



29 MARCH, 2002

VOLUME 7, N<sup>o</sup>. 1

## CDA – THE WAY AHEAD

*Lieutenant General (Retd) Richard J. Évraire, CMM, CD*

The last twelve months were certainly eventful ones for the CDA. Headed by an experienced team of dedicated individuals in the National Office, and ably supported by member associations and individual members across the country, we:

- Held our annual AGM and CDAI Seminar;
- Released the CDAI Research Project entitled *Caught in the Middle*;
- Conducted the fourth CDAI Graduate Student Symposium;
- Held an extremely successful annual Vimy Award Dinner;
- Appeared in front of the House of Commons Standing Committees on Finance, Defence and Veteran Affairs, and the Senate Committee on Defence;
- Received extensive media coverage (Television, radio and the press) in our continuing efforts of informing Canadians about national security and defence issues and the Canadian Forces;
- Met with the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Finance; and
- Met with senior DND officers and officials (including the Chief of the Defence Staff and the VCDS), Parliamentarians, Senators and senior officials of other Government departments and Central Agencies;

These substantial events (in addition to a number of equally important but less publicized ones all aimed at better informing the Canadian public on security and defence matters and on the Canadian Forces) did not achieve the hoped for results, however, as the Federal Government's 15 December 2001 budget, much to our dismay, added precious little to the Canadian Forces' budget; and this, despite the events of 11 September.

*(continued p. 2)*

## CAD – LA VOIE À SUIVRE

*Lieutenant-général (ret.) Richard J. Évraire, CMM, CD*

Les douze derniers mois ont certainement été mouvementés pour la CAD. Dirigés par une équipe expérimentée de personnes dévouées du Bureau national et appuyés par des associations membres et des membres dans l'ensemble du pays, nous :

- avons tenu notre AGA et le séminaire de l'ICAD;
- avons diffusé le projet de recherche de l'ICAD qui s'intitule *Coincé entre les deux*;
- avons dirigé le quatrième symposium des étudiants diplômés de l'ICAD;
- avons tenu une Soirée du Prix Vimy annuelle très réussie;
- nous sommes présentés devant le Comité permanent de la Chambre des communes sur les finances, de la défense nationale et des anciens combattants (CPDNAC) et du Comité du Sénat chargé de défense;
- avons reçu une importante couverture médiatique (la télévision, la radio et la presse) relativement aux efforts constants que nous déployons pour informer les Canadiens/Canadiennes au sujet des questions concernant la sécurité nationale et la défense et des Forces canadiennes;
- avons rencontré le ministre de la Défense nationale et le ministre des Finances;
- avons rencontré des officiers et des fonctionnaires du MDN (y compris le chef d'état-major de la Défense et le VCEMD), des parlementaires, des sénateurs et des agents responsables des autres ministères et organismes centraux;

Ces événements importants (en plus d'un nombre d'événements de même importance mais dont on a moins parlé visent tous à informer le public canadien des questions de sécurité et de défense, ainsi que des Forces canadiennes) n'ont pas obtenu les résultats escomptés. Le

*(voir p. 2)*

### Donor Patrons of CDAI

*The War Amputations of Canada - Colonel J.H.C. Clarry, MBE, ED, CD, QC - Flight Lieutenant Lt (Retd) Howard Ripstein, CA*

*Colonel J.H. Turnbull, OMM, C St J, CD, FCIP - Lieutenant-Colonel J. Roy Weir*

### Donateur Patrons de l'ICAD

This horrific event, more than any other, turned the tide in favour of a Canadian security and defence review. The Government has in fact announced that such a review would be carried out this year. The following will remind our readers of the February 2002 CDA AGM's position on this extremely important issue, a position that was clearly set out in a recent letter I sent to the Minister of National Defence:

“Given recent world events, and the continuing need to maintain and demonstrate Canadian sovereignty, the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) believes that the Canadian Government must undertake a fundamental and wide-rang-

(continued p. 3)

The Conference of Defence Associations is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. It restricts its aim to one specific area - **defence issues**. CDA expresses its ideas and opinions and utilizes its political rights to influence government defence policy. It is the most senior and influential interest group in Canada's pro-defence community. Defence issues are brought to the public's attention by analysis and informed discussion through CDA's Institute.

The CDA Institute, a self-supporting entity within CDA, is dependant on private donations. See the donor application form in this newsletter. In return, donors will receive *ON TRACK* and other publications for the next 12 months. The CDA Institute is a registered charity and donations to it qualify for tax receipts.



La Conférence des associations de la Défense est un organisme non-gouvernemental et à but non-lucratif. Son champ d'expertise se limite aux **questions de la défense**. La CAD exprime ses opinions et ses idées et se prévaut de ses droits politiques pour influencer le gouvernement en matière de défense. La CAD est le groupe le plus ancien et ayant le plus d'influence au sein de la communauté canadienne pro-défense.

Les questions de défense sont portées à l'attention du public par le truchement d'analyse et de discussions informées parrainées par l'Institut de la CAD. L'Institut, un organisme autonome, est complètement dépendant des dons reçus. Veuillez donc vous référer au formulaire inclus à ce bulletin. En guise de retour, les donateurs recevront *ON TRACK* et les autres publications pendant les 12 prochains mois. L'Institut de la CAD est un organisme de charité enregistré et tous les dons reçus sont déductibles d'impôt.

**Officers - CDA Institute**

**Officiers - Institut de la CAD**

**President/Président**.....  
Brigadier-General (Retd) W. Don Macnamara, OMM, CD, MA  
**Secretary-Treasurer/Secrétaire-trésorier**.....  
Lieutenant-Colonel (Retd) G.D. Metcalfe, CD  
**Executive Director/Directeur exécutif**.....  
Colonel (Retd) A. Pellerin, OMM, CD

budget du 15 décembre 2001 du gouvernement fédéral, à notre grand désarroi, attribuait une très petite partie du budget aux Forces canadiennes, et ce, malgré les événements du 11 septembre.

Cet horrible événement, plus que tout autre, a fait pencher la balance en faveur d'un examen de la sécurité et de la défense canadienne. En fait, le gouvernement a annoncé qu'un tel examen serait effectué cette année. Ce qui suit rappellera à nos lecteurs la position adoptée lors de l'AGA de la CAD de février 2002 sur cette question d'une extrême importance, une position qui a été clairement exposée dans une lettre que j'ai envoyée récemment au ministre de la Défense nationale :

«Étant donné les récents événements mondiaux et la nécessité de conserver et de démontrer la souveraineté canadienne, la Conférence des associations de la défense (CAD) croit que le gouvernement canadien doit entreprendre un examen public général et fondamental des politiques relatives à la sécurité nationale et à la défense, ainsi que des politiques étrangères.

Nous croyons que les piliers du Livre blanc sur la défense de 1994 (défendre le Canada, aider à défendre l'Amérique du Nord, contribuer à la paix et à la sécurité internationale) sont bons. Néanmoins, bien que des progrès aient été réalisés relativement aux initiatives de la qualité de vie et à certaines acquisitions d'équipement, la politique n'est pas adéquatement financée. Nos principales préoccupations sont les suivantes :

- depuis le 11 septembre, il faut examiner la défense de notre patrie et du continent;
- il faut examiner la capacité expéditionnaire des Forces

(voir p. 3)

<i>Contents</i>	<i>Contenu</i>
<i>CDA - The Way Ahead</i> .....	<i>1</i>
<i>CAD - La Voie à Suivre</i> .....	<i>1</i>
<i>From the Executive Director</i> .....	<i>4</i>
<i>Le Mot du Directeur Exécutif</i> .....	<i>4</i>
<i>Biography - BGen (Retd) W. Don Macnamara</i> .....	<i>7</i>
<i>Biographie - BGén (Ret) W. Don Macnamara</i> .....	<i>7</i>
<i>Combat Capability and the Canadian Forces</i> .....	<i>8</i>
<i>How Many Pounds of Policy Are Needed to Secure Canada?</i> .....	<i>16</i>
<i>Why Does Canada Need Armed Forces?</i> .....	<i>19</i>
<i>Ballistic Missile Defence and Canada</i> .....	<i>21</i>
<i>Doit-On Créer un Ministère de la Sécurité au Canada?</i> .....	<i>23</i>

**Companions of CDAI**

**Compagnons de l'ICAD**

Mr. M.G. Corbett - Colonel T.A.H. Sparling, CD

ing public review of national security, foreign and defence policies.

We believe that the pillars of the 1994 Defence White Paper (defend Canada; assist in the defence of North America; contribute to international peace and security) are sound. Nonetheless, although some progress has been made in Quality of Life initiatives and specific equipment acquisitions, the policy is not adequately funded. Our principal concerns are as follows:

- a. post-September 11<sup>th</sup>, there is a need to review our homeland and continental defence;
- b. there is a need to review the expeditionary capability of the Canadian Forces (an expression of our sovereignty obligations in contributing to world peace); and
- c. the general readiness, deployability and sustainability of the Canadian Forces remain in doubt.”

The CDA is not alone in recommending Government action. In addition to our own two most recent CDAI studies (*Caught in the Middle* - October 2001, and *Stability and Prosperity* - September 2000) calling for Government action, the Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (February 2002), the Second Report of SCNDVA (November 2001), FMUSIC's report (Canada's Strategic Security XXI – February 2001), the Council for Canadian Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century's *To Secure a Nation* (November 2001), and the RCMI's *A Wake Up Call For Canada* (Spring 2001), in addition to letters and comments from many security and defence-minded Canadians (many of whom belong to CDA member Associations) have done the same. But reports, however numerous, are not enough. Grass roots support is needed!

The CDA's task is clear! As the “voice of defence”, we must double our efforts in informing Canadians of the urgency of reversing the long period of under funding of our Canadian Forces, the result of which has been the steady decline in the number of personnel available for an ever increasing operational tempo, and a serious shortfall in the capital acquisition program.

(continued p. 4)

canadiennes (une expression de nos obligations à contribuer à la paix mondiale en tant que pays souverain);

- c. de nombreuses incertitudes persistent en ce qui a trait à l'état de préparation général, la déployabilité et la soutenabilité des Forces canadiennes.”

La CAD n'est pas seule à recommander une action de la part du gouvernement. En plus de nos deux plus récentes études de l'ICAD (*Coincé entre les deux* – octobre 2001 et *Stabilité et prospérité* – septembre 2000) demandant au gouvernement d'agir, le rapport du Comité sénatorial permanent de la Sécurité nationale et de la défense (février 2002), le deuxième rapport du CPDNAC (novembre 2001), le rapport de la FIMIC (Canada's Security XXI - février 2001), *To Secure a Nation* du Conseil pour la sécurité canadienne au XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle (novembre 2001) et *A Wake Up Call For Canada* du RCMI (printemps 2001), en plus des lettres et des suggestions des Canadiens soucieux de la sécurité et de la défense (dont plusieurs font partie des associations membres de la CAD) ont aussi recommandé au gouvernement d'agir. Mais les rapports, bien que nombreux, ne sont pas suffisants. Il faut des militants de base!

La tâche de la CAD est claire! En tant que la «voix de la défense», nous devons redoubler d'efforts à informer les Canadiens de l'urgence de renverser la longue période de sous-financement de nos Forces canadiennes, qui se résume par le déclin constant du nombre de militaires devant faire face à un rythme des opérations sans cesse croissant et à de graves lacunes dans les programmes d'acquisitions du matériel.

Vous vous souviendrez que lors de notre AGA de février 2002, deux documents importants ont été approuvés- les programmes d'affaires publiques et de sensibilisation de la CAD. Grâce à la mise en œuvre et la coordination minutieuse des plans d'action contenus dans ces deux programmes, la CAD a l'intention d'informer les Canadiens de l'urgence et de l'importance d'un vaste examen public des politiques de sécurité nationale de défense et des politiques étrangères et de les convaincre

(voir p. 4)

#### Officer Level Donors to CDAI

#### Donateurs de l'ICAD - niveau d'officier

Lieutenant-général (Ret) Charles H. Belzile, CM, CMM, CD; Honorary Colonel James W. Burns, QOCH; Brigadier-General James S. Cox; Lieutenant-Colonel (Retd) G.L. D'Appolomia; Dr. Dawson W. Einarson; Lieutenant-général (Ret) Richard J. Evraire, CMM, CD; Dr. Donald Heckman; Major-General Reginald W. Lewis, CM, CMM, CD; Brigadier-General W. Don Macnamara, OMM, CD, MA; Major (Retd) Sean MacNamara; Colonel (Retd) W.J. McCullough; Colonel (Retd) D. Bruce McGibbon, CD; Brigadier-General (Retd) Leslie T. Rowbottom; Captain (N) D.J. Scott, CD, MD, F; Lieutenant-Colonel Ernest Skutezky; Lieutenant-Colonel David L. Stinson, CD; Lieutenant-Colonel (Retd) William Tenhaaf; Honorary Colonel L.A. Watkins  
Mr. Robert G. Tucker; Honorary Colonel L.A. Watkins

You will recall that at our February 2002 AGM, two major documents were approved – the CDA’s Outreach and Public Affairs Programs. Through the diligent application and coordination of the action plans contained in both these programs, the CDA is prepared to inform Canadians of the urgency and the importance of a wide-ranging public review of national security, foreign and defence policies, and convince them to pass that message on to their Members of Parliament. If we hope to be successful in this undertaking, your participation is not only welcome, it is necessary.

I therefore urge you to respond to your Association’s request (coming soon) for help in ‘getting the message across’.

de transmettre ce message aux membres du Parlement. Votre participation est non seulement bienvenue, mais essentielle au succès de cette entreprise.

Je vous exhorte donc à répondre à la demande de votre association (à venir bientôt) afin de contribuer à «faire passer le message».

## FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

*Colonel (Retd) Alain Pellerin, OMM, CD*

Our 18<sup>th</sup> annual seminar, presented in association with the Chair for Defence Management Studies, Queen’s University, was held on the 21<sup>st</sup> of February. Its theme, *Combat Capability and the Canadian Forces*, was a timely one. The Ballroom at the Fairmont Château Laurier, in which the seminar was held, was filled to near-capacity, and I am pleased to note that the feedback we have received has been very positive.

The seminar was attended by members of the Canadian Forces, senators, members of Parliament, and, most importantly, members of the Canadian public. The day was filled with prominent speakers from across Canada and the United States. Addresses included those of the Minister of National Defence, the Chief of the Defence Staff, with the keynote address being given by Dr. Jack Granatstein, a long-time friend and supporter of the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA). It was gratifying for the profession of arms to see the lively exchange of views that took place between our panellists and their audiences.

*(continued p. 5)*

## LE MOT DU DIRECTEUR EXÉCUTIF

*Colonel (ret) Alain Pellerin, OMM, CD*

Notre XVIII<sup>e</sup> séminaire annuel, présenté en collaboration avec la Chaire d’études en gestion de défense de la Queen’s University, a eu lieu le 21 février. Son thème, *Capacité au combat et les Forces canadiennes*, était opportun. La salle de bal au Château Laurier Fairmount, où avait lieu le colloque, était remplie à pleine capacité. Je note d’ailleurs avec satisfaction que les commentaires que nous avons reçus sont très positifs.

Des membres des Forces canadiennes, des sénateurs, des membres du Parlement, mais surtout, des représentants du public canadien ont assisté au colloque. Au cours de la journée, des conférenciers renommés de différentes régions du Canada et des États-Unis ont participé. Des discours ont été prononcés par le ministre de la Défense nationale, le chef d’État-major de la Défense, ainsi qu’un discours-programme donné par M. Jack Granatstein, un ami et un partisan depuis longtemps de la Conférence des associations de la Défense (CAD). Il est vraiment gratifiant pour la profession militaire de voir l’échange animé d’opinions qui s’est tenu entre nos experts et leurs auditoires.

À la suite du séminaire, les copies des discours prononcés paraîtront sur notre site Web, [www.cda-cdai.ca](http://www.cda-cdai.ca), sous la rubrique *Séminaires de la Défense*. Notre analyste principal-Défense, Colonel Sean Henry, offre aux lecteurs de *ON TRACK* un résumé du séminaire et de l’assemblée générale annuelle (AGA). Le XVIII<sup>e</sup> séminaire annuel a été une réussite sur toute la ligne, reflétant l’intérêt prononcé du public pour la sécurité et la défense nationale. Note défi est de conserver le haut niveau d’intérêt professionnel au sein de l’Institut et son travail.

*(voir p. 5)*

**ON TRACK**  
**Advertising Rates - Per Issue**  
 Camera-ready material

Full page .....	\$400
Half page .....	\$200
Quarter page .....	\$100
Business card size .....	\$50

**T Members Receive 10% Discount**

Contact the editor at (613) 236 9903

Copies of the addresses that were delivered will appear on our website, [www.cda-cdai.ca](http://www.cda-cdai.ca), under *Defence Seminars*. Our Senior Defence Analyst, Colonel Sean Henry, presents the readers of *ON TRACK* with a summary of the seminar and of the Annual General Meeting (AGM) which followed the seminar. The 18<sup>th</sup> annual seminar was truly a success, reflecting the public's heightened interest in matters of security and national defence. Our challenge is for all of us to maintain the high level of professional interest in the Institute and its work.

Contributing to the success of the seminar was GM Defense, hosting the CDAI Luncheon and the CDAI Reception which followed the close of the seminar. The Institute is grateful for the very generous support of GM Defense.

The 65<sup>th</sup> AGM began with a meeting of the CDA Council on Wednesday, and carried on with the general meeting Friday, the day following the seminar. Of particular interest were the very informative presentations by the Chiefs of the environmental staffs at National Defence Headquarters, the Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources - Military), and the Executive Director of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States. As Executive Director, I congratulate Council for its endorsement in the appointment of Lieutenant-General (Retd) Richard J. Evraire as the new Chairman. I am pleased, also, to report that the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute elected Brigadier-General (Retd) Don W. Macnamara as President of the Institute, succeeding Lieutenant-General Evraire. A biographical sketch of Brigadier-General Macnamara follows this article.

The army Officers Mess was the scene Friday evening of the largest gathering in years of supporters of the CDA Institute, as well as many who participated in the annual seminar and AGM, for CDA's annual mess dinner. The AGM concluded its business Saturday with syndicate discussion reports on the CDA Outreach Plan and Public Affairs, the Defence Review, and the Restructure of the Reserves.

The Conference of Defence Associations is examining issues in preparation for the defence review which we believe will be undertaken by the government; although the time of such a review is not known. Most of the articles that appear in this edition of *ON TRACK* address issues that must be examined in the next defence review. With our thanks to the editor of *Vanguard*, we have reprinted *How Many Pounds of Policy Are Needed to Secure Canada?*, by Major-General Clive Addy, one of our vice-chairmen. Major-General Addy assesses the reasons for a defence review and examines studies that were produced within the past year that focus on Canadian Forces capabilities relative to the White Paper of 1994.

(continued p. 6)

GM Defense a contribué à la réussite du colloque, en parrainant le déjeuner et la réception de l'ICAD après la clôture du séminaire. L'institut est reconnaissant du soutien généreux apporté par GM Defense.

Le LXV<sup>e</sup> AGA a débuté par une réunion du Conseil de la CAD mercredi, et s'est poursuivi par une réunion générale le vendredi, le lendemain du séminaire. Les présentations très instructives, données par les Chefs d'État-major du Quartier général de la Défense nationale, le sous-ministre adjoint (Ressources humaines – Militaire) et le directeur exécutif de l'association des officiers de réserve des États-Unis étaient très intéressantes. À titre de directeur exécutif, je tiens à féliciter le conseil d'avoir appuyer la nomination du lieutenant-général (ret) Richard J. Evraire comme nouveau président. Il me fait aussi plaisir d'annoncer que le Conseil d'administration de l'Institut CAD a élu le brigadier-général (ret) Don W. Macnamara comme président de l'Institut, succédant ainsi au lieutenant-général Evraire. Une courte biographie du brigadier-général Macnamara suit cet article.

Vendredi soir, le mess des officiers de l'armée a été la scène du plus grand rassemblement depuis des années de partisans de l'Institut CAD, dont plusieurs ont participé au colloque annuel et à l'AGA, pour le dîner régimentaire annuel de la CAD. L'AGA s'est terminée samedi par des rapports de discussions sur les affaires publiques et le plan de sensibilisation, l'examen de la défense et la restructuration des réserves.

La Conférence des associations de la Défense examinent les questions relatives à la préparation de l'examen de la défense qui sera, selon nous, entrepris par le gouvernement, bien que le temps nécessité par un tel examen reste indéterminé. La plupart des articles qui paraissent dans l'édition de *ON TRACK*, abordent des questions qui doivent être examinées dans le prochain examen de la défense. Avec nos remerciements à l'endroit de l'éditeur de *Vanguard*, nous avons fait réimprimer *How Many Pounds of Policy are Needed to Secure Canada?*, rédigé par le major-général Clive Addy, l'un de nos vice-présidents. Le major-général Addy se penche sur les raisons d'un examen de la défense et examine des études qui ont été produites au cours de l'année passée et qui sont axées sur les capacités des Forces canadiennes relativement au *Livre blanc sur la défense de 1994*.

Le nouveau président de notre Institut, le brigadier-général Don Macnamara, examine la raison d'être des Forces armées pour le Canada, dans *Why Does Canada Need Armed Forces?* et fait des observations sur la position des Canadiens, après le 11 septembre, à l'égard de l'importance de la sécurité nationale.

(voir p. 6)

Our new Institute President, Brigadier-General Don Macnamara, examines the rationale for armed forces for Canada, in *Why Does Canada Need Armed Forces?*, and comments on the attitude of Canadians post-September 11 toward the relevance of national security.

We are pleased to provide for our readers with Dr. George Lindsay's thoughtful paper, *Ballistic Missile Defence and Canada*. Dr. Lindsay has written an interesting addition to the current debate on the demand for 'Homeland Defence'. Also, in this edition of *ON TRACK*, Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Giguère questions the appropriateness of the primacy of foreign policy, and suggests alternatives to our existing approach, to solving problems of national security.

One of the major events in the CDA Institute's calendar is the annual presentation of the Vimy Award to a Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values. Last year's award programme was an outstanding success, with the large number of submissions that were received for the consideration of the Vimy Award Selection Committee, and culminating with the presentation of the award to Air Commodore Leonard Birchall by the Honourable Arthur Eggleton, Minister of National Defence.

This year's presentation of the Vimy Award will take place 15 November at a gala dinner that will be held in the Grand Hall at the Canadian Museum of Civilization, Gatineau, Québec. To make the award truly meaningful the Institute needs your nomination for the award's recipient. CDA member associations as well as individuals are encouraged to submit nominations for their candidate to the Institute. Please refer to the notice of the call for nominations which appears elsewhere in this issue.

In closing I wish to remind our readers that without your financial support the national office cannot carry out the work of CDA and the CDA Institute on your behalf. Your past support is reaping dividends through the increased awareness of Canadians for a credible military. We are making some progress. We add to the debate on issues of defence and national security. We are here to promote the study and awareness of Canadian military affairs. **Your continued financial support as members of the CDA Institute is vital** to our continuing success. Better yet - introduce a fellow Canadian to the Institute.

Il nous fait plaisir d'offrir à nos lecteurs un document riche en réflexion rédigé par le D<sup>r</sup> George Lindsay et qui s'intitule *Ballistic Missile Defence and Canada*. Le D<sup>r</sup> Lindsay expose ses réflexions sur le débat actuel sur la revendication de la «défense de la patrie». De plus, dans cette édition de *ON TRACK*, le lieutenant-colonel Richard Giguère s'interroge sur la pertinence de la primauté des politiques étrangères et propose des solutions de rechange à notre approche actuelle à la résolution des problèmes relatifs à la sécurité nationale.

La présentation annuelle du Prix Vimy à un Canadien/une Canadienne, qui a contribué de façon importante et remarquable à la défense et à la sécurité de notre nation et à la sauvegarde de nos valeurs démocratiques, est l'un des événements les plus importants du programme l'Institut CAD. Le programme de reconnaissance de l'an dernier a été une réussite retentissante, étant donné le grand nombre de demandes que nous avons reçues et qui ont été soumises au Comité de sélection du Prix Vimy et qui s'est terminé avec la remise du prix au commodore de l'air Leonard Birchall par l'Honorable Arthur Eggleton, ministre de la Défense nationale.

Cette année, la présentation du Prix Vimy aura lieu le 15 novembre lors du dîner gala qui se tiendra dans le Grande Galerie du Musée canadien des civilisations, à Gatineau, Québec. L'Institut a besoin de vos suggestions de candidats pour recevoir le prix de façon à rendre l'événement significatif. Les associations membres de la CAD ainsi que les personnes sont incitées à soumettre les candidatures de leur candidat à l'institut. Veuillez consulter l'avis concernant les appels de candidatures.

En terminant, je désire rappeler à nos lecteurs que sans votre soutien financier, le bureau national ne peut donner suite au travail de la CAD et de l'institut CAD. Votre soutien antérieur a apporté des dividendes grâce à la sensibilisation accrue des Canadiens pour une force militaire crédible. Nous faisons des progrès. Nous ajoutons au débat des questions sur la défense et la sécurité nationale. Nous sommes ici pour promouvoir l'étude et la sensibilisation des affaires militaires canadiennes. **Votre soutien financier continu en tant que membre de l'institut CDA est essentiel** pour assurer notre succès continue. Mieux encore - parlez l'Institut à un concitoyen.

**BIOGRAPHY****BRIGADIER-GENERAL (Retd) W. DON  
MACNAMARA, OMM, CD, MA**

Brigadier-General Don Macnamara (Retired), a specialist in strategic intelligence analysis and planning, joined the faculty of the Queen's University School of Business in 1987 following a 37 year career in the RCAF and Canadian Forces. Starting as a RCAF radar technician and then air traffic control officer, he worked in biosciences operations research and flight safety for 18 years at the RCAF Institute of Aviation Medicine, Toronto, the Royal Aircraft Establishment and RAF Institute of Aviation Medicine in Farnborough, UK and the Defence and Civil Institute of Environmental Medicine in Toronto, and in accident investigation and analysis in Canada and Europe. Then, in the latter 15 years of his air force career, he was Director, Unified Studies at the Canadian Forces College, Toronto, Director, Strategic Policy Planning and Director, Arms Control Policy at National Defence Headquarters, and Director, Curriculum at the National Defence College in Kingston. He is a graduate of the University of Western Ontario, the University of Toronto, the Canadian Forces Staff College and the National Defence College.

While at Queen's, he taught international business in the undergraduate and MBA programs. He taught International Management at Uni Kaiserslautern in Germany for four summer semesters and for three years directed the start-up of the Queen's International Study Centre at Herstmonceux Castle, East Sussex, England. Now retired from Queen's, Brigadier-General Macnamara remains a part-time associate professor in the School of Business, a Senior Fellow in the Queen's Centre for International Relations and is Associate Director of the Queen's Public Executive Program.

He is an Officer in the Order of Military Merit, and the recipient of the Commerce Society Award for Teaching Excellence, and the Rotary International Paul Harris Fellowship for his contribution to international education. Since 1996 he has been the Honorary Colonel of the Canadian Forces College, the first to be so appointed. He received a CDS Commendation in June 2001, and is to receive a Doctorate in Military Science (honoris causa) from the Royal Military College in June 2002.

Brigadier-General Macnamara is married to Lee Wilson of Ripley, Ontario, a retired occupational health nurse, and they have two sons, Doug a management educator in Banff and Pete, a musician in New York.

**BIOGRAPHIE****BRIGADIER-GENERAL (Ret) W. DON.  
MACNAMARA, OMM, CD, MA**

Le brigadier-général Don Macnamara (retraité), un spécialiste en planification et en analyse de renseignements stratégiques, s'est joint à la faculté de la Queen's University School of Business en 1987 et a été par la suite au service des Forces aériennes royales et des Forces canadiennes pendant 37 ans. Ayant débuté sa carrière comme technicien-radar de l'ARC et ayant occupé par la suite le poste d'officier du contrôle du trafic aérien, il a travaillé en recherche des opérations biosciences et en sécurité des vols pendant 18 ans à l'Institut de médecine aéronautique de l'ARC à Toronto, au Royal Aircraft Establishment et à l'Institut de médecine aéronautique de la RAF à Farnborough, au Royaume-Uni, à l'Institut militaire et civil de médecine environnementale, à Toronto, ainsi qu'en analyse et enquête sur les accidents au Canada et en Europe. Plus tard, au cours de ses quinze dernières années de service dans la Force aérienne, il a été directeur, Unified Studies au Collège des Forces canadiennes à Toronto, directeur de la planification de la politique stratégique, directeur de la politique relative au contrôle des armements au Quartier générale de la Défense nationale et directeur des programmes d'études au Collège de la Défense nationale à Kingston. Il est diplômé de la University of Western Ontario, de la University of Toronto, du Collège d'état major des Forces canadiennes et du Collège de la Défense nationale.

À la Queen's University, il enseignait le commerce international dans les programmes de premier cycle et de M.B.A. Il a aussi enseigné la gestion internationale à Uni Kaiserslautern en Allemagne pendant quatre semestres d'été et a dirigé pendant trois années la mise en service du Queen's International Study Centre à Herstmonceux Castle, East Sussex, en Angleterre. Maintenant retraité de la Queen's University, le brigadier-général Macnamara demeure un professeur agrégé à temps partiel à la School of Business, un agrégé supérieur de recherches au Queen's Centre for International Relations et occupe le poste de codirecteur du Queen's Public Executive Program.

Il est Officier de l'Ordre du Mérite militaire et est récipiendaire du Commerce Society Award for Teaching Excellence, et du Rotary International Paul Harris Fellowship pour sa contribution à l'éducation à l'échelle internationale. Depuis 1996, il est colonel honoraire du Collège des Forces canadiennes, le premier à être honoré de cette façon. Il a reçu une Mention élogieuse du Chef d'état-major de la Défense en juin 2001 et

(voir p. 8)

est sur le point de recevoir un doctorat en science militaire (honoris causa) du Collège militaire royal en juin 2002.

Le brigadier-général Macnamara est marié à Lee Wilson de Ripley en Ontario, une infirmière de l'hygiène du travail à la retraite. Ils ont deux fils, Doug, un spécialiste en gestion à Banff, et Pete, un musicien à New York.

## CDA INSTITUTE 18<sup>TH</sup> ANNUAL SEMINAR/ CDA 65<sup>TH</sup> ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

### *COMBAT CAPABILITY AND THE CANADIAN FORCES*

*Colonel (Retd) Seán Henry, OMM, CD, Senior Defence Analyst CDA*

The eighteenth Annual Seminar of the CDA Institute was held in Ottawa on February 21, 2002, in conjunction with the CDA Annual General Meeting. Welcome and opening remarks were delivered by **Lieutenant-General Richard Evraire (Retd)**, President, CDA Institute. He expressed his pleasure at seeing the large number in attendance, including Senators and Members of Parliament, and conveyed a special welcome to the distinguished speakers. He noted that the war on terrorism has added urgency to examination of Canadian defence policy and the state of the Canadian Forces. With some 4500 troops now deployed overseas, it is appropriate to consider questions of their combat capability.

**The Honourable Arthur C. Eggleton**, Minister of National Defence, delivered the Introductory Address. He praised the work of CDA and the CDA Institute, and stated that the theme of the seminar, combat capability, was an important one. He also lauded the dedication and professionalism of the members of the Canadian Forces who are defending the interests of the nation worldwide. He continued that the onset of the campaign against terrorism has forced a refocus of Canadian defence policy on security of the North American continent, in cooperation with the United States. Although this has been a fundamental component of defence policy since 1940, a number of adjustments will be required in the near future.

The Minister then outlined a number of the new security initiatives underway, starting with the \$7.7 billion allocated in Budget 2001 to fight terrorism and enhance security. It would be applied to a number of projects in DND and other departments, and in conjunction with a number of new pieces of legislation. He emphasized the challenges arising from the nature of terrorism, and the need to create new responses. He then summarized the main features of the latter, including: doubling the size of the JTF2 unit of the Canadian Forces; research and development into chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear protection; enhancing the capabilities of the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness; enhancing intelligence gathering capabilities; and, aspects of continental security. Regardless of the

arrangements falling from the latter, Canadian sovereignty would be preserved.

The Minister concluded by reiterating that the fundamentals of Canada's defence policy (in the 1994 White Paper) remain sound. However, he stated that options are now being actively considered to update aspects of the policy so as to provide a framework for military planners to respond to the changed environment.

**Doctor Jack Granatstein**, distinguished military historian, presented the Keynote Address. His main theme was that, in the past, Canadian governments have been notoriously unwilling to support combat capabilities for the armed forces in times of peace. In colonial days, the French or the British were expected to provide the professional sailors and soldiers to defend the country, assisted to a limited degree by a poorly trained Canadian militia. He then reviewed Canada's military contributions to the wars of the twentieth century where the armed forces became increasingly large and professional during the conflicts themselves, only to lapse back into obscurity when peace returned. This only changed during the 1950s, with the onset of the Cold War. For the first time Canada was forced to raise and maintain a large regular component of its armed forces in peacetime. However, the end of the Cold War, and the severe fiscal situation of the government in the 1990s, have caused a relapse; the Canadian Forces are in their most weakened state since the 1930s – this applies to both the regulars and the reserves.

This has occurred because Canadians still have a fundamentally colonial attitude, and still expect someone else to look after their security – principally the United States, and the NATO allies. A willingness to allow others to fight and die for one's national interests will inevitably lead to erosion of national sovereignty. Allies have become critical of Canada's lack of defence effort, especially the United States, where defence has become the top priority of government. In this

*(continued p. 9)*

respect, the Canadian government's presentation of its recent budget is misleading. Very little of the money will be spent on improvements to the personnel strength and combat capability of the Canadian Forces. Canadians should stop acting like teenagers and start taking on the responsibilities of adults. Saying that peacekeeping alone will suffice is unrealistic. Canada requires well-trained and professional sailors, soldiers and airmen, and viable reserves. Only in this way will the national interest be served. The events of last fall should be a wake-up call for Canada, and the Canadian public seems to be ahead of their government in realizing this.

**Panel 1 –Where Are We Now (And in the Foreseeable Future)?** The moderator was **Doctor Joel Sokolsky**, Dean of Arts, RMC. He introduced the session by stating that in matters of defence policy it is important to obtain the views of those from a wide variety of backgrounds, and the panel satisfies that requirement.

**The Honourable John Fraser**, Chairman, Minister's Monitoring Committee, led the discussion by noting that to define what the Canadian Forces need to be combat capable, it is necessary to know their true state today. There is both political and public confusion on this matter, since DND officials say the military is in the best shape it has been in 10 years, whereas CDA and others say its level of combat capability is low. There must be a balance of enough people and enough modern technical systems for them to use. The public (and to some extent Cabinet members) only read the headlines. In this respect, they see qualified military people say that technology will replace manpower in the years ahead; no wonder they do not protest cuts to manpower. At the same time, senior officials become evasive in testifying before parliamentary committees, regarding the operational readiness of the Canadian Forces. Avoiding the problems of the present, and failure to look ahead and plan for the future are key failures – in terms of national security and the armed forces.

**Doctor Martin Shadwick**, of the Centre for International and Security Studies at York University, continued the discussion by noting that great care should be exercised in accepting too many quasi and non-military missions for the Canadian Forces; it tends to mask the true state of their combat capabilities. The 1994 White Paper got it right – Canada is best served by multi-purpose, combat-capable armed forces. The main problem of that document is not the basic policy, but a lack of funding to execute the policy. Today, some elements of the forces are more combat capable, but by no means all of them. Perhaps the major weakness is that there is not a critical mass of capability to make other than token contributions to combat operations, and that does not serve Canada well in the eyes of its allies. There will be problems, especially problems of foreign policy, in introducing any changes to the 1994 White Paper. As well, a new policy debate

could re-open the question of the need for combat capability, and this time it might not be accepted. Finally, the new prominence of homeland defence ought to be approached with caution; witness the way in which money was allocated to departments other than DND in the Federal Budget 2001. The public and politicians must understand the interplay of defence spending and provision of social programmes; they are complementary, not in opposition.

**Doctor Richard Gimblett**, Defence Consultant, noted the need to consider both the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of armed forces, as well as their priority of deployment into operations – especially in the modern era, where emphasis has been placed on the navy and the air force, at least in the early phases of war. One should also consider that in the past, Canada has rarely contributed armed forces outside of allied coalitions.

Today, the future of the war in Afghanistan is not clear; How long will it last? Will it expand? What will the US do? At any rate, it has already underscored the emphasis on long range bombing and special forces' operations. However, in the end, the value of the Canadian contribution will be assessed by the number of troops deployed on the ground. A failure to do this in the Gulf War overshadowed the significant naval, air and support elements. In this respect, anything less than a brigade would squander Canadian effort, as it would get lost in the larger US contributions, and would not garner credit for its efforts. For the future, one must decide what functions the Canadian Forces are to perform, and whether the emphasis will be on continental or expeditionary capabilities.

The seminar then continued, with an address by the Chief of the Defence Staff, **General Raymond Henault**. He stated quite clearly that combat capability of the Canadian Forces must be maintained – that is not an issue. The senior leadership is committed to maintaining the effectiveness of the armed forces both today and tomorrow –even within the restrictions of limited financial resources. He then referred to the missions of the 4500 troops deployed overseas, and covered as well those serving on operations at home and in support roles. The Canadian Forces are stretched very tightly. They could surge to the levels required in the White Paper, but would likely not be able to sustain those levels.

For the way ahead, one must still use common sense and reasonable solutions to problems – especially those related to people, equipment and training. It will be necessary to examine all options, including force structures. Modernization of the Canadian Forces must be maintained as a high priority. In the end, the quality of the members of the armed forces is most important. The welfare of the troops must come first – from

*(continued p. 10)*

care of casualties through reduction of the stress of overtaking to availability of personal development programmes. The CDS then summarized a number of the main modernization projects underway in the Canadian Forces, pointing out Canada was ahead of allies in some areas, but there are many challenges to be overcome. He remains optimistic in spite of challenges, and welcomed the advice of CDA and others regarding the way ahead.

**Panel 2 –Where Should We Be in Twenty Years?** The moderator, **Honourable Senator Colin Kenny**, took the opportunity to mention that the Senate committee he chairs would be tabling a report on the state of national security and the armed forces on February 28, 2002. He noted it would cover many of the topics raised in this seminar – including technology vs manpower, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and the implications of security for Canada in all its aspects. In the end, regardless of the role Canada wishes to play in the world, it must take seriously the impact on its interests of global instability – and the benefits of dealing with threats as far away from the homeland as possible. For that reason there will be a requirement for combat capable and flexible armed forces, not those tailored to narrow or specialized roles.

**Doctor Jim Fergusson**, Deputy Director, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, led the discussion by stating that the US Administration is committed to vaulting ahead in terms of high technology military systems. This is particularly true for the “fourth dimension” of operations – outer space. Canada and the Canadian Forces must stay in the loop, even though the costs will be enormous, and nations must avoid the Callahan theory of self disarmament, whereby the defence budget could only afford a very few systems. The US can avoid this, but nations such as Canada will have to be careful and be highly selective in obtaining systems with maximum utility. The current force structure of the Canadian Forces is unsuitable today, let alone for the future. The government must define its strategic interests, and the types of forces needed to satisfy those interests.

For Canada the strategic implications are relatively constant, but the government does not understand how armed forces fit into the equation. The US holds supreme power unrivalled since the time of the Roman empire. Allies must not give up in the face of this, but study carefully how they can make contributions of best value to US-led coalitions – or other coalitions. For the next 20 to 30 years the range of conflicts will be similar to those that have occurred in the past 10 years. The most important driving force will be the exponential progress of high technology. This must be a key factor in considering future Canadian Forces structure. In this respect there is some validity to the theory of systems replacing manpower – but within limits. It is also the ‘American way of

war’. Again, one can expect that the Canadian Forces of the future will look much different than the Canadian Forces of today.

**Colonel Howard Marsh**, Special Assistant to the Chief of the Land Staff, outlined a series of future possibilities both fascinating and alarming, in terms of Canadian security and the armed forces. In his opinion (and not as a spokesman for DND), there are five determinants that could indicate where Canada’s combat capability should be in 20 years. First, no military can escape its history. Past personnel policies have set in motion strong human resource resonance waves that will prejudice recruiting the talented youth needed for an age of special operations and cyber-warriors.

Second, three decades of low capital investment have undermined the Canadian Forces’ holdings of high technology equipment and systems. There are large gaps across the whole spectrum, and consequently Canada’s armed forces will, by default, be in the second echelon of stability operations, unable to participate in high-readiness combat. National security will need to be re-negotiated with high technology entities such as corporations, and this is likely to compete with the armed forces.

Third, there is a global straight jacket being applied, involving expanding interconnectedness and interdependence. This will limit freedom of action, and for Canada will impose closer relations with the US. Fourth, there will be a blurring of boundaries between the military and other groups, such as multinational business, who will take part themselves in an expanded definition of security. Finally, there is the determinant of the Canadian economy. The Canadian economy is shrinking (in relation to the US) at about 2% per annum – caused mainly by the Canadian decision to invest in people rather than innovation. Therefore, the Canadian economy is unlikely to be able to support defence expenditures on a par with the US – or even the majority of its NATO allies.

What then should the Canadian Forces’ combat capability be in light of all this? Paramount is national sovereignty – involving the ability to monitor a whole range of threats, from the physical to the cyber-technological. This suggests unmanned sites, backed-up with reconnaissance patrols. The second priority would be interoperability with forces of the US. These two priorities would likely absorb all of the money allocated to defence. Hence, the third priority, stability operations could only be acquired within existing resources by a rigorous reduction of DND corporate entities, the application of strict priorities, and focussing Canada’s global involvement.

**Mr. David Pratt, MP**, Chairman of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans’

*(continued p. 11)*

Affairs, indicated it was vital to stimulate public discussion of factors of national security. He listed a number of assumptions regarding developments over the next 20 years: The first is that the US will remain the dominant military power, and that has significant implications for Canada and other allies. It is both a consolation and a worry. In the end, success will depend on our ability to mount joint and combined operations. Certainly, Canada has the added concern of the extent to which we can or should harmonize our national security with that of the US.

The second assumption is that Canada will remain engaged in international affairs and require armed forces. Those armed forces will need to be utilized in military operations far beyond those of traditional peacekeeping. Canada has a long tradition of multi-lateralism grounded in the concept of collective security.

The third assumption is that Canadian Forces could be committed to mid-intensity military operations. This implies the need to structure our military forces accordingly. Some specialization may be acceptable because of the nature of coalition warfare, but military capabilities must be interoperable and combat capable. This will assure sovereignty.

The fourth assumption is that Canada will continue to seek security through collective arrangements, especially with the US, and through NATO and similar partnerships in the Pacific and the Western Hemisphere. There are, however, some clouds ahead as NATO nations have embarked on reductions of defence expenditures. Nonetheless, Canada should continue to cooperate with its European allies.

The fifth point is that Canada will need an independent capability to assert its sovereignty – especially in relation to homeland defence, for example in the arctic, and this will require military capabilities. A sixth consideration is that while the RMA may change methods of war, it will not change its nature. It will still be a nasty business, and our troops must be properly equipped and trained to engage in it. Finally, and importantly, there will likely be no significant change in the fiscal environment for DND and the armed forces – although this could change.

In summary, Canada must be as prepared as possible to meet the security challenges of the future. The next 20 years will not be unlike the past 10. In this respect the 1994 White Paper remains a credible foundation, but adjustments will need to be made in terms of force structure and planning.

**Doctor Douglas Bland**, Chair for Defence Management Studies, Queen's University, presented a summary of the

seminar. He reminded participants of major points covered by the speakers, and then extrapolated them into a number of major observations. In the situation in Canada today, the government does not think in terms of armed forces' operational readiness. This ought to change, and politicians should welcome it, since it would avoid the need for abrupt moves early in a crisis. There is a need to relate foreign policy objectives to the capability to back them up with military capabilities as necessary. Until the 1960s Canada could do this almost independently – witness the 1956 Sinai situation; Pearson's diplomatic success was able to be implemented by a strong and self-contained Canadian military contribution. Contrast this with Zaire in 1995, when Canada found itself unable to deliver on its initiative to establish and lead a similar multi-national force.

In that respect, a defence review must ask questions along the lines of what should the armed forces be able to do, and how are they going to do it? There needs to be a constant thrust towards defining end states in situations from peacekeeping to war. It must be accepted that the government can deploy forces into military operations, but it often cannot predict or control what happens once they are committed. Hence, defining precise end-states is impossible. One should therefore plan for general capabilities, not specific capabilities, while creating armed forces that are ready for a set of missions. High technology can increase capabilities, but not readiness.

Again, a defence review needs to assess what capabilities will be needed – not necessarily to solve the problems of today, with the forces of today, but rather how can the Canadian Forces be rebuilt over the next 5 to 10 years. Obviously, Canada/US defence arrangements will be a major focus of interest and effort. The question of sovereignty will always come up (with the Cuban missile crisis as an extreme example), but what is needed is foreign policy interoperability and the means to execute it. Again, the example of 1956 is instructive. Canada had the diplomatic and military capabilities, and was rewarded by the US with the Autopact agreement, among other benefits.

As a bridge between the CDA Institute Seminar, and the CDA Annual General Meeting, several additional presentations were made, as outlined below.

**Mr. Jayson Spiegel**, Executive Director, Reserve Officers' Association of the United States, spoke on developments in his organization. He explained that 'transformation' of armed forces must address both mindset and training; not merely more/new equipment and reorganization. Moreover, in the US President Bush campaigned on the need to transform the US armed forces from their Cold War configuration towards the emerging security challenges of the new century. In this respect, Afghanistan could be seen as the first war of transformation – involving new

*(continued p. 14)*

**THE CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE  
ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE**

**WISHES TO THANK**

**L'INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE  
DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA  
DÉFENSE**

**DÉSIRE REMERCIER**



**FOR THEIR**

**GENEROUS SPONSORSHIP**

**OF**

**THE INSTITUTE'S 18<sup>TH</sup> ANNUAL  
SEMINAR LUNCHEON**

**AND**

**RECEPTION**

**THURSDAY, 21 FEBRUARY, 2002**

**CHÂTEAU LAURIER**

**OTTAWA, CANADA**

**POUR LEUR**

**GÉNÉREUX APPUI**

**LORS DU**

**DÉJEUNER DU  
18 IÈME SÉMINAIRE ANNUEL DE  
L'INSTITUT**

**ET**

**DE LA RÉCEPTION**

**JEUDI, LE 21 FÉVRIER, 2002**

**AU CHÂTEAU LAURIER**

**OTTAWA, CANADA**

## THE VIMY AWARD

Nominations are invited for the year 2002 Vimy Award.

The Vimy Award was initiated in 1991 to recognize, annually, one Canadian who has made a significant and outstanding contribution to the defence and security of our nation and the preservation of our democratic values.

Previous recipients of this prestigious award include the Right Honourable Brian Dickson, General John deChastelain, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Vice-Admiral Larry Murray, Dr. Jack Granatstein; Lieutenant-General Charles H. Belzile, the Honourable Barnet Danson, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, and Air Commodore Leonard Birchall.

Any Canadian may nominate a fellow citizen for the award. Nominations must be in writing, and must include a summary of the reasons for the nomination and be accompanied by a short biography. Nominations must be received by 1 August 2002, and should be addressed to:

VIMY AWARD SELECTION COMMITTEE  
CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS  
INSTITUTE  
359 KENT STREET  
OTTAWA ON K2P 0R7

The Vimy Award will be presented on Friday, 15 November 2002, at a gala dinner that will be held in the Grand Hall of the Canadian Museum of Civilization, Gatineau QC.

For more information, including ticket orders for the Award dinner, contact the Conference of Defence Associations Institute at: Fax (613) 236 8191; e-mail: [pao@cda-cdai.ca](mailto:pao@cda-cdai.ca); or telephone (613) 236 9903.



*The Vimy Award/La Distinction honorifique Vimy*

## LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY

Nous invitons les nominations pour la Distinction honorifique Vimy 2002.

La Distinction honorifique Vimy a été instituée en 1991 dans le but de reconnaître, chaque année, un Canadien ou une Canadienne ayant apporté une contribution extraordinaire à la sécurité ou à la défense de notre nation et à la préservation de notre démocratie.

Les récipiendaires précédents de la Distinction honorifique Vimy sont, entre autres, le Très honorable Brian Dickson, le Général John deChastelain, le Très honorable Joe Clark, le Vice-amiral Larry Murray, le Dr. Jack Granatstein, le Lieutenant-général Charles H. Belzile, l'Honorable Barnet Danson, le Major-général Lewis MacKenzie, et le Commodore de l'Air Leonard Birchall.

Tout Canadien/Canadienne peut nommer un citoyen/citoyenne pour le Distinction honorifique Vimy. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir par écrit et inclure un sommaire des raisons motivant votre nomination et une biographie du candidat. Les nominations doivent nous parvenir au plus tard le 1 août 2002, et doivent être adressées au

COMITÉ DE SÉLECTION DE LA DISTINCTION HONORIFIQUE VIMY  
L'INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE  
359 RUE KENT, SUITE 502  
OTTAWA ON K2P 0R7

La Distinction honorifique Vimy sera présentée vendredi, le 15 novembre 2002, à un dîner gala qui aura lieu à la Grande Galerie du Musée canadien des civilisations, Gatineau QC.

Pour de plus amples renseignements, incluant la demande de billets pour le banquet, veuillez contacter l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la Défense à: télécopieur: (613) 236 8191; courriel : [pao@cda-cdai.ca](mailto:pao@cda-cdai.ca); ou téléphone: (613) 236 9903.

technology and new tactics. The comparison with Operation Desert Storm brings this into full focus.

He noted, however, that the situation is complicated because of the potential variety of military operations. For example, in Iran or Iraq today there would be no equivalent of the Northern Alliance, so US forces would take on more of the conventional operations, but advances in technology would still make it different from Desert Storm. In the end, in a \$1 billion per day defence budget it is vital to be able to decide how much will be spent on transformation projects. Examples of the latter include strategic lift and special operations forces.

He then discussed a number of areas, from a Reserves perspective, that would need attention: for example the US Coast Guard has had its tasks increased and expanded since September 11, but it is in dire need of replacement equipment; the issues of pay and allowances for some 72,000 members of the Reserves and the National Guard called-out since September 11; questions regarding the heavy engagement of the National Guard in homeland security.

In a reserves context, there is also a basic question of the force structure for conventional operations overseas versus new threats at home. Overall, the US does not necessarily want to engage in unilateral action, but allies will have to spend money on defence if they want to keep up. The terrorist attacks were against Western values, so we must all share in fighting back. The general trend will be towards lighter forces, but the US will retain some heavier forces. An important question is, how much of the latter responsibility will be allocated to the National Guard?

**Lieutenant-General Lloyd Campbell**, Chief of the Air Staff, presented a situation report on the state of the Canadian Air Force. He said that combat capabilities are not an absolute in their own right, but involve many factors. This applies as well to the different factors which impinge on the three services. He then referred to the UK Strategic Defence Review as a good example of an approach to armed forces transformation. There is a trend away from large standing military forces towards improved individual capabilities such as intelligence, reconnaissance, target acquisition, etc. Strategic deployability and capabilities for joint contingency operations are also evolving requirements for armed forces.

In the case of the Canadian Forces, some equipment is becoming less capable as time goes by. However, new capabilities such as precision guided munitions and night-fighting assets have been added. Nonetheless, the CF-18 fighters need upgrades of many of their systems. This will be an example of improving the combat capabilities of weapons we already possess. He then applied the same logic to the Aurora upgrade, noting that it would expand its capability from

coastal surveillance and anti-submarine operations to long range strategic reconnaissance, and include installation of an air to surface missile system

He then covered other aspects of air force developments such as combining senior headquarters, and installing indirect simulation training. Strategic air-to-air re-fuelling will be re-introduced by incorporating that capability into two Airbus transports. The air force is also deeply involved in plans to improve the Canadian Forces' strategic airlift capability. The Canadian Air Force is working closely with USAF in terms of transformation. Finally, although the air force is in relatively good shape, there is no doubt that it cannot continue to operate at its current level of activity within the bounds of current financial resources.

**Vice-Admiral Ron Buck**, Chief of the Naval Staff, opened his presentation on the Canadian Navy by stating the need for effective operational capabilities for all of the Canadian Forces, and his great pride in what they are currently accomplishing. In this context, the navy is certainly combat capable and is doing its job. It is not the biggest navy, but is one of the most highly capable in the world. The naval contributions to Operation APOLLO are the largest since World War II. In this respect, the navy is exceeding the requirements stated in the 1994 White Paper.

There is also a wider span of naval commitments, including coastal defence and port security. The navy is still in transition. The new submarines will be in operation soon, and this will mark an important milestone in the emergence of the new navy. Canada can and will continue to make credible contributions to security through its navy, on its own, and in coalitions. Again, Canada is one of the few navies that can participate in "heavy lifting," and is fully interoperable with the USN. In fact, the USN in certain cases is adopting Canadian Navy standards and procedures. Having said all this, the overall navy situation remains fragile due to stressed resources, especially in relation to people. Other problems include the rundown of the AORs, and the need to develop more advanced capabilities in C4I<sup>2</sup>.

**Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffery**, Chief of the Land Staff, spoke on the state of the Canadian Army. He commenced by saying that he is still struggling with most of the same issues regarding the shortfall in resources versus commitments as he discussed last year. He too spoke of the importance of the capabilities of all three services in concert, rather than in isolation. However, the fact remained "There is too much army for the budget, and too little army for the tasks." As well, the subject of armed forces capabilities is a complex one today. For these reasons he stated his remarks would be presented

*(continued p. 15)*

under two general categories – what is “doable,” and what is “sustainable.” In terms of former it means doing the task with resources at hand – not necessarily in ideal fashion, but up to the required level of performance set by the government. In terms of equipment, the army is in relatively good shape (he then gave an overview of new or improved items). However, the key element of doability is the state of training. In the current situation, the army can undertake all peace and stability type operations with minimal risk. Combat operations could also be undertaken, but here the level of risk increases depending on the type of operation and the environment. Afghanistan is doable because light infantry operations rely heavily on individual skills, and in that area the capability is satisfactory.

Commitment of troops to mechanized operations would be a greater risk. They could be done if time were available for preparation. In the Afghanistan case, this could not have been done. The unsatisfactory state of higher levels of training, at battalion and brigade levels, would be the key shortfall. An attempt will be made to overcome it in the next few years. In this context he also noted that the introduction of new equipment in the army brigades will mean that two of those brigades would not be available for high readiness tasks over the next year as a minimum. In today’s world, we may always have part of our force out of action so as to implement modernization programs. We will never have everything we need, but we must ensure the risk is acceptable.

He then commented on the army of tomorrow (ten years hence). The end result should be lighter, more mobile strategically, more rapidly deployable, and still with sufficient “punch.” A key part of this modernization involves improvements to the reserves. However, this plan may only be implemented if new money is provided, and that will presumably be decided by the new defence review. This applies as well to the second factor: sustainability. Not much elaboration is necessary for this factor – the Canadian Forces continue to live beyond their means in resource terms, and have a demand for people that exceeds their current capacity; and this is especially true for the army. Of greatest concern is the resulting high rate of personnel tempo that places heavy stress upon people. At this time it is planned to significantly increase the number of reserves employed in Bosnia to help

reduce the strain on the regulars.

In summary, the army is capable. It can do what is required of it, but with risks and its capability will get better in the years ahead. However, it faces real challenges in its level of sustainability. This is a situation the army alone cannot resolve, and in that respect the risks get higher. Above all, Canadians should be proud of what their army is doing.

The final presentation was made by **Lieutenant-General Christian Couture**, Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources – Military). He stressed the fact that people remain the most important component of operational capability, and that it was his responsibility to ensure that the Canadian Forces, both regular and reserve, were well served in this regard. However, people as a resource cannot be managed the same as military materiel. Human resources have to be managed in line with a delicate balance between missions, Canadian society and its people. Above all, military operations are the primary focus of the personnel organization – but without sacrificing people in the process.

Today, the most pressing challenge is the recruitment of new members into the armed forces. A plan is currently being implemented to restore the strength of the Canadian Forces to the authorized ceiling of 60,000. Partnerships with colleges have been put in place to accredit civilian levels of training and education, etc. So far the results have been satisfactory. Of the Regular Force target of 7000, 85% has been achieved. The Reserve Force exceeded its target of 3000 by 1200. However, the campaign must continue, and there are challenges in certain occupations. This means that there must be complementary action to retain people who have those skills. Attrition in the reserves is higher than for the regulars for a number of reasons, and these too are being addressed.

Training and development have large roles to play in human resource programs. Similarly, armed forces need special resources in terms of medical and other health services. In both areas, improvements are underway. In summary, there have been numerous challenges over the past few years in terms of human resource management, but the situation is now recognized, and corrective action and improvements are now being undertaken.

## HOW MANY POUNDS OF POLICY ARE NEEDED TO SECURE CANADA?

### A comparison of recent papers on the matter of the need to review Defence Policy

*Major General (Retd) Clive J. Addy, OMM, CD, Vice-Chairman CDA*

*(Re-printed with the kind permission of the Editor of Vanguard, Issue 1, 2002. Vanguard's website can be visited at: [www.vanguardcanada.com](http://www.vanguardcanada.com) - ed.)*

“Life is what goes on around us while we are making plans.”  
– John Lennon

It would appear to most Canadians that a new Defence Policy would be required in the event that the present one was not working, the strategic environment had changed or that the Canadian Government intentionally opted to choose another course. One must admit that the current government remains reasonably content with (if not necessarily financially committed to) the present '94 White Paper course of three priorities best summed up as: domestic security, continental security, and contributing to international peace and security through the UN, NATO and other multilateral organizations. Therefore, a major change in the government course seems unlikely.

This leaves us with the two other reasons why there should be so much ink spilled to convince our Prime Minister that time, money and effort should be invested to examine and coordinate better our defence policy in this, potentially, his last mandate. Were it not for the tragic events of 11 September, I would not have put my money on this probability.

Unfortunately, two realities were forced upon us on that tragic day. First, the myth of the invulnerability of the North American continent was shattered even for the most idealistic of Canadians. Canadians are now aware and very concerned about their security and its impact upon their well-being. Second, the assumption that technical intelligence can afford time and avert surprise was seriously challenged. Since then, of course, the very dire straights in which our forces have been placed to sustain a deployed four thousand strong force is proving untenable. Consequently many deem our strategic assessment wanting and the '94 White Paper somewhat lacking in pertinence to the future.

It is opportune, therefore, that we compare the leading papers that are in the public domain at present and that seek such a review or debate of defence and security policy. All of these, with the exception of the last Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans' Affairs (SCONDVA) report, were written essentially before the 11th of September and appear to have been more insightful than recent policy decisions based

upon the 1994 White Paper. The documents that I suggest we examine are: the Federation of Military and United Services Institutes of Canada (FMUSIC) paper, “Strategy XXI”, released on 06 February 2001; the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) paper, “Caught in the Middle”, released on 27 Sep 01; “To Secure a Nation”, released in November by a group co-chaired by Dr. J.L. Granatstein and Senator Laurier Lapierre, called the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century; the SCONDVA reports of July and November 2001; and, from Toronto, the Royal Canadian Military Institute (RCMI) paper entitled “A Wake Up Call for Canada” released last spring. They are available through links on the Web.

Each approaches its analysis from a different perspective, but all are worth reading if one is to get a better idea of the various ways and how the present policy is wanting. Some studies confront head-on the devil of detail, while others stress key policy elements or strategic considerations that would imply the need for a policy revision. All would seem to agree that there is a need for some major revisions to the basic tenets of the '94 White Paper. This analysis does not purport to be the “Coles' Notes” on any or all of these studies.

#### *Major Areas of Convergence*

All of these documents agree that Canada needs armed forces that “must be able to fight and to win.” They also largely agree that the security of Canada will continue to consist of three major components: the protection of Canada, continental security, and contributing to international peace and stability in concert with allies. How these are achieved and what priority they take do vary, but these will be broached later.

The documents largely concur that the “1994 Defence White Paper is so out of date in some of its content and so deficient in addressing new situations that have arisen since 1994, that a full, public defence review is now warranted.” Most, in fact, see a need for far better coordination between Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Department of National Defence in producing this revised policy.

Others suggest that this inter-departmental coordination must be even broader. All see Canada being marginalized by its allies and friends on the international scene if present trends

*(continued p. 17)*

continue, however diplomatically and politely this may occur. Also if these trends continue, all see our forces, regular and reserve, deteriorating beyond repair.

Most consider the Canadian Forces severely under-funded to meet our obligations and provide the security Canadians should expect. In all aspects, “the Canadian Forces have been stretched to the limit of what they can accept and manage.” As a result, “the CF are Caught in the Middle, unable to deliver satisfactorily either conventional capabilities or new capabilities driven by change.” With the exception of the RCMI study which proposes that commitments might be met with a budget of \$12 Billion, all others see the need to increase significantly the Defence Budget as vital to the security of Canada in the years to come.

This is also SCONDVA’s first recommendation (Special Report: State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces).

There are some nuances, and in some cases some fundamental differences, when determining the relative importance of major strategic considerations, our future relationship with the UN, the US, NORAD, and NATO, and our role in the Americas, the Pacific and elsewhere. To deal with these, it is best to examine each study briefly. So as not to offend, each will be dealt with according to its time of release.

#### *Strategy XXI*

Released in February 2001 by FMUSIC

This study points out some of the major strategic environment trend changes that have evolved since 94 in the world. It underlines the demographic trends, the potential geographic locations and economic causes of potential conflict, such as the clash of tribalism and technology, that would on their own dictate a need for policy review. In addition, it considers that balance of power politics still remain, even in a US dominant environment and that, coupled with the increasing need for energy, particularly oil, the future looks even less benign than it did in 1994.

It stresses the need to be capable of dealing with asymmetric threats, the “revolution in military affairs”, the importance of space and information warfare (Cyber warfare to others), all of which have implications beyond purely DND and the 1994 White Paper. The authors suggest some strategic goals for a future Canadian security strategy: Security for the territory, citizens and property of Canadians; Stability in as much of the world as is possible; An open, transparent and free system of trade; and, Promotion of respect for those inalienable rights in the UN Declaration of Human Rights.

The paper reviews briefly the recent security strategies of the US, the UK, The Federal Republic of Germany and Australia,

to show the differences in appreciating future trends. This study is particularly critical of how we deal presently with the collation of all sources of intelligence and proposes a National Security Office to help cabinet arrive at better decisions more rapidly and knowingly.

Finally, it has one major recommendation and that is: “for the government to charter an independent blue ribbon panel of experts to quickly craft a national security strategy for the 21st century” and present their findings to Parliament.” This broader view of security policy goes far beyond the more traditional and limited Defence policy implications.

#### *A Wake Up Call for Canada*

Released in Spring 2001 by the RCMI

In contrast to the above paper, this study goes into very much detail as to the proposed future structure of the CF, is very army focused, and is the only one of the five documents that believes, as a basic assumption, that Canada’s security can be provided for \$12 Billion.

This study proposes five joint commands across Canada, each capable of sustaining a light 1,000 strong battle-group, the two on each coast to be part of amphibious task- forces, with the necessary helicopter and naval transport. The other three would have air-mobile capability. It suggests not investing in new or improved fighter aircraft but focusing on patrol, transport and attack helicopters. It relies heavily on reserves to fill gaps. Strategic lift would be primarily by sea.

There is less discussion of the changes in NATO, NORAD, OSCE, UN and the general strategic environment but there are some interestingly prescient comments on terrorism.

It focuses clearly on its regional joint structure approach to resolve the funding and readiness challenge. It does recognize the difficulty in sustaining such a structure at the current operational pace but accepts such levels of commitment.

It does not purport to be all things to all, but there are some innovative ideas that bear deeper examination. For instance, its discussion of cyber warfare<sup>11</sup> is worth further consideration, at the interdepartmental level. It will also draw the ire of the navy, by suggesting the elimination of submarines and frigates to focus on patrols, mine warfare and amphibious transport and support. Admittedly incomplete in its analysis of the reserve structure, it does offer food for further study in this realm as well. No one will be unmoved after reading this study, and it does force you to think out of the traditional box.

*(continued p. 18)*

*Caught In the Middle*

Released Sept 2001 by CDA

This is the last of the trilogy by CDA begun in 1999 with the *Strategic Assessment*, and followed in 2000 by *Stability and Prosperity: The Benefits of Investment in Defence*.

It is an assessment of the operational capability of the Canadian Forces, drawn largely from the statements in the respective business plans of the Chiefs of the naval, land and air staffs respectively.

Its deductions from these are that the CF is ill-equipped to continue at the present and foreseeable operational tempo and still adjust to the necessary technological, human resources and material challenges of their own Strategy 2020 document, particularly within the present financial envelope. Its six recommendations in Part VIII, include a need to increase the size of the overall regular component to 75,000 and add \$1 Billion a year for the next five years to the base budget.

Relying heavily also on other government documentation, particularly from the Finance Committee, SCNDVA and the Auditor General, the study disposes of the shibboleth of comparing operational capability relative to ten years ago, and focuses on the more relevant present operational state and that which is forecast in the near to middle term.

Of much interest is the degree of potential future shortages and delays that the lack of funding will cause that the *Caught in the Middle* paper summarized as follows: "The watershed of change is bringing pressure to bear on Canada to provide necessary resources to implement its defence policy." This is deduced from an analysis of the Department's Capability Programs framework from which the study concludes: "The most important flaw is that DND has not been allocated sufficient funds to implement the policy stated in the 1994 White Paper – notwithstanding the additional funds allocated in 2000 and 2002."

It is obvious that all components suffer, but that suffering for resources is most serious in the army and some specialist components. This study, while not referring back to the 1999 CDA strategic analysis, indicates a very serious need for the government to reflect upon what policy it needs for the future armed forces of Canada, since it concludes that an underfunded 1994 White Paper is unacceptable, will accelerate the demise of the CF, and leave Canadians without the security they deserve.

This is a must read for all seriously interested in knowing the facts about our operational capability.

*To Secure A Nation*

Released Nov 2001 by the Council For

## Canadian Security in the 21st Century

This is another excellent document calling for an immediate defence review. Its 27 recommendations are well worded and contain an obvious wealth of background research.

It focuses on issues with which the present defence policy and procedures either omitted to deal properly or altogether. It, more clearly than all others, makes the detailed case for a comprehensive defence review.

It stresses our domestic security and its linkage with the US and continental security, and analyses the management of defence, all of which it submits for careful and complete review. The clarity of its analysis of the major strategic factors including space and NORAD, the evolving European dimension and expansion of NATO, reflections on the failures and future challenges of the UN and, finally, the reducing ability of Canada to contribute are drawn to your attention at recommendations 3 through 8.

There are other changes underlined such as Canada's position in a changing arms control and proliferation environment, not at all as successful as hoped for in 94, our security role in respect of the Americas beyond the US and in respect of the Asia-Pacific region.

The study calls for Force Structure changes, as the status quo is deemed unacceptable. It recommends that obsolescence be mitigated by the intelligent application of advanced military technologies, requests that Defence not bear the budget burden of regional procurement preferences and makes solid arguments on the matters of recruitment and retention, the reserves, education, defence administration, DND the CF and civil military relations. This study offers a broad view with succinct and pertinent recommendations pointing quite clearly to the need for a comprehensive security and defence policy review in concert with foreign affairs. Some quotes are worth underlining such as:

"It is this lack of sustainability and depth in the expeditionary capability of the land forces that is the most damaging consequence of a decade of force cuts and budget contractions."

"There is a deep divide between the rhetoric of a grandiose foreign and defence policy and a decline in resources that threatens to discredit Canada's commitment to Common security."

(continued p. 19)

“The CF stands on a precipice between being truly combat capable forces and a constabulary force.”

This study is a clear and convincing case for a review, with solid proposals that should be considered in such deliberations and many of which should form the framework of just such a new policy.

SCONDVA Reports  
of June and Nov 2001

These two reports by the Standing Committee are indeed in concert with the general thrust that has been expressed above. Though normally less prone to recommending policy reviews, it was important to note that at their 4th of 19 recommendations in their November Special Report, the Committee urges the government to conduct “Immediately... a major review of our foreign and defence policies....”

In the 8 recommendations made in the July report, the key elements of policy involved the urgency to redress the need for proper funding and the declining force levels of the CF. It also asked the government to explain the delays in the Maritime Helicopter Project and underlined the need for a capital program of 23% of the overall budget but not at the expense of personnel. The Committee also issued a reminder to government of the need for reliable strategic lift.

In the Special Report in November, though it followed the 11 September tragedy and focused largely on anti-terrorism issues, the Committee made it very clear that “when considering additional funding the government do so, not only

with a view to covering operational costs related to the counter-terrorism effort, but also with a view toward addressing problems related to program integrity.”

The report also recommended increasing the sea and airlift capabilities of the CF. Its recommendation 6, proposing that the cabinet Committee on Public Security and Counter-terrorism be made permanent, goes some way along with the National Security Office suggested by FMUSIC. This along with the critical infrastructure protection and emergency preparedness proposals (7, 8, 9, and 14) add increased importance to the domestic security dimensions of DND that should also be funded.

This is an extremely important Committee to the Canadian Forces and it has displayed a critical but objective approach to resolving the dilemma of change, operational tempo, diminishing personnel, and inadequate funding. It represents the advance-guard of change in government and has been as impartial as can be expected of any such political committee and better than most in the thoroughness of its analysis of needs.

#### *Conclusion*

Many pounds of policy and many pages later, it becomes obvious that some elements of the 94 White Paper remain valid, but there are more and most complex ones that do indeed demand more than a cursory review. They demand solid reflection, broad coordination, intelligent decisions, and, ever important, adequate resources. Canada will be well served by devoting resources at this critical time to a Canadian Security review, and those charged with such a review would do well to examine the documents reviewed herein.

## WHY DOES CANADA NEED ARMED FORCES?

*Brigadier-General (Retd) W. Don Macnamara, OMM, CD, MA  
President, Conference of Defence Associations Institute*

As Canadians see their soldiers, sailors, airmen and airwomen being deployed abroad in numbers now approaching 4500 in 18 different NATO, UN and other military operations, it is legitimate and appropriate for them to ask, “Why?” In extreme terms others may also ask, “Given the overwhelming military strength of the US, which would certainly protect Canada as well, why does Canada have any armed forces at all?”

National security has a broad meaning. It represents the preservation of a way of life acceptable to the Canadian people, and compatible with the legitimate needs and

aspirations of others. It includes freedom from military attack or coercion, freedom from internal subversion and freedom from the erosion of the political, economic and social values essential to the quality of life in Canada.

In his book, *Strategy for the West*, Royal Air Force Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor wrote, “It is customary in the democratic countries to deplore expenditures on armaments as conflicting with the requirements of social services. There

*(continued p. 20)*

is a tendency to forget that the most important social service a government can do for its people is to keep them alive and free.” After September 11, 2001, many Canadians concluded that without national security, nothing else mattered – a sentiment expressed over and over in media around the world. But, at the same time, the limited capabilities of the seriously under-funded and over-tasked Canadian Forces became a topic for discussion.

The armed forces of a country are the ultimate institutional and legitimate use of force and violence in the physical defence of the country and the interests of the state at home and abroad. The real and perceived capabilities of a country’s armed forces represent, therefore, not only the degree to which a state perceives its interests to be at risk, but also reflects the national will or resolve of the state to defend those interests.

The Canadian Forces, then, both Regular and Reserves, represent Canada’s capacity to apply ordered force – up to and including the ultimate violence of war, that is, sanctioned killing, in the name of Canadian state, its people and their interests. In executing this responsibility, the nation, through its democratically elected government, entrusts to its military leaders its most precious and valuable resource – its youth – for training and preparation for military service to Canada. It accepts that these young people will be expected to do so under a contract of ‘unlimited liability’, that is, to die for their country, if called upon to do so.

This confers upon both Canada’s national political and military leadership a double responsibility. The first is to ensure that the Canadian Forces have the resources necessary to be trained and equipped for the missions expected of them. This includes ensuring that the military leaders are educated, trained and responsive to the nation’s needs, grounded in the nation’s fundamental values – democracy, freedom and social justice. The Canadian Forces do represent Canada, and are expected to be effective and professional in conduct, ethics and leadership.

The second responsibility is that neither the Canadian political nor the military leadership will permit the capricious commitment or deployment of the Canadian Forces, or otherwise place the nation’s young people ‘in harm’s way’, either when the nation’s interests are not being served, or if the Forces do not possess the training, experience and equipment necessary for the assigned tasks.

These obligations lead to an implied ‘social contract’ within which, in return for a willingness to accept the condition of ‘unlimited liability’, Canada, the government and its military leadership will ‘look after’ its military sons and daughters as a ‘military family’.

The responsibilities of all citizens in a democracy are assumed to be part of an informed electorate. This should include an awareness and consideration of the nation’s interests that must be defended – from the immediate physical defence of the homeland and its sovereignty, to the capability to contribute to the protection of its interests far from its borders. The latter contributes to international stability in the defence of political and economic interests, and precludes the need for direct homeland defence. Overseas commitments might also include armed forces as representatives in various councils, coalitions and alliances. Democratic governments must also ensure that an informed electorate is knowledgeable of the scope and issues affecting national security.

Canada, the second largest country in the world in area, with the longest coastline, and but 34<sup>th</sup> in population, is essentially incapable of defending itself against all but minimal incursions. It must, however, provide for its own internal security, and be capable of providing aid to the civil power or assistance to civil authority. Beyond that, it is appropriate that Canada maintains alliances with countries of common values and interests for cooperative defence – the United States for the defence of North America, NATO for the defence of interests principally in Europe, and other coalitions for worldwide operations.

Canada became a contributor to United Nations peacekeeping operations during the Cold War as it was in Canada’s vital interests to prevent the escalation of local and regional conflicts into an East/West confrontation and a US-USSR nuclear exchange, which could destroy Canada. Since 1989, Canada has been a contributor to many other overseas operations, which have ranged from benign humanitarian operations to peace enforcement and restoration operations involving combat. The number, intensity and repetitiveness of these missions, combined with the neglect of defence over decades, has strained the Canadian Forces to the breaking point. The army is in especially dire straits, and neither the navy nor air force possesses the equipment to support the deployment and sustainability of the CF abroad.

Canada, and Canadians, are among the most fortunate in the world being blessed with a neighbour, which does not represent a military threat, but rather an essential ally in its defence. Canada’s commercial relationship with the United States has been enriching for every Canadian, placing us among the wealthiest in the world and consistently among those countries with the highest ‘quality of life’.

The question then must be asked and answered. What kind of armed forces, for what kind of Canada, in what kind of world? Canada may recognize its primary interest to be the defence of its homeland, including its people, their assets and

*(continued p. 21)*

values. The next interest would be Canada's economic well-being in a stable world, followed by projecting Canadian values and culture internationally. In a world convulsed by over 40 intra- and inter-state conflicts in all regions, which of these conflicts affect Canada's interests? How is Canada's national security affected by these world conditions? What kind of military capabilities should Canada maintain to protect its interests at home, within North America and abroad?

These are questions that are not best left to interest groups, elected politicians, public servants or the members of the armed forces themselves. These are questions that must be asked, understood and answered by an informed citizenry, in the interest of the national security of Canada and of all Canadians.

## BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE AND CANADA

*Dr. George L. Lindsay*

Throughout the first half of the Twentieth Century, Canada and the United States did not face significant threats of attack on their central territory. None of the coast defence or anti-aircraft artillery deployed in Canada or the 48 states during World War II ever fired a shot in anger.

The first significant threat came in the 1950s, as the USSR built long range bomber aircraft armed with nuclear weapons. The great circle tracks leading from the USSR to the USA made it clear that almost all of the likely approaches would cross over Canada, and the ranges and speeds of the interceptor aircraft and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) of the day made it highly desirable for the radars and weapons of an air defence system to be deployed well forward of the likely targets of the bombers. Before the defensive systems for the US and Canada were completed, a very satisfactory organization for their integrated command and control was established by the creation of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD).

In the 1960s a new threat to North America arose in the form of nuclear armed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). The first countermeasures against these came in the form of deterrence rather than defence. They consisted of large radars based in Alaska, Greenland, and England, able to provide enough warning for some of the US bomber forces to get airborne before missiles landed on their bases, and, as the US deployed their own ICBMs, the opportunity to launch them before they were destroyed.

Canada had no offensive strategic weapons to contribute to the deterrent forces, but did provide assistance in the form of air bases used for refueling of US bomber aircraft. Another threat emerged, from Soviet Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), against which Canada was able to deploy its antisubmarine forces, especially in the North Atlantic area.

As the ICBM threat grew, the US undertook programs to acquire an active defence system able to intercept ICBMs in flight. The first program, originally named "Sentinel" and later

"Safeguard", was based on SAMs with nuclear warheads, with plans to place batteries at several locations around the periphery of the 48 states. A base was deployed at Grand Forks, North Dakota, but soon deactivated. In the early 1980s, a second program, officially labeled "Strategic Defense Initiative" (but unkindly named by its numerous critics as "Star Wars") would have employed SAMs with self-contained guidance sufficiently accurate to depend on high-explosive warheads, and was investigating the possibilities of space borne weapons.

Neither of these systems called for installations on Canadian territory, or cooperation with Canadian Forces. However, NORAD incorporated the collection, distribution, and analysis of the information on the launching and tracking of missiles and satellites with that dealing with aircraft, and amended its title to "North American Aerospace Defense Command".

Today, in 2002, a third major US program is underway, first called "National Missile Defense" (NMD), but, in the hope of enlisting the support of skeptical allies, now renamed "Allied Missile Defense". This began (during the Clinton administration) concentrating on interception of ICBMs in the **midcourse** of their trajectories, a technique demanding long-range interceptor rockets propelling a sophisticated payload with a guidance system able to direct itself into a direct collision with the target missile.

Planning has now extended from midcourse interception to consideration of a multilayered system which would be capable of interception of the ICBM in an early stage of its trajectory (the "**boost phase**", while the propulsion rockets were still burning, or the succeeding early ascent phase), and also able to intercept the ICBM as it descended towards its intended target in the "**terminal**" or "reentry" phase.

The development of both types of interception will be able to build on the considerable experience already gained from

*(continued p. 22)*

systems designed for defence against shorter-range (theatre) ballistic missiles. The threats posed by **Theatre Ballistic Missiles (TBMs)** have existed for years (although not for North America). Over 5,000 of them have been fired in anger since 1944, contrasted to no ICBMs at all. As the performance of the systems for defence against TBMs is improved, they are likely to develop an increasing capability to intercept ICBMs in the earliest and latest phases of their trajectories.

Defence against TBMs could prove to be important for overseas operations, such as those in which Canada has participated since the dawn of peacekeeping. Many of these take place in the vicinity of states now possessing TBMs, which could offer a serious threat to landing areas and seaports.

The chief problem that must be overcome for interception of the boost phase of a missile's trajectory is that it must be completed very quickly, by a high velocity interceptor launched fairly close to the place from which the missile has been launched. While this may be feasible against TBMs, and perhaps against ICBMs launched from a small-sized country whose borders were accessible for the intercepting party, it could not offer a threat to ICBMs launched from a location well inside the boundaries of a large country. Thus, there would be no reason for Russia or China to consider the development or deployment of a weapon capable of intercepting TBMs to offer a threat to the boost phase of ICBMs launched from deep inside their large territory.

Other advantages of boost phase interception are that it can offer protection to potential targets within a large area, that the exhaust plumes of the missile's propulsion rockets offer an easy target for simple infrared sensors, and that decoys or whatever other penetration aids intended to confuse the interceptor which may be contained in the missile will not yet have been deployed.

Interception in the terminal phase of an ICBM aimed at North America would have the advantage of many minutes of early warning and tracking provided by the sensors necessary for the other layers of the defence. And discrimination of the missile warhead from decoys would be aided by the increasing air density, which would slow down lighter decoys more than the heavy warhead. However, the area that could be protected by one interceptor battery would be far smaller than that covered by a boost or midcourse phase interceptor.

Terminal defences to provide protection for strategic targets in the northern United States may require deployment of sensors or weapons in Canada. They may also be able to protect cities in southern Canada.

Research and Development (R&D) on systems for

interception of ICBMs in their midcourse phase by ground-based SAMs, and for interception of TBMs in their terminal phase, has been conducted with high priority in the USA for many years. However, attainment of an effective multilayered defence against ICBMs will demand many more years of R&D on boost phase interception (possibly incorporating the use of laser weapons), on interception of ICBMs in their terminal phase, and on instant interchange of data between widely separated sensors (many of them in orbiting satellites), the command and control centres, and the weapon systems (which may be on the ground, in ships, or in aircraft). Some of these programs should offer opportunities for Canadian firms already proficient in the technologies of space, communications, and computing.

The future of NORAD is a subject of importance for Canada's armed forces. NORAD seems the obvious agency for the command and control of defence of North America against ICBMs, SLBMs, and cruise missiles. But the growing threat of terrorism and consequent demand for "Homeland Defence" could result in substantially altered arrangements to the roles and organization of the US armed forces, changes which could expand or diminish the role of NORAD. Canadian refusal to cooperate in missile defence could result in her exclusion from other activities devoted to the defence of North America.

Remember how the two previous large US projects for defence against ICBMs were abandoned as circumstances changed, the enormous costs that are sure to be incurred by actually deploying even a midcourse interception system, let alone a multilayered one, and the long series of tests, failures, and delays that have characterized such extremely difficult advances in technology. Note the many competing demands for large new expenditures to combat threats that are far more urgent for early solution. Consider the possibilities that the US economy will not soon re-experience the expansions of the previous decade. It may be a long time before a midcourse interception system is deployed.

However, the threats from shorter range ballistic missiles is here today, and it is imperative to continue to investigate the possible techniques to combat them with easily transportable systems.

A sensible policy for Canada would be to offer its support, in principle, for the planning of a multilayered system of defence against intercontinental ballistic missiles. Canada should give very careful consideration to any US requests for Canadian participation. Canada should express its preference for cooperating in the development of mobile systems intended for interception of shorter-range missiles in overseas operations,

*(continued p. 23)*


but with growth potential to be able to contribute in the first and last layers of a multilayered defence against intercontinental missiles. And Canada should urge that NORAD take a major role in homeland defence. This should include the integration

of the information being collected from the widely dispersed sources deployed for aerospace defence with the other sources needed for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

## DOIT-ON CRÉER UN MINISTÈRE DE LA SÉCURITÉ AU CANADA?

*Lieutenant-colonel Richard Giguère, Royal 22<sup>ème</sup> Régiment,*

*Chargé de recherche à l'Institut Québécois des Hautes Études Internationales, Université Laval, Québec*



Que veut-on défendre? Pourquoi? Contre qui? Contre quoi? Avec quels moyens? sont des questions brûlantes d'actualité qui doivent être posées et auxquelles il faut répondre avec honnêteté et courage. Toute politique doit s'adapter en permanence pour répondre aux exigences de l'évolution de l'environnement. Les attaques terroristes du 11 septembre dernier et la riposte associée constituent un "événement-choc" à partir duquel se «reproblématise» le monde. Désormais, il y a un «avant» et un «après». La communauté stratégique canadienne doit se pencher d'urgence sur les questions de sécurité nationale dans toute leur nouvelle complexité.

La perception dominante qui existe au Canada est celle de l'expression d'une sécurité dans son sens le plus traditionnel et strict. Même si des notions comme les droits de la personne, la sécurité humaine, le crime international et le terrorisme, la consolidation de la paix, figurent à l'ordre du jour de notre politique étrangère, il est clair que les actions canadiennes sont encore guidées par la prépondérance de la Realpolitik ou d'une politique de défense traditionnelle. La sécurité, au Canada, c'est essentiellement une affaire des forces armées dans le cadre d'opérations exécutées à l'extérieur de nos frontières.

Les environnements externes et internes de l'État sont cependant de plus en plus enchevêtrés. Et la coupure entre politique intérieure et politique extérieure de plus en plus floue. Les dangers que représentent la prolifération des armes de toutes sortes, le terrorisme international et intérieur, l'espionnage, les risques pour la sécurité économique et la sécurité de l'information, le crime organisé et la corruption à l'échelle internationale mettent au défi un nombre croissant d'organismes gouvernementaux qui ne sont pas habitués à œuvrer ensemble.

La vision classique de la sécurité ne tient définitivement plus la route dans un tel contexte. Ce qui se passe à l'intérieur de l'État est traditionnellement et automatiquement du ressort des forces policières, sauf lors de rares opérations d'aide au pouvoir civil, tandis que les forces armées restent orientées vers des «missions extérieures». Que nous ayons initialement confié au Solliciteur général et à la GRC le dossier des attaques terroristes du 11 septembre 2001 constitue une preuve irréfutable de ce réflexe. Le rôle classique joué par les forces armées comme bras séculier de l'État dans sa sphère extérieure doit être reconsidéré. S'il n'y a plus d'ennemi désigné comme au beau temps de la Guerre froide, il est grand temps de réviser la raison d'être et les rôles confiés à nos forces armées face à l'émergence de nouveaux risques, multiples, diffus et fluides. Ceci ne signifie pas que le rôle classique des appareils militaires est devenu caduc. Des traditionnels combats de fer et de feu inter ou intra étatiques sont encore à prévoir. Mais il faut s'interroger sérieusement sur l'adéquation actuelle de nos forces militaires face aux menaces émergentes.

Les préceptes fondamentaux propres au fonctionnement d'un État ne sont pas ici remis en cause. La police et l'armée ont toujours clairement occupé des «niches» bien spécifiques, mais le partage des responsabilités est aujourd'hui beaucoup moins évident en pratique, alors que par exemple des policiers sont employés dans le cadre de missions onusiennes à l'extérieur du pays et que les militaires sont requis pour effectuer des déneigements dans la ville de Toronto! Les risques et menaces propres à notre ère ne nécessitent plus tout simplement une réponse policière ou militaire mais plus souvent qu'autrement un amalgame des deux. Par exemple, dans un pays comme le Canada, qui doit contrer les menaces que font planer les cyber-pirates ou les terroristes menaçant d'utiliser des armes biologiques ou chimiques? L'armée ou la police?

Au Canada, la sécurité nationale ne fait pas l'objet d'une stratégie spécifique mais est plutôt garantie par l'amalgamation de diverses politiques, émanant principalement du Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international et du

(voir p. 24)

Ministère de la Défense nationale. La politique de défense canadienne découle, selon la tradition, de la politique étrangère. Les Forces canadiennes ont bien participé à certaines opérations d'aide au pouvoir civil en territoire canadien, mais ces opérations constituent l'exception à la règle. Cette vision des choses était nettement reprise par l'ancien premier ministre Trudeau dans un discours prononcé à Calgary, en 1969: "*Jusqu'ici, l'OTAN, organisation militaire, a défini la politique de défense du Canada, qui à son tour, a défini sa politique extérieure. Cela va à l'encontre du principe naturel et démocratique selon lequel la politique extérieure doit définir la politique de défense.*"<sup>1</sup>

La primauté de la politique étrangère dans la sauvegarde de la sécurité du Canada est un *modus operandi* qui doit aujourd'hui faire l'objet d'une révision. Les ministères de la Défense, des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international, le Solliciteur général, le Bureau de la sécurité des transports, Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada, Santé Canada sont toutes des instances gouvernementales dont les responsabilités touchent aujourd'hui de près ou de loin aux questions de sécurité. Une véritable politique de sécurité nationale doit désormais fusionner les responsabilités relatives aux menaces intérieures et extérieures. Voilà un domaine de réflexions qui mérite d'être approfondi.

Il n'y a pas, au Canada, d'instance permanente chargée de coordonner tous les aspects de la sécurité. Dans le passé, il y a bien eu un Comité du Cabinet sur les Affaires extérieures et la Défense nationale, ou encore un Comité du Cabinet sur la défense, mais ces organismes ont connu des existences plutôt aléatoires. La création au Cabinet d'un Comité de la sécurité publique et de la lutte contre le terrorisme suite aux attentats terroristes du 11 septembre dernier ne constitue en fait que le dernier acte d'une longue suite d'initiatives visant à optimiser la gestion de la sécurité nationale canadienne.

Pourtant, le débat n'est pas nouveau. Dans le but d'amoindrir l'épineux problème de la coordination de l'exécution de la politique étrangère canadienne, Albert Legault proposait, il y a déjà vingt ans, la création d'un Conseil de planification de la politique étrangère principalement chargé de revoir sur une base annuelle comment s'insérerait la poursuite des intérêts nationaux canadiens dans le contexte international, comment ils seraient affectés par l'évolution de la situation internationale, et de quelles façons leur pérennité pourrait être le mieux protégée ou affermie. Dans l'étude de l'affaire somalienne, des recommandations du même ordre furent énoncées. Le Major-général à la retraite Dan Loomis, qui a assisté aux délibérations de la Commission d'enquête sur la Somalie, estimait par exemple qu'il était utile de créer une forme de Conseil de sécurité qui assurerait une coordination interministérielle en cas de crise. Certains considèrent que ce type d'institution n'est pas adapté à la réalité politique canadienne. Plu-

sieurs admettent toutefois l'existence d'un problème de coordination interministérielle et civilo-juridico-militaire particulièrement mis en évidence lors du déploiement des Forces canadiennes en Somalie en 1992. Dans un rapport soumis au Ministre de la Défense nationale Douglas Young en mars 1997, Albert Legault a recommandé que soit créée pour chaque opération importante de maintien de la paix une structure de coordination interministérielle et une autre cellule de coordination de suivi pouvant fonctionner comme cellule de crise durant le gros des opérations. Dans la même veine, et à la même époque, David Bercuson a recommandé l'élargissement de l'autorité du Comité permanent de la Défense nationale et des anciens combattants dans le but de mieux surveiller et de mieux équilibrer les pouvoirs du Premier ministre et de son Cabinet en matière de politique étrangère et de défense. Peter Haydon a aussi suggéré de ressusciter l'ancien Comité permanent du Cabinet sur la Défense, tenant compte du besoin constant de considérer les facteurs politiques affectant l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre d'une politique de défense tout autant que de la nécessité de prévoir une forme d'arbitrage entre les différents acteurs ou organismes impliqués. Jane Boulden a analysé nos mécanismes actuels d'élaboration et de gestion en matière de sécurité nationale et a proposé différentes options allant de la création, au Canada, d'un Conseil national de sécurité à l'américaine au maintien du *statu quo*. Hugh Segal a encore récemment proposé l'établissement au Parlement d'une structure permanente avec une capacité de recherche autonome et un personnel permanent pour s'occuper de la sécurité nationale. Il suggère ainsi la création d'un comité conjoint (du Sénat et de la Chambre) sur la sécurité nationale et la création d'un Conseil national de planification de la sécurité. Douglas Bland, de son côté, recommande l'élargissement du mandat du Ministère de la Défense nationale pour inclure des responsabilités diverses et multiples qui tiennent compte de l'évolution de l'environnement sécuritaire, y inclus l'effacement des distinctions entre les menaces externes et internes. Finalement, dans un rapport publié en novembre 2001, le Conseil pour la sécurité canadienne au 21<sup>ème</sup> siècle recommande d'aborder les préoccupations actuelles de la sécurité domestique dans une nécessaire révision de la politique de défense canadienne tout en prônant une réévaluation des processus par lesquels on fait et administre la politique de défense canadienne, avec un accent particulier sur la définition d'un rôle plus efficace pour le Comité permanent de la Défense nationale et des Anciens combattants et la Chambre des communes.

Certaines initiatives ont déjà été entreprises dans le but de faciliter la coordination en matière de sécurité au Canada. La création en février 2001 du Bureau de la protection des infrastructures essentielles et de la protection civile (BPIEPC) peut être en effet perçue en ce sens. Le ministre de la Dé

(voir p. 25)

fense nationale est le ministre de tutelle de cette organisation, qui englobe également les fonctions de Protection civile Canada. Cette organisation a vu sa raison d'être confortée par les attaques terroristes du 11 septembre 2001 et le Rapport intérimaire du Comité permanent de la Défense nationale et des Anciens combattants paru en novembre 2001 ne proposait pas moins que quatre recommandations visant à améliorer le fonctionnement et à augmenter les budgets alloués à cet organisme.

Le gouvernement canadien, suite aux attaques terroristes du 11 septembre 2001, a également formé au Cabinet un Comité ministériel spécial sur la sécurité publique et la lutte contre le terrorisme. Placé sous la direction du ministre des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international, ce comité rassemble le vice-premier ministre et les ministres des Transports, de la Défense, de l'Immigration et de la Citoyenneté, des Finances, du Revenu national et Douanes, de la Justice, des Affaires intergouvernementales et le Solliciteur-général. Ce comité se veut la contre-partie du "Homeland Security Council" américain dirigé par le gouverneur de la Pennsylvanie, Tom Ridge. Véritable cabinet de guerre, ce comité coordonne les stratégies des différents ministères dans la lutte antiterroriste. Ce comité, selon le premier ministre Chrétien, se veut la réponse à la résolution 1373 du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, qui réclame des États qu'ils prennent des mesures d'urgence pour prévenir les actes terroristes. Le gouvernement canadien ne s'est pas encore prononcé sur la durée exacte du mandat de ce comité ad hoc mais sa permanence n'a jamais été adressée, ni envisagée. Le rapport intérimaire du Comité permanent de la Défense nationale et des Anciens combattants de novembre 2001 recommande toutefois que ce comité "devienne un comité permanent du Cabinet et qu'il soit doté des effectifs nécessaires pour mener son mandat à bien." Cette recommandation est pour l'instant restée lettre morte, et la permanence de ce comité spécial au Cabinet est loin d'être assurée.

Il est évident que les événements du 11 septembre 2001 ont forcé les gouvernements à s'interroger sur les façons de mieux coordonner la lutte contre le terrorisme. Au Canada, une action concertée des diverses institutions touchant de près ou de loin à la sécurité nationale pourrait être favorisée par l'énoncé d'une politique de sécurité qui engloberait tous les aspects de la défense et de la sécurité et qui aurait par exemple le mérite d'institutionnaliser la coopération interministérielle. Une politique de sécurité efficacement gérée nécessitera un cadre politique compétent au niveau exécutif. Dans la situation actuelle, une approche centralisatrice serait peut-être la plus prometteuse. Un environnement menaçant oblige souvent les États à centraliser leurs structures de fonctionnement. Nous avons déjà eu par exemple au Canada en 1993 un Ministère de la Sécurité publique sous le gouvernement de Kim Campbell. Le Solliciteur-général de l'époque, Doug

Lewis, déjà responsable de la Gendarmerie royale et du Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité s'était vu octroyer le contrôle des frontières, des passeports et l'immigration. Nous avons également déjà formé un ministère des Affaires extérieures dirigé par un secrétaire d'État aux affaires extérieures flanqué d'un ministre d'État pour le commerce international et d'un ministre d'État pour les relations extérieures.<sup>2</sup> Pourquoi ne pas mettre en place un semblable triptyque pour la sécurité nationale avec un secrétaire d'État à la sécurité nationale, secondé par un ministre d'État à la Défense nationale et d'un ministre d'État détenant les responsabilités actuelles du Solliciteur général? Il ne s'agit pas ici de bureaucratiser davantage notre appareil gouvernemental mais bien d'optimiser la coordination de nos ressources touchant de près ou de loin à notre sécurité nationale. La tradition canadienne qui prône l'improvisation circonstancielle et la création de comités ad hoc pour répondre aux situations d'urgence nationale doit être sérieusement analysée et reconsidérée dans le cadre de la nouvelle donne sécuritaire en émergence. Comme le dit si bien un vieux proverbe africain, "Faut-il attendre d'être vaincu pour changer?"

**(Extrait de Giguère, Lcol Richard, "Doit-on créer un ministère de la sécurité au Canada?" *Bulletin Le maintien de la paix*, No 57, Québec, IQHEI, Université Laval, Février 2002.)**

#### Sources consultées

Bashow, Lcol David L., « Réconcilier l'irréconciliable? Les liens entre les politiques étrangère et de défense du Canada », *Revue militaire canadienne*, Vol. 1, No 1, printemps 2000, pp. 17-26.

Bercuson, D.J., *Rapport au premier ministre*, 25 mars 1997.

Bland, Douglas L., "Defence and Security: The Next Generation", *Policy Options Politiques*, Montréal, IRPP, Vol. 22, No 2, mars 2001, pp. 40-46.

Boisvert, Yves, "Un cabinet de guerre est-il suffisant?" dans *La Presse*, samedi 13 octobre 2001.

Boulden, Jane, *A National Security Council for Canada?*, Kingston, The Claxton Papers No 2, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, 2000.

Comité permanent de la Défense nationale et des Anciens combattants, *État de préparation des Forces canadiennes: Réponse à la menace terroriste*, Rapport intérimaire, novembre 2001.

(voir p. 26)

- Conseil pour la sécurité canadienne au 21<sup>ème</sup> siècle, *Pour assurer la sécurité d'une nation: La justification pour un nouveau Livre blanc sur la défense*, Centre d'études militaires et stratégiques, Université de Calgary, novembre 2001.
- Haydon, Peter T., "The Somalia Inquiry: Can It Solve Anything?", *Revue canadienne de défense*, avril 1997.
- Legault, Albert, « Le Canada doit-il se doter d'un conseil de planification en matière de politique étrangère? » dans Gosselin, Guy, éd., *La politique étrangère du Canada : Approches bilatérale et régionale*, Québec, Centre québécois de relations internationales, 1984, pp. 189-201.
- Legault, Albert, *Les Forces armées canadiennes : Pour entrer dans le XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Rapport soumis au ministre de la Défense nationale, l'honorable Doug Young, 1<sup>er</sup> mars 1997.
- Loomis, Mgén (r) Dan, « Speaking Notes on the Somalia Affair », *Canadian Defence Institute Newslines*, Vol. VI, No 2, 1996, pp. 1-4.
- Oliviero, Lcol (r) Charles S., « Opération Délivrance : Succès international ou échec national? », *Revue militaire canadienne*, Vol. 2, No 2, été 2001, pp. 51-57.
- Sallot, Jeff, "Ottawa setting up antiterror committee" in *The Globe and Mail*, Tuesday, October 2, 2001, p. A4.
- Segal, Hugh D., « Sécurité nationale, intérêt public et façon de gouverner : Le temps d'innover » dans *Revue militaire canadienne*, Vol. 2, No 2, été 2001, pp. 39-42.
- Stanley, Georges F.G., *Nos soldats*, Montréal, Les Éditions de l'Homme, 1980, p. 579.
- <sup>1</sup> Stanley 1980, p. 579.
- <sup>2</sup> Legault 1994, p. 191.

---



---

## NATIONAL OFFICE STAFF/L'EXÉCUTIF NATIONAL

**Executive Director/Directeur exécutif:** Colonel (Retd) A. Pellerin, OMM, CD, (613) 236-1252; **Executive Secretary and Treasurer/Secrétaire exécutif et Secrétaire-trésorier:** Lieutenant-Colonel (Retd) G.D. Metcalfe, CD, (613) 236-9903/1252; **Senior Defence Analyst/Analyste principal sur la Défense:** Colonel (Retd) A.S. Henry, OMM, CD, (613) 236-1252; **Archivist/Archiviste:** Major (Retd) G.V. Clark, CD, (613) 828-6124; **Honorary Counsel/Avocat-conseil honoraire:** Colonel J.H.C. Clarry, MBE, ED, CD, QC (416) 601-7752; **Public Affairs Officer/Officier de relations publiques:** Captain (Retd) P.W. Forsberg, CD, (613) 236-9903

*ON TRACK* is published by the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. Submissions on past and present defence issues, news of CDA member associations and of associate members, and letters to the editor are encouraged. Forward to the attention of the editor at the address below.

*ON TRACK* est publié par l'Institut de la conférence des associations de la Défense. Nous encourageons les soumissions d'articles sur des questions de défense, les faits nouveaux ayant trait aux membres et associations de la CAD et également les lettres à éditeur. Veuillez faire parvenir vos soumissions à l'adresse indiquée ci-dessous.

### ATTENTION NEWSPAPER EDITORS/ATTENTION AUX ÉDITEURS DE JOURNEAUX

Permission is granted to reproduce, in whole or in part, articles from *ON TRACK*. A credit line is desired. For inquiries contact the Public Affairs Officer, Captain (Retd) Peter Forsberg, CD at: (tele) (613) 236 9903; (fax) 236 8191; (e-mail) pao@cdai.ca.

Il vous est permis de reproduire, intégralement ou en partie, les articles du *ON TRACK*, en donnant le crédit à la publication. Pour tout renseignement, veuillez vous adresser à l'officier des relations publiques, le Capitaine (ret) Peter Forsberg, CD au numéro de téléphone (613) 236 9903; télécopieur (613) 236 8191; courriel pao@cdai.ca.

### L'Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la Défense Membre/Donateur - formulaire d'adhésion

**359 rue Kent, Pièce 502, Ottawa, Ontario K2P 0R7**

**Tél: (613) 236-9903 Béline: (613) 236-8191 Courrier électronique (E-mail): pao@cdai.ca URL: cda-cdai.ca**

- Patron (\$ 1,000+)       Chèque/mandat poste  
       Master Card  
 Compagnon (\$ 500)       VISA \_\_\_\_\_ Date d'expiration: \_\_\_\_\_ Signature: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Officier (\$ 300)  
 Associé (\$ 150)      Nom: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Supporter (\$ 65)      Adresse: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Autre \_\_\_\_\_ (\$50)(\$40)(\$30)(20)      Endroit: \_\_\_\_\_ Prov: \_\_\_\_ Code postal: \_\_\_\_\_ Tel: (\_\_\_\_) \_\_\_\_-\_\_\_\_

CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE  
359 KENT STREET, SUITE 502  
OTTAWA ON K2P 0R7

**The Conference of Defence Associations Institute  
Member/Donor Application Form**

**359 Kent Street, Ste 502, Ottawa, Ontario K2P 0R7  
Tel: (613) 236-9903 Fax: 236-8191 E-mail: pao@cda-cdai.ca URL: cda-cdai.ca**

- Patron (\$ 1,000+)  Cheque/Money Order  
  Master Card  
 Companion (\$ 500)  VISA \_\_\_\_\_ Expiry Date: \_\_\_\_\_ Signature: \_\_\_\_\_
- Officer (\$ 300)  
Name: \_\_\_\_\_
- Associate (\$ 150)  
Address: \_\_\_\_\_
- Supporter (\$ 65)  
City: \_\_\_\_\_ Prov: \_\_\_\_\_ Postal Code: \_\_\_\_\_ Tel: (\_\_\_\_) \_\_\_\_-\_\_\_\_\_
- Other \_\_\_\_\_ (\$50)(\$40)(\$30)(\$20)