

Vice-Admiral Dean McFadden, Chief of the Maritime Staff

Remarks

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The National Interest – A Regulated Ocean Commons

- Ladies and Gentlemen, as I try to imagine what awaits Canada in an uncertain future, virtually every defence and security problem I can envisage will require us to integrate every element of the Canadian Forces—in fact, the entire arsenal of skills and competencies that this country has at its disposal—if we are to succeed in meeting our future challenges.
- So my presentation to you this morning is not a lecture on how to do the job, but rather what that job is likely to be, and why naval forces are an essential element of this nation's response to challenges that are already evident.
- As a result, I bring no pictures, offer you no schedules of prediction but rather I focus on what challenges this country, even this planet will face, why it matters to Canadians and why they should and must support with their interest and their money the work that needs to be done by the Forces.
- Encouraging and contributing to that understanding is what CDA is about. I think it's why you're here.
- I will argue, as you might expect, that there is a substantial contribution that the nation's maritime air and naval forces are making now, and will continue to make in addressing challenges we face in what will be an increasingly maritime century.
- Mais tout d'abord, laissez-moi vous expliquer pourquoi le XXI^e siècle sera un siècle maritime, en construisant sur certaines des remarques que vous avez entendu hier de l'amiral Roughead, Chef des opérations navales des États-Unis.

But first, let me explain why the 21st century will be a maritime century, by building on some of remarks that you heard yesterday from Adm Roughead, United States Chief of Naval Operations.

- Today's global maritime order is based on a delicate geo-political and juridical balance between two central but essentially competing ideas that have existed in a state of tension for some five hundred years:
 - The first is *mare liberum*—the concept that the seas cannot be made sovereign and hence are free for all to use.
 - The second is *mare clausum*—the idea that the seas can be made sovereign to the limits of effective state control.
- Cet équilibre délicat—qui n'a pas été atteint dans la violence, mais plutôt grâce à un niveau sans précédent de consultation internationale durant les dernières décennies du XX^e siècle...

That delicate balance—achieved not in bloodshed, but rather through an unprecedented degree of international consultation in the closing decades of the 20th century.

- That balance is exactly what the United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea attempt to accomplish, making them arguably the crowning legal achievement in history.
- Few states have benefitted as much from this landmark treaty as Canada. It's endowed our nation with an immense ocean estate, one that extends beyond our shores to encompass the riches of more than 3 ½ percent of the planet's entire surface—a priceless inheritance for generations to come, with unalienable sovereign authority over part of this massive oceanic reach, but as well special duties of care and custody for the resources and ecosystems of the remainder.
- Anything that challenges or threatens to challenge the geo-political balance embodied in the Law of the Sea therefore touches deeply on Canada's national interest. And, given the enormous stakes involved, it's by no means assured that the unique and remarkable consensus of maritime interests that occurred in the latter half of the 20th century will withstand the tremendous changes this century is likely to witness, changes that will come from the convergence of a number of powerful and globally coupled forces.
- What is very clear today is that the world's oceans no longer serve to shield Canada from far-distant events. Rather, they connect us through a vast and intricate web of relationships—political, economic, financial, and social—that has made us neighbours with all the world's peoples.
- When the 16th century was still young, the Portuguese traveller and chronicler Tomé Pires observed that “Whoever is the Lord of Malacca has his hands on the throat of Venice.” In the 21st century, this enduring reality applies to all the world's capitals.
- Our prosperity and security are thoroughly enmeshed in a global system that transcends all boundaries: a system that depends to varying degrees on regulated air, space and cyber commons for its functioning, but that would not function at all without a regulated ocean commons. Defending that system is not a matter of choice for Canada: it is essential to our way of life.
- In fact, I would maintain that the most essential public good of this globalized era is a regulated ocean commons—one in which the seas are open for all to use freely and lawfully, regulated against the increasingly troubling range of illegal and criminal activities that are being drawn inexorably seaward, and defended at home and abroad against those who would threaten the pillars upon which the current global system resides.

Required Capabilities

- Thus, the strategic organizing principle for the application of Canadian seapower in this maritime century is to defend the global system both at sea and from the sea. The strategic requirement this calls for is a globally deployable sea control navy with its strategic operating concept being a maritime force not only held at readiness, but also forward deployed, both at home and abroad.
- The responsibility to regulate the ocean commons in our own home waters must be done by Canada alone, even were we to develop closer arrangements with our American neighbours for domain awareness. But doing that is not exclusively the work of the navy. It requires a comprehensive, whole of government approach, at which this nation is considered to be a

world leader, and I say with some pride and without fear of contradiction that your navy has led the way in that.

- However, defending the global system abroad is clearly the work of navies. Only navies can operate in waters that are likely to become increasingly contested by a range of actors from the purely criminal and opportunistic, as we're seeing today off Somalia or the Gulf of Guinea, to armed maritime groups, whose political purpose and access to increasingly sophisticated weapons can be used to hold even an advanced navy at risk, as Hezbollah demonstrated in its missile strike on an Israeli corvette in 2006.
- But even the largest of navies can't be everywhere. This is why you heard Adm Roughead speak yesterday to a cooperative maritime strategy that seeks actively to enlist all coastal states and maritime powers to regulate the ocean commons cooperatively, to the extent permitted by their capacities. We clearly need to build a meaningful capacity within the Canadian Forces, including the Navy, to help build the capacity of others.
- In the meantime, we can direct our limited capacities to best effect, I would contend, in our own hemisphere, where our continental and domestic security requirements are most closely implicated.
- Nous devons non seulement défendre le système global en mer, mais nous devons aussi défendre les conditions qui permettent au système global de s'épanouir, en étant en mesure d'œuvrer en tant que forces interarmées à partir des océans. Le bien-fondé de la révision du rôle de la diplomatie de la défense envers des populations entières par l'importance accrue accordée à l'aide humanitaire et le secours aux sinistrés en tant que missions militaires essentielles existe vraiment. Ce n'est pas seulement la chose honorable à faire—c'est aussi dans l'intérêt national en raison des rôles cruciaux que ces populations jouent dans les perspectives collectives de la mondialisation, et par conséquent dans notre avenir collectif.

Not only must we defend the global system at sea. We must also defend the conditions that permit the global system to flourish, by being able to operate as part of a joint force from the sea. There's a reason we're seeing defence diplomacy being recalibrated toward entire populations through the elevation of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as core military missions. It's not just the right thing to do—it's in the national interest because of the crucial roles these populations play in the collective prospects for globalization and hence our collective future.

- An increased focus and capacity in providing humanitarian assistance or disaster relief as a core military mission is not to say that traditional maritime diplomacy will no longer be important. In fact, it is probably much more important now in this globalised era than "gunboat diplomacy" ever was. At the strategic level, forward-deployed maritime forces help to prevent and contain conflict, while also creating the conditions that can shape the success of joint forces should they ever be needed. They provide Canada with insight and influence, promote trust and confidence among our friends and give pause to our potential adversaries.
- At the operational level, forward deployed maritime forces provide options to Government as you heard both from Adm Roughead and Senator Segal: the capacity to respond quickly to unfolding events and a range of choices that can be carefully calibrated to the situation—including creating the time for diplomacy to work, and declaring intent without irreversible entanglement.

- Nothing says commitment like boots on the ground, the presence on someone else's sovereign soil of a joint force, regardless of service, with a Maple Leaf on each individual's shoulder, as well as on the side of our planes or tanks. However, when that decision is taken to act, maritime forces can provide the priceless advantage of choosing when and where to commit a force. That is the use of the sea for operational manoeuvre, greatly amplifying the employment of even a relatively small ground force, as was the case in East Timor.
- Mais le fait de défendre le système global « à partir des océans » ne veut pas nécessairement dire faire appel aux capacités de pointe associées à la guerre amphibie moderne.

But defending the global system “from the sea” doesn't mean the kind of high-end capabilities that are associated with modern amphibious warfare.

- When Admiral Roughead spoke yesterday of Haiti as a form of power projection, he was suggesting that there are a whole range of operations where the capacity to operate from the sea is essential. Normandy, Iwo Jima or Inchon are beyond this country's aspiration.
- What is within our national ambitions, as declared by the current Government, is the capacity, in relatively permissive environments, to deliver a joint force ashore and to sustain it there indefinitely without reliance on shore based infrastructure.
- But the world's littorals—that relatively narrow zone along the coastline where the vast majority of the world's populations live—will not always be permissive. Accordingly, we will continue to need to integrate our joint force into large and complex multi-national operations led by our closest defence partners and allies.
- Ce qui rend l'Afghanistan si inhabituel à cet égard est le fait que le pays se trouve si loin de la mer. Mais ce sont dans les régions littorales du monde que les effets de changements massifs dans toutes les sphères de l'activité humaine —sociale, démographique, culturelle, technologique et climatologique—se concentrent de plus en plus. C'est là que la force interarmées de l'avenir sera le plus utile.

What's unusual about Afghanistan, in this regard, is that it's so far from the sea. But the world's littorals are where the effects of massive change along every human axis—social, demographic, cultural, technological and climatological—are increasingly being concentrated. This is where the joint force of the future will operate.

- As a battlespace, the world's littorals are becoming increasingly cluttered and congested, requiring the precise delivery of a whole range of kinetic and non-kinetic effects, from the need to win the “battle of competing narratives” at one end of a spectrum of conflict, to the need to take and hold ground at the other.
- Moreover, the joint force will usually be more constrained by international law and the values of Canadian society than its potential adversaries who have learned to integrate the warfare traditions of Clausewitz and Mao Zedong in what some observers are calling “hybrid war”. All of this makes for future joint operations of great ambiguity and complexity.
- There are important implications in this for Canada's maritime forces, including the fundamental capacity to fight and prevail in combat at sea against a potentially far broader and more comprehensive range of threats than ever in our history. Our maritime forces must continue to be organized trained and equipped to control events in contested waters, from which our competence and capacity to lead maritime operations will continue to reside. The “price of admission” to these high-end capabilities is unlikely to go down.

- De plus, nous aurons besoin de développer de nouvelles compétences dans les disciplines non cinétiques et non traditionnelles exigeant de plus en plus de la force interarmées.

In addition, we will need to develop new competencies in the non-kinetic and non-traditional disciplines that are increasingly demanded of the joint force.

- It is far from certain that we will continue to enjoy our current technological and materiel advantages, and we are unlikely to ever enjoy the advantage of numbers. This means that we must become far more agile and adaptable as an integrated fighting force. We have made real progress as the Canadian Forces in our structures and in our command and control, in this regard.
- As you heard the CDS say this morning, our engagement in Haiti was as integrated force, rapidly deployed for immediate effect; delivered before anything else could be brought to bear, regardless of the will of other agencies. That is what we do.
- The Chief had wanted an exercise, knowing that we needed to do more to practice and perfect those skills of not just inter-Service collaboration, but alignment. What he got was a tragedy of immense proportions on our doorstep and the order to act.
- The men and women of all Services, who went down range to do the mission created a joint force of integrated tactical effects that a dozen exercises and months—even years—of doctrinal discussions could not have achieved.
- Our one clear advantage remains our people. They are the ace in our hand and so they must remain a key area of investment. Within the navy it means growing them back to a level that has fallen off in the past half decade, even as the Canadian Forces as a whole has achieved and in some cases exceeded its expansion targets. We need to get that balance right, across the Canadian Forces.
- But it means investing our men and women with new skills and competencies that future operations will require, including a greater understanding of the cultural and social dimensions of future conflict.
- The Government charges the Canadian Forces to defend Canada, to defend North America and to contribute to international peace and security. The navy has vital roles to play in each of these enduring pillars of defence policy. Defending the global system, both at home and abroad, is fundamental to all three, as is the capacity to defend from the sea the conditions that permit the global system to prosper.
- Il s'agit là de notre contribution unique à la prospérité, à la sécurité et aux intérêts nationaux du Canada. C'est ce qui permet à la Marine canadienne mondialement déployable et axée sur le contrôle de la mer de garder sa pertinence en ce siècle maritime.

This is our unique contribution towards Canada's prosperity, security and national interests. This is what makes Canada's globally deployable, sea control navy of enduringly relevant in this maritime century.

Thank you / Merci.