

SYNOPSIS OF REMARKS TO CDA ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

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CANADA'S SECURITY INTERESTS – IMPACT ON THE CF

Mesdames et messieurs, merci d'être restés pour ce dernier panel.

I come to you today after finishing almost four years as the Chief of Staff of the only NATO headquarters outside of Europe. To give you a sense of its importance, the headquarters is manned by more than 650 military and civilian officers and enlisted personnel from 24 of 26 NATO Nations. There are also nine Partnership for Peace (PfP) Nations represented in the HQ, such as Azerbaijan, Albania and Croatia. It is one of only two Strategic Commands within the NATO force structure. All operations are commanded by the other Strategic Command, Allied Command Operations. Our Command, Allied Command Transformation, has no geographic responsibilities; it is a functional command with its area of operations the "future." It acts as the permanent change agent of the Alliance's military forces.

Le sujet pour aujourd'hui est "L'impact sur les Forces canadiennes des intérêts de sécurité du pays." I would like to make three quick points to set the scene and provide some context to this discussion before I introduce my two panelists.

First, the security environment has changed. The threat is mainly from non-state actors and can be summarized as terrorism and extremism. This threat knows no boundaries; it has unclear norms and values; it lacks moderating influences; has no discernable centre(s) of gravity; it is continuously engaged; it is cell-based and globally networked. As described by General Schoomaker today, we are in an "era of uncertainty, unpredictability, misinformation, and misconception."

The “three-block-war” is blended into one concurrent activity involving military and non-military warriors.

So what, therefore, for the Canadian Forces and for Canada? The result is that Canada’s security interests are much more difficult to address and to assess; but this must be done. Il est donc d’autant plus difficile de déterminer les intérêts nationaux mais il faut le faire!

Secondly, flowing from the first point : We must deal with operations in a comprehensive approach; what is called in Canada I believe, a “whole of government” approach. In the military structure of NATO, this is referred to as an “Effects-based Approach to Operations.” In this approach, all elements of power need to be brought to bear to achieve the end-state, the solution.

I believe this has always happened on the ground in different missions to a different level of success, but there must be a higher-level acknowledgement and support for the approach (nationally and in NATO), well before a crisis. The creation in Canada of an Associate Deputy Minister focused on Afghanistan as explained by Ambassador Noble is a step in the right direction, but there must be other pragmatic moves forward right across government; this is not a military issue.

So what for the Canadian Forces? The Forces must therefore be trained and prepared to cooperate early – at the outset of a crisis – with the other elements of power. The linkages and relationships with other government departments and NGOs must be created well before a crisis. This means assigning Liaison Officers and Exchange Officers, mutual and joint participation in training, etc.

Because of their inherent hierarchy and ability to command and control, it is often an issue of the Canadian Forces assuming the leadership from the rear. In years past, we called this “unity of effort,” where there is a direct line of effort at all

levels, across all pillars, from the political to the tactical. I saw this work in the Medak pocket, I saw it work in the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone operation, and I have seen it on every instance of success in operations. An uncoordinated approach such as was used in Kosovo yielded no credit for Canada, in my opinion; but the approach used today in Afghanistan is much closer to the model we should be using. We have created there a Canadian footprint; we have brought along all assets and are trying to coordinate all efforts to create a “Canada message.” I applaud the CDS’s and Team Canada’s efforts in that regard.

Ceci m’amène à mon troisième et dernier point, l’OTAN.

Thirdly, NATO and its relevance to Canada. NATO is still an imperfect Alliance, but it is improving. For all its “warts,” it is a question for Canada of staying within the Alliance and trying to fix it or dropping it as too hard. We heard the Minister of National Defence earlier today refer positively about some of the ongoing issues Canada has with NATO. Nations are slowly but surely removing the caveats tying their forces’ hands, and we are seeing greater commitments of forces by Nations. This is a good thing. Another positive development is that there is an acknowledgement within NATO of the need for a comprehensive approach to operations as described earlier.

This is one of the reasons I believe NATO’s assumption of the ISAF task in Afghanistan will be the greatest test for the Alliance – its greatest transformational catalyst. Unless NATO is successful in Afghanistan, its relevance will be in question.

But we should not forget all the progress NATO has made over its 57+ years of existence; all the standardization work, for equipment and procedures; all the joint training accomplished and all the sharing of lessons over these 58 years. All non-NATO Nations want to adopt these procedures and standards, which

speaks to their acceptance worldwide. To my mind, NATO can continue to be useful for Canada and all Nations; but it must make further efforts to improve interoperability through the development and policing of standards.

In the end, we must remember that NATO is an alliance of sovereign Nations all with different national interests. When they coincide, nothing is more powerful; when they do not, it is powerless.

Ceci est la force de l'OTAN; c'est aussi sa faiblesse.

Donc, quel est l'impact sur les Forces canadiennes? Nous devons rester engagés; nous devons demeurer et forcer l'OTAN à changer, à améliorer davantage l'interopérabilité de ses forces militaires pour transformer vraiment l'Alliance.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Colleagues, my two panelists today will address the impact on the Canadian Forces from both the outside Canada view and the inside Canada view. They are LGen Michel Gauthier, Commander CEFCON, and LGen Marc Dumais, Commander CANCOM.