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FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Colonel (Retd) Alain Pellerin, OMM, CD

A major concern of the defence community these days is the requirement of a review of the government's defence policy and of how much public consultation on defence policy the government will be willing to accommodate. Articles are appearing regularly in the media over whether the Canadian Forces can continue to fill their current commitments. As well during this process, questions have arisen over whether the Canadian Forces are, in fact, still able to meet their 1994 White Paper commitments. This issue of *ON TRACK* features articles of varying opinions from our contributors and other sources on this important subject.

General Raymond Henault has provided us with an overview of the Canadian Forces (CF) from the time that he was promoted and appointed Chief of the Defence Staff. He has also outlined his priorities for the CF. General Henault's remarks, in *At a Crossroads*, are refreshingly clear and are a pleasure to read. His remarks carry essentially the same message that is contained in the CDS' Annual Report to Parliament. His message is very important and is deserving of the support of the members of the Institute.

There is uncertainty over the government's intention to conduct a review of foreign and defence policies. The longer the process is delayed the situation of the Canadian Forces (CF) will continue to deteriorate. Senior Defence Analyst Colonel Sean Henry explores three options available to the government in *The Elusive Defence Policy: A CDA Appraisal*.

Dr. Jack Granatstein, a former Director and CEO of the Canadian War Museum and long-time friend of CDA, addressed a sitting in Toronto on 8 May, last, of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. We are pleased to include

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DU DIRECTEUR EXÉCUTIF

Le colonel (à la retraite) Alain Pellerin, OMM, CD

L'une des principales préoccupations de la collectivité de la défense, en ce moment, est d'exiger l'examen de la politique du gouvernement en matière de défense et de savoir jusqu'à quel point le gouvernement est disposé à consulter le public à propos de la politique de défense. Les médias publient régulièrement des articles à savoir si les Forces canadiennes (FC) peuvent continuer leurs missions actuelles. On se demande également si les Forces canadiennes sont en mesure de demeurer fidèles aux engagements énoncés dans le Livre blanc sur la défense de 1994. Des articles parus dans *ON TRACK* décrivent les opinions divergentes de nos contributeurs et d'autres sources à ce sujet crucial.

Le général Raymond Henault nous a présenté une vue d'ensemble des Forces canadiennes (FC) depuis sa promotion en qualité de chef d'état-major de la Défense. Il a également donné les grandes lignes de ses priorités pour les FC. Les remarques du général Henault dans le rapport intitulé *À la croisée des chemins*, présentent des idées fraîches et nous les lisons avec plaisir. Elles transmettent essentiellement le même message que contient le Rapport annuel du CEMD au Parlement. Ses propos très importants méritent l'appui des membres de l'Institut.

Une certaine incertitude plane autour de l'intention du gouvernement à examiner ses politiques étrangères et de défense. Plus le procédé s'allonge, plus la situation des Forces canadiennes (FC) se détériore. Le colonel Sean Henry, analyste militaire principal, examine trois options qui se présentent au gouvernement et les énonce dans son article intitulé *«The Elusive Defence Policy: A CDA Appraisal»* [L'insaisissable politique de défense : une appréciation de la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD)].

(voir p. 2)

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Dr. Granatstein's remarks to the committee in *ON TRACK*. His address covers the defence issues effecting North America and Canada's role in North American defence.

Our Chairman, Lieutenant General Richard Evraire, presented the Atlantic Council of Canada spring seminar in Toronto, on May 22, 2002, with an overview of global security issues. We are pleased to provide for our readers an abridged version of the Chairman's address.

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The Conference of Defence Associations is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. It restricts its aim to one specific area - **defence issues**. CDA expresses its ideas and opinions and utilizes its political rights to influence government defence policy. It is the most senior and influential interest group in Canada's pro-defence community. Defence issues are brought to the public's attention by analysis and informed discussion through CDA's Institute.

The CDA Institute implements CDA's public information mandate. The Institute is a non-profit, charitable agency, dependant on private donations. See the donor application form in this newsletter. In return, donors will receive *ON TRACK* and other publications for the next 12 months. The CDA Institute is a registered charity and donations to it qualify for tax receipts.



La Conférence des associations de la Défense est un organisme non-gouvernemental et à but non-lucratif. Son champ d'expertise se limite aux **questions de la défense**. La CAD exprime ses opinions et ses idées et se prévaut de ses droits politiques pour influencer le gouvernement en matière de défense. La CAD est le groupe le plus ancien et ayant le plus d'influence au sein de la communauté canadienne pro-défense.

L'institut de la CAD s'occupe de l'information publique. L'Institut, une agence charitable, à but non-lucratif, est complètement dépendant des dons reçus. Veuillez donc vous référer au formulaire inclus à ce bulletin. En guise de retour, les donateurs recevront *ON TRACK* et les autres publications pendant les 12 prochains mois. L'Institut de la CAD est un organisme de charité enregistré et tous les dons reçus sont déductibles d'impôt.

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Jack Granatstein, Ph.D., ancien directeur et PDG au Musée canadien de la guerre, ami de longue date de la CAD, a prononcé une allocution, lors d'une conférence à Toronto le 8 mai dernier, du Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international de la Chambre des communes. Nous avons le plaisir de publier les remarques de M. Granatstein au Comité dans *ON TRACK*. Son allocution traite différentes questions de défense et leurs répercussions sur le rôle de l'Amérique du Nord et du Canada en matière de défense en Amérique du Nord.

Notre président, le lieutenant-général Richard Evraire, est intervenu lors du colloque du Conseil Atlantique du Canada qui a eu lieu le 22 mai 2002 à Toronto, en présentant une vue d'ensemble sur les principales questions de sécurité. Nous avons le plaisir d'offrir à nos lecteurs une version abrégée de l'allocution du président.

Nous sommes heureux, également, de publier dans le présent numéro les principales conclusions énoncées dans le rapport du comité de M. David Pratt, député, président du Comité permanent de la défense nationale et des anciens combattants de la Chambre des communes (CPDNAC), déposées le 30 mai et portant sur la capacité opérationnelle des Forces canadiennes. Les arguments avancés dans le rapport afin d'accroître le financement des Forces canadiennes et d'examiner la politique de défense, en consultant un vaste nombre d'intervenants, sont convaincants. Le rapport de M. Pratt est suivi d'un exemplaire de la lettre que la CAD a adressée à tous les sénateurs et les membres du Parlement, les encourageant à prêter leur appui au gouvernement dans le cadre des recommandations contenues dans le rapport du CPDNAC, intitulé «*Faire face à nos responsabilités : l'état de préparation des Forces canadiennes*».

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We are also pleased to include in this issue from Mr. David Pratt, MP, Chairman of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA), the main conclusions of his committee's final report, tabled on 30 May, on the operational readiness of the Canadian Forces. The arguments for an increase in funding for the Canadian Forces and for a defence policy review, with broad consultation, that are presented in the report are compelling. Following Mr. Pratt's report we have included a copy of the letter that CDA sent to all Senators and Members of Parliament, urging them to convey to the Government their support for the recommendations that are contained in SCONDVA's *Facing Our Responsibilities: The State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces*.

Lieutenant-General Lou Cuppens looks at the impact on Canada following the creation of Northern Command, in *Whither the Defence of North America*. In his well presented article Lieutenant-General Cuppens,, reviews the national policies of the United States that lay behind the impetus for the creation of NORTHCOM.

We are indebted to *National Network News* for its permission to include a very well presented article on the subject of a national security review, *A National Security Strategy*, the authors, Commodore (Retd) T.C. Heath and Lieutenant-Colonel (Retd) J.C. Berezowski, examine a number of factors that have a direct bearing on defence strategy

Mr. Joe Varner, an Ottawa-based defence analyst, provides for our readers a very interesting examination of Iraq and its links to the Al Qaida in *Evidence Linking Al Qaeda to Iraq Grounds For War*, that portray chilling consequences for both sides in the war on terrorism. Mr. Varner has examined links that one does not readily recognize.

One of the major events in the CDA Institute's calender is the annual presentation of the Vimy Award to one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values. Last year's programme was an outstanding success, and I am pleased to report that support for the programme this year, to date, from Canadian industry and others is very encouraging. This year's presentation of the

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Le lieutenant-général Lou Cuppens se penche sur les conséquences de la création du Commandement de l'Amérique du Nord dans son article intitulé «*Whither the Defense of North America*» [Où va la défense de l'Amérique du Nord]. Dans son article étoffé, le lieutenant-général Cuppens étudie les politiques nationales des États-Unis qui sous-tendent la création soudaine de NORTHCOM.

Nous sommes redevables à National Network News pour nous avoir permis de publier un article fort bien rédigé portant sur un examen de la sécurité nationale, intitulé «*A National Security Strategy*» [Une stratégie nationale de sécurité]. Les auteurs, le commodore (à la retraite) T. C. Heath et le lieutenant-colonel (à la retraite) J. C. Berezowski, se penchent sur un certain nombre de facteurs qui exercent une influence directe sur la stratégie de défense.

M. Joe Varner, un chercheur d'Ottawa, offre à nos lecteurs une étude très intéressante sur l'Iraq et ses liens avec Al-Qaida, intitulée «*Evidence Linking Al Qaeda to Iraq Grounds For War*» [Les liens évidents d'Al-Qaida avec les incitations de l'Iraq à la guerre]. L'étude décrit les conséquences effrayantes, pour les deux clans, dans la guerre au terrorisme. M. Varner a examiné des liens qui ne sont pas évidents pour tous.

L'un des événements principaux dans le calendrier de l'Institut de la CAD est la présentation annuelle de la distinction honorifique Vimy à un Canadien ou à une Canadienne qui a contribué, de manière significative et remarquable, à la défense et à la sécurité de notre nation ainsi qu'au maintien de nos valeurs démocratiques. Le programme de l'année dernière a été un succès remarquable et je suis heureux d'annoncer que le soutien que nous témoigne l'industrie du Canada, à ce jour, et d'autres secteurs représente un véritable encouragement pour la réussite du programme de cette année. La présentation de cette année de la distinction honorifique Vimy aura lieu le 15 novembre lors d'un dîner d'apparat qui se tiendra, selon une demande unanime, à la Grande Galerie du Musée canadien des civilisations, à Gatineau,

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Vimy Award will take place 15 November at a gala dinner that will be held again, by popular demand, in the Grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization, in Gatineau, overlooking the Ottawa River and Parliament Hill.

In closing I wish to thank our members, particularly our donor patrons, companions and officer level donors, and corporate sponsors, for their financial support in the work of CDA and the CDA Institute. Their support is reaping dividends through increased awareness by Canadians, including Parliament, as well as the media, of the need for a credible military. We add to the debate on issues of defence and national security. With your continued support, we can promote the study and awareness of Canadian military affairs. However, as you may be aware, convincing the Government of the importance of the CF in our society is an ongoing battle.

If you are not already a member of the CDA Institute, I would urge you to join us. Registration forms are printed on the past page of this newsletter. **Your financial support as a member of the Institute is needed as a valued element for the continuing success of your CDA.**

AT A CROSSROADS

General Raymond R. Henault, CMM, CD
Chief of the Defence Staff

Overview

Looking back over my first year as Chief of the Defence Staff, it is my opinion that it has been a crucial year for the Canadian Forces. It has demonstrated with clarity that we are at a crossroads as an institution – a crossroads between the past and the future.

Over the past 12 months, we have witnessed the brutality of terrorism and the potential dangers that a wide range of new asymmetric threats poses to civil society and to Canadians.

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avec vue sur la rivière des Outaouais et sur la Colline du Parlement.

Pour conclure, j'aimerais remercier nos membres, en particulier nos clients donateurs, nos compagnons, nos donateurs officiels et nos sociétés commanditaires pour leur soutien financier à la CAD et à l'Institut de la CAD. Leur soutien a suscité une connaissance accrue auprès des Canadiens et des Canadiennes, le Parlement et les médias y compris, de la nécessité d'avoir des forces armées crédibles. À cela s'ajoute le débat qui porte sur les questions de défense et de sécurité nationale. Grâce à votre appui continu, nous sommes en mesure d'encourager l'étude et la connaissance des affaires militaires du Canada. Cependant, comme vous devez le savoir, persuader le gouvernement que les Forces canadiennes sont d'importance dans notre société, représente un combat constant.

Si vous ne faites pas encore partie de l'Institut de la CAD, je vous encourage à vous joindre à nous. Vous trouverez les formulaires de demande d'adhésion à la fin du présent bulletin. **Votre soutien financier en tant que membre de l'Institut nous sera précieux afin de maintenir la réussite de la CAD.**

À LA CROISÉE DES CHEMINS

Général Raymond R. Henault, CMM, DC
Chef d'état-major de la Défense

Vue d'ensemble

En faisant le tour d'horizon de ma première année en tant que Chef d'état major de la Défense j'en conclus que l'année a été décisive pour les Forces canadiennes. L'année qui vient de s'écouler a illustré clairement que nous sommes à la croisée des chemins en tant qu'institution – à la croisée des chemins entre le passé et l'avenir.

Au cours des douze derniers mois, nous avons été témoins de la brutalité du terrorisme et des risques que posent les menaces asymétriques nouvelles pour la société civile et l'ensemble des Canadiens. Nous nous sommes rappelés nos liens étroits avec les États-Unis et l'importance d'unir nos efforts en vue d'assurer la sécurité de nos citoyens. De plus, nous avons assisté au plus important déploiement des Forces canadiennes sur la scène internationale depuis la guerre de Corée.

Les événements récents ont confirmé que le contexte stratégique dans lequel nous évoluons a changé au cours des dix dernières années et qu'il continue d'évoluer. Depuis la fin de la guerre froide, nous nous sommes transformés d'une organisation structurée et prête à seconder l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN), essentiellement au moyen de forces déployées « à l'avant » en Europe, en une organisation

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We have also been reminded about the depth of our relationship with the United States, and the importance and value of working together to ensure the security of our citizens. In addition, we have seen the largest deployment of Canadian forces into international operations since the Korean War.

Recent events have also reinforced the fact that the strategic environment in which we operate has changed over the past decade and that it continues to evolve. Since the end of the Cold War, we have gone from an organization structured and ready to come to the aid of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, mainly with forward-deployed forces in Europe, to an organization that must be ready to answer the Government's call to action on a global basis in a wide variety of missions and tasks, from humanitarian assistance to combat operations.

Closer to home, the past decade has reinforced the Canadian Forces' unique role as Canada's 'force of last resort' and the importance of ensuring that we are prepared to assist the Government and other government departments to respond to disasters such as the Manitoba Flood in 1997 or the Ice Storm in 1998 or the protection of Canada's critical infrastructure. On our own continent, it is clear in the aftermath of September 11th, that both the United States and Canada are moving ahead quickly to strengthen our collective defence and security, particularly here at home.

Overall, recent events and developments have confirmed that the strategy we are pursuing to transform and prepare the Canadian Forces for the future, through the vision embodied in our Strategy 2020 document is sound. We have recognized the dangers of modern operations and the growing list of new threats to which we must respond. We have invested in a focussed and deliberate manner in our people, in training, and in the modern equipment needed to ensure we remain relevant, combat capable and inter-operable with our allies. And, we have worked diligently to reach out to Canadians, defence stakeholders and Canadian decision-makers to improve public awareness of the contributions and challenges ahead of us.

The Canadian Forces leadership has also clearly stated that, while our strategy for the future is sound, the status quo is not sustainable. Operational and personnel tempo remain high, we face significant recruiting and retention challenges, we are carrying a significant amount of aging infrastructure, and we need to modernize equipment and capabilities in key areas. Most importantly, perhaps, and as many of our allies are doing, we need to continue transforming the CF into an organization that has the capabilities needed for the future, and divest ourselves of those that are less relevant to today's security environment.

Some will argue that we can overcome the majority of those challenges with more financial resources. While more money

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qui se doit d'être prête à répondre à l'appel à l'action du gouvernement à l'échelle de la planète, et ce dans un grand nombre de missions et fonctions, de l'aide humanitaire aux opérations de combat.

Plus près de chez nous, les dix dernières années ont mis en valeur le rôle unique que jouent les Forces canadiennes en tant que « force de dernier recours » du Canada et rappelé l'importance de veiller à ce que nous soyons prêts à aider le gouvernement et d'autres ministères à intervenir en cas de sinistre tel que les inondations au Manitoba en 1997 et la crise du verglas de 1998, ou pour protéger les infrastructures essentielles du Canada. À l'échelle du continent, il est clair que dans la foulée des événements du 11 septembre, le Canada et les États-Unis s'affairent à renforcer la défense et la sécurité collectives.

Somme toute, les événements et les développements récents ont confirmé la validité de la stratégie dont nous nous sommes dotée afin de transformer les Forces canadiennes et les préparer pour l'avenir, grâce à la vision énoncée dans la Stratégie de défense 2020. Nous avons reconnu les dangers inhérents des opérations modernes et le nombre grandissant de nouvelles menaces auxquelles nous devons réagir. Nous avons investi de manière ciblée et délibérée dans nos effectifs, dans l'instruction et dans l'équipement moderne requis pour faire en sorte que nous demeurions une force pertinente, apte au combat et apte à mener des opérations avec nos alliés. Enfin, nous avons travaillé avec diligence pour rejoindre les Canadiens, les intervenants du secteur de la défense et les décideurs canadiens afin de sensibiliser davantage la population à nos réalisations et aux défis que nous affronterons.

Les dirigeants des Forces canadiennes ont indiqué clairement que si notre stratégie pour l'avenir est valable, le statu quo ne peut toutefois être soutenu. Les rythmes opérationnel et d'affectation du personnel demeurent élevés; nous sommes confrontés à d'importants défis en matière de recrutement et de maintien des effectifs; nous héritons de nombreuses infrastructures vieillissantes et nous devons moderniser notre équipement et nos capacités dans des secteurs clés. Ce qui importe peut-être le plus, c'est que nous devons – tout comme un bon nombre de nos alliés – poursuivre la transformation des FC en une organisation dotée des capacités dont nous aurons besoin à l'avenir et renoncer à celles qui sont moins utiles dans le contexte de sécurité d'aujourd'hui.

Certains affirmeront que nous pouvons relever la majorité de ces défis en obtenant davantage de ressources. Bien que l'injection de ressources soit toujours bienvenue, elle ne peut résoudre seule le problème; elle ne peut non plus éliminer la nécessité de faire des choix difficiles sur la meilleure façon d'optimiser et de moderniser les Forces canadiennes. Par ailleurs, nous devons reconnaître que le gouvernement a autorisé dans les budgets de 1999, 2000 et 2001, une augmentation des dépenses militaires à compter de l'exercice 2001-2002.

(voir p. 6)

is important and always welcome, it alone will not solve the problem, nor will it eliminate the need to make tough choices on how best to optimize and modernize the Canadian Forces. Further, we must recognize that the Government, through Budgets 1999, 2000, and 2001, has authorized increases in defence spending commencing in fiscal year 2001-2002. While these additional resources do not overcome all of our operational, sustainment and modernization challenges, they do provide for a number of personnel initiatives and investment opportunities, and serve to increase our ability to support counter-terrorism and respond to asymmetric threats.

In the meantime, we must not lose sight of the fact that today's Canadian Forces is a modern, professional and combat-capable force. We are currently making the fourth largest contribution to the international campaign against terrorism. Our land forces have played an important role in combat operations on the ground in Afghanistan, alongside their U.S. counterparts. Our Navy is fully interoperable with the U.S. and other coalition naval forces in the region and has participated in and led coalition naval operations. Our Air Force has provided air transport and maritime patrol capability to the coalition throughout the campaign, as well as embarked helicopter detachments aboard our ships. In addition, we are providing air, land and naval forces to 12 other missions around the world, including those in the Balkans and the Middle East.

Looking Forward

If we are to remain relevant, however, we must ensure the Canadian Forces are affordable and sustainable in the long term. Given this, and the changes shaping Canada's security and defence environment, the Government has announced that defence update is in order. While this update will generate some uncertainty about the future by its very nature, it is an important and positive development for the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence. The core tenets of Canada's defence policy remain sound. Canada continues to need and benefit from multi-purpose, combat capable forces. However, the update will provide greater clarity and direction from the Government on the capabilities on which we need to focus today and into the future.

Priorities

Our main objective remains as it always has and that is to deliver on operations. Our main function is to provide defence and security for Canadians, and operations are the most visible and important element of that task.

That said, we must continue to put people first as our success depends upon them. No amount of new technology will compensate for a force without professionalism, expertise and mo-

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S'il est vrai que ces ressources supplémentaires ne répondent pas à l'ensemble de nos besoins opérationnels ni de nos besoins de maintien en puissance et de modernisation, elles nous permettent néanmoins de prendre certaines initiatives favorables au personnel et des mesures d'investissement, ainsi que d'accroître notre capacité de soutenir des activités antiterroristes et de répondre aux menaces asymétriques.

Dans l'intervalle, nous ne devons pas oublier que les Forces canadiennes d'aujourd'hui sont une force moderne, professionnelle et apte au combat. À l'heure actuelle, notre contribution à la campagne internationale de lutte contre le terrorisme est la quatrième en importance. Nos forces terrestres ont joué un rôle important dans les opérations de combat au sol en Afghanistan, aux côtés de leurs homologues américains. La Marine canadienne est complètement interoperable avec la marine américaine ainsi qu'avec les autres forces navales présentes dans la région, et elle a été appelée à diriger des opérations navales de la coalition. Notre Force aérienne a fourni des services de transport aérien et de patrouille maritime à la coalition dans toute la région, ainsi que des hélicoptères Sea King embarqués à bord de nos propres navires. Parallèlement, le Canada fournit des forces aériennes, terrestres et navales à une douzaine d'autres missions de par le monde, y compris celles dans les Balkans et au Moyen-Orient.

Le Futur

Si nous souhaitons demeurer pertinents, toutefois, nous devons nous assurer que les Forces canadiennes soient abordables et soutenables à long terme. Cela dit, et étant donné les changements qui transforment le contexte de la sécurité et de la défense au Canada, le gouvernement a indiqué qu'il conviendrait de faire une mise à jour de la défense. Bien que par sa nature, cette mise à jour sera une source d'incertitude face à l'avenir, il s'agit quand même d'un développement important et positif pour les Forces canadiennes et le ministère de la Défense nationale. Les principes fondamentaux de la politique de défense du Canada demeurent valables. Le Canada a besoin et profite toujours d'une force polyvalente et apte au combat. La mise à jour sera toutefois l'occasion de préciser l'orientation du gouvernement en ce qui concerne les capacités dont nous devons nous doter aujourd'hui et à l'avenir.

Les Priorités

Notre objectif principal doit être d'exécuter nos opérations. Notre fonction principale étant d'assurer la défense et la sécurité des Canadiens, les opérations constituent l'élément le plus visible et le plus important de cette tâche.

Malgré l'incidence des nouvelles technologies sur les opérations militaires la réussite repose encore sur le professionnalisme, l'expertise et la motivation de nos effectifs. Voilà pourquoi nous devons continuer d'accorder la priorité

(voir p. 7)

tivation. Our people are our lifeblood, and the military demands more from its people than perhaps any other profession – namely, it asks them to serve anywhere, anytime and with unlimited liability. In other words, we ask our men and women to be prepared to sacrifice their lives as part of their job. In return, we have an obligation to keep their needs and those of their families at the forefront of our thinking and decision-making. In today's context, that means managing our operational tempo, and making the changes needed to address our recruiting and retention challenges, continuing to invest in leadership and professional development, and promoting diversity. It also means ensuring our people have the right tools to do their job.

That is why we must continue to move forward to modernize and enhance our operational capabilities. We must look at readiness levels, examine ways to guarantee our ability to deploy globally, and seek to remain inter-operable in key areas with our allies, particularly the United States. We must also continue to strengthen our ability to deal with asymmetric threats. Furthermore, we must support the revitalization and restructuring of the Reserves. And, through the defence update, we must ensure our resulting force structure is affordable and sustainable.

Finally, we must continue to be proactive in communications. We have made enormous progress over the past few years in strengthening our external communications through a series of initiatives including the Canadian Forces Parliamentary Program. These efforts must continue. We must also do more to enhance our internal communications. The rapid pace of change is going to continue, and we must all play an active role in explaining those changes to Canadians and to the men and women of the Canadian Forces.

Canadian Forces members, both Regular Force and Reserve, capably supported by the civilian members of the Defence Team, are doing an outstanding job of serving their country. I am fully confident in the Canadian Forces' ability to meet the challenges we face as we continue to provide for the defence and security of Canadians today and concurrently prepare for the future.

aux gens. Nos effectifs sont notre ressource première, et la profession militaire est probablement plus exigeante à l'égard de ses membres que toute autre profession – elle leur demande notamment de servir n'importe où et n'importe quand, avec une responsabilité illimitée. Autrement dit, nous demandons à nos hommes et à nos femmes d'être prêts à faire le sacrifice de leur vie dans le cadre de leurs fonctions. En retour, nous avons l'obligation de tenir compte de leur besoins et de ceux de leur famille lorsque nous prenons des décisions. Dans le contexte d'aujourd'hui, cela signifie que nous devons gérer notre rythme opérationnel et apporter les changements qui s'imposent pour répondre aux défis liés au recrutement et au maintien des effectifs, continuer d'investir dans le leadership et le perfectionnement professionnel et promouvoir la diversité. Cela signifie également qu'il faut veiller à ce que le personnel dispose de l'équipement dont il a besoin pour exécuter ses tâches.

Voilà pourquoi il importe que nous poursuivions nos efforts visant à moderniser et à renforcer nos capacités opérationnelles. Nous devons nous attarder aux niveaux de disponibilité opérationnelle, examiner les moyens nous permettant de nous déployer à l'échelle de la planète et chercher à maintenir notre interopérabilité dans des secteurs clés avec nos alliés, en particulier avec les États-Unis. Nous devons également continuer d'accroître notre capacité de réagir aux menaces asymétriques. Il nous faut aussi appuyer la revitalisation et la restructuration de la Réserve. Nous devons veiller à ce que la structure des forces qui résultera de la mise à jour de la défense soit abordable et soutenable.

Enfin, nous devons continuer de prendre les devants en ce qui a trait aux communications. Nous avons fait des progrès considérables au cours des dernières années en améliorant nos communications externes au moyen d'une série d'initiatives, dont le Programme parlementaires des Forces canadiennes. Ces efforts doivent se poursuivre. Nous devons également redoubler d'ardeur pour améliorer nos communications internes. Le rythme effréné des changements va se poursuivre, et nous avons tous un rôle actif à jouer afin d'expliquer ces changements à la population ainsi qu'aux hommes et aux femmes des Forces canadiennes.

Les réguliers autant que les réservistes des Forces canadiennes, habilement appuyés par les membres civils de l'équipe de la Défense, servent leur pays avec brio. Je suis persuadé que les Force canadiennes sont parfaitement en mesure de relever les défis auxquelles elles sont confrontés, tout en continuant de subvenir aux besoins des canadiens et des canadiennes en matière de défense et de sécurité aujourd'hui et demain.

THE ELUSIVE DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW - A CDA APPRAISAL

Colonel (Retired) A. Sean Henry, OMM, CD

Senior Defence Analyst, CDA

The abrupt change of defence ministers at the end of May 02 has added more uncertainty over the government's intention to conduct a review of foreign and defence policies. What is known, however, is that the longer the process is delayed the situation of the Canadian Forces will continue to deteriorate at an accelerated rate. Senior officers currently assess the status of the forces as 'survival mode'.

The origins go back to April 01 when the decision was taken to conduct a defence program update. This was conceived as an in-house exercise involving Central Agencies and DND. The focus was on the 50% of the DND budget request not approved for Budget 2000. It was clear from the beginning that there was a bias to continue denial of additional funds. Later, in August 01, the process was re-designated as a 'defence policy' update. The implication was that policy options would be put forward to fit the existing defence budget envelope.

The events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent 'war on terrorism' at first appeared to open the door for a significant increase in defence spending. That assumption was shattered by the contents of Budget 2001, in which only a pittance of some \$500 million was allocated to military capabilities – and over fifty-percent of that was assigned, in advance, to JTF2.

Sharp public criticism of these developments may have prompted former defence minister Art Eggleton to announce during a media scrum at the CDA annual AGM and Seminar that a full-blown defence policy review would be undertaken. In April 02, foreign minister Bill Graham confirmed that a review of foreign policy would occur in parallel with defence, and that Foreign Affairs would provide the "framework" for analysis and public consultations. Public involvement would be sought through the appropriate parliamentary standing committees – on foreign affairs and international trade, and on defence and veterans' affairs.

Since then there has been no further information released on the form and timings of such a review. On the contrary, it seems instead that there has been a return to the original concept of an 'update' of sorts, with limited public input, and little increase in funding beyond the immediate needs of Operation APOLLO, and other current commitments.

The position of CDA, enunciated in public on a number of occasions by the Chairman and senior CDA staff, is that a public foreign and defence policy review should be undertaken forthwith. Moreover, it is appreciated that there are three options available to the government:

- approve only a defence program/policy update in fall 02, with minimal additional funding in Budget 2002;
- launch a public foreign and defence policy review in fall 02, with a view to publishing a new defence white paper in Jun 03, with guaranteed funding in Budget 03;
- a combination of the two options stated above.

CDA supports the 'combination' option, and believes there is a strong case in favour of it. It would comprise an update proposal (which has been under preparation in DND for the past year – see above), combined with a reasonable infusion of money into Budget 2002. This would improve the 'life-support system of the dying patient (the CF)' to a more satisfactory level. It would also buy time. Simultaneously, the government should announce a full foreign policy/defence policy/funding review, with a commitment to publish a new White Paper on Defence by fall 03. This would signal that defence is finally recognized as an important responsibility by the Chrétien government. The most immediate benefit would be to create a positive image with the Americans, and other allies at the Prague NATO Summit in December 02. Without a full defence review, DND would still be left with an underfunded 1994 White Paper, thus prolonging the crisis in Canadian defence.

The combination option would, however, present some difficulties over modalities:

- How would the update and full review process be presented in a credible fashion as a seamless and logical exercise?
- What would be the framework for the review – regarding committee structures, forms and sources of input, etc, etc?
- If the Prime Minister stays beyond Feb 03, the full review results could be pre-empted by his ongoing direction not to spend more money on defence. This a fundamental problem and is likely not resolvable, other than by an indirect approach such as allocating funds to other departments for projects beneficial to DND.

Further considerations are as follows:

- A major problem would be how to sell the update as 'progress', vice mere muddling through, and how to make it look like a logical lead-in to a full review. The

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international security outlook has changed fundamentally since the attacks of 11 Sep 01. Budget 2001 addressed some of the issues, but the health of the Canadian economy was uncertain then. Today it appears a recovery is underway. This development could permit a larger and immediate investment in defence. This was a possibility advanced by the former Minister of Finance;

- A useful initiative would be to focus on the army transformation (restructuring) process and objectives that have been announced recently by the Chief of the Land Staff. The army plan has been extremely well conceived and could be a show case to prove that the CF are really on their way to dealing with the new security environment;
- But it must be clearly understood and accepted by the government that:
 - * for the army (and by extension the CF) this is merely an *interim step pending the completion of a full defence review*;
 - * a reasonable sum of money must be provided in Budget 2002 to stabilize the army and the CF, to carry on with current missions, and to create a foundation to implement results of a full defence review;
- The minimum additional allocations for DND in Budget 2002 should be:
 - * \$ 1 billion to the budget base to remove the annual deficit in the O & M account;
 - * \$ 500 million to cover costs of Operation APOLLO;
 - * \$ 142 million to raise Militia strength to 18,500;
 - * \$ 100 million for repayment of the purchase of two Challenger jets.

Considering what was not done for the Canadian Forces in Budget 2001, the total of about \$ 2 billion in Budget 2002 would not be unreasonable, and it is congruent with recommendations of both SCNDVA and the Auditor-General. Again, with the economy picking up and, a significant fiscal surplus apparently available, the pre-conditions for allocating more money to defence are being met.

An immediate (Budget 2002) allocation to DND would need to be designated for expenditures to maintain military capabilities – not for anti-terror projects outside DND, as was done in Budget 2001. Input into either a short term defence update, or long term defence review, would need to be a balance of bold new proposals, and a selection of perennially

sound military capabilities. The three services (especially the army), and the evolving joint CF framework, are producing a number good plans in this regard.

Again, the major challenge would be to justify and render credible a separate Defence Update in advance of a Defence Review. The following themes are considered valid to this end:

- the desirability of legitimizing/confirming the ‘policy’ enunciated in Budget 2001. Most commentators criticize this trend towards having policy in a variety of fields announced by the Minister of Finance as part of his budget statements. In this case the objective would be to assess the new threat situation comprehensively – not to simply address terrorism alone;
- the fact the CF must have immediate interim direction and funding to assure preservation of core military capabilities. They cannot afford to wait another year for this;
- along the same lines, summarize any number of other loose-ends that have emerged since White Paper 94; eg, even without a full defence review, it is possible to state that the fundamental factors in Canadian defence remain sound; ie, defence of Canada, defence of North America with the US, and contingency operations overseas. This would provide a firm and credible base for announcement of selected vital capital projects now held in abeyance; for example, maritime helicopters and logistics/deployment ships;
- showcase the army transformation project, as a first step to meet the new challenges posed by revised threat priorities and technological advances;
- tie-up the loose ends of Militia expansion, by providing money for the approved increase to 18,500 (this could also be tied to the needs of Homeland Security);
- provide money for these initiatives – but indicate they would not prejudice the results of a full defence review;
- there is a need to stabilize the CF in its present situation, so that it may implement effectively its current commitments. It is not in the national interest to withdraw from these commitments in piece-meal and ad hoc fashion – especially the ‘war on terrorism’ commitments, such as the one in Afghanistan;
- an immediate defence update would provide a firm foundation upon which the results of a succeeding defence policy review could be built;
- it is possible that a short term increase in the DND budget could improve the chances of resolving trade disputes with the US, through ‘linkage.’

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The combination option presents certain risks, the most obvious being to allow the government to get 'off the hook' for the immediate future, while it continues to procrastinate regarding a longer term review and advances the 'do nothing/muddling through' policy that has been in effect for almost a

decade. On the other hand, merely allocating a pittance of funds to DND in Budget 2002 would present even greater risks for Canadian national interests and the Canadian Forces. For this reason CDA supports the combination option.

COMMENTS TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Toronto, May 8, 2002

Dr. J.L. Granatstein, Chair, Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century

There are a number of issues that precede and arise from the events of 9/11 that pose challenges for Canada's immediate and long-term relations with its superpower neighbor. They merit full public and parliamentary discussion for all are important questions on which Canadians need to be informed. On behalf of the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century, I would like to discuss only two today, and the first is National Missile Defence.

Defence against Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles has been of major concern in the United States for years, though the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union constrained research for years. The Bush administration has given the strongest of indications of its intention to withdraw from this commitment and to proceed full blast with research to develop by 2005 a defence against ICBMs from present and future 'rogue' states such as North Korea, Iraq and others. The Russians and Chinese are unhappy about this, naturally enough, and so are many Canadians. But the United States is all but certain to speed up the research and deployment of an NMD system—if one can be developed which is by no means certain.

What should the Canadian position be when faced with this American determination, a determination only strengthened by 9/11? Most Canadian officials downplay the rogue state threat and worry about American unilateralism. If the research failed to produce a useful defensive system, almost no one would weep. But if it does?

Canada has been a partner in the North American Aerospace Defence Command, headquartered at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, since 1957-58, successively renewing its commitments under this agreement every five years. The changing thrust of NORAD is best demonstrated by the replacement a number of years ago of "Air Defence" in its name by "Aerospace Defence", and it is very likely that the United States will want to put NMDs under NORAD control

to take advantage of the existing warning systems NORAD possesses and that Canadian personnel help run.

If Canada takes a high moral stand against the NMD defensive system, therefore, the Canadians in NORAD could no longer fully participate in the warning and assessment process. The implications of this are clear: the Americans might prefer to close down NORAD as an integrated command or to give NMD to their Space Command, perhaps even amalgamating it with the U.S. Strategic Command. For all practical purposes, NORAD's gutting would take with it all Canadian influence on continental air defence, and it will almost certainly affect the vast flow of intelligence Canada receives from American sources. If Canada accepts NMD, on the other hand, and missile defence goes to NORAD, Canadian influence might increase.

No one suggests that Canada will acquire go/no go authority over NMD if NORAD runs the show. But Canada will have the right to consultation, the right to participation, the right to a place at the table when decisions are made. As the United States is all but certain to proceed, Canada must choose between high morality and great practicality, and in such circumstances, when morality will only anger the Bush Administration **and** hurt Canadian interests, there is no choice: the time for maximum benefit may already have slipped by but, nonetheless, the earlier Canada agrees to support the NMD decision, the better.

Similar to the NMD/NORAD conundrum is the question of the Northern Command, the new United States military super-command, announced April 17, 2002. NORTHCOM is to be activated on October 1, 2002, and to be led by the US Air Force four-star general who commands NORAD. NORTHCOM will also be housed alongside NORAD at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. Such an organization, largely for purposes of coordination among the fractious American

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services, had long been suggested in the United States, such proposals pre-dating the World Trade Center attack.

Homeland defence is obviously of great concern to Americans—the Department of Defense’s *Quadrennial Defence Review* of September 30, 2001 declared it “the highest priority”—and should be so to Canadians. NORTHCOM, however, is an American national command, and it is very unlikely that Canada will be invited to participate in joint planning or command. But it would be good sense for Ottawa to press for the creation of an expanded NORAD arrangement that covers both nations’ land and naval forces and preserves Canada’s status in the bi-national NORAD.

Such suggestions run up against the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade’s concerns about sovereignty and autonomy, and likely the Finance Department’s fear that, if Canada expands NORAD to cover Homeland defence, American pressures for much greater defence spending might be too strong to be ignored.

The question, however, must be approached exactly as the NMD question. The United States is determined to improve its Homeland defence and is certain to approach this subject, as it must, from a continental perspective. The news release announcing Northern Command declared its area of responsibility to be all of continental North America including Canada and gave the Commander-in-Chief of Northern Command the task of “security cooperation and military coordination” with other nations.

Canada thus has the choice to stand back and allow the Americans to plan for the use of Canadian territory or to participate in the decisions. Prime Minister Chretien’s instinctive response was to say correctly that Northern Command was the Americans’ “own business,” but he then added that “The defence of Canada will be assured by the Canadian government and not by the American government.” His office issued a ‘fact sheet’ that suggested that ‘informal’ discussions thus far “do not include the possible creation of a new joint command with standing forces attributed to it.”

Foreign minister Bill Graham was more circumspect, noting that the government had advised the United States “that once they have announced their plan...we will study it and determine to what extent we wish or whether it would be good for Canada to participate”. Published reports suggested that the Cabinet was to respond to the United States by mid-May.

Once again, there is no real choice. Canada Firsters will

claim that Canada is tying itself to the American chariot wheels if it expands NORAD or posts officers to Northern Command as it might do in the future, but the basic decisions were made in the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940 and confirmed by a succession of defence and trade agreements. Do we want some consultation or none on matters that concern Canadian security every bit as much as American?

Some have pointed to existing differences in Canadian and American policy in arguing against NORAD expansion. “What does a Canadian soldier do,” Lloyd Axworthy asked, “if asked to handle land mines on Canadian soil, in contravention of our treaty undertakings? What if we apprehend someone considered a war criminal...? US law would prevent them being turned over to the [International Criminal Court], while our obligations require it.” These are important questions, but they would have more force if the Canadian and United States air forces had not successfully worked together in NORAD for 45 years and if the Canadian and United States navies had not seamlessly integrated, daily resolving problems of equal complexity.

So long as our troops remain under Canadian command, with Canadians able to decide what they will do and when, if ever, to place them under US operational control, the nation will have more than sufficient power over its military destiny. If operational control is granted to American commanders, it can be withdrawn at any time. Moreover, an expanded NORAD would be obliged to request Canadian forces for particular missions and the Canadian government would be able to agree or not after assessing all the factors. This is the case in the present NORAD.

Very simply, Axworthy’s concerns are largely wrong in fact; they are certainly not in the interests of Canada and continental defence. By all means, Canadians need to raise their concerns about further integration with the United States military, but in their desire to stay a sovereign nation, they must not forget what is at stake. With almost 90 percent of our trade going to or passing through the U.S., our well-being depends on good relations with our superpower neighbour.

One unnamed senior Canadian official told the *National Post* that “there is an option for us to work together to watch over North America or we are going to have the Americans watch over us because they are going to do it one way or the other”. That frames the question before us very clearly and there is only one possible answer. Canada must join with the United States—if the Americans ultimately agree to an expanded NORAD, something that is by no means yet clear.

LCol Douglas Bland, a respected Queen’s University defence analyst who considered this subject after consulting an array of

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Pentagon officials put the matter in the bleakest possible terms: “Should Canada hesitate or seek to avoid these new obligations, it seems likely that the United States will blockade its northern border, undertake covert intelligence operations in Canada and act unilaterally to defend itself by deploying its armed forces in Canada whenever the president deems it necessary”.

We must hope that Bland is overstating matters by declaring such actions “likely,” but his point cannot be ignored. The

United States is deadly serious about Homeland defence and only utterly foolish Canadians will ignore this. For more than sixty years the Americans have sought Canadian cooperation in defence. Canada has almost always offered it, though frequently not without misgivings, and it must do so once more.

(J.L. Granatstein is Chair of the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century (www.ccs21.org.)

CANADA IN A DANGEROUS WORLD

Colonel (Retd) A. Sean Henry, OMM, CD, Senior Defence Analyst

(This article is an abridged version of a presentation made by Chairman CDA, Lieutenant General (Retd) Richard Evraire (Retd), to the Atlantic Council of Canada spring seminar in Toronto, on May 22, 2002)

A quote from Vincenzo Coli, custodian, Holy Convent of Assisi, as reported in *The Italian Daily* dated May 13, 2002, sets the scene well for this discourse:

Our starting point is clarity. One must distinguish, when referring to people who say ‘no’ to war, between pacifists and men of peace. The former refer to non-violence; an obsolete and one-way principle that doesn’t in fact help understand situations. The others seek to analyse concrete reality, admitting that the use of force is sometimes necessary to stop massacres.

The conference theme is asymmetric warfare, and that is certainly the threat that has moved to the head of the list over the past several years. Other speakers and panel members will cover asymmetric warfare in some detail. However, a note of caution needs to be sounded so as not to succumb to the human tendency of focussing solely on the ‘threat of the moment,’ and fail to consider the broader tapestry from which it has emerged – and which will inevitably change the ranking of threats in the years ahead.

I shall therefore examine the ‘dangerous world’ Canada inhabits at the start of the 21st century, and what the implications should be for our defence policy, and the military options for the Canadian forces. From the beginning of time, the fundamental drives of the human condition, have remained much the same. I refer, of course, to the eternal forces of survival and competition, and the need to develop measures of security to deal with them.

For those who say that we are moving into a more peaceful era compared to the past, I draw attention to the consistent presence of savagery and brutality in our affairs over many millennia, the most notable and recent manifestations of

which are conjured up by uttering the words: Bosnia; Rwanda; and, the World Trade Centre.

It is clear to me that “history has not ended.” To be blunt, war, violence, brutality and aggression are hard-wired into the human psyche – and any nation that does not plan to deal with that reality is doomed either to subjugation, or to irrelevance. Although it is unfashionable to say so, the old Roman proverb is still largely correct: “if you wish to preserve peace, prepare for war.”

With the sudden end of the cold war, and the collapse of its accompanying bi-polar framework, the world has entered a period of great uncertainty. Alliances shift and threats arise or recede as actors attempt to identify their new roles in international affairs.

A new pattern of stability is being sought; an elusive goal to be sure. What is equally certain is that future international security arrangements will differ from those of the past. While some components of national power, such as natural resources, geography and demography have changed little, important new forces have come on the scene. Globalization of economic and financial affairs is moving ahead quickly, assisted by the so-called ‘information revolution’ that is already increasing the power of individuals, while at the same time raising to prominence international corporations and interest groups.

But even in this fluid context, future world security will still gravitate around the interests of major players such as the United States, Russia, China, Japan, India, and a united Europe. Any number of possibilities exist for conflict within this group. Moreover, a number of flashpoints could, in the short term, call for armed forces to supplement diplomacy to end aggression and restore peace. The Middle East, South Asia (especially Kashmir), the Balkans, Korea, and Central Africa, are of course the obvious tinder boxes. But new threats are emerging from the spread of terrorism, crime, pollution, population explosion, disease and resource depletion.

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THE VIMY AWARD

Nominations are invited for the year 2002 Vimy Award.

The Vimy Award was initiated in 1991 to recognize, annually, one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values.

Previous recipients of this prestigious award include the Right Honourable Brian Dickson, General John deChastelain, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Vice-Admiral Larry Murray, Dr. Jack Granatstein; Lieutenant-General Charles H. Belzile, the Honourable Barnet Danson, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, and Air Commodore Leonard Birchall.

Any Canadian may nominate a fellow citizen for the award. Nominations must be in writing, and must include a summary of the reasons for the nomination and be accompanied by a short biography. Nominations must be received by 1 August 2002, and should be addressed to:

VIMY AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS
INSTITUTE
359 KENT STREET
OTTAWA ON K2P 0R7

The Vimy Award will be presented on Friday, 15 November 2002, at a gala dinner that will be held in the Grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization, Gatineau QC.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations Institute at: Fax (613) 236 8191; e-mail: pao@cda-cdai.ca; or telephone (613) 236 9903.



The Vimy Award/La Distinction honorifique Vimy

LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY

Nous invitons les nominations pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy 2002.

La Distinction honorifique Vimy a été instituée en 1991 dans le but de reconnaître, chaque année, un Canadien ou une Canadienne ayant apporté une contribution extraordinaire à la sécurité ou à la défense de notre nation et à la préservation de notre démocratie.

Les récipiendaires précédents de la Distinction honorifique Vimy sont, entre autres, le Très honorable Brian Dickson, le Général John deChastelain, le Très honorable Joe Clark, le Vice-amiral Larry Murray, le Dr. Jack Granatstein, le Lieutenant-général Charles H. Belzile, l'Honorable Barnet Danson, le Major-général Lewis MacKenzie, et le Commodore de l'Air Leonard Birchall.

Tout Canadien/Canadienne peut nommer un citoyen/citoyenne pour le Distinction honorifique Vimy. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par écrit et inclure un sommaire des raisons motivant votre nomination et une biographie du candidat. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 août 2002, et doivent être adressées au

COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DE LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY
L'INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE
359 RUE KENT, SUITE 502
OTTAWA ON K2P 0R7

La Distinction honorifique Vimy sera présentée vendredi, le 15 novembre 2002, à un dîner gala qui aura lieu à la Grande Galerie du Musée canadien des civilisations, Gatineau QC.

Pour de plus amples renseignements, incluant la demande de billets pour le banquet, veuillez contacter l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la Défense à: télécopieur: (613) 236 8191; courriel : pao@cda-cdai.ca; ou téléphone: (613) 236 9903.

Overarching these concerns is the threat posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction. What a depressing state of affairs!

Response to conflict over the past decade has comprised a doctrine of intervention, applied by coalitions under the United States, NATO, or the UN. Intervention serves to quell public clamour to ‘do something’ to alleviate the human suffering served-up on television each night. Military operations have ranged from conventional combat to low intensity conflict, and a variety of peace support missions. Examples of all of these have occurred in the relatively short period from 1990 until today. It is quite likely these scenarios will persist well into this century.

Adding to the complexity of national and international security is the rapid pace of advances in the field of high technology. For the military, this is termed the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and entails dramatic advances in target detection, weapon accuracy and firepower. The downside of the RMA, however, is that it is expensive and, currently, the systems it produces are highly vulnerable to cyber-terror and a range of other relatively cheap and low-tech counter-measures – asymmetric threats to be sure!

The RMA creates several important challenges for nations – especially nations such as Canada, with only a foot in the door. The question is: can a nation choose not to advance further with the RMA and still expect to remain secure? Would not failure to do so quickly relegate a nation’s armed forces to the second, third, or even lower tiers of operational effectiveness? Again, if RMA developments are implemented, then the cost of defence will increase.

In this rapidly evolving situation, security differs in many ways from what has been the norm for some 400 years. The essence of the new situation is captured by a quotation from General John Sheenan, US Marine Corps:

Unlike the ideology-based, correlation-of-forces model used during the Cold War, or its balance of power predecessor, today’s security challenges are multi-dimensional and often transcend the power and authority of affected nation-states...therefore, security is derived from the aggregate of political, economic, cultural and military factors...today, *instability* constitutes the primary threat to security in all its dimensions. Instability anywhere affects everyone in a global economy. Moreover, with global communications and permeable borders, instability can overcome nearly every effort to contain it... (modern) strategy requires multi-faceted engagement at all levels.

I urge you to remember this quotation. We must not focus on one, possibly trendy, threat at a time – terrorism today, something else tomorrow. Although the government may not like the implications in terms of costs, the Canadian Forces

must retain a flexible and multi-purpose combat capability.

Canadians have traditionally seen themselves as one of the most secure nations in the world. We are isolated from conventional threats by three oceans, the Arctic itself, and a benevolent super power neighbour. Nevertheless, Canada has chosen to ensure its security interests by entering into credible military alliance contributions at home and overseas: two world wars, Korea, and the Cold War come to mind. The payoff was that by the 1950s, Canada emerged as an important player on the international stage – with all the benefits that came with it.

Today, because of the continued existence of the potential for conventional war, the emergence of asymmetric threats such as terrorism, and Canada’s severely depleted military capabilities, our country’s security displays new vulnerabilities. One of the more important of these is our heavy reliance on foreign trade – in fact, both exports and imports are equivalent to 70% of our GDP – compared with 24% in the US and 21% in Japan. This vulnerability is made potentially greater because of our small domestic market, and our overwhelming dependence on the large US market – 87% of our foreign trade.

Let me summarize this first part of my presentation by repeating that the world Canada must contend with remains in fact an unstable and dangerous place. The major implication falling out of this, as I stated earlier, is that *the threat* to peace and security is *multi-faceted*. Nations must therefore recognize this challenge and be prepared to meet it, if they expect to preserve peace and stability. How, then, is Canada meeting this challenge? How viable are its defence establishment and its armed forces?

The answers in both cases are unsatisfactory! That is the conclusion of the recent CDA study, *Caught in the Middle*, and a number of other similar reports on the subject produced by the Auditor-General, parliamentary committees, and defence studies institutes.

It is worthwhile to consider how the current unsatisfactory state of affairs came about; it might help us design and implement remedies. At the end of the Cold War a fierce competition occurred in Canada between those who wished to rehabilitate and modernize the Canadian Forces, and those who were determined to continue to downgrade them under the guise of reaping a so-called *peace dividend*. The crisis in Canada’s fiscal situation helped this latter group to prevail. The most visible impacts were the withdrawal of Canadian Forces from Europe, and the elimination of planned increases to the DND budget

More importantly, the anti-defence players used the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to impose their agenda, and to do so without the hindrance of public debate. They achieved this

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in part by having their views regarding reduced defence funding, and increased peacekeeping, included in the Liberal party Red Book prepared for the 1993 election. This initiative resulted in the emergence of both *human security* and *soft power* as Canadian foreign policy thrusts. (I might add that these concepts still linger in the minds of influential politicians and officials – who also tend to ignore the necessary role of armed forces in their application).

Shortly after the 1993 election, the Chretien government convened two special joint parliamentary committees to review Canada's defence and foreign policies. The anti-defence community assumed that this process would rubber-stamp its proposals to reduce conventional defence. In the event, this did occur with the foreign policy review, which then became a focus for the human security agenda.

The outcome of the defence policy review was different. There, the onslaught of the activists was met by a determined group who presented a strong case in support of the continuation of Canadian internationalism, and the retention of combat-capable armed forces. In the end, they won their case for combat capability, but lost the battle for adequate defence funding to support it.

The dichotomy in Canada, over the use of armed forces, can be discerned from the differing positions of the departments of foreign affairs and of national defence. But, then, is it not axiomatic that there must be convergence between the two in order to produce a coherent and beneficial national security policy? Thereafter there must be a firm government commitment to fund that policy. This has certainly not happened in Canada since the 1950s, and has led to muddling through and to the decline of the armed forces.

However, the threats I have outlined against the background of a shrinking, interactive and complex world, imply that national security policy must now comprise more than just a coordinated foreign and defence policy. Nations must improve their intelligence capabilities and cooperate in sharing information.

The anti-terrorism measures being implemented by Canada and the US – ranging from legislation to numerous enforcement measures – are a good indication of the need for broader scope. But once again, although peace support operations and asymmetric threats dominate the situation today, major conventional war should not be eliminated from the list of possibilities. For example, consider that operations against terrorism in Afghanistan and the Arabian Sea currently require the use of military capabilities not far removed from those of conventional warfare.

In Canada, one may be forgiven for believing that, for reasons of cost and ideology, the government does not want to expand the threat spectrum beyond low levels of combat – the ideological reason being driven by the same factors that have spawned soft power, and the 'myth of peacekeeping.' Modern

armed forces fielded by a leading industrial nation should be able to cover a broad spectrum of military capabilities. What is being forgotten, here, is that even peace support operations under the United Nations require robust military forces; and that a G-8 nation ought to be a net, broad spectrum contributor to peace and security – not a net consumer. National sovereignty and pride are also at stake here, as are national peace and security.

A glimmer of hope may have emerged in the Canadian Forces. Despite all the serious problems related to underfunding of defence, the Chief of the Land Staff has committed himself to responding to the mixed-bag of threats I have just discussed. He has just taken a first step towards "the army of tomorrow" – by unveiling an interim restructuring of the army organization. What is important is that he really is breaking with the Cold War model and creating a force structure that exploits high technology, and will be able to engage in a wide range of military operations. But, make no mistake, he is still limited in how far he may progress by shortages of people and money – starting with a deficit of some \$200 million per annum in his operating account alone.

I am not alone when I state the variety and scope of threats facing Canada today, and what should be done about it. The Americans have added significant funds to their defence budget (a budget 33 times larger than ours), and defence secretary Rumsfeld is proceeding with his plan to transform the US armed forces in response to the realities of the threat spectrum and the digital battlefield. Australia and the United Kingdom are doing much the same. Russia and China are also increasing defence spending, and the Europeans are looking at doing the same.

It seems that only Canada is failing to come to terms with the fact that the world is still a very dangerous place, or is choosing to let others protect and defend us.

In summary, the world faces disorder and conflict in the aftermath of the Cold War. With the removal of bi-polar constraints, old adversarial trends based on cultural and other incompatibilities are re-emerging – often with brutal results. For two decades after the end of World War II, Canada occupied a well-earned leading position amongst western nations. This status had been built upon exceptional sacrifices and contributions to the war effort, and was maintained by substantial military forces assigned to collective defence in NATO, NORAD and the UN.

Over the past thirty years, Canada's outstanding reputation for military contributions has eroded along with its armed forces, as has this country's national sovereignty. The situation will not improve until the Canadian government understands the benefits of investment in defence, and reverses the rundown state of the Canadian Forces – as well as its deficient level of support for international peace and security.

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Yes, the world remains a dangerous place, and the blending of old and new threats means Canada must act to protect the

future well-being of its citizens. Not only has the 'fire-proof house' lost much of its fire proofing; arsonists now lurk within it.

NATIONAL DEFENCE COMMITTEE TABLES REPORT ON OPERATIONAL READINESS

David Pratt, MP, Nepean-Carleton
Chair

Standing Committee on National Defence & Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA)



On May 30, 2002, the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs tabled its much anticipated report on operational readiness *Facing Our Responsibilities, The State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces*. The committee's report was supported by all of the federalist political parties and representing the entire range of the political spectrum. This agreement constituted a remarkable and unprecedented political consensus.

To attempt to address the cumulative affects of rust out over the past several years, to protect the integrity of the core capabilities of the Canadian Forces, and to give Canadians the sort of defence force that we need to confront the security challenges of the future, the report made 25 recommendations.

Increased Defence Spending

The most important recommendation contained in the report concerned the immediate and urgent need for increased funding to the Canadian Forces. The report recommended that, ***"The government increase the annual base budget for the Department of National Defence to between 1.5% to 1.6% of GDP, with the increase to be phased in over the next three years, and continue to move towards the NATO average."*** In terms of concrete dollars and cents, this recommendation would add close to \$2 billion to the base budget of the Canadian Forces over each of the next three years, bringing the budget to almost \$18 billion per year.

Like several other organizations, including the *Conference of Defence Associations*, which have taken the time to examine the state of the Canadian Forces, the Defence Committee came to some very sobering conclusions regarding the current level of funding for the Canadian Forces. After hearing from 92 witnesses in 39 separate meetings on the issue of operational readiness, the committee has concluded that:

- the requirements of the '94 White Paper can not be sustained by current funding levels;
- the increased operational tempo of the post-Cold War period is putting too much stress on the Canadian Forces; and
- if nothing is done to correct the situation, the Canadian Forces will soon face a crisis, if they are not already doing so.

According to the report, ***"We are now in a situation where we will either have to increase funding or significantly restructure the Canadian Forces. Or, we may simply decide to limit future commitments. However, limiting commitments for the sake of cost savings may not be that easy. Given our preference for multilateralism, the current focus on Africa, and our alliance responsibilities, the Canadian Forces will, in all likelihood, be called upon to do more rather than less in the coming years."***

We have already begun to experience this increase in demands on the Canadian Forces in recent years. Of the 72 international operations conducted by the Canadian Forces since 1947, a third have occurred in the last ten years. The result of this high operational tempo has been that, with the very best of intentions in terms of wanting to help a troubled world, we have done so to the point of wearing out our equipment, and much more importantly, our people.

The committee continues to believe that the general principles underlying the 1994 Defence White Paper are still sound. The 1994 policy statement identifies three broad tasks for the Canadian Forces:

- The protection of Canada;
- The defence of North America;
- Contributions to international peace and security.

These are not only reasonable tasks; they are essential ones. As our report points out, ***"What will change from time to time is the emphasis we place on each. We have an obvious hierarchy of taskings. What will prove increasingly***

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important in relation to the first two will be the dictates of homeland defence. At the same time, our contributions to international security are proving far more onerous than when the White Paper was written. The choices we make in regard to these tasks will have a necessary bearing on our force structure.”

To be a meaningful participant in the global community, Canada requires a balanced, well-equipped combat capable force — one that can deploy rapidly and that is interoperable with its major allies. The committee is convinced that we are not spending sufficient funds to ensure this commitment. The Canadian Forces need stability and predictability in their funding.

Defence Policy Review

In the Defence Committee’s interim report which was tabled in the House of Commons last November, called for a foreign and defence policy review was recommended. Now more than ever, the need for such a review is obvious and urgent. As the committee stated, *“An ambitious and active foreign policy will require an appropriate military as one of its instruments. And if there is one thing our Committee has learned over the years, it is that we cannot afford to sacrifice the men and women of our armed forces on the altar of overly ambitious foreign policy goals or ventures. When foreign policy commitments outstrip our military capabilities, the consequences could prove disastrous.”*

Our report went on to say, *“A defence review needs to be pursued judiciously. Today, it is much more difficult to make defence policy than it was in 1994 and, therefore, much easier to get it wrong. A proper review will be one that is transparent, wide ranging and one that gives access to public opinion and concern. It should also be based on a clear understanding of foreign policy objectives on whose behalf the CF is to act as instrument.”*

Defence policy is driven by two factors: domestic policy as it relates to issues like sovereignty protection, disaster relief,

search and rescue, interdiction of illegal immigrants and drugs, fisheries patrols and environmental protection, to name just a few areas. It is also driven in large measure by foreign policy. Precisely how large or how small a role do we want Canada to have in global affairs? Do we wish to take up our share of the responsibility for defending North America? Do we wish to be a player in NATO, the world’s pre-eminent military alliance? Do we wish to continue to contribute in a meaningful manner to UN peacekeeping operations and coalitions of the willing aimed at ending aggression? Do we wish to involve ourselves in protecting civilian populations from human rights abuses or, in the worst case scenarios as we have seen in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, preventing genocide.

While the need for a policy review was obvious to members of the committee, it was also our conclusion that such a review of defence and foreign policies should not serve as an excuse to delay desperately needed funding increases. This conclusion was based on two considerations.

First, we do not believe that a major review of foreign and defence policy will subtract in any substantial way from the current missions of the Canadian Forces. In fact, we believe that the Forces will have additional responsibilities as they relate to the terrorist threat, homeland defence, emergency preparedness and asymmetrical warfare. And second, we believe that the over-stretch faced by the Forces is so significant that it cannot wait the results of a foreign and defence policy review. A properly sized, properly equipped and properly trained defence force is a critical and indeed indispensable tool in the conduct of foreign policy.

Every Canadian has a stake in seeing Canada’s military adjust to the new realities of the 21st century. Much of the influence that we as a middle power nation can and do exert on world affairs depends on maintaining and improving our military capabilities for the future.

For a full copy of the defence committee’s report, please visit our website at, www.parl.gc.ca, or call the Committee Clerk, Diane Deschamps at 995-9461.

CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE

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4 June 2002

Dear Senator/ Member of Parliament:

The purpose of this letter is to draw your attention to the Final Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans= Affairs (SCONDVA), *Facing Our Responsibilities: The State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces*, tabled on May 30, 2002, and to urge you to convey to the Government your support of its recommendations. May I also request that you and your parliamentary colleagues treat this matter as a non-partisan issue.

The Chairman, Mr. David Pratt, and members of SCONDVA deserve credit for producing a well-crafted, thoughtful report for consideration in the federal budget planning process. According to the latest Pollara poll, 48% of Canadians, an increase of 22% in the last year, support an increase in funding to support the Canadian Forces (CF). Thus, the report is aligned with, and should reinforce, the momentum of public opinion. A substantial increase in the budget would enable Canada to continue to contribute to its domestic security and to international stability in a way that is commensurate with its status as a responsible member of the G-8 Group of Nations.

The most important recommendations of the SCONDVA report include the following:

- increasing Canada's share of defence spending to between 1.5 % and 1.6 % of gross domestic product over the next three years, up from 1.2 %;
- significant parliamentary and public input towards any future defence review;
- a comprehensive system for determining the readiness of the CF;
- funding Phase 2 of the Land Force Reserve Restructure project; and
- making up as quickly as possible the annual shortfalls identified by the Auditor General to enable the

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le 4 juin, 2002

Cher/Chère Sénateur/Député:

Je me permets d'attirer votre attention sur le rapport final du Comité permanent de la défense nationale et des affaires des anciens combattants (CPDNAC) de la Chambre des communes, *Faire Face à Nos Responsabilités: L'état de Préparation des Forces canadiennes*, déposé le 30 mai 2002, rapport dont je vous prierais de bien vouloir conseiller au gouvernement d'accepter les recommandations. Je vous demande, ainsi qu'à vos collègues du Parlement, de bien vouloir traiter cette question de façon non partisane.

Le président, M. David Pratt, ainsi que les membres du CPDNAC méritent des félicitations, car ils ont rédigé un rapport bien structuré et bien pensé qui devrait faciliter la planification du budget fédéral. D'après le dernier sondage Pollara, 48% des Canadiens supportent une augmentation des dépenses de défense, soit une hausse de 22% sur l'an dernier. Donc, le rapport fait sienne et appuie l'opinion du grand public. Une hausse importante du budget permettrait au Canada d'assurer d'avantage sa sécurité intérieure et de contribuer à la stabilité internationale d'une façon digne de son statut de membre responsable des pays du G-8.

Voyons les plus importantes recommandations du rapport du CPDNAC.

- que le gouvernement augmente le budget de base annuel du ministère de la Défense nationale (MDN) pour qu'il atteigne entre 1,5 et 1,6 % du PIB, de 1,2 %, augmentation qui sera appliquée graduellement au cours des trois prochaines années;
- que, tout examen de la défense réalisé à l'avenir bénéficie d'un apport parlementaire et public considérable;
- que le MDN mette en place un système global de détermination de l'état de préparation opérationnelle des Forces canadiennes (FC);
- que le MDN s'engage à financer l'étape 2 de la restructuration de la Réserve de la Force terrestre; et
- que, pour permettre au MDN d'acheter les biens d'équipement nécessaires en temps opportun, on

(voir p. 19)

Department of National Defence to purchase necessary capital equipment in a timely fashion.

The significant mismatch between the operational commitments of the CF, and the financial resources provided to execute those tasks, are the central themes of the SCNDVA report.

The theme of the report is mirrored in similar reports published by other groups expert in the field of defence analysis. These include, among others, the most recent Conference of Defence Associations Institute study (*Caught in the Middle* - September 2001), the report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, (*Canadian Security and Military Preparedness* - February 2002), the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century (*To Secure a Nation* - November 2001), and the Report of the Auditor General of Canada, tabled December 4, 2001.

I thank you for your consideration, and I would be pleased to offer further information by any of the means listed in the letterhead. In that regard, I would encourage you to visit the CDA website: www.cda-cdai.ca.

Sincerely,

Le président
Le Lieutenant-général (Ret) Richard J. Evraire, CMM, CD

“O.S.B.”

Richard J. Evraire, CMM, CD
Lieutenant General (Retd)
Chairman

comble aussitôt que possible les manques à gagner annuels constatés par la vérificatrice générale.

Le rapport du CPDNAC met l'accent sur la disproportion qui existe entre les obligations opérationnelles des FC et les fonds dont elles disposent.

Les rapports émis par d'autres groupes d'experts dans le secteur de l'analyse de la défense arrivent à la même conclusion. Au nombre de ces rapports, on compte les suivants : *Coïncé entre les deux*, de l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense, septembre 2001, *L'état de préparation du Canada sur les plans de la sécurité et de la défense*, du Comité sénatorial permanent de la défense et de la sécurité, février 2002, *To Secure a Nation*, du Conseil pour la sécurité canadienne au 21^e siècle, novembre 2001, et le rapport de la vérificatrice générale déposé le 4 décembre 2001.

Je vous remercie de votre attention et il me fera plaisir de vous donner de plus amples renseignements si vous communiquez avec le soussigné à l'aide d'un des moyens mentionnés en tête de page. Je vous invite aussi à visiter notre site Web au : <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/>.

Veillez agréer, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

THE CREATION OF NORTHERN COMMAND

Lieutenant-General (Retd) Lou W.F. Cuppens, Former Deputy Commander-in-Chief of North American Aerospace Command

The US government recently updated its Unified Command Plan (UCP) and with that update announced the creation of a new command, Northern Command (NORTHCOM). As Secretary Rumsfeld pointed out in the announcement, this command is intended to coordinate the Department of Defense efforts in support of other government agencies that will be involved in the Defence of North America.

Both the reaction of the media and the reaction of some of

Canada's elected officials indicate that this issue and the force structure of the United States of America are not well understood. This article is intended to make clear what NORTHCOM's mandate is and to explain and clarify some of the US Force structure.

The military of the United States of America consists of the

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Active and Reserve components of the Armed Services, the National Guard and the Coast Guard. While the latter two elements have certain legislative restrictions on employment, the Active and Reserve Components of the Armed Services are directed by the Secretary of Defence, through the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the respective Chief of Staff of the service.

It is the responsibility of the services (army, navy, and air force) to organize, train, and equip the services, while their day to day employment is the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of the command to which they are assigned.

Within the US military structure, responsibility for contingency planning and the conduct of operations within a specified area is mandated to a CINC (e.g. Pacific Command, Central Command, European Command, Space, Southern Command, Northern Command, to name but a few). The commanders of these commands are also charged with the responsibility of ‘shaping the environment’ within their geographic areas of responsibility. The key document that defines the responsibilities, and geographical boundaries of the command and assigns forces to that command is the ‘Unified Command Plan’ (UCP). This plan is reviewed (by law) each two years.

To illustrate, CINC CENTCOM (Central Command) (Gen Tommy Franks) is responsible for the area of the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan. He commands and operates all US Forces that are assigned to him in that theatre, through his army, navy and air component commanders. The respective chiefs of staff of the army, navy and air force are responsible to Gen Franks for training, organizing and equipping the service elements assigned to CENTCOM. CINC CENTCOM’s mandate, responsibilities, geographic areas of responsibility and assigned forces are set forth in the UCP.

Until 11 September 2002, not one CINC or service chief was responsible for the overall defence of the homeland or for coordinating the responses to requests for assistance that might come from other Federal Agencies [e.g. Federal Emergency Management Agency (like Canada’s former Emergency Preparedness Canada/Emergency Measures Organization)].

While statutes and laws set forth how states can request the assistance of the Active and Reserve Components of the Armed Services, there was not single-focused DOD planning and coordinating agency.

Within Canada, there are laws and statutes that set forth how provinces and other federal government departments may request the aid or assistance of the Canadian Armed Forces for employment within Canada—note we have no state National Guard equivalents, nor is our Coast Guard mandated like the US Coast Guard.

Within the United States of America, there are legislative instruments that regulate the employment of ‘federalized’ armed forces within the Continental United States and Alaska. The states have a National Guard that can be called up for service by the state Governor to respond to particular circumstances within that state. There are also laws that permit the President to ‘federalize’ elements of the National Guard, reserve components of the Armed Forces and the Coast Guard; however, there are distinct limits on the employment of such forces.

In general, ‘federalized’ armed forces may only be employed to assist other government agencies (for example some of the agencies that might need DOD assistance are FBI, CIA, DEA, FEMA) and the US military (DOD) is not intended to be the lead agency.

To illustrate, if the Drug Enforcement Agency or Coast Guard had need of US Navy assets in the war on drugs, or in searching foreign vessels, the Secretary of Defence would assign such US Navy assets to assist the Coast Guard. If the FEMA had need of the US Corps of Engineers to assist in flood conditions on the Red River, the Secretary of Defence would assign military assets to assist the Secretary of FEMA.

What was missing within the US Defence structure was one entity to conduct contingency planning, to coordinate the overall DOD effort, and to effect command of the forces that would be so assigned. To resolve this, Northern Command was created and its first commander will be double-hatted as he is also CINC NORAD.

The UCP is the ‘blueprint’ of the US operational force structure. It is a US-only and classified document that describes how the US major commands will function and for what they are accountable. The UCP is all about US military commands and not about NATO, UN, and other allied commands. That very special Command—North American Defence Command—is mentioned in the document; however, since that command is bi-national, the NORAD agreement (renewed each five years by Canada and the USA) sets forth that commands mission, mandate and structure.

Some of the media and political comments about Canada being left out of Northern Command are difficult to comprehend. Canada is not part of the USA; therefore, our armed forces would not be part of Northern Command. The US military structure has no foreign troops assigned within it; therefore, there would not be any reference to the Canadian Armed Forces.

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The USA, as a sovereign nation, has the responsibility and the right to defend itself and it does so through the Unified Command Plan. The USA cannot and should not dictate, in their key defence document, how Canada or any other nation should defend itself. In sum, Canada is not a part of the US defence process, except for the aerospace defence of North America - the NORAD agreement.

There have been defence consultations with the USA concerning the creation of the US Northern Command and such consultations concerned the importance of NORAD, its bi-national mission its accountability framework. It is probable that such consultations also included enhanced security within the Canada/USA border regime, counter-terror operations and a host of agreements and memoranda that exist between our two nations. It is probable that the discussions may have

focused on cross border operations and the overall security within the transportation media. It is extremely doubtful that the notion of the Canadian Armed Forces being subordinated to a US-only command would have been discussed.

In conclusion, the USA has created another command to coordinate and deliver DOD's efforts in support of other US agencies that will have a need for the significant capability of the US Armed Services. Northern Command will commence operations in October 2002 and will join the other Major USA Commands in fulfilling that nation's defence efforts. It is expected that the cooperation, in the Defence of North America, that has existed for decades between the Armed Forces of both nations will continue and grow.

THE WAY AHEAD: A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Commodore (Retd) T.C. Heath and Lieutenant-Colonel (Retd) J.C. Berezowski

(The Way Ahead: A National Security Strategy is re-printed with the kind permission of the Editor of National Network News, Volume IX No 1, Spring 2002, a publication of Defence Associations National Network – ed.)

After years of defence cut backs in Canada, it should be clear to even the most passionate of pacifists that our armed forces can no longer do more with less. Not any more after years of questionable budgetary neglect, administered by governments seemingly more intent on re-election and placation of special interests than the security and long-term future of our nation.

Despite great anticipation, Budget 2001 gave the Canadian Forces little more than what had been already earmarked earlier. And it gave little more than necessary to sustain our limited participation in the United States-led coalition against terrorism. For regardless of the words of our government, our participation is limited and more for political show than military meaningfulness. Indeed, the government's budget merely gave credence to the scathing commentary of the Auditor General of Canada, Sheila Fraser, in her first report to parliament.

Ms Fraser cast serious doubt on assertions by the defence minister that the Armed Forces are more capable of combat than they were ten years ago. "The department has frequently said that the Canadian Forces have never been more capable," Ms Fraser said. "But until steps are taken to manage equipment readiness more adequately, these claims should be taken with a grain of salt."

Yes, we may have more combat capability in certain areas for our ships as an example or in specific areas of ground operations, but is there the wherewithal to sustain that combat effectiveness into the future or for extended periods of operations? It is into these areas that the Auditor General's report should channel our questions.

The assumption by policy makers that the current or projected risks to our nation do not demand a higher state of readiness, or the ability to deploy meaningful force levels to aid our friends

and allies, is faulty to say the least. An additional \$500 million annually to Defence for the next two years for Operation Apollo and some capital procurement does little to help the current crisis. Indeed, the Auditor General asserted that the immediate need was at least \$1.3 billion for this year and more billions for the next five. The additional funding levels for JTF2 is welcome but is it enough? Do we need even more emphasis upon Special Forces for the future?

The bulk of the \$7.7 billion for security is allocated to improving domestic security and intelligence in response to quiet American pressure. Securing the perimeter of North America, expediting border crossings and customs, policing, fixing Canada's porous immigration and refugee processes were more worrisome than defence. Moreover, the Americans have not pressed hard on Canadian defence, knowing the huge costs of our military modernization.

Our allies know that we spend only US\$265 per capita on defence while the NATO average is US\$589. Will Canada only realize that our defence investments have been too limited when we experience some tragedy in the future? Will we continue to take calculated risks sending our sons and daughters into harm's way knowingly ill equipped, just to maintain an international image for sake of the political leadership? Will the price of learning be in the return of body bags?

A more urgent need now is a synthesis of foreign policy, defence and security policy. There is the great question of what do we as a nation want defence to do? Without a definitive answer there is little long-term management that will occur as we continue lurching along.

While our country is in for a difficult time financially, are we getting the best out of current investment? Is the investment directed towards a long-term goal? What are Canada's objectives in the world? There is a need to revisit the defence white paper of 1994, which was directed at a post-Cold War world much more benign than has come to pass.

(continued p. 22)

Last year the Federation of Military and United Services Institutes of Canada recommended to government that a blue-ribbon panel of experts be chartered to quickly craft a national security strategy for the 21st Century. Its mandate would be to find maximum, feasible convergence on issues of paramount importance to the security of Canada. This strategy would guide and coordinate our future foreign, defence and economic policies, their plans, programs and resources for the next ten to fifteen years. The panel would report to Parliament.

Other countries have been more insightful. The British, for example, already have a rapid reaction plan for their military to respond in a crisis. Now because of 9/11, they are upgrading those foreign policy, defence and security plans. Their approach is instructive. Following the appalling events of 11 September, Britain's defence minister commissioned work to ensure that Britain's Armed Forces are able to deal with new threats. It is to ensure that Britain has the right defence concepts, capabilities and forces to deal with threats of this kind and of this scale. It will look hard at plans and programs so that they add capability where it counts—where it makes a difference.

Like their Strategic Defence Review three years ago, they will draw on the extensive pool of knowledge within the United Kingdom—from other government departments, academics and other experts, parliamentarians, and, of course, the public.

However, the attacks on the United States on 11 September have shown that they must build on their previous efforts. They must ensure that they continue to adjust their defence posture and capabilities to meet the possible demands of the future. We in Canada also need to review our efforts and potential responses. The areas that we need to re-examine parallel those of the British study, hereunder.

1. How much has changed? The first task is to stop and assess if 11 September represents a fundamental change in the strategic context and, if so, how serious a change?

2. Dealing with symptoms and causes. The second task is to ensure that the examination attempts to understand the causes of terrorism, and where and why asymmetric threats might emerge.

3. Threats and vulnerabilities. The third task must consider the extent to which one can continue to rely on specific intelligence of threats. Should one now be thinking more in terms of risk and vulnerabilities and how to manage these?

4. Overseas operations. The fourth task is to strike the right balance between the contributions the Armed Forces make to homeland defence and challenges abroad. The nature of these external missions must also be examined.

If we are serious concerning the human rights of others, then we must consider the potential options of intervention. These are not just limited to humanitarian aid or peacekeeping. If we are really interested in the plight of others, they also include the potential use of limited force. For example, a deployable capability and collective international political will would have gone a long way in preventing or limiting the genocide in Rwanda. Response to human security in a violent world will some times take more than good intentions and political speeches.

5. Internal security. The fifth task is to consider the role of the Armed Forces at home. Are the Forces the prime emergency response mechanism, or is it rightly the role of civil agencies taking the lead with the Forces assisting?

6. The Reserves. Can the reserves structure continue as now? Should the reserves not be capable of rapid integration into meaningful and deployable force structures at short notice? Future requirements for the military will most probably not include time for mobilization and lengthy pre-deployment training. Future and indeed current response requirements are 'come as you are affairs' and may emerge with short notice. If we are going to participate then we must be ready to do so on a permanent basis. This entails not only restructuring of the reserve concepts but also proper equipment and training. It also requires that the government provide the necessary legal protection for jobs for members of the reserves.

7. International organizations and regional relationships. The final task is to examine how regional and bilateral relationships have been affected by 11 September and to understand how international organizations, including the United Nations, NATO and the European Union, should be operating in the new environment.

Our Question: What should Canada's place be in these organizations? Membership entails more than the nation's name on a placard at the table. Rights and privileges of membership come with obligations to give credible support of a high quality. Forces and capabilities earmarked for these organizations need to be more than the numerical 'shell game' that is conducted at present.

Canada's shortfalls currently are many: there is limited strategic lift capability for the air force, limited numerical strength for the army, no maritime helicopter contract. Our ability to maintain significant forces on high readiness is curtailed by limited operational funding. We seldom train at the force levels that we claim. When was the last full and protracted Brigade-level exercise for the Army for example? (Answer: Over 10 years.) Without these investments, capabilities erode away. The crisis is now; further erosion brings into question any investment at all.

None of us is seeking a large military capability at the cost of social programs or other essential frameworks of our society, just a level of credibility both within the nation and without. It should not be a case of either/or in the world's ninth largest economy. Our forces are a seriously ill patient, just like Medicare but without the high public profile and without champions in the body politic or the media. It is now up to those interested, those who place value on the total framework of the nation-state called Canada, to invest their time and energy and their support.

Ted Heath served in the Navy for 35 years. He was DCOS Intelligence SACEUR at NATO HQ when he retired to Victoria in 1998.

Cec Berezowski served as an artillery officer and was a director at NDHQ with 34 years service when he retired to Victoria in 1985.

EVIDENCE LINKING AL QAEDA TO IRAQ GROUNDS FOR WAR

Joe Varner, BAH, MA, Fellow, IUS

It is time for the United States-led Coalition to put in place military forces and move decisively against Iraq and the Saddam Hussein regime once and for all. It is contended by some in the American government that the Iraqi Government has been supportive of international terror in the past and that Saddam's illegal Weapons of Mass Destruction programmes are nothing more than a ticking time bomb waiting to explode the Middle East region.

Currently, Coalition political leaders are debating whether or not the United States should widen the War on Terror to Iraq. Most of the lukewarm supporters of military action against the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein have tied any military action against him and his regime to direct evidence of involvement with Al Qaeda and the September 11th terror attacks on the United States. These leaders are gambling and expect that the direct evidence of Iraqi involvement does not exist. Saddam Hussein on the other hand knows different.

Hussein knows that the time clock is running out for himself and his regime for good reason. At strategic locations in Iraq, engineers are building sand 'berms' around assets important to the Iraqi regime. Hussein knows that the evidence the United States and the United Kingdom are putting together is real, it has depth, and most importantly it is readily available to anyone who wishes to look for it from open sources.

Will this evidence of Iraqi involvement with Al Qaeda and September 11th stand up in a court of law? No one knows. The question though is irrelevant. The real question is whether or not the evidence of Iraq links to Al Qaeda and September 11th will stand up in the court of public opinion? A review of the past makes for easy decision.

Iraq has had ties to terrorism and particularly Al Qaeda since 1993. In 1993 Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein ordered an attempted assassination of former U. S. President George Bush Senior. According to Yossef Bodansky's book, *Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America*, in 1993, Iraq aided Al Qaeda training of Somali militants who were responsible for the deadly ambush attack on U.S. Marines in Mogadishu.

According to Simon Reeve, author of the *The New Jackals*, on February 26th 1993, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef led a team of Islamic radicals funded in large part by Al Qaeda in blowing up a van bomb in the underground parking of the World Trade Center. The first World Trade Center bombing left 6 innocent people dead and over 1000 injured. Yousef was trained in Al

Qaeda camps in the spring of 1992. He later told the police that the date of February 26 was forced upon him by accident because his team was out of money, something the police found out later to be not true. February 26th was the anniversary of the Liberation of Kuwait and Saddam's most bitter military defeat.

Abdul Rahman Yasin, one of Yousef's conspirators in the attack, fled the United States for Iraq and lives in Baghdad employed in an Iraqi government job. Mohammad Salameh, another Yousef team member made 46 phone calls to Baghdad where his uncle had a residence and was a senior member of Palestinian group that receives funding from Iraq. Additionally, in June 1994, Osama bin Laden met with the head of the Iraqi Intelligence Department, Faruq al-Hijazi, in Khartoum.

Further, Iraq has long been a suspect in the deadly April 19th, 1995 Oklahoma City truck bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah U.S. Federal Building. This supposed act of 'homegrown' terror left 168 Americans dead and 600 more wounded. Yet, it is known that Timothy McVeigh, one of the two men found guilty of the bombing and who was later executed for it, was in contact with an Iraqi national and former member of the Iraqi Republican Guard the day of the bombing. In fact, an *NBC* affiliate reporter, Jayna Davis, maintains that witnesses saw the Iraqi national drive up to the Murrah building area in a Ryder truck (the vehicle used in the bomb attack) moments before the blast and depart the scene in a brown Chevrolet pick up truck immediately after the incident. Moreover, U.S. News and World Report stated last year that Department of Defense officials thought McVeigh himself was an Iraqi agent.

According to Reeve in the *The New Jackals*, McVeigh's accomplice Terry Nichols, went to the Philippines in mid-November 1994 to spend Christmas with his Filipino mail order bride and her family in Cebu. Nichols left a package with his ex-wife to be opened in 60 days if he had not returned safely. After he had left the U.S. for the Philippines, Nichol's ex wife opened the package and found a note telling McVeigh to go for it accompanied with \$20,000 worth of cash, gold and silver bars.

As a point of fact, it is difficult for law enforcement officials to track and intercept gold and silver bars when used as a method of transferring funds and this method of moving large amounts of cash is often used by terrorist organizations

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particularly, Al Qaeda. It is also interesting to note that Ramzi Yousef, the original World Trade Center bomber and an experienced explosives expert lived in Cebu at this time.

A senior member of the Al Qaeda linked organization, Abu Sayyaf, told interrogators that Nichols and Yousef were acquaintances and it appears they met through Nichol's mail order bride's family. The senior Abu Sayyaf prisoner told Philippine authorities Yousef introduced Nichols as 'the farmer.' As a point of fact in October 1994, Nichols and McVeigh tried to build an ammonium nitrate bomb on his farm, the type that they would later use at the Murrah building, and instead of it exploding it simply went out.

Months later, after his visit to the Philippines, Nichols created the bomb that brought down the Murrah building. A lawsuit has been initiated in the last few days in Oklahoma City naming the Iraqi government as a defendant in the killing of 168 innocent Americans at the Murrah building.

According to Bodansky, Iraq was approached to host Osama bin Laden in 1998 by Hassan al Turabi, and agreed to the arrangement but in the end Osama bin Laden decided to move to Afghanistan instead of Iraq. In 1998, Iraq is reported to have supplied Osama bin Laden with blank Yemeni passports and specialists from the Iraqi Intelligence Unit 999.

These specialists went to Afghanistan through Pakistan to help with Al Qaeda training programmes and took Al Qaeda teams back to Baghdad for training at a terrorist camp outside of Baghdad named, Salman Pak, that included a mock up of 707 airliner. Additionally, it has been reported that an Al Qaeda delegation went to Baghdad to for the official Iraqi birthday celebration of Saddam's Hussein's birthday on April 25th, 1998.

In mid-March 2000 an Al Qaeda operative, Hamoud Abaid al Anezi, went to Sydney, Australia and met with 4 Iraqi nationals who had claimed refugee status. With their aid al Anezi tried to recruit militants for operations in Kosovo and Chechnya. The group was later arrested after assaulting a potential recruit who threatened to tell authorities about their activities.

It has also been widely reported that Iraqi intelligence spent two years ferrying back and forth from Afghanistan to meet with Ayman Al Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's second-in-command. One Iraqi intelligence agent was captured by Pakistani forces on the Afghan border in October 2000.

As well, it is known through Western media reports that Mohammad Atta, the leader of the September 11th terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. is reported to have met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague, Czech Republic prior to the terror attacks in April 2001. A news reporter in

Ottawa stated that Iraq attempted to buy satellite time in Canada one week prior to September 11th. Just prior to the September 11th attacks and without reason, Saddam Hussein placed his military on the highest state of alert since the Gulf War and is reported in the Western press to have moved his most valuable assets to caves in the North of the country, including his Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Rumors also continue to circulate that the same strain of Anthrax, the Ames strain, used in terror attacks in the U.S. post September 11th, was obtained by Iraq in 1988. Iraq then created a substantial amount of militarised Anthrax prior to the Gulf War 1990-91.

Mohammad Atta, leader of the September 11th attacks on the United States is believed to have taken possession of a cylinder containing an unspecified substance from Iraqi intelligence prior to the September 11th attacks while travelling in the Czech Republic. He is also believed to have entered a pharmacy in Florida looking for antibiotics such as cipro used to fight Anthrax. According to the Wall Street Journal, Atta also met with an Iraqi diplomat, Ahmed Khalil Samir al-Ani, who was later expelled for spying.

These widely reported facts have been examined in an effort to link the Anthrax used to kill 5 people in the U.S. to Al Qaeda and Iraq.

In conclusion, by all reports, Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda, and Iraqi intelligence headed by Saddam's own son, Qusai Hussein had close ties. It is well known that Iraq tends to use terrorist groups, such as Hizbollah's Overseas Special Operations Group headed by Imad Mughniyeh, to carry out terror attacks rather than execute them directly through Iraqi intelligence. Al Qaeda is a case in point.

Without question, given Iraqi activities around September 11th and their past connection to Al Qaeda it is almost certain that Iraq provided financial, logistical and/or intelligence assistance to Al Qaeda for the deadly attacks. The only reason for Saddam's armed forces to go on the highest state of alert since the Gulf war just prior to the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon was that he knew in advance that the attacks were about to be executed and that he would be linked to Al Qaeda.

In a country supposedly strapped for cash by UN sanctions you do not move your most valuable assets around unless you think that they are going to imminently come under threat. Saddam did not pull his decision to move his Weapons of Mass Destruction to caves and bunkers by osmosis. Finally, Osama bin Laden's video taped messages lashing out at the West have

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frequently focused attention on the U.S.-backed UN sanction regime and the alleged deaths of thousands of Iraqi children, and U.S. military action against Iraq in 1998 as grounds for Al Qaeda's 'holy war.'

In the last few weeks it has been reported that approximately 200 'Afghan Arabs' have turned up in 2 villages in Northern Iraq.

Thus, the evidence of Iraqi links to terrorism when coupled with Iraq's refusal to forsake its Weapons of Mass Destruction programmes present a clear and present danger to the United States and its Allies. The time has come to deliver a final ultimatum to Iraq and then if Saddam Hussein does not step down and open his country to UN inspectors, it is time for war.

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