

# e-Capabilities;

## Canadian Military Transformation in the face of 21<sup>st</sup> Century Challenges.



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## **Canadian Military Transformation in the face of 21<sup>st</sup> Century Challenges.**

### **Strategic Integration**

This academic paper will circumvent the lack of integration within Canada's National Defence Institution. This issue is strategic in that faced with limited resources and new challenges, the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces (CF) cannot persist to sustain two antagonistic Defence entities. In June 2000, DND and the CF adopted Capability Based Planning (CBP) with a primary focus on Force Development<sup>1</sup>. Based on the premises of the 1994 White Paper, CBP was to provide more focus to Defence planning and serve as a change catalyst for DND/CF integration. Indeed, integrating planning to produce capability is the main objective of CBP, but this is a challenging task. Up to the present, DND/CF CBP has not reached its full implementation potential, for a number of reasons: Firstly, fundamental changes in the Security Environment have prompted an accelerated transformation pace; Secondly, the Canadian Context has shifted in significant ways, more in favour of Security, in light of September 11; And thirdly, Canada's Defence Posture has also dramatically changed, presenting new and emerging challenges to be addressed.

### **National Defence**

Historically, the Canadian Institution of Defence has been composed of three military services, namely: the Navy, Army and Air Force, and of civilian oversight embodied in the Ministry or Department of Defence. The primary focus of military services has mostly been concerned with military operational effectiveness, while primary focus of DND has been national and political interests, and civilian oversight of the military. History reveals the Canadian Institution of Defence has been plagued ever since with conflicting agendas. "Operational effectiveness & Strategy are essential to superior performance, but work very differently<sup>2</sup>". Strategically, the 1994 White Paper mission stated that the CF would maintain core capabilities to protect Canada and further national objectives<sup>3</sup>; It did not specifically set out a mission for the Department itself. This has literally institutionalised two antagonistic defence perspectives: That of DND and that of the CF. So far as no real or new security challenges to Canada emerged, these antagonistic entities could survive. However, the fundamental changes in the Security Environment now exacerbate this strategic disconnect. Thus, in light of the emergence of a National Security Portfolio, DND now faces a serious relevancy issue.

### **Defence Stakeholders**

Canadians are not really interested in Security and Defence issues<sup>4</sup>. However, they relate to the military when they think of Defence, whether at home assisting civil authorities or abroad serving as Peacekeepers. Canadians intuitively understand the key role of military capabilities in preserving their Peace & Freedom. Canadians as primary stakeholder know that our military can protect and project their values and interests. The Government also understands the high political leverage an effective and efficient military provides<sup>5</sup>. For the Government of Canada (GoC), political leverage comes through the complex workings of DND. And the Department acts as its intermediary in order to maintain civilian oversight of the Military or CF. Indeed, faced with other budgetary pressures, such as Health, Education and even the Economy, the GoC must ensure the efficiency or best value for Defence money, while our Military focuses on effectiveness. International Allies, as a third order stakeholder, are also primarily concerned with military effectiveness. As such, "the credibility-capability gap<sup>6</sup>" is very reflective of the strategic challenge the GoC is faced with when trying to address both the efficiency of the Defence Portfolio and effectiveness of Military Services. This is directly reflected in the policies the GoC lays out for Defence, and more specifically for the CF. Many visions have been articulated in recent Force development efforts, but integration really is lacking.

## Security Environment

In a traditional strategic analysis, the external environment would be composed of economic, technological, political-legal and socio-cultural variables<sup>7</sup>. Factors like the globalisation of the economy, the convergence of technology, the transcendence of security challenges and the widening cultural disconnectedness<sup>8</sup> would all individually be analysed to identify possible opportunities and threats. However, to a certain extent, this would recreate the disintegrated condition that currently plagues traditional Strategic Analysis of Defence. Indeed, the combination of environmental analysis factors, into new and emerging holistic phenomenon's, like Geopolitical Power, Human Security, Unrestricted Warfare or Information Operations, better serve to illustrate the complexity and linkages that now characterise the Global and Canada's security environment: Geopolitical Power<sup>9</sup> remains the main multidimensional challenger of the near future security environment; Human Security<sup>10</sup> offers a paradigm change in how we traditionally viewed security, as primarily military; Unrestricted Warfare<sup>11</sup> is the new expression of the unlimited nature of chaos, within or without conflict; And Information Operations<sup>12</sup> add a completely new-networked dimension to global security challenges. The new challenges of the Security Environment all have a transcending human thread to their existence. Globalisation and technology, with parallel compression of time and space, exacerbate these challenges. Furthermore, any combination of variables will create extremely complex security environments, and the consideration of existing realities like demographics & urbanisation, exacerbate global disconnectedness. In essence, and for myriad of reasons, the world has already entered a new epoch of conflict, and crime<sup>13</sup>. Simply, in asymmetry, strategic opportunities arise in threats and strategic threats arise in opportunities. And no longer does the simple definition of enemy fit in this new multidimensional security environment. "If we are going to defeat the multitude of threats that face us in the new millennium, we are going to have to slay some sacred cows and that is going to take some serious debate. Success will lie in how we think<sup>14</sup>".

*"The new protagonist's centre of gravity lies 6 inches between its two eyes and ears"*

## The Pentagon's New Map; Disconnectedness

(Thomas Barnett)



*"For Canada, it is time to awake, and seize the day<sup>15</sup>. Indeed; Hope is not a method<sup>30</sup>"*

### **Defence Disconnectedness**

Considering the CF would maintain core capabilities to protect Canada and further our national objectives<sup>16</sup> and in light of the challenges emerging from the security environment, it is quite obvious that there exists a strategic disconnect between the DND and the CF perspectives in their respective entities and also agendas. Faced with faster, leaner and meaner security challenges, finding refuge in the opportunities offered by new phenomena like the emergence of new economic powers, cyber and information warfare, trans-national narco-criminality, international terrorism and social disruption, Canada's Defence clearly lacks integration. The asymmetric paradigm is so simple that it isn't so obvious; opportunities become threats and vice versa. So where traditionally, our military would have viewed geopolitical power as a form of stability, as in the Cold War era, and would perhaps wish to recreate a polar world much easier to manage in military terms, the emergence of powers like China and India within a strategic partnership<sup>17</sup>, remain nonetheless threats. Opportunities, like the distribution of water in the Middle-East, can become human security challenges by creating migrant flows towards these new found sources of life, exacerbated by high density urbanisation, which in turn create yet unforeseen security challenges, such as criminal networks fighting over its control. And further opportunities, like the Internet and global media, offer an information threat to global stability. Traditionally, Defence was not concerned with these second order threats, but clearly since September 11, our military has to take a more holistic & proactive approach to managing Defence & Security challenges. Clearly, our Defence is not ready to face these strategic challenges arising from the Security environment.

### **Defence Posture**

Internally, the Defence Institution is not well aligned with its own stated mission, that to protect Canada. Bringing Defence policy intentions and administration into harmony is the next great Defence challenge<sup>18</sup>. Structurally, National Defence headquarters (NDHQ) is known as the one biggest bureaucracy in town. Its stove piped, generally disintegrated approach to Defence management often serves to justify its own ends. The Military on the other hand, is still structured to fight a known enemy coming in the March formation, with its Regiments, Battalions & Companies, Napoleonic formations, more appropriate today for museums. Culturally, the internal environment operates like an immune system to isolate and expel hostile individuals who challenge current directions or established thinking<sup>19</sup>; this applies as well to DND as it does to the CF. Systematically, stovepipes are the construct of the Defence Institution, reinforced by the military hierarchy. Horizontal activities like Infrastructure and Environment, Human Resources, Information Management and Material Procurement, have only limited functional authorities and do not transcend organisational barriers. In essence, inappropriate structure, based on an inadequate culture and inefficient systems, are weaknesses. But on the other hand, Military leadership has consistently demonstrated its great strength in times of crisis. Military professionalism and can do attitude, have been the fundamental keys to Peacekeeping's successes, and military esprit de corps, based on a firm military ethos, have been the moral foundation of our military. Thanks to this combination of Leadership, Professionalism, Esprit de corps and Ethos, the CF has excelled. However this is not to say that it couldn't have done better; more Effectively, Efficiently and Responsively. "Like humans, corporations must choose to master their fate, or doom themselves to be mastered by it"<sup>20</sup>.

### **Strategic Architecture**


At this point in our analysis it is now obvious that the crux of the issue is the lack of DND/CF integration: Defence "is not well positioned, from a management perspective, to meet its strategic-level challenges"<sup>21</sup>. Faced with emerging security challenges, such as threats arising from opportunities and vice versa; faced with significant internal weaknesses, culturally, structurally and systematically; thankful for its strengths of leadership, professionalism, esprit de corps & ethos, an integrated perspective of Defence is quintessential. Indeed, beyond Defence all by itself, the new Security Paradigm calls for more interagency co-operation<sup>22</sup>.

As well, ongoing reforms in International Organisations, UN and NATO, also call for more co-operation<sup>23</sup>. Therefore, the formulation of strategy enforces that DND/CF must now consider a strategic architecture<sup>24</sup>: “A strategic architecture should make resource allocation priorities transparent to the entire organisation. It provides a template for allocation decisions by top management, as it also helps line managers understand the logic and intent of the allocation priorities, disciplining senior management to maintain consistency<sup>25</sup>”. In order to develop a CF integrative strategic architecture, capabilities constitute the basic building block: Capabilities must be viewed as integrated solutions considering structure, culture and systems holistically.

**Integrated Capabilities**

As a strategic approach to managing change, Capability-based planning proposed conceptual models<sup>26</sup>, often based on ill-conceived or outdated assumptions, such as those in the 1994 Defence White Paper. Indeed, the so-called CF Transformation has focused primarily on Force Development in recent years. However, it is necessary to revisit the fundamental assumptions under which today’s posture was based. Emerging technological concepts such as Network-enabled operations<sup>27</sup>, Effects-based approach<sup>28</sup>, have generated great expectations that digitisation could break down the stovepipe information structures that have characterised armies throughout the ages<sup>29</sup>. This is partly based on intuitive knowledge of change. “Strategic reorientation’s really are cultural revolutions<sup>30</sup>”. Culture is the fundamental strategic leverage. “To effect transformation, make fundamental change, it is necessary to change those critical processes<sup>31</sup>”. Culturally also, integration is the key, realising the interdependence of Defence, the Military & Security. In order for the Defence people to personify integration, a change in structural paradigms becomes key. “Organisations don’t make progress, people do; and the organisation is just a vehicle for cooperation<sup>32</sup>”. Structurally then, the power of new technology and their enabling concepts and capabilities, can only be leveraged with integrated organisational structures and systems, much like a spider web of capabilities:

**e-Capabilities Nucleogram**





- Capabilities Characteristics :**
- People (Reg, Res & Civilians)
  - Expeditionary Focus Areas
  - Domestic and Interagency
  - Network-Enabled (NEOps)
  - Effects-Based (EBOps)
  - Mission Command

- Strategic Architecture:**
- Joint Task Force Capabilities**  
Command, Sense, Act, Shield, Sustain and Special\*
  - Integrated CF Capabilities:**
    - Command (CF)
      - CDS & DCDS
      - POL, PA, JAG
    - Managing (HQ)
      - VCDS & DCDS
      - IM, FIN, CRS
    - Generating (HR)
    - Equipping (Mat)
    - Training (IT&E)
    - Basing (IE)

**2X e-Strategy<sup>33</sup>**


But before adopting change and adapting to new circumstances, it is imperative to define a new Strategy. Indeed, many visions have been articulated and interpreted in recent years identifying where we want to be. Although quite interesting, Strategy 2020 namely, doesn't explicit how we will get to where we want to be. The latest Defence policy statement<sup>34</sup> also does not further articulate how to implement its very own vision. Thus, integrating DND and the CF becomes key, streamlining the Defence political management overhead. Making choices<sup>35</sup> and selecting key capabilities for their adaptability to both Domestic and Expeditionary challenges is necessary. Striking a balance of Forces and being able to leverage capacities of Agencies and Allies is also crucial. If the new defence policy is to succeed, the Government must review not only policy objectives but also every major aspect of Defence organisation and administrative processes and methods as an essential first step<sup>36</sup>. We do have to earn our way back in the world but ours will never be the biggest force, so it must be smart, strategic, focused<sup>37</sup>. Clearly, Canada's National Security interests reside with our Forces' Military Capabilities, not with the Institution, and our Military's allegiance should be to Canadians. Fundamentally, this really entails a DND/CF cultural revolution, as a needed transformational catalyst, and changing culture is a question of leadership. This has been a key strength to ensure the DND/CF survival. Success in warfare depends on morale, which in turn depends on good leadership, and it doesn't cost much. However, the current DND/CF leadership is not geared towards change as it has emerged from its stability. CF human resources policies are essentially the pegs that hold the entire Institution firmly rooted in place<sup>38</sup>. Because all military capabilities are fundamentally human-centric, this is where transformation focus lacks. Capabilities are based on capacities of course, but the assumption is that people will engage their abilities.



**Implementation Articulated**

“Like humans, corporations must choose to master their fate, or doom themselves to be mastered by it<sup>39</sup>”. Therefore, redesigning the military is necessary, from culture as catalyst, to structure and all system types, the intent being to design with outputs/operations in mind and with people as key transformation enablers. A single integrated (perhaps unified) CF chain of Command is required, Domestically and Expeditionary; thus reinstating a CF Headquarters (CFHQ) with primary focus on military operations, our raison d’être<sup>40</sup>. Streamlining the Defence management framework by integrating into the Program Activity Architecture, which identifies the strategic outcomes, describes the supporting activities and organisational structure<sup>41</sup>,

is necessary. Strategic planning must also be integrated and become strategic management and thinking<sup>42</sup>. An integrated management readiness framework should engage all CF capabilities into one focused effort. Integrating the many disparate DND/CF ERPs and information management systems is also fundamental. Financially, efficient and responsible planning of any sort requires a stable predictable flow of funding<sup>43</sup>. Furthermore, zero-based budgeting should be adopted within the CF, on a 3-year cycle, tied to postings. The Joint Capability Requirement Board would be the strategic oversight of Program Management Board. Accelerating the material world, procurement process and capital equipment acquisition is also necessary; integrating various disconnected processes in a strategic level (national) equipping capability, leveraging Canada's National Industrial Base, accelerating procurement and opting for more off the shelf are all key. Infrastructure rationalization is also essential, in the constant search for efficiencies and value for money. Indeed, refocusing efforts into more modern infrastructure, better aligned with the requirement, will help alleviate the critical sustaining issue that is exponentially consuming the overall National Defence budget. There is no point forming task forces if synergies can't be found, clustering them in fewer strategic bases. And integrating all training capacities & abilities into a strategic level joint training capability is required: "Of all forms of personal development, none is more effective than learning on the job under a mentor<sup>44</sup>". Finally, an integrated strategic level capability to generate people must transcend organisational barriers. The HR system must evolve from fatherhood to adulthood; CF members competing for CF opportunities. Exploiting technological benefits of synthetic training environments or online HR management is cultural. Operationally, task forces would comprise of command, sense, act, shield, sustain & special capabilities<sup>45</sup>. What is the point having goalies in one place, defence in another, offence and the coach somewhere else? If task forces are to be the construct of the CF, then from the moment of generation on, a task force fuses: In other words, is generated, managed, equipped, trained, based, commanded as a single entity task force. Standing Task Forces would be domestically interagency responsible and have expeditionary focus areas. In essence, redesigning the CF, with outputs in mind and around people, is key to leveraging capabilities:



## **Strategic Conclusion**

Warfare remains Human-centric; Defence as history shows, is the extension of politics in military affairs. Weaknesses from the current defence posture are cultural, structural and systemic, primarily in their lack of integration. But the institution has clearly excelled thanks to its core military competencies of leadership, professionalism, esprit de corps & ethos. A strategic architecture is required to better align the Defence posture with the realities of the Security environment, building on capabilities as the basic building block. Indeed, capabilities are more than just assets or platforms; they are about the effect that can be achieved<sup>46</sup>. But capabilities only provide a vehicle by which to integrate the breadth of DND/CF capacities & abilities. Fundamentally however, this is based on the one assumption that people will engage their best of abilities. For the first time in the history of management, it is the human mind that is the primary creator of value<sup>47</sup>. Paradoxically then, we should not employ a Network-enabled metaphor but a Human-enabled one. This is especially true if we consider that Strategic victory in modern warfare is synonymous to Moral victory. If it is the ball of snakes we are facing, in the operational context of a three-block-war<sup>48</sup>, then integration is key. Strategically, the crux of the issue is: “Old business models prove insufficient to deal with new realities<sup>49</sup>”. There is no more need for two antagonistic Defence entities; CF military capabilities must become central. Over consumption of Defence resources not for military capabilities, has led to structural disarmament<sup>50</sup>. Amidst all the transformational talk, fundamental integration is the one strategic leverage to our success. Real transformation is one that takes root within the minds of those participating in the change process<sup>51</sup>. Thus, redesigning National Defence with outputs in mind and people at heart really is the key to success. “To effect transformation (make fundamental change) it is necessary to change those critical processes<sup>31</sup>”. Leadership has always made the day: It is now more important than ever that CF leaders make choices<sup>52</sup>. And by establishing a new integrated strategic architecture, capabilities would truly leverage our people.

*“Generals do not victories make; Captains, Sergeants and Soldiers do<sup>53</sup>”*



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