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Second Panel on CF Transformation

PRINCIPAL(S)/PRINCIPAUX: General Evraire, Moderator

Admiral J.Y. Forcier, Commander of Canada Command

Major General Michel Gauthier, Commander, Expeditionary Force of Canada

Major General Herb Petras, CD Chief, Reserves and Cadets

General Evraire: Ladies and gentlemen, may I request that you take your seats please. Mesdames et messieurs s'il vous plaît on est sur le point de débiter. Alors mesdames et messieurs, bienvenu encore une fois à cette 69ième session de la réunion annuelle de la Conférence des associations de la Défense. Cet après-midi, toujours un peu dans le même thème de restructuration, la transformation des forces armées canadienne, on a le plaisir de recevoir trois officiers de la haute direction du quartier général dans la personne de l'amiral Forcier, du général Gauthier et du général Petras.

This afternoon continuing on this morning's theme of discovering in some amount of detail the transformation, both part of the transformation process of the Canadian forces precisely having to do with the standing up of recent, the recent standing up on the 1st February of certain headquarters. We're delighted to have on this final panel of, our panel sessions three gentlemen who have, would obviously have something to say about these new headquarters. First of all and in order that they will be speaking, let me introduce first of all Admiral Forcier, Commander of Canada Command. Admiral Forcier, if I can turn the page to the right place and limiting myself to comments as I did this morning about their backgrounds in terms of what it is that they were in command of over time prior to they're taking their most recent appointments, Admiral Forcier commanded HMCS Algonquin in Halifax and also the Maritime Operations Group, Operations Group 4 in Victoria. In 1990-91, the Persian Gulf crisis, he was Deputy Chief of Staff Operations with the Canadian Naval Taskforce and later with the Canadian Forces Middle East Headquarters in Bahrein for which he was mentioned in this batch incidentally.

Chief of Staff Action Team for Transformation and now Commander Canada Command. Admiral Forcier will be the first of our three speakers. Our next speaker will be Major General Gauthier who sometime back was Commander of 4CER. You don't have to tell us how far back though and from that particular post took his unit on deployment as the lead UN unit in the former Yugoslavia in support of the initial United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) during the build up of that particular mission on Operation Harmony. Among other things he returned to former Yugoslavia as an Operational Commander, as UNPROFOR's Chief Engineer responsible for de-mining, infrastructure and force protection support and reconstruction efforts. In 2002, assumed operational command of Joint Taskforce Southwest Asia consisting of the Canadian battle group

ships and aircraft detachment deployed in support of the campaign against terrorism and later still appointed the first commander of the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command on 12 or the designated Commander on 12 September last and of course on the 1st of February, the defacto commander of that force. And our third speaker this afternoon, Major General Herb Petras.

Herb of course has spoken more than a few times to this particular audience always bringing very interesting and important insight regarding the reserves and of course Herb was appointed Director General Land Reserve, Director General Land Reserve in the Land Staff and in July 2003 Director General Land Combat Development in Kingston and now Chief, Reserves and Cadets as of December 2004. Please join me in welcoming our three speakers for this afternoon and the first of which of course who will grace our podium Admiral Forcier. Thank you. (Applause)

J.Y. Forcier: Merci général Evraire. Good morning ladies and gentlemen or good afternoon I should say by now, it is after lunch isn't it. It is indeed my pleasure to be here today to speak obviously about transformation and specifically Canada Command. It's also my first, very first participation in a CDA forum like this and I'm delighted to be here on the panel this afternoon. I would also like to thank you for coming back this afternoon, on a wonderful Friday afternoon. I see we still have a good attendance and we're looking forward obviously to engage you this afternoon. Like my fellow panelists I was allotted 20 minutes to holding remarks at the seam so to speak. You've heard clearly from the CDS this morning I think most of the message on Canada Command. You've also heard from Walt Natynczk who also covered some of the ground. So I may not take 20 minutes but I certainly want to take time to pass some messages and tell you what we do and to some extent tell you what we don't do in Canada Command.

But going back to Walt Natynczk's comment this morning about trying to find a label for his job and discussing things like maybe Mr. T and so on, at one stage I guess some of my colleagues were trying to find a label for me and of course it wasn't a big stretch to think about Captain Canada. (Laughter) I was reminded very quickly at one of our senior officers' forum from Tom Ring, our ADM for Public Affairs, that if you want to get this idea out of your mind once and for all, is imagine me and my svelte physique in tights, in a cape. (laughter) So you never want again to think of me as Captain Canada. (Laughter) My own involvement in CF transformation actually has been going on for a full year.

I was very fortunate to be asked by the CDS a year ago, just after he took command, to lead one of the CDS action teams that Walt mentioned this morning. I specifically looked at Canadian forces command and control arrangement and as you would imagine the way things evolve as you look at one specific focus you cannot look at it in isolation so it spilled into a lot of issues. We work clearly on the command and control aspect, as I said the first tenet, and our initial deductions led us to some recommendations, one could say even confirmation for the need to put a much more dedicated effort on operations both at home and abroad and obviously this is what we're doing now, this is what we've talked about as well as realizing the benefit of separating the operational functions and the operational support functions of the Canadian forces from the strategic military and departmental functions. Let me take an issue dead on which I'm surprised wasn't raised this morning.

I realize there's a limited time for questions but there were hints early in our work, February, March, April timeframe that we were attacking the construct of National Defence headquarters and then let me tell you it was never the intent of de-construct NDHQ but rather simply to change our mentality here to create a more enhanced capability to plan and execute military operations while having an opportunity to refocus the strategic level on strategic issues and I think what you've seen so far in the briefings today is where we've gone. I'll first admit that the CDS action team work certainly from February to June was extremely exciting. It was difficult and in our developed potential courses of action we were challenging every bits of the organization we work for and we certainly stepped on some toes including I must admit the ECS' which all of them I counted as my friend, I hope that they are still too but really the final report did challenge our

organization overall to possibly go beyond what we've done today for force employment but of course as a decision step here and quite frankly the capacity for change, the CDS wisely decided that the first tranche here would be to focus very much on separation of force employment away from NDHQ and still leave, and strongly leave the ECS' to do the force generation and of course I talk about force employment from my side and of course General Gauthier has the flip side of my mandate with the international realm which he'll speak about. Malgré qu'on a annoncé le démarrage si je peux dire de mon commandement le premier février, la réalité c'est que le commandement du Canada a été créé le premier juillet 2005 par un décret ministériel.

J'ai appris de mon affectation comme premier commandant à peu près un mois avant. Mon mandat initial était de superviser l'état major de 60 quelques personnes afin de mettre sur pied le quartier général, de compléter le cycle de formation sur le processus de planification opérationnel, aussi de raffiner notre concepte d'opérations et développer un plan de travail afin de combler certaines lacunes dans nos capacités et dans certains de développer des processus mieux adaptés à la réalité post 9-11. From the onset, my team and I saw our role as pretty clear, to improve the Canadian forces' ability to respond to domestic requirements by viewing Canada as a single operational area with a single integrated structure that brings the best available military resources from across the country to bear on any crisis or contingencies wherever it occurs nation-wide and in fact continental-wide.

That is to say one commander with authority to gather a clear picture of all Canadian forces assets readiness in Canada to direct planning and execute operations, one commander in charge of the defence of Canada who also acts as the prime coordinator for support to other government departments, for assistance to law enforcement and of course consequence management. I think the message was clear this morning, Canada Command is not the DCDS of yesterday. We are an operational command. We are directly responsible to the CDS for planning and execution of all routine and contingencies, domestic operations as well as continental operations as I've just mentioned with US North Com and potentially Mexico and to do this of course I've received a great deal of authority from the Chief of Defence Staff, delegated authority which we've never had before and by this I go right to the realms of basically mission assignment, in some cases rules of engagement and so on. So we have a lot more autonomy than we ever had before. I should point out though that my jurisdiction does not include NORAD which we still have as a viable, bi-national treaty arrangement. However, we work very closely with NORAD and US North Com on a daily basis.

In fact I've been saying folks that we're looking at ourselves as a ..inaudible.. of capability to protect the continent. Now to help me discharge my functions and help the completion of the realities of the complexity of force generation the CDS as you heard this morning has appointed six regional commanders who otherwise work for the environmental chiefs as force generators. They are my six standing regional joint taskforce commanders. The taskforces are Joint Taskforce Atlantic with Rear Admiral Dan McNeil in command from Halifax, le lieutenant brigadier Lucien Bérubé de Montréal commande la Force d'opération inter-armée S qui comprend le Québec, Joint Taskforce Central covering Ontario where Brigadier General Guy Thibault of course works out of Toronto, Joint Taskforce West covering the Prairie provinces with Brigadier General Tim Grant working out of Edmonton, Joint Taskforce Pacific covering BC Rear Admiral Roger Gerard in command and of course Joint Taskforce North covering the three territories with Colonel Norm Couturier from Yellowknife in command.

I want to emphasize that these commanders are responsible for integrated regional military planning and they have the operational control of all assigned assets for deliberate and routine tasks while they have automatic operational command to task all resources in their area when a need for rapid response contingency operation is voiced. All assets in their region in case of emergency is what we're saying here. No need to call home on the first hour. At this juncture, I want to emphasize two things, that while these joint taskforce commanders are entrusted to keep and enhance situational awareness especially as it relates to the possible request of assistance

from the Canadian forces, when they do so they remain in support of federal departments or in some cases provincial governments and the second point I want to emphasize, and this is a drastic change in our philosophy and it's going to take some time to operationalize it, to make it more robust, is that the practice of using the commander of northern region as simply what I call a landlord or host to visiting forces has seized.

The commander of Joint Taskforce North is the commander for operations in the north. The days of the three ECS' doing their force generation or force employment on his footprint independently is no longer tolerated. He's responsible for the operations in the north. Now an important addition to my command structure is the commander of the Canadian Air Division in Winnipeg who has been appointed as the Canadian Forces Air Component Commander or CFAC for Canada and now conducts complete air planning processes for Canada in issues of national air tasking order on my behalf. Now air tasking orders are not new in the business but we never had before a national ATO and this process has been created by my need for awareness, my need for my subordinate commanders to have immediate awareness of assets availability and forecaster availability. So it's driven by the rapid reaction process and this process allows as I said not only visibility but also since we have an integrated national planning scheme here when we have conflict I have the hammer to referee the requirements. À cette étape vous vous dites probablement so what comme on dit en anglais.

Sur le plan domestique nous avons déjà fait une fière histoire d'assistance à nos concitoyens canadiens. La plupart d'entre eux assument aussi que nous avons une cible de plan cohérent pour la défense du Canada. Plusieurs parmi vous savez que c'est pas tout à fait vrai. Environmental commanders formation basis units have clearly filled the void to super vacuum, fill space the best they could. They have not, we have not always had a very robust National Defence planning effort and no cohesive forecasting in what I call weather gauging of national events which have clear potential for an outcome that will be translated in the demand for the Canadian forces here to assist. Yes we clearly responded well to crisis, we have a proud history as I said. We were there when we were asked but at the same time we were very limited to do deliberate planning and sustaining large operations if we had to in the country and the process to request and respond to support other government departments and fellow Canadians and our neighbours to the south is excruciatingly slow and bureaucratic. We're working on that one.

Those are the kinds of issues we're trying to fix with having a dedicated man that focuses on Canada and the continent. I promised you to, before I talk to you I guess about the, what I promised you to do about what we are and we are not, I'd just like to mention the reality of course as you watch the split away from NDHQ and the reality of working in the environment of Ottawa and the reality of working with allies to the south. What I'm really saying here is being a commander, a theater commander on your own soil brings some interesting twists, many challenges. The point of entry for requests for support of course can come from anywhere into our organization anywhere from a joint taskforce level, from local and provincial government request or through a host of federal departments here in Ottawa or through NDHQ or from NDHQ to ourselves.

Of course our national partners the OGD's who are trying to build a stronger bond and relationship in this town are not structured the way defence is structured. They certainly have no rigid separation of strategic and operational boundaries. On top of that my key continental partner to the south, US North Com, has really a hybrid strategic operational mandate. As a combatant commander under the US unified command plan, he really has a foot in both camps and therefore one of our top challenges is to maintain a good flow of information with a strategic joint staff of various operational branches of all the key government departments and of course my US counterpart. As I said finally I promised to tell you what we are and what we're not. So starting with what we are not, we're not force generators so we are not responsible for bases and wings or what to do on behalf of the ECS. We are not NDHQ and therefore we are not in the business of developing national policies and we are not an extension of NDHQ which quite frankly sometimes

is the natural pull so we do not participate in all the strategic fora and the corporate meetings of the Department of National Defence. We are however the parent command for northern region. With the dissolution of the DCDS group we have to establish an ECS like relationship with Joint Taskforce North as the higher headquarter. We are an operational command. We are the sole point of operational contact with US North Com and we cooperate with NORAD. We are exchanging situational awareness with the six joint taskforce commanders 24-7 and we're open for business 24-7.

We are re-visiting all key national contingency plans and we'll be developing others. We are the command that conducts mission analysis for all domestic and contingency operations. We are nosy and we're learning to lean forward and providing not only the Chief of Defence Staff but certainly providing others with an integrated view of defence of Canada in our territory and of course we remain poised to support others when legally requested for assistance. In conclusion, I'm privileged to bring along one of the five pillars of transformation, Canada Command. This emerging command has great potential and in the few days we've been in full operation, our awareness of CF asset readiness, our awareness of our national and regional issues has increased significantly so we can be more effective, relevant and responsive. Thank you.
(Applause)

Michel Gauthier: How's that? Good back there? Monsieur le président, mesdames et messieurs, bonne après-midi. I do want to thank you for the opportunity to provide this overview of my life as it is today and I have to say that this is a little bit of a daunting challenge for me in the sense that I don't think I've been successful in trying to explain what CEF Com is all about in under 45 minutes to any other audiences that I've done this for but I will do this in less than 20 minutes this afternoon or feel free to pull out the big hook and cause me to sit down. J'ai été nommé tout comme le général Evraire l'a mentionné le 12 septembre de l'an passé comme commandant désigné du Commandement de la force expéditionnaire du Canada. Between mid-September and January quite frankly my focus has been almost exclusively on building a team, building a headquarters in order for us to be positioned to be operationally effective in command of current operations on the 1st of February of this year.

So an awful lot of my challenge, in fact virtually all of my challenge and my focus for the past several months has been on the here and now, on the near term objective of the 1st of February but of course there is more to CEF Com than that. I almost said next slide but I guess I have control here, we'll see if that works. Notwithstanding the fact that that has been my focus, what I'd like to do over the next 20 minutes or so is to talk a little bit about what we are, what we do and more importantly where we're going which in essence in a number of slides I think you'll probably interpret as my vision for the way forward with CEF Com. So here's what I'm going to talk to you about and if you can think of this as I'm speaking at three different levels. The first level is the Canadian forces writ large and its expeditionary capabilities, writ large and Walt Natynczk's presentation this morning, Andrew Leslie's presentation this morning, the CDS' presentation this morning were about the Canadian forces but a huge part of that is about CEF Com and what will be CEF Com business. So there's expeditionary capabilities writ large. At a level below that there's Expeditionary Forces Command. In other words what I will command over a period of time and that will be transient as force generators over periods of time provide me forces to employ on operations and then the third level I guess much closer to home for me today is my headquarters itself and I'll give you some insight, a little bit of insight into that also this afternoon.

If you scan this slide, if you are able to scan this slide and I can only hope here that before hand les francophones parmi vous aviez choisi des sièges de ce côté ici de la salle parce que ce côté ici est en français, English on that side, otherwise I can simply hope that you have great 20-20 vision. This captures an awful lot of, not nearly as eloquently obviously, of what the CDS' has been talking about for the last year and what it is from my perspective is our extract, our broad mission analysis of the essential elements of the defence policy statement of last year shaped according to the CDS' vision and then extracting from that what is relevant to a Canadian

Expeditionary Force Command. So the notions of relevance, responsiveness and effectiveness are tactically decisive. The notion of focused effects which you will hear repeatedly in this presentation, which you've heard repeatedly from the CDS earlier and getting the right mix of forces to the right place by and at the right time to achieve the right results.

The notion of a three block war which I will say more about, the focus on failed and failing states, modern capabilities and force structure, you heard a little bit about this morning. Integrated effort which I'll talk more about. Perhaps most important on this slide from my perspective and from the Chief's perspective when he looks either J.Y. or I squarely in the eyes, it's about a command centric operationally focused organization. So we've gone from a structure where we had a DCDS who is responsible for many different things and from the DCDS position we now have four operational commanders plus a director of staff within National Defence headquarters, each of whom has a slice of that and what that means is I have or he has in me, the CDS has in me an individual who is able to devote all of his time, all of my time to international operations and another who is able to devote all of his time to commanding domestic and continental operations and that has to be a good thing for the Canadian forces.

It's also about having a headquarters or a headquarters each of us that are exclusively focused on operations, unencumbered by all of the other distractions and challenges associated with a National Defence headquarters. Again a huge gain from the perspective of those who conduct operations today. The other elements of this I'll cover on subsequent slides so I'll skip along here in the interest of the 20 minutes. The essence of what we do is captured on this slide and again I don't think there's a word in here that was not used by the CDS this morning in reflecting on the way forward for the Canadian forces. I'll simply let you read that. Again from my perspective a key which I will come back to is the notion of effects, strategic effects. Next slide, next slide, I've got the switcher. In a slide the concept that underpins expeditionary forces operations, again much of it already explained certainly in our literature.

Working from the top center of the slide, it's about partnerships, partnering to deliver decisive strategic effects on behalf of the Government of Canada in failed and failing states, making a difference in people's lives where they need our help. It's also about three D plus C, not a particularly helpful label but whole of government and I'll come back to that notion when I speak more about the three block war. The enabling forces are the tools that I will use to achieve those strategic effects again are reflected in the graphic whether they be the Standing Contingency Taskforce which the CDS alluded to this morning or mission specific taskforces and on the left of the graphic is essentially my value proposition, where we will add value, where my headquarters will add value and I as the commander of Expeditionary Forces will add value and I'll come back to this also again in a minute.

I'm not going to dwell on the Standing Contingency Taskforce because if you'll pardon the pun it's not my part ship right now. I have my hands full commanding and controlling today's operations and in fact CMS has been given the lead in developing the capability concept associated with the Standing Contingency Taskforce. Of course I have a voice in that, the ECS' have a voice in that and sooner rather than later I will have ownership of the capability itself but for the time being CMS has the lead in developing the concept. Again it's the same theme fully integrated. Land, sea, air and special operations forces trained and certified to deploy quickly within 10 days. Equipped, trained, positioned, in some cases forward position based on warning scenarios, to be where it needs to be to quickly achieve strategic effect and as the CDS mentioned this morning initial operating capabilities for the SCTF, we're looking at 2008.

Mission specific taskforces can be anything. Taskforce Afghanistan, 2,200 men and women under Brigadier General David Fraser in Afghanistan today with soldiers, not too many sailors but certainly airmen and women, it is a mission specific taskforce. We also have, and this is a transitional function, we have had for a number of years a joint operations group with a deployable joint headquarters and until the SCTF has matured we will retain a small core

deployable headquarters capability in Kingston which will enable effective command and theater activation for some new missions and for high readiness requirements such as the DART or non-combatant evacuation operations. I suspect that the notion of the three block war is something that probably does not need a lot of elaboration in this forum. My personal view is the term, I first heard the term three block war when I was a student at the US Army War College in 1997, then coming out of the Marine Corps Charles Prulac (ph) addressed us and referred to the three block war and his vision of a three block war which essentially what is captured in the slide that we have here. It's almost too simplistic a notion now. What it's really about is that the 21st century security environment that we must operate in in which you can't separate in many cases whether it's Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Haiti, DRC, you can't separate security from governance from development.

They are all linked and each is a chicken and an egg and military commanders when they deploy to these places have to understand that in certain circumstances they will have a huge leadership role to play just as David Fraser does today in Afghanistan or will soon have in Afghanistan. Bear with me here, my apologies. In that context, in the context of the 21st century battle field, partnerships are absolutely vital. I have to tell you that personally this is my main effort is building those partnerships at the operational level in an international context and in a Government of Canada context. To make sure of that we have the greatest potential for synergy that we possibly can have in operations. It's a very important role for us to play and as I say one that I and my staff have already committed quite some time to. Referring back to the notion of expeditionary capability, this slide tries to capture an end state of sorts for Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command but it really is about capability much of which I've already alluded to and therefore I won't work my way through the slide in detail, I'll highlight again the notion of, as is indicated in red, fully integrated and unified which is a concept that I suspect again many in the audience understand well. Integrated again goes beyond, it goes beyond joint and it goes beyond military to a fully integrated effort.

It's all about what the PRT is doing in Kandahar and it's about what my headquarters is doing in concert with Foreign Affairs and CIDA and the RCMP and others in Ottawa to set the conditions for those that have deployed to Afghanistan to succeed. The notion of focused, timely and decisive effects, again I've mentioned several times but for so long in the Canadian forces our planning has revolved around projecting capability to be given to someone else as opposed to determining what strategic effects the government wishes to achieve or wishes its military to achieve on behalf of the Government of Canada and forming forces for that purpose, developing a campaign plan and managing that campaign plan over a period of time. Well this is what we're going to begin to do with a CEF Com like capability. The notion of a rapid response, and again three block war environment, I don't need to dwell on that. What CEF Com headquarters will do as a headquarters in terms of scanning, planning, shaping, synchronizing, sustaining, all of which is aimed at effective response to emerging threats.

A relatively new notion is the last one, the reference to integrated managed readiness which from my perspective is about much more of a continuum as opposed to a division between force generator and force employer. Responsibilities are overlapping. Force generators, the service chiefs, the army, navy and air force obviously are the force providers but I am the force employer who has to help in the shaping of those capabilities, preparation of those forces so they serve the desired purposes whether it be in Afghanistan or elsewhere and we hope to do much better at that than we've been able to do in the past. Implicit through much of what I've said but not stated explicitly is the big change with CEF Com today is the fact that I've stood up a separate headquarters from the J staff in NDHQ located in Startop, co-located with Canada Command headquarters, able to focus on, exclusively on international operations and the key principles established, discussed between the CDS and I before I developed the final structure for my headquarters was this alignment, where I hoped or perceived that we needed to be adding value and then resourcing in the right places to be able to do that within the headquarters and again what you see in red is much of what I've spent the last several minutes talking to you about.

Implicitly in all of this of course is that there were in my mind at least perceived gaps in each of these areas.

Getting back to notion of force preparation is the role that I would hope we will play in shaping future capabilities based on my view and my headquarters' view and deployed forces' view of what's required on operations and in some cases that is shaping in the near term so turning new capabilities over in a or new TTP's or new processes, procedures and so on in a 24 hour cycle when it's necessary in response to an IED strike for instance and in other cases it's about turning something around over a period of years where there's longer term development required. One message on this slide and it's much more of an internal message but I'll share it with you anyway, that in our transformation process we are much closer to the beginning than we are to the end of the process.

If you look at where 1 February is, this is day 24 for CEF Com. We have some ways to go yet and to show that in another way, if you consider the things that General Natynczyk is working on and the things that the Canadian forces at large, the services together with Andy Leslie and the future Chief of Force Development, as they what they are planning comes into being our expeditionary forces capability will grow obviously. A final good word goes to what we are doing and there is certainly no intent on my part to have you actually be able to read what's on that slide nor for me to speak to each little box on the slide but this is what we are involved in operationally around the globe today. 18 missions, almost 3,000 men and women of the Canadian forces with a huge chunk of those obviously employed on Operation Archer, Operation Athena, Operation Argos, all of which is in Afghanistan but also small numbers in a number of other places who are also achieving strategic effect whether it's Colonel Michel Duhamel who is the Canadian Chief of Staff of Manoosta (ph), the UN operation in Haiti playing an absolutely vital role there in support of that mission or Colonel Barry McLeod who has been deployed there for the last two months and played a very direct role notwithstanding what you might read in the papers in supporting the electoral process again as a lone Canadian.

I could go on with those kinds of examples. With each of these small missions we are achieving significant impact, strategic effect from a Canadian perspective and I put this slide up also to say that whereas much of what I've talked about is the future, the way ahead with respect to transformation viewed from a CEF Com perspective, while I'm doing that this is job one and certainly will continue to be job one for the foreseeable future. I look forward to your questions. Thanks very much. (Applause)

Herb Petras: I want to do a sound check as well. Are we okay back left there? Is everything okay on the right hand side? Good, thank you very much. A couple of caveats before I begin. Those of you who were paying attention yesterday, one of our academics talked about the format of the presentation. I'm going to use that format he talked about, the military one, you know, where I tell you what I'm going to say and then I'm going to say it and then I'm going to say what I said at the end kind of thing to make everybody got it. I'm going to begin though with some summarizing the key messages in my brief presentation in case numbness Friday afternoon after lunch has started to set in. If you pick up the second slide you'll get the key messages of what I've got as well. A pleasure for me to be here. C'est un honneur pour moi d'être ici avec mes collègues. For those who speak French I've got a présentation en français à gauche, your gauche not mine and English over on this side. At lunch time one of the members in the audience here had made a comment about the CDS' remarks this morning and said how terrific they were and how they have generated so much enthusiasm and have created so much momentum and the team that's been doing the presentation today is part of that team that's caught in that enthusiasm and is helping to deliver that momentum and I have to tell you that as reservists we're very much a part of that team who is helping to deliver on that momentum.

The CDS also talked about how important it was to get the message out to Canadians and the messages have to be correct and there are some optics here this afternoon that perhaps are

evident or not self-evident. What is the Chief of Reserves and Cadets doing sitting in a panel with two operational commanders? We do not want to get the message out that I have now become the operational commander of all reserves, that is not the case and isn't going to be the case in an integrated Canadian forces. But the optics are important because it demonstrates the increasing importance that reservists have played in the last dozen years but in the last five particularly in support of day to day operations and I'll be able to tell you that because of my involvement with NATO, that NATO is going down that same road, that all nations who have reserves similar to our structure, those that are coming out of the construct model and going to our structure realize that reservists cannot sit there only as a mobilization base, have lots to contribute to immediate operations but there needs to be a balance. And so, I'm not an operational commander, as a matter of fact I really don't command anything except for a small staff, deliver a world class youth program with cadets on behalf of the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, work for the CDS as his reserve advisor and with members of Armed Forces Council and I use the reserve generals and flag officers as a way of ensuring that anything that we do at the CF level, policies and procedures are put into place to set reserves up for success.

So, here are the key messages. The reserve role, even though the roles as articulated in the environments are confirmed, there's a shift and there has been a shift from purely a strategic role as reservists to one that is both strategic and operational and I'm going to talk a little bit about that in terms of how the reserves will support Canada Command and CEF Com. The other thing I'm involved in is Canadian forces transformation. You heard General Natynczk and General Leslie this morning talk about that and General Natynczk particularly talked about the enablers that are going to enable strategic and operational enablers. That was the term I think that General Natynczk used. Well the reserve vision that I'm going to be responsible for producing so that the CDS can issue it as a directive is part of that, is part of my job and the last part of the key messages that I want to make everybody understands is that we are not turning over the applecart starting from a clean sheet of paper, we're going to build on the successes that have been so hard earned particularly over the last years in each of the environments.

The only thing that we're going to try and do is to bring more of a CF focus to what been an environmentally driven process to date. I like using this slide because it always has an impact and I'll begin by telling you a little about where we are and who we are. Some of you heard this last year but if you're new a little reminder is probably not such a bad thing. There's the regular full-time folks across the country. We did a better job with the slide this year. Last year I think we had Gagetown sitting out in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean and somebody objected to that. Why, exactly. (Laughter) Here's where the primary reserves are across the country and here's a group that General Natynczk said that we're very interested in as well, the Canadian Rangers spread throughout our north. So, some pretty terrific capabilities covering this vast country, small but very capable. I'm going to bring up each of the reserve entities in the Canadian forces.

I've rounded off the numbers for context. If you can see a little difference between the numbers that I have here and the ones that General accrual accounting Leslie has said this morning, they're really only minor and it's purely for context but approximately 25,000 folks are serving in the primary reserve at this point and you can see the way they're broken down there. The NDHQ PRL, the primary reserve list at NDHQ, those are reservists who are working largely on a full-time basis but also part-time basis at National Defence headquarters and now equally important in the headquarters supporting Canada Command and CEF Com also. And then the rangers, proud of that group who so proudly on their own are members of the Canadian forces in the north, not the same terms of service as reservists and regulars have. As a matter of fact there's no compulsory retirement age up there and one of the rangers up there is in his 80's still providing valuable advice and guidance as an elder to one of the ranger patrol groups. Alright, let's talk a little bit about force employment. I think from the presentations you've had so far everybody understands the term of force employment really is how we use our capabilities, use our troops. I used this slide last year with respect to domestic operations.

This is just a way of demonstrating that through the 90's and into early 2000 reservists were used frequently. I use the ice storm as a pretty good example and I know the CDS has used that many times in the past as a wonderful example of CF capability responding to a civil emergency, integrated regular reserve, at that particular time it didn't really matter who was who, they were out and did a wonderful job and so what those things really demonstrate is that as part of CF capability reservists play a key role and have been successful in the past and will be in the future. Here are some of the principles that are tied into domestic operations, that the primary reserve are a key part of Canadian forces capability and they're employed by the Commander of Canada Command. That's the approach that we're taking enough though they're generated by each of the environments, army, navy and air force.

The CF essentially provides support to first responders and often is involved in what we call consequence management. Sometimes what happens afterwards although now with the kind of work that Canada Command is doing in contingency planning we're certainly going to be able to respond better. Reservists have started to put a model into place called Contingency Planning Officers and these are real community linked. Their job is to plug into the local emergency measures organization, not to run it, not to direct it, but to be the face of the Canadian forces locally and to be a continued extension of the operational headquarters that Canada Command has here in Ottawa and also in each of the six regions. Northern sovereignty is a huge focus. There's potential for reservists to do a number of things up there. There's potential for the rangers to do perhaps a bit more and we're looking at the roles, missions and tasks of the rangers to see what's appropriate for that kind of group to contribute and there's a strong interface between Canada and the US. I go regularly to the US to meet my American counterparts.

I think I may have mentioned last year that when I went down to Washington when the Armed Forces Council of which I'm a member goes to Washington I stay at home because there's no equivalent in the US Joint Chiefs of Staff as a reservist. They have a Major General on staff but it does not have the same level of participation as I do here in Canada and so that's kind of unique and it's something that's not lost on the reserve senior leadership in the US as well but they certainly want to be able to plug in better. This would be an opportunity for them to at least credibly try to influence what happens to the reserve components in their country and ours. International operations, I didn't use General Leslie's slide about invading Africa, I've just borrowed one of the slides that have been used by CEF Com and really have nothing to do with this slide other than the fact that reserves contribute to international operations both domestic and international, let's be clear about that. Just because of an increased interest in using reservists for domestic ops where it makes sense does not detract from the kind of contributions they are going to make internationally.

I'll show you in a minute where we're at. How are we going to do it? Individually and in formed groups. Somebody asked that question I think of Jay Seagle this morning, you know, what's better and so on. Well, where it makes sense, where it makes sense. I think when we were in Bosnia part of the planning that we got done at that point that if we'd stayed there until 2008 we were prepared to put a reserve heavy battle group into Bosnia, you know, where 80, 90% of the battle group would have been reservists, that was in the planning phases for the army and when you get into a mature theater or you want to give rest to regular formations and units, if the risk is appropriate reservists can absolutely do that. The other is we're going to provide new and enhanced capabilities two of which are already producing tremendous results. You hear an awful about CMC, civil military cooperation, that capability is virtually resident 100% in the reserve side of the house. They're the folks that are over in Kandahar right now. They're members of the provincial reconstruction team.

They link with the locals, they link with the non-government agencies. We have about 300 of those officers and NCO's currently involved in that program and they're a huge force multiplier. The caution we always save when we're putting capabilities like CMC into the reserves only, there has to sufficient critical mass to be able to sustain that and so we're careful about what we

put into the reserve component and we've learned lessons from our American friends across the border, you know, who've taken huge entities of their reserves and put them, capability put them into their reserves and there are some difficulties associated. Alright. There's the mandatory slide, I've updated it from last year. The last five years, 3,720 reservists have been involved in operations overseas in all of the ones that CEF Command is involved in. That's really hard to read but the bottom line on that slide is that it shows operations all across where the Canadian forces are and the percentage of people who are involved in them. I got an e-mail, you know, you try and stay current with these numbers, we have an officer on our staff who kind of tracks these things regularly through CEF Com and it said you may interested to know this is as of yesterday that ROTO 1, the brigade headquarters and the PRT in place in Kandahar, 23% of the personnel that are employed in this operation are reserves, 23% in Kandahar and that percentage of reserve personnel deployed on all international operations is now 19%. You notice that the Commander of Canada Command and CEF Com didn't mention reserve, didn't mention regular.

We don't think about it that way but I certainly do in a big way because when we send these folks out the door we want to make sure that they're successful and contributing to Canadian forces operations. I put this list up. As we go on force developing the Canadian forces as we start to look at capabilities that the Canadian forces needs for operations, there's a list of the number ones that are either already in place, that we're going to enhance or we're going to build and for those of you who were here last year you'll know that I said that we're building it not necessarily by re-rolling people but by using existing units and giving them cross training in kind of a secondary military occupation. So if somebody who does CMC may do CMC for 3 or 4 years and then go back into their unit and to the normal trade. Although we're beginning to find that CMC has created such a great degree of interest that people necessarily may not want to leave, it doesn't mean they have to change their hat badge to build that capability and so 300 CMC operators is a pretty nice contribution and I won't run through all of the examples but CIOPS is becoming increasingly more important from a reserve perspective. You'll notice in the other environments as well air field engineers, the air force air field engineers are a huge potential capability.

There aren't a lot of them but where there are places they are highly effective particular in domestic ops but also international ops and the navy has shifted its capability of navy intelligence virtually exclusively into the reserves. They used to be the naval controller shipping folks, they still do that kind of thing but naval intelligence now they're intelligence arm is a reserve capability. The health services specialists, what a great thing they've done in terms of bringing in specialists who wouldn't normally want to join the permanent force all at once but wouldn't mind going out for a few months, a few weeks so anaesthesia and special capability surgeons, there's a long list. They have them on a health reserve list and it's really hugely effective. Military police particularly in the army, we've now stood up four military police companies. It didn't take a lot of rocket science. Even before 2001 we were starting to move down that road because of the additional requirement for military police. Our MP's are kind of small pockets wandering around on their own.

They now have a life, they now have a progression, they have some equipment, they have regular support and I'll tell you on the security and intelligence on the military police end they're making a significant contribution and I won't mention the others at this particular point. Just briefly going to mention NATO because of the context yesterday. There's a committee in NATO called the National Reserve Forces Committee. It's a two-star level equivalent committee, 19 nations belong. Their job, and I'll mention exactly what it is in a moment, Canada is going to assume the chairmanship of that committee in 2006-2008. It's kind of a nice time to do that with General Henault over there as the chairman of the military committee. There's what the committee does and we know very well that, you know, this committee is one of 80 committees in NATO. Reserves are often fairly small on the radar screen and in the grand scheme of things but the one thing I've discovered in this committee is that there are only 4, actually wrong, 3 reserve two-stars who are reservists, the rest are all regulars well connected within their governments.

The reason most of them are regulars is because a lot of the new NATO countries still have conscripts in their reserves and they're part of the personnel but it's an opportunity I think to influence what happens in those militaries if you can come forward with some sensible things of how to re-shape reserves. The most important thing that this group does is to exchange information. Those of us who have sort of well established reserve programs, the new countries are particularly interested in finding out about these models. So you know the three are reservists, you may be interested in knowing who they are besides myself. There's a General two-star from Australia. Is Australia part of NATO? No but they're an associate member of this organization because they want to be plugged in and the other gentleman is the Duke of Westminster who is my counterpart in the UK. Most of you know of the Duke, Gerald Grosner, quite a wealthy well connected individual.

I discovered that he's the 6th Duke and I won't get into that in any more detail but if anybody wants to hear some Duke stories on the side I've got a few but he's a great fellow and he's terribly interested in what the reserves do in the UK. There's a little study they did, Canadian Reserve Support, somebody did a study about how many soldiers have supported NATO operations. S414 or ISAP, there we are almost 3,000. As a matter of fact the person that the study when he did the presentation said Canada is only second to the United States in terms of percentage use of reservists on NATO operations not counting countries who use conscripts of course because many countries use conscripts as their soldiers on operations.

So that's quite telling and significant as well. So we're really looking forward to getting into that, we're really looking forward to participating in that for the next couple of years. Alright. You heard about CF transformation from a number of people today and you heard that terrific address from the CDS this morning. So we're enthusiastic and one thing that has been very good about General Hillier as you know the direction is always clear and concise and working on a series of principles makes so much sense to set things up for success. The was mentioned this morning in various terms, here it is in a bit more detail. This is the CDS' 6th of 6 principles and for those that can't read it from back there it says regular reserve and civilian personnel will be more closely integrated into virtually every CF structure in order to ensure the best utilization of appropriate skills and experience at every level. So it doesn't matter what component you're in, what you bring to the job is what counts. There's a second direction from the CDS and one of the responsibilities that I've got along with the reserve general and flag officers and the wider community here is to produce the development of a reserve vision subordinate to the CF vision that articulates the role reverse forces will fulfill and support a CF transformation. This vision will speak to reverse force generation, force development, directly aligned to domestic, continental and international force employment requirements of the operational level headquarters.

This is something that we've been working at and I'll give you a bit of an example very quickly. The way we're approaching it is we're taking the principles that have led to success in each of the environments and building on them and we're going to put them into a framework that talks about principles of reserve service, talks about what kind of reserves there are in the country and then talks about principles under force development, force generation and force employment. Here's a couple of quick examples. We want to reaffirm the overall role of augmenting the regular force by adding depth and breadth as well as maintaining the vital link to communities. So the roles that are generally articulated in the environments are really something that we want to confirm. We want to confirm that the hallmark of reserve service is its voluntary nature and that the force development, this is one of the things that we're looking at, we're saying while there must an overall CF focus, roles requirements and structure of each environment will lead to recommendations to unique solutions for the integration and use of reserves.

Consultation is the key to success. Under force generation, some of these are motherhood, demands for training and operations must respect the time available and under force employment, reservists will normally provide depth to fill existing formations but they can also do specific tasks and missions. So there's a series of principles under each one of these things that

we're hoping to be able to bring to the CDS shortly and he will be able to issue that as part of the enablers in CF transformation. Alright, this is the mandatory wiring diagram. This shows the Chief of Reserves as the center of the universe in the Canadian forces (laughter) if you look at very carefully but in reality what it's intended to do is that the Chief of Reserves and Cadets, I just want to show you where the role fits. You remember I said earlier we run a youth program for the Vice-Chief and we provide advice to the CDS and Armed Forces Council but I'm also at times able to provide advice to the operational commanders when it has to do with employment of reserves.

We've also got Chief of Transformation up there. Walt Natynczk and I have been working very very closely to make sure that anything that impacts on reserves is carefully thought out before we get into it. There's a thing called the Chief of Reserves Council. There are 12 general officers and flag officers in the reserve. A number of them are part of my advisory council, so when I speak to the CDS or speak at Armed Forces Council I can speak credibly because I'm representing the folks that are out there. Nobody is shy about giving me advice about the kind of things I should bring forward. We also have a transformation steering group that is really part of General Natynczk's organization and we have a reserve working group that's sponsored by HRMIL, Human Resources Military, and ourselves to make sure that the reserve policies that are going to allow reservists to more effectively and available for operations actually happen and I know the cynics out there are saying you've been talking about this for 10 years, right. Well, there's nothing like a little bit of impetus like the momentum that CF transformation has created that's going to try and fix some of those irritants that you've all talked about. Unfortunately for the reserves we've got a number of policies that are caught up in the Cold War. We have a number of policies that were developed and adjusted using band aids during the 90's as a result of Somalia and what came after that. So the policies are hugely complex. You try and mess with one, you mess up a whole bunch of other things and we're really starting to talk about a new personnel paradigm for the Canadian forces.

Maybe we've got to look at a full-time part-time construct and how the reserves play into that game. So, important to note that the purpose of this slide really is to say that reserves are fully engaged in CF transformation and consultation is key to making sure what it is that we're saying. There's the conclusion, indication of what I said at the beginning. Reserves are going to be fully integrated as a key part of the Canadian forces. It will be a challenge to figure out how to do that. Policies that apply to a full-timer don't always apply to a part-timer. How do you find the right balance? Support the domestic and international ops is going to become increasingly more important. What lessons that we learned from our allies and our own experience, how do we find the right balance between how much do we invest in the strategic reserve, how much do we invest in sending folks off to support operations but there's no doubt that the reserves willingly step up to the plate and deliver when required. More volunteers than we need at this particular point quite frankly for the positions available and that's a good thing. The question always is how long can you sustain it.

I mentioned NATO leadership role, it's an opportunity for Canada, small thing but you know what, an opportunity for us to project the way we do things, our values, the way we approach our reserve model and that is a very good thing and the last one, reaffirm CF transformation, we're build on the success of the environments to come up with a more CF focused model about where the reserves are at. That's it. Thank you very much. (Applause)

General Evraire: We have 15 minutes for questions and answers if you'd make your way to the microphones. Well, gee, Mike?

Question: Mike Jeffrey. Gentlemen, in a small military the challenge of finding a balance between effectiveness and efficiency is one that all of us in this room have grappled with and from my perspective the Canadian forces has done a superb job in recent years of honing the efficiency piece of that problem to a very very high level. We have not been as effective in maintaining effectiveness particularly from a command and control point of view and clearly of the

CDS' tenets of transformation is what you represent in terms of creation of that operational level of command and I highlight there's only two of the four of you sitting here and there's no doubt in my mind that we're going to see an improved level of effectiveness. But the question is what are the implications for efficiency? Certainly in the short to mid term because we've created a whole new approach to life here and the question is how are we or how or how do you envisage the delicate management of command and control? I'm referring to transfer of command authority issues between the force generators and the force employers, now four of you, and at the same time don't drive our soldiers, sailors, airmen and airwomen into the ground?

J.Y. Forcier: I'll take a stab at it first I guess from two perspectives. The effectiveness versus efficiency has obviously been forefront in the discussion for the last year and certainly in our business we're reminded every day from the Vice-Chief that there needs to be an efficiency component here as we develop our headquarters. What we've done collectively I think is migrate a lot of the positions that were embedded in the strategic staff. There is obviously a little increment because we do need to have a core capability in each of our headquarters and I say each of our headquarters I mean the four operational headquarters but we've also not talked much about it today here but from a support component most of the support effort is residing into the support command that Dan Benjamin is commanding.

So we have an initial synergy of planning capability in our headquarters and the big delivery of the big support plan in the execution to support functions done by Dan which quite frankly is re-grouping functions once again that were inter-mixed inside the operational level and strategic level before. The balancing act of keeping the future effort here is to make sure that we maintain that balance here and as I say we're reminded every day by the Vice-Chief. We can't afford to be creative in National Defence headquarters but at the same time we can't re-create the situation like before where the DCDS of the day was a member of 30 committees. I mean I remember distinctively as Chief of Staff J3 during the beginning of the campaign in Afghanistan having Admiral Madison in the headquarters for one week and I could never talk to my boss. I mean this is a situation we managed to develop before so I guess that's really the balance act here. I don't know if Mike you want to add anything?

Michel Gauthier: The first comment I would make is that someone's been reading our briefing slides (laughter) in terms of the balance. Not these slides but slides we've been briefing in terms of our proposals forward because it is a key issue. What is the balance between effectiveness and efficiency? Clearly from our perspective it's all about effectiveness. I mean that's the track that we are on. It's about operational effectiveness but we do continue to live in a resource constrained environment and I think that's, that will be the equalizer and right now there's been a little bit of a shift in the pendulum in favour of the operational commands as we stand up but the pendulum is going to shift back and forth and at some point, sooner rather than later reach the equilibrium based on the resourcing, really.

Resourcing will answer the question in terms of effectiveness versus efficiency. The other aspect of your question if I understand it correctly is of us as force employers and the force generators in the force preparation process and fortunately I was designated in my job early enough that the Commander of the army and I were able to work through that over the last almost six months in the preparation of this rotation into Afghanistan. We had some very good discussions and there's clearly some grey there, there's no question about that but fundamentally the issue there is about balancing service, readiness, imperatives as identified by individual services on a standing basis in the context of their management readiness frameworks that exist right now according to which they determined based on the money that they're allocated the level to which they will train and maintain forces prepared to a certain level of readiness on a cyclical basis. That has to be balanced with my more specific need for a certain type of force and what that simply means is that I as the international guy need to have influence at the front end of the preparation process to a much greater extent than I have tended to have or that we have tended to have in the past.

These are things that certainly with the army because our contribution to Afghanistan is land centric, the army commander and I have discussed, I can tell you there's actually, there's no space between us, we see things pretty much the same way and the real issue is my ability based on the, getting back to the effectiveness versus efficiency issue, there's a lot of those desks that aren't filled right now that would contribute to providing the capability guidance that needs to be provided at the front end of a mission.

J.Y. Forcier: Maybe I need to add a specific comment here, maybe there's a perception out there that Canada Command is hoarding troops, I'm not. I mean I have the standard immediate reaction units that we've always had provided by the three services. What I do have as Mike said is an influence in the future through the integrated management readiness system as to demands of their forecast. Take the example of the Olympics, you know, we're going to have obviously a forecast here that will demand a significant amount of troops that will be a major line of tasking for the Canadian forces.

That will be counted in the integrated management readiness system. The bulk of the troops I use every day in fact are arising in emergency and all bets are off when it's defending Canadians. So it's not necessarily troops in high readiness. There could be troops that are back in garrison. The reality is that I see Mike as the first draw on the long term planning of forces to do our expeditionary force and I keep tabs of his demands and what's left in the cupboard. Clearly as we move forward we're probably going to have unique demands of our own but right now we haven't determined those.

General Evraire: David?

Question: David R., Institut canadien d'études stratégiques. Ma question est pour le général Gauthier et aussi pour vous mon amiral. On a déjà discuté ce sujet juste avant le déjeuner et c'est lié à la question qui a été posée par Mike Jeffrey. If we look at the CF as a spear, the refurbishing of the command structure looks like we're refurbishing the shaft or part of the shaft. The journalists and the public with whom I deal on a daily basis is interested mostly in the pointy end and word around the water cooler is that the establishment of the commands while necessary has at least a short term negative effect. In other words it's gone through the forces like a syph, taken out very very talented and key people in order to staff the commands with the result that for example the training system is left with the short end of the stick to coin a phrase. Now I'm wondering if you can reassure the assembled congregation that even if that is the case that at least in the medium term some sort of balance is going to be restored so we're not putting ourselves in the rather curious position of having a wonderful command structure but no forces in the field to command.

Michel Gather: I guess the only thing I take umbrage there was you referred to a spear, a syph and a shaft and you sort of referred to us and our headquarters as the shaft piece. (Laughter) I would much rather have been perceived as a syph or a spear obviously with my warrior mentality. I think you, if what you said is your belief or if it's not you David then those that are suggesting that we've taken this out of the hides of the field force that's not right, it just isn't. The reality is from my headquarters, for instance the manning of my headquarters, the lion's share of that if the truth be told came from those that were doing the job in NDHQ and they were simply shifted over to the Startup.

There isn't that perfectly linear relationship obviously but I can tell you that the likes of Major General Walt Natynczk, Major General Andrew Leslie have gone to great lengths to remind us and to keep everyone honest about what this is really all about and again I go back to what I said a number of times in my presentation, it is about achieving strategic effect on behalf of the Government of Canada. I really believe that. It is about achieving some predetermined desired effect. I think we have an important role to play in that and that will cause what we deploy our forces to do overseas not to be negator, is an element of this. So I think that there is value to be

added by us beyond just another level of headquarters. At the same time if we were going to be doing this on the backs of deployable sea based capability, deployable land capability or the enablers in terms of air lift and close air support and so on, I'd be the last to support it. So we're very mindful of that sort of a concern.

General Ervaire: Both of you will notice that Admiral Porter stood up to that microphone after these two gentlemen stood up behind theirs. Unless sir you are a member of the senior service I'm compelled by tradition to ask Admiral Porter (laughter) to pose his question.

Question: Thank you General Ervaire. This is a question for General Petras. He hasn't said much about cadets today and I'm the national President of the Navy League of Canada. I do agree with your first statement which was the Canadian cadet organization is one of the finest youth movements in the world and I've been in a position to judge other sea cadet programs against ours and they don't hold a candle to it. For the people in the audience I just want to cast a wide net to tell you what the Canadian Cadet Organization is about. There are 55,000 cadets in Canada. They're commanded and trained by 6,000 CIC officers and I think the budget is somewhere around 150 million dollars. Two years ago there was a study which attempted to assess the contributions made by volunteers and organizations like mine, the Air Cadet League and the Army Cadet League, and that came out to 43 million dollars. So 140, sorry, 150 and 43 gets you almost a 200 million dollar program. In the current organization, the Director of Cadets reports up through your chain to the CDS and at the regional level we have regional staff officers who in fact manage the operations of the cadet program. You can see where I'm going. What does the transformation do for the cadet organization? Will the D Cadets organization staff merge somehow with the regional organization line? Where does a D Cadets organization wind up and will there be any reduction to the budget for the Canadian Cadet Organization? Thank you.

Herb Petras: Thank you very much. That was several points but let me tell you that the title I've got as Chief Reserves and Cadets I'm very proud of the cadet portion of it. I didn't speak about cadets today because this was an operationally focused reverse talk, it was a NATO theme. But I fully agree with everything you said and I think I tried to sum it up, you know, world class youth program with not just all those 6,000 CIC officers but many many thousands of other parent volunteers that really make it work. The nub of your question is what CF transformation is going to do to the cadet organization. Right now we've got a huge amount of top cover for the cadets.

The Vice virtually runs it personally supported by myself and a Director General Reserves and Cadets who is Commodore Roger McIsaac. Plus there's a four ringer Colonel who is D Cadets. When I went out last summer I did cadet immersion and I went around to the various camps to talk about it and I guess at that stage to give you an indication of how well thought of D Cadets was when I introduced myself they wanted to know if I worked for D Cadets because he's such a powerful entity in their world. There's no intention whatsoever to get rid of the top cover for the cadet program. As a matter of fact the cadets corporate account, you probably see 150 million but there's about 180 million dollars spent annually and that doesn't really count the many millions of dollars that are raised by the parents and the leagues and all the groups that are involved in the cadet program. Whether we do some internal adjustments to the Chief Reserves Organization perhaps, it certainly doesn't like it's going to leave the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff and he's the guy that controls the resources and makes sure that nobody messes with the money and is obviously senior enough to indicate to everybody in the cadet organization that there's going to be somebody at that rank as the go to person to make sure the cadets get the support they need. So it's one of those things that I think I said earlier about CF transformation that you don't want to break things that aren't broken.

This thing is absolutely world class and all we want to do is try and enhance and support it and, you know, it isn't just the cadets, it's also the junior Canadian ranger program up in the Arctic. All of those ranger patrols that I've showed you, many many many of those patrols have junior ranger programs which is like an aboriginal cadet program but aligned to the culture that's there.

Hugely successful, huge impact on the communities in the north. So I thank you for your comments and I want to reassure you that that's where we're going.

General Ervaire: Thank you. My apologies.

Question: It's okay, thanks. My name is David Debent from the University of Ottawa and I'm working on a book on Canada-US relations across its various dimensions, one of them being the military dimension of which I don't have any particular expertise. The creation of the Canada Command and the Expeditionary Command, how can we understand if we're trying to explain to fellow Canadians the creation of those two commands vis-à-vis our relationship with the Americans in this domain of our Canada-US relationship, the military domain. What do those two commands mean, how has it changed the way the military works with the Americans both abroad and in Canada and in North America. Thanks.

J.Y. Forcier: I'll start up this time I guess. The relationship from my perspective at my level is clearly the day to day operation issue. So certainly National Defence headquarters works with the Pentagon. Of course we have a unique relationship in this country where we have the Permanent Joint of Defence, that's been there for decades which provides top cover as well for larger Canada-US military discussions and sub-set called the Military Cooperation Committee. In fact that body has been strengthening since 9-11, those two bodies have been strengthening since 9-11 and all anticipation is that as we work our way through final steps of transformation they will be strengthened in their capacity as well. That national to national relationship discusses major policy issues, how one government supports the other maybe on a mission where Mike may be deploying troops but where we're down to is working at the committee level. So when we're down to the plans of common defence plan, common civil assistance plan, responding to a crisis on a border, in my case on a border event certainly that's the level at which we operate.

It doesn't mean that I keep my colleagues from National Defence headquarters in the dark. They are aware of what I'm doing at the operational level but we are more responsive, we're more the quick response organization and we are literally talking every day. In fact I'll go beyond this, we are in my command center on the chat line with folks from Colorado 24 hours a day. The information that flows inside North Com on their arising of issues that may affect us and vice versa, our watch standers are actually exchanging information in case the issue requires bi-national consideration here on the developing crisis. So that's the level that we're working at. Mike I don't know if you want to add anything else from your perspective?

Michel Gauthier: A couple of other thoughts, in terms of how we explain to Canadians how this might benefit the Canada-US relationship if I understood that part correctly, clearly if we're able to achieve greater strategic effect, if we're able to make a more meaningful contribution in operations overseas in places where we're working alongside our American friends or we're in a place where we're able to do this and therefore that relieves the pressure on them, that's got to be good from their perspective. Clearly if we're doing something that enhances our operational effectiveness, makes us more credible and makes us, it leads to us being perceived to be more reliable. The other aspect I would throw out is this layering of headquarters is actually consistent with the layering of headquarters in the US as well as in UK as well as in Australia where there's a separation between the strategic level and the operational level and therefore for operations Afghanistan for instance there's a better fit between my headquarters, CEF Com and SEN Com in a direct relationship whereas the connection for NDHQ is with the Pentagon. So in that sense also I think it's something that will enable inter-operability and therefore success on operations.

General Ervaire: Thank you. Our two final questions please. Luke?

Question: Thank you. I'm one of those uneasy feeling dinosaurs who sits here and watches a whole new construct unfolding. I have every confidence that you'll get there but we've been to

some of these places before. I have a question for each of you in turn because they maybe raise a little bit our comfort level. The first one I think Colonel Jeffrey asked the same, I'll just be a bit more specific.

Could you kind of walk us through a tailor-made taskforce and the issue of preparation of rules of engagement, national command authority, transfer of command and who are the players in this with respect to, I guess I'm going from a premise and I may be wrong in my premise that the three services still organize, train and equip their folks and provide them to you for employment and that they're responsible for generation and sustainment and that's why I ask the question about national command given the old construct and this is quite new. Similarly, if you'd weave into your answers what would happen in an aid or assistance to civil authorities operation or an armed assistance operation and again where the national entity fits in between NDHQ and yourself and thirdly in Canada Command, who is going to look at and execute and change the hundreds of MOU's that exist between other government departments and Defence and with our national allies internationally as well and I haven't forgotten you General Petras. What about the SRR, is that going to be revitalized?

General Evraire: Thanks Luke. Go ahead.

Michel Gauthier: (Laughter) Thanks very much for that I think. (Laughter)

J.Y. Forcier: We're no longer on the clock obviously. (Laughter)

Michel Gauthier: Yeah, that's right. On the specific question of train and equip, clearly in a strategic sense that is a service responsibility. There are three principal force generators, the commander of the army, the commander of the navy, the commander of the air force and I don't know that that's going to change any time soon. The dilemma we face is that there isn't enough time, there isn't enough money to make sure that, to allow the training and the specific preparation for an operational theater to be done in a linear and sequential manner so that you walk through all of the basic army stuff for instance according to long published battle task standards and then you build on that after all of that training's been done with all of the money that that calls up to then go through a mission specific.

The reality is that the training has to be done, all that training has to be done virtually at the same time and so I think the service commanders will always have the lead in that process, in the force generation process. I, in fact the words that I've used as recently as last week are that I need to be as a force employer influential at the earliest stages of the process and I also have to have some level of control at the output end and therefore some say in certifying forces to say yes they are ready for the purpose that I say they are needed for as the force employer and everything in between. I mean 90% of that is force generator and quite frankly even the evaluation certification piece may well be done, provided by the army but with me or folks from my organization participating in that process.

I don't see that as a huge issue and as I say I've spent a lot of time discussing this with the commander of the army, I've spent a lot of time discussing with the army's chief trainer and we see a way ahead here and there's not been a lot of, certainly at our level, a lot of worry over whose turf is whose and whether we were going to be stepping on each other's toes. It's still early days and undoubtedly there will be some of that in the future but there has not been a lot of that thus far. The same sort of answer I guess to the question of who's responsible for what in a strategic versus operational sense as opposed to a service to joint sense and I'm sure the Admiral will have a lot more to say about this. I think we're still finding our way there. It's the 24th of February.

We started this on the 1st of February. Now some things are very clearly, ROE for instance, CDS is the person empowered with the ROE question and he is able to authorize use of force down a chain but ultimately he is the individual who makes those judgements at the top end. There are many different areas where we will find our way over time I think. I will say freely that inside the guts of CEF Com and probably in, maybe not but perhaps inside the guts of Canada Com as well as the strategic joint staff it might not be a real pretty picture on any given day but it's getting clear with every day that passes and we'll get there. I'm very optimistic about this.

J.Y. Forcier: Just quickly, the layers of obviously responsibility is probably slightly different in my domain than CEF Com. He obviously focuses on mounting a mission. As we know even in an urgent mission overseas it is weeks to mount this up. I'm playing in an interface to operational to tactical safe ..inaudible.. this afternoon. So a lot of my delegated instruments are a little more robust if I can put it that way. The Chief is comfortable with an approach that a three-star commander should be able to make some decisions based on his commander's intent and in some cases some very specific direction. So I have a menu if you can call it that of scenarios where he's very comfortable in me moving aggressively, never will I can him in the dark but at the same time I have, I guess as you heard in my presentation my joint taskforce commanders have the authority today to respond to emergencies in their AOR for humanitarian needs.

When we cross of course, and you hinted at that, at the assistance to law enforcement, of course we can't cross the line, we don't have any requests from, you know, the Public Securities Minister to our Minister to ask. However I can tell you that as that request is being formulated, I already know what the question is and my people are already working the options and in some cases I may even pre-deploy troops around in anticipation to the response because I have that freedom of action. Didn't exist before so the level of nosiness as I called it in my presentation is there and so our anticipation is much more tuned than it was before. Rules of engagement, we can't go into specifics but once again the boss has said J.Y. talk scenarios to me. So we describe scenarios and he says you have it, this, this, this pre-authorized.

So I don't go up to him and say boss I wish to do this. I'm issuing rules of engagement on his behalf but we're really saving a lot of time and he's putting trust at an operational commander because we keep reminding ourselves and this is the big paradigm shift even I have to take some time and my staff, you know. Mike may have a large operation in Bosnia. My Bosnia is Canada every day so I have to start being a little bit more aggressive on having my intelligence, my awareness, my posturing, my what ifing every day so it's a little different. The last thing point you mentioned is MOU Luke. God, I had lawyers working on this for 8 months already. Most of it we got around by having some of the MOU's have some wonderful words in there. The Chief of Defence Staff or his delegated authority, I'm it and he put it in writing. So we got around several of the MOU's that way. So RCMP asking direct involvement on some preliminary plans, blah blah blah, it's me. So the rest of it I'm going to keep lawyers busy for a while re-writing the rest of them. (Laughter)

General Evraire: Herb?

Herb Petras: Right, thanks. I can answer the SCRR in a word, yes it's going to get fixed. The sceptics then say talking about it for 10 years, right. The SCRR for those who may not know the term, Supplementary Reserve, people that retire or leave the forces can transfer to the supplementary reserve and then be recalled at a later time for temporary duty or into a permanent position. It's bubbling along right now in the Chief of Personnel, the HR Miller organization. They have a clerk there who kind of keeps track of it but it's really just the list and nothing more and they were trying to clean out. A few years ago I think we had several people who deceased that were still on the list. Now we think that virtually everybody on the list is alive. I've put a marker (laughter) I wasn't going to check that personally (laughter) I put a marker down, we're currently taking a look and I think I mentioned when I was talking about cadets, we're looking at the chief reserves in cadets organization.

When the CDS talks about principle six about integrating regular and reserve, one of the things he said at a CDS seminar of general officers last year was that, he pointed to me and he said I don't want Herb Petras, we were just talking about the chief reverses whoever that will be, to not just be an advisor or to run the cadet program. I want it to be a doer and a worker that has to respect time available that the individual can contribute but the organization can certainly pick up other things and so I've been saying that we put a marker down and perhaps the SRR would make some sense to be managed out of the Chief of Reserves and Cadets organization to be able to get a grip on it and perhaps regionalize it so that Canada Command can access it a heck of a lot better than we do now. So more traffic to follow on that one.

General Evraire: Thank you Herb. Do you really want to ask your question?

Question: Actually I have two of them.

General Evraire: Quickly.

Question: I'll be like General C.. who gets three in.

General Evraire: Quickly please.

Question: First of all last month I had a brigade safety officer come out to my museum to visit and look at the situation and I was quite surprised that here was a full-time brigade safety officer in a job that I told ..inaudible.. to do as staff officer 25 years ago as a secondary duty and was quite amazed that they had enough time to put a full-time civilian personnel on that. So I thought oh there's 10 people across Canada if you've done it in one brigade you've probably done it in all of them.

And secondly last year we announced we were putting one civilian clerk into each reserve unit or grouping some of them and there was another 96 civilian personnel being put into reserve units. At the same time we're going through this ARE review and we're sitting there trying to figure out how we can get rid of commanding officers, chief warrant officers, senior NCO's by putting units together and my point is that I think we're adding infrastructure at the expense of soldiers and trainers and supervisors. So it always seems that infrastructure grows and we suffer on the other end, the soldier part. Maybe you could take that back to, you know, the discussions you're having with the commander of the army and your reserve input on that. Secondly, for you too General Petras was the reserve retirement pension plan. I heard a bit of a briefing at my unit a few months ago. It appears that it's slipped about a year during transformation, we were talking about accountability and reserve initiatives. Who's being held accountable for that one slipping and are they still in the job?

Herb Petras: First of all thanks for your other comments, duly noted and you never want to get into the stage where you're building organizations and things that are going to detract from putting soldiers on the ground, reservists on the ground. That's, I think that's pretty clear. The pension slipped for a year for a ridiculously innocuous reason had to do with the kind of computer program that was being used in trying to merge it with the regular and quite frankly the people who were running that particular program (laughter) you know I could go into a long winded explanation but the bottom line is that there are no contractors around who are actually, there was only one who was authorized to work or had the capability to work in that particular computer program and the government rules had indicated that you had to go out for tender and so they go for tender and come back and there was a huge delay.

But all that to say is that the pension is slipping till March of '07 but the caveats that have been put in is that anybody who's serving because the announcement was that it was going to come into effect on the 1st January '06, anyone who's serving at that particular point will go on the

supplementary reserve regardless of the age and nobody will be serving past 60 anyway but SRR you can be on it until you're 65. So they're going to supple reserve, when the pension comes into force administratively those people will be called back for a day to be able to start drawing their pension should they wish to do that and quite frankly we're taking a look at which options are better. The retirement gratuity is going to stick around for a while, the pension is going to be a good thing. They tell me that by November or December they'll have enough information on the website for you to be able to actually look at the retirement gratuity and the pension to see which one makes most sense for your circumstance.

General Evraire: Thank you Herb. How things have changed. Fifteen years ago I remember that the Deputy Minister thought that he could issue ROE's. Things have changed in the right direction I suspect. And in addition, may I point out that I see in the presentations we've received today many very positive developments, one of which happens to do with something the CDA's been trying to convince people about for a long time. I see as a result for instance of the standing up of Canada Command an involvement for a much more visible and pro-active involvement of other stakeholders, all levels of government, federal, provincial, municipal, when we're talking about Canada Command, all of the central agencies and the major interested departments at the level of our international involvement. A permanent or semi-permanent national emergency response organization rather than an ad hoc thing that responds after the fact as opposed to pro-actively, hey, this is a real turn in the right direction and so allow me to on your behalf thank our three speakers this afternoon for again spellbinding us.

I think it is very interesting to hear all of this and we have information to go back to our various groups and talk in the most positive way and probably or possibly generate interest in the whole recruiting scheme that the forces are obviously about to put in place. Gentlemen, thank you very much. Allow me to offer you a book. We're talking about David Burkerson's book here, ..inaudible.. on Christmas in Washington. Thank you very much for being with us this afternoon. (Applause) Well we're 25 minutes over time so sue me. (Laughter) I think it was worthwhile going beyond the time that we expected to be done and I solved the problem additionally by cutting the last hour to 30 minutes so we're back on track already. I would ask you to re-assemble in 5 minutes in the room here all of those members, representatives of various CDA associations for a closed session the final portion of the annual general meeting, 5 minutes. Thank you very much indeed.