We couldn't go out across the country as we have said in the report, and try to actually design the Force on behalf of the people there, because we realize how difficult it will be, to start with. Second, we didn't have either the time or the data readily available, because a lot of this had to be done one-on-one by area, the senior Militia system, the Senates, and what-have-you. All of this is going to have to be a bit of a team effort; but we have gone all the way though, we have gone very heavily in stating that the Militia should form part of those decisions.

I realize that certain areas will find it more difficult than others. We didn't base it totally on population, but a number of units - and simple arithmetic tells me that in that context if you stay at seven, the one that is hit the most is Ontario because it is a central area. If you go up to an additional brigade or two - I don't think this Commission is really in the position to disagree totally with that, except to warn you that you are going back down the same treadmill where you are now.

COLONEL DILLON: Mr. Chairman, my name is Dillon, Colonel of the Regiment, the RCR. The question that I would like to address to the panel this morning stems from a concern I have that the terms of reference for the Commission restricted your investigation largely to the Reserves themselves when, in fact, I believe that the problems which this group is trying to wrestle with reach far beyond the Reserve Forces themselves, far beyond the Regular Force, and deeply into the community, the total country.

In 1939, as I recall, English and French Canada, as part and parcel of the British Commonwealth, went quietly to war. There were 5,000 Regular soldiers, 50,000 Reserves and, as we were reminded this morning, in a remarkably short space of time an incredibly large army was formed which achieved a record of which all Canadians can be proud.

I was part of that exercise, as many of you here in the room were, and I recall that there was a visceral emanation from the community. We are talking about 700,000 to 800,000 in the Army alone. The question is: where did these people come from? What was it that drove them to do what they did?

Today there is a totally different community. There is cultural and ethnic diversity. The Army has been cut back, as we know. But what is more important and more serious, I think, is that armouries have been closed, not just in the past little while but for years. The Army is being cut off effectively from small town Canada. The Regular Forces have in many cases been moved from the community to relatively sequestered large camps like Petawawa and Gagetown and so forth. My regiment has been one that has suffered because of this, I can tell you.

The result is that there is now relatively little knowledge or interest in the Armed Forces as part of the Canadian community, as part and parcel of Canada itself. So my question, gentlemen, is this: is there anything that can be done, in addition to the very, I think, wise and far-reaching recommendations that you have made to improve the situation? Is there anything in addition that should be done to ensure that we do succeed in what we are trying to do, to establish once again the community roots of the Army? It will have to be different, but I think the roots have to be replanted. Is there anything that should be done to generate, in today's diverse population, the idea of service to the nation? Instead of adherence to what the editor of the Globe and Mail has called "our culture of entitlement", is there anything we have to do to address this situation in order to succeed?

Finally, what else might be done to rebuild Total Force? In my view Total Force is nothing new. I think we had Total Force in 1939. I have referred to it as the trinity, a military trinity, which comprises the Regular Force, the Reserves and the people. And, gentlemen, I would like to know whether there is anything that you feel that we might be doing that you haven't been able to mention or have not mentioned because of the restriction of your terms of reference?

JUDGE DICKSON: Thank you, sir. Dr. Granatstein will reply to your question.

DR. GRANATSTEIN: You are certainly right, sir, that our terms of reference restricted us to the Reserves; and the questions that you have raised by and large are political questions. The way to deal with them is through the political process, primarily. If the Government of Canada decides in its wisdom that the Armed Forces are important it will do certain things. If it continues to think that they are not important it will continue to do what it has been doing. So it is a political question primarily.

You talked about the ethnically diverse nature of the country. I was quite struck as we went around Canada on our travels doing this Commission, at the multi-hued variety of Reservists. The Reserves are not a white, Anglo-Saxon component of the military. They are in fact increasingly reflective of the diverse nature of the country; and I have no doubt at all that the recent immigrants to Canada are committed every bit as much as the longer (established) parts of our society to the idea of service.

It is difficult to establish roots in the smaller towns, and I recognize that some of the recommendations that we have made may impact heaviest on small and rural communities. It is a problem of money and aging armouries and lack of governmental interest, more than it is a lack of popular interest. We have to find some ways, and many of the units that General Belzile mentioned, the specialist smaller units, seem to me ideally to be able to be located in small town

Canada.

The Air Force's Contingencies Support Wing Units are being put into small town Canada. Bridgewater, Nova Scotia is not one of the major metropolises in Canada. It is going to have one of these units.

There are ways of reaching out, it seems to me, to small town Canada. But it is difficult and it is a function of government support and government interest, more than it is anything that we could do, other than as private citizens pushing our politicians. That's what we have to do.

GENERAL BELZILE: Two small points, if I may, on the community roots or on the footprint. In addition to what Professor Granatstein suggests - that some smaller centres might lend themselves better to smaller specialized units - General Fred Mariage mentioned briefly, in his short talk before we took the podium, the Cadet movement. Some of you will recognize that as Colonel Commandant of the Army Cadets I have a certain amount of vested interest in this. But as was pointed out this is a way - an enhanced Cadet movement is a very good way indeed - to project at least a military flavour to outside communities, because you don't need very large segments of population. That brings instructors there; that brings uniforms to the place.

The other one is - and again we mention it so little - and with all the respect that I have for my two colleagues who spoke to you early this morning, when particularly Hal Klepak was using the Oxford Dictionary to tell me what "reserve" meant, "something that you do not use until you absolutely need it"; but he also qualified it by saying that you just can't afford not to use it right now and hence the Total Force that you have, and hence secondary tasks of augmentation.

But all of this - if you're going to use the term "reserve" we have one Reserve right now that we do not use. I don't know if it scares people to talk about the Supplementary Reserve, but the Supplementary Reserve is people that are recently retired, in most cases, that are all across this country, that are everywhere. They don't necessarily need to belong to a unit, but everybody knows that Joe has just come back from Yugoslavia where he went as an augmentation. He works at the local gas station. So there is a presence, and if our recommendations are also followed where we suggest that this be revitalized and perhaps certain uniforms be left in the hands of the people, you might again see a lot more of the military in the communities where you don't see them now.

For some reason we are completely blocked in this country about trying to count this amazing resource that exists here, [which we] keep on maintaining, and we write all over the place that the only nation in the world that has Reserves smaller than its Regular Forces is Canada; and we compare ourselves to other nations which have a Reserve Force that is really not even as good as our Supplementary Reserve. Yet we accept their figures. We don't talk about ours.

There are all sorts of ways this resource could be used and one of them, Colonel Dillon, is exactly that: to have them in the community and give them a sense of belonging somewhere. They don't have to be a parading member of a unit, but have some sort of a system where the lists are evolved and you are in contact with them, and the Militia units talk to these guys, bring them in, have them speak to service clubs.

I would just like to show you one slide, (15 please). You will probably find me harping on the Supplementary Reserve quite a bit. I confess that in my all years in uniform I ignored them too. I will not ignore them now; we can't afford to.

That is the current composition of the Supplementary Reserve. There are now 47,000 people there who are less than 65. You may be worried about the 60 to 64 which uses up a lot of us here; but have a look at the 25 to 34. At the 35 to 44 a lot of these people have been out of the Forces - there are 20,000 people there, recently out of the Forces that don't require any great amount of training, that are probably better trained and more usable than a lot of the people in the Primary Reserve; yet for some reason we just want to shy away from these people, we don't want to talk about them. Why are we hiding them? Let's use them.

JUDGE DICKSON: Thank you, Colonel Dillon, and may I thank you for the letter which you were kind enough to write and for the material which accompanied the letter. It was very interesting.

MR. JOHN BELL, Maritime Defence Association of Canada:

Let me first offer my congratulations to Chief Justice Dickson and to the other Commissioners. I would also like to ask a question related to the recommendation from SCONDVA on cost benefit analysis. I would like to ask the Commissioners why it is that in the process of doing the Commission that they felt that, one, it was not possible to undertake a cost benefit analysis, or secondly that it was not appropriate to undertake a cost benefit analysis, and thirdly, what you feel the result will be of the SCONDVA recommendation now to undertake that before any further implementation is under way?

JUDGE DICKSON: Dr. Granatstein.

DR. GRANATSTEIN: I thought the SCONDVA recommendation was a deliberate effort to delay any action on the Reserves, period. What will happen to that recommendation? Maybe the Minister will tell us tomorrow. Why didn't we do a cost benefit analysis? One, because we didn't think it mattered. The cost of the Reserves is completely unimportant. This is a device that is being used repeatedly, to my mind, to muddy the waters and to serve no practical purpose.

The only thing that matters to Reservists is the amount of money that gets down to the training floor. Everything else is immaterial. There is no Reserve cut in the cost of a tank; that simply does not exist. The overall cost of the Reserves is, frankly, immaterial; it doesn't matter whether it's \$1 billion or \$500 million.

What matters is how much money is there for training and, as we know, there has not been enough money there for training. The recommendations we made tried quite hard to turn the pyramid on its end, so that the first cut - instead of going to NDHQ, to the Areas, to the Districts - is a guarantee of four days a month to units for the period September to May, with a quantified amount to cover the cost of administration and command, with summer training paid out of the budget

above. That way units have the money they need to operate and that is the only money that matters for the Reserves. It is very simple.

JUDGE DICKSON: One of the early questions which we addressed was whether or not we, as a Commission, should take it upon ourselves to decide which units should be derolled or put on the shelf or what have you. I think I can say that the advice we received unanimously is that we should not. In the first place, we didn't have the staff. We didn't have the time, we didn't have the money. The advice we got from senior officers and others was that the determination as to which units should be amalgamated or shelved should be at the grass roots and not above that. We had this example of what has been done in the Atlantic, where the down sizing was done, apparently without actual money, and the same thing on the West Coast. From that point of view we felt that we should not get into the matter of deciding which is going to go and which units are going to stay.

The other thing that concerned us was the matter of costing. It will be a major undertaking to decide which units will stay and which will not. From that point of view we found that it was better to leave it to the units themselves who are familiar [with the situation]. Apart from that, the suggestion that we should go ahead now and do a cost study before deciding which units remain and which don't, and what the infrastructure will be, which armouries, if any, are to be closed - I think those things must be decided before you get into the dollar and cents. Again, the advice we got was we should not get into the arithmetic at this stage.

GENERAL BELZILE: May I just add a word: it is also, John, as far as we are concerned, a normal staffing process. The chain of command eventually is going to have to implement those things with their Reservists. They have to sit down and figure out, as the Chief Justice said, not only what unit is going to go or is going to be absorbed or what have you, that the cost of closing armoury "x" versus building another one in a population centre, and things like this. This is part of the normal staffing. Before they decide that armoury "x" is going to be closed - presumably, as we stated in the report, all things like its historical significance, its location, its distance to modern transportation systems, its accessibility, and all of these things which are called an impact analysis are part of the normal staffing process. We found it very difficult, when we were in front of SCONDVA, to be challenged with this sort of thing, because I don't know how you can achieve it without having decided what your structure is going to be. The normal staffing process should do that; and everybody participates in that; and that should be part of the ongoing implementation.

CAPTAIN HATFIELD: My name is Captain Hatfield, I am with the War Studies Program, Royal Military College.

I understand the report has been presented directly to the Minister, rather than being tabled in the House of Commons, which is normal with a Commission of your sort. Is there any intention on the part of the Minister or SCONDVA to table the report before the House of Commons?

GENERAL BELZILE: We don't know, is the short answer. But we have listened to all of the usual rumours, and things like this. If one is looking at the dissenting statement written by the

Reform Party to the SCONDVA Report, they seem to assume it will not be tabled. Perhaps they have inside information that we don't have.

Because it was a report on our part to the Minister it is really up to him what he does with it, and he passed it to the Standing Committee to study, and the Standing Committee gave him their report, which was not unanimous. As you probably know, there was a strong dissenting statement written by the Reform members of the Standing Committee, who, in their case, recommended it be tabled in the House. But we have not heard either rumour or been told that the Minister planned to do it, or whether he plans not to. Again, maybe this is something that in his speech tomorrow may come out.

COLONEL BAXTER: My name is Colonel Baxter. I have served both in the Reserves and the Regular Force. I would like to make a comment and then ask General Belzile a question. I feel brave now, because we're both out of uniform.

The first comment I would like to make: for the last five years in Atlantic Canada we have operated the Atlantic Training Brigade. It has worked very well, and I can say categorically that it worked far better, as it concerns Reserve Army training, than anything that I was exposed to in the Army out in the west. I think it is an excellent concept, and anyone who wants to discuss how we did it during the next two or three days - I would be more than prepared to do this.

My only concern on the brigade concept is that people say that they want more brigades, more brigades. Today in the Reserve Army you are going to have senior infrastructure problems. The people that had the time to give to the Reserves at the senior positions - Majors and above - today with down-sizing in civvy street don't have that same time. They can't get off; they can't dedicate the same amount of time to the Reserves as they used to; and one of our problems is to get the proper people in the infrastructure.

I am concerned how long the debate on this study will carry on. The people that don't like it are never going to like it. The people that say you have to have all the senior officers, we have to have districts, we have to have that, their mind is made up. But I think most people generally accept this study.

The question I would like to ask you, General Belzile: you are now back commanding the Army. You say the word "implement". How would you implement this? Would you do it with one action directive from Victoria to St. John's to do it all at once, to save the rumour mills, to get it all sorted out at one time; or would you allow the Area Commanders to all play with it longer and longer and longer, which is my greatest concern, sir?

GENERAL BELZILE: Bob, you never cease to challenge me. You did it when you were in uniform and I was in uniform and you still do it.

If you have a look at our report carefully, we have suggested a sort of an implementation or a phasing system. We have also indicated what the participation should be, and we've even used

milestones. It is very difficult for me to put myself back in the shoes of the Commander of the Army. But what we are suggesting here is not unlike a lot of the things we had started then; I mean it's not a mystery.

If I can come back to your other comment, I seem to discern that people were concerned about rank - I don't see any difference between the Districts and the Brigades. You have a lot more Districts, and they are the same rank that was suggested. We are suggesting a Militia Colonel to command those Brigades.

You also brought up the point very carefully, and very wisely, that those are training Brigades. Those are not the Brigades that will probably be mobilized for action per se, because historically we have not done that, we have taken people in units from all over the place. It is the training Brigade that gets units ready so eventually you can put them in the field, a deployable force, and you assemble them there. The Brigade gives you the staff system, the Brigade is the same structure as the Regular Force counterparts which are across the country. If you go back, you look at the west, you look at Ontario and you look at Quebec - except in the Maritimes where it doesn't apply, right now - there's not only those three or those two Militia brigade groups that we are commanding, there is a Regular brigade group there too, and it's the same Commander. He has some concerns, presumably, about trying to get all this to work. And his own Deputy is a senior Militia officer in all cases. It is different in the Maritimes, because the Combat Training Centre is there and there is - at least for the moment - no Regular brigade, and it's not likely to have one given the current fiscal constraints, obviously.

So I think it is important that the time lines should be the same across the country. But at the same time I think we are very careful in stating that there was a reasonable amount of discretion in there, or that there should be a reasonable amount of discretion, because the brigade that is mostly centred, on say, Northern Ontario or wherever, is going to be different, probably, than the one that is in the Maritimes. That doesn't mean that you shouldn't be able to implement all this on a phase or on a milestone system which is the same for everybody. That would be terribly tempting, to be quite honest, if I were still in uniform, to do it all in one go, but not necessarily in the details that they are all made uniform and things like this.

PANEL DISCUSSION: RESERVE FORCES IN OTHER COUNTRIES

MR. E. YERUSHALMI Israeli Embassy
MGEN. SCHLUP Swiss Embassy
COL. W. HAGEMAN Royal Netherlands Embassy

MR. YERUSHALMI:

First of all, I feel a little humble because I am only a Sergeant-Major in our Reserve system, while I am surrounded here by Major General Schlup and Colonel Hageman. But I will try to give you a perspective of Israeli Reserves from the point of view of a Sergeant-Major in the Israeli Reserves.

What is the philosophy behind Israel's Reserves? As you know, Israel is a new country. It was formed in 1948, and it is a country that rose out of a war. We were born in the middle of a war, and since 1948 until today we have been fighting constant wars all the time. Today we hope that finally we can achieve peace with our neighbours.

We were always surrounded by countries that were enemies of Israel, and we had to fight for survival for the last 50 years. The country, of course, had the need to build itself, to develop itself, while protecting the country in terms of its security. We had to form a strong army that can protect the State of Israel, but not having too many people actually in the army itself - because we couldn't afford having too many people doing military jobs while we had to build our civilian economy and infrastructure.

We tried to find a solution, and the solution was to build a Regular Army that is based on the Israelis who were between the ages of 18 to 21 years old. It is a compulsory army; every Israeli between the ages of 18 and 21 has to serve in the Israeli defence forces. Beyond the age of 21 we have to serve in our Reserve system until the age of 40, if we belong to a combat unit; or the age of 55 if we belong to a non-combat unit.

After the War of Independence of 1949 ended, we sent a few of our Generals to Switzerland to learn how the Swiss developed their Reserve system; and we basically decided to copy their system because this is the best, we thought, for the State of Israel. We can hold a small regular Army while having a pretty large Reserve system. Our Reserve Army is a civilian army. Every Israeli considers himself a soldier on vacation, because what happens to a typical Israeli is that during the year, for eleven months you are a civilian, but at least one month per year you are called into military duty.

Since we developed this Reserve system, our Reserve military system proved itself, proved itself in ways of protecting the State of Israel, and through the wars that the Israeli Army went through. In the war of 1967, when we were threatened by all of our neighbours, when Israel was a very tiny country, our borders were narrow, most of the central part of Israel was only 12

kilometres wide, then we had to mobilize our Reserves three weeks before the war started. All the Reserves were in place, and when the war started on the 5th of June, 1967, our Air Force attacked the Arab Air Forces, managed to destroy them, and the Army moved into the Arab countries and it was mostly a Reserve Army. The Regular Army was only a very small part of the armies that entered the Arab countries and defeated the Arab countries at that time.

So it has proved itself in protecting a very, very tiny country. I think the population of Israel at that time was about 2.5 million and we were facing enemies with a population of around 150 million. So we beat the odds with this Reserve system.

In 1973, six years later in the October War - a war which I personally fought in - we were attacked by complete surprise. The Egyptians and the Syrians attacked us by surprise on the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, Yom Kippur; and then the Regular Army had to try to fight its way to try to repel the enemy across the borders while the Reserve Army had to organize itself and reach the borders and reach the front lines; and this took about 24 to 48 hours until the Reserves reached the front lines and started to push the Arab armies that attacked us across the border lines of Israel.

So in both cases, in '67, when we could prepare our Reserves beforehand, and in '73 when we had to mobilize our Reserves after a surprise attack, the system actually worked.

I will try to give you a little personal view of what it means to be a Reservist in the Israeli Army. First of all, after the age of 21, you leave the Army after three years of service, and after three years of service in the Israeli military you basically don't want to see a uniform any more. You want to forget about the Army and start your studies in university and start becoming a civilian and start being part of the Israeli economy and part of the Israeli civil life.

What happens is that two or three months after you become a civilian you are usually called to the first training with your new Reserve unit. This training lasts usually about a month or a month and a half, and then you know your friends that you're going to serve with for most of your life, until the age of 40 at least and sometimes beyond that.

What happens technically, in terms of mobilizing people into the Reserves, is that you are called. You get an envelope through the mail and it gives you a 40 day warning that you are going to be called into the Reserves. If you are a student you are allowed to actually write and say, "I have tests, I have important exams, important studies", the Army sometimes can say, "Okay, we won't need you at this point." It's the same with somebody who runs a business and he has a problem running his business. He can come to the Army and say, "I have a problem" and the Army will usually let him off.

One of the problems that you have in terms of being an actual Reservist and being part of the unit is that you know if you do not come to your Reserve unit for a certain duty you know that your friends will have to cover for you, and the unit is of course smaller because you are not there. So Israelis are very hesitant in actually giving up these reports and saying, "I have a problem and I don't want to come to my unit", and usually people who are called come to the unit.

As Reservists we of course participate in manoeuvres; we participate in border patrols. Usually most of the duty is done on the boundaries of Israel; most of the borders of Israel are defended by Reserve units and only some of the boundaries, especially where the hot spots are, where there are actually clashes going on, like in Lebanon, that is usually defended by the Regular Army. Reservists also sometimes participate in military actions in Lebanon and in other borders of Israel.

Of course if, God forbid, a war breaks out you are immediately called to your unit. They simply call you by phone and they tell you in 12 hours or 24 hours you have to come to your unit, and off you go to war. That is, of course, very, very difficult coming out of civilian life and you get this phone call and you have to pack your things and a few hours later you are somewhere in mid- Lebanon and then you are fighting a war. It's very, very difficult for the person, for the family. But that is a part of Israeli life, or used to be part of Israeli life.

I remember in 1973 during the Yom Kippur War, I was a Regular soldier at the time and we were fighting the Egyptians for 48 hours along the Suez Canal before we saw the first Reservists, and I remember the first Reservists coming in and some of them could technically, in terms of age, be our fathers. I remember some of them cried when they saw us. You know, black with all the gunpowder and after fighting such hard battles for 48 hours against tremendous odds. I was part of Artillery and we were firing 24 cannons against over a thousand Egyptian artillery pieces, which was unbelievable. You couldn't imagine this kind of duel going on. I remember the Reservists coming in to replace us and the way they looked at us.

The same thing happened to me when I came into Lebanon in 1982, and I came after four days of fighting already in Lebanon and we replaced some Regular units which were fighting already for four days, and we saw the same thing. Then I could imagine how the Reservists at that time looked at us as Regular soldiers. So this is my personal experience in two major wars.

What happens to an Israeli in the Reserves is that you develop a strong sense of friendship. Your friends in your Reserve unit are your best friends, forever, and one of the crises that we have in Israel - we have the famous 40 year old crisis, that you start feeling that you are becoming older. In Israel it is a double crisis because if you go at the age of 40 and your final assignment in your Reserve unit - and this is the last time you will ever see your friends again in the military and in uniform. Even though we don't like to go to the Reserves, and after 20 years we basically want to go out of the Reserves and out of the military system still it really happens to you at the end of your military service. You kind of feel unneeded by the State and you can't give to the country as much as you did during the years that you participated in the military.

What will happen to the Israeli Reserves in the future? Of course a lot depends in what happens in the peace process. The peace process that is going on today between Israel and the Arab countries we hope will lead us to peace, to final peace between Israel and all our neighbours. Then Israel will not need the size of the Army that we have today, and of course we can reduce our forces, both in the Regular Army and the Reserves.

But as far as I see it, and as far as we know the Middle East neighborhood, and we look at the countries around us, I am sure that Israel will need to keep itself strong militarily for at least the next 15 or 20 years or more to come and have to keep a very, very strong Reserve system so if - God forbid - something goes wrong in the countries around us, if somebody decides to attack Israel - which is a very, very tiny country, we're only talking about less than 30,000 square kilometres - we have to be prepared to defend ourselves.

So I do not see any major changes in our Reserve system for the years to come, but I do see changes in terms of reduction of numbers, using more sophisticated weaponry so we would not need too many people actually on the front line. I think the military will be reduced a bit, but again every Israeli after the age of 21 until 40 will have to know that, if a crisis comes, he will have to be called into the Army and do his job for his country.

Thank you very much, and I will be prepared to answer questions later on.

GENERAL SCHLUP:

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I am surely delighted to speak to such a distinguished audience. I am sorry that I cannot answer the question about my duties in naval affairs, this is a top secret issue as we have a navy which seems to be completely stealth technology. We don't know where it is. But to have some evidence about naval functions or affairs, today in St. Louis we have the roll-out of the very first FA-18. And you know that the FA-18 is a United States naval airplane and our conditions in Switzerland are kind of aircraft carrier conditions, so we feel a little bit naval-like.

I would take this opportunity here to express our deepest gratitude to the Canadian Air Force because when we went through evaluation and testing of a new jet fighter - we had it done between F-16 and FA-18 - we had great support from the Canadian Air Force. In an unbureaucratic manner they did support us from Germany and your present Chief of Defence Staff, General Boyle, did even come for a hearing in our Parliament; and your present Commander of the Air Force, General de Quetteville, did also help us very heavily.

Coming to my topic, I will start by answering your first question, the answer is yes. What is the question? The question is: does Switzerland have an army? Yes, it has one. Not an active army, a total Reserve-type army. But sometimes we are asked: where is Switzerland? Switzerland is here (pointing to map) in the centre of Europe.

You know that Switzerland is a federalistic and multilingual country. We have four official or national languages.

Let me give you some basic figures about our nation: population: 7,037,800; languages: German 64%, French 19%, Italian 8% and Romantsch 1%. I think you also know that Switzerland is a neutral country. This is our political stand for a long time, and also the reason for our Militia-type army. I don't know whether you know when our neutrality did start here - the reason to be neutral. I don't know whether you can read it so I will read it here: (Cartoon Slide) "Okay men, are you ready to march into battle for some political dogma, to keep a handful of rich guys in

power?" The moment the Swiss decided on neutrality.

I would like to speak about some key elements of our defence system. First of all, we have a conscript system; under our Constitution every male Swiss has to [perform] military service. There are a few exceptions. When somebody can prove conscientious reason or religious reason he might be excluded from military service, but then he has to [perform] a civilian type service, one and a half times as long as the military service.

The basic principles, or key elements, of our Militia system are that we draw from the main population, but for women it is optional. We have high numerical strength of our Army: we have strength in mobilization of some 400,000 men and women. We have almost no professionals or active forces. We have a few pilots, a surveillance wing, of some 40 to 50 active pilots, and our commanders up from the Division level are professionals. Then those people who maintain our fortresses and our equipment are professionals; but most of them are in civilian clothes, federal employees who are not military men.

An important element of the short tours of duties I will come (to) in more detail to this question.

We have besides these short periods of service, some off-duty obligation; and we take as much advantage as we can. We try to use their professional skills and to put them in the same function in the military. It needs to have a very good mobilization system so that we can have our Armed Forces at all times ready.

Our military service consists of a basic training school for everybody of 15 weeks and normally then refresher courses, three weeks each, every second year; for some branches, every year, a two-week refresher course. With that we try to fulfil our training and our function.

The military age starts with the age of 20 and ends at the age of 42. When the duties are over, then each one has to change to the civil defence and serve another ten years there. Totally, we come for a soldier of roughly one year of military service; for officers, lower rank, roughly two years; and higher rank roughly three years.

To teach and educate our leaders we have a system of technical courses, leadership courses, on-the-job training, and refresher courses to fulfil the various functions of various levels all through the military life. This is not spent as military service, (but as) off-duty obligations.

Every Swiss has always to be available, so he has to report. He cannot go abroad for a long period without having (permission of) the government. He has to go every year for shooting exercise with rifles; and by the way, these shooting exercises are also done abroad. We have in Canada six to eight Swiss Rifle Associations, associations which complete the same exercises as in Switzerland.

Then there are inspections of personal equipment. I think also you might have heard that each Swiss military man takes his own equipment home after basic training school and maintains it and keeps it for his military life. This includes an assault rifle and ammunition. So we have, spread out in our country, some 600,000 to 800,000 weapons: rifles, pistols and assault rifles. We

are often asked about the crime situation. We have some crime, sure, but only very few are done by the military weapon.

Now to our mobilization system. This has to be very carefully and thoroughly prepared, so each military man knows where to go in the case of mobilization. He goes there with his full equipment. When he leaves his home he is equipped to fight when it is necessary. We have prepared (messages) announcing mobilization by mail, by TV, by radio, whatever. We have prepared unit assembly areas nearby to the equipment of the unit: tanks, artillery guns - whatever is needed - and we also have prepared stocks, supplies, and the Op plans for a first deployment of the Armed Forces. We are able, when we have some warning time, to mobilize our total Army within 48 hours.

The framework in which we see our Swiss Army; first, the goals of our nation, which are:

Security Policy Objectives

Peace in Freedom and Independence
Maintenance of Freedom of Action
Protection of the Population and its Basic Needs
Defense of the National Territory
Contribution to International Stability (mainly in Europe)

Our Army is part of these objectives (and must) fulfil or achieve the objectives. We have set down our security policy in a kind of White Book in 1990, just when everything changed in the world, and especially in Europe. This is also the reason that we call it the "Swiss Security Policy in Times of Change". Here are the elements of our security policy, and you see our Armed Forces as just one element of the total security policy, but the most important one. There's no question about it.

We have a very well developed civilian defence system. We have more than 90 per cent of our population in protected places. We have prepared organizations to help when anything should happen, a crisis or whatever, or war.

The mission of the Army within the security policy is three-fold. First of all, promotion of peace. We also share missions of the United Nations, although we are not a member of the United Nations, but we provide other help. As you know, Geneva is a very important international place so we try to protect it as much as we can.

Then the main mission is prevention of war or defence at the [borders and inwards]. Finally, also, supporting our civilian authorities when there is a need in times of disaster or of any kind of internal danger.

Our Armed Forces are organized with the political level up with the Minister of Defence, the government and the Parliament - and, above all, the people. The people have the last say, and also in military or defence matters; so we had during the last five or six years some major

referendums or initiatives. In '89 we had to vote about a referendum to abolish the whole Swiss Armed Forces. It was rejected. In '93 we had to vote about buying a new jet fighter, the FA-18. It was opposing to buy a new one. It was rejected. In '93 we had to vote whether to create a Blue Helmet Battalion - that was also rejected. But sometimes you also accept something.

The general staff has to translate political goals into military requirements, and then these requirements are executed by the Land Forces, by the Air Force and by the Support and Procurement Department. We have controlling and feedback and this is a kind of a circle [process].

The organization of our Army [has a] headquarters with some direct subordinated units, the Air Force and four Army Corps, [three field army corps and one mountain army corps]. Due to the threat of today which is multiple, we have created some quick-reacting elements like an infantry regiment to protect our capital, Bern, and an airfield defence battalion to protect our international airport in Zurich.

The equipment of our Armed Forces I would say is quite remarkable and also quite up-to-date. We will have soon 34 FA-18s. We have the most dense self-propelled artillery system in Europe. We have 580 M-109s. You can see here it is quite remarkable equipment which is all ready to serve in a mobilization case.

Key Figures of the Swiss Army 95

187 Combat aircraft (34 F/A-18, 102 Tiger II/F-5E, 51 Mirage III)
87 Transport helicopters (15 SUPER PUMA, 72 Alouette III)
742 Battle tanks (186 Pz 68, 186 pz 68/88, 370 Pz 87 Leo 2)
507 AIFV (M-113 versions)
836 APC and AIFV look-alike (M-113 versions)
1308 Towed and SP artillery pieces and mortars (100 mm calibre and above) (216 10555 mm gun 46, 558 155 mm SP How M-109) (402 120 mm mortar 87, 132 120 mm SP mortar 64)
30 AVLB (armoured vehicle launched bridges)
303 ATGM (TOW PIRANHA)
2700 AT Missiles (DRAGON)
7 AD Regt (35 mm guns with skyguard)
810 Air defence guns 20 mm
1 SAM Regt (BLOODHOUND)
56 SAM (Rapier)
hundreds SAM (Stinger)
2000 demolition sites
4000 permanent obstacles
400,000 Men in 48 hours

When we need to deploy our Armed Forces for defence we have an advantage: that's our terrain with Euro mountains and Alps that makes for a good defence, and we would deploy our Armed Forces in a kind of flexible, dynamic defence according to the threat. The old concept, when we

had the east/west threat, was that we were mainly oriented out to the east.

Finally, we are sure that, as we face a very diversified threat scenario, we don't think to mobilize the total Armed Forces. We try to have a concept of some units for immediate need. As I mentioned, the regiments for Geneva or Zurich or Bern, or disaster relief, only go for a partial mobilization according to the kind of threat, for instance, to protect our borders in times of large numbers of refugees. So we have set a concept which would help us to face any threat with an equivalent force.

We are sure that a Militia-type and Reserve-type Army has also disadvantages, such as the short period of training time. We try, as I mentioned, to use the civilian skills as much as possible. We try to modernize our training with all kinds of simulations, but this would be a critical element of our system. When we should have a major threat like it was in the Cold War time then we would need for sure some time to bring up our readiness for war, our armies as well.

I am sure we are also in a situation to find our way. In Europe we are not a member of EEA, we are not a member of European Economical Area, we are not a member of NATO or Partnership for Peace. Will we be a member, will we not? Those are questions which are asked today and to which we have to find a solution in the coming years. But I hope, when something would happen, that we could answer like it was answered in 1912 when we had a large-type exercise, and we had a guest, the Emperor of Germany. He asked a soldier: what would you do when you would be attacked by Germany and outnumbered ten times as the Swiss Army? The Swiss soldier said: very easy, Emperor, we would shoot ten times.

Thank you very much.

COLONEL HAGEMAN:

Generals, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, I feel very honoured that I was given the opportunity to brief you in the next 15 minutes or so on the future structure of the Dutch Armed Forces of which the new Reserve component will be an important part. I say "new" because until now the Netherlands only had a small reserve component in the sense of the word, called the National Reserve.

During the Cold War period its tasks included defence of national vital objects, such as bridges, depots, guarding duties, host nation support, and assistance to the civilian authorities, including disaster relief.

I recognize that this is not the best time of the day to give a presentation, but I will do my best and try to keep you awake with a few slides. I will brief you on the new Dutch philosophy on flexible force and on the latest developments in our new policy concerning Reserves.

After the introduction I will briefly explain the old situation, as it was during the Cold War, followed by the transition phase in which we are now, and what must lead to the new situation in the years to come.

I said "being a small country." That's true, but I am proud to tell those of you who don't know that the Netherlands has contributed almost 2,100 soldiers to IFOR in the former Yugoslavia, and apart from a vessel in the Adriatic Sea we contributed almost for two years with a full squadron of 18 F-16s over there.

First, the old situation. The old situation was during the Cold War. The Netherlands Armed Forces were organized in such a way that they were thought capable to defend their assigned areas in the North German Plain. The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union around the end of the Cold War - did this influence the Dutch Armed Forces? Yes, it did, mainly by shrinking budgets. This led to down-sizing the numbers which subsequently forced restructuring and reorganization of the Forces. This process was enhanced by the fact that, though the imminent threat from the east exist larger ethnic differences, nationalism, and the turbulent path of reforms, not only in Europe, but as it seems, in all regions around the world, required an adapted approach, more flexibility and more out of area.

NATO, the United Nations, and other organizations are now confronted with unpredictable regional conflicts of which the nature, magnitude and the location can vary for each situation. With a smaller budget we have to adapt to this new situation.

The latest Dutch White Paper dates from 1991. Since that time it has been amended two times. The reason for this was that the world has seen more rapid and more dramatic changes than could have been foreseen at that time. Now that the threat of an all-out war has disappeared (at least that is assumed for the next coming years), the Dutch defence organization will be presently reduced from almost 130,000 military and civilian personnel in 1990 to approximately 70,000 in 1998. For some of you these numbers might seem very small; but remember that the Netherlands has only 16 million inhabitants.

A major change was the government's decision to change from an Armed Force consisting of a mix of volunteers and conscripts to an all volunteer force. The obligation to enlist will be suspended. The last batch of conscripts was called up last fall. So, roughly by the end of this year the four Dutch armed services: (army, navy, air force, and what we call the military police) will consist entirely of Regular military personnel serving on a voluntary basis. However, conscription itself will not be officially abolished, which means that conscripts can still be called up should the international security situation dictate so.

The aforementioned governmental decision has the greatest impact on the Royal Netherlands Army. Even during the Cold War period the Navy and the Air Force organizations were manned with a very low percentage of conscripts. The Army, on the other hand, was thus far in peacetime no more than a training school, solely preparing for the defence in the framework of the Alliance against a large-scale threat.

The main task of the Regular Forces of the Army, the backbone, was to train conscripts for all-out war. With almost no reaction time, the aim was to establish an operational Dutch Army Corps, in the North German Plain. That was the situation of the Royal Netherlands Army as it was until a few years ago.

In the new situation, without conscripts, down-sizing numbers, and still the requirement to cope with a broad spectrum of operations ranging from peace, via all types of peace operations, regional conflicts, up to Third World War like-scenarios, there is a firm need to establish some Reserve structure. The Army is conducting a pilot study. The Navy and Air Force may follow this, although there is a lesser need for those two services.

This new situation required another approach toward the composition of the Army (in effect, the conceptual approach, how the Army has changed). In the past we had the tendency to consider our Army consisting of an active component that would be augmented by a mobilizable component in case of a severe threat to our security only. Now we look upon the Army as being a whole entity of combat potential in the hands of our government which, for economical reasons, is not manned by all regular, active duty soldiers. More than half of this potential will have a Reserve status in normal circumstances. When I say "Regular soldiers" I mean those regulars for an unlimited period - let's call them career soldiers - and Regulars for a limited period, soldiers with a contract for a number of years. The active component, consisting of 26,500 regular soldiers and 10,500 civilians, forms the base force, which is structured in such a way that it is able to assure the continuity of the Royal Netherlands Army, and that it has the capability to participate in an, albeit limited, number of operations. A Reserve component of 45,000 Reservists adds to the flexibility of this base force and enables the Army to deploy its full operational capabilities.

The base force forms the core which takes care of generating personnel for the Reserve component. It is expected that, in many events, at least a few volunteer Reservists will be involved. Depending on the type and duration of the commitment, more or less Reservists may be involved. The moment might arrive that the government will have to take the decision that Reservists will be called out on a compulsory basis. The aim, however, is to have an adequate or at least a large number of Reservists who will augment the Forces on a voluntary basis in case they are needed. In this respect it is important to realize that the availability of Reservists, similar to volunteer Regular soldiers, is subject to market conditions. Essential is the development of good training programs and a program for employer support. The legal status will be adapted as well. A parallel approach toward the Reservists themselves and their employers is required.

In the near future we identify two ways of becoming a Reservist. The majority of the Reservists will be emanating from Regular soldiers who have been discharged from military service at the end of their contracts. To adjust the number and quality of the Reserve component we will seek, on top of that, people who volunteer to be a Reservist without having been a Regular soldier. We are thinking, for instance, of personnel who, on the grounds of their qualifications in civilian society, would be excellently educated (and suited) to playing a role in the Armed Forces, or who would simply like to be a Reservist. These categories of Reservists will be trained in their free time, for instance weekends, evenings and school holidays.

In the transition period, in which we are now, until we have generated sufficient Reservists according to the aforementioned system, we will have to avail ourselves of former conscripts to provide our Reserve units with personnel. Although the obligation to enlist will be suspended by

January 1, 1997, the framework law of conscription which has been sent to Parliament last July has provisions to ensure the timely availability of conscripts on long leave. We expect this transition phase to last until the second half of the next decade.

Once a Reservist there are different levels on which he or she can play a role. These different types of Reservist, which range more or less from the person who has a normal civilian job and only has an assignment notification at home, to the on-call Reservist, let's say that is a soldier who was dismissed after his contract has finished and he takes an obligation for a year or so to be on call if he is needed.

A Regular Reservist is assigned for the job he had as a Regular. As longer military reaction times allow us to retrain these Reservists during the activation operation, no training in peacetime will be required. The only way they notice being a Reservist is that they receive an assignment notification.

An Active Reservist voluntarily takes on the obligation to participate in training activities, which makes him/her eligible for assignment to key positions. In the National Reserve all Reservists, ranging from soldiers up to officers, participate in a training program of approximately 100 to 200 hours per annum. This situation has always existed and still exists today.

Any Reservist, holding an assignment or not, can be asked to participate in crisis management operations on a voluntary basis whenever the need occurs. Those volunteers are recruited from the whole Reservist Corps. For a number of functions, which we foresee to be required quite frequently, pools will be formed of reservists who will be prepared for their assignment in advance; examples are medical personnel, interpreters, lawyers, UN observers, etc. All of the obligations - I

did not mention them all - are taken voluntarily, but that does not mean that one will not be committed to their promises. Legislative measures will be taken to give this a legal base. Furthermore, it seems fair that their employers will be compensated as well.

By the end of this year the last conscripts will leave the Army. They will be available for manning the Reserve component until about 2005, after which the new system must be in place.

For the activation times of the different Reserve categories, we assume reaction times from 15 days up to six months. Activation plans, as well as training plans, are developed in broad lines, but have to be worked out in detail. Last year a pilot project within a mechanized brigade was started. Many problems were encountered, but also many solutions were found.

Essential for the success of the new approach is a good understanding and full cooperation of operational commanders. They should make clear what functions will be available for the Reserves. They must organize relevant training and educational programs, if possible custom tailored. Reservists must be involved in the unit and use of them must be made in case Regulars are not available. For instance, don't let a Deputy Commander command the unit if a well trained Reserve is available.

With regard to training it is worth to mention that, as was the case during the Cold War, the same

equipment as the Regular Force has is in stock available for the Reservists. That has been the case always and still will be the case in the near future.

I would like to conclude with the following: the Netherlands has always devoted considerable attention and contributed substantial funds to the Reserve component of its Army. It is therefore that we have a mobilization system we are proud of: on the one hand, enabling us to have a cost-effective peacetime organization, and on the other hand complying with NATO's requirement to field an Army corps within a very limited period of time. With the flexible force concept we aim at achieving a method of fielding as much combat potential as in the actual situation as needed, while maintaining the principle of being as cost-effective as possible, a flexible force so to say.

The actual implementation of this concept requires a step-by-step approach. Working with this concept means not only making a mental switch for people within and outside the Army, but quite a lot of laws and regulations will have to be adapted as well.

In addition, an employer support program will be set up. Organizations might have to be adapted, and above all we will have to gain quite a lot of experience with the new system.

Without having, by any means, been exhaustive with reference to our new policy system I nevertheless hope I have given you some impression of the process in which we are involved now. I thank you for your attention.

PLANNED FORCE STRENGTH AFTER RESTRUCTURING

- RNL NAVY PEACETIME; 17.300
- WARTIME; 21.000
- RNL ARMY PEACETIME; 37.000
- WARTIME; 65.000
- RNL AIRFORCE PEACETIME; 13.500
- WARTIME; 18.400
- RNL MIL POLICE PEACETIME; 3.600
- WARTIME; 4.500
- TOTAL PEACETIME; 71.400
- WARTIME; 108.900

QUESTION PERIOD

MR. RICHARD: Pierre Richard, Logistics Association. I have a question that I leave you to decide who is going to answer. Related to the logistic infrastructure, in your military organization do you have Reservists in logistic organization, or do you in fact have civilian contractors? If so, what is the percentage between civilian and contractors?

GENERAL SCHLUP: We base our logistical system on a governmental base. We have stocks,

we have our maintenance plans and so on. Only when there would be no chance to do it in governmental base we would probably refer to a private enterprise. But after mobilization we should be able to achieve all the needs by the organization we have in our Army.

MR. YERUSHALMI: In Israel it is done completely by the military. There are Regular units of the soldiers who are between the ages of 18 to 21 who usually do this, who are paid soldiers in the Army, they make the Army as their living, and of course some of it by the Reservists themselves. But it is completely military, no civilians.

COLONEL HAGEMAN: As I have briefed you, we are in a transition phase and at the moment we don't really have a Reserve component, but as in Canada you hear the same phrases in Holland: efficiency, decentralization. So we are in the process of privatizing things, not as much as possible, but we study each subject. Where it is cheaper to privatize we will probably do that, and we have done that already.

MR. RICHARD: I have another question. This one is not related to logistics, but what I call personnel administration.

I would like to know, in your Armed Forces if in fact, in general terms, there is a huge difference between a Reservist and a Regular in terms of pay and benefits. Let me explain. In Canada, for example, we have a pay scale for Reservists and a pay scale for Regulars. In industry, for example, in Canada, if you have a person who works eight hours they are paid eight hours, whether it is a part-time or full-time employee. I would like to know [about this], in your Armed Forces, in terms of personnel benefits in general and pay in particular?

MR. YERUSHALMI: In Israel the system is very, very simple. A soldier who is in the compulsory Army, the three year service, gets a certain salary, which is usually a very low salary because he is at the age of 18 to 21. A Reservist gets his salary from the Army. It's the same salary he gets in civilian life, the same salary that he reports to the Israeli income tax authority, that is what he is going to get. If somebody has a business and he tries to sneak around Israeli income tax he may lose money when he is in military service.

GENERAL SCHLUP: In the Swiss Army there are very few professionals concerned. They have a normal salary, as everybody whether he is a government employee or a civilian employee. As far as military people or Reservists or the Militia men are concerned, they have a very small amount of money. Each day they spend in military service you could speak of pocket money, a soldier gets six Swiss francs a day, a Captain 12 Swiss francs, and a Major-General 25 Swiss francs.

In addition to this we have a kind of a social security system. We call it compensation; this gives an additional money for one month, according to the family status, for probably 1,500 to 2,000 Swiss francs.

Now comes something very peculiar, I think, for our system. When we go for refresher courses -

three weeks normally - then the company, the employer goes on to pay the salary for those who are in the military service, but pay to them this compensation money. Let's say an average employee earns 4,000 or 5,000 Swiss francs a month, the company pays this and gets probably 1,500 Swiss francs only.

This is an important element of our whole system - that our economy is sharing our Militia system. But it is also a very positive element that our defence expenditures are rather low because we have not to pay high wages of salaries.

COLONEL HAGEMAN: In Holland conscripts are paid less than Regulars. But if they are called up after they have left the Army and they are in civilian jobs, after they are called up for a refresher training for let's say a couple of weeks, then the government will pay the same as they would have got from their employer.

SPEAKER: Would you just refresh my memory and give me some figures on the percentage of GNP that is being spent on defence? And also I believe that one of the problems is currently a high inflation rate. If you could briefly comment on that?

For Switzerland, I am quite impressed that the Swiss in Canada are doing their annual rifle classification - with these assault rifles, I guess. Can you just tell me whether it is the individual or the government who is going to register those under our new laws?

MR. YERUSHALMI: To answer your question concerning Israel, it is around 25 per cent of our total budget. That is what we have in terms of what we spend on security. It doesn't affect too much our inflation because it is already very much into our economical structure, the amount that we put on defence issues. We hope that this will change as the peace process progresses so we can put more of our budget on civilian matters.

GENERAL SCHLUP: I might answer his question about the registration of weapons. Sure, these people are Canadian citizens and they have to follow the laws of your country. I have to tell you this gives me personally some concerns, because they were used to provide or to execute these shooting exercises with carbines, which is an old weapon. This is no problem, but also with an assault rifle, an IG-90, which is the civilian version. You cannot shoot automatic fire and this is, I think

now, for people under new law, if I am right, just recently; and there are some associations which have bought a number of these rifles for quite a lot of money, so they are not very happy. Being the Defence Attaché in Canada I would be happy when they could continue under all the safety rules to perform their off-duty activities. Sure they are Canadian citizens, but still adhere to our traditions, and we would be happy when that could go on. But I am not allowed to interfere in your laws, that's quite true.

MR. CODE: Thank you, General. Maybe I could ask one more. General Schlup, you mentioned that in Switzerland instead of being conscripted it is possible to perform alternate civilian service, but only in certain approved service, I assume. I know the Czechs do the same. But how about your other two countries, Israel and the Netherlands; do you allow alternate service?

MR. YERUSHALMI: In Israel there is no alternate service except for women soldiers who are allowed not to be part of the Israeli Army from the age of 18 to 20. Women are supposed to be in the Army for two years. These women who do not want to enter the Israeli Army can do two years of service, and it is called national service and it is usually done in schools and hospitals and development towns all over Israel.

COLONEL HAGEMAN: We offer also alternate services for those who refuse to join the Armed Forces. It is not easy to refuse and to stay away, but it is possible, especially when you don't like to join because of your beliefs, your religion.

PANEL DISCUSSION: THE ROLES OF THE RESERVES AND THEIR VALUE TO CANADA

CMDRE. ROBERT N. BAUGNIET; Commander of Naval Reserve
DR. DESMOND MORTON; McGill University
LGEN. (RET'D) W.A.B. ANDERSON;
BGEN BARRY CURLEY; Senior Communications Advisor
MGEN (RET'D) LIONEL BOURGEOIS; Moderator

COMMODORE BAUGNIET:

I am going to start, since I did this morning, with a little joke because Paul Hayes was going to do this, but unfortunately he ran out of time. This is a story that is attributed to the Honourable Barney Danson, and it is about bravery.

It is about three General officers, Army, Air Force and Navy, standing there discussing who has the bravest of their group. The Air Force General says, "Well obviously it's a pilot and I will prove it to you." He takes the other fellows out to Cold Lake and he says, "Here is my absolute best pilot. He is going to take this F-18 up to 35,000 feet. I am going to be in radio communication with him, I am going to tell him to point its nose down to the ground and only when I tell him to pull out will he do so."

So sure enough this smart, good looking young officer gets in the aircraft, takes it up to 35,000 feet, points the nose down; the General is sort of chatting with the other fellows, the plane is getting closer and closer, and at the absolute last minute the General says, "Pull out." The F-18 pulls out, scorches the grass - it's that close to it - and the Air Force General turns to the Army and the Navy fellow and says, "Now that, gentlemen, is what I call bravery."

At that point the Army General says, "Well, I want you to come to Gagetown with me because I can show you the epitome of bravery." There is this RSM, moustache bristling, pace stick under his arm, boots shined, pants pressed immaculately. The General says, "I want you to stand there, RSM, and you will not move. That tank half a mile down the road is going to come at you and you will not move; but I'm in communication with the driver of the tank and at the last minute I'm going to say "Turn".

Sure enough, the RSM stands there, the tank comes trundling down, all tons of it, the RSM doesn't move, and at the last minute the General says, "Turn", and the tank pulls out of the way, the air causing the moustache to flutter slightly in the breeze. "That", says the Army General, "is bravery."

Well the Admiral says, "Gentlemen, that is really impressive, but I want you to come to Halifax with me and see one of the new Canadian patrol frigates and I am going to show you an example of classic naval bravery."

So they get to Halifax; there is this ship alongside, a mast 150 feet above the water level, and the Admiral says, "Bloggins", and this somewhat disreputable sailor who needs a haircut, his breath smells a little bit of last night's rum, and comes says, "Yep". The Admiral says, "Bloggins, up to the top of that mast and stand rigidly to attention at the top of it." Bloggins does that. When he's up there the Admiral yells up to him and says, "Jump", and Bloggins says, "Are you out of your mind?"

Bug off." At which point the Admiral turns and says, "And that, gentlemen, is bravery."

I mention that because I intend to be a little provocative this afternoon. I don't know how many of you saw the movie *Pretty Woman*, but in a certain scene there is Richard Gere in a bathtub with Julia Roberts and at a given point in time he says, "I'm angry and it cost me \$10,000 in psychiatric counseling to now be able to say 'I'm angry'." I feel that way because we have one of the best systems and organizations in this country. We have young men and women, as I alluded to earlier, who deserve the very best, and we are almost ignoring them, and we're not helping them.

When I look at what the Reserves offer - and I'm not going to talk about the Reserves offering to the military, in that narrow sense: I want to talk for a few minutes on what the Reserves offer to Canadian society, because they offer an incredible amount. You have all seen the various presentations that have been made, where we break down what a Reservist means to industry, where we have people who are trained in handling hazardous goods, where we have people who are training in leadership, where we have people with discipline and a sense of responsibility, of loyalty, and we can do fabulous things with Reservists in industry.

In the community I would be hard pressed to find people serving in Reserve and Militia organizations who in and of themselves are not members of Boy Scouts, Guides, Big Brothers, Boards of Trade, service clubs, St. John Ambulance, the Corp of Commissioners - they are involved in all of them. The Reservists' contribution to Canadian society is incredible and good.

We have also managed at times to appeal to the community. In 1984 a certain City Councilor in Toronto was so impressed by the then SYEP that we were able to get \$20,000 from the City of Toronto to augment the number of people that we had at (HMCS) York's Summer Youth Employment Program. In 1995 we did it again. In other words, the municipal government gave to the Department of National Defence \$20,000 so that we could expand the number of young people that we train. The City of Toronto followed up. That program only lasted two years. Why? Because we didn't follow up.

Every year - and you've heard November 11th, Battle of Atlantic, Battle of Britain - who does everybody in the community turn to for military representation and to add a bit of history and dignity to the program? They turn primarily to the Reserves and the Militia. Have we ever gone back to the communities and said, "If you don't support us, next year we won't be here"?

I'm angry because after all these years - and Canada has a phenomenal history of the Militia, the Reserves, of what it has done for this society - we even have to have a debate today as to: is there

a value? That makes me angry, it makes me upset.

It makes me really angry that one of our resolutions at CDA is to determine whether or not the Canadian Forces Liaison Council is even going to continue. My God, that's a no-brainer; but yet we are going to spend time and energy and money making sure that at least somebody pays some attention to whether or not the Canadian Forces Liaison Council continues with its job. In its early days I had questions about whether it was going to be effective or not, and today I am proud to say that I am a great supporter of it in any way that I can.

Therefore I would suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen - and I know we are running a little late in the afternoon - it is my contention that the Reserves: Army, Air Force and Navy have, and will continue, to make a major contribution to Canadian society; and in any way, shape or form to diminish them or dilute them would be a mistake. To be terribly parochial, let me make one observation, and this is a straight pay basis. The Naval Reserve pay budget, divided by 30 million Canadians means that the average Canadian pays \$1.03 per year to have a Naval Reserve. This package of cigarettes represents four Reservists.

Thank you.

DR. DESMOND MORTON:

Gee, when Bob Baugniet raised the cigarette package and said, "That's four Reservists", I remember going on manoeuvres back in the '50s and somebody held up a gas rattle and said, "That's a machine gun." The mind boggles.

You know, you prepare a speech well in advance and then the guy who is the Chair gets up and tells you to say something different. What can I say? I will keep it. I'm a professor, I might be able to use it again.

I don't know why you invite historians and then somebody else does his work and I'm not allowed to talk about the past, which is the only thing I have the faintest idea of: not much, a little bit. The future I don't know at all.

You know, we all look back on our predecessors. "How come he didn't do a right flanking when we know they were all over there on the left waiting for him?" They are so stupid, our ancestors. Yet our own future looks so puzzling? How many people predicted? Certainly nobody in NDHQ was writing in the last major White Paper in '87 that the Berlin Wall was about to collapse. But then nobody predicted the Great Depression either, I mean the one in 1990, or for that matter the one in 1929. The future is very puzzling and confusing and uncertain.

That, folks, is of course why we buy insurance. It used to be said of Canadians that we bought more insurance than anyone else. I don't know that we still do, because we are so busy cashing policies. We have been told we have been put on early retirement, and it's about time we lived off of our savings, right? That is what the country has been doing.

We were told, of course, when the Wall came down and the Cold War was over, that we would have a peace dividend. I remember listening to politicians saying that in the summer of 1990. I was reading an article by a fellow called Meirshimer who teaches at the University of Chicago who was explaining that now we were in a much more dangerous world. As I put the magazine down the television was telling me about Saddam Hussein and Kuwait and another war.

We live, in fact, in a much more dangerous world, a multi-polar world. The trouble is for Canada that Canadians are not crazy; we're forgetful, we're indifferent, but we do have memories. One memory we don't have, that the Dutch do, that the Israelis sure as heck do, that the Americans do because there was a place called Pearl Harbour. For Canadians, however - I'm sorry, it would make our lives so much easier and clearer - but I also rejoice that there wasn't a Pearl Harbour; we have lived in a wonderfully innocent state, absolutely indefensible along our southern frontier. Only George Taylor Dennison of the GeeGees thought we could defend ourselves along there. After all, look at 3,000 Confederates, they managed to hold off the north. We have 3 million Confederates, 3 million Canadians, they had Robert E. Lee, we had George Dennison.

We live, however, in a dangerous world and it's all over the place now; and we need to be there because we are a wealthy country and we share responsibility with countries to make sure that crises do not grow out of control. We need Armed Forces that can represent Canada in those roles.

The Chairman reminded you that I also spend my time at McGill these days worrying about whether I will have a country to study. There is, I think, an understandable, very Canadian ban on thinking dangerous thoughts about what would happen if Canada dissolved. I will just say one thing. It seems to me my more conservative friends think that they can rescue Montreal. My more liberal friends, who are these days a bit more numerous - I am in academia after all - think that of course the Cree and the Inuit and the other people of northern Quebec will be saved. I say, "Well, you know, I have a son of military age and I have some doubts about him dying to save the Cree in northern Quebec" and they say, "Oh, you won't have to. They are such tough fighting people they will defend themselves." Nobody has told Matthew Coon Come this.

There are uses for the Canadian Armed Forces which we don't want to think about, even in this hall, because those thoughts are horrendous. Even thinking about them, as you know from the gathering in Montreal on Sunday, leads to talk about weirdoes, extremists, wild people - crazies testing the limits of free speech when they talk about the right of self-determination, the right to break up a country like Quebec.

These are crazy thoughts, my sovereignist friends tell me, but they are thoughts that create awful, nightmarish possibilities for military involvement; and the military traditionally have to think about nightmarish possibilities, because that's the business of armed force.

You have heard the values, and Bob Baugniet put them very strongly. I will just add for the record that I do know that the function of the Reserves is primarily to provide a mobilization base for major challenges, to support the forces that we send for smaller challenges, be they domestic like Oka, be they international like so many.

There is - and we all in this room know it and embody it and practice it - a role for the Reserves in citizenship, whether it's what we do for and with the people who join, for and with the communities which those units serve and belong to intensely.

There is also - and this goes back a long way - a certain value again. The man I deeply admire, Colonel Dennison, talked about how the only public spending that went down every concession road was Militia drill pay. Well, we have a more modern version, and it isn't the only public money that goes down every street and road in this country, but it's important; and that is very important to the people who otherwise show no interest in this - our elected representatives.

Finally - I'm not sure whether it's a value because it is highly ambiguous, and it is of long standing - it's that old debate between the PF and the militia, the Regulars and the Reserves that goes on in this room when the CDA meets, and nowhere more, I suspect, and no time more than this weekend, but which has gone on for a very long time; and which, let me tell you, is fun, it delights the audience - all fights do as long as nobody gets hurt on the sidelines. It prevents, it saves people from making tough decisions. After all, they say the guys in uniform haven't figured it out yet, we don't have to make a decision yet. In fact, we will make the best possible decision, we won't do anything. We will let them fight a little longer. Meanwhile let's turn back to something more interesting like, well, the Constitution.

Earlier today Chief Justice Dickson and his colleagues came and told you about how they see the near future. I am on record as thinking that I don't like the future very much. That seems to me a very rational way of approaching it. They found - and I think it explains to some degree the participation in this discussion - that the Navy, the Air Force, Communications have found roles for their Reserves. Pretty sensible roles, pretty rational roles, roles those elements are performing, can perform, will perform and are important that they are performed. There have been other really interesting and good suggestions about the ways the Reserves can, within those frameworks, do even more for a community that needs to be reassured of their utility in tough times.

The issue, of course, is with the Army's Reserve, the scores of tiny units, the fact of its political clout, the battle that has been going on subrosa for the past - well really for the past 127 years - and which goes on with increasing venom at present.

What do you do? I think that within the framework of anything I or anyone I have heard say about the future of this country, that a restructuring of the Army's Reserves makes as much sense as anything I have seen come out of a study of this country's defences. It is painful; and they have shrewdly, cleverly, neatly avoided being part of the specific pain, because it is only when you get down to specifics that you get the pain.

As a historian, what I am supposed to say when there is a threat to historic regiments and to communities which support them? The answer is that I will feel like hell if units which I or my family have known - and the Queen's Own, my great-grandfather started in in 1860. He almost didn't, incidentally: he was blackballed because he had served in the volunteer fire department.

The Queen's only, in those days, took the very best, and people who served their community in the fire brigade were considered below the salt.

My father's association with the Fort Garry Horse, which meant an enormous amount to him, and even my brief association with the Princess of Wales' own regiment in Kingston - if these fall victim to change I will feel pain, and you will feel pain when these things happen in your area of emotional connection. But they will happen. They will perhaps share the fate of historic Canadian regiments like the VICs in Montreal and the Winnipeg Grenadiers in Winnipeg, and I could go on; and they will share the fate of scores of British regiments of far greater history that also have been reorganized out of existence. The British, who invented the regimental system, as we know, have been vigorous in amalgamating and disbanding historic units, because they wanted to save the substance of the regimental spirit and not just its image.

If the Militia are going to be part of the front line of Canadian defences - and they don't belong anywhere else - a thorough organizational restructuring simply cannot be avoided. Patriotism also involves making sacrifices of institutions and values and memories for something more important. Of all the Reserves it is the Army's Reserve that needs restructuring the most, where it will cause the most pain, where the political defences are frankly the most defective, and where the political pressures can be exerted. But when military organizations depend on politicians and the pressures on politicians to survive they are not, in my opinion, going to be very good military organizations. That is why, knowing the unpopularity of taking that position, I have taken it because I think that's the right thing to do.

LGEN. WAB ANDERSON (Ret'd.):

The reason I would like to come here [is that there] is a whole audience there, I am led to believe, and I just wanted to see this subject from a different perspective.

You have really had the good word, starting with Nick Stethem, and going right through the program this morning and this afternoon. I have to ask myself: Why did Ben Shapiro ask this 80-year old dinosaur to come and contribute some thoughts to an audience that is saturated now with thoughts? I haven't altogether got the answer in my own mind, but in part I think it is because (I hope it is) my military life does really represent the whole cycle of what the Army has been through: through lack of funds, through the dirty '30s. When you think austerity is around the corner tomorrow, join me in history; as what it was like to believe you had a career in the military in the '30s.

Let me give you an example. When I got my commission in the Permanent Force I already had four years of Militia service under my belt. In the '30s there was only one Army, that is to say the Militia. It was the Army. The permanent Force, which I was about to join, had one role, and only one role, to ensure that the Militia was trained for whatever might come.

It came, and one of my main points I want to get across this afternoon, is that what came in 1939 came, engulfed us all, at a time when the Government of Canada was saying that we would never repeat what we did in 1914. The government was insistent that we had a role to play if war in Europe broke out, but we certainly wouldn't be sending a Canadian corps. They were adamant

about this. As an innocent 22 year old subaltern I guess I more or less believed that if they said that was it.

The years unfolded quickly; and in 1939, with only three years of permanent Force service under my belt, they mobilized two Divisions. By the time September was out, I was designated to become adjutant of an artillery regiment that I had never heard of because it didn't exist as a regiment in western Canada. I bought my ticket and went to Edmonton - they bought my ticket, okay? I got to Edmonton and here all the profound wisdom was that, while we were mobilizing as a unit, a regiment of the 1st Canadian Division, we clearly would not be going overseas in the foreseeable future. Well, time scales hastened and by December we were in the first flight of ships going to England.

The message I would deliver is that in that particular regiment in western Canada there were four batteries: one from Winnipeg, one from Regina, one from Edmonton and one from Trail, B.C. They had never been part of a single regiment before. The regimental headquarters had never existed until mobilization started, and yet piling into those trains in the cold December of '39, off-loading into those ships, going to England - and I am only unveiling for you one little sample of what went on throughout Canada - here before your eyes was a full-blown regiment. Not too many guns, but a regiment that could feed itself, could administer itself, understood the basics of military good order and discipline - how was that all possible?

It simply means that somebody must have done something right in the Militia, because you cannot put a whole Division on the ships in such short order unless there is a good order and military discipline somewhere in the realm that you can mobilize.

So my first point, ladies and gentlemen, is that if the role of the Militia is to be nothing else but to provide the basis on which rapid mobilization, if required, can take place, we must not go around trying to figure out how useless the Militia has become. We must exaggerate, if possible, the role that the Militia has in mobilization.

My next point is the impact that the military has on public opinion, and you have heard a lot about that today, understandably. For me, as a lifetime soldier, I would regard the militia as an indispensable contact with the Canadian public, the public's understanding of things military, the public's understanding of the motivation of young Canadians to join the Army, Regular or Reserve.

I would plead with those who see very little value in the Militia - because the bands have been disbanded, because there's not much about the Militia in the newspapers, because the small town armouries have all been closed - not to let that process go downhill to its ultimate conclusion. Rather, I would plead that everyone who has the interests of the Canadian Army at heart, be he Regular or Reserve, should be thinking of ways to impress upon the public that right within the communities are people with military motivation for the defence of the realm, and that they live in the communities.

In my military lifetime I have seen the Regular Army grow from the 3,200 it was when I was one of them, to the 87,000, or whatever it was, when I left. I have seen the Regular Army move from the communities in which they live to the isolated bases and camps across Canada where they live a secluded, monastic sort of life. If I were in the Regular Army today I would be thinking of every possible way to employ the Militia, to extend the communications network with the public that the Regular Army is obviously at a great disadvantage in trying to do.

My third and last point, Mr. Chairman, is that for someone who has lived the service life for as long as I have it doesn't take very long - just last night, to sniff around this hotel, and this morning, and to sense a real illness in our affairs which I am going to suggest to you is quite intolerable and one that has to be dealt with. I refer, as the Special Commission did in their afterthought, to the really quite unpleasant attitudes of some in the Militia to the Regular Army - reckoning the Regular Army is using its influential muscle at NDHQ to rig the books so that the Militia will inevitably wither on the vine, and those in the Regular Army who realize that tougher times are coming and that if we are to protect the Regular programs of which DNA policy is based, we are going to have to, reluctantly if you like, turn the thumbscrews more on the Militia.

I think that it's unmistakable. Jack Granatstein talked about it this morning. It really is unworthy of any of us, and if I were looking for just one example of how leadership really is effective in today's Army - and this issue of leadership is forever at the minds of the editorial writers - I would expect to see, if the Army is in healthy shape I would expect to see the Regular component, from the very top down, say to themselves, and to the Militia, "This is disgraceful and this has simply got to stop." I would expect to see the evidence of that leadership right across the realm, and I would retire once again to the quiet of Florida where I spend the winter, happy to think that the Regular component, from the top down, has got a message that there is a virus in the body and only those in the position of power and leadership can do something about it.

Thank you. BGEN BARRY CURLEY: Mr. Moderator, delegates, members of CDA, ladies and gentlemen, my name is Barry Curley, I am the Senior Reserves Communication Advisor and I thank the Moderator for the opportunity to make a few brief comments about the future of the communications world.

I don't have a prepared speech, obviously, from the invitation that was extended a little while ago, but I think there are some important points that I would like to communicate to you. Perhaps a little background first on who are the Communication Reserves.

The Communication Reserves are no stranger to change. Back 18 months ago we existed as a command - Communications Command. At that time there were seven other organizations that provided communication services. A decision was made, back at that time, that they would be integrated together and come up and form a new organization called Defence Information Services Organization, as we know it today, DISO.

That whole process itself brought about considerable change, that we had to restructure, realign, re-engineer our organization. What we did at that time was - we always felt in our organization,

Communications Command, that Total Force was an integral, critical objective that we had to work toward. For the last five or six years we have been establishing that one of our major objectives, is to try to integrate the Communications Reserves in our Regular Force, together, as a Total

Force. Everything has been basically pointed toward that, and if we ask: what is the role of the Communication Reserves, we would say it is there to augment our Regular Force counterparts. That is really what the philosophy has been; and as I said, change has been evolutionary and ongoing for the last five or six years.

The numbers [of] the Communications Reserve: we have 23 units across the country, roughly 2,000 people, and when I talk about change what I mean is that we have to seriously show that we are working toward Total Force. We can prove it with the statistics and the evidence that we have had. Of those 23 units five years ago they were all Communications Reserve units, all Comms people. Today we have six Total Force units out of the 23, and we have another four or five units that

are moving toward Total Force as well. When I talk about a Total Force unit I mean that we have taken a Regular Force communications squadron and a Reserve communications squadron and we have integrated together, and now we have a Total Force unit. That is the proof.

Over the course we have started it off slowly; we've got feedback of how well it is working, and we have continued to bring other units on line. Our feedback is that, from a cost-effectiveness point of view, this process is working extremely well. To compliment that, and to deal with change, we are faced with the whole area of technology changing in communications. Things at one time were fairly stable, but now with information technology, information management - and the Moderator a few minutes ago asked you how many people use the network, E-mail, et cetera - and we said no, the majority of people are moving towards information management techniques.

We have to provide that as a department. The ADM (DIS) has a responsibility, a mandate to do that. Through the Communication Reserves he is expecting that his COMM Reserves people, working in a Total Force concept, provide that service as well. So the types of things that our Reserves used to do very much have changed. When you go into a unit there are computers, we are working land management, we are training our people in developing skills as land managers. It's not the old COMM centres that we used to have. That's all been replaced.

We think there is value in that from a cost effectiveness/efficiency effectiveness point of view. That's where we're going. I think what is important also is that, if we are to get value for Reserves, not just our own COMM Reserves but all Reserves, the critical thing is that units must be provided meaningful tasks; and that has to come down right from the very first, right from the very top. Departments of the various organizations must determine what are the taskings that they want to assign their particular Reserves, and then it moves into what are the respective taskings that will be given individual units.

I think, in closing, that there is a very vital, important role for our Reserves, as well as all the

Reserves out there. From a cost-effectiveness point of view, to me that is the way that we have to move.

Thank you.

Question Period

MR. DAVID ROBINSON, Maritime Defence Association of Canada:

This Panel is entitled "Roles of the Reserves and their value to Canada", and if you will forgive me, without undermining the value of anything I have heard today - because I have heard an awful lot of stuff, and some of what I want to say has been alluded to - I think we have missed the point; because what the Reserve is is not about crunching a bunch of numbers and balancing budgets and convincing politicians and citizens that we should be loved, and it is not about Maritime coastal defence vessels, or C-7 rifles, or how many armouries we have. A Militia, whether it was from the very first day that the people who came over and founded New France decided that this place needed to be defended, to today, to tomorrow - the Militia and the Reserve is people, and they are special people because they are people who, every time they put on their uniform, a uniform that has a Canada flash on it, are saying not just that this country is a country that is worth believing in and is worth serving; but they, unlike most of their other citizens, are also, by putting on that uniform, affirming that this is a country that is worth dying for, even if you haven't been properly prepared to do so, and that is very special. That is what a Reserve was on the first day it was created, and that's what it will be regardless of how many politicians and how many Generals and Admirals ignore us and under-fund us and under-train us and under-equip us.

MR. BOURGEOIS: That's a good answer, what is the question?

MR. ROBINSON: If I may, you indicated when we started that you wanted a little bit of emotion, and I'm trying to give you some.

MR. BOURGEOIS: Go ahead, but not ten minutes worth, please I'm thirsty.

MR. ROBINSON: Those kind of special people I think deserve to be looked after; and in all of the discussion of what we are going to do to reform the Armed Forces, and what we are going to do to reform the Reserves, we have heard an awful lot about capabilities and we have heard an awful lot of rationalizing things, and I haven't heard an awful lot about looking after our people, and I haven't heard an awful lot about the support branches - the purple branches of the Armed Forces that generally are engaged in doing that. None of them have been represented up there on our distinguished shed podium today.

I am a Personnel Administrator, as well as being a Naval Reservist, and I happen to think that some of those things are awfully important. I happen to think that the kind of people that are in our Militia and in our Reserve deserve to be looked after. We just went through a rather

considerable struggle; actually to save my MOC from being eliminated entirely from the Naval Reserve. I'm not alone, because that is going on in all of the Reserves, and that is going on throughout the Regular Armed Forces as well.

What I would like to say is, if we are going to continue year after year - and I have been here for about six years now - to come up to these podiums and say, "Woe is us, we are not loved by the Canadian people; we are not loved by our politicians, perhaps we are not loved by our Generals and our Admirals", maybe it's about time - and forgive me, some people might be uncomfortable with a touchy-feely word like "love" - but I think if we had a little bit more talking about loving each other and loving our country right now it wouldn't do us an awful lot of harm. If we are not willing to demonstrate that we love one another and that we are willing to look after one another, whether it is through a divisional system or a support system or a personnel administrator, or whatever title you want to have it, then we perhaps haven't earned that respect and we haven't earned that love. I would echo the comments of those who have said, "We had better get our own house in order", and we had better not rationalize all of the emotion, and all of the love, and all of the caring, and all of what really at bottom matters about being a Naval Reservist before we start worrying about what the budget bottom line is.

Thanks very much, there isn't a question.

MR. BOURGOIS: There is a company whose motto is "Our product is steel, our strength is our people", That's basically what you are saying and we thank you very much for that statement.

I'm not sure the support groups have been left out, when one talks about Land, Sea and Air Reserves. They are there, but they have not been singled out and you have made a very good point. I would like to ask Des just to comment briefly on that.

DR. MORTON: I should have given the speech I was going to give. When they told me I had flat feet I was given two choices, join the Service Corps or get out, so I joined one of those purple organizations, and actually it was in the real speech, along with all the other Log and Admin and everybody else. Of course they are there.

There is a kind of devilish plot in Total Force that says: "Well, the Regulars should do the fighting. The Reserves can provide all those purple elements." I have opposed that and I'm sure people in this room would oppose that. That was one of the issues that came up because the Americans moved in that direction for practical reasons during the Gulf War, relying very heavily on Reserve-loaded TF units to do logistics, and finding great difficulty in mobilizing active combat units for what people thought at the time might be quite a serious war.

I don't think that's the way I want to see the logistics and support units go. I think that Total Force makes a lot of sense. I don't happen to think that dedicated equipment to one branch or another makes as much sense when you have a terribly short inventory and a great deal of difficulty adding to it. I think there should be, as the visiting foreign officers pointed out, a single Force approach to that element.

MR. KERNIHAN: Don Kernihan, Infantry.

Looking back in history - fairly recent history, 1965 to 1972 - we had quite a down-sizing then; and the story was then [that] we're going to take these units and amalgamate; them and all these little small units, we're going to make big units out of them. Then of course what happened is you kept cutting the funding; and the funding kept going down, until of course they became small units. Now, 30 years later, here we are and the same talk is going on that we are going to be taking these units, putting together, making big units, 300 to 350 strong. Is this just another step in the same direction of history? If so, what can we do to reverse this trend?

MR. BOURGEOIS: Well, I guess General Anderson did that study in '57. I don't think we can blame him for what happened in '65, can we, General? Seven years is enough to...

LGEN ANDERSON: You are very fortunate that I haven't got a copy of my report here, but it was in the days of national survival and how we should restructure the Militia to be as useful as it could be in national survival.

MR. LINDSAY: Maritime Defence Association.

A couple of the speakers have talked briefly about people not loving us, and I would like to make an observation. All of the distinguished panelists who have spoken to this group are older gentlemen with British sounding names. We are no longer that sort of country.

I'm a Commanding Officer of a Naval Reserve Division and it is my privilege to command some of Her Majesty's ships at sea. I have had a number of female officers, they have come from big, large, brown, white and yellow. If we want people to love us, and we want to be relevant to our society, this Association, as well as the military, had better mirror that. My observation is that perhaps some of our distinguished panelists should come from other genders and other places.

MR. BOURGEOIS: Your point is well taken. Let me just say, in my work with Air Cadets that we found it takes about 20 years - in the inner city of Toronto we have squadrons where you have difficulty finding somebody who is white on the squadron - but it takes us half a generation or more before we have young officers from that background. It's the same thing with this panel. I mean, if you do 38 or 43 or 25 years in the military you joined at an age when the country was more white and women didn't really have the place that they deserved in society. Your point is very well taken, and I will ask David Code in future years to ensure he puts some women and some younger sprogs up here.

MR. JIM BOYLE: LOG Association.

I also happen to be the President of the Army Cadet League of Ontario, and I would like to echo just a few of the observations in here.

One of the things that we have heard coming through here was the Student Militia Program that was in the past, and such a valuable asset to us as a training vehicle, and how Toronto had put funds into it. One of the very best things that we had going for us in the Militia to get young

people involved and to retain them and to work with them was killed. It's gone and it should come back.

I have also taught co-op education, where I had a military co-op program. I had them at the armouries but I took them to the school; and the school was like any other one, it wasn't particularly oriented towards the military. After they saw those young people at the school they were saying, "Why isn't there more of this? We don't get the support towards our youth." We think in terms of everything else, we don't get creative in thinking how we are going to make some of these things, and tradition can be creative if we go back and take a look at some things that have worked.

What also was alluded to by yourself and the Commodore is ownership: he was talking about the new ships and how that was driving their Naval Reserve to better things. The Militia has not had ownership of equipment for so goddamned long it hurts. I had equipment the first time I commanded that belonged to me; that space belonged to me. When I came back ten years later it had all gone, it was pooled, it belonged to somebody else and I had to beg for it. As a Commanding Officer I detested having to beg for things, and that is what has happened to us.

I commanded in the late '70s. I had equipment; things were on the upswing and then it just started to erode and it went away and away and away, and the unit that is now there has very little equipment to work with. It is all pooled some place else and they have to beg to be able to use it. I think these are things that our panel - and if you are sensing some emotion in here - again, we have to take a look at it. Ownership is a good pride-building instrument and we haven't had ownership in the Militia for a long time.

MGEN. L. BOURGEOIS: Thank you very much. Your point is very well taken.

MR. ED GOODMAN: This is a question. My name is Goodman and presently I am with the Queen's York Rangers - Canada's oldest regiment, notwithstanding Mr. Morton's views - but I did spend almost five years with Mr. Morton's father and commanded a squadron under him. My question is aimed at Professor Morton.

It is all very well, Professor, to shrug your shoulders and say, "What's all the fuss about? You lose a few regiments and you merge a few regiments like they did in Great Britain?" But some of us believe that the very future of the regiment, and what they contribute to the militarization of the country and to the unity of the country - because as we've been told, and as I have seen, they have a great number of new Canadians in their ranks - what happens if it is practically dead five years from now?

DR. MORTON: When a distinguished lawyer and skilled cross-examiner calls you "Professor" you know you're in trouble. Particularly when he also raises ancestral memories.

MR. GOODMAN: You raised them first, Des.

DR. MORTON: I do so because, when I went out and talked to people in the Reserves in Toronto and Montreal and Halifax, and I got the impression that somebody else raised earlier about a generation gap (and I apologize for being on the wrong side of it, but there's nothing I'm going to do about it), I intend to live a lot longer. I got the sense of people who were wondering about the significance of those many regiments that had distant traditions, that had lots of officers and not many people in the ranks, and people who, for example, had served in augmentation roles with the Canadian Forces abroad and at home and who wanted units that were real units, and who wanted to train with the people who would be in those units if they were needed, and who were asking real questions which I thought deserved real answers.

I spent a little time at another stage trying to find out what had happened to British regiments that were amalgamated and I found that they, in their amalgamated role, acquired old and new traditions; and very quickly, within a couple of years, they had developed an esprit de corps that resembled very closely the one that was before. Not, of course, the older members who remembered being in the old regiments; and when you had old comrades' gatherings they would of course condemn the government for doing in their unit. The people in those new units would of course be sympathetic, and they still very often had old connections; but their identity now was with their new unit.

Of course I am afraid that the government will do what it did in the '70s, and what it did in the '80s, and it will keep cutting the Militia, and they will be encouraged to because of the obvious absurdity of the structure of tiny units, company-sized regiments. If you can beat that, I think you have a case. I'm sorry, that's the point I take because I don't ever want to quarrel with Eddie Goodman for both legal and personal reasons, but I do.

MGEN. BOURGEOIS: Thank you very much. In that we are into distinguished lawyers, Major-General Bruce Legge.

MGEN. BRUCE LEGGE: I would certainly like to quarrel with Professor Morton, because if ever there was anyone who knows better it is Professor Morton. The reason we must have, Professor Morton, units of the Militia across the country is because you must have people who have been worthy of the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, have been trained to the level of a Lieutenant-Colonel, have had training by the Regular Force, have had successful experience in life, and can urge on their friends in the civil world, as well as in their betters in the Regular Force what their point of view is. It seems to me that the Conference of Defence Associations - and this is what I'm going to ask them to do - must go to the Government of Canada with the benefit of the great knowledge and patriotism and spirit and verve that has been conveyed to this afternoon by this august panel, and say to the Government of Canada, "For the reasons that we know as well as you do, Canada does not have one single Militia regiment to lose, and we want you to maintain in the Militia order of battle every unit that we now have so that there are spokesmen in the civilian community who know something about the military and will urge the case of the Militia, which is a military presence in the citizenry of the country, will urge the government to maintain that system". I am going to ask you: will they do that?

DR. MORTON: Well, the Association will do what the Association is going to do. How will the rest of society respond to that? I think that they will respond that it's the same old story, from

vested interests who have achieved status and rank who are trying to protect that status and rank when, to the outside eye, that status and rank looks a little excessive.

I know that there are people in this room - because they told me in the corridors - how important it is to get the number of General officers down. They are Regulars; there are too many [generals] and I agree, we have a kind of Spanish Army; only the Spanish Army is more realistic these days.

I think you have to look at the whole organization. To my mind a convincing blueprint was put before you. If you throw it down you will delight politicians who don't want a change, don't particularly care if the Militia is efficient, and don't want to offend prominent constituents, and I think you will have done a bad day's work.

MGEN. LEGGE: I have to tell Professor Morton that to have the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel or above in civilian life in this country is not an advantage; it is a disadvantage. It is almost as bad as being called a professor on the grounds that they are purely ethereal.

MR. KERNIHAN: Mr. Chairman, I was struck as I was listening to General Anderson, who was to me one of the greatest old soldiers that I have ever fought with - on the same side and on different sides. When he told us his experience of moving from eastern Canada to Edmonton to form this artillery regiment, what he was telling us was that in 1939 Total Force was working. The Regular soldiers, as he said, their main job then was only to serve the Militia. You get on with the job and in a matter of weeks the first Division was on its way.

This brings us to today, and I think we have made a lot of progress, and I think we are doing a lot of the right things. We are trying to grapple with making Total Force work in peacetime, in 1996. Our communications expert told us that progress is being made there.

I think that the Dickson Commission made two good recommendations when they said that augmentation, in spite of its problems and its weaknesses, is a good thing. But let's go a little further than we are doing and let's encourage the system to produce not individuals, not Private soldiers and Master Corporals and Lieutenants and so on, but sections and platoons. I suggest to the panel that this group urge those who have to make the final decisions to go even further. Why do we set up two kinds of brigades, a Reserve brigade and a Regular brigade? One, I understand, to be commanded by a Brigadier-General and the other by a Colonel. This, to me, is going along the same line, having first-class Brigades and second-class Brigades. Why not have Brigades? In those Brigades set up the number that we should have? It would be commanded in the initial instance by Regular soldiers, because they are the only ones that have the training. But if these composite brigades had a full battalion of Regular infantry and some composite battalions there would be a tremendous incentive for those Reserve soldiers to attain the standards so that they could be operational, and that - who knows - one of the whole units could be sent to Croatia, for example.

I believe this is what we need. This is what Total Force is all about, and today - for the last few years - we have had a need for Total Force in peacetime because we have had to have significant numbers of soldiers in the field. I believe we should recommend that they go ahead and at least

consider this concept.

MGEN BOURGEOIS: Thank you very much. Let me just sum up briefly. Then we'll get on with other things: we have all day tomorrow and Saturday - those of us in CDA and CDAI - to discuss these other items, and some of them really need some airing.

The first point - and what I detected from 8:30 this morning - is that the Commission has given us a useable document. With necessary adjustments, we should push and get on with. This has been brought up a number of times. The solution will only come out if the Reserves and the Regular Force, in these times when they are both short of money, stop the infighting and work the problem together.

The second message I get from all of you is our image across the country. What we can do for our country for unification. What our country can do for us in getting our Reserves the support they need. We have to get out and pontificate, and you can't count on the professional Public Affairs people to do it for you. I have been in that business, and I know. They have screwed up so much over the last while, including myself, that you have got to do the job yourself; your associations have got to get out there and do it; your Militia have got to get out to do it; your cadets have got to get out to do it. They have got to be seen, and they have to be seen in a good light. I think we have come to a couple of conclusions here today, which I hope will be discussed at the various drinking spots tonight and here over the next two days.

I would like to thank very much my three panelists, who have helped us tremendously; they have kept the thought process going; and I am glad we did get some of the emotion out. I would like to thank the CDAI for allowing us to do this today. Thank you.

**ADDRESS BY THE HONOURABLE
DAVID COLLENETTE, P.C., M.P.**

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

It is a great pleasure to be with you this morning for two reasons. First, in speaking once again to the Annual General Meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations, I am addressing an audience with a deep appreciation of the important role that the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces play at home and around the world. Your continued advice and support is crucial.

Second, I am happy to be here, because after two challenging years in Defence, to paraphrase George Burns, I'm happy to be anywhere. I also want to thank the CDA for its unwavering support of DND and the Forces, and for its expert advice on defence matters. I certainly encourage all members of the CDA to promote Canada's military. We must work together if Canada's defence team is to perform effectively.

Pour relever ces deux défis que présentent des ressources financières limitées et un monde qui est loin d'être stable, le ministre de la Défense nationale et les Forces doivent modifier complètement la façon dont ils mènent leurs affaires. Les anciennes méthodes ne suffisent plus. Nous devons nous adapter aux nouvelles circonstances en modernisant et en transformant ensemble de l'organisation de Défense. Nous devons devenir plus dynamiques, plus efficaces et plus rentables. Par-dessus tout, nous devons nous assurer que les Forces canadiennes pourront, dans l'avenir, faire leur travail et le faire bien.

As John F. Kennedy said, "change is the law of life. And those who look only to the past or the present are certain to miss the future." (1963)

Renewal and change are the themes of my remarks today. Much of what our Party promised the electorate in 1993 has been done or begun, but a huge challenge lies ahead. The Canadian Armed Forces must preserve their operational capability in a world that remains far from stable and in the face of continuing fiscal constraints. We will meet that challenge.

Canada's defence policy, as set out in the 1994 White Paper, continues to be the touchstone for change. But change does not necessarily mean loss. It can, and in this case will mean growth, as well - not in size and budget allocation, but in effectiveness, productivity and in healthy pride.

Change in the way we conduct our business is no longer optional, but neither should it be something to fear. There is no doubt that change, even when competently managed and professionally choreographed, inevitably brings certain phases to an end. But just as surely, it releases new energies and opens up new opportunities. My focus continues to be on the many benefits of change, not the few losses.

Setting the Context

Why all of this change?

The challenge facing the Canadian Forces is to continue to protect Canadian interests and values in an uncertain world, while at the same time the Department does its share to reduce the federal deficit. You all know the terrible lament of defence cuts. Our budget has been reduced by 20 per cent or \$28 billion dollars in the period 1989-98. My colleague, the Minister of Finance, will bring forward a budget in March that will continue to meet the government's deficit targets. Once again DND will be asked to do its share and we plan to do it in a way that preserves operational readiness. We are finding new savings.

As the 1994 Defence White Paper stated, we have no choice but to retain combat capable, multi-purpose forces to respond to a wide variety of post-Cold War challenges. More specifically, these forces must continue to protect Canadian territory and sovereignty, co-operate with the United States in defence of North America, and contribute to international peace and stability.

If the Canadian Forces are to carry out these roles in the current fiscal environment, we must find ways of maintaining the operational sharp end. This means changing the way we manage our resources and targeting them specifically at operational goals. It also means no longer doing everything we did in the past.

We must identify work that is essential to support operational capabilities and find ways of doing that work better through new technologies and management techniques.

Mise en oeuvre des changements

L'une de nos grandes priorités à t ede r eduire les frais g en eraux et les co uts de soutien. Ceux-ci incluent l'infrastructure, le personnel et les quartiers g en eraux ainsi que les syst emes d'approvisionnement et de maintenance.

For a long time the Canadian Forces have maintained too many facilities in too many places. They were a needless drain on resources.

For example, when I became Minister, the Canadian Forces had facilities to support a military of about 120,000 men and women at a time when there were only about 80,000 people in uniform. For political reasons, previous governments did not make the necessary but difficult decision to close bases and reduce infrastructure. A consequence was to burden the military and the defence budget with unnecessary costs and constraints. This government is now well into its plan for closing, reducing or consolidating numerous installations across the country. We have closed 25 bases and facilities since 1993, and our aim is to have the bulk of the infrastructure reduction program completed by the end of this year.

Nos efforts de rationalisation et de regroupement couvrent une vaste gamme d'activit es. Ainsi, en mil neuf cent quatre-vingt treize (1993), le Ministre a commenc e,  a regrouper les quatre d ep ots d'approvisionnement des Forces canadiennes en deux unit es situ ees  a Edmonton et  a Montreal. Jusqu'  a pr esent, nous avons d em enag e, quatre-vingts pour cent du mat eriel de Moncton et de

Toronto à Edmonton et à Montréal, ainsi qu' à la base des Forces canadiennes Halifax. Lorsque le projet de regroupement et de modernisation des dépôts prendra fin en juin prochain, nous devrions réaliser des économies de trente-trois (33) millions de dollars par année.

One of our most ambitious attempts to cut overhead and support costs has focused on headquarters. Last week, after a year of careful study under my direction, the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff unveiled the Department's plan to implement Budget 95's promise of a leaner and more efficient headquarters structure. Command and control will be simplified. Air Command, Maritime Command and Land Force Command headquarters will be eliminated and a single, strategic national defence headquarters will be created in Ottawa.

We will eliminate one layer of management within the new organization, as the two-star "Chief" level will disappear. We will also dispense with Associate Assistant Deputy Ministers. The one exception will be the Associate ADM for Personnel, who will continue to be responsible for civilian personnel matters. And the temporary position of Associate Deputy Minister will not be recreated. Overall, we will reduce by at least 28 per cent the number of senior positions at headquarters since December 1994. Efforts to reduce the executive ranks throughout our defence organization will continue.

Since 1991, the number of generals and colonels has dropped by over 30 per cent, and that of civilian executives by 45 per cent. By 1998, we expect to have approximately 70 generals, a 44 per cent reduction since 1991, and 245 colonels, a drop of 38 per cent over the same period.

This demonstrates our commitment to a leaner senior officer corps. However, I must caution those critics who continually assault the ratio of officers to enlisted personnel. A dynamic, modern, efficient and effective armed forces needs the skills and expertise of well-seasoned senior leaders. To cut too deeply at a time of rapid change and evolution could have a negative effect. However, renewal can be achieved by the normal process of generational change. Each year senior officers retire and new people take their place. Under a policy instituted by General de Chastelain last year, accumulated leave must be taken before retirement age, not after. As a result, a number of general officers will leave before reaching mandatory retirement at age 55. This will provide opportunities to bring younger officers into the senior ranks.

The new CDS, General Boyle, who is the youngest in the history of the Canadian Forces, will soon be announcing the annual postings and there will be many new, younger faces to lead our armed forces into the 21st century.

By 1999, one-half of all headquarters positions will be eliminated. As a result, the new headquarters will operate out of only three or four buildings, compared to twenty-eight in its previous life.

Je devrais ajouter qu'il nous faudra acquérir, en matière de gestion de l'information, de la nouvelle technologie qui répondra aux besoins d'une structure de commandement et de contes le rationalisée. Nous avons donc mis au point un plan quinquennal afin de nous assurer que cette technologie sera bien mise en place.

We are now embarking on the implementation phase of headquarters re-structuring. But let me stress that our re-engineering effort is not simply about streamlining. Under the direction of our Management, Command and Control Re-engineering Team, we have been evaluating activities across the Department and the Forces to identify those that are absolutely necessary and to find ways of managing them more efficiently.

We have launched initiatives at all levels of our defence organization. They are aimed at delegating more authority and responsibility to lower echelons of command and establishing new partnerships with industry.

Some of these initiatives deserve special mention. In July of last year, the Department introduced its Alternative Service Delivery program, which encourages managers to determine the most efficient and cost-effective method of delivering non-core services. This will include contracting out to the private sector, restructuring work within the Department, or any one of a number of innovative arrangements in-between.

We have already launched a number of pilot projects in this area. At the Militia Training and Support Centre in Meaford, Ontario, private industry is taking over virtually all support services, including housekeeping, transportation, maintenance and food services.

Initial estimates suggest that we will save seven million dollars over five years from this venture. As you will recall, primary flight training used to be conducted by the military as CF Base Portage La Prairie. Both the base and the flying school have since been turned over to Canadair, which now provides most of the training and all the base support under contract. The quality of training is as good as ever, but it is achieved at considerably less cost to DND.

These projects have produced encouraging results, but we have barely scratched the surface. It is now time to take the next step and advance on a broader front.

Indeed, the Alternative Service Delivery, or ASD, program will soon examine possibilities in a number of activities currently performed in-house. The list includes food services at three separate bases, NATO flight training at Moose Jaw, and base support at CF Bases Goose Bay and Kingston.

Last week I received a delegation from Kingston, with my colleague, Peter Milliken, MP for Kingston and the Islands, the local municipal officials and others who have been working with the Base commander, Col Richard, to develop a model that will assist the military structure in the management of that facility. Those kinds of projects we have to try to increase, across the country, so that we can meet our financial targets.

Our ultimate objective is to review all non-core activities. This new ASD initiative demonstrates our ongoing commitment to finding best value for our defence dollar. In putting our strategy in place, we intend to solicit the views of the private sector in setting criteria to ensure openness in any bidding process initiated under the ASD program. This may include independent evaluation of bids. Moreover, we intend to monitor other countries' experiences with ASD, including Great

Britain and Australia.

Some of our allies have been down some of the roads that we are now going, and they have valuable information that we can use to help us with our new way of managing. But in doing this I have to underscore the fact that we are not, and I repeat, that we are not going to create a new level of bureaucracy around the implementation of the ASD program. If we do that, it will only limit transparency and delay the process.

I want to stress that, as we proceed with our re-engineering efforts, we are keeping in close contact with the unions. Our ASD plan must involve consultation with our civilian workers.

And I should say that the Union of Defence Employees, under the leadership of Mr. Millette, has worked exceedingly well - been tough in negotiations, but exceedingly well - with all of the management at National Defence at a period of down-sizing period, of much restructuring. I would like to thank him and his colleagues in the civilian unions for their cooperation.

This consultation is an essential element in our plans to move ahead, and it will continue. We want to ensure that the lines of communication remain open, allowing an opportunity for parties to express concerns and resolve disputes. We need to work in an atmosphere of mutual trust.

There is still much work ahead on the re-engineering front. Perhaps the greatest challenge lies in changing a defence culture that is based on a traditional hierarchy, that is slow to respond to change and avoids risks, and that focuses more on process than results. This culture also has its strengths, to be sure, especially in battle, and we will build on those strengths, but our first priority must be to discard old attitudes and adopt new behaviours.

All of this cannot happen overnight. Sometimes I am rather amused at some of the advice I get from various pundits and other critics, about the requirement for massive, sweeping change. The people in this room - you who know the Department, who know the Forces - know that we could not have absorbed any more change than we have absorbed over the last two years. And it is a testament to the dedication, the professionalism, of the men and women of the Canadian Armed Forces and the dedication of all those civilians employed by the Department that we have come through this period of restructuring. And we have done it well, and we have retained our capabilities and we have discharged our services.

All of this will not happen overnight. Still, we are well on our way to establishing a defence organization that is leaner, more efficient and more competitive.

Reserve Restructuring

There is one aspect of the renewal process I have yet to mention. I am speaking, of course, of the Reserves. They, too, must evolve in response to the changing environment.

In summary, we are coming through this period of change, creating an organization that is leaner, more efficient and more competitive. Now, there are a couple of other important aspects that I would like to deal with before I conclude my speech. One, on restructuring, is very important,

and it is one that I have an emotional bias towards. The commanders in the Forces know this, and they have been very cooperative in trying to understand the attitudes that I bring to the table, in what will be a very difficult area to restructure. And of course, I am talking about the Reserves. The Reserves must evolve in response to the changing environment. They cannot be immune from all of the change that's going on in the Regular forces and the Department.

The Reserves are a vital part of Canada's military organization. They have a long and illustrious history stretching back centuries, and they have been playing an increasing role in operations at home and abroad in recent years. At the end of last year, there were 115 Canadian reservists participating in international operations. I continue to be impressed by the skill and commitment of our reservists, and by the courage they show in the face of hardship and danger.

But like the rest of Canada's military team, the Reserves must adapt to new circumstances. The White Paper noted that changes should be made to the Reserves to improve their operational capabilities and cost-effectiveness. Once again, we must spend our money wisely in the current fiscal climate.

Last year at this time, at your Annual General Meeting, I announced the Government's intention to form a Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves to look into these questions. The Government wanted to ensure the widest possible participation of Canadians in any major decisions affecting the future of the Reserves. And indeed, the public, including the CDA, took full advantage of the opportunity. Many Canadians feel strongly about the Reserves, and want to see them play an effective role in Canada's defence organization.

I want to congratulate the Commission members, retired Chief Justice Brian Dickson, General (Retired) Charlie Belzile and Professor Jack Granatstein, who reported on time and under-budget - a commendable achievement. They have produced a comprehensive document that I think points the Reserves in the right direction for the future.

I also have in hand the reports of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs and of the Senate sub-Committee on Veterans Affairs. These two committees have made observations on the Commission's findings, and added their own recommendations.

I expect that my evaluation of all three reports will be completed by the Spring. Some of the recommendations are straightforward and will be easy to implement; others are more complex, and will take time to assess in terms of cost and other factors. Our goal is to begin the implementation process this Summer.

It is still too early to render any definitive judgement on all of the recommendations contained in the Special Commission's report. But allow me to make a few general observations that I don't believe will compromise the findings in the end.

The Commission makes a number of recommendations concerning job protection and terms of service for reservists. These are complex issues, and as the SCNDVA report points out, a

consensus even within the Reserve community is lacking. We need to study in-depth the financial and legal implications of some of the proposed changes before arriving at any conclusions.

With regard to administration, the Commission underscores the need to fix the pay system. The Government took steps in that direction last year and as a result new computer hardware will be installed this year with two software upgrades, the first to be introduced in May. This should pave the way for a more efficient system that can be implemented across the country.

Reserve restructuring, of course, is very much at the heart of the Report. I was pleased to see that the Commission was generally satisfied with the state of the Naval, Air and Communications Reserves. The Government will closely examine all recommendations that apply to these organizations.

With respect to the Militia, I believe we all agree with the view that they should have a clearly articulated role. At the same time, the Commission recognized the need to streamline the Militia's structure by reducing both the number of headquarters and units. It said that too many units, despite long and honourable service, have diminished in size and effectiveness.

In principle, the government is open to the recommendation to adopt a brigade structure for the Militia. The criteria provided by the Commission for determining the viability of units will be critical in deciding the number of brigades - whether seven, as recommended by the Commission; nine, as suggested by the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs; or some other figure.

As we tackle this entire issue, we must ensure that the proud legacy of the Militia is preserved. We must also maintain the links to community that make the Reserves so important a bridge between the Canadian Forces and the people they serve.

On this point, I would like to add that, in my opinion, local communities should assume more responsibility in helping sustain Reserve traditions and activities. This could include capital investment in facilities and amenities that the Crown may not be able to provide. The work of the RMC Club Foundation in keeping alive the Royal Military College band is just one example of how this might be done. If the Government can create local airport authorities such as those in Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver and Halifax, why can't we create similar structures for the local armouries. Such a body could be composed of local militia units, business people and community groups and local elected officials, who could be responsible for managing and maintaining the local armoury.

I realize that there are severe financial implications in that kind of an approach, and if that were the way to go there would have to be transitional arrangements; but this may be one way to ensure that armouries stay open. For me, the thought of even one armoury closing, across the country, brings shudders to my emotional spine.

It was in 1855 that the Militia Act was passed, before Confederation, in the Parliaments of the

two Canadas of the time, Canada East and Canada West; and that tradition has been maintained by contributions to all of the major conflicts the Armed Forces have been involved in during the ensuing 150 years. And those armouries are the focal point: they are the national military presence, but also the representation of the national spirit in all of those communities, and we must do all that we can to ensure that those facilities remain open. We won't be able to do it entirely perfectly, but we have got to work toward that goal in our restructuring and in our consolidation.

As I said earlier, we are continuing our assessment of the three reports. I can assure you that any decisions on the future of the Reserves will be implemented with the full involvement of the Reserve community. Within the army, the Reserve Advisor to the Commander, Land Force Command, has been appointed to lead the planning and implementation process for the Militia; and I will ask the Militia to appoint other representatives to work with the Commander's representative to ensure the widest possible consensus in the process.

The task ahead will not be easy. There are many difficult and emotional issues to address. I know that the Reserves have been under a cloud of uncertainty for some time, and that tensions between the Reserves and the Regular Force have occasionally surfaced.

We must remember that we are all members of the same team; it is in our interest to put our differences aside and to work together in pursuit of our common goal - national security and a strong defence force. The Commission has really done yeoman work in putting down many of the options for consideration. I would like to thank former Chief Justice Brian Dickson, the Chair, Lieutenant General (retired) Charles Belzile, and Professor Jack Granatstein, who did something that not all Commissions do. They reported on time and under budget - a commendable achievement. I also want to thank my colleagues in the House of Commons and the members of the Senate for looking at the Commission's report in a short time frame and issuing reports that will help the process. So, whatever is done, we have had a lot of consultation. But whatever is done must be done in partnership with all concerned. I should also say that our new CDS, General Boyle, and - I can't call him new because he has been there six months now, Lieutenant General Baril, have impressed me with their openness to change and understanding of the core issues affecting the Reserve community.

Conclusion

The famous military strategist Basil Liddell Hart once said that "the only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out." (Thoughts on War, 1944). The Canadian military, I can assure you, is doing both with equal determination and success - throwing out the old and bringing in the new. That said, there is still much good in the Canadian forces tradition, and we will preserve it.

In concluding my remarks today, I would like to comment on a subject that has the capacity to do great damage to the institution of the Canadian Forces, a source of great pride in this country. I refer to the so-called Somalia Affair.

The very word Somalia has become synonymous with scandal in Canadian defence circles. The acts of a few have obliterated from our collective memories the courage and decency demonstrated by so many. Who remembers the heroic efforts of most Canadian peacekeepers who served in Somalia? Unfortunately, certain incidents have cast a pall over the entire deployment. That is shame enough, but now the unfairness of people's perception about Somalia is being confounded by what I believe is a fundamental misunderstanding about the inquiry process that the Government put in place to deal with the issue.

Upon taking office in 1993, the Liberal government of Jean Chretien, inherited the problems stemming from the deployment to Somalia, and those problems cried out for resolution and justice. While in opposition, we called for a public inquiry. In order not to jeopardize the court martial relating to the acts in question, we delayed calling the Inquiry until the Supreme Court of Canada, in the Westray mine disaster case, ruled that trials and inquiries may proceed simultaneously. The Somalia Inquiry, armed with very broad terms of reference, is now underway.

In establishing the Inquiry, the Government undertook to see that justice would be done. The truth will be known. If any people lied, obfuscated, intimidated or covered-up, then this will be exposed. In return, I ask Canadians to give the process a fair chance. Let's be fair to the men and women of the Armed Forces who are having to endure this very difficult situation. Let the Inquiry do its job. Do not ask me to second guess those conducting the Inquiry, or to evaluate and respond to each day's testimony. That is a recipe for confusion. It's also a recipe for injustice.

Until the truth is finally known, Canadians must be patient. The last thing we want to do is destroy over a century of Canadian military pride and tradition by superficial analysis.

Canadians have made the supreme sacrifice in two World Wars and any number of other struggles against tyranny. The rights and freedoms we take for granted were purchased at enormous cost in places like Vimy Ridge and Dieppe. That kind of sacrifice is what our armed forces are all about. But we should not lose focus on our accomplishments. Those members who have served with great distinction in the former Yugoslavia - we have come through a really difficult time in the last three years - and all the people who served in Bosnia and Croatia should be congratulated for the way they conducted themselves in that awful situation.

We have had people in the Golan Heights; we have had people in Rwanda; we have people clearing mines, still, in Cambodia; and of course we have people doing an outstanding job in Haiti. And at home we cannot forget the assistance the Canadian Forces provide to local communities hit by natural disasters or to people lost in the wilderness or clinging to sinking ships in stormy seas. Who could forget the images created just a few weeks ago, when one Corporal, from a Sea King helicopter - yes, a Sea King helicopter off HMCS Calgary - went down time and time again to pull more than 30 people off a boat that was breaking up in the Atlantic. That, Ladies and Gentlemen, is the heroism of the Canadian Armed Forces. That is the kind of work that is being discharged every single day by men and women across this country, and we should not let any other events - or enquiry's or testimony - nudge us off the fact that we have an outstanding Force that

continues to do its work every single day.

The Canadian Forces is a proud institution that reflects the linguistic and cultural diversity of the country. Our members are respected around the world for their sense, and their duty. The strength of the Canadian Forces will see it through these difficult times. The fairness of the Canadian people will give the Forces the chance to overcome today's difficulties.

Thank You.

Question Period:

LIEUTENANT COLONEL YVES MARTIN: I am President of the Air Reserve Association in Montreal. You congratulated the Commission on the Reserves for being on time and under budget, and I would say that's very significant; that's usually what you get from the Reserves. One of the aspects of the Commission was the matter of either a pension or severance pay for Reservists leaving the service. I have been in the Reserve over 30 years and I am sure there are a lot of people here that have - you'll pardon me if I am a little bit political here - but we haven't had any answers, haven't seen anything from the Senate report about a pension or a termination package. However, we see that we have people in our government that aim to separate this country, and people in the Reserves who have worked to unite it. I have been through crises like the October crisis, the Oka crisis; and we have worked to unite this country. Why is it that the government doesn't take a positive look at either a pension or severance pay for the Reserves?

MR COLLENETTE: The short answer is one that I tried to include earlier: I have a totally open mind on all of these issues, and it is a matter we must look at carefully, cognizant of the financial problems that we have. But whatever we do has to be fair. This may be an area we have to move on. But I can't make that commitment [now] because we aren't at that position yet.

KIM KRENZ, TRENT UNIVERSITY: I would like to speak to the work of the Canadian Forces Liaison Council. You haven't mentioned its importance to the entire Reserve program of employer support. I can remember several years ago, when the number of companies which agreed to support reservists could be counted on the fingers of two hands. The work of the Council, in the past two years, has increased this number to more than 600. They are represented in every Province and Territory, but the federal Government is not among them! Several years ago your predecessor, Mr Perrin Beattie, standing where you are, claimed that he would give prominence to federal support of reservists in this way. The next day he was changed in portfolio; and we heard nothing about it. I would like to suggest that if you are interested in giving real support to the Reserves you could initiate some sort of federal (and perhaps provincial) employer support of Reservists.

MR. COLLENETTE: Well, I don't think the Prime Minister is going to shuffle the Cabinet tomorrow. But, certainly, the work of the Council, under the direction of John Eaton, one of Canada's very prominent businessmen, has been outstanding; and this has been the approach that we have followed so far. Of course, a different approach is followed in the United States where

there is legislation; and, as I said, that is an area that really divides many people and creates a number of legal problems. But it is something that we would look at. In the meantime the work that you have done is outstanding, and again, in addressing the Reserves issues we also have to address the point that you raise about the federal government's role as an employer; and I will be discussing it soon with my new colleague, Marcel Mass,.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MC QUAIG, CANADIAN INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ASSOCIATION: You made the comment this morning that we all have to be members of the same team. In light of the ongoing Somalia situation and the Canadian laws I am wondering if you would be able to advise us regarding the rules of engagement for the Canadian contingent in Bosnia, if they are going to be the same as for our NATO allies.

MR COLLENETTE: One of the things that has not been extensively reported is that we learned from some of the lessons in Somalia in devising the rules of engagement for the IFOR force in Bosnia; and General de Chastelaine spent a whole week negotiating (and berating, in some cases) with his NATO counterparts, and scored some successes. The rules of engagement now reflect a lot of the problems that we had. That is a good start: that we can learn from some of the problems in the past, and that we have had a considerable effect on the rules of engagement within NATO. There may be some differences, but they are fully acknowledged and fully acceptable and fully manageable, operationally, by NATO. We don't anticipate any problems, and I know that General Jeffries, who is the commander of one of the sectors, is quite comfortable with what we have done and believes that if there are any differences between our rules and those of other countries, this can be worked out and would not compromise operational effectiveness. I am glad you raised that point, because it is one of the "good news" stories that is not widely known.

CAPITAINE MICHEL LAVIGNE: Je suis membre de la réserve ici à Ottawa. My question is the same as the one at this time last year (when) you expressed tremendous support for the Canadian soldiers that served in Somalia, and the question was raised about recognizing this service and having a service decoration. Since then the government has announced three new service decorations for (other) operations around the world but nothing for Somalia. The Reserves Commission recommended that this action be taken, and, considering that this action is well recognized and documented, and that the current inquiry does not really deal with that subject, and will not reveal anything new, I would like to know what is going on. Last year you clearly indicated your support for it and that "action is well underway" and that it should be resolved before mid-summer. So I would like to know what is happening to delay the process. Must we wait until the turn of the century, when the enquiry is done?

MR COLLENETTE: It is a very good point, and a difficult problem to adjudicate. Without elaboration, all I will say is that there is no question that it will be done at some point in time. But I cannot give you the assurance I gave you last January, and I apologize for that.

ADDRESS BY GENERAL J.E. J. BOYLE

CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

It is indeed a pleasure to join you here today, and I thank you for the invitation. For almost 65 years, the CDA has supported the Canadian Forces by campaigning for a beneficial defence policy and effective armed forces. I think it most fitting then that your Annual General Meeting is the forum for my first major public presentation as Chief of the Defence Staff. I would like to use the opportunity to discuss two subjects that are not nearly as unrelated as they might seem at first. Those subjects are change and traditional military values, and I hope to show that the pursuit of the former does not require a deviation from the latter. In fact, I believe strongly that serving members must embrace change and traditional values with equal fervour, if we are to fulfil our military mission effectively in these challenging times. I'd like to begin with a look back at the geostrategic and fiscal changes that have affected the Canadian Forces and the Department over the past five years. I'll examine the Forces in the wake of the 1994 Defence White Paper and, finally, talk about the military ethic and its continuing relevance to those of us in uniform. After that, I will be pleased to answer your questions.

Geostrategic and Fiscal Change 1990-1995

The last time I addressed the CDA was in January 1990 in my capacity as Commander of 1 Canadian Air Division in Europe, and I remember using the opportunity to discuss the rapidly evolving European security situation. The Ceausescu regime in Romania had fallen just a few weeks beforehand, and I talked about the impact that this overthrow might have on events. I also discussed the likelihood of further security difficulties as the countries of Eastern Europe began to adopt western democratic ideals. Sadly, my predictions came true with respect to the former Yugoslavia. There has been much criticism of the United Nations' failure to stop the fighting in Bosnia. But at least the UN effort, to which Canada contributed, managed to contain the conflict and carnage within the boundaries of the former Yugoslavia. As a result, the rest of Eastern Europe has been able to move towards democracy relatively unaffected.

It appears that the new regimes in Eastern Europe saw a lesson in the Yugoslav experience, and prudently decided to re-establish government structures through negotiation rather than confrontation. In fact, most of them have made an impressive political transformation since the beginning of the decade. Although much remains to be done, Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics and the Baltic States have improved their domestic situations greatly.

The political evolution in Eastern Europe provides a compelling example of the radical change that is redefining the world order. Here in the West, change is also sweeping through business, industry, education and social institutions in response to such diverse factors as new technology, increased competition, declining revenues, and the growing emphasis on individual rights. Many of these same factors are also exerting an influence on Canada's military establishment. It's no exaggeration to say that the Canadian Forces have undergone dramatic change - in character,

structure, and certainly in size - over the past five years.

At the same time we have undertaken a number and range of operations unprecedented since the end of the Korean War:

The Oka Crisis in the summer of 1990;

The UN action in the Persian Gulf in 1990 and 91;

A wide variety of UN peacekeeping, peace-restoration and humanitarian aid missions in Europe, Africa and Southeast Asia, to which thousands of Canadian servicemen and women contributed;

Beginning in July 1992, Operation Airbridge, the Canadian Forces airlift of humanitarian supplies into Sarajevo. This mission ended recently after three and a half years and almost 2000 flights; and

At home, numerous national operations including Search and Rescue missions, evacuation of communities threatened by fires or floods, assistance to other departments with fisheries patrols and drug interdiction, and just last month, the heroic rescue of 30 people from a sinking freighter by the crew of HMCS Calgary.

The Post-White-Paper CF

These are just some of the challenges that we've had to meet while making deep cuts to personnel and resources.

It's interesting to look back to the end of the last decade when some 87,000 Canadians were in uniform. Today, that seems like a huge number. Until 1989, the military was on the upswing, and Government policy called for the Total Force to expand significantly. However, this was not to be, as Government policy toward the military changed in response to sudden and dramatic changes in the global security environment.

The reasons for that course correction are familiar to this audience, so I need only mention them in passing. The end of the Cold War redefined the geostrategic situation, leading the Government to withdraw our stationed forces from Europe. At the same time, the critical fiscal situation here at home dictated the need to cut government spending.

The Governments change in direction was signaled clearly through a series of reductions in defence funding. For example, taking into account the latest cuts announced in the 1995 budget, defence funding has dropped from \$11.3 billion in 1989 to \$10.5 billion for the upcoming fiscal year. If we take into account the difference in buying power between 1989 and 1996, this is a very significant decrease in funding.

Since 1989, we have undertaken a number of personnel reduction programs. By 1999, the Regular Force will be reduced to 60 000 - a full 30% below the 87 000 in uniform at the end of the last decade. The Primary Reserve will be reduced to about 23 000, and the Civilian

workforce to about 20 000.

Despite significant reductions in funding and personnel, the Forces must continue to maintain a demanding level of operational effectiveness. The White Paper directed the Canadian Forces to make as many as 4 000 servicemen and women available for continuous contingency operations. I believe we can still achieve this aim, although it won't be easy, as I'm sure you can appreciate.

To meet our commitments and to maximize our ability to mount operations we must rationalize resources as never before. Reducing the number of non-operational personnel is only one means to this end. Streamlining the command and control structure and re-engineering many of our processes - to borrow a word from industry - offer other means.

As you probably know, we are in the midst of implementing the White Paper direction to develop a smaller and more efficient headquarters' structure with one less level of command. The task of simplifying command and control by eliminating the functional command headquarters - Maritime, Land and Air - is now under way. Under the new structure, Commanders are being relocated to NDHQ as Environmental Chiefs of Staff.

Plans call for the Chiefs of Staff to assume strategic responsibilities while retaining command of operational formations. At the same time, direct control of operations is devolving to group, area and coastal commanders. Tactical decisions are continuing to be made at the wing, brigade and maritime operation group level.

As of December 1994, the command and control structure down to the formation level employed more than 14,000 military and civilian personnel. In our re-engineering work, we have identified reductions to 8,800, and this number is expected to drop even further - to slightly more than 7,000 - or roughly half of what it used to be. These reductions are to be completed by 1999. Altogether, we are in the process of eliminating six headquarters, bringing the total from 18 down to 12.

With regard to senior and general officers, since 1991 the number of officers at the rank of General and Colonel has dropped by more than 30 per cent, and this downward trend will continue. One of my first initiatives as CDS was to reinforce my predecessor's direction to reduce positions for Generals to about 70 and for Colonels to 245, effective by the end of the 1997/98 fiscal year. Compared to 1991 levels, that target reduces the number of officers holding General rank by 44 per cent and those at the Colonel level by more than a third.

To this point, I have been talking largely about the Regular Force. But I need hardly remind this audience that, under the Total Force concept, the Reserves continue to play an important role in helping Canada meet military commitments at home and abroad. We depend on them, and they have proven themselves up to the task in many situations. Our success in fielding adequate combat-capable forces depends, in part, on the availability of well-trained Reserves.

As Minister Collenette just commented a few moments ago, the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves submitted its recommendations to him last fall. At this point, we don't know which recommendations will be accepted, or what the final decisions will be. But I

welcome any initiatives that will ultimately enhance the operational effectiveness of the Reserves.

For some two years now the Canadian Forces have endured scrutiny as a result of its participation in the United Nations-sanctioned mission to Somalia. As you are aware, a Commission of Inquiry into the 1993 deployment is now in progress and it would be improper of me to remark on specifics of the Forces' activities while in theatre. However, it is important that I add a personal perspective to the whole and discuss some of the actions taken by the Canadian Forces as a result of lessons learned thus far.

Operation Deliverance, as the Somalia deployment was known, was executed under Chapter Seven of a United Nations mandate. In its broadest terms, it was a humanitarian mission of unprecedented complexity and difficulty. Members of the Canadian Forces performed their mission in an outstanding fashion and received praise from the international community for their contribution.

Organizations such as the International Red Cross and Medecins Sans Frontieres praised the Forces' work in restoring schools, providing food and water, as well as establishing law and order.

This standard of professionalism, compassion and dedication to fundamental moral and democratic values is, I am sure you will agree, the norm in the Canadian Forces. The tragic incidents involving our troops in Somalia were clearly exceptions to that norm. These events demonstrated unacceptable behaviour by members of the Canadian Forces, and such behaviour cannot and will not be tolerated.

The Commission of Inquiry, with its mandate to review the affairs of the Canadian military in the Somalia deployment, is an essential activity for the Canadian Forces to close this chapter in their history. As I have stated previously, I encourage all members of the Canadian Forces, should they have information which could assist the Commission in its deliberations, to contact the Commission Offices.

As for lessons learned from Somalia, action has been taken by the Forces based on two major reports submitted to the Department. The first was the report of the DeFaye Board of Inquiry, which contained thirty-three major recommendations. All recommendations have been actioned, although nine remain active files.

Of these major recommendations, we have developed a Harassment and Racism Awareness Program and a "zero tolerance" approach to racism in the Canadian Forces. In addition, after a fundamental review of rules of engagement and their interpretation and application, the Forces have produced a guidance and training document called "Use of Force in the CF Joint and Combined Operations." One of its key tenets is that the CDS must now personally review and authorize the Rules of Engagement that are developed for each operation.

The second source of lessons learned was the Post-Operations Report on Op Deliverance produced by the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff. This report contained 18 major

recommendations and 140 subordinate recommendations on subjects ranging from training, operations, personnel, equipment and command and control.

The major outflow from these lessons learned was the publication in April 1995 of the Joint Doctrine for CF Joint and Combined Operations, which incorporates major reviews of rules of engagement development, training and application. This new doctrine was the cornerstone used in negotiating IFOR Rules of Engagement within NATO, and has received much praise. Because of our advances in developing rules of engagement, Canada played a major role in drafting rules of engagement for UN missions in Rwanda and Haiti.

Military Ethics

Military personnel today are being called upon to serve in an environment of constant change and uncertainty, and to do so under the watchful eye of the media. If we are to achieve our fundamental mission - the maintenance of combat-capability - we must be working from the bedrock of common values.

I'd like to spend a few minutes talking about the military ethic, the professional values it embodies and their relevance to our situation today.

My first exposure to military values occurred at the Royal Military College in Kingston. The school's motto, etched forever on every cadet's mind, is "truth, duty, valour." Those words and the powerful concepts they represent have guided and sustained me throughout my career.

The circumstances of military service today are in flux but, in my view, leadership imperatives and traditional military values remain unchanged. Virtues such as integrity, loyalty, obedience and professional competence must continue to influence every military member's behaviour every day. To separate military ideals from military functions is to court failure, if not today, then certainly tomorrow.

Of course, one does not have to enroll in the Canadian Forces to be exposed to values. Recruits who arrive for training bring the values of Canadian society with them, and those values are much the same as the ones espoused in the military.

However, there is an important reason to restate these common, shared values within the framework of a military ethic. It's a matter of professionalism. The military ethic is fused with the Canadian Forces' specific and unique function - which is to provide physical protection against violent threats to the citizens of Canada and their interests. In other words, adherence to the military ethic influences our ability to meet the objective of preserving peace and freedom.

In order to reinforce the values that constitute the military ethic, I expect everyone in a leadership position, beginning with myself, to articulate the ethic and to act according to its precepts - not only when it's convenient or when a crisis makes the issues clear - but especially when the challenges are subtle.

What are the ethical standards of behaviour that I expect Canadian Forces members to follow?

Well, as every junior officer who undertakes the professional development self-study program learns, the true military professional has an obligation to:
base his or her conduct on the concept of personal honour; believe without reservation in the legitimacy of command;
subordinate self-interest in the service of the common good; offer undivided loyalty to the country; observe the prohibition against participation in political affairs; and finally, cultivate professional skill.

As we undertake an expanding number and range of missions, and as we push responsibility for decision-making downwards in the new force structure, the moral challenges confronting military personnel can only grow. There is an urgent as well as an enduring reason, then, to ensure that military training is built on a solid ethical foundation.

I've already mentioned the transformational role leaders must play through the expectations they voice and the personal example they set. However, we have recently taken an extra step by creating a formal Defence Ethics Program to provide the entire defence team with a common point of reference for ethical decision-making.

In our quest for performance, productivity, economy and, potentially, success on the battlefield, we must remember that the military is not a business established to transact with the public. It is a professional organization constituted to serve society. The concept of service before self must remain the moral focus for our actions.

Thus far, I have been talking about the military ethic as it applies to every member of the Canadian Forces. But as one rises to assume command, the ethical burden expands to embrace the concept of accountability.

Command is an opportunity offered to few, and I feel strongly that it is also a privilege. Commensurate with that privilege is the Commander's obligation to be accountable - not only for his or her own decisions and actions but for those of subordinates. Self-interest, which characterizes the careerist, simply cannot be allowed to dominate.

In my capacity as CDS, I plan to ensure that Commanders at all levels are held accountable. But I will also be just as demanding of myself. I, too, am accountable to a superior - in my case, the Government of Canada. And in the spirit of any loyal subordinate, I plan to offer my full support.

But if providing good counsel sometimes means voicing disagreement, I am prepared to do that as well. Why? Because, as CDS I am responsible for the lives of those I must send into harm's way. For the military leader, the willingness to be forthright with advice is not only an important aspect of accountability - it is an essential aspect of moral courage.

Conclusion

The picture I have tried to draw this morning is of a military institution grappling with the strains and challenges of dramatic change, a series of deep cuts in resources and the heavy demands of its operational mission. I appreciate the support of organizations such as the Conference of

Defence Associations for the Canadian Forces. At the same time, I firmly believe that we in the Forces must find the strength within ourselves to overcome our difficulties and meet our responsibilities. The traditional military values and especially the concept of service before self are not only relevant - they are essential to achieving that goal. We cannot afford to abandon those values if we hope to profit from change. And we will not remain effective as a fighting force unless we do change.

These, then, are some of the messages that I plan to communicate to the Canadian Forces, both personally and through my commanders, during my term as Chief of the Defence Staff. I hope I will have your support in that endeavour. Thank you.

QUESTION PERIOD

LIEUTENANT (N) DAVID ROBINSON, Maritime Defence Association of Canada: Yesterday, in the CDAI Seminar, a number of speakers were very eloquent in addressing the roles of the Canadian Forces, and particularly of its Reserves, in developing promoting and putting forward Canada's national identity. This is not just a matter of looking backwards, especially at this time when the integrity of our nation itself is threatened by some very determined advocates of separatism. It is very much an issue of our future as well. In that context I was very pleased to hear the Minister this morning talk about our armouries and our reserve units as representations of the national spirit, and I was pleased to hear you say that we had to embrace both change and traditional military values with equal vigour. In that context, I am very surprised to have learned that the role of the Canadian Forces in promoting and preserving national identity was removed from the most recent version of the Defence Development Planning Guidance. My question is whether you might wish to consider re- inserting that, in your new capacity; and if you don't feel that it is appropriate that the role of this (perhaps) unparalleled national organization in promoting our national identity be noted in a cardinal guidance document?

GENERAL BOYLE: A very perceptive point. Certainly I was not aware that it had been deleted as a fundamental of military life and application. Certainly, I am a firm believer that the Reserves are an essential ingredient in the fabric of our nation. All we need to do is go back in history. The national unity debate is one which we all cherish(sic) as very difficult to deal with. The military has a place throughout the communities in all parts of our country, and they are an essential ingredient in promoting national unity outside the boundaries of the various provinces. When I ran the Military College in Kingston I was always impressed by the homogeneity of the character of that university, because it had representation from the national element of our country. For some reason we select, from across the broad spectrum of students and young applicants, from all corners of the country; and it is a national institution which we should look at in terms of modeling some of the rhetoric that we need to discuss, and the words that we need to say to our fellow countrymen about the essential component that the military brings to the fabric of our country. When one looks at negotiating NORAD renewals, one looks at the importance of a united Canada, because a united Canada is a Canada which is easily defensible.

MR. DILLON: Royal Canadian Regiment. General, during your speech, which I enjoyed very much, you indicated that most of your remarks had referred, up to then, to the Regular Force. But you followed by telling us that the Reserves have a role to play, and that you would welcome any suggestions to increase their effectiveness. You further went on to talk of the military ethic and the importance of our job in the armed forces to preserve and protect the values which our country holds to be important. I have no question; I have a comment, based on my sixty-one years of experience in the Army, fifty years of which in peacetime have been as a reservist serving with a Regular Force regiment. I think that, if we are going to move ahead and resolve the issues, which all of us hold to be important, we have to recognize the final responsibility for an effective army rests not with the Regular Force, not with the Reserves, but with the Army as a whole. What we need most of all is a united sense of purpose - professional soldiers, full time and part time.

GENERAL BOYLE: I would like to comment on that. Sir, I agree 100%. I met with the Honourable Judge Dickson and Lieutenant General Belzile in my first couple of days as Chief of the Defence Staff. The following day I met Mr. Peter Cameron from Reserve 2000. I have a firm belief in what General Anderson mentioned to me this morning: that we must unite; we must stop the "we/they", we must have a dialogue, we must reopen the dialogue; because what's important here is the fabric of our military institution in Canada - not necessarily the fabric of the Regular Force or the Reserve Force, but the fabric of the military institution of Canada: land, sea and air. I will do everything I can to meet and to dialogue with the Reserve, with the Regular Force, with the Honouraries and with those who have "rice-bowl agendas" because I understand those, and I understand the emotion; and I am prepared, as I will be doing at the end of next month in Toronto, and meeting with Mr. Eaton and his group, because I need to understand where the dividing lines are and how deep the rice-bowls are. One of the things we all have to recognize is that funding is limited. The dollars are just not there. But we in the military, I, have a responsibility to deliver military combat capability to the government of Canada. I want to do it with the Reserves, with the Regular Force and with all of the agencies together. I need to open that dialogue.

MAJOR GENERAL LIONEL BOURGEOIS: Retired Air Force. Two of the main themes we discussed yesterday were the morale of people in the forces today and the lack of information on what the Armed Forces are doing - getting to the general public; the public being more concerned, of course, with other issues such as the economy and jobs and the separation of the country. The real concern there is that the two are inter-related. If our public is not supporting us; if our members of the Canadian Armed Forces are not enthused about what they are doing and the morale is not high it will certainly affect the ability of the Forces in the future. Having been in Public Affairs I know what we have tried to do in the Department over the years on internal communication, in public affairs officers speaking for us, doing our thing. It seems to me, though, that during your tenure as Chief of Defence Staff, you could help us tremendously if you came up with the wherewithal, with new technology, for other people like us to be your spokesmen out there, talking to the general public and getting the message across.

This organization, through its Institute, set up a Speakers Bureau. But they don't have the

wherewithal, in the technological equipment that is available, either on the Internet or with CD-ROMs or with preparation of speeches, et cetera, to go out there and really have an effect on the general public. They are also not fed the current information which is in your department and in the operational headquarters about what is really going on. What have Canadians learned about the

operation going on down in Haiti, and the great work that is being done there? Little snippets come out, but not enough. My question to you, in a time of a really restricted budget, is: can we really look forward to the future and come up with some programs and some help to get across to the general public, and to give our own people a sense of worth for what they are doing?

GENERAL BOYLE: General, thank you for that incisive question. I met with all of my colleagues on the weekend, all of the general officers, in Toronto. The first question, General Bourgeois, was exactly that: how come we cannot get our message out to the Canadian public, let alone get our message down to our own people? I have asked the staff to do some review of the processes we have now, in delivering information through the new information technologies. For example, I went last week - along with the Deputy Minister - to Air Command, to Maritime Command and to Land Forces Command; and we met with all formation-and-above commanders. We delivered to them a message, and in that message was a small snippet at the end, which was quality-of-life to our people. By delivering that message I expect my formation commanders to deliver the message downwards. But we can't do it on an annual basis; we have to do it on a bi-weekly or a monthly basis. How do we provide that downward information - of good news, and sometimes bad news? Let's admit it: everything is not rosy these days. So we have to look at the latest technologies to deliver that message. Also, we have to provide defence associations - the Air Force Association, and all of the other organizations out there - with the facts about the business that we are in. I would expect the commander of the Air Force to be dealing with the Royal Canadian Air Force Association on his operations, whether it be Operation Air Bridge in Sarajevo or the operation he is running in Haiti right now. I would expect the commander of the Army should be dealing with the army associations and providing them as much information on the composition of the force in Bosnia, how we are doing in Bosnia, the number of people. Also, we should be informing ourselves and informing you of some of the difficulties that we have: post-theatre syndromes - how our people who come back from these theatres deal with the shock of returning and the atrocities that they saw out there, because they are not always good stories, but we know that, inside your organizations you have experts that could probably provide us advice on how to deal with these issues. I take your point, sir, and I will go back once again; and we will try to generate a methodology of providing you with this kind of information for dissemination.

CAPTAIN MICHEL LAVIGNE: A number of years ago the Canadian Forces dealt with the issue of equitable treatment of Reservists overseas, to ensure that everybody was compensated equally for their service. However, that issue has not yet been resolved in Canada. A number of years ago a paper was written and presented to Armed Forces Council and approved by ADM (Per) in regard to the class of reserve service, to ensure that all reservists in Canada are treated equitably and the employment practices are the same. However, that paper and recommendations were suspended last year for unknown reasons, and what [results] now is that you have Reservists treated differently within Canada. As an example, the staff officers working for the Reserves review committee were paid on Class "B" reserve service, when most of these officers

are now employed with the Somalia inquiry and are on Class "C" reserve service. Or, in your own headquarters, sir, you have staff officers that are on reserve service being paid what often is considered slave wages as Class "B", and the officer sitting beside him, doing the same duty, is on Class "C" reserve service. I would like to know, sir, what steps are being taken toward a comprehensive class of Reserve service to ensure that all Reservists are paid equitably, treated equitably, and that employment practices are equal for all officers of the Reserves vis-a-vis the Regular Force.

GENERAL BOYLE: Merci pour cette question. When I was ADM Per I was Chairman of the Canadian Forces Pension Advisory Committee, and the first meeting I went to - and I somewhat surprised my colleagues at the table - I said: we either deal with the issues or we don't have a committee. They all came back to the next meeting, and at the table were my colleagues from the Reserves. We brought the Reserves in as members of the Pension Advisory Committee, based on one of the comments that was raised earlier on, to the Minister: when are we going to see a pension benefit for the reservists, et cetera? So we brought the Reserves and their players in that domain because we recognized that we do have, and we are treating people, as two classes of citizen. We need to redress that within the Canadian Forces. We've got studies in place right now that are looking at employment packages, that are looking at class employment of reservists, et cetera. And I can't give you a more definitive answer than: it is part and parcel of the whole Reserve study that has been commissioned by the Minister and that will be making recommendations to the government.

EDWIN GOODMAN: General, you mentioned during your address, which I found very helpful and informative, that there are limitations of money, which we all recognize. But why can't the Army (and Air Force and the Navy) do what all other philanthropic organizations across the country are doing, faced with cuts? They are working with development departments to get, first of all, volunteers, and to raise money themselves. Why can't the Army encourage the regiments to go out and appeal to the people - not just their own members and those who have served in the past, but the whole of the country - and that way, raising an army of volunteers, you will have a means of carrying on and informing people of the military ethic?

GENERAL BOYLE: I believe that, in a macro sense, that would probably be very difficult to sell, both to the Canadian public and within the rationalization of the militia; because, if you are going to depend on philanthropic donations for the militia we may be at risk here. The Minister did throw out, though, a small lure to you about the armouries, with the armouries becoming somewhat of a community component and being somewhat supported by the local community - in an effort to reduce the financial burden on the Department and the Canadian Forces, but at the same time ensuring the preservation of that armoury in a local community. If the choice is between closing an armoury and keeping it open - because we have a new means through community appeal to keep it open - I know what the choice is going to be. So I appreciate your point. It is just that I would not want to - I guess - base the Reserve and the militia on donations outside a structured, funded domain.

EDWIN GOODMAN: May I respectfully suggest that some of the regiments have done this, through establishing foundations, with reasonable results.

BRUCE LEGGE: Sir, I was very impressed with Colonel Goodman's fund-raising ideas. He is probably the world's greatest fund-raiser for a thousand-and-one things; but his regiment is rich and we mustn't worry about it. Colonel Goodman is great counsel, and he knows that I give to my unit and he gives to his.

As you know, sir, Canada is a country of great geographic diversity. It is also a country of great people diversity. From that comes the obvious conclusion that, if we are going to have reserve units that mean anything to the country they have to be almost everywhere in our geography and they have to appeal to old Canadians and new Canadians alike. From those two simple facts I believe most firmly that Canada has not got one single Reserve unit to dispense with. I think that you, as

Chief of the Defence Staff, have to be the Lord Protector of all of the units in this country. Because they are needed. And I think there is no way of overcoming that argument. If there is no unit in the community there is no visible group of friends of the military in that community. And, rather than talking about - as everyone is - abolishing units, amalgamating units, it should be the first point of the creed that we will maintain the units; we will make them successful again, and they will be

able to appeal to the new diversity of people in the country because there is a presence. Without a presence, there can be no appeal. I hope that you will do that, sir.

GENERAL BOYLE: I am glad to see that within my mandate the "Lord Protector" is pretty high up there. Certainly I have a responsibility of ensuring that we have a sustainable strategy, doctrine and application, that we have a resource base of mobilization. Whether that translates into the preservation of every unit, I am not at liberty to discuss, because the studies have not been completed. But what I must ensure, though, is that what you have all communicated to the Minister and to

myself this morning is that every community in this country needs to want to be involved in the fabric of the defence of this country. And if we jeopardize that ability, then we are not preserving the doctrinal and strategic base for mobilization and for defence, and also for the integration, within the fabric of this land, the spirit that you are talking about, sir.