



Air Commodore Leonard Birchall
Address on the Occasion of His Acceptance of the Vimy Award
Hull, Québec, Friday, November 16, 2001

Madame Chief Justice, Mr. Minister, General Belzille, General Evraire, Honoured and distinguished guests, members of the Conference of Defence Associations, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you very much indeed, for those all too kind words and a most complimentary citation in granting us this prestigious award. The reason for my saying "us" is that always, standing in the background of every successful man, is an outstanding, loving and caring woman who makes these things happen. In this regard I am the most fortunate of men. I am therefore honoured in having my wife, Kathleen, here as the other half of the "us" in receiving this award.

The Vimy Award is without doubt the highest honour that any Canadian could ever hope to attain in a military career. It is named after that terrible battle for Vimy Ridge in World War I when over 97,000 Canadian soldiers stormed through the German defences, winning one of the most decisive battles of the war. This battle is recognized as a major turning point in Canadian history and marked our coming of age - - - our shedding of the role as a colony and taking our rightful place as a full partner in the British Empire.

After that "war to end all wars" was over, a great complacency set in. Canada did not suffer any fighting or actual war on its territory and hence it was only those who had been overseas and fought in the battles who knew the horrors of that war. When they returned home they were most reluctant to talk about those terrible conditions, death, and destruction. In addition, at that time there were many other events that caused us to forget that war, such as the world wide depression and influenza epidemic. With these things going on, the providing and maintenance of military forces was the last thing anyone wanted to even think about.

In the summer of 1938 the storm clouds started to gather again, and the majority started shouting:

"Consult ! not Conflict !"

At the same time over in Germany, Hitler in a pre-Munich speech to his Nazi colleagues said:

"Consultations are the last refuge of indecisiveness when confronted with reality. It is not fondness - but weapons that bring nations to the conference table".

Another typical example of those times was a Peace Referendum in the mid-thirties when over 10 million people endorsed the view that Britain should unilaterally disarm. A much more realistic view of that referendum was by, William Inge, a former Dean of St. Paul's Cathedral, London, England, who, as a lone voice crying in the wilderness, said:

"There is not much use in the sheep passing legislation in favour of vegetarianism while the wolves still prefer mutton".

Believe me, we heaved a big sigh of relief when Sir Neville Chamberlain arrived back in London from Germany, waving his umbrella and a piece of paper with Hitler's signature on it and shouting:

"Peace in our time !".

Now that was the biggest understatement since Noah said: "I think we are in for a rain shower".

Looking back on World War II, my participation was a piece of cake compared to the tens of thousands of Canadian civilians - - - those wonderful "citizen soldiers" - - - who joined up during the war. I think of their coming from their civilian life, leaving peaceful, comfortable homes, going through an all too brief, inadequate training and then thrown into the harsh crucible of battle, where they fought and were killed. This fills me with admiration, respect - - - and I am

(continued p. 2)

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extremely humble. On their success or failure depended the freedom and lives of all Canadians, not to mention their own lives and those of their comrades. There could never be a higher price for Canada to have paid for their failure and I - for one - - will never be able to repay them.

The supreme sacrifice paid by so many tens of thousands of these Canadians is best expressed by the epitaph in the Kohima Allied War Cemetery in Burma where over 1500 Commonwealth soldiers lie buried. This epitaph reads:

“When you go home tell them of us and say
For your to-morrow we gave our to-day”.

The Conference of Defence Associations is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. It restricts its aim to one specific area - **defence issues**. CDA expresses its ideas and opinions and utilizes its political rights to influence government defence policy. It is the most senior and influential interest group in Canada’s pro-defence community. Defence issues are brought to the public’s attention by analysis and informed discussion through CDA’s Institute.

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Les questions de défense sont portées à l’attention du public par le truchement d’analyse et de discussions informées parrainées par l’Institut de la CAD. L’Institut, un organisme autonome, est complètement dépendant des dons reçus. Veuillez donc vous référer au formulaire inclus à ce bulletin. En guise de retour, les donateurs recevront *ON TRACK* et les autres publications pendant les 12 prochains mois. L’Institut de la CAD est un organisme de charité enregistré et tous les dons reçus sont déductibles d’impôt.

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With the end of World War II, once again the euphoria and complacency took over as we all settled down to getting on with our lives. Once again Canada had not suffered the horrors of actual war by its citizens in the homeland. Once again all too many groups of strident youths, vocal adult men and women, started shouting:

“Ban the bombs !”

Their demand was that we draw up treaties to this affect and that we unilaterally disarm, destroying all our armament and weapons. This only brought back to me those predictions by Dean Inge about the wolves still preferring mutton. What we failed to realize is that for the vanquished the war is never over.

Once again we commenced having ever diminishing budgets for National Defence, creating reduced combat training, rusting out of equipment and an ever decreasing armed force. One of the more recent actions being taken by the military in trying to cope with this situation, and which causes me great concern, has been the contracting out of some of our most essential military support services such as day-to-day maintenance of equipment and replacing our supply systems. To my mind this only reduces the efficiency and flexibility in deploying units at what is at best, very questionable savings. It also opens the way for the undesirables and terrorists to infiltrate these civilian elements leaving our armed forces with very unreliable and contaminated resources.

In the ideal world of the distant future, there may not be any requirement for military forces simply because we have found a better, more positive way of ensuring world peace. Somehow I think that our chances of attaining that ideal world are about as good as those of a celluloid dog chasing an asbestos cat through the gates of hell.

And so for the foreseeable future we will still have to carry on with the bonding together of like minded nations. They will
(continued p. 3)

<i>Contents</i>	<i>Contenu</i>
<i>Address by Air Commodore Leonard Birchall.....</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>From the Executive Director.....</i>	<i>4</i>
<i>Mot du Directeur Exécutif.....</i>	<i>4</i>
<i>Where Are We Now? - A Political Perspective.....</i>	<i>7</i>
<i>Canadian Force Structure and requirements for 2020.....</i>	<i>8</i>
<i>Where are we now and the foreseeable future?.....</i>	<i>10</i>
<i>Where Should We Be in Twenty Years.....</i>	<i>15</i>
<i>Military Transformation and the Aftermath of the Quadrennial</i>	
<i>Defense Review.....</i>	<i>18</i>
<i>Selflessness.....</i>	<i>20</i>
<i>Developing Soldiers on Peace Support Operations.....</i>	<i>Insert</i>

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have to determine the necessary actions to be taken in maintaining world peace. Each member will have to provide and maintain their fair portion of adequately trained and equipped military forces to be used as and when necessary.

Canada has joined three such major organizations - - the United Nations, NATO and NORAD. But we must now ensure that our influence within these organizations is such that we fully participate in making the decisions and especially the enforcing of them by armed forces. We can only do this - IF - we are accepted as a credible member. The amount of our influence will be totally dependent on providing our fair share of land, sea and air forces - properly equipped - trained - and supported.

The present condition of our armed forces is known only too well by this particular audience. Also several recent studies have pointed out the pertinent facts with great clarity. One such study is by your own organization, the CDAI, titled: "Caught in the Middle - - An Assessment of the Operational Readiness of the Canadian Forces". This study reports that Canada only spends \$265 per capita per year on defence while the NATO average is \$589. It also states that our percentage of annual Gross Domestic Product for National Defence, in comparison to that of the 18 members in NATO is second lowest, with 1.2% as against the lowest, Luxembourg, with 0.9%.

An indication of these criticisms we are starting to hear, is an article I read recently which quoted Dr. Edward N. Luttwak, of Georgetown University's Centre for Strategic Studies and a member of Reagan's Defence Transition Team as saying:

"Canada is a country that has decided to take the free ride. It has historically got away with it and wants to continue getting away with it. The administration has a real problem here. If we hector and lecture them then everybody will say its counterproductive. They will say that it merely irritates, stimulates nationalism, backlash and so on. If we don't say anything then the Canadians are allowed to comfortably forget about the problem. It's something for the Canadian elite to contend with. Are they comfortable in this posture of essentially irresponsible children in the Alliance ? If they want to go on in this lukewarm, comfortable pool, that's fine. But please don't ask people to treat Canada as an equal and as a partner and as an ally, because it is not an equal and a partner and an ally".

And now once again we are actively involved in war. This time

the enemy is defined as: "terrorists and terrorism - - - including any state, nation or group of individuals that support, harbour or assist in these activities". All the time this war will be going on, lurking in the wings are those atomic and bio-chemical weapons of mass destruction. As for the using of these weapons let me refer to Chief Justice B.V.A. Roling, the Netherlands Judge at the Nuremburgh and Tokyo War Crimes Trials. In his final summation of those trials, he has written:

During the trials in Nuremburgh and Tokyo, the prosecution pointed to the deterrent force of individual criminal accountability. Supposedly it would prevent statesmen and influential military personnel from adopting a bellicose posture. It seems to me that this kind of deterrence is practically insignificant. War, in the sense of Von Clausewitz, - war as a continuation of policy by other means - is begun in expectation of victory and victors are not held accountable, even though their crimes are known. Lady MacBeth's cry: "What need we fear who knows it when none can call our power to account" expresses an often bitter reality.

I fully agree with the judge. It is the victor in any war that writes the rules by which that war has been fought and hence victory is essential at all costs by taking every means possible to emerge victorious. This has always happened and will continue to happen despite the supposed protection of any treaties or conventions. Our only defence against the use of such weapons is to have large, reprisal forces and weapons, in being, so as to deter the enemy from starting to use them.

All this leads me to the final big question, "What can we and future generations do to prevent ourselves from constantly getting into this situation". As the great philosopher George Santayana has written:

"Those who forget the past are condemned to relive it"

We must do everything possible to ensure that those who follow us do not forget our past. That they study it and

(continued p. 4)

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thereby avoid making the same mistake we have made of letting ourselves fall into a state of military unpreparedness. They must ensure that at all times Canada does have adequate armed forces in being, properly maintained, equipped and trained to combat status - - regardless of the cost.

But how do we do this ? The first action that we must take would be the bringing back and teaching Canada's military history in all our educational institutions. This should be reinforced through proper publicity in our news media. In this way Canadians would be kept fully aware of the absolute necessity of having and paying for such forces.

With the present day tendency to reduce taxes, increase budgets for health, education, social welfare, - - - all at the expense of National Defence - - - my convictions will be construed as a wish to glorify war - - - a war monger - - - a typical General dashing around on a white charger. Nothing could be further from the truth. The military, as you all know, only too well, hate war far more than civilians. It was a General - none other than General William T. Sherman - who said:

"I am tired and sick of war. Its glory is all moonshine.

It is only those who have neither fired a shot or heard the shrieks and groans of the wounded, who cry aloud for more blood, more vengeance, more desolation.

WAR IS HELL!"

To-night, as I look back on my 67 years of military service, it has been the most fascinating, rewarding and complete life one could ever have had. If I could live my life over again I would not change one minute of it. This has only been made possible by the solid, unselfish efforts of my comrades in arms. We have stood steadfast together during our good times and especially the bad ones. And believe me there have been some real dandies when we have had to circle the wagons in an ever tightening knot just to survive. It is, therefore, with the greatest humility and respect that I dedicate my receiving this prestigious Vimy Award to my comrades in arms, especially the absent and departed. As the Joe Erks in the Air Force would say;

"BLESS 'EM ALL"

Ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of my wife, Kathleen, and myself, we give you our sincere thanks.

(The full text of Air Commodore Birchall's address can be seen at the CDA website www.cda-cdai.ca - ed.)

FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Colonel (Retd) Alain Pellerin, OMM, CD

The Conference of Defence Associations Institute was honoured when the Honourable Arthur Eggleton, Minister of National Defence, presented the Vimy Award to Air Commodore Leonard Birchall at a sold out formal dinner at the Canadian Museum of Civilization in Hull, Québec, 16 November. The evening was extremely well attended by the leaders of corporate Canada who are supportive of the aims of CDA and the CDA Institute to increase, annually, public awareness of the significant and outstanding contribution of a

(continued p. 5)

ON TRACK

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LE MOT DU DIRECTEUR EXÉCUTIF

Colonel (ret) Alain Pellerin, OMM, CD

Ce fut un grand honneur pour l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense lorsque l'honorable Arthur Eggleton, ministre de la Défense nationale, a remis le Prix Vimy au commodore de l'Air Leonard Birchall, lors d'un dîner officiel, au Musée canadien des civilisations, le 16 novembre, à Hull, au Québec. Plusieurs dirigeants d'entreprises canadiennes participaient à la soirée, en témoignage de leur appui aux objectifs de la CAD et de l'Institut de la CAD qui, chaque année, s'efforcent de sensibiliser le public à la contribution importante et exceptionnelle d'un Canadien ou d'une Canadienne à la sécurité du Canada et au maintien de nos valeurs démocratiques. L'appui considérable que nous témoignent nos sociétés commanditaires et les associations membres a rendu possible cette soirée mémorable que tous les participants ont grandement appréciée. Nos remerciements à nos généreux commanditaires sont publiés à la page 13 du présent numéro de *On Track*.

Le 18^e séminaire annuel de l'Institut de la CAD, dont le thème est *La capacité au combat : les Forces canadiennes*, se tiendra le jeudi 21 février 2002, et sera suivi du congrès annuel de la CAD, le vendredi 22 février, l'Hôtel Fairmont Château

(voir p. 5)

Canadian to the security of Canada and to the preservation of our democratic values. The very significant support of our corporate sponsors and of the member associations contributed to a successful event that was appreciated by everyone who attended. Our formal thanks to our corporate sponsors can be read on page 12 of this issue of *ON TRACK*.

The CDA Institute will present its 18th annual seminar, *Combat Capability and the Canadian Forces*, on Thursday, 21 February 2002, followed by CDA's AGM on Friday 22 February, at the Fairmont Château Laurier in Ottawa. The Minister of National Defence is expected to open the seminar. We have invited US General Wesley Clark, NATO's former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to deliver the keynote address. We have a very impressive lineup of speakers that are scheduled to address and participate in both the seminar and AGM. Please refer to the notice of the annual seminar and AGM on page 17 for more details. I urge our readers to attend what should be a very stimulating and informative period of discussion. Circulate the information widely to our pro-defence stakeholders. If past experience is any indication, register soon to avoid disappointment. Most of the articles featured in this edition of *ON TRACK* reflect the theme of the seminar.

We are pleased to include for our readers *Combat Capability: Where Are We Now? - A Political Perspective*, written by Colonel the Honourable John A. Fraser, Chairman of the Minister's Monitoring Committee. The Honourable Mr. Fraser will present a paper at the seminar in February, arguing that there is a world of difference between contradicting or defying our political masters and telling them the factual truth.

Dr. James Fergusson, Deputy Director, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, has provided us with a critical review of how changes in force structure and capabilities will be defined by the dominant political-military power of the day. In his paper *Canadian Force Structure and Requirements for 2020*, he examines how Canadian policy may cope with the Revolution in Military Affairs. Dr. Fergusson will be a panellist at the 18th Annual Seminar in February.

Colonel Howard Marsh, in *Combat Capability and Canada: Where are we now and the foreseeable future?*, presents our readers with a critical, long-term view of the capability of Canada's armed forces. He measures capability, based on a model borrowed from TNO Physics and Electronics Laboratory. Colonel Marsh is Special Assistant to the Chief of Land Staff. He will be a panellist at the CDA Institute's 18th annual seminar.

(continued p. 6)

Laurier, à Ottawa. Le ministre de la Défense nationale devrait inaugurer le séminaire. Le Général Wesley Clark (ret), ancien Commandant Suprême des Forces alliées en Europe (SACEUR) au sein de l'OTAN, prononcera le discours-programme. D'éminents conférenciers participeront au séminaire ainsi qu'au congrès. Pour obtenir de plus amples détails, veuillez consulter l'avis du séminaire et du congrès à la page 17. J'incite tous nos lecteurs à venir participer à des discussions qui seront tout aussi stimulantes que constructives. Nous vous demandons de communiquer ces renseignements aux intervenants du monde militaire. Si l'on se fie à l'expérience des années passées, il vaut mieux vous inscrire le plus tôt possible afin d'éviter d'être déçu. La plupart des articles du présent numéro de *On Track* traitent du thème du séminaire.

À l'intention de nos lecteurs, nous publions dans le présent numéro un document rédigé par le colonel et honorable John A. Fraser, président du Comité de surveillance des changements au sein du ministère de la Défense nationale et des Forces canadiennes, document intitulé «*Combat Capability: Where are we now? - A Political perspective*». L'honorable Fraser fera une présentation, lors du séminaire de février, qui traitera de l'immense différence qui existe entre contredire et provoquer nos dirigeants politiques et leur expliquer les faits dans toute leur véracité.

Le Docteur James Fergusson, directeur adjoint, Centre for Defence and Security Studies de l'Université du Manitoba, explique comment les changements apportés aux structures et aux capacités des Forces canadiennes seront effectués par le pouvoir politico-militaire en place aujourd'hui. Dans cet article intitulé «*Canadian Force Structure and Requirements for 2020*», il examine comment le monde politique au Canada peut répondre aux bouleversements que connaît le monde militaire. Le Docteur Fergusson sera l'un des experts invités au 18^e séminaire annuel.

Le Colonel Howard Marsh, dans son article intitulé «*Combat Capability and Canada: Where are we now and in the foreseeable future?*», partage avec les lecteurs son point de vue sur ce que sera à long terme la capacité au combat des Forces canadiennes. Il évalue cette capacité en se basant sur un modèle emprunté au TNO Physics and Electronics Laboratory. Le Colonel Marsh est adjoint spécial au Chef d'état-major de l'Armée de terre. Il sera l'un des experts invités au 18^e séminaire annuel de l'Institut de la CAD.

Le capitaine de corvette Richard Gimblett (ret) fera un exposé, lors du 18^e séminaire annuel, intitulé «*Combat Capability and the Canadian Forces: Where Should We Be in Twenty Years?*». Dans son exposé, le Capitaine de corvette Gimblett émet l'opinion selon laquelle l'acceptation éventuelle par le Canada du

(voir p. 6)

Lieutenant-Commander (Retd) Richard Gimblett will present a paper at the 18th annual seminar. In *Combat Capability and the Canadian Forces: Where Should We Be in Twenty Years*, Lieutenant-Commander Gimblett argues that acceptance of Canada's intended role in the world would provide a somewhat more focussed rationale for the Canadian Forces than exists at present, and presumably would inspire a greater government commitment to achieving the necessary capabilities.

In order to ensure that the United States national military strategy is updated as the threat evolves, the US Congress has directed that each incoming administration to report on strategy and the roles and missions of the US armed forces. Mr. Jayson Spiegel, Executive Director of the Reserve Officers Associations of the United States, in *Military Transformation and the Aftermath of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, presents us with an assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review.

Earlier this year General Montgomery C. Meigs, Commander of US Army Europe and (US) 7th Army, wrote of Generalship: Qualities, Instincts, and Character. With the kind permission of General Meigs we are pleased to include in this edition of *ON TRACK* an excerpt from his paper, titled *Selflessness*.

In the September edition of *ON TRACK*, Lieutenant Francis Conliffe, an officer of the Royal Canadian Dragoons (RCD) in Petawawa, described for us how his unit prepared for deployment on operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are pleased to follow up in this edition with *Developing Soldiers on Peace Support Operations*, wherein Lieutenant Conliffe describes for us how he and his troops benefited from working with other nations in a military environment. Lieutenant Conliffe is the son of the late Lieutenant-Colonel Christopher Conliffe of the R22^eR.

The world events that have taken place in 2001 have brought greater focus on the urgency to examine the roles that Canada should expect of her armed forces. It is our hope that our readers will lend their voice to the discussion on the issues of security and national defence. The CDA Institute's 18th Annual Seminar is an important platform from which these issues will be explored.

The Conference of Defence Associations add to the debate on issues on security and national defence and, with your continued support, we can promote the study and awareness of Canadian military affairs. **Your continued support as members of the Institute is vital** to our continued success. Please renew your membership when you are asked - and introduce a fellow Canadian to the Institute.

rôle qu'il joue dans le monde précisera encore davantage la mission des Forces canadiennes et fera en sorte que le gouvernement s'engagera encore plus à les doter des capacités nécessaires.

Afin de s'assurer que la stratégie militaire nationale des États-Unis évolue au même rythme que les menaces, le Congrès des États-Unis a statué que toute nouvelle administration doit donner un compte rendu de la stratégie, du rôle et du mandat des Forces armées des États-Unis. M. Jason Spiegel, directeur général de la Reserve Officers Associations of the United States, fait un exposé intitulé «Military Transformation and the Aftermath of the Quadrennial Defense Review», exposé dans lequel il évalue l'examen quadriennal de la Défense.

Plus tôt cette année, le général Montgomery C. Meigs, commandant de l'Armée des États-Unis en Europe et de la 7^e Armée des États-Unis, a rédigé un document portant sur les qualités, les instincts et les traits de caractères que doit posséder un candidat à un poste de général. Avec sa gracieuse permission, nous publions dans le présent numéro de *OnTrack* un extrait de ce document intitulé «Selflessness».

Dans le numéro de septembre de *On Track*, le Lieutenant Francis Conliffe, officier du Royal Canadian Dragoons (RCD), basé à Petawawa, nous a décrit la façon dont son unité s'est préparée à être déployée en Bosnie-Herzégovine. Nous sommes heureux de présenter à nos lecteurs, dans le présent numéro, un autre article du lieutenant Conliffe, intitulé «Developing Soldiers on Peace Support Operations», article dans lequel il décrit combien ses troupes ont bénéficié de la collaboration avec des militaires d'autres nations. Le lieutenant Conliffe est le fils de feu le Lieutenant-colonel Christopher Conliffe, du Royal 22^e Régiment.

Les événements que le monde a connus en 2001 nous ont fait prendre davantage conscience de l'urgence de définir le rôle que le Canada souhaite que jouent les Forces canadiennes. Nous espérons que nos lecteurs nous donneront leur opinion sur les questions liées à la sécurité et à la défense nationale. Le 18^e séminaire annuel de l'Institut de la CAD constitue une tribune importante où sont débattues ces questions.

La Conférence des associations de la défense alimente les débats sur la sécurité nationale et sur la défense nationale et, avec votre appui, elle favorise l'étude et la connaissance du monde militaire canadien. **L'appui continu que nous manifestent nos membres est primordial** à notre réussite. Nous vous prions de bien vouloir renouveler votre adhésion, lorsque nous vous le demandons, et de vous efforcer de recruter un nouveau membre de l'Institut.

COMBAT CAPABILITY: WHERE ARE WE NOW? - A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

*Colonel The Honourable John A. Fraser, Chairman Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the
Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces*

For the past few years, the combat capability of the Canadian Forces has been a topic of some interest in the media, Parliamentary Committees and countless academic papers. In 2001, a sometimes heated discussion ensued between senior defence officials and members of the defence community over whether the CF was more combat capable than it was in 1990. Not an entirely fruitful exercise, the debate was bolstered by several key reports from various organizations making recommendations on what to do about what seemed, to them, the unrelenting slide of the Canadian Forces into operational irrelevance. The Royal Canadian Military Institute, the Conference of Defence Associations Institute and the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century, and the Auditor General all went public with different takes on how to make the CF effective in the future. 1990 is, after all, in the past.

Having served modestly in the Canadian Forces, I can claim only some knowledge of strategy, doctrine, tactics and other concepts, which are second nature to the military professional. He or she is best placed to determine what combat capability is *militarily* required on the battlefield, at sea or in the air. However, as Chairman of the National Defence Minister's Monitoring Committee, tasked with overseeing reforms in the military, I can tell you a little about what is *politically* required to ensure the Canadian Forces are supported by the Government and people of Canada. They require, and deserve, truth about our military based on facts.

The military must trust the people of Canada to accept their responsibilities, as any adult must. Truth about our capabilities, truth about our deficiencies, truth about our commitments: these are all essential to ensure our combat capability for, without political engagement in defence the country will simply not understand, or accept, combat.

I've been watching a gulf widen between defence officials and the wider defence community on a number of issues. They include force structure, defence policy, public relations, and possibly some others. Most interesting has been the insistence that acquisitions of new kit have, in themselves, made the CF more combat capable. Defence officials insist that CF is now more combat capable than they were during the Gulf War because of increased firepower and new platforms that have come on-line since. The LAV 3, the Coyote, frigates, coastal

patrol vessels, Griffon helicopters and smart bombs for CF-18's all represent capabilities that the CF can exploit.

There is no doubt that this new kit is impressive. Canada was able to contribute effectively, for example, to the Kosovo campaign, but what if similar operations were necessary elsewhere at the same time? If we were called upon to put ground forces in to enforce NATO's will, could we have contributed any more than a token contingent? Could we have coped with a domestic crisis, an Oka or an Ice Storm? Or an asymmetric attack? And how sustainable is our capability?

Yes, we have participated in many missions since the end of the Gulf War. Yes, our technology has come a long way.

But technology is a tool - nothing more, nothing less. Technology in conjunction with adequate numbers of personnel can deliver force on an enemy, but ultimately war, and peacekeeping, is about politics. Armed forces can aim to destroy each other, they can inflict or threaten punishment to force diplomacy, or they can take territory. At no time, however, does technology and firepower or their own 'win' wars or 'inflict' peace or reason on so-called rogue states. The aim of warfare is always a political determination.

Politicians are your neighbours whom you have elected. Most of them know very little about the Canadian Armed Forces. As hard as it is for the informed observer of defence to figure out what combat capability is or is not, try to imagine the Parliamentarian or the average Canadian grappling with the distinction between a corps, a division, a brigade, a battle group or even a mission element, then the nuances of the revolution in military affairs, then, to top it off, 'capability-based' versus 'commitment-based' planning. Confusing? Yes.

But Parliamentarians and Canadians still deserve articulate, straightforward and believable answers to their questions about our military capabilities. Many of you may say that military leadership is constrained from being frank, for fear of appearing to contradict government policy. In my paper to be presented at the seminar in February, I will argue that there is a world of difference between contradicting or defying your political masters and telling them the factual truth. Providing such information to political masters and to the Canadian public is the starting point on the road to combat capability.

CANADIAN FORCE STRUCTURE AND REQUIREMENTS FOR 2020

Dr. James Fergusson, Deputy Director, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba

The future is a product of the present, and the present is captured by the past. For many, this statement resonates with regard to the military in general, and arguably the Canadian Forces in particular, through the old cliché that militaries always plan to fight the last war. The last war in the case of Canada may be understood as some combination of World War II and the Cold War, which has captured the present. This capturing is perhaps most evident in the current and projected force structure of the CF. The current structure looks little different from the past, albeit much smaller and less robust, and the future looks little different if one takes the current capital spending priorities as a benchmark.

This is not to suggest that changes have not occurred, or will not occur in the immediate future. Certainly officials within DND and the CF are well aware of changes or transformations portended by the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). In addition, they are also well aware of the implications of the last ten years of CF combat experience on projecting the nature of war or combat into the future, especially in light of Kosovo and Afghanistan.

It is the very uncertainty associated with the RMA - technologically, and organizationally - and the future nature of combat that makes it very difficult to prepare for a world of 2020. It is this very uncertainty which demands a gambler's mentality in the context of an institution which by its very nature is not a gambler, especially in the case of Canada. With limited resources available today and into the future, gambling today may create a force structure and set of capabilities dysfunctional for the politics of war and diplomacy in 2020.

The answer, thus, is slow, incremental change, and it is this type of change which in many ways creates the future itself. It is also the environment of the follower for Canada. Changes in force structure and capabilities will be defined by the dominant political-military power of the day - in this case the United States - as it has always been in the past for most states. The reality of Canada as a follower is even more pronounced not least of all because of its geopolitical space, and the unwillingness of successive governments to invest sufficient resources to do anything more than just follow. The gap between the internationalist rhetoric of Canadian foreign policy and the reality of a lack of resources to implement this rhetoric is not likely to change.

This then is the first yardstick for projecting the future combat capabilities of the CF. It is highly unlikely that even the traumatic events of September 11th will have more than a

transitory impact upon this yardstick. Of course, future unpredictable events may provide the catalyst for altering the nature of this yardstick, and a major war is certainly a candidate. But even here, there is little evidence that the conditions that would lead to such a war will appear for at least a decade, if not more. Real military challengers to US supremacy are likely far off. This is not to suggest that the US, Canada, and the allies will not be engaged in war. Rather, the most likely wars are of intervention into the conflicts, external or internal, of others, which demand engagement for reasons of self-interest and morality.

Canada will continue to follow with all the pretensions of internationalism (of being a Great Power in effect). In other words, Canada will continue its past practices of never saying no, and the nature of what it can commit will be a product of following the US lead under the mantra of inter-operability.

The second yardstick concerns the nature of war or combat itself over the next twenty years. A true RMA is the product of a fundamental transformation in the relationship between society, armed force, and war. Notwithstanding the great debate on RMA's history as the means to evaluate the notion today, two key factors stand out: fundamental transformations in the social units that employ armed force and practice war, and in the technology that is developed and employed for political purposes by these units. The former is most clearly reflected in the French/Napoleonic revolution when the legitimacy of the state shifted from the dynasty to the people, creating the nation-in-arms, and over a century of wars of nationalism. The latter is evident in the development of nuclear weapons, which changed the fundamental role of armed force from fighting to deterring systemic war.

Generally, the US understanding of RMA is a technological one, in which new technologies that have evolved since the war in Vietnam (precision strike capabilities and information technologies) are, or will soon reach the point of producing revolutionary organizational and doctrinal change. Such change will in turn significantly affect the way in which armed force is employed in combat as informed by their societies. Today, and in the future, this is being manifested around concerns for casualties in two senses. First, the US and Western societies as a whole are assumed to be highly sensitive to the loss of their own soldiers, especially in missions driven more by a moral imperative, than vital national interests. Second, it reflects Western sensitivity to non-combatant casualties in wars of intervention (i.e. collateral damage).

(continued p. 9)

These sensitivities, which naturally reflect a much deeper set of western liberal values, account for the search for technological solutions to the inherent bloody nature of war. In effect, they are the drivers for the creation of bloodless war, at least for the West.

Technology will largely replace labour on the battlefield, and precision strikes from land, air, sea, and space possessing global targeting data in real time (all weather, 24/7) will likely negate even the smallest military units from operating effectively. Large unit formations will become a thing of the past. Manned strike platforms in all environments will be replaced by automation, smaller and more lethal, and directed by weapons control officers far removed from harm's way. While territory will still have to be occupied and held, the next generation of soldier will not only be plugged into a wide range of all-weather, day/night sensor capabilities, but will also possess more lethal capabilities by virtue of the systems-of-systems networking and a range of incapacitating technologies in which adversaries will not be killed, only rendered harmless.

This image, perhaps somewhat premature for 2020, will represent the triumph of the American way of war. For followers such as Canada, several paths are present, and it is difficult to estimate which will be chosen, or which will be imposed by default. The basic path is the choice between technology and labour. One can decide to adopt fully the American way of war and choose the US model of technology replacing labour. It is the path of integration in which Canada would be able to provide similar capabilities to augment, and or replace US capabilities in situations where Canada may be engaged, but the US is not. Augmentation, as evident in the current ability of the Canadian Navy to insert vessels into US naval carrier task forces, carries political benefits and liabilities; the benefit of greater avenues of influence on Washington, and the liabilities of dependency.

Labour, on the other hand, is the path of capability replacement with regard to the US model. Notwithstanding the image of the modern soldier in 2020, a technology intensive US military will likely lack certain labour intensive capabilities, which, in turn, will be magnified by US preferences for the role and function its forces should play, relative to its expectation of the roles others should undertake. Basically, the US will likely eschew a direct role in missions short of a significant war of intervention, such as peacekeeping (really occupation) missions. Canada's contribution, then, would be to provide well-trained, professional ground forces for international missions that the US would be unable and/or unwilling to provide. Again, there are political benefits and liabilities attached to this path.

Of course, the paths are not mutually exclusive. If Canada

chose the later, it will still require sufficient technological capacity to be inter-operable with the US, especially because the US would provide the back-up strike forces for situations in which the conflict escalated unexpectedly. However, such a technological capacity does not amount to full inter-operability with US assets. Nor does it necessarily require these ground forces to possess the technological capacities of the modern US soldier integrated into the US systems-of-systems network. Rather, it may be understood as a minimum capacity to communicate effectively with US command and control and strike assets.

The likelihood that Canada will have to chose between a technology intensive (hence augmentation) or labour intensive (gap-filler) force is simply a product of constrained resources. Arguably, the CF could maintain both a labour intensive ground force for peacekeeping missions, and technology intensive air and naval forces for combat missions (i.e. a miniature US force structure). However, future governments are unlikely to be willing to invest the money required to do both at the same time. An attempt to do so would likely result in a CF with insufficient labour for the ground and insufficient technology for air and sea; a situation somewhat reflected in the current one facing the CF. For example, the CF can deploy well-trained professional forces in the field today, even for significant combat purposes. They, however, can neither be deployed rapidly with the necessary equipment, nor sustained due to labour, lift, and equipment shortfalls.

The basic requirement to chose one model over the other raises, of course, the issue of specialization; a longstanding anathema to the CF. Despite the fact that the CF is already specialized and unable to perform the full range of possible combat missions, CF opposition stems from two considerations. The first is the loss of a specific capability that cannot be recovered quickly or easily. The second follows from the current state of the CF in which the loss of a combat capability may set in motion combat specialization centered upon a single service.

The problem for the CF in the future is differentiating between a capability in terms of its functions, and a capability in equipment terms. For example, the loss of a heavy armoured capability (i.e. the obsolete Leopard 1 MBT) amounts to the loss of a specific equipment to perform the function of armour on the battlefield. However, other types of assets capable of performing the same function can replace it on the future battlefield. Projecting into the future, the MBT is likely to become obsolete, and replaced by a variety of strike platforms, such as waves of unmanned aerial combat vehicles and long

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range precision artillery guided to targets by air and space targeting assets. It is in this sense that dramatically different types of assets than currently in operation will undertake certain combat functions. Thus, giving up a capability in equipment terms does not necessarily mean giving up a functional capability.

With regard for the second consideration, global strike assets may also create the conditions whereby combat becomes specialized in service terms. Notwithstanding the weight placed today on jointness, elements of the RMA imply the possible elimination of a CF force structure based upon the three services. New technologies, as they impact upon force structure and doctrine, may result in the concentration of strike or combat assets in one of the services as traditionally understood. This does not necessarily mean that the importance of possessing land, sea, and air (and in the future space) forces will disappear. Each performs a variety of other functions in support or political terms (i.e. the Army in aid and assistance to the civil power). But, it does not necessarily follow that each must possess modern combat or strike capabilities.

Space does not permit a complete, detailed exposition of the

implications of these arguments, the relative costs associated with technology versus labour, and the multiple paths or choices open to the CF in preparing for war in 2020 and beyond. Certainly, some of the paths and choices are beyond the purview of the CF to control or manage. Nonetheless, the future of warfare given the developments that are occurring today indicate that combat requirements and force structures will be radically different than the present as captured by the legacy of the past. With these developments, the ongoing life extension projects in the CF that will take existing capabilities out to 2015 and beyond, and the projected capital projects of today tend to indicate that the CF will not be equipped and structured for war in 2020 as lead by the US.

Why replace a destroyer with a destroyer, and why invest in research and development for another manned fighter (JSF) today, if combat capabilities are likely to be transformed. Investing in the future today may be a gamble, but failure to do so will likely lead to an out-dated, ill-prepared force for the future with significant political implications for Canada. Above all, more investment is needed, but investment without a vision and a willingness to gamble will only translate into a future CF that looks like the present and remains captured by the past.

COMBAT CAPABILITY AND CANADA: WHERE ARE WE NOW AND THE FORE-SEEABLE FUTURE?

Colonel Howard Marsh, Special Assistant to Chief of Land Staff


The search for a definition

Combat capability is a wonderfully elastic term that is used to accommodate many conflicting assessments. However, for Canada, any definition must be restrained by the reality that combat capability is an instrument wielded by democracies. Fine wine like successful combat capability is determined by a nation's soil. Society's values decide its combat capability. Any definition needs to acknowledge its origin—people and governance.

The recent announcement that the US defence community will shift from threat-based to capability-based planning heralds a new era of defining combat capability. Soon super computers will bring digital preciseness to this elusive term. In the interim the dictionary, Canadian Force usage and NATO's 30-year quest to define interoperability of combat capability provide orientation.

Combat capability can be defined as the authority and power to do something while being opposed. A more precise definition might be borrowed from TNO Physics and Electronics Laboratory, The Hague. Their comprehensive treatment uses

a definition pyramid of four levels.



This pyramid does not float in the vacuum of space but is found in the complex environment of geo-political realities. Situations shape futures. At some point national leadership expresses intent to do something. **Intent** is at the apex. Here, national and coalition interests along with political perspectives shape the authoritative component of combat capability. Intent then passes to the **human level**. Here, the power of

(continued p. 11)

intellect and human will wrestle with how intent is best translated into results. Strategies, doctrines, force structures lead to trained forces. Historically the geneses of military failures originate at the human level.

The third level of the pyramid is command

Command has been defined as, 'the creative expression of human will necessary to accomplish the mission.' Commanders establish common aims at various levels of command to achieve coordinated action.

The **fourth level**, the base of the pyramid, is **materiel**—the available means—to achieve the coordinated action. Most discussion on combat capability focuses on the 'physical' component. The 'moral' component transcends the levels. Courage, leadership, cohesion and discipline spring from command and human qualities. Readiness is the entire pyramid plotted against time to availability. When wine is drunk does anyone reflect on the soil? When a unit fails, combat capability or readiness is blamed. Few hold national indifference accountable.

Combat capability is not effective unless it has the authority and power to impose will while being opposed. All four levels of the definition should support one another. Coherency of authority and power from intent to materiel produces viable combat capability.

Application of the definition

Aside from individual and unit acts of heroism Canada's combat capability has been in decline since Lt. Gen. Sir Arthur Currie commanded the Canadian Corps in the last 100 days of the Great War. He was probably the last Canadian commander to enjoy coherency across all four levels of the definition pyramid. Political variation was attenuated by transoceanic correspondence and political desire to avoid repeating the mistakes of Minister Hughes' earlier [1914-1916] meddling in military affairs. Lt. Gen. Currie forged pragmatic strategies, doctrines, force structure and training while in theatre. He was an exceptional field commander who was admired by superior, peer and subordinate. His soldiers were made strong by a frontier nation willing to contribute to the cause and a maturing, coordinated support schema of empire scale. The Canadian Army in the last 100 days of the Great War was formidable.

The combat failures at the outset of WWII, notably the debacle at Hong Kong, illustrated Canadian combat capability failures at all levels of the definition pyramid. Up until the fall of France Canada sought limited engagement and attempted to participate in the low-risk components of

war. After the Battle of Britain allied leadership in the form of Churchillian oratory shaped intent. The human level of Canadian combat capability was borrowed from British military pamphlets, staff colleges and UK force structures.

The effectiveness of Canadian command during WWII is still debated. Official histories record that senior command was no worse than that of our allies. Others write that it was worse, saved by exemplary unit leadership. The materiel level—the available means—was largely derivative. The physical component was derived from North American factories and farms. The moral component was derived from British discipline, ethos and training. In a crisis it is easier to recruit a million Canadians than build ten thousand fighting machines. Lightly protected infantry was Canada's main contribution to the allied cause. Canada's combat capability in WWII was not innovative or elegant however brute force has its own quality. Britain shaped intent, human and command levels of Canadian combat capability. Much equipment came from USA factories. The materiel level of Canadian combat capability in WWII has been described as, 'by convenience'.

The downward trend continued. Neither political nor military leadership anticipated that Canada's military would soon be fighting on the Korean peninsula. Alliance commitments ensured participation. WWII doctrines were employed. The Regular Force could not go so a Special Force was formed. The troop rotational concept was introduced. Limiting liability by sharing combat opportunities reduced corporate memory hence command suffered. Although effective in its mission Canada's military contribution to Korea was much less than that of WWII.

As the bi-polar world of the 1950's took shape Canada saw the need to be part of the North Atlantic alliance (NATO). Political intent was clear. Common defence provided much security with little investment. Military thought was easy. British doctrines, establishments and lexicon were familiar. Motivating personnel in an armed service with four different terms of service must have been a command challenge. The 1950's and 1960's were the 'Golden Years' of equipment acquisition. By the 1960's Canada's NATO brigade (27 Brigade) under command of British Army of the Rhine had coherency of authority and power across the four levels of combat capability albeit with a strong British influence. Then Canadian politicians dreamt of a new-world order apart from bi-polar realities. Withdrawing military formations from Europe proved to be a long endeavour with a 25-year respite in southern Germany.

The annual operational readiness reports of the 1970's and 1980's from 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (Lahr, Germany) painted a very bleak picture of the brigade's materiel. Protection, firepower, mobility and night observation were chronic deficiencies. Command and control was hampered by aging communica-

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tion. Doctrines for 4 CMBG were a stew of British, German and USA military thought. Material purchased and doctrine rarely matched. While a fog enveloped the mental level of combat capability the political leadership sent vacillating messages of intent to allies and Canadian soldiers.

Canada's NATO brigade was failing in every level of the combat capability definition pyramid. The penultimate test of 4 CMBG's combat capability came with the call to join the coalition in the 1991 Gulf War. It did not deploy.

Although 4 CMBG soldiers were well trained and motivated by 1991 the materiel required to address the long-standing deficiencies were enormous. The army staffs, the human level of combat capability, further exacerbated the materiel requirement by applying sustained combat criteria. The resulting gargantuan bill dissuaded many. The human level presented the intent level with unpalatable options. The intent level assessed that an 'overseas' commitment and a domestic operation (Oka) were beyond the capacity of the Canadian Forces. In the end the Navy, Air Force, Defence Research Establishment personnel and a field hospital deployed. Light infantry protected Canadian land-based assets.

Throughout the 1990's Canada has and continues to contribute more to stabilization operations as a percentage of its force structure than any NATO ally. The military has now better aligned its human, command and materiel levels of combat capability to that of the intent level. In the year 2001 there is more coherency in the definition pyramid than there was in 1990, but as evident from recent announcements, Canada's deployed military capability against the War on Terrorism differs little from that deployed during the Gulf War. Ships, planes, support and light infantry (Special Operating Forces) is the offered combat capability. Is this a marginal improvement over the Gulf War contribution?

There is little profit in comparing 1991 combat capability with that of 2001. Both hover near the nadir of a century-long down cycle. Hopefully the Canadian Forces will cycle upwards.

The foreseeable future?

Winston Churchill's century old quote is apt.

"The army ... is a living thing ... if it is sufficiently disturbed, it will wither, dwindle and almost die; it is only to be revived by lots of time and lots of money."

Winston Churchill, 1905

Intent-level. The situation Canada faces in 2001 is not unlike that of 1937. After a long period of neglect global and na-

tional security are suddenly topical. What needs to be done is different from previous direction. Other than the preservation of security, freedom and prosperity the ways and means are indistinct. Historically national intent is sharpened by crisis. The form in which that could appear is not known. The current USA over-arching determination to focus national power could serve as Canada's impetus as they render their infrastructure, economy and governance more robust. Equally, large-scale destruction delivered by sea container or a military debacle could further focus political attention. Until intent is defined and resourced an upswing in combat capability is unlikely.

Human-level. Canada's extant expression of military strategy, doctrines and force structure is still influenced by the Cold War. The Navy tends towards blue-water, USN carrier task-group. The army is mainly configured for open-terrain engagements in Northwest Europe. The Air Force is largely, air-to-air fighter, NORAD-centric. Doctrines and equipment linger for 30 to 50 years. The terms Revolution in Military Affairs, Asymmetric Warfare, Joint and Combined are now being expressed in writing. In 10 to 15 years the terms might be in tangible form with 'born-joint' command, force structures, support, training and equipment acquisition. Militaries have much inertia.

Command-level. Command may be Canada's strong suit. A generation of military leaders has grown up with repetitive, ambiguous command challenges in an awkward, complex world. Many have been out-maneuvred by non-state entities and now better appreciate cultural subterfuge. Likewise the regional command structure has a proven track record, serving the nation well in times of stress. The Canadian Forces' priority to enhance C4ISR (Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) dovetails well with the USA Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff focus.

Materiel-level. The decisions of the 1990's will dog the Canadian Forces well into the foreseeable future. Unrestrained downsizing has created military demographic troughs. Shortages of junior leaders (officers and NCM), specialist officers and technicians will constrain any half-hearted attempts at revitalization well into the next decade. Likewise the long gestation period of equipment acquisition (10-15 years) has already defined most of the materiel level of combat capability for 2010.

The military challenge of this era is daunting. Simultaneously, the Canadian Forces needs to address the annual sustainability gap (a deficit of \$1 Billion), and the cumulative sustainability gap since Defence Economic Review 1994 (a debt) in op-

(continued p. 15)

erations & maintenance, ammunition, fuel, spares, infrastructure, environment, minor capital, national procurement, human resources, training, etc. In addition the Canadian Forces needs to find resources to modernize and to participate in counter terrorism and future stabilization operations. Remaining relevant to our major military ally requires obtaining 'Revolution in Military Affairs' interoperability. Canada will soon need to define the level of engagement and influence the nation wishes. With a national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) less than 3% of the global economy and defence expenditures less than 1.2% of that Canada's economic-military influence is marginal. By way of illustration, should Canada decide to achieve meaningful coalition commitments (NATO national contributions average 2.5% of GDP) annual defence

expenditures would need to increase by \$1 Billion/year for every of the next 25 years to achieve parity.

Closing

None of us want to hear that terrorist indoctrination influences three generations. Long struggles require looking beyond any political mandate or military career. Canada's combat capability has been on a century long downward trend. With a revitalized national will and no change to legislation, policies and practices Canada could significantly enhance combat capability for the future security environment within two decades. Faster revitalization requires significant intervention.

COMBAT CAPABILITY AND THE CANADIAN FORCES: WHERE SHOULD WE BE IN TWENTY YEARS

Lieutenant-Commander (Retd) Richard Gimblett, CD, PhD

Introduction

There has been a clamour in recent months for a defence review, on the grounds that a gap exists between the operations to which the Canadian Forces are committed and their capability to undertake and sustain them. That gap generally is considered to be a problem of funding, a view most clearly articulated by Caught in the Middle. But surely a policy in which the government truly believed would be adequately resourced?

The root of the problem, perhaps, has been the failure to address in a Canadian context the fundamental question posed by Samuel Huntington of any military: "What function do you perform which obligates society to assume responsibility for your maintenance?"

Until Canadians and their politicians admit to a general strategic framework for the employment of their military, any attempt to transform the Canadian Forces, let alone to identify future capabilities for it, will be an exercise in frustration. Acceptance of Canada's intended role in the world would provide a somewhat more focused rationale for the Canadian Forces than exists at present, and presumably would inspire a greater government commitment to achieving the necessary capabilities.

Strategic Considerations

Implicit in all official and analytical works on Canadian defence policy is the notion that there is a national strategy. But if one does exist, nowhere has it ever been articulated. This author was a collaborator in writing Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020. In it, this credibility gap was bridged by the development of a strategic framework of 'forward security' as the reason why Canada sends its forces abroad. In essence, the notion holds that ours is not an inward-looking nation, and with our territorial boundaries safe from direct con-

ventional military assault, Canada is made more secure by seeing to the resolution of global problems at their source, before they can expand to threaten the Canadian heartland.

The tragedy of September 11 only throws the matter into sharper relief. Suddenly, the terms 'homeland defence' and 'forward security' can be spoken openly. Now, more than ever, Canadian security can only be ensured through a judicious combination of the two.

Huntington's question was answered in the naval context with an analysis that the foreign and security policies of the Canadian government will continue to require a Medium Global Force Projection Navy (see Leadmark, pp. 44-45, for the full typology and definitions of the range of forces). It is submitted that this answer can be extrapolated to the Canadian Forces as a whole:

A Medium Global Force Projection Military that may not possess the full range of capabilities, but has a credible capacity in certain of them and consistently demonstrates a determination to exercise them at some distance from the homeland, in cooperation with other Force Projection Militaries.

This is not far removed from the vision for the CF of 2020 described in Strategy 2020, and as developed from the themes of the 1994 Defence White Paper. But the full scope of the Canadian strategic environment generally is not appreciated, and there remain four considerations fundamental to its acceptance.

The Future Threat. One does not have to be a student of Samuel Huntington's more recent thesis, that future conflict will be driven by a "clash of civilizations", to accept that the

(continued p. 16)

structural inequalities of the Muslim world will be a source of instability for some time to come, and that its proximity along the margins of the West – and the propensity for certain elements to express their frustrations outward – will make resolution of that instability a necessary interest of all Western states. And, despite the recent apparent success in Afghanistan, it cannot be presumed that other ‘states of concern can be dealt with the same judicial application of air power in concert with organized local opposition or resistance forces; such indigenous forces simply do not exist in the other reaches of ‘the swamp’. Quite simply, Western armies are more likely than not to have to be engaged directly in combat operations.

Canada’s Geostrategic Position. North America essentially is an island continent, meaning not only that it is theoretically possible to establish a defensive perimeter around it, but more importantly that any significant quantity of imports into and exports out of the NAFTA area must, by definition, be carried overseas. Both demand Canada’s engagement on the world scene, in concert with the United States, to deal with threats at their source and to see to the freedom of global trade. Again, there are few if any direct threats to Canada and the indirect ones are far away. Canada does not have to go abroad with military force, but the pace of globalization and its reach back into North American markets suggests a much different view, and we do go abroad.

The Canadian State of Mind. This is the most challenging condition to quantify and hence to accommodate. The past occasions when Canadians mobilized with military might to meet global challenges all transpired before the fundamental transformation during the last half of the 20th century of Canada into what has been described as ‘the first post-modern state.’ One searches recent publications on the attitudes of Canadians for mention of the word “security” or related subjects in vain – it is a non-issue to Canadians that not even the tragedy of September 11 has been able to awaken significantly.

Because it may be viewed as unnecessary for Canada to fight abroad, we have become unwilling to do so, and indeed have adopted a sense of moral superiority as helpful-fixers to the world. The insistence of neo-liberal analysts to stylize the military as “peacekeepers” – that is, not like those American warriors – speaks to the sentiments of a large number of Canadians and their politicians. Attempts to date to address these attitudes have been unsuccessful, and – in the absence of a direct attack upon Canada – they are unlikely to be, until the Auto Pact goes the way of softwood lumber. Until then, military planners must factor into consideration that the Canadian public will not support the development of powerful forces for employment in intensive combat operations.

The Western Maritime Alliance. Recent work by the noted strategist Colin Gray (for example, his *Modern Strategy*), points to the success of the West – led by the United States – in establishing an alliance built upon the military exploitation of the sea. This is not an argument to build naval forces at the expense of air or land forces, but only to emphasize that the unique characteristics of all three elements need to be recognized in the development of a force structure that will be capable of cooperating effectively with our major allies in the projection of power at some distance from the homeland. In the absence of local bases, this can only be accomplished by sea-based air and ground forces.

A Rational Force Structure

These strategic considerations highlight the fact that Canadian Armed Forces exist, fundamentally, for two reasons. The first is to keep the United States ‘out’, that is, in the sense that we must safeguard the northern approaches to the continent so that the Americans do not feel they have to do it for us. The second is to give Canada leverage on the world scene. As such, after providing adequate forces for homeland defence, any excess capacity is directed to expeditionary forces mandated for forward security. Effectively, the government uses the Canadian Forces as a Medium Global Force Projection Military.

But the present crisis has exposed the inability of either the Canadian Air Force or the Army to deploy and sustain forces of any meaningful size to a distant theatre, and even the Navy is at its limit. There is a commitment-capability-credibility gap. The basic capacity of the services is driven by Canada’s geostrategic position. The sheer vastness of the landmass and the offshore estate requires an oceanic navy on each coast and an air force with continental reach, but without a direct land threat there is no ‘national sovereignty’ rationale for a fighting army.

The problem is that, during the Cold War, Canadian governments got used to employing the excess capacity of the overseas army for peacekeeping operations, and in the aftermath of the so-called peace dividend typically it is the army that has had to bear the brunt of both cutbacks and a sustained operational tempo.

How, then, to make it all right? The answer is not simply to restore funding to cover the shortfall, but to deliver to Canadians a military deserving of their upkeep. But the general lack of dissatisfaction outside of defence circles is indicative of the fact that Canadians and their government must find something satisfying in the perceived *status quo* – that is, a Medium Global Force Projection Military. Understanding the perception and making it the reality is the key.

The reality may very well be that in many ways the present CF structure is just about right. Canada will continue to be served best by a broad range of balanced, combat-capable forces. But the essence of the present structure must be understood and the weaknesses corrected – and it might just take twenty years to accomplish that. The existing capacities of the Navy and the Air Force must be maintained, but the Army is more problematic. Having the greatest gap to fill, it requires radical re-structuring. The Militia should be formally accorded primary responsibility for homeland defence, leaving the regular force available for overseas commitments.

Given the basic requirement that such forces be air-sea portable, the marine expeditionary unit (MEU) model proposed elsewhere should be the basis for consideration. Finally, all forces must be capable of operating effectively with their American counterparts. The Air Force must be fully integrated with the USAF for the air defence of North America, just as the Navy must share battlespace awareness with the USN as required for the in-theatre area defence of allied forces. Since the Army would not be intended to operate in

(continued p. 18)

**65th ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING
and
18th ANNUAL SEMINAR
20 - 23 February 2002
Fairmont Château Laurier, Ottawa ON**

The annual seminar, *Combat Capability and the Canadian Forces*, will be presented by the CDA Institute on Thursday, 21 February, 2002, commencing at 0900 hrs with the opening address by the Honourable Arthur Eggleton, Minister of National Defence. US General Wesley Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, has been invited to deliver the keynote address. Speakers will include: General Raymond Hénault, CDS; Colonel the Honourable John Fraser, Chairman of the Minister's Monitoring Committee; Dr. Joel Sokolsky, RMC; Colonel Howard Marsh, Special Assistant to the Chief of Land Staff; Mr. David Pratt, MP, Chairman SCONDVA; Senator Colin Kenny; Lieutenant-Commander (Retd) Richard Gimblett; and Dr. Douglas Bland, Queen's University.

Registration Fees (including seminar luncheon and reception)

A.	<i>Members, Associate members, CDA Institute members, Past Chairmen</i>	\$ 125
B.	<i>serving Regular and Reserve Forces personnel, DND civilians</i>	\$ 150
C.	<i>Military Attachés and civilians</i>	\$ 175
D.	<i>full-time students (captain equivalent and below)</i>	\$ 20

22 February, 0815 - 1230 hrs - Addresses by:

Executive Director, Reserve Officers Association
of the United States,
Chief of Air Staff,
Chief of Maritime Staff,
Chief of Land Staff, and
Chief of Reserves and Cadets

Enquiries and individual registration by 1 February 2002 by
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**65^{ième} ASSEMBLÉE GÉNÉRALE
ANNUELLE
et
18^{ième} SÉMINAIRE ANNUEL
20 - 23 février 2002
Fairmont Château Laurier, Ottawa ON**

Le Séminaire annuel de l'Institut de la Conférence des Associations de la Défense, intitulé *La capacité au combat: les Forces canadiennes*, aura lieu jeudi, le 21 février, 2002, à 0900 h avec comme premier conférencier l'Honorable Arthur Eggleton, le Ministre de la Défense nationale. Le Général (E-U) Wesley Clark, ancien Commandant suprême allié, est invité à présenter le discours-programme. Le Général Raymond Hénault, CEMD; le Colonel l'honorable John Fraser, Président du Comité de surveillance des changements au sein du Ministère; le Dr. Joel Sokolsky, CMR; Colonel Howard Marsh, Adjoint spécial, Chef d'état-major de l'Armée de terre; M David Pratt, MP, Président CPDNAC; le Sénateur Colin Kenny; Lieutenant-Commandant (ret) Richard Gimblett; et le Dr. Douglas Bland, Université Queen's, sont parmi les conférenciers invités..

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C.	<i>Attachés militaires et civils</i>	175 \$
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assault capacity, it would not need the full range of electronic battlefield resources, but it also must share battlespace awareness and be able to operate and survive in a hostile environment.

The capabilities required to achieve balanced and sustainable forces are not far removed from the 'combat-capable, multi-purpose forces' called for in the government's DWP 94 and the department's Strategy 2020. Their development will not be cheap, and economy of effort must be emphasized. Military planners must resist the temptation to engage in non-essential, flavour-of-the-month capabilities.

The present newfound pursuit of specialized homeland defence options is being driven by those very elements who, before September 11, were arguing that the Air Force did not need fighters for the air defence of North America, or that the Naval Task Group concept had no merit, or that there was no problem with the deployability of the Army. It is fair to counter with three simple questions. Where would we be today if the Air Force did not have sufficient aircraft to patrol the commercial airlines against the new 'manned bomber' threat? Or what would be our representation to the overseas war on terrorism if a Naval Task Group – with all of its constituent elements of command and control, area air defence, and integral replenishment – did not exist ready for immediate deployment? And if, at the time of publication-presenta-

tion, the Army is not still sitting in Edmonton waiting for the order to go, how many chaulks of former-Soviet heavy transport aircraft were needed to get a useful contingent off the ground?

Conclusion

Canada's national response to world events has been undertaken more as instinct than as rational determination. If the Canadian Forces and those responsible for them are to have any hope of realizing the development, funding and employment of a viable military out to the year 2020 and beyond, the renewal process must begin with a full appreciation of the national grand strategy – call it forward security.

Futurists will have been disappointed by the essentially conservative prescriptions of this paper. But no military has ever radically re-shaped itself successfully – especially in peacetime – without the catalyst of a disaster. Our own flirtation with unification only proves the point. Not until the Canadian political and military establishment admits the disasters of Somalia and Bosnia will that catalyst exist. Or until we admit that we are at war.

In ordinary times, the transformation of the Canadian Forces could take 20 years to accomplish. The fast pace of current events, however, tends to constrict normal timelines. 2020 could be just around the corner.

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION AND THE AFTERMATH OF THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

Jayson C. Spiegel, Executive Director Reserve Officers Association of the United States

Since the end of the Cold War, most defense experts have argued that the military must be transformed to meet the post-Cold War threat environment. As information-age technology has matured, visionary analysts such as Admiral Bill Owens, USN (Ret.) have urged the Pentagon to exploit technological advances to lift the 'fog of war' and develop a more flexible, deployable and lethal military. The critical need to transform both doctrine and structure was confirmed by the September 11 attack.

In order to ensure that the national military strategy is updated as the threat evolves, Congress has directed each incoming administration to report on strategy and the roles and missions of the armed forces. In compliance with the congressional mandate and deadline, DOD released the Quadrennial Defense Review ("QDR") on September 30, 2001. The report was virtually ignored by the press and generated little comment from Capitol Hill. This was not surprising given that the September 11 attack so dominated media and political analysis.

The administration came into office promising that it would

fix a supposedly broken military. By the spring of 2001, there was concern as to whether these promises could be met. The administration's focus on its top priority, missile defense, and the fiscal impacts of the tax cut made a significant investment in transformation problematic.

In an effort to generate funds for national missile defense, the administration even contemplated significant cuts to conventional force structure. These proposals were shelved in the face of opposition both within and outside the Pentagon. As a result, nobody expected much from QDR other than a strong endorsement of missile defense, a repudiation of the force sizing construct and a reorientation toward China and newer threats.

Like so many previous Pentagon reports, QDR will likely not have a major impact, mostly because it is already moot. The real military transformation is playing out in Afghanistan where the first information age war is being fought. In fact, war may never be the same in light of the ongoing war against terror

(continued p. 19)

ism. As of early December, it appears that the US can claim to have successfully toppled a hostile regime without deploying significant conventional ground forces. Instead, the US is achieving its objective by supporting indigenous forces with those assets where the US has undeniable dominance - air superiority, precision guided munitions, standoff platforms, intelligence and special operations.

By fighting on US terms, in a manner conducive to US victory, Operation Enduring Freedom demonstrates how warfare will be fought in the information age against a nontraditional enemy.

Even if transformation were not already playing out in Afghanistan, it is not likely that QDR would have significantly altered the debate, mostly because it is so short on specifics. The report is only 70 pages long and deferred all major decisions until after completion of another round of studies. Although directed by Congress to answer certain specific questions in the QDR, the report failed to answer them.

Ironically, the QDR ratifies most Clinton administration policies. The report highlights the importance of security cooperation with allies. It argues that defense of the homeland must begin with an engaged foreign policy, peacetime forward deterrence through projection of military presence and strong alliances. The QDR reaffirms that an engaged national security strategy contributes to economic growth through expanding the global economy. Although the report urges greater emphasis on China, it does not propose to lessen the commitment to other potential theaters.

As expected, QDR proposes a 'capabilities-based' approach to defense, rather than a threat-based approach. This model is a step forward. It makes sense to prepare to counter how an adversary may fight rather than focus on who the adversary may be. At the same time, the QDR states that the U.S. must be prepared to swiftly defeat attacks in any two theaters and decisively defeat an enemy in one of those theaters by occupying territory and causing a change in regime. At first glance, this implies a substantial increase in the size of the armed forces, not a reduction. However, the QDR only calls for fielding capabilities that would accomplish each mission at an 'acceptable level of risk.'

The use of the word 'acceptable' rather than 'minimum' level of risk is significant. These are terms of art and Pentagon modelers can specify separately the number of personnel and equipment that would be lost if the risk is 'acceptable', 'high'

and 'low.' The Chiefs would clearly prefer sufficient force structure to execute the strategy at 'minimum' rather than 'acceptable' risk. Or perhaps Operation Enduring Freedom suggests that the US can get by with a smaller structure based upon air power and special operations. Because the QDR is so lacking in specifics, however, it is impossible to tell exactly what kind of military is envisioned to perform an expanded portfolio of missions, how large it should be and what other options are available.

The QDR calls for the transformation of the military 'over time.' Clearly, the entire force cannot be transformed simultaneously because legacy forces are needed to meet current threats. However, transformation can go faster than OSD is apparently suggesting without sacrificing readiness. Other than the Coast Guard, special operations, intelligence, military police and aviation, the current crisis has involved only a fraction of our current force structure. Just 4% of the Ready Reserve have been called up. As of early December, there are more conventional Army ground assets in the Balkans than there are in Afghanistan.

The US can simultaneously pursue a more aggressive transformation strategy while preserving the ability to execute the national military strategy.

The QDR contains few specifics with respect to transformation other than vague calls for securing the 'tools' needed to exploit our advantages in C4ISR and information technology. Perhaps most disconcerting, QDR passed on the opportunity to centralize transformation initiatives, leaving it instead to the services. Although the report calls for increasing joint task forces, command and control, and exercises, the report directs the services separately to 'develop transformation roadmaps ... to develop Service-unique capabilities.' Such a diffuse approach precludes making hard decisions about which service can best provide a given capability. Furthermore, it does not address the cultural barriers to transformation or joint operations.

Although retired VADM Art Cebrowski has been appointed 'transformation czar,' he has no authority to direct the service chiefs to invest in one program as opposed to another. In the absence of such budgetary authority, it remains to be seen how effective the new office can be in breaking down interservice rivalries and cultural barriers to transformation.

(continued p. 20)

Again, the conflict in Afghanistan will prove more relevant to transformation than the QDR. We are witnessing an operation unlike any other in history. The lessons learned from Enduring Freedom, properly applied and enforced, will do more to transform the American military than any other initiative.

The report also misses the mark with respect to the Reserve Components. Instead of articulating a clear vision for the future role of the Reserves, the QDR recommended yet another study of the subject. Although QDR states that homeland defense will remain primarily a Reserve Component mission, no specifics are provided. Furthermore, the few signals contained in QDR about the Reserve are not encouraging. The report implies that something is wrong when increased PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO results in increased use of the Reserves. If in fact that is a problem, there are only two courses of action. We can either increase the size of the active force or reduce our commitments. The former is unnecessary and unaffordable and nobody believes that the latter will come to pass.

More importantly, it is not even a problem. Reserves are employed because calling them up engages hometown America in a way that does not happen when the Active Component deploys. Additionally, Reserve capabilities often mirror skills acquired in the civilian economy, skills that would be all but impossible for Active Component personnel to master. Finally, there are significant cost savings associated with moving later deploying structure to the Reserve Components.

Unfortunately, QDR ignored the challenge of allied interoperability. Although the report discusses the need for US forces to have compatible and interoperable systems, it virtually ignores the need to ensure that transformation of U.S. forces does not hamper our ability to operate jointly with our allies.

As expected, the QDR contains an extensive discussion of the need for ballistic missile defense. Far less attention is paid to the need for defenses against terrorism, including biological warfare. Only one paragraph is devoted to the need to improve special operations forces. In light of the events of September 11, the report perpetuates the concern that the focus on national missile defense may continue to divert attention from equally devastating and more likely threats.

There are many critical issues that must be addressed to meet new and emerging threats. Some problems can be fixed by reorganizing, i.e., creating a Homeland Security Agency that would command the myriad of agencies involved in homeland security. Solving other problems requires only that existing programs be adequately funded, e.g., the U.S. Coast Guard, whose aging cutter fleet makes it the 49th oldest navy in the world.

Other challenging problems require political will and creativity. For example, the Hart-Rudman Commission recommended that the National Guard focus exclusively on homeland security missions and divest itself of expeditionary responsibilities. A more robust homeland defense capability as well as efficiencies would be achieved if other Reserve Component forces assumed the Guard's overseas combat missions, thereby allowing the Guard to develop the homeland security mission to its fullest potential.

We are at a unique crossroads. Public attention is focused on security, as it has not been in many years. Fundamental change is possible if the administration backs up its rhetoric with concrete proposals and the bean counters at the Office of Management and Budget are beaten into submission. As the administration completes the studies promised in the QDR, the specifics of transformation should become apparent. If the administration and Congress fail to seize this opportunity to transform the military, we may pay the price for inaction for years to come.

SELFLESSNESS

General Montgomery C. Meigs, Commander US Army Europe and 7th Army

(Selflessness is an extract of Generalship: Qualities, Instincts, and Character which appeared in Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly - Summer 2001. This article was developed from a presentation given by the author to the Brigadier General Training Course at Fort Leavenworth in late November 2000. By kind permission of General Meigs - Ed)

Force of intellect, and energy expressed in the ability to be at the place where the critical events are going to take place, underlie the decision and execution needed to bring campaigns to a successful conclusion. But there is another trait crucial to good generalship: selflessness. Marlborough certainly was not worrying about his own skin when he placed himself in danger

(continued p. 21)

at Ramillies and Oudenarde, nor was Meade while sitting astride his horse at the Peach Orchard. Both were focused mentally and physically on controlling events. Selflessness underlies physical courage, but equally important, it is the basis for the moral courage so critical on the political-military stage where the events of the day play out. Good generals are not worried about themselves when they make the tough decisions.

Think of Eisenhower on 5 June 1944. He had irrevocably unleashed the D-Day assault in what would be—along with the Battle of Britain, Midway, Stalingrad, and the events in the Battle of the Atlantic in Spring 1943—one of the significant turning points of the war. But that night, the outcome was not certain. The weather looked promising for only a short time. No one knew how deeply the hook of Allied strategic deception had sunk into the German High Command's strategic appreciations. No one could have known how much Hitler's personal interference would hamstring the Wehrmacht's ability to counterattack the landings. Knowing the outcome was in doubt and that in case of failure an accounting would be made, Ike wrote this short message to have on hand in case of a reverse:

Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based upon the best information available. The troops, the Army and the Navy did all that bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone.—July 5[1]

Ike was not worrying about himself. He was preparing for the eventuality that, if defeat came, he would have to leave command taking responsibility for it. Ike's diary is very useful for understanding the powerful, self-effacing nature of his generalship. In February 1944 Ike was newly assigned as Supreme Allied Commander. He mused about the events of 1942 in Northern Africa and the assessment the British press made of his contribution to the campaign—mere “friendliness in welding an Allied team,” not boldness or initiative. Ike wrote privately to himself:

The truth is that the bold British commanders in the Med were [Admiral Cunningham] and Tedder. (Not the English ground commanders.) I had peremptorily to order the holding of the forward airfields in the bitter days of January 1943. I had to order the integration of an American corps and its use on the battlelines. I had to order the attack on Pantelleria. And finally the British ground commanders (but not Sir Andrew and Tedder) wanted to put all our ground forces into the toe of Italy. They didn't like Salerno—but after days of work I got them to accept. On the other hand, no British commander ever held back when once an operation was ordered. We had a happy family—and to all the C-in-C's must go the great share of the operational credit. But it wearies me to

be thought of as timid, when I've had to do things that were so risky as to be almost crazy.—Oh hum—.”[2]

Ike's reaction, “Oh hum,” gives an understanding of his unique contribution as Supreme Allied Commander. He could forge consensus and order reluctant generals with large followings in their own country to take risky action precisely because his absence of self-interest was a given. Ike could manage the precarious balance between American and British strategic points of view and the personalities that represented them, and he could bring together dissenting American and British generals simply because he advocated on the merits and without animus or personal bent what was right operationally and what would work, and he had the patience to see the issue through.

This dynamic works so often in our affairs. Read General Bruce Palmer Jr.'s *The 25-Year War*. He gives one a strong sense of Creighton Abrams' leadership. Abrams and Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker routinely received conflicting guidance in parallel from the White House and the Secretary of Defense. The White House came to accept the military assessments of General Al Haig, then Henry Kissinger's deputy on the National Security Council staff and at the time a very junior general officer, over those of Abrams and Bunker. In the extremely challenging operational and diplomatic situation in Vietnam, these complications created tremendous difficulty. Palmer describes Abrams' frustration with “the inevitable urgent and sometimes contradictory messages that daily arrived from Washington.” Years later, Palmer urged General Abrams to consider writing his memoirs, “however brief”. His reply was vehement, “Never.” And when I asked why, he gave two reasons—because memoirs become larded with the “vertical pronoun” and because he would never reveal certain aspects of his service in Vietnam.[3]

Abrams' response reveals a total absence of self-interest. In the toughest times the best decisions are made by men and women who focus on the realities, the opportunities, and the risks inherent in a given situation, with no thought to themselves. One will never shoulder the tremendous risks involved in the critical operational and strategic decisions if he is worried about how he will look if things go poorly.

Finally, generals often must execute a course of action with which they do not completely agree. One may know a better way. One may have even offered that alternative to the boss, and may have even argued for it strongly. Or, as with General Abrams, one may find oneself constrained by guidance from political leadership that mitigates military effectiveness and increases risk. In these moments it is always a good thing to

(continued p. 22)

attempt to put yourself in the boss's shoes. What are the constraints with which he must deal? Is there something he has factored into the decision that you have missed or underrated? Is there a way to meet his intent with an innovative course of action not yet proposed but within your own latitude for initiative? It also never hurts to accept that none of us is right all the time.

In the final analysis, if an order is illegal or negligent or totally inimical to success, one may have to object even to the point of requesting relief. But remember you owe to your commander the same faith given to you by your soldiers simply because you are their commander. Even when faced with a less than optimum decision, and perhaps especially when your commander does not have the human touch to engender confidence, once any discussion is over and the decision is made we each must execute loyally and with enthusiasm. Sherman's relationship with Grant comes to mind, most specifically the letter he wrote to Grant after Vicksburg.

When Grant was deciding to move south around Vicksburg, Sherman wrote to him arguing for another course of action, begging for a council of war but pledging, "Whatever plan of action [you] may adopt will receive from me the same zealous cooperation and energetic support as though conceived by myself." [4] When the order was given, Sherman did execute with total loyalty to his commander. After the operation, he admitted his concern that Grant's plan was too risky and gave him full credit for the result: "Until this moment, I never thought your expedition a success. I never could see the end clearly, until now. But this is a campaign, this is a success, if we never take the town." [5] You don't have to always agree completely with the boss to support him.

Even in peacetime, when in the eye of a storm of national events in which decisions about policy and resourcing are being made—let alone in wartime when decisions affecting the fate of the nation are at hand—the pressures are tremendous. Only those who have trained themselves to remove any self-interest from the equation will be able to successfully face the dilemmas, abstractions, and uncertainty, and handle the stress, to apply their intellect to frame the best possible decision or to render the best advice. Only those who can put away their own self-interest to face with equanimity the risk to reputation in peacetime and the physical risk in combat will be able to do what is right.

Under the tremendous pressures of national decision, selflessness helps to ensure that a powerful force of intellect focuses solely on the causal aspects of the decision at hand and the risks that must be borne to achieve success. Ferreting out the best course of action, assessing and minimizing the risk and then accepting it require intellect and an absence of self-interest.

Forcing execution to a successful conclusion by being with the troops when they need us most demands tremendous energy and drive. In addition, creating consensus among men and women of great emotion, talent, and ego requires that one's own ego be under control. Creating consensus also requires the intellectual and emotional stamina to keep advancing convincing arguments in ways that do not offend and that always offer an aspect of logic unanticipated by the dissenter. Stamina and energy make possible the ability to see the battle by being where, in the words of Ridgway, things are going to happen, not just where they are happening or, worse yet, where they just happened.

General J. Lawton Collins served as head of the machine-gun committee at Ft. Benning when George Marshall was Commandant of the Infantry School. Daily, he would supervise set-up of the training, ensure all was going well, and then retire to the bleachers to read and study professional matters. Don't for a minute think, however, that Collins was a dilettante. The officers of the machine-gun committee, as a professional standard, were required to be able to operate the machine-guns taught in their courses at least as well as the NCO instructors.

In Collins's words, "As an instructor there, I always prided myself that I could mount a machine-gun just as fast as Sergeant Wolf could, which was something, I can assure you. . . . We wanted to know as much about it as Wolf did, and McNerny and McGony, and if we could do that, then we knew our business." [6] Impressed with Collins, Marshall noted his reading habit and invited him to weekly gatherings at his quarters for "conversation, reading, and recitation."

Marshall's group trained many of the generals who fought World War II. Throughout the history of our profession, intense professional study has been one of the essential tools soldiers have used to advance their military art, and their generalship. As with Collins and his sergeants, moreover, intellectual development has walked hand-in-hand with technical mastery. Seeking the tough jobs provides another means of self-development. As a general, it is understood that when offered an assignment by the Chief of Staff, the officer without question enthusiastically and willingly accepts it. But there are times when one is given the opportunity to express a preference before the offer is made officially.

Some choices are more comfortable than others. In my opinion, the officer who accepts the challenge of the difficult, independent assignment is far ahead of the one who leans toward assignments where he or she is usually a subordinate. One learns more from the greater challenge of the independent role and takes on the case-hardening it provides. When the

(continued p. 23)

opportunity presents itself, seek independent command or directive authority. When the more risky job is offered, grab it. And along the way, don't be afraid to ask your own commander as well as your peers how you could do the job better.

NOTES

1. Steven Ambrose, *The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower* (New York: Doubleday, 1968), p. 418.
2. Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *The Eisenhower Diaries* (New York: W.W. Norton), p. 111.
3. Bruce Palmer, Jr., *The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 133.
4. Simpson, p. 183.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
6. J. Lawton Collins, *Lightning Joe: An Autobiography* (Baton Rouge, La.: LSU Press, 1979), p. 51.

(General Montgomery C. Meigs is Commander of US Army Europe and 7th Army. Early in his career he served as a company-grade officer in command of armored cavalry units in Germany and Vietnam. After study at the University of Wisconsin-Madison he taught history at the US Military Academy, and he subsequently received his doctorate in history from Wisconsin in 1982. His commands have included 1st Squadron, 1st Armored Cavalry Regiment; the 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division in Operation Desert Storm; and the 3d Infantry Division until its reflagging as the 1st Infantry Division in February 1996. In October 1996 he deployed with the 1st Infantry Division to Bosnia as Commander of Task Force Eagle and NATO Multi-National Division (North). He returned to Bosnia in November 1998 as Commander of the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR).)

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DEVELOPING SOLDIERS ON PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Lieutenant Francis C.J. Conliffe, RCD

Deployments on peace support operations are routine occurrences in the Canadian Forces. While the operations have affected families and units alike, the operations for the soldiers have become routine.

For many soldiers, the best training is now conducted during work up periods, with units returning from operations falling to the lowest priority for resources. Certainly the best training I have done has been during the work up period to Roto 8 in Bosnia. What I was surprised to discover was the enormous number of training opportunities available while overseas. Obviously operations are the most important priority, but in an established mission, like Bosnia, there are also occasions to forge bonds with allied units as well as expose soldiers to training not always available in Canada.

Bosnia presents many excellent opportunities for training and developing junior soldiers. Leave plans result in platoons and troops being at roughly three-quarters strength at any given time, and while they are planned in such a way that there is always a bulk of leadership present, there are also opportunities for junior soldiers to assume leadership roles.

Patrolling occupies the vast majority of time, and provides an ideal occasion to observe the potential of corporals. These opportunities also provide a refreshing change from the usual routine facing young soldiers. Occasions to lead patrols are eagerly sought after and give soldiers valuable leadership experience. They also provide the benefit of giving platoons and troops additional depth as the leadership pool becomes stronger.

Continuation training is also important, as it preserves perishable skills while simultaneously demonstrating the military potential of the Battle Group to the Entity forces. Different geography makes for a pleasant change for the standard Canadian training areas. New areas present new challenges and demand actual thought over the established drills that come with intimate knowledge of the few established training areas we normally use at home. Deficiencies in skills like map reading become quickly apparent, as does the ability to make a combat estimate on the fly. Such training ranged from live platoon attacks to marksmanship training to stalking and helocasting, all training which was not only of benefit to maintaining skills but also of a challenging nature that kept all involved interested and motivated. Variety in training is crucial to prevent complacency from setting in.

Variety in training assets also offers new possibilities. Air mobile exercises using Czech Hip and Dutch Cougar helicopters involve the same skills as would normally be required, yet generate greater interest due to the flavour of an exotic, foreign platform. Inspecting and guarding Entity weapons storage sites gave a very close view of both former Warsaw Pact equipment and Eastern European military living conditions. The barracks of the 1st Armor Battalion, 1 Guards Brigade were spartan at best, and gave a new appreciation for Canadian quality of life programs.

Operating with different nationalities provides some of the most interesting lessons. Working at the Division HQ for three months gave us the opportunity to experience the customs and operating procedures of British, Dutch and Czech soldiers.

Living in such close proximity broke down many barriers and opened many eyes to different philosophies and approaches to situations. It became quickly apparent that the CF is not alone in its problems of limited funds and numerous tasks. It also confirmed that Canadians and Czechs are better hockey players than the Brits or the Dutch!

The final half of the tour saw my troop rejoining the Canadian Battle Group as we joined Para Company in Tomislavgrad. During this period the company group conducted a small unit exchange with the French Marines based out of Mostar. This was another excellent opportunity to experience a different manner of working, starting with a 30km foot patrol and ending with an amusing discussion of how wine fits into the Canadian two-beer policy. Everyone was also eager to have a chance to closely examine foreign weapons and equipment. Not only does this broaden basic soldiering skills, but it also increases confidence in one's own equipment when comparing it directly with some of the other options available.

These interactions proved their use when requirements arose to work alongside each other. Riots in Banja Luka required the dispatch of part of a Canadian company and a Czech platoon to be sent to bolster the British forces in the region. In such situations time is often the most precious commodity, and it is often too late to try to sort through different national operating procedures.

Comfort, familiarity, and above all an appreciation of the capabilities of different nationalities gained from small unit exchanges is invaluable when working in a multi-national coalition.

(overleaf)

Opportunities were also taken for professional development, as junior officers were presented with the challenge to conduct the mission analysis and planning of the German airborne raid on Tito's caves in the Drvar region. Recreating this Second World War battle gave us the chance to examine the ground in a different tactical light, and culminated with a battlefield tour of the caves and town of Drvar.

To further increase our understanding of operations in mountainous terrain the junior officers participated in a rock climbing adventure training exercise in Croatia. Not only did we benefit from the training, but the exercise also brought together platoon commanders and troop leaders who had not seen each other since leaving Canada as we were spread out over the entire area of operations. Exchanging lessons learned through the duration of the tour to date, as well as catching up on varied operations spread knowledge and experience around the battle group.

Training and professional development was a secondary priority to operational requirements, but when the time and resources were available they were employed to maximize benefits for as many personnel as possible. Given the relatively benign nature of operations in Bosnia there are many occasions when training can be conducted to preserve skills and keep complacency from setting in.

The experience gained from working closely with allied units and developing proficiency in operating in different terrain is of immense value to units. When snap 'come as you are' missions arise, such as the one in Macedonia, prior experience working alongside allied forces can save valuable time and increase the likelihood of a successful mission. Further, any challenging training that is different from that available in Canada goes a long way towards maintaining morale, enthusiasm and motivation among soldiers. The effort required to organize such training and exchanges is well worth the enormous benefits they award.

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