



**Testimony of Lieutenant General Richard Evraire (Retd), Chairman
and Colonel Howard Marsh (Ret'd) Senior Defence Analyst
The Conference of Defence Associations
to the
House of Commons
Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs**

April 14, 2005

LGen Richard Evraire: It is a pleasure to be invited again this morning to address the topic of defence policy. Whereas on previous occasions I have commented to this committee on what the Conference of Defence Associations believed Canada's defence policy should be, this morning I would like to comment on the subject of defence policy management.

Let me begin by pointing out that the defence community views the current situation as rather unique. Allow me to explain.

At this point in the defence policy development process, the Prime Minister has, to a very large extent, already made his foreign and defence policy views known; the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence have outlined the government's overall intent regarding foreign and defence policies; the Chief of Defence Staff, on March 3, at the CDA Institute annual seminar, painted a clear defence plan for the way ahead; and the government has made public a long-term defence funding profile.

Yet, we still have no coherent, all inclusive defence policy statements. Vision, leadership and money are there for all to contemplate. Planning and implementation teams have been formed by the Chief of Defence Staff and will report to him on their recommendations sometime in June.

Is anything wrong with this picture?

Policy development process purists would argue that some of the steps I've just outlined are out of sequence. Others, the CDA included, believe that one of the most refreshing developments in defence policy

terms to have come about in a long time is the unequivocal support voiced by the Prime Minister and his cabinet for a viable armed forces and a credible defence policy tied to an international security policy intended to make Canada a significant player in the world. The CDA awaits, as we all do, with much anticipation and guarded optimism, the outcome of deliberations designed to achieve that goal.

It is therefore not my intention in my comments this morning to strike a pessimistic note on the defence policy development process or the outcome of that process. I do, however, believe it is necessary to alert you to the deliberations of a recent conference co-sponsored by Queen's University, the Institute for Research on Public Policy, and the CDA institute on the Department of National Defence's ability to manage the transformation that will be required for it to implement any new defence policy.

During the conference, held a week ago in Ottawa, defence analysts explained that there exist, across government departments and central agencies, several public administration impediments to achieving the current Canadian forces organizational objectives of stabilization, transformation and modernization. All of these are mandated government policies, as you know. These impediments exist in the policies, procedures and authorities for defence administration.

To quote from Dr. Douglas Bland, chair of defence management at Queen's University, last week's conference organizer,



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the objective of defence administration is to organize, equip, and sustain the Canadian Forces so that they are able to produce the maximum possible coercive force from the resources provided by the government.

He goes on to say that while strategic analysis, goal-setting, resource allocation, and public oversight ought to be essential components of defence policy, the key to building defence capability is effective and efficient public administration. We need to ask ourselves whether the existing system for defence administration is the one we would select were Canada to be fighting a war. His answer? We are at war, and the existing system does not adequately meet the nation's needs.

Dr. Bland went on to quote from Minister of National Defence John McCallum's 2003 report, entitled "Achieving Administrative Efficiency". In part, the report stated that DND and the Canadian Forces--and, by implication, other government departments and central agencies--were not well positioned from a management perspective to meet the strategic-level challenges they are facing.

The report stated, and I quote:

"...without fundamental transformation of the national-level management framework and practices of DND and the CF, the CF will not be able to transform itself rapidly enough to adapt to Canada's changing security environment."

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, without the cooperation of other government departments and central agencies, this transformation of the Canadian Forces, which is essential if the vision of the Prime Minister and the government is to be met, will not be possible.

The primary purpose of defence administration, stated earlier, has become lost in clashes over the policies, interests and procedures of various departments and central agencies of government that have

resulted in delays in defence planning, and in additional costs to the production of combat capabilities.

The Conference of Defence Associations strongly recommends that the Standing committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs look into this public administration issue, laid out in Minister McCallum's 2003 report, and recommend ways to streamline policies and procedures in order to expedite the production of combat capability.

In conclusion, allow me to highlight two existing impediments: the first, internal to DND and the Canadian Forces, and the second, contributed to mainly, but not exclusively, by other government departments and central agencies; and policy and procedure impediments that need to be eliminated or streamlined in order to expedite the production of combat capability in the Canadian Forces.

The first of these concerns is "force generation." A thorough examination of existing recruiting, training, and personnel practices within DND leads to the troubling conclusion that the Canadian Forces may not be able to increase the trained effective strength to the announced 5,000 regulars and 3,000 reservists above current levels before 2012.

During the question period, Colonel Marsh and I would be pleased to provide some of the reasons for this delay. Let me simply state here that the Conference of Defence Associations believes it is imperative that, as a matter of public administration of defence policy, policy implementation take this fact into consideration in assigning missions and tasks, especially offshore deployments, to the Canadian Forces.

Finally, let us consider the issue of capital equipment acquisition. At present, the department has inadequate numbers and expertise, both military and civilian, to execute the existing capital acquisition plan, the so-called strategic capital investment plan, the SCIP.

In the last six months, those responsible for advancing capital acquisition



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projects have missed 90% of their milestones. When that particular staff was twice its current size, it took an average of 15 years to process major acquisitions. Today, existing approaches to military acquisitions, and the dearth of project expertise, lead to the troubling conclusion that transformation of the Canadian Forces, based on the implementation of the existing plan, would not be possible before the year 2020.

Capital equipment procurement procedures, we believe, must therefore be changed. Should the government and the Department of Defence follow existing public administration practices, a long period of dormancy awaits many military capabilities. As a consequence, some of these capabilities will be lost. I will cite only one of many examples, one with which you are already familiar, I am sure.

For all intents and purposes, the Department of National Defence has grounded two thirds of the Hercules tactical airlift fleets. The remaining aircraft are not allowed to transport reservists, given that the dangers and liability costs are unacceptably high.

Given the recent decision by Air Canada to sell its passenger and freight configured 747B combi aircraft, the government has virtually no credible air transport capability at its disposal. This committee can appreciate the pressures a politician would endure during a national disaster, as the armed forces tender a contract for airlift or wait for allied assistance.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, the execution of government policy is a daily business based on the nature of the problem and the tools at hand. Canada is currently suffering an indeterminate period of shortage of military tools. The length of that period is governed not by a lack of vision, leadership, defence policy, or even money--the department is currently unable to spend the capital account--but by the inefficiencies of the public administration of defence.

It is therefore recommended that SCONDVA focus attention on the external and internal impediments to the public administration of defence policy by examining government policies and organization and management practices that together are meant to produce and sustain military capabilities, but in fact in many cases impede and even degrade them. The Conference of Defence Associations would be honoured to contribute more to this very important debate. I have made available to you this morning a copy of a document designed for that very purpose, and we are, of course, more than pleased to contribute anything else we may be called upon to contribute.

The government currently finds itself in a period in which its foreign policy options are fewer in number than they could be, in part because of the limitations of its military--this at a time when options, we think, would need to be greater in number. The loyal, disciplined force of last resort, the Canadian armed forces, should not find itself ill-equipped and under strength at this juncture.

The CDA believes that impediments to the public administration of defence are in Canada's foreign policy decision-making critical path and need to be reduced or eliminated. If they aren't, the required transformation of the Canadian Forces will suffer time delays that will put the men and women of the Canadian Forces at risk and continue to provide Canada with a limited number of security, defence, and foreign policy options.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, we would now be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. Dave MacKenzie (Oxford, CPC): I was quite interested in your comments with respect to procurement. If I understood you correctly, you're indicating that we've cut the staff in half. Are you anticipating that will cut the length of procurement in half, or double it?

LGen Richard Evraire: By our mathematics, it will double it, simply because



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of the fact that there is not only a lack in numbers of personnel required to undertake the project management process within DND, but also there has been an important loss of expertise in that area.

Colonel Howard Marsh: Sir, I was a little concerned that you used the word “cut”. The Department of National Defence rid itself of 500,000 person years of experience from 1995 to 1999, and now it has the capacity to generate only 490 project management experts, where it used to have 1,200 six years ago. So we're into a long season of not having the expertise at hand.

Mr. Dave MacKenzie: Is part of our problem that we have too many filters in the system, too many fingers in the pie?

Col Howard Marsh: Yes. At the present time, the central bureaucracy and the Department of National Defence bureaucracy combined require the average project to go through just under 100 stages of the cross within the department and just under 50 external to the department. And that takes around about 30 to 36 months to get through those.

Mr. Dave MacKenzie: And there are ways that we as a government could be finding solutions to---

Col Howard Marsh: Yes, most of those impediments were imposed by the government from 1964 to the present time.

Mr. Dave MacKenzie: You also indicated that management changes were required both within and outside the organization. Can you elaborate on what your vision would be?

LGen Richard Evraire: In respect of the procurement process, there is the possibility of reducing the overall time required for procurement by eliminating a number of the—as Colonel Marsh puts it—stations of the cross one has to go through. You have to provide reports and go through a large number of hoops in order to achieve eventual fielding of capital equipments.

Within the department, Colonel Marsh was involved in this much more closely than

I. He might be able to give you specific examples of areas where we might be able to make some changes.

Col Howard Marsh: Looking at the total process in a 15-year period, roughly one-third of that time is absorbed internally by the government, also by the Department of National Defence, and two-thirds of it is absorbed externally by Department of National Defence. I'll speak to the two-thirds first.

This two-thirds, or ten years, is spent in a consensus-building within about 40 different other government departments. To do a project, one might have to balance aboriginal textile production with Quebec availability of textiles, or whatever other demands happen to be in effect at the time. Within the department, a lot of time is spent on developing generic options. For instance, when I was working on the tank project, we must have spent about three years over the issue of who should deliver direct fire. When you were fighting a tank, the aim was to put 10 megajoules of energy on a piece of steel. So the department would start this long process of who could do 10 megajoules of energy on a piece of steel at 2,000 metres.

The air force would launch into how they could do it with CF-18s or A-10s, or attack helicopters, and would bring three or four options. The navy would come with harpoon missiles, and so on and so forth. The army would come with direct fire, indirect fire. We would go through this song and dance on option development of who could do it best.

Then when you had finally convinced yourself that the old way of doing it was actually the best way, you moved on to asking the army how they would do it in a land battle scenario. Did they want land-to-land missiles, hybrid missiles, kinetic energy? So the whole argument would start again in this development process. I won't bore you with all the details.

So you would go through all this—options, requirement analysis, engineering.

Then you would finally get down to a statement of requirement. The statement of



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requirement would then generate some engineering specifications. Here the engineering staff—which is quite large—would have a field day. They would write maybe a 700-page document, taking about nine months to specify everything in great detail—tire pressures within a strict limit, steel of a certain type. Your mind just goes on here. Every electrical junction, door hinge, and rubber seal was subjected to the most minute analysis.

Then the engineering specification would be turned into a request for proposal.

At this time, the government would come in with its acquisition strategy. The project staff would be stuck with this thing. Here I've got 700 pages of engineering specifications. I have to contract 38% in Ontario, 37% in the Maritimes, 23% in Manitoba, and so on. Then we would take about two years going across the country trying to identify who in northern New Brunswick could make a 27 psi cold wet plastic tire, who in Vancouver could come up with a heating coil. This would take a long time. Then we have to study the bids, evaluate them, list all the options, and present everything to cabinet.

So we do make things very difficult for ourselves. It's the details.

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): In this debate, there was no mention of the presence of Public Works Canada. They also have their specifications. There are also long term negotiations and so on. You are right, it's a total mess.

The Bloc Québécois has a certain approach. In fact, you know that we have always said in our reports, for many years now, that we needed a defence policy. We believe we will get one next week at the latest; it will be interesting. In our opinion it will have an impact on the branches of the Canadian Forces. I am referring to the land forces, the air force and the navy.

The army has an expression which you hear a lot: "we need more boots on the ground." But this is often said in a context of financial restraint. It means that if you decide to increase expenses for the armed

forces, we will have to cut elsewhere. I hope that this will be made clear in the documents which will be tabled next week. People have to know what their priorities are, since Canada wants to be able to make this type of interventions under its foreign policy.

It also has an impact on the equipment aspect of things. Equipment is also important, because if we decide to intervene in land operations theatres, be it peacekeeping or stabilization missions, we will have to make sure our soldiers are well equipped in order to avoid loss of life.

This has always been our approach. And that is why we don't understand the government when it announces it will spend \$5 billion to buy helicopters or something else.

Furthermore, our defence policy will have to be based on a philosophy. You seem to want to maintain combat capability in every branch. This means much more than simply enrolling more troops. But does that mean having to maintain the navy in its current capacity or the air force in its current capacity?

So I would like to know what you think about this, because this philosophy is evolving. Even within NATO—I often attend its meetings—there are countries which are beginning to want to become more specialized. They are wondering what the point is of training soldiers to become defence generalists. In answer to that, I was told that this type of troops are ready for anything.

I would like to know what you think should be the philosophy of the new defence policy. Do you think we should maintain a generalist approach and that our forces should be ready for anything and in a position to intervene in every type of situation? In other words, do you think that we have to maintain the navy, air force and the land forces as they are now?

Do you think that we should make changes and focus more on some areas and less on others? The generals are trying to convince me that their branch is the most important, and admirals are doing the same,



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which means they are just doing their job. For the admirals, the navy is the most important thing. For the air force people, it's the air force. It's the same for the commanders of the land forces. However, in the end, it is the poor members of Parliament like us, who know almost nothing about defence, who will have to make the decisions.

LGen Richard Evraire: If I may, I would begin by saying that it does not matter what seems to be happening within the department, because at the end of the day it is the minister who must convince his cabinet colleagues of the direction defence policy should take.

One thing is clear. Everyone here this morning would be very happy to see each head of the three branches of the armed forces—air, land and sea—try to “sell his product.” In the end, the Chief of the Defence staff is the one who will make recommendations to the minister. He will have to make a selection and determine what the priorities will be.

You recently heard from General Hillier. He has his personal vision which he presented to the minister. I do not know what the defence policy will look like, but I am convinced that it will contain a vision and a direction. Consequently, the focus will probably be very different. It will depend on which branch will be chosen and on the missions which will be given to our armed forces in the future. As a result, the department's budget will be spent according to materiel and personnel needs in order to eventually fulfil the missions.

have to say that the Conference of Defence Associations has always maintained that it is important to have a defence policy before spending a great amount of money. We agree on that point, except that we have always added that you need a good base to move forward from. That is why we have always believed in investing in maintaining the military capacity of our armed forces. You cannot build a solid structure on sand. You need a good foundation to reinforce the structure.

Since it now seems that we are on the point of getting a defence policy, we are optimistic. We want to know what direction it will take and where the money will be spent. We do not think that the military will become extremely specialized. The reason for this is simple. If something happens and the armed forces must intervene, we need a certain degree of military capacity. If we expect our neighbour or ally to provide us with this military capacity, but the neighbour or ally needs it himself at that very moment, we will be stuck.

We will therefore have to carefully choose the type of military capacity we will need to protect our territorial and continental security, and to also undertake the international missions which the government will confer on our armed forces. We therefore cannot act in a vacuum and give something to one side and nothing to the other.

We certainly want our armed forces to be able to work together, rather than have armed forces which operate separately in different places. We hope that, under the defence policy, money will be given to the various branches of the armed forces to enable them to work together and to intervene as the government sees fit.

Col Howard Marsh: Sir, you put your finger on a very key thing, and that's the change in philosophy. For the last hundred years the Department of National Defence and most people in the western world have looked upon war and peace as an on-off cycle, and we have this business where once the war starts, we'll start making bullets and tanks. This mentality of on-off, on-off has crossed into the acquisition cycle, and one of the major changes General Hillier is trying to bring about is recognition of the reality that the Canadian Forces are on continuous operations.

Carrying on to the second part of your question, I contend there are common tools in land-sea support communications that will be there for fifty or a hundred years, and we need to identify what those continuous, common tools are and then align the Canadian industrial base to respond to those.



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We will always buy trucks. We will always buy boots. We will always buy, for as long as I can think, engines. There are some things that are continuously common, and we need to identify what are continuously common and then move to have an industrial strategy around those things.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: Now we're reviewing the military and we have to keep up with modern conditions, with the Arctic ice opening up through global warming. We have boats landing on our coasts dropping off immigrants on the shore, and we have the potential of oil spills in our Arctic. There have been sightings of foreign submarines, yet we don't have a ship that can go in the ice. Do you have any comments on the next stage of our military, with respect not to changing our resources in total but to changing the deployment of our resources?

In fact, we have more sovereignty in the north now with our mapping of the continental shelf, so Canada is actually getting bigger as far as sovereignty and the area we have to protect go. Do you have any comments or suggestions as to what we should change in the allocation of our military in relation to protecting the northern half of our nation and the longest coastlines, which are in the north?

Col Howard Marsh: When Prime Minister Trudeau came into power, I happened to be a soldier at that time in the 5e Groupement de combat in Quebec. We had a huge thrust at that time to go to the Arctic, and when we went to the Arctic, a number of scientists came with us. We learned very quickly we had neither clothing, food, transport, nor support systems that were adequate for that climate.

I would be loath to actually come out with a recommendation other than to say go. Protect that capability. We know there is going to be an air component, a sea component, and a land component. Go and learn, and take the time, too, to develop it.

Gen Richard Evraire: Indeed, last year there was an exercise up north where quite a number of lessons were learned, precisely

in those very areas. A lack of funds and a lack of personnel in accomplishing all of the other missions the forces are required to accomplish were impediments to doing what Colonel Marsh suggests, which is to get up there as often as possible, more often than now. If that isn't done, then all of these problems will surface when we do dispatch a group and to our chagrin discover what we should have discovered during exercises.

There is a lack of funding for exercises, and one of those areas that is often neglected and has been neglected regularly is of course the north.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: I think the military is actually doing good in the area. As you said, they did a great exercise last summer. They're doing a number of things. I think you're right; I think they're doing that very well, but I'm talking more about permanent location, and let that lead into my second question.

As an example, it is about revising the search and rescue system. Now all our bases for that are not that far from the American border. Without increasing our resources, but looking at how they're deployed for most efficiency, we would find it quite easy to have at least one of the search aircraft farther north so there's better coverage of the country, especially now with the contracting out of maintenance and things they're doing for machinery that's not secret.

That could also have other functions; we need these other functions of aircraft in the north. With the dual functions, it could be quite efficient for us to have some search and rescue presence in the north rather than having to spend 10 or 12 hours to get to an accident site.

Col Howard Marsh: The biggest challenge in the Arctic is the size. When you add the water, you have approximately seven million square kilometres. Unfortunately, the best surveillance and detection devices belong to the American ballistic missile defence system, which can locate a 10-centimetre object that's one degree centigrade warmer than the background in



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about ten seconds.

Flying around the Arctic with planes trying to find bodies is virtually a lost venture. You can't do it. The area is just too large.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: The planes I was talking about.... I'm also glad the military has increased its satellite protection to areas where it worked before, and are in the process of that in UAVs and stuff, but my question was related to the actual response when something is found. If everything is down near the American border, it just takes a lot longer. In the north, of course, you're a lot more likely to freeze to death or have hypothermia in the ocean than you are down in the warmer lakes in the south. I'm talking about the actual response capability and time from where these aircraft are stationed, not the actual detection of the problem.

Col Howard Marsh: The problem here is cost recovery per person. In southern Canada, between 5,000 and 7,000 people a year need to be discovered, and they're in a very narrow 100-kilometre band, so it's relatively cost effective--about \$4 million a person--to recover them.

When you go to the Arctic, there are only about five people a year; that'll probably cost you somewhere in the order of \$100 million a person. This is where it gets a little bit difficult, perhaps a moral issue, but you have to make a decision. What is the cost-effective ratio of people dying in search and rescue? The general guideline is \$4 million a person for insurance purposes.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: Do you have any comments on whether, in the new armed forces, we should continue to have submarines?

LGen Richard Evraire: I will respond to that, if I might, Mr. Chairman.

We would wish to see what the defence policy suggests in that regard, in terms of distribution of resources. My personal view is that the longest coastline in the world in this country needs some attention. Whatever specific roles we assign to the navy submarines, one of them would

have to be coastal protection and intervention in situations in which something needs to be examined.

I've heard a lot of testimony about the usefulness of submarines for that purpose and for other purposes. The fact remains that submarines are an integral part of a navy, and coastline protection is one of the roles the navy has; it must carry out that role. Whether, ultimately, our submarines are involved in blue-sea intervention, which they are meant to be involved in at the moment, remains to be seen, but I would certainly see that the navy would be incomplete were it not to have that particular dimension in its tool kit.

Mr. Dave MacKenzie: Thank you. It seems one of the issues we always suffer with our military is the vision of Canadians with respect to the military. Maybe it's the optics, that they don't see the military. Can you comment on our reserve, as opposed to around the world? In some respects we're maybe backwards. We have fewer reserves than full time, and it's the other way around.

Col Howard Marsh: The first thing I'd like to do is bring to this committee's attention a fact that shocked me. Among all NATO countries, of which there are almost 25 now, Canada uses its reserves second to the United States. Of our operational deployments at the present time, 24% are sustained by the reserves, so the reserves are really involved. That's the first thing I'd like to say on this issue.

The other thing is within the department, and I did an analysis of this, there is so much movement now between the regular and the reserves that from a cost point of view, it's almost neutral.

LGen Richard Evraire: The issue of reserves has been on the department's and the Canadian Forces' plate for a very long time. They're trying to improve their usefulness, their operational employment. Much has changed in the last 30 or 40 years, from the time I first entered the force.

The decision by the government at the time of the Korean War to establish a force in being, a permanent regular force, resulted to



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some degree in what turned out in the sixties and seventies, and to some degree in the early eighties, to be a neglect of funding and therefore employability of the reserves. That has been turned around, and the reserves have indeed, as Colonel Marsh points out, been not only an important but an essential component in deployments for the Canadian Forces in the last 20 years, and probably even longer.

The problem of visibility of the military in Canada we hope will, to some degree, be solved by an increase in the reserves, by emphasizing the reserves. Indeed, the government's decision to increase by another 3,000 in the reserves is certainly a step in the right direction in that regard.

But the fewer people in uniform who walk our city streets and our communities, the more difficult it is to convince Canadians that the Canadian Forces are an important element of security and defence in this country. We view as a very positive development not only the 3,000 announced, but the plans we know are in the works for potential increases beyond those 3,000.

The decision some 25 or 30 years ago, or even longer ago than that, to concentrate a lot of our military on major bases away from population centres, and the decision, for instance, to eliminate the presence on our university and high school—but principally university—campuses of the Canadian officer training program personnel, have resulted in a separation, a distancing, between the military and the population, and all of the results have been somewhat negative with respect to the armed forces.

We applaud any effort to increase the reserves. We applaud any effort to reinstall the military in the view of Canadians—wherever, on campuses and anywhere else in our cities—for the simple reason that “out of sight, out of mind” needs to be set aside.

Mr. Dave MacKenzie: Let me ask you a small question with respect to how we utilize our reserves. Is our high percentage of utilization of reserves because our regular forces are small to start with and we need to

utilize them?

Col Howard Marsh: Yes, that's a part of it. The other thing is that the reserves currently have a whole suite of skills that the regular force does not have. The other thing is that there are a large number of Canadians, especially those in the 20 to 25 age group, who are doing, say, graduate studies and will go to a reserve unit and join—become a corporal, perhaps in the intelligence branch—and look forward to a six-month tour, where they can come home with \$10,000 American in their pocket to pay off their studies. So there are some high incentives in those areas.

Mr. Anthony Rota: I have a couple of questions regarding the acquisition process. I'm a bit troubled—or a lot troubled, but not really surprised—that 90% of the milestones are missed in the projects. I guess the question is, how large are these projects and by how much are they missed?

ask that question and I'm going to qualify it.

One of the observations that came up from the Auditor General was that the project management process within the armed forces is somewhat flawed. There seems to be a three-year rotation in and out. Project management is something you develop over a lifetime. You don't just come in for three years, take a course, and by the time you're done you ship out and bring someone else in. It just seems to me it's a very expensive training ground for project managers.

There are two questions, I guess. Can you comment on the project management process and the people they have in place? Is it civilian? Is it military? Is it a combination of the two? And would it be better to have one that's long-term?

The other question is about the size of the projects. If they're behind.... If they miss the milestone by a month, it's not a big deal. After five years, or a year, I start to worry.

LGen Richard Evraire: I would ask Colonel Marsh. He is much more expert in that area.

Col Howard Marsh: It needs to be a combination of military and civilian, and it currently is. Most project staffs are about 40%



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military and 60% civilian. The reason for the military component is that you need that officer who has 10 to 20 years of operational experience who knows what a sleeping bag is like in the cold. You need that military component. But your observation is absolutely right.

When I was director of land requirements, an officer posted to me, technically staff trained—whether he was trained in England or Canada or the United States—could only prosecute about \$2 million worth of projects a year. By the time he reached the fifth year of his career, or at least in his time with me, he was up to \$50 million a year.

It takes a while to figure out where the buttons are to press within the department. So there needs to be stability on the technical staff side, and to some degree there is. I'm a technical staff officer, so perhaps I'm biased here. In the French forces they take their technical staff and create them as a separate group, which I think is called *les ingénieurs*....

LGen Richard Evraire: It is the General Delegation for Armaments.

Mr. Anthony Rota: Would this be like the Army Corps of Engineers in the United States?

Col Howard Marsh: No, because that corps of engineers are the people who build bridges and fix things. This group of armament engineers start their careers within the armoured corps or the infantry. They are technically qualified, and then their career path is basically an operational tour, and then they're posted to industry and they carry on like that.

They have a different pay scale, so a lieutenant colonel on that pay scale makes the same money as a brigadier general, because within all military systems you're not promoted unless you're operationally competent, and you can't be operationally competent if you spend 20 years of your career in industry. The French have gotten around this by establishing an armament engineer corps.

But you're quite right. A qualified

person who specializes in that area is ten times more effective than a neophyte.

Mr. Anthony Rota: Very good. The other question....

LGen Richard Evraire: The delays in projects.

Col Howard Marsh: Oh, the delays in projects. It doesn't really matter. If the delay is at the front, you can't spend money at the back end. If the delay is at the back end.... Wherever you take that one-month chunk of time, it works its way right through.

Mr. Anthony Rota: I realize it's sequential. One causes the other; there's a causative effect. I was just wondering if there was an average on the size of projects, but I guess every one is different.

Col Howard Marsh: That's correct. You need to be aware that—this is my observation, I wrote on this—because it is so fearful for the Department of National Defence to go to cabinet for approval, it is, I believe, avoiding going to cabinet. Cabinet has demonstrated over the last 40 years that when you bring a large project for approval—over \$100 million—you'll likely have the money taken from you or a solution will be imposed on you that you do not want.

It's been my observation over the last 20 years that the department is getting around this by taking large projects and dividing them by the denominator that produces a number of projects under \$100 million. For instance, the CF-18 modernization is \$2.6 billion. It consists of 27 subprojects, each one under \$100 million. Now you have to have 27 project managers to look after the 27 components.

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron: If we are to believe my friend's theory, after the events of September 11, which we are all familiar with, and after the end of the cold war, we must constantly be on the lookout for conflicts. Knowing that it will not have to face an army—terrorists do not wear uniforms nor do they have military armaments—won't the Department of Defence and the Canadian Forces have to modernize themselves based on this type of conflict? If so, what type of know-how and weapons must they acquire?



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LGen Richard Evraire: It is clear that the threat is very different today from what it was before the cold war. The list of dangers now includes terrorism and unconventional warfare.

However, if you look at the list of military missions since the end of the cold war, you will realize that Canadian soldiers have had to fight in conflicts involving many weapons, the best example of this probably being Afghanistan. In no way should we limit ourselves strictly to military capacity and to training our troops to fight—if I may put it this way—simple terrorists.

However, Canadian soldiers have to wear bulletproof vests and travel in protected armoured vehicles. They need a variety of weapons to counter the threat, which is not always easy to do. This threat is certainly not as obvious as the one during the cold war.

Consequently—and this is repeated often—a combat-ready soldier is ready for everything. However, we have to make sure that if we send our soldiers on a mission abroad, they will be able to wage a traditional war armed with the appropriate weapons.

We hope to find out within the next few days what the new defence policy will look like. It is to be expected—rightly, I believe—that the government will say in its policy that the Canadian armed forces need to develop or maintain their capacity to not only wage war against terrorism, which comes in all shapes and sizes, but also to intervene in any type of conflict potentially unfolding today. This means helping civilians, which means intervening on the lowest rung of a conflict, as well as waging conventional war, which is at the other extreme.

So we need armoured vehicles—not necessarily tanks—direct-fire or indirect-fire weapons, and other things to fight the type of war which took place in the former Yugoslavia in the infamous Medak pocket, for instance, and to wage the type of war which took place in Afghanistan, when the PPCLI was deployed as the first Canadian

Force in that country. So we cannot limit ourselves to a certain type of conflict. Otherwise, we would put the lives of our soldiers at risk if we did not give them the necessary capacity or military equipment should they be asked to enter a combat situation on a moment's notice.

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron: The type of conflict I am referring to could unfold at the base of a Hydro-Quebec tower between LG-2 and Montreal, or at the foot of the CN Tower in Toronto. Has national defence started thinking about how to deal with that type of conflict?

LGen Richard Evraire: Yes, indeed. Colonel Marsh is reminding me that we hope that the defence policy will address the capacity to intervene in any type of conflict, ranging from what you have just suggested—and we certainly hope this will never happen—to so-called traditional warfare. The government said that if it was to deploy troops abroad, a military intervention would be complemented by diplomatic and humanitarian interventions as well.

So if our soldiers are to contribute effectively, they will not only have to be trained in combat, but also in a whole series of other types of interventions perhaps less military in nature, but taking place within a military framework nevertheless.

Mr. Wajid Khan:

Internationally, the world is far more unstable today than it's ever been. And whether it's pandemics or peacekeeping missions or war and terror at home and abroad, whatever the case may be, the load of the army has exponentially increased, but we still can't depend on the conventional type of armed forces.

So my question is, what would you identify as your top three priorities? What kind of a military should we have or focus on? Obviously you can't tell me how to bring in efficiencies in the procurement areas, but you can certainly talk about the airlift capability, which previous witnesses have mentioned as well.

We talk about the necessity for the airlift capability, but I have not heard an



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answer as to how we acquire it. We can't afford to buy it because to buy and to maintain it will take almost 40% of your defence budget. So is it a possibility that we can get a couple of Nordic countries together with us and buy or lease one of these that we can use collectively? I'd like to have some answers as to what we should do rather than what isn't there. And obviously defence, I believe, is very much an extension of foreign policy.

The last question, if you have time to answer is, what is your view of the belief that our emergency preparedness and our security matters should be led by the military rather than separate departments?

LGen Richard Evraire: If I could share the answer with Colonel Marsh on this one, let me begin by suggesting that it is very important, whenever the choice is available, for the military not to undertake tasks that are really not its responsibility. We have police forces and a variety of other intervention forces in Canada that must be fully integrated in whatever national in-country responses are required. The ideal situation is for the armed forces not to be employed in those sorts of tasks, so they could concentrate on intervening with the equipment and the training they have in the worst-case scenarios.

Nevertheless, we do call upon the armed forces to help if there is no requirement for them to be anywhere else. I have to point out, however, that quite a number of military personnel from the west coast and the prairies were called in to put out forest fires in British Columbia, as an example. Forgetting about how they got there, the fact remains that while they were employed doing that, there were many other jobs that they would normally have been required to perform where they were not employed. Maintaining equipment is one of those.

So in the very first instance, the forces should not be employed for tasks that more properly are those to be performed by other groups.

Col Howard Marsh: I'd like to respond

to your observation to say that it is quite valid. There's a lot of statistical analysis showing that the demand for military equipment or intervention is increasing. But one statement you made that I wouldn't hold to be true is that we can't afford tactical airlift.

At the present time the Department of National Defence is spending about \$385 million--this year--to maintain 31 Hercules aircraft, 19 of which are parked and the other 9 can--

Mr. Wajid Khan: I'm talking about heavy airlift.

Col Howard Marsh: We have approximately \$400 million to maintain a junk pile, and that amount over 10 years is \$4 billion. I'm quite sure that we could go to an aircraft supplier and probably buy six C-17 Globemasters and twenty C-130J Hercules aircraft if we said we'd pay \$400 million a year for the next 10 ten years. The supplier would probably say, thank you very much, and we would probably walk away with twenty C-130Js and six C-17s. We could probably solve this problem in about 12 to 18 months.

Mr. Wajid Khan: What's the difference in care and capability between the C-130Js and the C-17s?

Col Howard Marsh: When you have a CC-130J, which is a Hercules, you have relatively short range. When you put 20 tonnes in the back of a Hercules aircraft, you can only go 1,000 kilometres. You can only fly at 400 miles per hour, so you can't go into the international air lanes. So you have to bounce around. If you're flying a Hercules from Toronto to Vancouver, you have to stay outside the air routes because you can't stay up with the jets. It takes you 7,000 kilometres. You have to land seven times and fuel up to get there.

But they're great when you get to the far end and you have to do 500- to 1,000-kilometre sprints into an Arctic airfield. The larger aircraft carries 180,000 pounds--90 tons--and once it gets airborne, it can stay up there and travel at 650 kilometres and go 5,000 kilometres.



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I think we actually need a combination of the two, given our history and given the kinds of airfields we go into, because the reality is that when you take a map of the world and you put on the areas of the world where the problems are and then you look for runways in those problem areas, you come up with a shortage of runways.

LGen Richard Evraire: In answer to the broader question about what we, the CDA, believe would be required as an overall description of the armed forces, this has been articulated and mentioned a number of times, and we're hopeful it will be included in the defence policy as its primary and essential purpose.

We believe, first of all, that we need armed forces to contribute to the defence of Canada and North America. The exact size and nature of that force has yet to be determined, and we tend to stand away from that because those who are in a best position to determine size, composition, and nature are the members of the forces themselves, given the task they've been provided.

We also believe, as a G-7 or G-8 country, and given the nature of our economy, our place in the world, and the place we want to occupy in the world, we must contribute to alliances and to, more generally, peace and security in the world. In order to achieve this, we believe there is a requirement for Canada to have a deployable force--the exact size of it, ideally, a brigade, a couple of large battle groups, yet again depending on exactly what amounts of money the government makes available.

This force should ideally be deployable independent from allied assistance, but there are options there as well. In order to contribute meaningfully, we need to have something in the nature of a brigade group that would be deployable and sustainable as well.

If we do not contribute this, then the viability of our contribution will be in doubt, and I think we would be reneging on a responsibility that otherwise we should be

able to take on.

Col Howard Marsh: I think the last question really underscores the main thrust of our presentation--that is, the impediments of the public administration of defence. That's the main problem.

The reason the department can say to you that it doesn't have enough money, but it has enough money, is because of the artificial barrier of vote 1 and vote 5 money laid down by the central government.

Vote 1 money, as you know, is such that when you have bought something and it's up and running, you can get all the vote 1 money you want to pay for the salaries and the operations and maintenance. You'll find there's \$400 million of vote 1 money to sustain the Hercules fleet, because it has been around for 40 years, but there's no money in vote 5 to buy a replacement. At the present time, there is no mechanism that allows you to take \$400 million out of vote 1 to move into vote 5 and go and make a new acquisition. It's one of the impediments that I suggest you focus on.

Mr. Dave MacKenzie: Two of the buzzwords are "integration" and "interoperability". When we talk about acquisition, why do we need to do everything totally on our own? When we're operating with other organizations--Americans, the British, or whoever--why do we need to re-examine the whole thing when we want to purchase equipment?

LGen Richard Evraire: Without being totally obvious in our remarks earlier, I think we suggested that we don't have to reinvent the wheel in every case. A great deal of capital equipment could be purchased off the shelf, and in some areas this ought to be done, as opposed to going through the nightmarish procedures that Colonel Marsh described earlier, in satisfying requirements that, in many cases, quite honestly, we convince ourselves are necessary but only delay the acquisition of equipment and in the longer run make it risky for our men and women of the forces to go on deployments, so we don't.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: We don't have a



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boat in the navy that can go in, or through, or under the ice. Do you think that should be in our future capital plans?

Col Howard Marsh: You're quite correct. The strongest hull we have in the navy allows us to go through four inches of ice, which basically keeps us out of most of the Arctic, or most of our waters, for nine months of the year. You have to overcome that issue.

Hon. Larry Bagnell: I am just going to re-ask a question Mr. O'Connor asked of the last group.

Obviously, we're modernizing our navy and armed forces and putting in the different resources needed in the modern armed forces, like UAVs, the north, and airlift, etc. We therefore also probably have to remove things that aren't as essential in today's world, as Mr. Perron was saying.

What types of things do you think we could remove from our present configuration?

LGen Richard Evraire: We would not wish to give you an answer to that question, and I will explain why.

Given the fact that the armed forces have been reduced to the barely 50,000 number we know today, and that Canadians have reached the point where deploying a battalion group, or two groups, offshore is considered a "gee whiz, aren't we great" deployment capability, we consider those levels to be shameful, given the nature of this country, given our history, and given what we hope to achieve in terms of foreign policy and security and defence.

So we don't think we should be cutting back; we should be increasing the number of the forces, which the government has announced at least partly, or as a partial solution.

Yes, there may be infrastructure here and there, or buildings, that could simply be done away with rather than maintained. All of this is a very complex issue. But if we were to increase the forces, some of the infrastructure we would currently want to get rid of may become very useful in the future.

What has happened over time is that we have so ill-maintained a lot of our equipment--our bases and equipment--that we have reached the point where maintenance is no longer an issue, because the buildings are simply unsafe and unmaintainable.

So the bottom line, as far as we're concerned, is that we can't be satisfied with what we're doing now. Even if we make it more efficient, it's simply not enough, and we ought to be ashamed at how little it is that we can in fact deploy offshore, or provide as part of our North American and national defence.

Col Howard Marsh: I would just add anecdotally to that, because I know a lot of people think that one thing you can do is to park the tanks, but sadly, the tanks have been parked. Every time you park a capability, you lose a tool.

A lot of people don't realize that the tank is the only vehicle in Canada that has a neutron shield and an NBCW closed system. So if we had a radiological attack in Canada, it is likely we would have to bring the tanks out of service, or put them back into service, in order to ferry people in and out of a dangerous environment.

The tank is the only vehicle in Canada that can forge through 1.5 metres of water without preparation. So if you had a major flood in a city and you wanted to ferry people through water over 6 feet, the tank is probably one of the best things going.

It also has a 20-tonne drawbar pull, so it can push and pull 20 tonnes of debris. It is an incredibly flexible vehicle that could be used when you get into extreme national emergencies and disasters, and the fact that it only costs \$28 million a year to maintain means it's one of those cheap tools that you really don't want to get rid of.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Before expressing my point of view, I would like to come back to the example you have just given us. I have the impression that, since the events of September 11, there is a generational conflict in the perception of what constitutes a real danger. I have often heard it said that generals are always behind by one war. I do not know how you would translate this in



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English. I would like to discuss this with you. A little earlier, I was talking about philosophy; and now, I would like to talk about military doctrine.

I think that military doctrine has changed tremendously since the events of September 11. We used to have a military doctrine based on thousands of years of history. Napoleon's armies, as well as Caesar's armies, knew who their enemies were on the battlefield.

But today, this military doctrine has completely changed. We also cannot be expected to change as dramatically or with as much flexibility as our enemies have, that is, the terrorists. I do not think there is anyone left who would want to confront the U.S. army on a battlefield. Their only battlefields are the elements of surprise and the well-known asymmetrical threats they have made.

It is for that reason that members of Parliament will not only look at the capacity of Canada's armed forces, but also at how the various police forces could counter these types of asymmetrical threats. I have always said that I don't believe that North Korea would launch an ICBM. However, I do believe that weapons of massive destruction could one day enter an American port in a container.

So there is a kind of generational conflict. Sometimes people do not want to let go of things they believe are important, such as tanks, aircrafts, aircraft carriers, C-17s, new weaponry, and so on.

I sometimes have the impression that we are letting the new military doctrine pass us by. How can we deal with these asymmetrical threats? Are there today people in positions of authority, on the military side as well as on the civilian side, who understand that these threats cannot be countered by purchasing 300 tanks or 10 C-17s?

I am not saying that it should not be done. Indeed, if we have an international intervention policy to support stabilization, peacekeeping and reconstruction, we need equipment; it can be very useful. However,

as for the real asymmetrical threats, would you agree with me that the military doctrine must change and that it has not yet changed enough to deal with what is really at stake?

LGen Richard Evraire: I both agree and disagree, Mr. Chairman, because the armed forces have made huge changes to their doctrine. Those representing the current doctrine have gone through the era we are living in. They are the soldiers who were deployed to Afghanistan and to the former Yugoslavia, as well as to many United Nations missions. As you know, we even have soldiers who were in the Iraq conflict as members of the British and American armed forces.

In the debate on military doctrine, these people have brought forward all the elements you have mentioned as far as waging asymmetrical war is concerned. They have concluded that it is absolutely essential to redirect the doctrine in order to counter the asymmetric threat.

These people are also responsible for the lives of the soldiers under their command and realize that far from being harmless, asymmetrical war is extremely dangerous. As a consequence, they are not about to turn their backs on their comfort zone, which is knowing they are protected by what you refer to as the military elements of the last war. They are not about to strictly limit themselves to what could be called much lighter weaponry to fight terrorism, for instance. They need a whole range of capacities.

Will we one day have to fight the type of war we were ready for, such as the time I was the commander of the Canadian brigade in Germany and our enemy was the Soviet army? I do not know. But if we get rid of all these capacities and we need them in three, four or five years, we will never be able to get them back. We may have lost them forever. In any case, it would not be easy to get them back quickly enough. Let us not forget that, during the Second World War, we had virtually no capacity to begin with, but we created one. It took many years and cost a lot of lives before we reached the point of being able to fight on the same footing as our enemy.

Therefore, in my opinion, the doctrine has



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changed. It has changed so much that, if I joined the armed forces again today, I would feel lost.

However, I want to insist on the fact that today's generals, whom we often accuse of still being caught up in the last war, do not think that way at all, at least as far as I can tell. They are modern and turned towards the future; they are always on the lookout for the most recent changes and developments, and they try to include these factors in any recommendations they make to the government.

If I may, I would like to raise another issue, Mr. Chairman, since I am afraid that we may run out of time. It has to do with the fact that we should not expect too much from our armed forces, and the fact that they are often sent on missions for which there are not always enough troops. You have before you a slide which shows that we need 8,000 more troops in the Canadian Forces. That will cost \$80 million.

But the startling fact is if the Canadian Forces are to increase the total number of personnel by 8,000, the best guesses are that we will need 48,000 new people walking into recruiting centres to sniff around, 30,000 of whom will in fact turn into applicants and enrollees. In other words, out of that 48,000, 18,000 won't come back. Half of that number will actually enter the forces as recruits and will be under training, and out of 15,000, only 8,000, the number desired, will eventually turn into trained and effective operationally employable personnel in the forces.

The difficulty of about 48,000 walking into recruiting centres, of course, is that the Canadian Forces are fighting against any number of other interesting careers in Canada and people are being drawn away by any number of other head-hunters, if you'll pardon the expression.

So recalling what the Vice Chief of Defence Staff said to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence last fall about not being able to recruit and bring in 8,000 in the sufficient time indicated at that time, the money has been made available,

but the difficulty may be the lack of availability of interested candidates.

So even if there is a fair amount of optimism within the forces today about achieving the target of 5,000 regulars and 3,000 reservists, an optimism with which I can identify--the forces are always optimistic about what they can do--I think the task is an extremely difficult one, and we are not all that convinced that it will be achievable in the timeframe expected.

We are again very grateful for the opportunity of appearing in front of your committee, sir, and to repeat, finally, that the CDA is more than willing and, dare we say, able to contribute more to the process of the policy development process in regard to security and defence.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Rick Casson): After today, your ability to do that is clear. We're off to a good start on this portion of our work. Thank you very much.

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